South Asia

3 Items

A woman rows a makeshift raft near her partially submerged house in Gagolmari village, Morigaon district, Assam, India, Tuesday, July 14, 2020.

AP

Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Increasing Access to Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems: Promoting Climate Change Adaptation in the Hindu Kush Himalayan Region

| August 2020

More than one billion residents of the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region will be at risk of exposure to increased frequency and intensity of natural hazards due to climate change and land-use changes. We recommend that HKH stakeholders work towards regional approaches to a coordinated multi-hazard early warning system.

Paper - Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Stabilizing Sino-Indian Security Relations: Managing the Strategic Rivalry After Doklam

| June 21, 2018

The paper provides a detailed analysis of the contemporary Sino-Indian conventional ground and nuclear force balances and carefully reconstructs how mutual developments in these areas are perceived by both New Delhi and Beijing.

Discussion Paper - Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center

The Three Overlapping Streams of India's Nuclear Power Programs

| April 15, 2016

As India’s civilian nuclear energy program expands with the assistance of international nuclear suppliers, it creates new potential pathways to the acquisition of fissile material that could be diverted for military purposes. A key question is whether and how India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities are separated. In this discussion paper from the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom, Kalman A. Robertson and John Carlson argue that India has not established a complete and verifiable separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. The authors recommend steps for India to take under its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide assurances to all states that components of its civilian program are not contributing to the growth of its nuclear arsenal. These steps include renouncing options that would facilitate the use of safeguarded items to produce unsafeguarded nuclear material, and placing the proliferation-sensitive components of its nuclear power industry under continuous safeguards.