Energy

20 Items

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- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Testimony on China’s Cyber, Energy Plans

| Spring 2022

In February and March, Belfer Center Student Fellow Winnona DeSombre and Environment and Natural Resources Program Director Henry Lee testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in Washington, D.C. During separate hearings on China’s capabilities and plans related to cyber and to energy, DeSombre and Lee recommended actions Congress should take for the U.S. to remain competitive with China.

Paper

US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace

| June 2021

The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”

A tractor works the land on a farm in front of a nuclear power plant in Doel, Belgium, Monday, March 23, 2020. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo)

AP Photo/Virginia Mayo

Analysis & Opinions - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

How to Keep Nuclear Power Plants Operating Safely During the Coronavirus Pandemic

As the COVID-19 pandemic devastates the world, nuclear power plants must remain safe and secure to provide electricity for food supply chains, emergency response teams, hospitals, and telecommunications in countries home to more than half of all people. Meanwhile, the Islamic State terror group has already announced its intent to exploit the pandemic, and other violent extremist organizations are also taking pains to use the crisis for their own purposes.

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Magazine Article

Inside China's controversial mission to reinvent the internet

| Mar. 27, 2020

On a cool day late last September, half a dozen Chinese engineers walked into a conference room in the heart of Geneva's UN district with a radical idea. They had one hour to persuade delegates from more than 40 countries of their vision: an alternative form of the internet, to replace the technological architecture that has underpinned the web for half a century. 

Whereas today's internet is owned by everyone and no one, they were in the process of building something very different - a new infrastructure that could put power back in the hands of nation states, instead of individuals.

Russian President Vladimir Putin gestures while speaking at a cybersecurity conference in Moscow, Russia, Friday, July 6, 2018. Putin said it's important to develop common cybersecurity standards that take into account interests of all nations. (Sergei Chirikov/Pool Photo via AP)

Sergei Chirikov/Pool Photo via AP

Analysis & Opinions - The Washington Post

Working with Russia on Cybercrime is Like Hiring a Burglar to Protect the Family Jewels

| Sep. 04, 2018

Imagine a bully who’s pounding your head against a wall. When you complain that it hurts and threaten to punch back, he offers to sign an international agreement against bullying. Meanwhile, he keeps pounding your head.

A Wyoming coal mine

Max Phillips/Creative Commons

Analysis & Opinions - The Hill

Trump’s Bogus Use of Cyber Threats to Prop up Coal

| July 26, 2018

Bailing out uneconomic power plants would do nothing to improve cyber security for the energy sector. In fact, it wouldn’t even improve cyber security at the subsidized plants themselves. Meanwhile, it would siphon off much-needed resources from the real work of protecting our energy grid.

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

U.S. Department of Energy

Announcement - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Former Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall Named Senior Fellow With Harvard's Belfer Center

| July 12, 2017

Former Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall is joining Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as a Senior Fellow, the Center announced today. Sherwood-Randall, who has served in the White House and Departments of Energy and Defense, is returning to the Center where she worked in the 1990s to help establish two pioneering projects – the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project with Graham Allison, who this month stepped down as the Center’s director, and the Preventive Defense Project with Ash Carter, the former Secretary of Defense who is the new Belfer Center director.

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News - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Q&A with Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

| July 12, 2017

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, former Deputy Secretary of Energy who has served in high-level positions at the White House and Pentagon, joined Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center as a non-resident Senior Fellow in July. Sherwood-Randall is returning to the Kennedy School where she previously collaborated with Ash Carter, the Belfer Center’s newly appointed director, and Graham Allison, who stepped down as Center director this month. We asked Sherwood-Randall to give us some background on her Harvard connections, why she returned, and what she hopes to accomplish as a Senior Fellow.

Journal Article - IEEE Security & Privacy

Regulating Cybersecurity: Institutional Learning or a Lesson in Futility?

| November-December 2014

On 22 November 2013, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved the latest version of mandatory cybersecurity regulations for the bulk electric system—known as Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards. The CIP standards are relatively unique: they are developed through an unusual model of industry-led regulation that places industry, and not federal regulators, at the center of regulatory design and enforcement. The CIP regulations have received a significant amount of criticism. Critics argue that the regulations are incomplete at best and irreparably flawed at worst. The author examines the lessons we can learn from the CIP standards and poses a provocative question: Are the regulations actually a secret success?