Religion and Nationalism: Contradictions of Islamic Origins and Secular Nation-Building in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan

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Objectives. Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan have been persistently challenged, since their founding, by both Islamist and ethnic separatist movements. These challenges claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people in each country. I investigate the causes behind the concurrence of Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges to the state in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan. Method. This research employs comparative historical analysis, and more specifically, a most different systems design. In addition to small-\(N\) cross-national comparison, I also designed an intertemporal comparison, whereby Turkish, Algerian, and Pakistani history is divided into four periods, corresponding to preindependence, mobilization for independence, postindependence secular nation-building, and Islamist and ethnic separatist challenge periods. Results. Contrary to the prevailing view in the scholarship, this article formulates an alternative reinterpretation of Turkish, Algerian, and Pakistani nation-state formation. These three states were founded on the basis of an Islamic mobilization against non-Muslim opponents, but having successfully defeated these non-Muslim opponents, their political elites chose a secular and monolingual nation-state model, which they thought would maximize their national security and improve the socioeconomic status of their Muslim constituencies. The choice of a secular and monolingual nation-state model led to recurrent challenges of increasing magnitude to the state in the form of Islamist and ethnic separatist movements. The causal mechanism outlined in this article resembles what has been metaphorically described as a “meteorite” (Pierson, 2004), where the cause is short term (secular nationalist turn after independence) but the outcome unfolds over the long term (Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges). Conclusion. A distinct and counterintuitive path of nation-state formation has been identified based on the cases of Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan. This research demonstrates that a contradiction between the goals of the original mobilization that establishes the state and policies of its postindependence governments can be a major structural source of instability and violence in the long run. These findings suggest that theories of nationalism that were developed based on the European experience of ethnic or linguistic nationalism need to be modified in explaining the religious nationalism that is found in the origins of some of the major nation-states in the Muslim world.

Why are the Turkish, Algerian, and Pakistani states persistently challenged, since their founding, by both Islamist and ethnic separatist movements, with some of these challenges resulting in extremely violent confrontations? While there are many states where religious movements challenge secularism, such as India and the United States (Kuru, 2007; Needham and Rajan, 2007), and there are many other states that face challenges from

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ethnic separatist movements, such as Russia and the United Kingdom (Gorenburg, 1999; Nairn, 1977), it is less common to find states that face enduring challenges by both religious and ethnic separatist movements over many decades, such as Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan.

This outcome should be particularly puzzling in these three countries for two interrelated reasons. “Wars make nations,” as leading theorists of nation- and state-building convincingly argued (Howard, 1979; Tilly, 1975, 1985). While 47 of 49 present-day Muslim-majority nation-states (exceptions being Afghanistan and Iran) were occupied by colonial powers by the end of World War I, Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria were the three leading Muslim countries where millions of people mobilized for independence and tens of thousands were killed in the independence struggle, in many ways making these three states among the “hardest nation-states” in the Muslim world if “wars make nations” (Pew Forum, 2010). Therefore, their nationhood and statehood should have been among the most robust in the Muslim world, and among the “least likely cases” to be existentially challenged, and yet ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges led to the territorial dissolution of one (Pakistan-Bangladesh) and the near collapse of another (Algeria) of these states. Second, these outcomes should be particularly puzzling because Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan were founded by unmistakably secular nationalist leaders such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Ahmet Ben Bellah, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who were deeply influenced by French and British political systems, respectively. Whatever the causes of Islamist or ethnic separatist movements may be in other parts of the Muslim world, such challenges would be least expected in these three nation-states for these two interrelated reasons.

The Argument and its Theoretical Significance: Legacies of Mobilization

I dispute the prevailing depiction of Turkish, Algerian, and Pakistani independence movements as secular nationalist mobilizations resembling prototypical European nationalism, including their “ethnic” and “civic” subtypes (Kohn, 1982:62, 83). In contrast, I argue that these three states were founded on the basis of an Islamic mobilization against non-Muslim opponents, but having successfully defeated these non-Muslim occupiers or colonizers, their political elites chose a secular and monolingual nation-state model, which led to significant and recurrent challenges to the state in the form of Islamist and ethno-nationalist separatist movements. The legacies of religious mobilization followed by monolingual and secular nationalist policies explain the ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges in the following decades.

These observations and the argument have major theoretical ramifications for the debates on nationalism. A distinct and counterintuitive path of nation-state formation has been identified in this article, based on the cases of Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan. Leading scholars of nationalism, including Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Anthony Smith, despite their many differences otherwise, all argued that either language or ethnicity or both played the decisive role in the nationalist mobilization of intellectuals and the masses (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1991; Smith, 1986). These scholars argued that national leaders used ethnicity or language to mobilize the masses against previous regimes based on religious legitimacy, as observed in the fragmentation of Christendom into numerous nation-states based on ethnicity and language in Europe.

In contrast, in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan, which arguably witnessed three of the most popular “nationalist” mobilizations in the Muslim world for independence, not ethnicity or language, but religious identity played the key role. Nonetheless, the causal pathway uncovered in this article is not entirely without parallels elsewhere. Anthony Marx (2005)
argued that violent religious exclusion of Jews, Muslims, and Catholic or Protestant minorities can be found at the origins of nationalism in England, France, and Spain in the early modern period. The cases of religious mobilization analyzed in this article suggest that Turkish, Algerian, and Pakistani nationalism was similarly founded on religious mobilization and exclusion. This finding contributes to the theoretical debates on how religion relates to nationalism (Akturk, 2009; Brubaker, 2012) and to the literature on “varieties of nationalism” (Akturk, 2011; Greenfeld, 1992; Kohn, 1944; Sugar and Lederer, 1969).

Dependent Variables: Ethnic Separatist and Islamist Challenges

In October 19, 2011, Kurdish separatist PKK attacked Turkish soldiers in Hakkari, killing 24 soldiers in a single day. This was merely an episode in the fight against the PKK that claimed more than 30,000 lives since 1984, in what a former Turkish president dubbed as the “29th Kurdish rebellion” (Hür, 2008). In a historic speech on November 23, 2011, Turkish prime minister, Tayyip Erdogan, apologized on behalf of the state for the massacre of Alevi Kurds in the Dersim operation of 1937–1938, where 13,800 people killed (Star, 2011).

Further east in South Asia, Pakistan lost more than half of its population to Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), which seceded in 1971, accompanied by a civil war that claimed several hundred thousand lives. Pakistan continues to battle an ethnic separatist insurgency in Baluchistan, which comprises 40 percent of Pakistan’s territory, and where “successive generations have waged armed rebellions against Pakistani rule—in 1948, 1953, through the 1960s and 70s, and now” (Tharoor, 2009). Up to 10,000 people were killed in the suppression of the Baluch rebellion in 1977 alone. Pashtun, Sindhi, and Mohajir ethnic groups have also protested, sometimes violently, against the Pakistani state (Shah, 1997).

Further west in North Africa, the Algerian state has been persistently challenged by the mobilization of its Berber-speaking citizens, as in the famous “Berber Spring” in 1980. In June 1998, following the assassination of a famous Berber singer, Lounes Matoub, and a week before the coming into effect of the government’s “Arabic only” policy, thousands of Berbers “attacked hundreds of regional government offices and damaged public property” and by the time of Matoub’s funeral, “three more young men had been killed by police ‘stray bullets’” (Silverstein, 1998:3). The death of a young Berber under police custody in 2001 mobilized hundreds of thousands of Berbers for three months, during which Algerian security forces killed several dozen Berbers (Minorities at Risk, 2014a).

Islamist movements critical of secularism pose at least as big a challenge as ethnic separatism for Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. Algeria slid into a civil war that began following the landslide victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in December 1991. Algerian civil war claimed up to 200,000 lives in a country of 25 million people. Despite the end of the civil war, between January and July 2007 alone, “265 people were killed in engagements between insurgents and security forces” (McDougall, 2007:35). Pakistan witnessed a trend of Islamization since its founding in 1947, especially with its definition as an Islamic Republic in 1956 and gaining momentum with the adoption of Islamic laws in the Hudood ordinances of 1977 (Schmidt, 2011:60–65). Turkey, the earliest example of secular nation-building in the Middle East, gradually embraced Islamic idioms in politics since its transition to multiparty democracy in 1950, and has been governed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002, a party with Islamist origins that has won every election it has contested. Nonetheless, unlike in Algeria and Pakistan, Turkey did
TABLE 1

Most Different Systems Analysis: Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Causally Relevant Variables</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formerly colonized?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former colonizer</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political regime type (Polity IV, 2013)</td>
<td>9 (democracy)</td>
<td>7 (democracy)</td>
<td>2 (open autocracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political regime type (Freedom House, 2013)</td>
<td>3.5 (partly free)</td>
<td>4.5 (partly free)</td>
<td>5.5 (not free)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic majority (Alesina et al., 2003)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second largest ethnic category</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second largest sectarian category (Shia Islam) (Pew Forum, 2009)</td>
<td>10–15%</td>
<td>10–15%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of economic development: GDP per capita (World Bank, 2012)</td>
<td>$10,660</td>
<td>$1,255</td>
<td>$5,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical region</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV1: Ethnic separatist challenge to the state?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV2: Islamist challenge to the state?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

not witness mass Islamist violence and the Islamic challenge to the secular state remained peaceful and political (Kuru, 2007; Turam, 2007).

