

[applause]

GRAHAM ALLISON: So good evening. I'm Graham Allison. And we're looking forward to a spectacular evening. And I'm so pleased to have two new senior Fellows, nonresident, at the Belfer Center, as our guests tonight. So Jim Clapper was, until January 20th, the Director of National Intelligence for the US government. On January 20th he retired after 53 years of service. [applause] Most of it in the Intelligence community. And the benefit that we have here is an opportunity at the Center to have the wisdom of somebody accumulated overall these years is fantastic.

Mike Rogers, another new senior Fellow nonresident, was in his previous incarnation, the Republican Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. But before that, he was an FBI special agent. And before that, he was in the Army. So for somebody who's seen the Intelligence community from a lot of different angles, I would say we're again extremely fortunate to have somebody with that perspective. So thank you, Mike. [applause]

So we were chatting—Just to get started, the game plan for tonight is we're going to have a conversation among ourselves for a few minutes. And then, at some point, we'll go to the audience for questions and discussion. But I thought, and actually Mike suggested that it would be useful, take a minute each to just explain what is your perspective, given your career and seat from which you look at the Intelligence enterprise? Because for those of you not familiar, so if you read in the newspaper, it's got something called the Intelligence community. And again, what means that?

Well, then there's CIA. Well, okay, we've heard of that. Well then there's 18 other agencies. Well we've heard about most of them. And then, there's this thing called the Director of National Intelligence. And then, but any case, this just happens to be the Executive Branch component of this. If you think about the Intelligence enterprise, there's also something called the President. And there's something called the Executive Branch. And then there's something called the Congress. And so these are somewhat different perspectives, the way things were designed.

So Jim, tell us just a little bit about your perspective. And then Mike.

JIM CLAPPER: Well, the origins of the position of a Director of National Intelligence can be traced to the 9/11 Commission. And one of the recommendations they made, that there should be someone in a position to lead the community and to foster integration. Obviously, the prior construct had been that the Director of Central Intelligence Agency would be dual-headed as the DCI, Director of Central Intelligence. And I think I see Michael Ball here.

But my observation was that in 20 or 25 years worth of up close and personal observation of Directors of Central Intelligence Agency/DCIs, that sooner or later, mostly sooner, they tended to get consumed with agency-centric issues, and would pay attention to the community when they needed to.

So the conclusion was that there needed to be a fulltime person to do that. That found its way into what's called the IRTPA, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which President Bush signed into law on the 17th of December of 2004, a seriously flawed piece of legislation. But you know, that's the way it is.

There are three basic tasks of the DNI, which is to manage the National Intelligence—Well first, to be the primary, but not necessarily exclusive, but primary advisor to the President for Intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters, to run what's called the NIP, the National Intelligence Program, which is the programmatic aggregation that funds the national pieces of what's defined as the community, and to, in your spare time, lead the enterprise.

And so I was the fourth incumbent of the position. The first three went about five years, one month. I did six and a half years. In reference to your comment, NFAQ, towards the end, frequently asked questions, “Well, Director, what do you consider your greatest accomplishment?” And my response was, “I lasted.” [laughter] So that's kind of the fun meld of the position.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Mike, what is a member of Congress's perspective of all this?

MIKE ROGERS: Well, it does depend on the member of Congress, I think we've learned that. At least you would laugh at that I figured. So the committee is really an important function in the National Security space, I think. So when I became Chairman over the years, we had seen that partisanship had crept in even to the Intelligence community. And it was almost nonfunctional. They hadn't even produced a budget that they could agree on six years prior to me assuming the Chairmanship.

So I had a very good working relationship with my cohort, who was a personal friend of mine, a guy named Dutch Ruppensberger. We sat down, when he became the Ranking Member and I became the Chairman, and said, "Listen, this is important space." He was a prosecutor in his former life. I was a former FBI agent. I figured we ought to be able to work this out. We decided that we would establish an operating procedure that would try to defang the partisanship in the National Security space.

We felt we needed a classified space to have honest, thoughtful discussions, disagreements, agreements, and then finally conclusion and collaboration on getting the tools that our Intelligence services needed, as well as maybe any problems that we might have, and have a forum of which we could address those problems in a classified setting, and then move out smartly on any agreed upon future.

So our job was the 16 agencies plus the DNI's office, so 17 Intelligence agencies of the United States. Our job was all of the budgeting, the public number for that at the time was about \$75 billion dollars. It's actually gone down a little bit to about \$72 billion dollars. And we did all of the policy review, covert action review on a smaller set of the committee, all the counterintelligence actions, current and ongoing. As you can imagine, very sensitive information. So we tried to reestablish the committee in its original intent and form to do that legitimate oversight, and again, try to foster a better relationship between Congress and the

Executive Branch, when it came to following the law, following policy, and our influence through the budget that we had at the committee. So that was really the way we looked at our role. And we passed a budget every single year. And actually, the first year we passed the previous year's budget too, just to prove a point.

GRAHAM ALLISON: As we'll see in the conversation, as we've already been—Mike and Jim and I have been talking, there's some differences in perspective of the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. We'll try to illuminate those. I should have said to start with, and apologize, that we want to welcome especially the members of the International Council of the Belfer Center who are here, and many of whom are here. And two of them are the former Director of CIA, David Petraeus and the former Deputy Director, Michael Morrell. So after the commentary and whatever, if you have a strong point of agreement or disagreement, we'll let you do the microphones first.

So in any case, I pick up my local newspaper here on Sunday. So the topic today is "Russiagate: Everything You Wanted to Know But Were Afraid to Ask." So here's the Sunday *Globe* that says, "Keep your eyes on Russia." And it's a full page editorial. They never do full page editorials. Says, "We're forgetting to keep our eye on the ball." So I thought it was like an advertisement for our Forum here tonight. It says, "We got to figure out what do we know? And what do we not know? And why does it matter?"

