South Asia

The historical record does not support the idea that nuclear energy programs increase the odds of proliferation.

Assessing the risk of nuclear attack-by-proxy turns on the question of whether a state could sponsor nuclear terrorism and remain anonymous. A leader could rationalize such an attack—and entrust terrorists with a vitally important mission—only if doing so allowed the sponsor to avoid retaliation. After all, if a leader did not care about retaliation, he or she would likely conduct a nuclear strike directly. Giving nuclear weapons to terrorists makes sense only if there is a high likelihood of remaining anonymous after the attack.

"The problem is not the quality of Pakistan's nuclear security efforts. The problem is that the standard for success is so unforgiving. In a world in which terrorists are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, there can be no breakdown in security that enables terrorists to obtain a nuclear bomb."

In recent years, India's military, diplomatic and economic energies have expanded far beyond Nehru's Non-Aligned position. But what does that mean for India, its region, and the United States?

Dr. Ashton B. Carter testifies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Dr. Ashton B. Carter testifies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Implications for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy of the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India

Dr. Ashton B. Carter testifies before the 9/11 Public Discourse Project's hearings on "The 9/11 Commission Report: The Unfinished Agenda."

Dr. Ashton B. Carter testifies before the Robb-Silberman Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Dr. Ashton B. Carter testifies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.