Case Selection, Method, and Research Design: Comparative Historical Analysis with a Most Different Systems Design

The existence of a similar outcome (dependent variable), namely, enduring ethnic separatist and Islamic challenges to the state over many decades, despite significant variation in potential causes (independent variables), such as colonial past, former colonizer, ethnic demography, religious sectarian demography, political regime type, level of economic development, and geopolitical region, makes this study suitable for a “most different systems design” (Table 1). These factors, which are very different in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan, cannot explain the similar outcome, and hence they are ruled out as alternative explanations.

Most different systems design (MDSD) uses Mill’s method of agreement, whereby the finding of a common factor (or factors) is expected to explain the similarity of outcome among otherwise very different cases. As a small-N research design, MDSD is commonly used in comparative politics. MDSD is sometimes used alone, as in Theda Skocpol’s study of social revolutions in France, Russia, and China (Skocpol, 1979), and sometimes it is employed in combination with another research design, as in Ahmet Kuru’s (2007) study of secularism in the United States, France, and Turkey, where he combines MDSD and most similar systems design (MSSD).

Comparative historical analysis is “defined by a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003:6). The emphasis on long-term processes makes this method particularly suitable for the research puzzle of this article. While MSSD is better suited
for theory testing, MDSD is better suited for theory building, since it is geared toward uncovering new variables and new causal mechanisms that have hitherto been unknown or overlooked.

Although manifestations of ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges, especially the magnitude of violence, are not identical in Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria, all three have been experiencing both of these challenges as the two most important and enduring challenges in their political systems, which is a significant observation. Moreover, one of these challenges has been associated with very high levels of violence in each case. In Turkey and Pakistan ethnic separatism, and in Algeria Islamism, have been associated with mass violence that claimed the lives of at least tens of thousands of people.

Among the three cases, Turkey deserves more attention for three interrelated reasons. First, it is the earliest case of this causal pattern historically, which then makes it most logical to discuss it at the beginning. Second, and relatedly, it had a degree of demonstration effect on the other cases, especially on the Indian Muslim movement and its leader, Jinnah. Third, Turkey is the case where the causal mechanism uncovered in this article appears in its purest form, especially with regard to the sudden and unexpected turn to secular nationalism after independence. As such, Turkey is the “prototypical” case for this causal pathway. Nonetheless, it is also the case where the aggregate violence resulting from these challenges was kept at a lower level compared to Algeria and Pakistan, which might provide some lessons for managing instability.

Pakistan, although historically the second nation-state to emerge among these three, will be discussed last because Pakistan failed to maintain its territorial integrity (with the secession of Bangladesh in 1971) and ceased to be a secular state (with the incorporation of Hudood ordinances in 1977) as a result of the ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges. Pakistan ceased to exist in its originally secular form and territory due to the causal mechanism outlined in this article and yet even the remainder of (West) Pakistan continues to suffer both Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges.


What are some of the alternative explanations found in the literature for the rise of Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges? First, according to an argument that is also common in popular media and among policymakers, postcolonial states were created with artificial borders, which were assigned to them by the colonial powers, and this is the source of interstate and intrastate conflict (Peters, 2006). This argument parallels some of the claims found in the scholarly literature, namely, that postcolonial states are at an early stage of state making and especially challenged since the end of the Cold War (Ayoob, 1995:165–88) or that many of them could only attain a low degree of statehood (Clapham, 1998). Although these arguments have their merits when applied to many post-Soviet (e.g., Turkmenistan), Middle Eastern (e.g., Jordan, Kuwait), and Sub-Saharan African (e.g., Mauritania) states that became independent without popular mobilizations for independence, they are much less applicable to Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria, precisely because these are the three Muslim countries where there was massive popular mobilization against colonial powers and violent struggle for independence, which determined their national borders. In other words, Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria already had “blood borders” (Peters, 2006) drawn up by a popular struggle for self-determination.
Second, some scholars, including formerly leading proponents of the secularization thesis, argue that there has been a global religious revival, a process of desecularization, in the last quarter of the 20th century, which explains the Islamist challenges many countries around the world are experiencing (Berger, 1996, 1999; Cox, 1984). However, as the case analyses of the three countries will demonstrate, political Islamic revival and reaction against state policies in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan predated the global religious revival and was already apparent in the 1950s and 1960s, when the secularization thesis seemed to explain global trends. For example, the Arabic original of the call to the prayer (ezan) was reinstituted in Turkey in 1950, and Pakistan was declared an “Islamic Republic” in 1956. There is a similar chronological problem with the global religious revival argument in Algeria, where political Islamism peaked in the 1980s, and declined after the civil war in the 1990s, seemingly out of synch with the global trends. The global religious revival thesis might explain the rise of political Islamism elsewhere in the Muslim world, but not in these three countries.

Third, modernization theory would suggest that ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges might result from economic underdevelopment and that higher income levels might dampen ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges. More specifically, James Fearon and David Laitin argue that “after controlling for per capita income, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003:75). There are two significant empirical problems with economic explanations for the case analyses presented here. First, the levels of economic development and income significantly differ between Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan (Table 1). Second, the neighbors of these countries that are poorer and more ethnically fragmented, such as Turkey’s neighbor Iran, Algeria’s neighbor Morocco, or Pakistan’s neighbor Afghanistan, did not suffer from ethnic separatist violence to the same extent. Algeria is more developed compared to almost every country in North and West Africa, with the possible exception of Tunisia, and Turkey is more developed compared to almost all other Muslim countries.

Fourth, an argument that is particularly popular among many critics of Western and especially American foreign policy is that the rise of Islamism is in part the result of U.S. grand strategy to encircle and destabilize the Soviet Union, especially in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Mamdani, 2005). “In a nutshell,” Mamdani writes, “after defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal at home, the U.S. government decided to harness and even to cultivate terrorists in the struggle against guerrillas who had come to power and regimes it considered pro-Soviet” (2004:87). Although this argument is certainly relevant to the rise of Islamist terrorist networks centered in Afghanistan, posing serious security threats for Pakistan, it fails to explain the origins and the rise of mass Islamic political movements in Algeria or Turkey, or even in Pakistan itself. Algeria was not even part of the U.S. alliance system, and the Islamist resentment and countermobilization against the secular state was evident as soon as Algeria became independent in 1962, far before 1979. Also in Turkey, which is a key U.S. ally and NATO member, the first mass Islamic political party, MNP, was established in 1970, nine years before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and MNP and its numerous successor parties were at least as much anti-American, anti-Israeli, and anti-Western as they were anti-Soviet. Even in Pakistan, where this argument is strongest, the Islamist challenge was evident in the declaration of Pakistan as an “Islamic Republic” in 1956, 13 years before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In short, the Islamist challenges that I discuss in this article consist of popular, mass Islamist political parties and movements such as Turkey’s Welfare Party, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front, and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, which have domestic roots and that cannot be explained primarily as a part or unintended consequence of U.S. grand strategy. Finally,
I do not discuss or try to explain terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, which also include foreign fighters imported from around the world, and that are not actors in the party politics in these three countries. Although all the alternative explanations discussed above have their merits in explaining some of the Islamist or ethnic separatist movements in different Muslim countries, none of them provides a convincing explanation for the combination of Islamism and ethnic separatism in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan.

The Argument and the Outline of the Article

My main argument is that Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria were founded upon an Islamic mobilization, where a multiethnic but overwhelmingly Muslim population was mobilized on the basis of Islamic solidarity against non-Muslim opponents in a struggle that was labeled as a religious war (jihad) in all three cases, but having successfully defeated these non-Muslim opponents, their political elites chose a secular and monolingual nation-state model for their countries, which led to significant and enduring challenges to the state in the form of Islamist and ethnic separatist movements.

The Islamist backlash challenges the secular nature of the state, while the ethnic separatist backlash challenges the monolingual nationalism of these states. I argue that the combination of ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan is not coincidental but causally linked to the way in which these states were originally founded on the basis of an Islamic mobilization. The combination of ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges to the state also provides excuses for military praetorianism, amply evident in the military interventions in Turkish, Algerian, and Pakistani politics throughout the 20th century.

The contradiction, or the disjuncture, between Islamic mobilization for statehood by a multiethnic population followed by secular nation-building is the historical structural cause of decades-long Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges, which are “path-dependent” outcomes resulting from the choice of secular nationalism at a “critical juncture” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). My argument relies on a specific temporal sequence and as such, I divide pre- and postindependence history of Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan into four periods in order to explicate the logic of, and present the evidence for, my argument. Taking the starting point before independence as T0 (time zero), I label the following periods of causal importance as T1, T2, and T3.

T0. Before Mobilization: Quest for Living Together in a Multireligious Empire

In this period, despite their vast differences otherwise, Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan were part of multireligious empires. What is of causal relevance is the unabashedly multireligious population that existed in the territory of what later became the Turkish, Algerian, and Pakistani nation-states.