So it starts off, actually, it says, "A fog has descended on Washington." Excuse me, what's new about that? And there's a fog here, because if somebody is trying to make sense, just as an ordinary citizen, who has life, so they're not reading every little leak, every little claim, every little assertion, to figure out, what do we know, at least at this stage, about Russiagate? Okay. And then secondly, I want to go from there, but let's first, what do we know? And what do we not know? And then secondly, so what? Okay. What's its significance?

So let me, for what do we know, since you're called up repeatedly, Jim, by Congress to testify, to say, "Okay, so what do we know?" And you keep telling them, "Well, there's some things we

know, and there's a lot of things we don't know." Let's play the first clip very quickly. And then the questions to you. This was your—I think we have a clip with you testifying, if it works.

[VIDEO] **JIM CLAPPER:** With respect to the findings, is that we'll first address Russia's goals and attentions. We have high confidence that President Putin ordered an influenced campaign in 2016, aimed at the US Presidential election. The goals of this campaign were to undermine public faith in the US Democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential Presidency. [END VIDEO]

GRAHAM ALLISON: Okay. So at this stage, what do we know?

JIM CLAPPER: Well, we know, you know, what we said in the Intelligence community assessment that was published on the 6th of January. And that was a real quick summation of it, that clearly the Russians—and the shots were called here at the highest level—were interested first in sowing dissention and doubt and discord in this country. And as the campaign wore on, their objectives kind of switched. They too wouldn't take initially Mr. Trump seriously. But later on, they did.

And the primary motivation was intense animus towards the Clintons, both former President Clinton and as well as former Secretary Clinton. And then, more and more, Mr. Trump grew to be an appealing candidate. And so they threw their weight behind that, and to the point where they clearly favored Mr. Trump over Hillary Clinton.

So we published two versions of this, a classified version and an unclassified version. The key judgments rendered were identical. And we tried to put as much substantiation as we could at the unclassified level. And that was by design, because President Obama had directed this in the first week of December of 2016. And we put together all that we could, compiled all the reporting that we had, all the intelligence we had on what the Russians were doing, and put that in one report, no matter how highly classified it was, so we would have that to hand off to the next administration, and to the Congress.

As well, yet, he directed that, to the extent that we possibly could, to make that as much of unclassified as possible, to release to the American public, which I felt personally was extremely important. This was part of a multifaceted campaign, in addition to, of course, the famous hacking that went on. They did a lot of other things. You know, classical propaganda, paying people to insert social media, fake news that they generated, RT, very, very active and propaganda, which was very pro-Trump and very anti-Clinton.

I know it's been a rerecruited[?] size, of course, and understandably so, because we could not be as forthcoming with the evidence, the evidentiary base for these assertions and the unclassified publicly released version. But we—and I say we, the participating elements here, which were CIA, NSA, FBI, and under the allegiance of ODNI, almost uniformly had very high confidence in the judgments that came out in this thing.

And in my view, the evidence for it was overwhelming. It was extremely compelling. Just on the face of the—just on the basis of the [00:14:11] and the cyber evidence alone, to me is irrefutable. Unfortunately, for reasons that this group will understand from the sources, methods, and [00:14:21] standpoint, we couldn't expose that. So we did the best we could, and we only had a month or so to do this, so a pretty strict deadline that President Obama wanted it done before the end of his term.

GRAHAM ALLISON: So basically, we can read the January 6th report, the public version, and the key findings are stated clearly. And the classified report only gives you more reason for believing what's in the 6 January—

JIM CLAPPER: There was more substantiation, obviously, in the classified version.

GRAHAM ALLISON: So Mike, what do you think? What do we know now at this stage? Add or subtract, yeah.

MIKE ROGERS: And just one quick thing before we do that. I did not believe that the Director of National Intelligence was going to work after the first few directors, not because they weren't good and qualified people who were making a valiant effort. What fundamentally changed the way the Director of National Intelligence functioned, was a guy named Jim Clapper. Now I say that now because we're going to disagree and fight a lot here in a few minutes. I'm kidding. Maybe. I'm just kidding. [laughter]

He came in, and brought a level of professionalism to the DNI, and he brought such gravitas to the job, it finally ironed out the wrinkles that we thought would never go away. And he candidly made me believe in the function of the Director of National—The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. And from that, we saw an improvement of the daily briefs to the President. I thought the product got exponentially better, because there was more inclusion on what went in the product that went on the President's desk.

We started dealing with these really hard strategic problems of the Intelligence community we could never quite get around, because there was always a fire to put out somewhere. And your focus was there. Jim Clapper came in and changed the function of that, didn't get into operations unless he absolutely had to. And helped us deal with long-term budgeting, what is our satellite architecture look like in ten years? All the questions we were having a hard time getting answered. So I thought I'd throw that on the table. It was a valiant 53 years. And I think the last—He says his great accomplishment was staying six years. I'm going to adamantly disagree. He actually made the DNI function like we would all be proud that it functioned. So for that, I want to thank you very much.

[applause]

GRAHAM ALLISON: I even see David Petraeus shaking his head agreeing, what appears to be, yes. Okay, good.

MIKE ROGERS: So I'll tell you this story about the Russians.

GRAHAM ALLISON: On the other hand—

MIKE ROGERS: On the other hand, yeah, that dirty rotten dog of a DNI. When I was a young FBI agent, and they call it “getting the ticket,” I got a ticket on a professor at a national laboratory who was approached by a Russian. This would have been the mid-‘80s, when I was going to save the world and put every bad guy in jail.

