Asia & the Pacific

Stephen Walt argues for greater foreign-policy restraint by the United States: U.S. foreign policy would be more successful if it did less but did the vital things well.

Fredrik Logevall describes the legacy of the Paris Peace Accords, which effectively put an end to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, as the 50th anniversary of the accords nears.

Mina Pollmann details how the Japanese prime minister's U.S. visit, and the latest 2+2 consultations, emphasized an even-closer alliance amid Japan's changing security posture.

 Stephen Walt decided to look back to see if 2022 had gone according to his expectations. In his last column of 2021, he had described "Biden’s 2022 Foreign-Policy To-Do List." What did he get right, what did he get wrong, and how well did the Biden administration perform?

Joseph Nye writes that neither the war in Ukraine nor the Chinese Communist Party's increasingly turn to nationalism and “wolf warrior” diplomacy looks promising for effective diplomacy in 2023.

Joseph Nye explains why, for five decades, both China and the United States benefited from the time they had bought on the question of the island's status. To prevent what is currently a managed competition from spiraling out of control, the United States should take careful but clear steps to strengthen its longstanding policy of "double deterrence."

Stephen Walt posits that realists recognize that evil acts occur and that some states behave worse than others, but they also understand that all states compete for security in an imperfect world and that no country's conduct is beyond reproach. 

This article examines the trilateral relations between Russia, China, and Iran through their engagement in various issues from domestic, regional, and international levels. It explores the practices and coordination between Russia, China, and Iran in the international order, the Iranian Nuclear Program, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, domestic regime security, and economic connectivity. The article concludes that although Russia, China, and Iran have had overlapping interests and approaches in terms of contesting the Western created and dominated international "liberal" order, strengthening domestic regime security, defending authoritarian governance, and supporting de-dollarization, all of which have brought the three sides closer, a Russia–China-Iran axis has not thus far materialized. Rather, due to the lack of regularized and institutionalized mechanisms, the tripartite relationship remains an illusory entente, which is essentially driven by the bilateral ties followed by modest trilateral coordination in ad-hoc situations.

States frequently acquire proof that other states have violated norms. Yet, existing theories do not fully explain how states wield such proof to coerce wrongdoers. Four case studies of nuclear proliferation probe a novel theory of how states coerce norm violators by concealing, sharing privately, or publicizing proof of guilt.

Wedge strategy theory explains how states use strategic arms control to divide adversaries by affecting their trust, threat perceptions, and beliefs about a commitment’s trade-offs. Examining three landmark arms control negotiations shows how the wedge motive was a key component to these negotiations.