Energy

Joseph Nye considers lessons from his own work on preventing the spread of nuclear technology in the 1970s.

In this Q&A, Joseph S. Nye talks about his advice for the interim and future president of Harvard in the wake of Claudine Gay's resignation, which countries should be highest on our radar to prevent the threat of nuclear war, what role the U.S. should play in the Russia-Ukraine war, the significance of U.S. alliances in the Middle East, and more.

Amy Harder, the founding Executive Editor of the climate policy publication Cipher News, expressed her surprise with several positive outcomes from the recent 28th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 28) in Dubai during a special episode of “Environmental Insights: Discussions on Policy and Practice from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.”

The International Energy Agency predicted last month that demand for global oil for transport will peak around 2026, plateau for all uses by 2028, and possibly hit a zenith by the end of the decade. Harvard experts say the forecasts track with what’s going on in the developed world, but the energy needs of less-wealthy nations pressing to develop their economies could foil expectations for years to come.

Why do we think Vladimir Putin will not use “the bomb” when there is so much evidence that he will?

To keep oil flowing and diminish the U.S., Beijing brokers a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The price cap on Russian oil implemented today by the G7 countries plus Australia represents a novel approach to sanctions. The policy is designed to reduce Russian fossil fuel revenues while keeping Russian oil on the market. In this brief, Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel explain the basic economic principles at work and discuss some of the critiques of the price cap. 

The price cap on Russian oil implemented today by the G7 countries plus Australia represents a novel approach to sanctions, according to a policy brief authored by Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel and released today by Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government. 

As the best documented major crisis in history, in substantial part because Kennedy secretly taped the deliberations in which he and his closest advisers were weighing choices they knew could lead to a catastrophic war, the Cuban missile crisis has become the canonical case study in nuclear statecraft. Over the decades since, key lessons from the crisis have been adapted and applied by the successors of Kennedy and Khrushchev to inform fateful choices.

In the past, strategic surprise has often stemmed from a failure of imagination. Most intelligence failures are rooted in a lack of foresight or early warning of impending events. Blue sky thinking seeks to prevent these surprises by devoting more attention not just to known risks and likely scenarios, but also to low probability, high impact events. In an unprecedented step in forging ongoing global collaboration, 129 global experts gathered in Amman, Jordan, in December 2021. The conference was held under the auspices of Jordan’s Aqaba Process and facilitated by representatives from the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center’s Intelligence Project. Attendees included intelligence officers, diplomats, military officers, private sector practitioners, and academics representing 29 countries, 5 continents, and 68 government and private sector organizations. Through presentations and discussion under Chatham House Rules, the conference facilitated an open exchange of ideas on the possible next big threats from terrorism and on strategies for moving forward.