And so I get this ticket, I'm very excited about it. And long story short, this professor was going onto these different conferences, and a certain individual who was Russian kept showing up and making approaches to him. You know, he was very clumsy at it. But apparently it worked because he did it enough. And so we got onto this guy. I'm doing this interview. And so I'm going through, and I'm saying, “Sir, I”—the Russian who happened to be still in the United States.

And I said, “Sir, I'm having a hard time”—remember the age, we didn't have Google back then. I know it's shocking to many of you. I couldn't confirm his academic credentials back at that time in the Soviet Union. I was having a hard time getting even verified that he was at the stature that he claimed to be at these technical centers. And he was having a very difficult time answering basic questions that somebody at that technical level would be able to answer. He was having a hard time getting there. He kept blaming it on his English.

So we'd go through. And he said, “Well”—and I won't do my Russian accent. It's really bad. But he would always say, he said, “Oh, well we have a different word for that. We have a different word for that in Russian and it'll come to me. And I'll be able to translate it in a minute.” I went, “Okay.”

Well then I went through, and I said, “Your travel records are very suspicious to us. Every place that there's this interesting technological gathering or conference, you're there, even if it's not related to your academic credentials that you tell me that you have that I cannot prove that you

have.” And he said, “Oh, we have a different word for that. And it’ll come to me in a minute.” [laughter] So we go through the interview. And I’m kind of scratching my head, trying to figure out how I get around it. And he goes, “Ah, I know what it is. Flexibility.” [laughter] Wow, okay.

What they were doing back then is really a lot what you’re seeing today. It didn’t change. So the biggest shock to me in this whole thing is this whole public denial that the Russians were trying to influence an election at all. Why we should be surprised is shocking to me. If you look at the total history of Russian Intelligence Service activities, including going back to Latin America, there’s a great book by a former KGB officer called *The World Was Going Our Way*, where they talk about influencing elections in Latin America and how they believed, the Russians believed, the center believed that they were winning that fight, that they were actually moving the needle in their direction.

And they would do it the old-fashioned way. They would find newspaper people and bribe them to write certain stories. They would infiltrate political parties and try to sow discourse. They wanted discourse. They wanted lack of confidence in the election. All of these things that they wanted to accomplish. But they did it through, again, the old-fashioned way. They had somebody showing up at a conference. They had somebody showing up, knocking on a reporter’s door, trying to find some weakness so that they could recruit that reporter, including, by the way, just paying that reporter back then.

And so they found a way—But you can imagine doing it that way is not nearly as effective as the internet, social media. And so all that they’re doing is applying their same skill sets that they had developed over the 70 years that they’ve been doing this kind of thing, and then took this huge and new powerful tool, right, social media, and were incredibly impactful. And as the Director was saying, I think the evidence is just overwhelming how they were trying to influence.

What I don’t agree with, and both political parties are going to say—they’re going to fight about whose side were they on. I almost think you should take that away, right. You know, one party

wants you to believe that Putin had you around the throat as they walked into the voting booths and, you know, “Push that button right there.” That part wasn’t happening.

They saw the same polls that we did. Some notion that the Russians knew that Trump had an opportunity to win this thing more than US public polling, I find ridiculous, right. They were more concerned, in my mind, to try to sow chaos, discontent. And they are very good at it. And that’s what you’re seeing happening in France. You’re going to see it happen in Germany. You’re going to see this all over Europe, because they have found something that works.

And remember, they don’t have the same kind of resources even US Intelligence Services do. So when they find something that works, you’re going to see it a lot, because they don’t have a whole lot of plays in that playbook. But what they have is powerful. And it’s effective. And we have yet, I argue, in a public policy arena, figured out how we’re going to deal with it.

JIM CLAPPER: Well, Mike’s actually right. The Russians have a long—before them Soviets, a long history of influencing elections, theirs and other people’s. And their history in this country, going back to the ‘60s, where rather crudely, maybe, but they attempted to influence the outcome of elections through funding and propaganda and this sort of thing. The difference, though, in the election of 2016, is that this is the most assertive, most aggressive, and most directly impactful of any engagement that they’ve had in our elections.

And Mike is also absolutely right about this is going to continue. You know, they have to regard what they did as a huge success. They’ve been doing it in France and they’ll do it in Germany. And there’s all kinds of motivations for that. But when you think about resource expended versus result, they got to be pretty happy with what they’ve done. And that will reinforce, I think, ratcheting this up even more in the future.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Let me be the devil’s advocate for a minute here to ask. So are they the only country that attempts to influence elections? Are they the only country that tries to influence who becomes a government? Or even the only country to influence a government, maybe even to

undermine a government? I mean as a student of history, I think I can remember there were some guys called, in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas. And I do think we helped overthrow them. And I was in favor of it.

JIM CLAPPER: Yeah, but that all for a good cause. [laughter]

GRAHAM ALLISON: Well, no, I have no question that we're the good guys and they're the bad guys. So there's no more equivalence here. But if a Martian were looking at this and said, "Who interferes most frequently in other countries' elections?" Excuse me, we announced that we promote democracy. So I'm in favor of promoting democracy. That's the right form of government. and our Constitution, actually our Declaration of Independence says, "All human beings," whichever country, should be able to be free.

So, from a Russian point of view, are we just doing to them sort of like what we do to guys in Ukraine? If there's a government, there's a demonstration, a guy that we said was democratically elected—Yanukovich is there. Lo and behold, he's overthrown by a crowd, where we had an Assistant Secretary out giving out cookies and cheering him on.