In all three countries, this period is characterized by attempts at reform to ensure the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims and preserve multireligious society, despite enduring perceptions of structural economic disadvantage (in Ottoman Turkey) or official discrimination (in French Algeria or British India) Muslims felt they were facing. Present-day Turkey was the center of the Muslim-majority Ottoman Empire, in contrast to present-day Pakistan and Algeria, which were colonies of non-Muslim British and French empires, respectively. Nonetheless, Muslim leaders in the Ottoman Empire shared the Algerian and Indian Muslims’ perception of being disadvantaged because of their Muslim identity, which might seem surprising and counterintuitive (Göçek, 1996).
**T1. Muslim Mobilization for Independence: Cadres, Discourse, and the Non-Muslim Exodus**

In this period, most Muslim leaders concluded that attempts at living together with non-Muslims have failed because of the continuing disadvantages of Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslims. They concluded that Muslims were facing an immediate existential threat to their survival and their way of life if they did not mobilize as Muslims for an independent state. I argue that Muslim mobilization for independence in this period is one of the two causal factors that explain future patterns of conflict. However, explaining the cause of the religious mobilization itself is a different question and falls beyond the scope of this article.

What is the evidence for my claim that the mobilization for independence in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan was an Islamic one? There are three kinds of evidence that are symptomatic of the Islamic nature of the mobilization. First, the *cadres* that led the struggle for independence were entirely Muslim, even though the territories in which they lived included large (10 percent or more) non-Muslim populations (Armenian, French, Greek, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh, etc.). Equally importantly, although all Muslim, these cadres were ethnically and linguistically diverse and they were aware of their ethnic diversity.

Second, and more importantly, the *discourse* that accompanied the mobilization for independence was overwhelmingly Islamic. For example, in all three cases, the independence struggle was referred to as an Islamic religious struggle, a *jihad*. The key texts, declarations, and speeches during the mobilization for independence were saturated with Islamic religious terminology.

Third, rapid and massive exodus of the non-Muslim population immediately after independence from the territories that became Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria is a significant piece of demographic evidence demonstrating that the fundamental fault line in the conflict was religious identity. Non-Muslim inhabitants of the present-day territories of Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan, which constituted at least one-tenth of the population, left the country permanently within a year after independence.

**T2. The Choice of Secular Nationalism: Language, Law, Leaders, and Discourse**

In a radical reversal after independence, the political leaders of Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria adopted a secular nation-building model for their countries. Instead of an Islamic state with a religious legal system and multiple official languages accommodating the ethnic diversity, they adopted a single official language and a secular legal system. There are at least four kinds of evidence that are symptomatic of the turn toward secular nationalism.

First, one observes an unmistakable policy of promoting one language as the official national language (Turkish, Arabic, Urdu) after independence, despite the ethno-linguistic diversity of the population. Second, one observes the official endorsement of secular laws and institutions despite the hegemony of Islamic law (*sharia*) among Muslims before independence. Third, some of the leading cadres of the independence struggle who advocated a more Islamic or multiethnic vision for the newly independent state were eliminated after independence. Many of them were killed, driven into exile, put under house arrest, or otherwise rendered politically impotent. Fourth, the official discourse of the state after independence paralleled the shift toward secular nationalism.

The surprising turn toward secular nationalism after independence, following a heavily Islamic mobilization by a multiethnic population, is the key explanatory variable, the
Explaining the Choice of Secular Nationalism: Development and Survival

Why did the leading elites in these countries turn toward secular nationalism after a very popular Islamic mobilization for independence? This secular nationalist turn itself is in need of an explanation. Although fully explaining all the causes of the secular nationalist turn falls beyond the scope of this article, the most convincing explanation found in the secondary literature for the elite decision to choose a secular nationalist model is their ideological conviction that only secular nationalism could dramatically improve the socioeconomic status of the Muslim communities they were leading while ensuring the survival of their nascent state in a world of nation-states in the 20th century. Muslims were significantly poorer and less educated than non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, French Algeria, and British India, which itself was a key motivating factor for Muslim nationalism as mentioned earlier (in T0). The association between Muslim religious identity and socioeconomic backwardness apparently led many members of the elite to think that religion (Islam) itself was a cause of Muslims’ socioeconomic underachievement, and hence motivated the choice of secular nationalism as a panacea for backwardness.

Şükrü Hanoğlu forcefully argues that Young Turks, the nationalist elite that would lead the Ottoman Empire in its last decade and the Republic of Turkey thereafter, were followers of a German philosophy known as “vulgar materialism” (Vulgarmaterialismus), as well as a “medley of highly disparate ideas, the common denominator of which was the rejection of religion” (2011:48–49). Mustafa Kemal, the founding leader of Turkey, was also an avid materialist. “‘Seeking any guide other than science,’ he averred, making an oblique allusion to religion, ‘is thoughtlessness, prevarication, and ignorance’” (Hanoğlu, 2011:53). Ictihat, a Young Turk journal originally published in Geneva and Cairo, and later in Istanbul, “attempted to reconstitute Islam as a materialist philosophy that would serve as a cultural resource to build the religion-free society of the future” (Hanoğlu, 2011:54–55).

In a recent contribution, Faisal Devji (2013) also argues that the ideas of Jinnah and the elite of the Muslim League were shaped by the Enlightenment, and their understanding of “Muslim” identity was an unusually ecumenical one, partly because many of the leaders themselves (Jinnah and Aga Khan in particular) belonged to various Shia minorities, which may have been another motivation for their advocacy of secularism. The socialist worldview of the founding leaders of Algeria, such as Ben Bella and Ait Ahmed, is well-known (Stora, 2001). In sum, the critical decision to adopt secular nationalism after an Islamic mobilization for independence was conditioned by the ideological conviction of the elites that secular nationalism alone could guarantee the socioeconomic development and the survival of their newly independent states in the modern international system.

T3. Islamic and Ethnic Separatist Challenges: Votes, Violence, and Legislation

The unexpected turn toward secular nationalist policies after independence came as a shock to the leaders of the Islamic and ethnic minority groups who participated in the independence struggle. A few such leaders strongly disagreed with or openly rebelled against the new regime as soon as its secular nationalist orientation became apparent, and they
were mostly killed, imprisoned, or driven into exile. However, localized rebellions and a few individual acts of defiance aside, Islamic and ethnic separatist resistance to the new secular nationalist regime did not become a mass phenomenon in the first two decades after independence. Instead, ethnic separatist and Islamist challenges to the state grew over time, culminating in mass political movements such as AKP in Turkey, FIS in Algeria, and Awami League in Pakistan or cataclysmic violence many decades later, as in the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan (1971), beginning of the PKK insurgency in Turkey (1984), and the beginning of the Algerian civil war (1992).

There are three categories under which Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges can be operationalized and measured: votes, violence, and legislation. In the context of free multiparty elections, the number of votes received by Islamist and ethnic separatist parties is a good measure of their strength. Wherever democratic multiparty competition is absent or interrupted, the level of Islamist and ethnic separatist violence is an imperfect but alternative measure of their strength. Finally, in both democratic and authoritarian contexts, when states pass legislation attempting to accommodate Islamist and ethnic separatist demands, such as those related to the status of Islamic law and minority languages, this can be considered a measure of the growing strength of such demands.

The causal account presented in this article resembles what Paul Pierson classified as a “meteorite” in social scientific analysis, where the time horizon of the “cause” (Islamic mobilization followed by secular nationalism) is relatively short compared to the time horizon of the “outcome” (Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges), extending over many decades (Pierson, 2004:80). Why is there such a decades-long time lag between the secular nationalist turn in state policies and the growth of Islamic and ethnic separatist movements? I suspect that given very low levels of literacy and urbanization prevailing at the time of independence, it took decades for the full impact of the new regime’s secular nationalism to be felt by the masses, and for the resentment against such policies to brew.

**Turkey**

Turkey is historically the first and prototypical country that went through an Islamic mobilization for independence followed by secular nation-building. Moreover, Turkey’s struggle for independence against British, French, Greek, and Italian forces (1919–1922) was closely followed by many in the Muslim world, all of which lived under colonial rule with the exception of Iran and Afghanistan. Turkey’s story had a demonstration effect on Algerian and Indian Muslim struggles for independence. These considerations make it imperative to examine the case of Turkey in greater detail than Algeria and Pakistan.

**T0. Before Mobilization: Quest for Living Together in the Multireligious Ottoman Empire, 1839–1918**

The Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) was one of the longest lasting dynastic empires in history. Compared to its European contemporaries, it has been described as the “Empire of Difference” for the religious diversity it tolerated under its rule, including Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, Sunni, and Shiite populations (Barkey, 2008). Ottoman religious toleration attracted praise from many political philosophers, including Voltaire, John Locke, John Rawls, and Michael Wálzer.
Ottoman religious diversity was maintained in a hierarchical and unequal framework, where political power was monopolized by Muslims while economic power was dispersed among Muslim and non-Muslim subjects (Braude and Lewis, 1982). The population was divided in religiously defined communities known as millets, which is an Arabic word meaning “religious community” (Lewis, 2001:335). All Muslims regardless of their ethnicity or language belonged to the Muslim millet, whereas all Orthodox Christians regardless of ethnicity or language belonged to the Orthodox (Rum) millet.

Starting with the Tanzimat Reforms of 1839, the empire witnessed a series of constitutional reforms aimed at providing equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims and bolstering a common Ottoman identity. However, this effort failed on both sides. Tanzimat Reforms, the founding of the first parliament (1876), and the constitutional revolution (1908) could not stem the tide of secessionism among Christian populations, as Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro seceded and continued to expand their territories at the expense of the Ottomans. Reforms failed to keep Christians within the Ottoman fold. Moreover, the reforms promoting equal rights for non-Muslims stoked Muslim resentment because non-Muslims were already dominant in the economy, and equal political rights for non-Muslims could lead to further deterioration of Muslims’ status.

