Middle East & North Africa

18 Items

Displaced Ethiopians from different towns in the Amhara region wait for food to be distributed at lunchtime at a center for the internally-displaced in Debark, in the Amhara region of northern Ethiopia

AP Photo/Mulugeta Ayene

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Women in Public Policy Program, Harvard Kennedy School

SVAC Explainer: Wartime Sexual Violence in Tigray, Ethiopia, 2020–2021

| March 2023

The Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC)dataset measures reports of the conflict-related sexual violence committed by armed actors during the years 1989–2021. The dataset includes information about the prevalence, perpetrators, and forms of the reported sexual violence by each armed actor in each conflict-year. The information used to compile these data comes from three sources: the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. 

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

Wikimedia Commons

Policy Brief - Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Iran Stockpiling Uranium Far Above Current Needs

| January 10, 2017

In a televised speech on January 1, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Tehran had imported 200 metric tons of yellowcake uranium and would import another 120 tons at an unspecified future date. The imports are permitted by the nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but nonetheless significantly exceed Iran’s needs for natural (that is, unenriched) uranium over the next 15 years. Iran’s import of such high levels of uranium suggests it may be stockpiling uranium to reach nuclear breakout before the deal’s initial limitations expire in 2031.

The JCPOA permits Iran to buy natural uranium to “replenish” its stocks as it sells enriched uranium on the international market. To date, Iran has had difficulties locating a buyer for its enriched uranium stocks – unsurprising, given the current excess of commercially available enriched uranium. This, however, has not stopped Iran from buying and stockpiling more yellowcake.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry delivers a statement on the Iran talks deal at the Vienna International Center in Vienna, Austria Tuesday July 14, 2015.

(AP Photo)

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Elements of the Iran Nuclear Deal

| July 15, 2015

The July 14, 2015 comprehensive nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) consists of the agreement itself and five technical annexes: Annex I – Nuclear-related measures; Annex 2 – Sanctions-related commitments; Annex III- Civil Nuclear Cooperation; Annex IV – Joint Commission; and Annex V – Implementation Plan. The version issued by the EU is used here because pages and paragraphs are numbered in proper order.

This article describes the main elements of the JCPOA. In coming days, the Belfer Center plans to publish a more detailed description and assessment of the agreement.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan addressing the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), April 2000, New York, NY.

UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

Policy Brief - Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East

Possible Frameworks for Verification of a WMD/DVs Free Zone in the Middle East - The Nuclear Dimension

| August 2014

This policy brief argues that, on balance, a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone would be better off relying on IAEA verification and safeguards at the beginning. Over the medium- to longer- term, given the political will, financial, and human resources, the regional states could invest in a regional authority to build up their own capacity and thereby contribute to strengthening mutual confidence and trust.

Map of Iran Nuclear Sites

Getty Images

Testimony

Olli Heinonen's Testimony on 'Verifying Iran’s Nuclear Compliance'

| June 10, 2014

In my testimony today, I will focus on the verification aspects of elements needed in a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran, which is being negotiated as a next stage to the Joint Plan of Action concluded in Geneva on 24 November 2013. I base my remarks on the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and relevant UN Security Council resolutions in Iran, and complemented with experiences drawn, in particular from the IAEA verification activities in South Africa after its dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, Syria and North Korea.

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Why America Should Not Retrench

| March 2013

The United States' extended system of security commitments creates a set of institutional relationships that foster political communication. Alliance institutions are first about security protection, but they also bind states together and create institutional channels of communication. For example, NATO has facilitated ties and associated institutions that increase the ability of the United States and Europe to talk to each other and to do business. Likewise, the bilateral alliances in East Asia also play a communication role beyond narrow security issues. Consultations and exchanges spill over into other policy areas. This gives the United States the capacity to work across issue areas, using assets and bargaining chips in one area to make progress in another.

Gen. David Petraeus, left, coalition forces commander in Afghanistan, and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates at his arrival in Kabul, Mar. 7, 2011. Gates began a 2-day visit to gauge war progress as the Obama administration ponders troop level reductions

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Resurrecting Retrenchment: The Grand Strategic Consequences of U.S. Decline

| May 2011

"Husbanding resources is simply sensible. In the competitive game of power politics, states must unsentimentally realign means with ends or be punished for their profligacy. Attempts to maintain policies advanced when U.S. relative power was greater are outdated, unfounded, and imprudent. Retrenchment policies—greater burden sharing with allies, less military spending, and less involvement in militarized disputes—hold the most promise for arresting and reversing decline."

This Sept. 26, 2009 satellite file image shows a facility under construction inside a mountain located about 20 miles north northeast of Qom, Iran.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal

| November 2009

"Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."