JIM CLAPPER: Well Putin himself ascribed particularly Secretary Clinton an attempt to promote a covert revolution--I mean that's the way he perceived it, in Russia, to overturn him. He held us accountable for the Panama Papers and the doping scandal. And so this is just part of doing business. And sure, you know, we have favored candidates and parties and groupings in other countries. Yes, there's a long history of this. I just have to say, I just think in this particular case, the behavior of the Russians was just kind of over the top, and particularly egregious.

GRAHAM ALLISON: So this one's special.

JIM CLAPPER: Yes.

MIKE ROGERS: Well, and again, their purpose was to sow discontent and mistrust in our elections. They wanted us at each other's throat by the time it was over, which I think, 10 years from now, when somebody looks back, they're going to think, "Boy, they did a pretty darn good job."

GRAHAM ALLISON: Yeah, how did they do?

MIKE ROGERS: They did a great job. We're still fighting over it. We are still passionately, emotionally debating, whatever your political philosophy is, on what happened in the election. We have not resolved it ourselves. And it's influencing, by the way, legislative process today, I would argue. That's wildly successful. And you'd probably put a dollar figure on what they spent on this, versus other covert action programs, maybe around the world. This thing is a bargain, an absolute bargain.

And I would argue that the US role does take a moral imperative in any decision that they would have to support US interests where we find them around the world. And it isn't done in the way of purposely misleading, trying to sow discontent, exacerbating violence within a country in and of itself, for that particular purpose of discontent. Now there's difference between supporting elements who are seeking freedom and other things. I would argue that's a different case. It has a different moral imperative. And yes, the United States does do that. But, by the way, it goes through a pretty extensive process including the oversight by its elected representatives in a separate but equal branch of the United States Congress.

GRAHAM ALLISON: So let me get to the question of, so what we don't know. So again, the *Globe* tells us what we need to know is, did—quote "Did President Trump himself know about, approve, or invite the Russian role in undermining our election?" So what do we know about this? And what can we do to know more? Jim?

JIM CLAPPER: Well, as I stated, I don't know of any evidence of that, and did not. And none of that found its way into the Intelligence community assessment, even in the classified version.

Now that's not to say that my knowledge here was complete. I had no evidence that was presented to me of collusion. But again, that's not saying it didn't happen. I just, I never saw any evidence of it, as I have stated publicly.

GRAHAM ALLISON: But since you were DNI, and you were conducting this survey, if there had been any evidence at that point, you would have a pretty good—

JIM CLAPPER: If not these evidentiary bar that we established and agreed on, which was, you know, pretty high confidence, I think the answer is yes. But no such evidence was presented to me during the time that we were doing this.

GRAHAM ALLISON: And so Mike, would you agree or disagree?

MIKE ROGERS: No, I agree. I don't think we're going to know until the FBI investigation is done. But one of the only ways that Washington, D.C. gets exercise is jumping to conclusions. And they are—I mean, and character assassination is a side sport. And I just think that everybody needs to calm down about what conclusion they come to, until we know all of the evidence. The FBI is investigating any—they would call it collusion. I doubt that that's the—That is probably not the premise, as an old FBI guy, that's not the premise of their investigation. They're probably looking at other angles of this thing. And when that is done, then we'll know.

But until then, I think it's probably dangerous to say he was or he was not. You can have your own beliefs, but I just don't think we know that. And candidly, the way that campaign was run, I'd be highly suspect that they had an organized plan to do anything. [laughter] Let alone of trying to figure out a conspiracy to work with Vladimir Putin to disrupt US elections. I just find—You know, I find that a pretty high bar. I think the FBI will have to establish that.

JIM CLAPPER: I do think that there's an important point here, with specific respect to the FBI, which occupy—at least in my mind, occupies a unique position in the National Security apparatus, in that it straddles both law enforcement and Intelligence. And at least during my time

as DNI, the six and a half years I worked with Bob Muller and then Jim Comey, was to be very deferential to that distinction.

And I gave great deference to the Directors of the FBI to decide whether, when, and how much to tell me or anyone else in the IC about the state of play of an investigation, particularly one that involved, one that was focused on US persons. That's a unique and delicate role that FBI plays by virtue of its straddling both those roles.

GRAHAM ALLISON: So Mike, we were chatting before. What is it that you disagree most strongly with about Jim's views and vice-versa? But let's start with you?

MIKE ROGERS: Why didn't you like each other? Is that the question? Yeah, would you do that? Yep.

JIM CLAPPER: So we just thought, "Well, let's come up with—Instead of having loving all the time, let's come up with something where we have some disagreement. And I will say, just preface that by, so you know where I'm—my high regard for Mike Rogers is, I have achieved Intelligence geezerdom. And I was around when the committees were first stood up. And I was a young puppet in the Intelligence community during Church Pike and all that. I've seen, known about—most about just about all the Chairmen of the [00:31:05]. And I have to say that Mike is one of the handful, maybe the best, and a unique beacon of bipartisanship when Mike and Dutch Ruppensberger were running the committee. And you don't see that very often, all too rare. And boy did we miss you when you left. [laughter] So we're thinking—[simultaneous conversation]

MIKE ROGERS: Half of our district disagreed with that.

JIM CLAPPER: What is it we can talk about where we sort of had a difference?

GRAHAM ALLISON: Jim has to be careful since he's got four more hearings to do.

JIM CLAPPER: I'm radioactive.

GRAHAM ALLISON: This is on air. So the Chairman, the new Chairman just heard what you said. But in any case, go ahead.

JIM CLAPPER: So in the—[laughter] In the course of our dialogue back and forth, which was always very professional, we had one issue that came up during the course of the negotiations with Iran. And we were chastised by the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, House Committee for Intelligence, about our failure to keep the committee fully and currently and accurately informed on that.