Many Muslims felt that they were rapidly becoming an underclass in their own empire due to European favoritism of non-Muslim minorities in commerce through what were known as the “capitulations.” The Ottoman bourgeoisie was indeed overwhelmingly Christian, mostly Greek and Armenian (Göçek, 1996). Moreover, citizens of European powers living in the Ottoman Empire benefited from extraterritorial legal protection, which amounted to a form of “legal imperialism,” and this further added to the indignation of the Ottoman Muslims (Kayaoğlu, 2010). For example, “[i]n 1895, thirty-two British courts operated in the Ottoman Empire” (Kayaoğlu, 2010:1). The perception of religiously-based discrimination among Muslims might be an important cause for the religious nature of the mobilization for independence after the final defeat, partition, and occupation of Ottoman Anatolia by the Entente powers following World War I, although explaining the cause of the Muslim mobilization in detail falls beyond the scope of this article.

**T1. Muslim Mobilization for Independence in Turkey, 1919–1923: Muslim Cadres, Islamist Discourse, and the Non-Muslim Exodus**

The Ottoman Empire surrendered to the Entente in 1918, followed by the Sevres Treaty in 1920, which divided Anatolia into occupation zones between Britain, France, Italy, and Greece. Istanbul, the capital city, was put under a multinational occupation. At that time, more than one-tenth of Anatolia’s population was non-Muslim and the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul had many non-Muslim deputies, including Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. By 1919, those military officers and civilian notables who refused to accept the partition of Anatolia organized a resistance movement against European occupation under the leadership of an Ottoman general, Mustafa Kemal (renamed “ Atatürk” in 1934), opening a new parliament in Ankara in April 1920.

The mobilization for resistance against European occupation, which led to the founding of modern Turkey as an independent republic, was led by cadres that were entirely Muslim, and legitimized on the basis of a profoundly Islamic discourse. The mobilized masses belonged to what were known as the Muslim millet in Ottoman times, including Albanians, Circassians, Lazes, Kurds, Turkmens, and other Muslim ethnic groups (Akturk, 2009).
Unlike the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives (Meclisi Mebusan), which included many non-Muslim deputies, the new parliament in Ankara was named Assembly of the Millet [Muslim People], including only Muslim deputies.

Among the 337 members of the new parliament, there was not a single non-Muslim, despite the fact that non-Muslims constituted more than one-tenth of the population (Okutan, 2004:148). This is perhaps the most obvious indicator of the Islamic nature of the mobilization. While the Ottoman electoral law gave the right to vote and run for election to all citizens regardless of religion, members of the new parliament in Ankara were elected on the basis of a new electoral law that restricted the right to vote and run for election to Muslims only (Okutan, 2004:177).

Although entirely Muslim, resistance cadres were not only Turkish. Rather, a dazzling array of various Muslim ethnic groups participated in this struggle. Four examples may suffice. The poet who wrote the national anthem of Turkey, Mehmet Akif, was an ethnic Albanian. Foreign Minister, Bekir Sami, was an Ossetian. Diyap Aga, deputy of Dersim, was an Alevi Zaza. Yusuf Ziya, deputy from Bitlis, was a Sunni Kurd. “The founding charters of the Turkish Republic and the decisions of the Erzurum and Sivas conferences constantly refer to those ‘Muslims who form one nation’ or ‘all Islamic elements of the population’” and, therefore, “it was not a ‘Turkish’ war of liberation, as claimed in the official historiography, but rather a war of ‘Muslim elements’” (Yavuz, 2003:45). In addressing the parliament, Mustafa Kemal stated that “[p]eople who constitute this grand assembly are not only Turkish, Circassian, Kurdish, or Laz, but rather, they are all the components of Islam,” hence openly acknowledging the ethnic diversity of the Muslim nation that he was leading (Akyol, 2006:67). In short, a multiethnic but Muslim population speaking different languages was mobilized against foreign occupation.

Beyond being Muslims, a large number of the deputies were Islamic religious notables. There were 77 religious notables in the first parliament, which corresponds to 23 percent of all deputies, including “53 ulema, 14 muftis, and 10 sheikhs” (Akyol, 2008:145). This percentage does not include many other Islamists who were not religious notables, such as the aforementioned Islamist poet of Albanian origin, Mehmet Akif. There were undoubtedly many Muslim members of the parliament who had a secular worldview, including some socialists. However, the official discourse of the parliament during the independence struggle was clearly an Islamist discourse.

The Islamist nature of the discourse was evident in the ceremony that accompanied the opening of the parliament in April 23, 1920.

“The opening was deliberately scheduled for a Friday [Islamic holy day], following prayers at the central mosque. Accompanied by a crowd, the deputies marched to the old CUP club, in which the new assembly was to be located. Before they entered the building, which contained a replica of the Prophet’s banner and a piece of hair from his beard, clerics completed a recitation of the full text of the Qur’an. The Islamic character of these opening ceremonies outdid any comparable solemnity in Ottoman history and gave no inkling of the secular revolution that would follow in the years to come.” “The assembly proceedings [included] an imam leading prayers, deputies summoned to pray five times a day, constant reference to religious sources, and placards displaying Qur’anic quotations . . . ” (Hanioglu, 2011:102–03, emphasis mine).

The following eight observations, including pieces of legislation, official declarations, publications, and speeches, also indicate the hegemony of Islamism during the independence struggle. First, on April 16, 1920, 153 religious notables, led by the mufti of Ankara, issued a fatwa [religious decree] in support of the nascent parliament in Ankara, in which they argued that it is a religious duty to join the struggle to liberate the country (Akyol,
Second, on April 28, 1920, the parliament banned the production, sale, and consumption of alcohol throughout the country and mandated beatings for offenders in accordance with Islamic law, although even the Ottoman government did not enforce such an Islamic law at least since 1839 (Hanioğlu, 2011:103). Third, on May 9, 1920, the parliament issued a “Declaration to the Islamic World,” seeking help in a religious war against the Entente worldwide (Hanioğlu, 2011:103). Mustafa Kemal argued that “the forces of the Islamic world have been the only source for [our] liberation and salvation” (Akyol, 2008:150). Fourth, the leaders of the Mevlevi (Sunni) and Bektashi (Alevi-Shia) religious orders were chosen as the two deputy speakers of the parliament, in a move of great religious and sectarian significance.

Fifth, the Ankara government summoned the Libyan Arab religious leader, Sheikh Ahmed Sunusi, for Islamist propaganda, while organizing international Pan-Islamic congresses under his leadership in Anatolia (Akyol, 2008:194–201). Sixth, one of the two largest sources of foreign aid to the Ankara government was the Caliphate (Khilâfat) Movement of Indian Muslims, a tangible proof that the Pan-Islamist strategy worked (Akyol, 2008:177–88; Minault, 1982). Seventh, the official national anthem was written by the most famous Islamist poet of the time, Mehmet Akif, and is unsurprisingly awash with Islamic terms and symbolism. The Ankara government regularly described the Entente occupation as the “last Crusade,” and the renowned Turkish poet Yahya Kemal penned his famous lines, “[O Creator] bestow upon us victory/ because this is the last army of Islam!”

Eighth, unusual for a political leader, once Mustafa Kemal even gave a sermon after prayers in the Zağanos Pasha mosque in Balıkesir. There are many other examples of the Ankara government’s systematic usage of Islamic discourse in support of the war of liberation, of which a limited selection could be presented here.

The final victory of the Ankara government was followed by a mass exodus of the Christian population, especially the Greek Orthodox, from Anatolia to Greece, following the retreating Greek army. More than a million Christians, approximately 10 percent of Turkey’s population at the time, left. Nonetheless, several hundred thousand Christians stayed in Anatolia. In 1924, all the Christians in Turkey (except in Istanbul), regardless of their ethnicity and language, were exchanged for all the Muslims in Greece (except in Western Thrace), regardless of their ethnicity and language (Clark, 2006). Rapid exodus of the non-Muslim population after independence is another significant piece of evidence reaffirming that the fundamental identity fault line was religious.

**T2. Turn Toward Secular Nationalism in Turkey, 1924–1935: Language, Law, Leaders, and Discourse**

After the final victory over the Greeks in 1922, the Ankara government unexpectedly adopted radical secularist and Turkish nationalist policies, which shocked many who participated in the war, and who expected the continued application of Islamic law and the recognition of ethnic and linguistic diversity within Turkey. As mentioned earlier, the Young Turk military elite, including Mustafa Kemal, adhered to a strictly materialist philosophy (Hanioğlu, 2011), and they genuinely believed that secular nationalism alone would enable...
Turkey’s development and survival as an independent state. The parliament that conducted the war of liberation was dismissed in April 1923 and elections were held for a new parliament. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) led by Mustafa Kemal was the only party participating in these elections. Most of the Islamist and Kurdish critics of Mustafa Kemal were not nominated and hence not elected to the new parliament, clearing the ground for an authoritarian one-party regime without parliamentary opposition (Tuncay, 2001).

A series of reforms in the next couple of years marked a radical turn away from the Islamic policies pursued during the mobilization for independence and made Turkey the most secular state in the Middle East. First and most importantly, three major pieces of legislation were passed on March 3, 1924: the Islamic Caliphate was abolished; the Ministry of Sharia (Islamic Law) and Religious Foundations was abolished; and all educational institutions were brought under the control of Ministry of Education, effectively abolishing Islamic schools (Tuncay, 2001). In a single day, Islamic law, Islamic education, and the highest religious political office, the Caliphate, were abolished. The massive properties of religious foundations that sustained the financial independence of religious institutions from the state were confiscated. The Swiss civil code and Italian penal code were accepted in 1926, making Turkey legally a secular state without any religious laws.

