Russia

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine illuminated the long profound shadow of nuclear weapons over international security. Russia's nuclear threats have rightfully garnered significant attention because of the unfathomable lethality of nuclear weapons. However, the use of such weapons in Ukraine is only one way—albeit the gravest— that Russia could challenge the global nuclear order. Russia's influence extends deep into the very fabric of this order—a system to which it is inextricably bound by Moscow's position in cornerstone institutions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). From withdrawing from key treaties to stymieing resolutions critical of misconduct, Moscow has demonstrated its ability to challenge the legitimacy, relevance, and interpretations of numerous standards and principles espoused by the West.

Calder Walton says both seek to topple the United States from atop world stage, with China's blend of money, influence, all-hands-on-deck approach posing the greater threat.

Russia's permanent UNSC membership and presidency of the Council in April 2023 in the context of the country's war in Ukraine represents a mockery of the United Nations as an institution. To better position the UN to address Russia's continued defiance of international law, the UN and the UNSC need to be reformed. Given the difficulty of long-term reform, a set of short-term tools should be employed to address Russia's disregard of the institution's mission of peace.

This year's G7 summit in Hiroshima sees nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sitting high on the agenda, amid rising tensions between the nuclear states and an increasingly divided international order.  Six contributors offer their analyses, including the Belfer Center's Mayumi Fukushima.

Stephen Walt outlines how Washington and Beijing could stop the war in Ukraine.

Stephen Walt argues for greater foreign-policy restraint by the United States: U.S. foreign policy would be more successful if it did less but did the vital things well.

Stephen Walt argues that prudent states should not assume that a norm against conquest will suffice to protect them; adequate hard power, shrewd diplomacy, and reliable allies are better—if still imperfect—guarantees.

Stephen Walt, having just returned from the Munich Security Conference, writes that what government officials are saying about the Ukraine War in public, and private, is fascinating—and full of contradictions.

Stephen Walt explains why Putin understood that Ukraine's fate was more important to Russia than it was to the West.

 Stephen Walt decided to look back to see if 2022 had gone according to his expectations. In his last column of 2021, he had described "Biden’s 2022 Foreign-Policy To-Do List." What did he get right, what did he get wrong, and how well did the Biden administration perform?