Of course it was—the Intelligence community was kind of in an awkward position, because these were, you know, secret negotiations. We didn't want to have them exposed publicly. And so the question that came up in my mind is, what is the extent of the Intelligence community's responsibility to spy on the administration on behalf of the committee? Now Mike probably wouldn't characterize it quite that way. [laughter]

MIKE ROGERS: Now you see where the trouble started.

JIM CLAPPER: Yeah. So I'll stop there and over to you, Mike. [laughter]

MIKE ROGERS: Okay, so we did have a big disagreement. The good news is, none of you have heard about this because we did it in the way I think the committee is designed to do it. And it was all behind closed doors at the time. And obviously, the agreement is out and signed, and it's past history. But at the time, there were some pretty strong disagreements about where it was. And the oddest thing—So I do believe in the importance—Again, let me back up.

One of the reasons I reinstated this bipartisan effort to do serious oversight was because I knew that they would have to bring us things that we're just not going to agree on. Doesn't mean we're going to run to the microphone. It doesn't mean we're going to have a press conference every

day to talk about the things we disagreed on. That's the role of the committee. And my argument is, if you want to be able to handle classified material with two branches of government, you have to have an institution somewhere, or a body somewhere, that can get that information and have a free conversation. But I think that's a serious problem if we can't do that.

So I saw this was, as the first time, we had this serious agreement. And what shocked me most was that a foreign intelligence service brought it to my attention. And you can imagine, as somebody who took my role as Chairman pretty seriously, I would say not amused, right. So I had to call down to the White House and say, "You're not going to believe what happened to me today. A funny thing happened to me on the way into the Intelligence Committee. I was notified about negotiations in Oman that related to Iran's nuclear program."

And I can tell you, this is where this got kind of sticky a little bit. There were other programs that I might be interested in as Chairman, as an oversight role, that may have involved Iran's nuclear program, right. So we were making decisions on those kinds of things, not realizing that there's somebody was negotiating something that was fairly transformational to these other programs of which we were discussing and applying money to.

So I came away from a very different perspective about spying on the President. I looked at it as, this is the good course of oversight. And by the way, at the time, there was bipartisan disagreement where they were going. It wasn't just Mike Rogers being a partisan, thinking this was a bad idea. And so there was lots of conversations, you imagine, that followed it. And I did take a different tact. I think the Chairman—or the Director was not very amused with me.

JIM CLAPPER: Mostly, so the method of taking us to the woodpile was sort of the system of NIMs, or National Intelligence Managers for—and each one was in charge either of a region or a functional Intelligence issue. And their job for me was to kind of oversee the community and ensure that we're maximizing collection analysis or help set up taskforces, etcetera.

So we had about, I don't know, 17 or 18 of them when I was Director. And so what Mike did was summon each one of them separately to his committee and have a little tutorial on keeping the Congress fully and accurately informed.

MIKE ROGERS: According to the law, I just want to mention that. [laughter]

JIM CLAPPER: Now the good news is—actually, yeah. And this was done very quietly and discretely. It wasn't a big thing on TV or anything like that. And actually, it turned out to be, I have to admit, grudgingly admit, a positive, constructive exercise. For one, the NIMs felt like they had, you know, importance and stature enough that you would spend the time doing that. And I did have to admire Mike's stamina, you know, after doing about 12 or 15 of them, he's still at it.

But it does illustrate, I think, at least for me, the sometimes awkward position that the IC is in—and its leadership is in between doing the Executive Branch's—the White House's bidding versus your responsibility, which I certainly acknowledge, and which is necessary for keeping the Congress informed. So if I tell the committee about—or committees about, here is actually kind of a standard thing that Intel does is support negotiations. Well, what are the negotiations about? Well, they're about, you know, striking a bargain with the Iranians on their nuclear capability. Well, I oppose that from a policy standpoint. And so, you know, that puts us in an awkward position.

So I brought that up, or bring it up just to illustrate it's the nature of our system. There is friction between and among the branches, which is maybe a commentary on the genius of the founding fathers.

MIKE ROGERS: And I will just say one thing about that, and why I think it showed that the committee can work, actually, even when we disagree. I mean I passionately disagreed with where they were going, and all of that. That's all on the record. But what I thought was good about it, is that we had people who disagreed on both sides, by the way, of both sides of the

committee, we went through this for months. There was no weeks nobody knew about the negotiations. We never disclosed it publicly. No one on the committee leaked the information. To me, that shows that they understood that it's okay to have a forum. You have to have a forum for this to happen. If you believe your elected representatives should have oversight of the Intelligence Committee—and I believe it actually helps the Intelligence Committee to have that, it can work.

What doesn't work, in my mind, is unfortunately what you see today, where someone runs to the microphone and says, "He's innocent." The next day, "He's guilty." The next day, "He's really—Oh I saw something that makes him really guilty." "Oh I saw something that makes him really innocent." That is a complete injustice to a functioning body that has some very, very serious consequences if they get this wrong.

And I do think it will impact the committee's ability to interact with the Intelligence—You'll go into what we used to call 20 questions, where you'd haul them in front of the committee—this was years ago. And if you didn't ask exactly the right question, you wouldn't get exactly the answer you were looking for. And so you'd play this 20 question problem. I'd like to think the way we ran the committee, we got away from that. We had a dialogue. And the committees were more dialogue with the Intelligence Services in a way that I think most Americans would want to happen. You know, well what happens if this happens? You know, you want to go through the list of consequences of actions or consequences of inaction, in a forum where you can have that discussion, and so we could all make a decision together.

