Middle East & North Africa

The human tragedy continuing to unfold in Gaza and Israel reminds us how important it is to get strategic forecasting right. While in no way excusing Hamas’ culpability for 7 October, we also cannot dismiss the fact that the failure to anticipate and prepare for such an attack has had grave consequences for communities on both sides of this conflict, undermined efforts to bring peace and prosperity to the region, and affected global interests through the expansion of the conflict to the Red Sea and potentially beyond. 

The paper argues for putting aside the old rentier state paradigm that has long dominated Gulf literature, considering the emergence of both the Gulf Moment and the United Arab Emirates Momentum (henceforth UAE Momentum). Instead, it offers a novel analytical concept of the Khaleeji state, incorporating both the exceptionalist and normalist approaches to Gulf studies. The Khaleeji state is also a way to comprehend the unfolding of the Gulf Moment. The term Gulf Moment indicates the profound influence that the Arab Gulf States (AGS) maintain over the rest of the Arab world at the turn of the twenty-first century. The UAE momentum is currently the main engine of the Gulf Moment.

Prior to October 7, 2023, the defining feature of Israeli foreign policy was the drive to normalize ties with Arab states, thereby "shrinking” the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and assembling Iran's rivals into a broad regional coalition. Despite the endurance of interests that made such a pursuit desirable, the most lucrative selling point of normalization—the ability to develop it into a diplomatic construct with which to contain Iran—had already expired prior to October 7, along with the essential contextual condition for such a deal: broad US support. Rather, the "Age of Normalizations," a period in which diplomatic normalization could feasibly serve as the kernel of Israeli strategy, expired in late 2021 as a consequence of the Biden administration's volte-face in the Middle East.

Dozens of in-depth interviews in Lebanon after its civil war show how wartime displacement transformed localities in ways that transcend religious identity. With more than 80,000 people displaced from southern Lebanon because of fighting since October 7, 2023, the Israel-Gaza war is likely to strengthen Hezbollah’s grip when the displaced populations return and in localities in south Lebanon where displaced populations settle. 

Christopher Darnton responds to Rachel Metz's Winter 2022/23 article, "The Cult of the Persuasive: Why U.S. Security Assistance Fails."

Over the past few months, much has been said about the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, some of it strikingly shallow and misinformed, with recent op-eds characterising it as a “rivalry” or a “rift”, and one going as far as calling it a “theatre of confrontation” as though their relations are a zero-sum game. Such alarmism led me to wonder if we were even discussing the same two countries.

Jacqueline L. Hazelton's Bullets not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare (Cornell University Press, 2021)is the subject of a Roundtable Review.

In this Q&A, Joseph S. Nye talks about his advice for the interim and future president of Harvard in the wake of Claudine Gay's resignation, which countries should be highest on our radar to prevent the threat of nuclear war, what role the U.S. should play in the Russia-Ukraine war, the significance of U.S. alliances in the Middle East, and more.

As of early January 2024, discussion of the Gaza war heavily focuses on its humanitarian costs, cease fire possibilities, hostage prospects, and “day after” options. Yet what longer-term strategy guides actions on these vital issues while offering a more positive vision for Israelis, Palestinians, and key regional players? This paper sketches such a vision and strategy, but far more importantly, highlights the formidable barriers to its realization—and the elements of a realistic path to overcoming those barriers. With old political assumptions jolted by recent events, an opening exists for a new and better regional reality to take shape.

In an interview with Nada Ramadan Ahmed, North Africa Analyst with MEES magazine, she quotes Marina Lorenzini on the topic of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in Egypt: "Putin has used the Russian nuclear energy industry, through Rosatom, as a strategic export to build deep dependencies with geopolitically significant countries, such as Bangladesh, Egypt, and Turkey. So, even as times get tough in Moscow, Rosatom's foreign projects may not receive an immediate axe."

Other companies cannot necessarily replace Rosatom if needed, leaving Cairo "in a bind to negotiate with Moscow on a point-by-point basis on how to purchase and integrate new equipment. Moscow will likely not welcome such a move, and Cairo may not have a strong enough bargaining position, especially if it's not paying its bills on time, in order to introduce non-Russian supplies on site."