Energy

"Although China has every intention of continuing nuclear energy development, in the aftermath of Fukushima it has approved a number of plans to enhance safety standards. All of them emphasize that the pace of growth should be controlled to minimize risk."

"...[T]o believe that the market will maintain its current risk assessment forever is to believe in the power of magical thinking. The economic and political stakes are overwhelmingly in favor of drilling. The White House is pushing for domestic sources of energy. Alaska's elected and tribal leadership will gain much from taxes on new economic activity. And our foreign competitors near the Arctic circle — including Russia, which sent an oil tanker through the Arctic during in December — are ready to plunge into the cold."

Professor Findlay analyzed the response of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the March 2011 nuclear reactor disaster at Fukushima, Japan. He compared the expectations that the Agency, its member states, and other nuclear stakeholders had of the IAEA's role in such a situation with the harsh reality. Drawing on these insights, he suggested possibilities for strengthening the Agency's capacities for handling the next Fukushima.

As one of the most serious industrial accidents in history, the Gulf explosion should be a great case study for corporate leaders across the globe who are trying to manage risk in hazardous activities involving complex technology. Put simply, how did the directors, CEOs, top staff leaders and top business leaders at the companies involved — BP (owner of the Macondo Well), Transocean (rig owner), Haliburton (construction services), Cameron (manufacturer of the blow-out preventer) and other subcontractors — fail in establishing safety management, safety processes and safety cultures which would have prevented the accident or which would have led to more effective crisis response.

"Residents near the Pilgrim nuclear plant in Massachusetts, and those within the 10-mile radiation zone of Vermont Yankee and Seabrook, N.H., are used to preparing themselves and seeking assistance from the government with training and drills, access to medication, and evacuation plans. They may not be completely confident in the government's planning, but they aren't completely dependent on it, either."

The Winter 2010/11 issue of the Belfer Center newsletter features recent and upcoming activities, research, and analysis by members of the Center community on critical global issues. This issue highlights a major Belfer Center conference on technology and governance, the Center's involvement in the nuclear threat documentary Countdown to Zero, and a celebration of Belfer Center founder Paul Doty.

"The question of whether we can "act in time" on energy and climate change poses one of the most profound challenges facing the world today. No human activity, other than the wide-scale use of nuclear weapons, has greater potential to reshape and harm our planet and our species than the rapidly expanding generation of greenhouse gases. What is so frustrating about the issue is that even though the dangers are widely accepted in the scientific community, and even though failing to act in time could set off a chain of events that would be all but irreversible, action to date has been weak at best."

Although projections of nuclear proliferation abound, they rarely are founded on empirical research or guided by theory. Even fewer studies are informed by a comparative perspective. The two books under review—The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by Jacques Hymans, and Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, are welcome exceptions to this general state of affairs, and represent the cutting edge of nonproliferation research. Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed. While sharing a number of common features, including a focus on subsystemic determinants of national behavior, the books differ in their methodology, level of analysis, receptivity to multicausal explanations, and assumptions about decisionmaker rationality and the revolutionary nature of the decision. Where one author emphasizes the importance of the individual leader’s national identity conception in determining a state’s nuclear path, the other explains nuclear decisions primarily with regard to the political-economic orientation of the ruling coalition. Notwithstanding a tendency to overinterpret evidence, the books represent the best of contemporary social science research and provide compelling interpretations of nuclear proliferation dynamics of great relevance to scholars and policymakers alike.

Failure to develop a comprehensive contingency plan, such as the one proposed here, and inform the American public, where appropriate, about its particulars will only serve to amplify the devastating impact of any nuclear attack on a U.S. city

Article in The Nonproliferation Review