I worry now that we're right back into that same place before. And I saw it, and you all have some horror stories. I've heard your horror stories over a gin martini. Or you don't have those, do you? They're pretty awful. And so I worry about the institution of Congress, which I think is an important institution, despite the clowns and the circus-like atmosphere you see sometimes. It's an important institution for our democracy. And if that goes away, if you lose that ability to have these kinds of pretty serious, high level disagreements, I worry about how we get good oversight

and good policy and good support of our Intelligence Services doing really, really, really important work around the world.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Okay, so let me say where we are in the conversation. One of the wonders of the Forum is that we have in the Forum all sorts of people who know a lot about this topic, who might as well be talking. I remember the first Forum we ever had here, it was a long time ago. Teddy Kennedy sat up in one of the loges and asked the first question, and gave some sense of, well, wait a minute. There's all sorts of people here. So let me ask David and Michael Morrell to go to the – There's two microphones here on the floor. And say what you want to say. Michael over here, this one right there. And then, as soon as they've said whatever they want to say, and our guests say what they want to say, line up at these microphones on the floor and on the loge, and we'll call on you. But David Petraeus first, who was [simultaneous conversation] National Council and a former Director of the CIA.

DAVID PETRAEUS: Thank you. Look, I join in saluting these two great public servants. Both of them were the best that I ever saw in the times that I was interacting with the committee or with the DNI. And let's keep in mind, by the way, that you know, Jim Clapper followed someone who actually lost a power struggle between the DNI and the Director of the CIA, Admiral Denny Blair and Leon Panetta had so much friction. And you saw this, of course Mike, it was before you were a Committee Chairman, I think. But nonetheless, observed this from the Committee.

And frankly, what Director Clapper did—By the way, he also had, of course, decades and uniform prior to this. I remember when he was DNI, I think, when we were doing the surge in Iraq, and other things. I mean there's so many intersections over the years, and so many different contributions. We're focusing on the one that I think is the most significant. And it was not just survival, it was really showing how the position of Director of National Intelligence should be filled and how the duties should be performed.

What was great about Jim Clapper was that he was just very secure in himself. There was no big ego there. We've seen that. This was not someone who was out to show that he was in charge of the community. I remember sitting down, even before the confirmation hearing, and we had an agreement right away that—how you would work out certain issues that were sources of big friction, again, between Leon Panetta and Denny Blair. And keeping in mind that the Director of the CIA still reported directly to the President generally through the National Security Advisor. And Tom Donnell, I think, is in the audience, for covert action. So you still had that direct—And that's why the Director of the CIA is still at the table.

But in other aspects, of course, you're reporting through the DNI. And had a wonderful relationship, and it worked out very, very well. And I think it's just established it now. I don't think you're going to go back to the kinds of issues that caused friction in the past. And so I remain very grateful to him for that. And again, I very much share the praise that has been levied here this afternoon.

Look, Mike, you and Dutch Ruppensberger really did do it right. And again, four wonderful years of bipartisan leadership of that committee. Even when you did occasionally disagree on stuff, even when occasionally we saw things slightly differently, it was always a good dialogue. As you said, there weren't people rushing for the microphones out of each of those meetings. And again, my hat's off to you for that, and really for all the years that you were in there, because in earlier lives and earlier assignments, we had a lot of interaction as well.

I do think, by the way, a lot of people ask me, "Did you like the position of DNI? I mean it meant you can't be the Director of Central Intelligence. That used to be such a wonderful position." I said, "No, I love DNI. The CIA, I can focus on overseeing an agency that is out trying to steal secrets, recruit spies, carry out covert action, and contribute in a very substantial way to the development of the Presidential daily brief and all the other analytical products that the DNI pulls together. And you don't have to focus on all the other aspects of the community," which is why I think Jim noted that typically, DCIAs and DCIs, when they were dual-headed, tended to default, over time, to DCIA, because it's a reasonably consuming endeavor.

And frankly, it was great to be unencumbered by the duties that the DCI used to have with the DNI overseeing that. And so, for all of the criticism in the early years of that organization, I think again, it has proven itself. And I think it has proven the wisdom of those who created, undoubtedly some tweaks that could still be carried out here or there. And I know that, in fact talked to Senator Coates about that, Director Coates, the other day.

But I think, as history looks back, what we can conclude is that it was Director Clapper who really established what the DNI should do, how it should be done, and indeed, what the individual qualities of a DNI should be. And I do think Senator Coates brings that same gravitas that Mike mentioned, the same confidence, a quiet confidence without a big ego, that is the key to succeeding and getting all these different agencies and fiefdoms to work together. Thanks.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Okay, thank you. That's a very good way to try to provide a little perspective on an extremely complex maze. Michael, what would you say about either this or the topic, what do we know, and what do we need to know about Russia?

MICHAEL MORRELL: So I am going to join the chorus of praise for these two men on the stage here. Jim Clapper was by far the best DNI we ever had. I did not believe, like Mike, I did not believe in the DNI function until I saw Jim do the job. And I really hope that Dan Coates and his successors will continue to do the job the way Jim did. I'm a little concerned, I'm a little concerned that it may be person-dependent, it may be personality-dependent. I hope not. And I hope people learn from Jim. But Jim did a remarkable job.

And likewise, Mike Rogers was an amazing Chairman of an Intelligence Committee, both Senate and House, the best I've ever seen. In fact, I never saw oversight work as effectively as it worked in Mike's committee. I will say, from my perspective, that what I just said and what others have said tonight is true, because these two men have incredible integrity. And I saw it every day. And I really, really mean that.

I want to ask a question, which is really for Mike, I think, which is the appropriateness of two congressional investigations into the Russia matter at a time when there's an FBI investigation. How do you think about that?

[00:47:55]

MIKE ROGERS: And I was very upfront with this in the beginning. I thought the committees should do the investigation into Russian activities, not necessarily related to the campaign. What did they do? What did the Intelligence community know? How long have we seen this activity? What tools they use? What capabilities do they have?