On November 30, 1925, all religious orders (Naqshbandi, Bektashi, etc.) were banned, dealing a fatal blow to civil Islamic life beyond the mosques, which were already under state control. On November 25, 1925, Islamic and Ottoman headdress for men (fez, turban, etc.) were banned and instead all men were urged to wear Western-style top hats. On December 26, 1925, the Islamic calendar was replaced with the Western Gregorian calendar. On November 1, 1928, Arabic script was replaced with the Latin alphabet, marking a radical break with centuries of Ottoman and Islamic civilization. Teaching of and writing in the Arabic script was banned. On May 27, 1935, the Islamic weekend holiday, Friday, was replaced with the Western weekend holiday, Saturday and Saturday. In 1928, the constitutional article stating that “the religion of state is Islam” was removed. With no state religion and no religious law, Turkey became a fully secular state by 1928, only five years after independence.

A series of Turkish nationalist policies were put in place, and Turkish state discourse became heavily nationalist already by the late 1920s, which marked a radical turn away from the previous recognition of ethnic diversity. First and most importantly, Turkish became the only official language, not just at the national level, but also at the local and even at the individual level. People who spoke different languages in public were penalized. Turkish state discourse denied the existence of the Kurds (Yeğen, 1996). “Citizen, speak Turkish” campaigns put pressure on everybody to speak Turkish in public spaces (Aslan, 2007).

Mustafa Kemal was anointed by the parliament as “Ataturk,” meaning “father of the Turks,” in 1934. He ended his most famous speech on the 10th anniversary of the Republic in 1933 by declaring, “how happy is the one who says ‘I’m a Turk,’” a slogan that was later displayed prominently across Turkey, including in every school. A newly formulated “Turkish History Thesis” became the official historical doctrine in 1930. Accordingly, Turks of Central Asia were described as the source of every civilization in the world. This was supported by the “Sun Language Theory,” whereby Turkish was praised as the source of all languages (Aytürk, 2004). In July 1932, it became mandatory to have the call to prayer (ezan) in Turkish, although it has always been in Arabic in every part of the Muslim world before or since. The Turkification of the call to prayer was very unpopular among Muslim masses, and it also removed a key symbol of supraethnic Islamic identity in society, as Kurds and other non-Turkish Muslims felt further alienated.
The unexpected turn to secular nationalist policies after independence came as a shock to the leaders of the Islamic and Kurdish groups in particular. A few such leaders expressed their disagreement with and even openly rebelled against the new regime as soon as its secular nationalist orientation became apparent. In 1925, Sheikh Said, a Naqshbandi religious notable and a Kurdish tribal leader, mobilized around 30,000 fighters in a rebellion against the Ankara government (Akyol, 2006:89). His was a Kurdish-Islamic rebellion, since his supporters were mostly Zaza Kurds, but the justification for the rebellion was the preservation of Islam against the anti-religious policies of the new regime. Said famously argued that Islam was the only bond between Turks and Kurds, which the new regime severed with its abolition of the Caliphate and other secularizing reforms in 1924.

A secular Kurdish nationalist rebellion broke out in Ağrı, peaking in 1929–1930, and resulted in thousands of casualties. In 1930, another Naqshbandi sheikh led a small rebellion of symbolic significance demanding Islamic law in Menemen, a Turkish town in Western Anatolia, which was quickly suppressed. The sheikh and his 22 associates were executed. In 1937–1938, the Turkish army conducted an operation in the Kurdish Alevi region of Dersim, executing Kurdish Alevi religious and tribal leader, Seyyid Riza, and killing 13,800 people. Nonetheless, localized rebellions and a few individual acts of defiance aside, Islamic and ethnic separatist opposition to the secular nationalist regime did not become a mass phenomenon in the first few decades after independence.

The reason for the time lag between the turn to radical secular nationalism and the development of mass Islamist and ethnic separatist reactions may be found in the low level of state penetration of society in the 1920s, evidenced by the very low level of urbanization and literacy. According to the 1927 census, 89.4 percent of the population was illiterate (Yavuz, 2003:50). Therefore, although the literate and urbanized 10 percent of the population, some of whom were already inclined toward a secular nationalist worldview, may have fully grasped the radical nature of the transformation that was underway, 90 percent of the population went back to their villages after the war and probably did not fully understand or believe the news of the radical transformation coming from Ankara. Second, having lived through a series of devastating wars, including the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), World War I (1914–1918), and the War of Liberation (1919–1922), most of the population probably had no will or ability to risk a civil war over the secular nationalist policies of the new regime. Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges to the state grew over time, culminating in mass electoral support for the Islamic and Kurdish ethnic separatist parties as well as the rise of Kurdish guerrilla insurgency decades later.

Islamic mobilization in Turkey took an almost entirely nonviolent form because the transition to multiparty democracy in 1950, complemented by the liberalization of the economy after 1983, opened up opportunity spaces for the expression of Islamic resentment against the secular regime (Yavuz, 2003). After 27 years of one-party rule under secular nationalist CHP, Turkey held its first free and fair elections in 1950, where the majority of religious groups and ethnic Kurds voted for the opposition Democratic Party (Akturk, 2012:133–43; Yavuz, 2003:60–62). The Democratic Party was much more open to Islamic idioms and as its first parliamentary act, it allowed the reinstitution of the Arabic call to prayer.

The first mainstream Islamist party was founded in 1970 and no less than four Islamist parties (MNP, MSP, RP, FP) were closed down by the state for anti-secular activities. Since the end of the last military dictatorship in 1983, the Islamist vote share increased...
from 7 percent in the 1980s to 47 percent by 2007 (Table 2). There was a temporary decline in Islamist vote share in the late 1990s due to a military intervention known as the “postmodern coup” in Turkey in 1997, which forced an Islamist-led coalition government out of power and implemented punitive measures against the rise of Islamism. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which split from a former Islamist party, won every election it contested since its founding in 2001. While in power, “the AKP provided an Islamist multiculturalist new thinking about ethnicity” (Akturk, 2011:151). Religious newspapers put three times or more emphasis on Islam as the key component of national identity compared to secular newspapers, and religious newspapers were also more supportive of the right to form ethnic parties (Somer and Glöpker, 2015). AKP undertook numerous legislative changes that significantly softened the radical secular nationalist state policies, such as removing the ban on Islamic headscarves in the universities and in the bureaucracy, and allowing Kurdish language instruction and broadcasting using public resources (Akturk, 2012:175–92).

Kurdish ethnolinguistic demands were channeled through Islamist and socialist parties from the 1960s until late 1980s, as well as through independent candidates (Akturk, 2012:143–62; Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009). The illegal Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, launched a major guerrilla insurgency in 1984. The confrontation between the Turkish army and the PKK left more than 35,000 dead until 1999 when the leader of the PKK was captured and imprisoned. The first legal Kurdish nationalist party linked to the PKK, HEP (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi, People’s Democracy Party), was established in 1990, subsequently closed down and reestablished as DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, and BDP, which received between 3 and 6 percent of the national vote, but up to 50 percent of the vote in half a dozen Kurdish-majority provinces in southeastern Turkey. In short, the ethnic Kurdish separatist challenge manifested itself in both votes and violence, while the Islamist challenge has been almost entirely limited to votes, and yet both had and continue to have a major impact on Turkish politics and society (Table 3).

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National Vote Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Welfare Party (RP)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Welfare Party (RP)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Welfare Party (RP)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Virtue Party (FP)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (AKP)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (AKP)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (AKP)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Algeria

**T0. Before Mobilization: Quest for Living Together in the Multireligious French Algeria, 1830–1938**

French Algeria was built on a deep political inequality. One-tenth of the Algerian population that was non-Muslim (mostly Catholic Christians from France, Spain,
TABLE 3
Summary of the Case Analysis of Turkey

| T0. Demography | Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Muslims |
| T0. Muslim grievances | Bourgeoisie mostly non-Muslim; Christian separatism; Capitulations; Entente Occupation of Anatolia |
| T1. Muslim cadres | All-Muslim mobilization (Circassians, Kurds, Laz, etc.); only Muslims can vote for a new parliament in Ankara |
| T1. Islamic discourse | Quran recitations and Prophet's banner in the Parliament, ubiquitous use of jihad, crusade, fatwa; national anthem |
| T1. Islamic acts | Alcohol ban; declaration to the Islamic world; leaders of religious orders as deputy speakers of parliament, etc. |
| T1. Non-Muslim exodus | Christians of Turkey exchanged for Muslims of Greece |
| T2. Secularism | Caliphate abolished; Islamic law discarded; Swiss civil code and Italian penal code adopted; religious orders banned; Sunday replaces Friday as holiday, hat reform, Latin alphabet replaces Arabic script, etc. |
| T2. Monolingual nationalism | Official language Turkish; minority languages banned |
| T3. Islamist challenge | Votes: increasing votes for Islamist parties since 1970 |
| | Violence: Sheik Said (1925) and Menemen (1930) rebellions |
| T3. Ethnic minority/separatist challenge | Violence: Ağrı rebellion (1927–1930) and PKK since 1984 |

Italy, and Malta) had French citizenship, while nine-tenths that was Muslim did not. The non-muslim population with French citizenship was estimated at 1 million by the end of the French-Algerian war in 1962 (Evans and Phillips, 2007:38–40). Indigenous Algerian Jews were also given French citizenship with the Cremieux decrees on October 24, 1870, thus solidifying the religiously-based exclusion of Muslims alone (Evans and Phillips, 2007:31).

