Science & Technology

434 Items

business center building in St. Petersburg, Russia

AP/Dmitri Lovetsky

Analysis & Opinions - Project Syndicate

Rules of the Cyber Road for America and Russia

| Mar. 05, 2019

Joseph Nye says in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program's user. While this makes negotiating cyber arms-control treaties problematic, it does not make diplomacy impossible.

teaser image

News - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Does Venture Capital Have a Public Purpose Responsibility for Tech Startups?

Feb. 19, 2019

On February 19, the Technology and Public Purpose Project (TAPP) convened the second session of the spring semester for the Boston Tech Hub Faculty Working Group. This monthly meeting convenes faculty from across Harvard and MIT in disciplines of engineering, business, law, government, computer science, biology, and medicine to explore the intersections of technological innovation and risks and benefits to society. This month, the group discussed the topic “Do Venture Capitalists have a Public Purpose Responsibility for Emerging Technology?” 

Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow and the 28 Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council visit NATO’s cyber defence centre at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium on Friday, 23 January 2015.

NATO

Report - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

National Counter-Information Operations Strategy

    Authors:
  • Gabriel Cederberg
  • Jordan D'Amato
  • Simon Jones
  • Kunal Kothari
  • Aleksandra Milcheva
  • Irene Solaiman
| February 2019

While nation-state competitors have employed propaganda and information operations (IO) targeting the United States for decades, in recent years their efforts have changed dramatically. The rise of the Internet and social media as mechanisms for disseminating news has made our country both more globally interconnected and simultaneously more vulnerable to foreign efforts to destabilize our democracy. There is now clear evidence that Russia used influence operations designed to undermine U.S. democracy and citizens’ trust in its integrity in both the 2016 and 2018 election cycles. Adversaries are actively using information as a weapon to attack the United States, our political system, and citizens’ trust in it.

Audio - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Bruce Schneier on Office Hours Podcast

| Feb. 11, 2019

Cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier, author of the “Schneier on Security” blog and a Research Fellow with the Belfer Center’s Cyber Security Project, sits down with with Aroop Mukharji to talk about cybersecurity and tech, his book "Click Here to Kill Everybody," and the hacker mentality.

The U.S. Capitol is seen at sunrise, in Washington, October 10, 2017

AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Protecting Democracy in an Era of Cyber Information War

| February 2019

Citizens voluntarily carry Big Brother and his relatives in their pockets. Along with big data and artificial intelligence, technology has made the problem of defending democracy from information warfare far more complicated than foreseen two decades ago. And while rule of law, trust, truth and openness make democracies asymmetrically vulnerable, they are also critical values to defend.  Any policy to defend against cyber information war must start with the Hippocratic oath: first, do no harm.

Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Ending the Cybersecurity Arms Race

| February 2018

Network security has always been something of balancing act between maximizing sharing and ease of use, and erecting barriers.

When computer networks first emerged, there were few limitations on what could be transmitted over them. However, after the world’s first major network computer security incident—the Morris Worm of 1988—organizations began to retreat behind network-level firewalls and anti-virus software. Some defenders even tried to completely disconnect their networks from the outside world via “air gaps.”

This paper argues that it is time to move beyond the security paradigm of separating networks, as epitomized by the air gap. Instead, network defenders should embrace an approach which allows sharing and connectedness, anticipates that adversaries will penetrate the network, and is able to detect, and ultimately eject those adversaries before they can do harm.

Mirrors (heliostats) circle a solar tower in the Negev desert, souther Israel

AP Photo/Oded Balilty

Analysis & Opinions - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Envisioning a New Economic Middle East: Reshaping the Gulf with Israel

| Jan. 31, 2019

The hope is that the greater economic cooperation incubating between the Gulf States and Israel will create a culture of entrepreneurship within Gulf economies. In that way, the Gulf States will begin to each adopt a “startup nation” mentality that has been championed in Israel over the past successful several decades.

Maintaining America's Edge

Aspen Strategy Group

Book Chapter - Aspen Strategy Group

Introduction: Navigating Uncharted Territory in the Technological Era

| Jan. 30, 2019

In August 2018, the nonpartisan Aspen Strategy Group (ASG) convened its thirtyfourth annual meeting in Aspen, Colorado. Over the course of three days, ASG members and invited experts from government, universities, think tanks, and the private sector debated the impact of dramatic technological change over the next decade on American national security. Our conversations covered a wide breadth of emerging technologies—artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, and biotechnology—and the challenges they pose to America’s military, the intelligence community, U.S. economic power, and democratic institutions. Our group grappled with the central dilemma of how the U.S. government can harness these technologies—developed primarily in the private sector and research labs—to compete with China and other adversaries in the years ahead.