I thought if they could do that and have both a classified and unclassified document that could be released at the end of that investigation they would provide a public service. Here's—listen the Russian, we need to watch out for this. We're going to have to figure out what we do about Russian active measures, as they would call it by terminology. And so I thought that that would be a good function for the committees. They could participate in a way that would be very beneficial to the public good.

Trying to get into who you can call as a witness on a criminal matter I think is—candidly, I disagree with the way they're doing it. I wouldn't do it this way. Let the FBI have first stab at these witnesses. And candidly, if I were a lawyer for somebody under investigation, and you know the FBI wants to talk to you next week, you sure as heck aren't going to let him go up to a committee testify. I don't know what lawyer in their right mind would do that. So you're never going to quite get all that you need to get anyway to come to a good conclusion at any rate until after the investigation is over.

So I argue the criminal piece of this should be done by the FBI. Let them do their work. And then the committees get back to what I would consider regular order for the Intelligence community to know. Yes, it would be really important to know the certain, this is what I talked

about, capabilities, what are they doing, is there a way to defeat it, what's the assessment of the Intelligence Committee, excuse me, in our ability to go after this and how should we go after it. And then, again, produce reports, one that we can all read and one that's geared toward policy movement in the Intelligence community. I think that would be a great day for America if we could do that.

JIM CLAPPER: If I could just add a point here because it allows me to emphasize the point about the ICA, the Intelligence community assessment. And something it did not do, was it did not render any judgement whatsoever on whether the Russian interference actually had any impact on the election, something that some folks deliberately misquoted or distorted. So it allows me to make that point publicly again.

All we said in the Intelligence community assessment was there was no evidence of messing with voter tallies in any of the 50 states. But we never, we had neither the authority, the expertise or the resource to assess that effect did it actually have on the election. I don't know whether the Congress is the appropriate body to do that but I think we'll always wonder in the absence of some competent look at that, did it actually have impact on the election. And for us, at least, we didn't do that.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Mike, so you want to say anything about impact on the election as you try to assess it?

MIKE ROGERS: Well, I mean, again, it's really—try to find a metric where you could say that misinformation led to someone changing their vote for who they were—I mean I think a lot of the vote was baked in before all of this, candidly. If you look back at the timelines, think a lot of people opinion of either candidate was already kind of cooked into where they were going. That margin was getting smaller and smaller. By the time the Russians came in, did it impact their election? I don't know. And I don't think the Intelligence community is capable of telling us that either, candidly. Neither is the FBI, right? Here's the activities we know that they participated

in. Would they have loved to influence the fact that we should hate each other when this is all over? Absolutely. The Russians love that. Right?

That much I know. That much the Intelligence community can tell us. They can also tell u us, hey—I think one of the statements Director Clapper made was, “It was ordered by Putin.” I think that is really significant that you had the head of state of Russia using its military and Intelligence services to try to create chaos in the United States elections. That’s huge in my mind. I mean that’s—I don’t know how much—does it get much bigger than that? And so I think those are the kinds of things we can know. I think none of us are going to probably agree, did it influence the election at the end of the day or not.

And I don’t know if we should have a body charged with trying to figure that out because there’s—somebody would have to walk me through the metric you’d use to do that. And I just don’t know if it would be accurate enough. We’re just going to have to understand what their intentions were, what activities they did and maybe how we’re going to deal with it would probably be a much better use of our time, I imagine.

GRAHAM ALLISON: This lady, please. And introduce yourself and a short question. Thank you.

RACHEL BROWN: Thank you. I’m Rachel Brown. I’m with the LaRouchePAC. And I have a few details to bring up that I think were sort of left out of the discussion. There’s been ongoing material around the question of the alleged collusion, which you, Clapper, admitted that there actually is no collusion between Trump and Russia. You also have a certain track record around honesty, which I think might be brought into the question today. But we have things like the Christopher Steele document, who is an MI-6 agent who wrote an alleged proof of—

GRAHAM ALLISON: Let’s—

RACHEL BROWN: Short.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Question. Please.

RACHEL BROWN: Alleged proof of Trump going to Russia and colluding with them. He's an MI-6 agent. The only crime that we have found had not been by the Trump administration but was the unmasking of the name of General Flynn, which could only have been done by a foreign Intelligence service. It's been widely reported that this was a GCHQ in relation with NSA and FBI. The FBI hired Christopher Steele or this is under investigation tomorrow in Senator Grassley's committee, whether or not the, how the FBI felt about hiring a foreign agent to investigate the current President, incoming President. This seems to me actually a matter of treason. I would look at why—

GRAHAM ALLISON: Okay. So just ask the question.

RACHEL BROWN: This is the question part. It appears as though there is an attack on Trump, Pres. Trump. And this is, I would say, against the America interest, that we should work with China, we should work with Russia. This is—

GRAHAM ALLISON: Okay. We got the question. Good. Thank you.

RACHEL BROWN: So my question is, why are you covering for the British Intelligence who are acting against our presidency to insure that we don't have world peace.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Okay.

[Laughter]

GRAHAM ALLISON: Thank you.

MIKE ROGERS: Let me just say. Obviously, you're pretty passionate about your information. This is why we need to keep it out of the political side of the conversation. The FBI will do an investigation. And at the end of that conclusion of the investigation, and you may not have confidence—

RACHEL BROWN: Are you saying it's not political?

MIKE ROGERS: If you don't have confidence in the investigation I assure you the committees can then come in and do an investigation on their own. The whole purpose of this was to say, right now the emotions run so hot on this. And again, I can tell you as a former FBI agent you spend a lot of time tracing leads that don't necessarily go anywhere.