In the early 20th century, there was a strong movement led by a small, educated, Franco-phone Muslim elite seeking equality with the non-Muslim French citizens and integration to France (Lawrence, 2013:73–85). The Young Algerians, “inspired by the Young Turks movement in the Ottoman Empire,” were founded in response to the conscription of Algerian Muslims into the French army on February 3, 1912, and “argued that in return for conscription the French must be prepared to give Muslims citizenship rights” (Evans and Phillips, 2007:42). In 1936, the leftist Popular Front government in France formulated a proposal whereby only 25,000 of 6 million Algerian Muslims would be offered French citizenship without having to renounce their Muslim civil status, but even such a limited reformist proposal failed by 1938 after massive protests by the French settlers (Evans and Phillips, 2007:48; Lawrence, 2013:80–81).


The mobilization for independence was a Muslim affair in Algeria. “In Algeria, reformists sought to remove the stipulation that French citizenship could only be obtained through renouncing Islam” (Lawrence, 2013:88). Moreover, “even those who chose to renounce Islam were not assured of attaining citizenship” and “[o]nly about 2000 Algerians gained
French citizenship in this way” (Lawrence, 2013:74). As observed in the historic failure of the Blum-Viollette Bill, all significant attempts at providing equal citizenship to Muslims failed due to the opposition of (non-Muslim) French settlers. Such repeated failure finally turned even those previously assimilationist Muslim leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas, into Muslim nationalists (Lawrence, 2013:78–79).

Muslims constituted the cadres and the followers of all the major groups that contributed to Algerian nationalism: Association of Algerian Ulema (AAU) founded in 1931 and led by Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis (1889–1940); Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA) founded in 1926 and led by Messali Hadj (1898–1974); Young Algerians founded in 1912 and first led by Emir Khaled and later associated with Ferhat Abbas (1889–1985); and, finally, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), set up in 1954 by the merger of numerous smaller organizations in order to launch the Algerian war of independence. AAU, as an association of Islamic religious scholars, had an undoubtedly Islamic vision for Algeria. ENA’s leader was Messali Hadj, who typically appeared in public wearing a fez, and whose style has been described as one of “Islamo-populism” (Evans and Phillips, 2007:57–58). The Young Algerians also had a message of mobilization for Algerian Muslims, demonstrated by the name of their official journal, L’Islam (Lawrence, 2013:76).

Muslim identity and its symbolism was what all Algerian nationalist organizations shared. When the AAU and the Young Algerians convened a joint congress in 1936, it was labeled as the “Islamic” Congress, which led to the founding of the Youth of the “Muslim” Algerian Congress (Lawrence, 2013:79). Upon being banned in 1956, AAU joined the FLN. ENA was dissolved in 1937 and Messali Hadj was later sidelined in intranationalist infighting, making FLN the main organization of Algerian nationalism. It is a significant observation that the mass demonstrations for Algeria’s independence that resulted in a traumatic French military crackdown killing up to 45,000 Muslims on May 8, 1945, began at the main mosque in Setif (Evans and Phillips, 2007:51–52).

FLN’s discourse was also unmistakably Islamic. FLN’s official journal was titled El Moujadhid (i.e., mujabeed), meaning the Muslim who undertakes religious struggle, jihad, or simply an Islamic warrior. In choosing such a name, FLN was following ENA, whose main publication was titled El Oumma (the ummah), the Muslim people. The Algerian independence war began with FLN’s declaration on November 1, 1954, where their goal was declared as “the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam.” Evans and Phillips observe that “[b]y lionizing Islam, Arabism and the ‘people’ in these terms the FLN was taking over Messali Hadj’s Islamo-populism lock, stock and barrel…” (2007:57–58). Moreover, similar to the naming of the parliament in Turkey, the Algerian parliament after independence was named the Majlis al-Oumma, the Assembly of the Muslim People (umma).

Although all Muslim, the Algerian nationalist movement was very multiethnic, including many Berbers along with Arabs. Kabyle Berbers, estimated to be two-thirds of Algerian Berbers, were particularly prominent in the Algerian nationalist leadership, including Ferhat Abbas, Hocine Ait-Ahmed, Krim Belkachem, Abane Ramdane, and Rachid Ali Yáhia. In fact, Berbers of Kabyle were overrepresented “in nearly every political and military grouping involved in the struggle against French rule, both in Algeria and in France” and “Kabyles played an essential role in the struggle for independence, at both the elite and mass levels” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011:48). For example, since 1947, “a small group of Kabyles under the leadership of Belkacem Krim clandestinely organized anti-French activities” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011:48). In short, Arab and Berber Muslims together waged the Algerian war of independence.
A final demographic observation that corroborates the Muslim nature of the independence struggle is the rapid exodus of non-Muslims from Algeria following independence. In the last French Algerian census of 1960, there were slightly over 1 million non-Muslims. Although “bureaucrats made considerable effort to see that the ‘approximately’ 128,380 Algerian Jews one list claimed were living in Algeria at the beginning of 1961 remained in Algeria,” an overwhelming majority of Jews also left Algeria along with Christians within a couple of years after Algerian independence in 1962 (Shepard, 2006:174).

T2. Turn Toward Secular Nationalism in Algeria, 1962–1978: Language, Law, Leaders, and Discourse

Following independence in 1962, Algeria adopted secularist and Arab nationalist policies, which alienated many who participated in the war, some of whom expected the building of an Islamic state while some others expected the recognition of Berber ethno-cultural identity on par with Arab identity. Algeria became a one-party dictatorship of the FLN under its first president, Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–1965), and then evolved into a military dictatorship under its second president, Houari Boumedienne (1965–1978).

Although 20–30 percent of Algeria’s population is Berber speaking (Maddy-Weitzman, 2001:23), the Algerian state instituted Arabic as the only official language and embarked on an Arabization campaign, building a national identity based on “the assertion that Algerians were an Arab-Islamic people” (Evans and Phillips, 2007:75). Running parallel to this Arabization campaign, “those Kabyle leaders who in various ways had stood for an Algérie algerienne (as opposed to Algérie arabe) were either assassinated (Krim Belkacem and Abane Ramdane), jailed (Hocine Ait-Ahmed and Rachid Ali Yahia) or politically marginalized (Ferhat Abbas)” (Silverstein, 1996:15). Berber-Kabyle leaders of the independence war were purged, while the ethno-nationalist discourse of “Algeria for the Arabs” triumphed over the competing discourse of a multiethnic “Algeria for the Algerians.” The Arabization campaign intensified under Boumedienne, especially after 1973 when “[u]niversity courses in Berber linguistics (taught since the colonial period) were eliminated, the public and literary use of Berber was outlawed and a disproportionate number of Islamic institutes were established in Berberophone areas” (Silverstein, 1996:12). Both in terms of leading cadres and official discourse, Berbers were excluded from the postindependence Algerian nation-state.

FLN dictatorship put in power an “upper class of praetorian privilege,” which the International Crisis Group estimates to be 2.5 percent of the population, and whose modernism, socialism, and privileges pit them against the Muslim masses (Zartman, 2004:217). Since the beginning, “FLN was the antithesis of the mass-based party . . . if anything FLN distrusted the people” (Evans and Phillips, 2007:64). Islamic groups that supported the war of liberation were disturbed early on by the “fusion of socialism and Islam where the rising influence of Marxism was plain to see” in the official ideology (Evans and Phillips, 2007:75). As Ray Takeyh argues, “the FLN coalition that managed the extraordinary feat of besting the French empire greatly relied on religious forces and symbols to mobilize the population behind the cause of independence. Despite the clerical community’s contributions to this cause, the secular leaders of the FLN viewed religion from a utilitarian perspective, sufficient for mass mobilization but inadequate as a template for governance” (2003, emphasis mine).

After independence, Algeria became a socialist state with links to other socialists worldwide, welcoming “the arrival of young European revolutionaries such as the Belgian Gerard Chaliand,” which was a disturbing sign for the religious conservatives (Evans and Phillips, 2007:68). For example, Greek Trotskyist Michalis Raptis (a.k.a. “Michel Pablo”) became
a minister in the postrevolutionary Algerian government and wrote the Algiers Charter as the head of a small clique of Ben Bella’s advisers (Evans and Phillips, 2007:79).

Boumedienn’s further leftist turn following Ben Bella’s ouster in 1965, epitomized in his land reform, Fidel Castro’s visit to Algeria, the promotion of women, and the fusing of socialism with Islam galvanized the Islamist opposition, leading one prominent Islamist, Abdellatif Soltani, to issue a “fatwa saying that prayers were forbidden on nationalized land” (Evans and Phillips, 2007:93). Such developments led to a certain disillusionment among the Muslim masses, who thought that the brutal war against the French was fought in order to build an Islamic state and society. Abbasi Madani, the leader of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), provides a succinct summary of the Islamist dissidents’ perception of the contradiction between religious origins and secular state building in Algeria:

“The Algerian state of 1962 had nothing to do with what had been projected on the first of November 1954, for which we had taken up arms: an independent state founded on Islamic principles. The state that has risen before our eyes was founded on secular, socialist principles. This was a serious deviation” (Takeyh, 2003).


