South Asia

In this Project on Managing the Atom Discussion Paper, Mansoor Ahmed examines India’s fissile material production capacity and the military potential of its unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle and energy program.

As India’s civilian nuclear energy program expands with the assistance of international nuclear suppliers, it creates new potential pathways to the acquisition of fissile material that could be diverted for military purposes. A key question is whether and how India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities are separated. In this discussion paper from the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom, Kalman A. Robertson and John Carlson argue that India has not established a complete and verifiable separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. The authors recommend steps for India to take under its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide assurances to all states that components of its civilian program are not contributing to the growth of its nuclear arsenal. These steps include renouncing options that would facilitate the use of safeguarded items to produce unsafeguarded nuclear material, and placing the proliferation-sensitive components of its nuclear power industry under continuous safeguards.

In the 1970s, nuclear-power boosters expected that by now nuclear power would produce perhaps 80 to 90 percent of all electrical energy globally. Today, the official high-growth projection of the Organization for Economic Co‑operation and Developments (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) estimates that nuclear power plants will generate about 20 percent of all electrical energy in 2050. Thus, nuclear power could make a significant contribution to the global electricity supply. Or it could be phased out — especially if there is another accidental or a terrorist-caused Chernobyl-scale release of radioactivity. If the spread of nuclear energy cannot be decoupled from the spread of nuclear weapons, it should be phased out.

Following more than forty years of diplomatic estrangement, the last decade has witnessed India and Israel embark on a new multidimensional "strategic partnership." What are the implications of growing ties between these two countries for India and the United States?

In recent years, India's military, diplomatic and economic energies have expanded far beyond Nehru's Non-Aligned position. But what does that mean for India, its region, and the United States?

While India and the United States have embarked on a campaign to strengthen their bilateral relations, as symbolized by the proposed US-India civilian nuclear deal, it appears as though New Delhi has similarly begun to pursue a more robust relationship with another major power: Iran. The two states have recently expanded cooperation in a number of key areas, including counterterrorism, regional stability, and energy security. What are the implications of this "New Delhi-Tehran Axis" for the United States, and how should Washington respond to growing ties between India and Iran?

Dr. Ashton B. Carter testifies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Dr. Ashton B. Carter testifies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Implications for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy of the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India

The main challenge facing India's energy sector is to increase and improve the delivery of energy services to various sections of the citizenry and the economy in an environmentally and socially acceptable manner.

The Belfer Center hosted a half-day conference on March 23, 2017, gathering a group of top-level American and Japanese academics to discuss the US-Japan alliance and the rise of China. The event was well attended by scholars and students of Harvard and nearby universities, including a large group of scholars from the US Naval War College. Other notable attendees included policy officials as well as members of the Japanese Consulate in Boston.