Asia & the Pacific

The Project on Managing the Atom offers fellowships for pre-doctoral, post-doctoral, and mid-career researchers for one year, with a possibility for renewal, in the stimulating environment of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. The online application for 2016-2017 fellowships opened December 15, 2015, and the application deadline is January 15, 2016. Recommendation letters are due by February 1, 2016.

As the policy community prepares to assess an agreement between the U.S. and its P5+1 partners and Iran, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker asked me to review the history of analogous agreements for lessons that illuminate the current challenge. In response to his assignment, I reviewed the seven decades of the nuclear era, during which the U.S. negotiated arms-control treaties, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968; strategic arms limitation talks and agreements from SALT to New Start; the North Korean accord of 1994; the agreements that helped eliminate nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in the early 1990s; and the pact that eliminated the Libyan nuclear weapons program in 2003.

Among many lessons and clues from this instructive history, five stand out

"At the UN today, this year’s Review Conference will conclude its assessment of the performance of member-states that signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which became international law in 1970," Graham Allison writes. "Among the central issues the parties debated was whether the United States and Russia have been fulfilling their commitments under the treaty."

Allison points out that the U.S. arsenal has been cut by more than 80 percent by 1970, and the Soviet arsenal has been reduced proportionally. "The NPT and the norms it has established help ensure a more secure future for us all," he writes.

The ninth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held at the UN Headquarters in New York from April 27-May 22, 2015. This is the fourth such conference since the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Participating governments will discuss nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy with a view to arriving at consensus on a number of issues.

Washington Post Opinion Writer and Senior Fellow with the Future of Diplomacy Project, David Ignatius, delivered an address entitled “Covering the Obama Administration in the Fog of Foreign Policy” and led a breakfast seminar with experts, students, and fellows on September 18. He explored current trends in the Middle East, critical factors at play in the negotiations with Iran, the West’s relationship with Russia and positive developments in the US-China relationship.

At 6:00 PM on November 20, 2014, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General Emeritus of the International Atomic Energy Agency, gave the Robert McNamara Lecture on War and Peace in the John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum. Dr. ElBaradei spoke of the perils of poverty and income inequality in the modern world as they relate to nuclear security, mentioning the collective nuclear security problems that many impoverished third world nations may pose. The Forum was co-sponsored by The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and was moderated by its Director, Graham Allison.

Robert McNamara (1916–2009) was the Secretary of Defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. He later served as President of The World Bank. McNamara Lecture speakers address the prevention of conflict, weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear terrorism.

On October 15, 2014, Matthew Bunn presented "Strengthening Nuclear Security Through Bilateral Cooperation: What Next?" for the Stanley Foundation "Strategy for Peace" Conference in Washington, D.C.

Amidst intense negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Vienna on Iran's nuclear program, Professor Matthew Bunn was interviewed for a July 14 article in the Tehran Times about what a comprehensive agreement would look like and how the two sides of the dispute should approach the talks to obtain significant and substantive results.

In trying to prevent adversaries from acquiring new military capabilities, countries often employ strategies of arms denial; e.g., “unilateral diplomacy,” supply chain interdiction, covert sabotage, and targeted military strikes. Using a game-theoretical model of weapons acquisition and denial, the authors posit that the prevalence of this approach gives rise to strategic effects that affect all players’ behavior.