Asia & the Pacific

David Kearn argues that even in the absence of restrictive resource and budgetary constraints, a focus on identifying and achieving concrete objectives that will position the United States and its allies to effectively deter aggression in critical regional flashpoints should be the priority given the stressed nature of the defense industrial base and the nuclear enterprise.

Power transitions affect a state’s ability to exercise economic statecraft. As a dominating and a rising power approach parity, they face structural incentives to decouple their economies. This decoupling affects business-state relations: high-value businesses within the dominant power tend to oppose their state’s economic statecraft because of its costs to them, whereas low-value businesses within the rising power tend to cooperate because they gain from it. 

For many, integrating “decarbonization” into public policy, corporate and financial strategies has become a requirement, not an option — yet, what happens when the critical link between climate stability and decarbonization breaks?

Joseph Nye analyzes why the Cold War metaphor in relation to  the U.S. and China, although convenient, is lazy and potentially dangerous. It obscures and misleads us by underestimating the real challenge we face — and offering ineffective strategies.

The success of U.S. President Joe Biden's China policy will depend on whether the two powers can cooperate in producing global public goods, while competing in other areas. The U.S.-China relationship is a "cooperative rivalry," in which the terms of competition will require equal attention to both sides of the oxymoron.  Joseph Nye argues that it will not be easy.

Thucydides attributed the war that ripped apart the ancient Greek world to two causes: the rise of Athenian power—and the fear that this created in the established power, Sparta. Joseph Nye advises that in order to prevent a new cold or hot war, the United States and China must avoid exaggerated fears and misperceptions about changing power relations.

Stephen Walt looks back at the Trump administration as four years of big ambitions, a handful of successes—and many more failures. He concludes that it was more than a missed opportunity because Trump's blunders have left the United States in much worse shape than when he took office. 

Stephen Walt describes how the United States' rise was fueled by fortunate circumstances that seem unlikely to last much longer. He lists four reasons why the country's luck just might be running out.

Stephen Walt elaborates on what to expect from the next four years, regardless of who wins the vote.

Stephan Walt writes that Trump's foreign-policy instincts might be more sound—but he has forfeited the chance to lead.