South Asia

NATO after Afghanistan is an organization that suffers from a certain fatigue pertaining to future stabilization challenges. NATO will not automatically cease to conduct operations after 2014, but the level of ambition will be lower. The Afghanistan experience and the failures of the light footprint approach calls for a thinking that is less liberalist "in the abstract" and more focused on provision of basic services (security, development, and governance).

"...[T]he killer was a member of the Elite Police—a unit with special training for counterterrorism operations. After the gruesome act, he handed himself over to police and proudly claimed that he did the right thing. This shows pathetic security arrangements and poor management. Some fanatics have already created a Facebook profile of the killer—an indication of divisions within society."

Pakistan has an ideal opportunity to show to India that it is fully committed to defeat terrorism in all its shapes and forms. Political rhetoric for public consumption on the subject, both in India and Pakistan, should not be allowed to disrupt honest and professional investigations of the Mumbai attacks. All other disputes between the two countries should be dealt with and tackled separately from this case and no quid pro quo arrangement or expectation should come in the way of giving an exemplary punishment to those responsible for this crime against humanity. This includes all who are to be found involved in planning, facilitating, or orchestrating the atrocity.

"This was neither the first attack on an army structure in the country nor the most deadly — but it is unprecedented given the extent of the breach of the GHQ security, the confusion that it created in its initial stage (raising concerns about the safety of army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani), and its timing vis-à-vis the planned launch of a ground military operation in South Waziristan. It could be a transformational event for the army — cementing its resolve against local militants, bridging internal divisions and forcing a review of its intelligence estimates. However, jumping to conclusions without a thorough investigation and reacting rashly based on preconceived notions would be highly counterproductive. Additionally, though Pakistan's nuclear installations are not in the immediate vicinity of GHQ, the nature of the attack raises questions about how security agencies would react if a future attack targets any of the nuclear weapons facilities."

"It is quite striking that framers of the metrics have avoided the merest mention of Pakistan-India relations as a factor in understanding which way the wind is blowing in Pakistan's security environment. While the Obama administration has every right to wish that Pakistan delink its rivalry with India in the Kashmir region from its policy towards Afghanistan (and consequently in Federally Administered Tribal Areas), one cannot ignore the prevailing ground realities."

"...[A] lot depends on the state's capacity to hold the Swat area and re-establish civilian institutions there. And, even if the state succeeds, re-asserting control over Swat will only be the first step. The Taliban is spread throughout the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. "Punjabi Taliban" militants from the fighting in Kashmir against India continue to shuttle between the Punjab heartland and the Northwest Territories, posing another serious challenge to government authority."

"The growing Taliban insurgency in the Afghan-Pakistan border area increasingly threatens the geography of the region. Continuation of this crisis could derail the India-Pakistan peace process, undermine democratic gains in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan, and jeopardize U.S. interests in the region.

Despite the explosive nature of the crisis and apparent consensus between the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees about the need for additional focus on the area—as well as military forces there—the popular analysis of the situation often fails to appreciate the very basic facts of the issue...."

"...Besides leading to bad governance and a deplorable law and order situation in the country, police failures also have compounded the threat of religious extremism and terrorism. Poor data collection on crime and criminals and inadequate analytical capabilities hamper effective law enforcement. In many instances, banned militant organisations continued with their publications and in some cases wanted criminals, and terrorists changed their party affiliations (hurriedly joining groups that were not under government scrutiny after theirs were banned) and the police remained clueless. Here the police was also handicapped as many militant groups were producing "freedom fighters" for Kashmir and Afghanistan and had working relations with the intelligences services, and hence police officials were reluctant to go after some of these elements thinking that they might be the assets of some "other state institution." Things are reported to be progressively changing in this sphere lately, but the serious challenge remains...."

"The Pakistani Army positively contributed towards the holding of free elections on Feb 18, but it cannot be expected to do the job of law enforcement endlessly. Dependence on the military for such tasks ultimately persuades its leadership to increase the army’s involvement in the political domain, and in the process that follows such thinking, Pakistan loses many years. Generals like Waheed Kakar and Jahangir Karamat are rare, and given some recent developments it seems that Pakistan is lucky to have another of their kind in the form of the new chief, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. This golden opportunity should not be lost (like before) to nurture and groom civilian institutions to stand on their own feet."