Environment & Climate Change

As India’s civilian nuclear energy program expands with the assistance of international nuclear suppliers, it creates new potential pathways to the acquisition of fissile material that could be diverted for military purposes. A key question is whether and how India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities are separated. In this discussion paper from the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom, Kalman A. Robertson and John Carlson argue that India has not established a complete and verifiable separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. The authors recommend steps for India to take under its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide assurances to all states that components of its civilian program are not contributing to the growth of its nuclear arsenal. These steps include renouncing options that would facilitate the use of safeguarded items to produce unsafeguarded nuclear material, and placing the proliferation-sensitive components of its nuclear power industry under continuous safeguards.

Part of NTI's Innovating Verification reports series, Verifying Baseline Declarations of Nuclear Warheads and Materials analyzes how baseline declarations can contribute to near- and long-term arms control and non-proliferation goals and how to verify them without compromising sensitive information.

China’s approach to strengthening the security of its nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities plays an important role in facilitating strong global action on nuclear security. This report provides a better understanding of Chinese perceptions of the threat of nuclear terrorism and attitudes toward the nuclear security challenge; describes the current status of nuclear security practices in China and of planned improvements in rules and organization, management, and technologies; and recommends steps for further improvements.

Despite substantial progress in improving nuclear security in recent years, there is more to be done.  The threats of nuclear theft and terrorism remain very real.  This paper recommends learning from the much stronger national and international efforts in nuclear safety, and in particular taking steps to build international understanding of the threat; establish effective performance objectives; assure performance; train and certify needed personnel; build security culture and exchange best practices; reduce the number of sites that need to be protected; and strengthen the international framework and continue the dialogue once leaders are no longer meeting regularly at the summit level.

Dr. Kamarck's paper explores some of the politics and pitfalls surrounding climate change policy, specifically carbon tax and cap-and-trade solutions. A carbon tax would directly tax the carbon content of fuels. A cap-and-trade system would set an overall cap for emissions and allow trading of emission permits between companies that more than meet their caps with those that don't. The analysis is intended to help decision makers and the public better understand some of the pros and cons associated with these particular climate policies.

"We believe that the United States must become a smarter power by reinvesting in the global good — providing things people and governments in all quarters of the world want but cannot attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Providing for the global good helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world's interests, values, and aspirations. It is not charity. It is effective foreign policy."

In 2006, CSIS launched a bipartisan Commission on Smart Power to develop a vision to guide America's global engagement. This report lays out the commission's findings and a discrete set of recommendations for how the next president of the United States, regardless of political party, can implement a smart power strategy.

"After 10 years of multisectoral, multidisciplinary cross-pollination, where are we now? What are the key questions and themes for the next decade? For this 10th issue of the ECSP Report, we asked six scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to offer their recommendations for the future of environmental security."

This short paper explores the security implications of climate change, focusing on the impacts on developing countries, particularly weak states. Security risks related to climate change will not be evenly distributed globally and will affect some kinds of governments more than others. While local and regional consequences of climate change remain very difficult to predict, three types of nations seem particularly vulnerable to the security risks of climate change: least-developed nations, weak states, and undemocratic states. Poor developing countries are the perhaps the most likely to suffer from climate change. These states lack the economic, governance, or technical capabilities to adapt to climate change. Failed and failing states—those with weak institutions of government, poor control over their borders, repressed populations, or marginal economies—stand a higher risk of being destabilized by climate change. The paper recommends a renewed emphasis on risk reduction and disaster preparedness with early warning systems that integrate meteorological risk with political risk.