South Asia

Former Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, a lead negotiator of the P5+1 Iran Nuclear deal and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center, talks with Aroop Mukharji (@aroopmukharji) about her place in history as the first female Undersecretary of State, Vladimir Putin’s sense of humor, and how many snacks it takes to fuel a negotiating team.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to Washington last week, making his fourth trip to the United States since taking office just two years ago. India and South Asia Program Fellow, Ronak Desai examines the strategic approach to India's relations with the United States.

As part of the India and South Asia Program’s annual speaker series, Ambassador MaleehaLodhi, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the United Nations discussed her country’s regional agenda.

When do states acquire nuclear weapons? History shows that only two types of states decide that the bomb is essential to their security: 1) very powerful states; and 2) weak states that lack ironclad security guarantees.

At first glance, the main advantage of Pakistan's new battlefield nuclear weapon—known as the Nasr missile—would appear to be its ability to slowdown and stop an armored attack by the Indian Army inside Pakistan, before it reaches vital cities. But deeper examination reveals that deploying this particular weapon on the battlefield against an advancing Indian armored column would cause substantial deaths and injuries to Pakistani citizens, rendering its purpose moot.

After decades of flirting with nuclear weapons, India finally emerged as a nuclear power in the 1990s. New evidence suggests that India was able to hold off in part because it was able to secure protection through an alternate method: implicit “umbrellas” from superpowers. In the late 1970s, however, U.S. support for India waned as it began to improve its relations with Pakistan, and India lost its other major backer with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s, India could no longer protect itself through diplomatic means, and acquisition of the bomb became an inevitable response to its security needs.

The Belfer Center's Graham Allison, Nicholas Burns, Ashraf Hegazy, Joseph S. Nye, and Stephen Walt consider the U.S.'s shifting foreign policy in the Middle East.

The Summer 2010 issue of the Belfer Center newsletter features recent and upcoming activities, research, and analysis by members of the Center community on critical global issues. This issue highlights the Belfer Center's involvement with the Nuclear Security Summit, which was organized by Center alumni Gary Samore and Laura Holgate.

India’s inability to coerce Pakistan into halting its support for insurgents in Kashmir, as well as its experience in past conflicts with Pakistan, led it to develop Cold Start—a new offensive military doctrine that will allow it to mobilize quickly and retaliate in a limited manner. Although India is far from realizing its goal, this break from a traditional defensive strategy deserves scrutiny. A history of misperception and mistrust between India and Pakistan, poor intelligence, and domestic insecurity suggests that limited war could quickly escalate to the nuclear threshold, posing a serious risk to the stability of the subcontinent and the rest of the world.

The premise of the Shiite Crescent assumes that states sharing common sectarian ties tend to form alliances and choose cooperation partners. But do they?