Middle East & North Africa

In the cyber arena, the same technologies that are creating unprecedented benefits for billions are also democratizing destruction. Graham Allison reviews ‘The Virtual Weapon and International Order’ by Lucas Kello.

When Ben Buchanan received his first computer 17 years ago, he could not have known that the technical skills he acquired would prove vital to understanding today's cybersecurity dilemma.

Regardless of the innovations that lie ahead, technology by itself will neither doom nor rescue the world. Responsibility for our fate, for better or worse, will remain stubbornly human.

This policy brief is based on “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Concepts, Causes, and Assessment,” which appears in the winter 2016/17 issue of International Security.

Does cyberspace favor the offense, as many analysts and policymakers claim? Three factors undermine any cyber offensive advantage, as demonstrated in a cost-benefit analysis of the Stuxnet operation against Iran. First, any measurement of the offense-defense balance must consider a cyber operation’s value as well as its cost to both sides. Second, organizational capabilities play a significant role in determining the balance. Third, offensive advantages decline when attackers target physical infrastructure rather than information networks.

Fifty-plus countries are attending the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit this week in Washington, DC. Notably missing from the guest list is Iran, whose recent negotiation and implementation of a landmark nuclear deal with the P5+1 led some experts to call for more engagement and cooperation in nuclear security.

With the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) now over, policymakers are thinking about next steps to address nuclear security. The NSS process has progressed since its first installment in 2010; yet, the Middle East, a key region where nuclear security is of tremendous importance, remains underrepresented.