Asia & the Pacific

Joseph Nye argues that episodes of "declinism" say more about popular psychology than geo-political analysis, but they also show how the idea of decline touches a raw nerve in American politics. China is not an existential threat to the United States unless U.S. leaders make it one by blundering into a major war.

Joseph Nye argues that the "one China" formula, if combined with other measures to bolster deterrence against any sudden acts of aggression, can still help to keep the peace.

Stephen Walt writes that those who favor foreign policy restraint believe the United States should trade and invest in other countries, encourage other states to do the same, and be open to managed immigration instead of building walls in a fit of xenophobia.

Stephen Walt analyzes U.S. reliance on its toolbox of coercive instruments and stubborn adherence to unreachable objectives. He concludes that both are significant obstacles to a more effective U.S. foreign policy.

Stephen Walt writes that the differences in foreign policy will be less significant than one may think. Consider how Trump and Biden would each likely deal with the three most important items on the current foreign-policy agenda: Ukraine, China, and the Middle East.

In this deeply personal book, Joseph Nye shares his own journey living through the American century.

Although China's motives for developing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have been well studied, scholars have yet to comprehensively examine why states seek to join the initiative. The authors fill this gap by examining how and why states join the BRI. Countries join by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China on cooperation under the BRI framework.

In the Henty Mance interview, Joseph Nye, who coined term 'soft power,' says that the turmoil facing the United States and Harvard was worse in the 1960s.

Joseph Nye argues that while former US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping each played important roles in ending Sino-American engagement, the death of the policy started with the 2008 global financial crisis. That is when Chinese elites concluded that America was in decline, and that China need no longer bide its time.

Stephen Walt argues that Henry Kissinger's concerns about the destabilizing impact of ideas made him hypersensitive to the smallest perturbations in strategically marginal countries and inclined him to overreact to them in ways that other realists opposed.