Within two years of independence, Islamic and ethnic Berber reactions to the secular nationalist turn of the Algerian state erupted. The leading Berber member of the FLN, Hocine Ait Ahmed, broke away to form the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), which established a strong base of support in the Berber Kabylia region. “Between 1963 and 1965, the FFS led an open revolt in Kabylia against the ‘fascism’ of the FLN. The movement was suppressed and Ait-Ahmed exiled to Europe” (Silverstein, 1996:15). In 1968, a clandestine Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) was established and some young members of the MCB launched a terrorist attack on the FLN newspaper El-Moudjahid in 1976 (Evans and Phillips, 2007:87).

A critical point was reached when the government ban on a lecture by Mouloud Mammeri on the use of the Berber language at Tizi-Ouzou University on March 19, 1980, led to the occupation of the university, widespread demonstrations, and a general strike in Kabylia. The government clamped down on these protests, known as the “Berber Spring” (Tafsut Imazighen). Thousands of Berbers were mobilized again in 1998 following the murder of the famous Berber singer Lounes Matoub, and the death of a young Berber under police custody in 2001 mobilized hundreds of thousands of Berbers, during which Algerian security forces killed several dozen Berbers (Minorities at Risk, 2014a)

Islamist reaction to Algerian secularism is much better known. Islamist Al-Qiyam was founded in 1964 “by a group of clerics, including Abassi Madani, Ahmed Sahnoun and Abdelatif Soltani, which called for the country to be cleansed of anti-Islamic practices” and the government banned this organization in 1970 (Evans and Phillips, 2007:77, 91). The first two decades after Algerian independence under Boumedienne’s (1965–1978) dictatorship witnessed heavy-handed repression that was successful in containing Islamist and ethnic separatist mobilization in the short term.

The Islamist movement endured and grew until the first free and fair (local) elections of June 1990, when Islamist FIS received 54 percent of the vote. In the December 1991 parliamentary elections, FIS won 188 of the 231 seats in the parliament, and Berber-supported FFS won 25 seats, mostly in the Kabylia region, while the FLN only won 15
TABLE 4

Summary of the Case Analysis of Algeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T0. Demography</td>
<td>French Algeria: Muslims, Christians, and Jews</td>
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<td>T0. Muslim grievances</td>
<td>Only Christians and Jews are citizens with voting rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1. Muslim cadres</td>
<td>AAU, ENA, FLN, Young Algerians: organizations led by Muslim leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>T1. Islamic discourse</td>
<td>Journals employing Islamic discourse: <em>L’Islam</em> (Young Algerians), <em>El Moujadhid</em> (FLN), <em>El Oumma</em> (ENA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1. Non-Muslim exodus</td>
<td>Almost all Christians and Jews leave Algeria for France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2. Secularism</td>
<td>Socialist state; influence of non-Muslim, non-Algerian socialist cadres</td>
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seats. The 1991 election results succinctly demonstrate the magnitude of the Islamist and Berber nationalist challenges, which proved to be far more popular than FLN’s secular Arab nationalism.

Most observers concur that since political liberalization in Algeria, “only two types of organisation proved to be powerful, resilient and constantly challenging: the Islamist and the Berber parties and associations” (Layachi, 2004:46). Some others argue that Islamist and Berber parties make up two of the four sizeable blocs in Algerian society, adding the “nationalist group, made up of officials, state workers and rural voters, that reliably votes for the FLN or other government-endorsed parties” and “a scattering of democrats, regionalist and independents who probably make up much of the remainder of society” (Quandt, 2004:85–86). However, due to the military intervention and the annulment of the 1991 elections, a civil war erupted between the Islamists and the secular nationalist government that claimed the lives of 160,000 people and forestalled any hope of genuine democratization (Layachi, 2004:46).

The Algerian government passed pieces of legislation to mollify Islamist and Berber demands. Under President Chadli Bendjedid (1978–1991), “a new ‘Family-status Code’ was adopted that represented major concessions to the Islamists, especially with regard the status of women” (Takeyh, 2003). Berber (*Tamazight*) was recognized as a “national language” in April 2002, but not as an official language. However, such accommodative legislation failed to abate the tide of Islamic and Berber mobilization. In conclusion, Algeria, perhaps even more clearly than Turkey, demonstrates the pattern of Islamic mobilization for independence followed by a secular nationalist regime leading to massive Islamist and ethnic minority nationalist opposition movements (Table 4).

Pakistan

**T0. Before Mobilization: Quest for Living Together in the Multireligious British India, 1857–1930**

Religious diversity of British India surpassed even that of Ottoman Anatolia and French Algeria. Although Hindus formed the majority, a very large Muslim minority, which
formed the majority in many regions, existed alongside Sikh, Parsee, Christian, and other minorities.

Muslims suffered a severe status reversal following British rule. Prior to the arrival of the British, India was ruled by a Muslim dynasty, the Mughals. With the Battle of Plassey (1757) and the Battle of Buxar (1764), Muslims were subordinated to the British, who exercised their rule through the British East India Company. Making matters worse for the Muslims, as a result of the Indian Rebellion of 1857, which sought and briefly succeeded in restoring the Mughal dynasty to the imperial throne in Delhi, the British perceived Muslims as the more seditious community in India. Muslims witnessed a further deterioration of their status vis-à-vis Hindus, who formed the demographic majority in the Indian subcontinent.

Many Muslim leaders, including Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), who took the leading role in the founding of Pakistan, sought equality with Hindus and minority protections for Muslims at first. Jinnah was a member of the Indian Congress Party until 1920, and advocated Hindu-Muslim unity with minority protections for the Muslims. However, he and the Muslim League that he led gradually came to the conclusion that the Indian Muslims needed a separate nation-state (Jalal, 1985). The failure to achieve equality with non-Muslims and guarantee collective political rights in a multireligious empire are eerily significant parallels between Ottoman, British Indian, and French Algerian experiences, which then motivate Muslim mobilization for a separate state (Table 5).


The founding of Pakistan was based on a Muslim mobilization within and against the Hindu-majority India that was politically led by the Congress Party on the one hand, and against British (nominally Christian) colonialism on the other. Jinnah developed the “two-nation theory” whereby he defined Hindus and Muslims, otherwise religious categories, as two separate “nations” and explicitly demanded a “Muslim state” in the Indian subcontinent. He argued that “[t]he Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry, nor dine together, and they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions” (Islam, 1981:55).
Jinnah’s two-nation theory very much resembles the redefinition of religiously-defined “millets” into “nations” by nationalist ideologues in the Ottoman Empire. The Muslim League was very much influenced by the war of liberation in Turkey and Jinnah was a well-known admirer of Ataturk, which is a concrete connection between Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms (Qureshi, 1996). Jinnah feared that the Muslims “would become a political underclass in a unified India dominated by Hindus . . . while Congress insisted on a unitary state with no special status accorded on religious grounds” (Schmidt, 2011:19). British India was partitioned in 1947 and all the Muslim-majority provinces (except Kashmir) were designated as Pakistan.

The leading cadres and the support base of the Muslim League consisted of Muslims, which is an undeniable historical fact bordering on tautology. The Muslim League reflected the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Indian Muslims. It was founded in Bengal in 1906, and therefore had a very large number of Bengali speakers. For example, the second and third prime ministers of Pakistan, Khawaja Nazimuddin (1951–1953) and Muhammad Ali Bogra (1953–1955), were both Bengali, and were members of the Muslim League. The mobilization for an independent Muslim state in India was led and supported by Muslims from different ethnic backgrounds.

The discourse of the Muslim League was thoroughly Islamic. Muhammad Iqbal declared the goal of creating a “Muslim state” in northwest India in his presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930. “‘Islamic state,’ ‘Islamic government,’ ‘Islamic constitution,’ and ‘Islamic ideology’ were the slogans of the preindependence era and these slogans were successfully utilized to mobilize mass support for Pakistan” (Islam, 1981:56–57). However, important substantive details of this prospective Islamic state, for example, its legal system and its policies toward ethnic and linguistic diversity, were not clarified.

In a striking parallel with the Turkish experience a quarter-century earlier, Muslims fled India for Pakistan and Hindus fled Pakistan for India during the Partition of India, with an estimated 17 million people permanently leaving their homelands in “the largest transfer of populations in recorded history,” once again demonstrating the religious nature of the mobilization for independence (Davis, 1949; Jalal, 1985:1).

T2. Turn Toward Secular Nationalism in Pakistan, 1947–1956: Language, Law, Leaders, and Discourse

Despite the multiethnic Muslim mobilization for an Islamic state, Pakistan declared its independence in 1947 as a secular state with a single official national language, Urdu. Nasir Islam argues that “[t]he use of Islamic slogans by the bourgeois, Westernized leaders [in Pakistan] was largely a façade,” and, quoting Myron Weiner, emphasizes that “[t]he Westernized, largely non-religious leadership which led the preindependence movement . . . had no desire for an Islamic state” (Islam, 1981:56, 58). Islamic law did not become the basis of Pakistani legal system, much to the consternation of the Islamist movements. Pakistan remained as the “Dominion of Pakistan” with British Indian laws in place. The disagreement over what is meant by a Muslim state was a major reason for Pakistan’s inability to formulate its constitution until 1956 (Islam, 1981:59). Nonetheless, unlike Turkey and Algeria, Pakistani nation-builders were more careful not to antagonize the ulema (religious scholars) and they also did not repress Islamist movements even after Pakistan’s founding as a secular state, but they also did not include these Islamist groups within the political leadership, keeping them at arm’s length. Pakistan’s founders were highly Westernized and nonreligious individuals who instrumentally used Islamic discourse to facilitate Muslim
mobilization for independence. Faisal Devji (2013:61–68, 212–22) emphasizes that many of the founders of Pakistan were Shia Muslims, even Ismailis, a smaller subsect of Shiism, and as such, these elites may have also had a sectarian motivation to establish a secular state with a very ecumenical definition of Muslim identity. Not only was Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, a Shia, but Aga Khan, the key businessman who financed the Muslim League, was an Ismaili.

