Science & Technology

The risks of nuclear escalation between the U.S. and China or Russia are greater than ever given the possibility of misinterpreted cyber espionage and military strikes against early warning systems. What can be done to reduce this risk?

Ask almost any U.S. Navy officer about mine warfare and the reply most likely will center on efforts to recapitalize the service’s surface and airborne mine countermeasures capabilities. It would be unusual to receive a response that has anything to do with the actual use of maritime mines by the United States or friendly nations.

The Navy’s response has been to dedicate additional resources and intellectual firepower to countermine warfare in an effort to preserve its freedom of maneuver. However, the service has overlooked the other half of the lesson: mines are a cheap and disruptive weapon in naval warfare.

The focus on cyber-deterrence is understandable but misplaced. Deterrence aims to change the calculations of adversaries by persuading them that the risks of an attack outweigh the rewards or that they will be denied the benefits they seek. But in seeking merely to deter enemies, the United States finds itself constantly on the back foot. Instead, the United States should be pursuing a more active cyberpolicy, one aimed not at deterring enemies but at disrupting their capabilities. In cyberwarfare, Washington should recognize that the best defense is a good offense.

The military not only plans for operations, it also plans to plan. Yet there is no current plan or process in place to integrate cyber initiatives into campaign planning. The US government must determine how to integrate offensive and defensive cybercapabilities into campaign planning in order to leverage these capabilities and pair them with the military’s broad array of tools.

During the Future of Diplomacy Project's 2017 'Europe Week' series, diplomats, scholars, and policymakers visited the Kennedy School to examine Europe's greatest challenges. 

As cyber weapons are incorporated into US military planning, policy makers and field commanders will increasingly confront a core issue: How to formulate the rules of engagement (ROEs) for US forces with regard to military operations that may use such weapons. Michael Sulmeyer, Herbert Lin, and C. Robert Kehler address ROEs from the perspective of US military operators.