Asia & the Pacific

In view of the aggravated conflicts in other regions that include Russia as the largest Arctic state, and China as its strategic partner, an understanding of China’s opportunities to affect Arctic affairs is urgently needed. Kobzeva and Todorov use a regime theory approach to outline the Arctic regime complex (ARC) and determine China’s actual potential for making amendments to the ARC.

The Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs recently published an extensive report with a detailed analysis on the current relationship between Greenland and Iceland with 99 recommendations on how to strengthen their co-operation. Halla Hrund Logadóttir moderated the discussion.

Tongfi Kim and Andrew Taffer respond to Ketian Zhang’s summer 2019 article, “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea.”

Arctic Innovator Rumaitha Al Busaidi argues for an Arctic Plastic Partnership that could highlight the business advantage to solving the region's marine plastic crisis.

Combining decades of experience advancing frontier technologies, on the one hand, and analyzing national security decisionmaking, on the other, we have been collaborating over the past year in an effort to understand the national security implications of China’s great leap forward in artificial intelligence (AI). Our purpose in this essay is to sound an alarm over China’s rapid progress and the current prospect of it overtaking the United States in applying AI in the decade ahead; to explain why AI is for the autocracy led by the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter, the “Party”) an existential priority; to identify key unanswered questions about the dangers of an unconstrained AI arms race between the two digital superpowers; and to point to the reasons why we believe that this is a race the United States can and must win.

Henry Kissinger warns that many existing domestic and international institutions that have helped govern the past decades will not survive the Covid-19 crisis. He is surely correct.

In the context of the South China Sea, China uses coercion primarily to maintain its reputation vis-à-vis other states, but remains aware of the potential costs of its actions.

Michael C. Horowitz and Shahryar Pasandideh respond to Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli’s winter 2018/19 article, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage.”

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, China is a cautious bully that seeks to balance between the need to establish resolve and the economic cost of coercion, seen through its territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Liberal market-oriented states are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect a global order that is systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market-oriented norms and values.