Middle East & North Africa

Before trashing the Iran deal — the agreement inked last fall, which limits Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief — the incoming Trump administration should consider how a policy of soft economic engagement with Tehran could provide Washington with strategic leverage and increased bargaining power in a post-Iran deal world.

Throughout his campaign, now President-elect Trump attacked the Iran deal, claiming that “it will go down in history as one of the worst deals ever negotiated.” The future of the deal now seems to be far less certain, as Trump fills key positions with outspoken critics of the agreement. Congressman Mike Pompeo (R-KS), Trump’s recent pick for CIA director, is well-known for his hardline stance on the deal, recently noting that it should be “rolled back.”

In June, the Financial Action Task Force, which is an inter-governmental body responsible for setting global anti-money laundering standards, issued its quarterly public statement on high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. Somewhat surprisingly, FATF suspended its call for member states to employ countermeasures against Iran for a period of twelve months. Since 2008, FATF has called for states to apply enhanced due diligence and counter-measures against Iran in order to “protect the international financial system from the on-going and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing risks” emanating from Iran.

One of the arguments for the Iran nuclear deal was that it would encourage greater openness and investment from the West. But Iranian hard-liners have been working in recent months to sabotage the proponents of economic globalization and change.

Opponents of the Iran nuclear deal are understandably frustrated. While they urge the U.S. Congress to reject the agreement negotiated by the United States, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran, and endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council, they have been unable to identify a plausible alternative that would better serve the national security interests of the United States and our allies and friends. What alternatives, whether feasible or not, have been offered, and how do they compare to endorsing the pact that is currently being considered by Congress?

In making the case for his nuclear-arms-control deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran, President Obama has confronted Congress with a stark choice. "There really are only two alternatives here," he declared at last week's press conference. "Either the issue of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is resolved diplomatically through a negotiation or it's resolved through force, through war."

This binary argument is so central to his administration's case that the president provided a second formulation: Without the deal, he said, "we risk even more war in the Middle East, and other countries in the region would feel compelled to pursue their own nuclear programs, threatening a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world."

Much of the immediate commentary on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between the P5+1 and Iran on July 14 focused on the deal’s details as well as its many shortcomings. Most of these reactions, both favoring and opposing the agreement, focused on elements of the nuclear package itself.

"The breathtaking intensity and variety of speculation on the future of the Middle East that were sparked by the signing of the nuclear technology/sanctions agreement this week between Iran and the P5+1 powers has revolved around a few key issues. Is Iran a threat to the Arab world because of its “hegemonic” aims, as some Arab states believe? Will its increased power and influence in the wake of this accord be used to “destabilize” the region? Will the United States slowly make Iran a major regional ally and recalibrate somewhat its relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and Egypt? Will the devious Iranians cheat during the years of the accord, and then sprint to build a nuclear bomb in its wake?"

The latest sticking point in nuclear negotiations with Iran has little to do with the issues that have captivated attention in Washington—centrifuges, uranium stockpile and inspections of military sites. Instead, it has focused on the intricacies of sanctions: the Iranian delegation has demanded that a United Nations embargo on conventional weapons and ballistic missiles be lifted. While the United States rejects such a concession, the Russians have reportedly broken ranks and support Iran’s position.

Diplomats are extending Iran nuclear negotiations into overtime this week, and American lawmakers are preparing for mandatory congressional review. As they decide whether to vote yes or no on a possible deal, they should remember the sage advice of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who observed that the “most common form of human stupidity is forgetting what one is trying to do.” I have a framed version of that quotation in my office and try to think about it every day.

In the case of Iran’s nuclear program, what is the U.S. trying to do? In a sentence: “Stop Iran verifiably and interruptibly short of a nuclear bomb.” No agreement, no airstrike, and no other option anyone has identified can give 100 percent assurance that Iran will not acquire a bomb. The U.S. does not have 100 percent confidence today that Iran has not already built a bomb, or bought a weapon from North Korea (from whom it has certainly purchased missiles). The question members of Congress must answer is whether the deal the U.S. and its P5+1 partners have negotiated is more likely to prevent Iran’s acquiring a bomb for the lifetime of the agreement than any feasible alternative.