South Asia

"Nuclear proliferation is a crime that pays well. Those involved in the Khan network were made very wealthy for their efforts, and the inability of the international community to effectively punish them has resulted in a missed opportunity to provide a deterrent against future black-market salesmen."

The Winter 2010/11 issue of the Belfer Center newsletter features recent and upcoming activities, research, and analysis by members of the Center community on critical global issues. This issue highlights a major Belfer Center conference on technology and governance, the Center's involvement in the nuclear threat documentary Countdown to Zero, and a celebration of Belfer Center founder Paul Doty.

"The growing Taliban insurgency in the Afghan-Pakistan border area increasingly threatens the geography of the region. Continuation of this crisis could derail the India-Pakistan peace process, undermine democratic gains in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan, and jeopardize U.S. interests in the region.

Despite the explosive nature of the crisis and apparent consensus between the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees about the need for additional focus on the area—as well as military forces there—the popular analysis of the situation often fails to appreciate the very basic facts of the issue...."

Pakistan's Supreme Court Bar President Aitzaz Ahsan discussed what is needed to fix the country’s dire judicial situation at a seminar hosted by the Project on Managing the Atom and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

"...Besides leading to bad governance and a deplorable law and order situation in the country, police failures also have compounded the threat of religious extremism and terrorism. Poor data collection on crime and criminals and inadequate analytical capabilities hamper effective law enforcement. In many instances, banned militant organisations continued with their publications and in some cases wanted criminals, and terrorists changed their party affiliations (hurriedly joining groups that were not under government scrutiny after theirs were banned) and the police remained clueless. Here the police was also handicapped as many militant groups were producing "freedom fighters" for Kashmir and Afghanistan and had working relations with the intelligences services, and hence police officials were reluctant to go after some of these elements thinking that they might be the assets of some "other state institution." Things are reported to be progressively changing in this sphere lately, but the serious challenge remains...."

"The Pakistani Army positively contributed towards the holding of free elections on Feb 18, but it cannot be expected to do the job of law enforcement endlessly. Dependence on the military for such tasks ultimately persuades its leadership to increase the army’s involvement in the political domain, and in the process that follows such thinking, Pakistan loses many years. Generals like Waheed Kakar and Jahangir Karamat are rare, and given some recent developments it seems that Pakistan is lucky to have another of their kind in the form of the new chief, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. This golden opportunity should not be lost (like before) to nurture and groom civilian institutions to stand on their own feet."

"While the jury is still out on whether General Pervez Musharraf's limitations in overpowering the Taliban in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas are primarily an outcome of "incapacity" or "unwillingness" (or both), the United States has committed itself to helping Pakistan transform its Frontier Corps into an effective fighting force....Pakistan has received billions of dollars from various international donor agencies over the years for different development projects, yet sadly, in many cases, a major chunk of the funds evaporate through corruption and mismanagement. This analysis attempts to understand the structure, strengths and potential of the Frontier Corps through the lens of its history and the political dynamics of the region. It also proposes some ideas for reform of the institution and better utilization of U.S. funds."

This article examines why India walked away from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). After having spent years strongly advocating for a test ban accord, India changed course in the aftermath of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) indefinite extension in 1995, becoming the most outspoken opponent of the CTBT. This article argues that India's reversal cannot be explained by the conventional wisdom about (non-)compliance in nuclear arms control negotiations, which usually highlights the power of material interests. Since there was no development in the nuclear realm that might have compromised India's interests prior to its decision to change course, these theories fall short of explaining India's sudden opposition to the CTBT. The same holds true for the influence of norms. This article instead argues that perceived disrespect precipitated India's decision to abandon the treaty. India criticized the NPT as biased because it enforced non-proliferation without obligating the nuclear superpowers to disarm. Similarly, New Delhi believed the NPT's indefinite renewal made a mockery of a proud country's political claims.