Asia & the Pacific

Instead of trying to command maritime East Asia, the United States should focus on helping China’s neighbors deny China sea and air control in the region.

This policy brief is based on "Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia," which appears in the summer 2016 issue of International Security.

This analysis suggests that the United States will continue to face difficult trade-offs in its Taiwan Strait policy. On the one hand, the United States should not—as some prominent analysts have suggested—scale back its commitment to Taiwan. Such a change in U.S. policy would accelerate the shifting balance of power in the strait, thereby magnifying the risk of armed conflict between the PRC and Taiwan. On the other hand, Washington must continue to tread cautiously on the Taiwan issue. The fact remains that many in China care deeply about Taiwan.

China's continuing commitment to a nuclear strategy of assured retaliation indicates that it will prioritize avoiding a nuclear arms race with the United States. Nevertheless, leaders and militaries in both countries will need to be exceptionally careful to avoid nuclear escalation in a crisis.

A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy toward China. Unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of U.S. policy. When uncertain about a state's motives and goals, a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies.

Given the nature of intentions, there is little Washington and Beijing will be able to do or say to persuade the other side that it has and will always have peaceful intentions. In tomorrow's Asia, great power conflict is destiny.

Information technology has generated tremendous wealth and innovation for millions, underwriting the United States' preponderance as well as China's meteoric rise. The costs of cyber espionage and harassment pale beside the mutual benefits of an interdependent, globalized economy. The inevitable frictions of cyberspace are not a harbinger of catastrophe to come, but rather a sign that the states inflicting them lack incentives to cause any real harm. Exaggerated fears of cyberwarfare or an erosion of the United States' competitive advantage must not be allowed to undermine the institutions and architectures that make the digital commons so productive.