Pakistan was made up of five provinces, Balochistan, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab, Sindh, and East Pakistan, each province having a particular ethnic majority with its own native language, namely, Baloch, Pashtun (NWFP), Punjabi, Sindhi, and Bengali (East Pakistan). In contrast, a large percentage of the Muslim League and the early Pakistani leadership, including Jinnah, were *Mohajirs* (Arabic for “migrant”), Muslim refugees who left India after the Partition and settled mostly around Karachi, the first capital and the most populous city of Pakistan (Schmidt, 2011:23).

The Pakistani government declared Urdu to be the only official state language of Pakistan (Islam, 1981:62), while Aga Khan advocated Arabic as the national language for Pakistan in a controversial speech in 1951 (Devji, 2013:213). Muslim leaders since Syed Khan (1817–1898) advocated a standard language for all Indian Muslims. “Urdu” is an admixture of Arabic, Indic, Persian, and Turkic elements developed by the Muslim rulers of India. Although Urdu has been the primary language of the *Mohajirs*, more than 90 percent of the Pakistani population did not speak Urdu as their first language. “The effort of the Central Government to impose Urdu as the national language and the denial of representation on the basis of population by the West led the Bengalis toward a complete distrust of the central government” (Islam, 1981:60).

Ayub Khan’s military coup in 1958 made matters worse, since “[t]he military-bureaucratic-industrial complex that became all powerful in the Ayub era was largely unrepresentative of East Pakistanis” (Islam, 1981:61). Under Ayub’s dictatorship, Punjabis established their political economic hegemony and sidelined previously powerful Mohajirs, although “Ayub governed as a pro-Western, pro-business leader who shared the largely secular views of the mohajir class he had brushed aside” (Schmidt, 2011:27). The refusal of the ruling elite in Karachi to accord Bengali the status of an official language alongside Urdu led to strikes and violent demonstrations in East Pakistan in 1952 (Schmidt, 2011:30–31).


The 1956 Constitution anointed the state as the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and Bengali was finally recognized as one of the official languages, two legislative gestures meant to appease the Islamist and Bengali critics of monolingual secular nationalism. However, these concessions did not stem the tide of Islamism and ethnic separatism.

Three conditions made the Bengali separatist challenge particularly threatening for the territorial integrity of Pakistan. First, Bengali-speaking East Pakistan was geographically detached from West Pakistan by more than a thousand miles. Second, far more people spoke Bengali as their native language than Urdu. Third, although East Pakistan’s population surpassed that of West Pakistan, the West Pakistanis and especially the Punjabis dominated the military, the bureaucracy, and the bourgeoisie. Bengalis of East Pakistan were not even allowed to exercise the political power that they deserved due to their demographic superiority. The problem of underrepresentation and the appearance of internal colonialism deepened during the military dictatorships of Ayub Khan (1958–1969) and Yahya Khan.
(1969–1971). The Bengali Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won a landslide victory in the 1971 elections but the West Pakistani elites did not allow him to govern Pakistan, leading to a military conflict where several hundred thousand Bengali civilians were killed. Nonetheless, with India’s intervention against West Pakistan, East Pakistan seceded and became independent as “Bangladesh.”

Pakistan lost more than half of its population with the secession of Bangladesh. However, ethnic separatist challenge continued in (West) Pakistan, where Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhi, and Mohajir ethnic groups all resented and resisted Punjabi hegemony. Baloch nationalism presents the most significant ethnic separatist nationalism in Pakistan since the Bangladeshi secession. Baloch are the majority in the province of Balochistan, which constitutes 40 percent of Pakistani territory and includes most of the country’s oil and natural gas resources. Ethnic Baloch “rebelled against Pakistani rule—in 1948, 1953, through the 1960s and 1970s, and now” (Tharoor, 2009). Up to 10,000 people were killed in the Baluch rebellion of 1973–1977. “[I]n 1998, several Baluch parties joined with Mohajir, Pashtun and Sindhi parties to form the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM), which seeks to challenge Punjab hegemony in Pakistan’s political life” (Minorities at Risk, 2014b). These ethnic groups together make up 40 percent of Pakistan’s population. PONM is a concrete embodiment of the full spectrum of ethnic minority resentment in Pakistan.

Islamist mobilization against the state has been more limited in Pakistan than in Turkey and Algeria. Even in its first decades when it was governed by a Westernized, secularist military bureaucratic clique, the Pakistani state did not repress the Islamist opposition and continued to pay homage to the ideal of an Islamic state. The main Islamist political party has been Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which aims to make Pakistan an Islamic state governed by Islamic law. The founder of JI was Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1971), who is a major figure for the Islamist movements worldwide.

Although not one of the mainstream political parties, having received 10 percent of the vote at its high point in the 1970 elections, JI’s influence has been far beyond its electoral weight. The following three observations demonstrate the successful pressure Islamist JI put on the Pakistani state. First, JI organized street demonstrations in 1953 that had a role in eventually compelling the Pakistani state to declare Ahmadis, who self-identify as Muslims, as a non-Muslim group (Schmidt, 2011:61). Second, following independence in 1947, JI supported the declaration of Pakistan as an “Islamic Republic,” which was done with the 1956 Constitution. Third, JI colluded with the Pakistani military dictator Zia Ul Haq (1977–1988) and succeeded in pushing Islamization measures, such as the legislation of “Hudood Ordinances” in 1979 and the establishment of a Federal Shariat Court in 1980.

In conclusion, unlike in Turkey and Algeria, Pakistan failed to maintain its territorial integrity against ethnic separatist challenges (secession of Bangladesh) and it failed to maintain the secular nature of the state against the Islamist challenge (transition to an Islamic legal system). Although Pakistan has been compared to Israel in terms of converting religious identity into a national identity (Akturk and Naseemullah, 2009; Devji, 2013), the Israeli model has been initially more successful in terms striking a balance between the secular state and (Jewish) religious law, in part because it permitted far more extensive religious regulations in many areas of everyday life. However, religious-secular conflict is also apparent and growing in Israel in issues such as “the expansion of commerce on the Sabbath, a thriving nonkosher culinary culture, marriages performed without Orthodox rabbis, civil burials, and even an annual gay pride parade” (Ben-Porat, 2013:xi–xii).

Why has Pakistan failed to preserve its territorial integrity and the secular nature of the state to a greater extent than Turkey or Algeria? Significantly lower state capacity that
Pakistan inherited compared to Turkey and Algeria appears as the most likely factor that can explain this difference, but a full explanation of this variation is beyond the scope of this article. Turkey inherited the core of the Ottoman Empire, an already centralized entity, including a military and a bureaucracy that was experienced in running a state in a territory that is very compact and defensible, surrounded by the seas in three directions. Algeria inherited a very compact territory with a heavily centralized infrastructure that is the legacy of French Algeria. In stark contrast, Pakistan inherited the periphery of an already colonial entity, British India (its “core” became India), a periphery that was territorially noncontiguous, with more than a thousand miles separating East and West Pakistan, and ruled by elites that were the minorities of a previous colonial entity, with very little experience in governance.

Conclusions: A Structural Crisis of Legitimacy Based on a Historical Disjuncture

Several conclusions with theoretical ramifications result from this comparative analysis of the interplay between religion and nationalism in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan. First, I argued that Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan were founded on the basis of an Islamic mobilization against non-Muslim opponents but having successfully defeated these non-Muslim opponents, their political elites chose a secular and monolingual nation-state model for these countries, which led to significant and recurrent challenges to the state in the form of Islamist and ethnic separatist movements. Secular nationalism faces a structural and path-dependent crisis of legitimacy in these countries because of what could be described as a historical or “genetic” disjuncture located at the very origins of these nation-states. Therefore, these challenges are unlikely to disappear completely, but they can be contained more peacefully in some contexts than others, as the comparative analysis in this article demonstrates. Second, the protracted struggle along religious communal fault lines led to a rapid religious homogenization of the territories that became Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan. Third, in all three countries, ethnic minority nationalist and Islamist challenges have been used as a justification by the military to intervene in politics, leading to many coups and long periods of dictatorship as well as military tutelage during periods of civilian rule. Fourth, despite the fact that Islamism and ethnic separatism posed existential challenges for all three countries, Pakistan has been the least successful one in coping with these challenges as it failed to preserve the territorial integrity and the secular nature of the state, which is most likely related to a lower state capacity it inherited and continued to have compared to Turkey and Algeria. Theories of nationalism must be revised to take into account this distinctive path to nationhood through religious mobilization observed in three major Muslim states, which has some similarities with nation-building in early modern England, France, and Spain (Marx, 2005), as well as with the creation of Israel (Akturt and Naseemullah, 2009; Devji, 2013).

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