RACHEL BROWN: [Simultaneous conversation] crimes have been done by the FBI.

MIKE ROGERS: Okay. But I'm just telling you, and I'm not saying I disagree with you. I think that there was some activities of the administration that are questionable that I do believe are currently under the investigation by the FBI. Let's let them make that conclusion on both sides of that equation. And then if that doesn't, you know, satisfy both political parties, trust me, the committees can then engage because then the subpoenas are a little harder to get around if there is no criminal action toward that particular individual.

GRAHAM ALLISON: The lady in the loge. Please. Introduce yourself.

KATIE ROSE: Hi. My name is Katie Rose. I'm a second year Master in Public Policy student here. My question has to deal with the trade-offs of revealing the information that you uncovered in your investigations. Specifically that acknowledging the Russian interference and it's success in some way confirms the objectives of the Russian hack and moreover maybe even advances them as they shift towards the European elections. And I'm wondering if you can talk about the impact of kind of confirming and advancing those objectives when you're deciding both what kind of information—and how much you choose to release to the American people,

especially since, with this question, I do believe that the American people know this as it impacts their democracy. Thank you.

JIM CLAPPER: Well, that is a very relevant question and it was one that was debated. We spent a lot of time discussing, you know, when and how much we should put out to the public. The issue here, which you know Pres. Obama was concerned about was amplifying or dignifying what the Russians were doing—and thereby emphasizing its import and its impact. And the appearance, if not the reality of putting his hand on the scale in favor of one candidate and in disfavor of another.

And that was a major topic of discussion. The statement that Jay Johnson and I issued on the 7th of October, we had a lot of debate about that, a lot of discussion about whether or not we should do that. Because that in itself could have some impact on the election. Jay and I were pretty adamant, assertive about the notion that knowing what we knew, and we didn't say anything about it—and then the election happened and it went bad. It went south for whatever reason. And then afterwards, the public, the Congress, everybody else learns that we had this information and we sat on it without saying something to the electorate—ergo the statement on the 7th of October.

You can argue that, well, it was too late or it wasn't fulsome enough, but that's a very, I think, key point. As well, by the way, how much and when do we share with foreign governments, who obviously had great interests in particular European governments, who were seeing the same kinds of things going on there. So we had to reckon with all these sort of countervailing concerns and considerations. And I'm sure we'll write a history about that someday.

MIKE ROGERS: And I'll just say two things. I was a little concerned and a little troubled by some of the statements after the election of why information was shared throughout the government. I think that's a dangerous thing. I do think that that's part of an FBI investigation. So let them get to the bottom of that. And again, I was troubled to say the least. Because the way it was disseminated raised some concerns for me. But again, I think the FBI needs to get to the

bottom of that. If you try to put that into a political arena you'll never know what you think by the time you're done.

Secondly, I think this is really important to have a public dialogue. We don't have a lot of options on how to get at this. And this is that one, interesting time where the Russian Intelligence officer was not trying to recruit Jim Clapper to commit an act of treason against his own country in the back third world of, you know, fill in the blank. This was a very public display about trying to influence average Americans going about their day in a way that we really hadn't seen before at this level and magnitude.

So my argument was, at some point we better have a conclusion or at least a public discussion so that if I'm reading this material, and by the way, these elections now are more about affirmation politics. If I agree with this position and I read this article, then that article is right. And if I read this article and I disagree with it, then they're just wrong. We should at least start getting people to understand that someone is trying to say, and they're very targeted, they started going into certain demographics and people's beliefs and understanding what kind of material they were reading. The was very deep and very detailed Intelligence analysis on a large scale.

I think we all should understand that people are going to try to do that to you the next time you walk into the voting booth. You ought to understand that someone out there, today it's the Russians, who knows, is trying to make some kind of an influence statement on this. And this is where I worried about it from a public official that used to run for election and get the snot kicked out of you. And that was fun when we didn't have this problem.

Think of that. So I come out very strongly and say, "I'm in favor of tougher Russian sanctions." And an article comes out in some magazine next week and says, "Mike Rogers was, you know, naked running with goats in, you know—and here's a picture, a grainy one. You can hardly tell but isn't that him?" And that thing goes viral. Why? Because they don't like my position on sanctions. The influence of that can be catastrophic. And in the court of public opinion, that member of office, he or she is cooked, right? Because the people who don't like them already

believe it. The people who aren't sure think, "Really? That happened?" Right? And the people who love the person are going to love them no matter what. They are like, "I run naked with goats." It happens all the time.

[Laughter]

GRAHAM ALLISON: We thought it was cows.

MIKE ROGERS: [Laughter]

GRAHAM ALLISON: Gentleman here.

SHAREK [?] CARNEY [?]: My name is Sharek Carney. I'm a mid-career student here. My question is about the standards of evidence for collusion. At this point in 1973 we had a Senate select committee, a special prosecutor and the Deputy Director of the FBI leaking to the *Washington Post*. And still a year and a half later it was only when we knew that there were tapes in the White House that we actually had enough evidence to connect the president to the burglary. Now we have a much bigger crime. But in the absence of any wiretapping is it possible to establish that evidence of collusion with this administration. And if that evidence is established, what is the crime? Is it treason?

JIM CLAPPER: Go ahead.

MIKE ROGERS: Thanks, Jim.

[Laughter]

MIKE ROGERS: He did this in committee, too, I want you to know.

JIM CLAPPER: [simultaneous conversation] oversight.

GRAHAM ALLISON: For the FBI—

MIKE ROGERS: Yeah. Exactly. A, it's—I'd have to—it would be interesting to determine what crime they're investigating. I don't think it would be collusion. I think they are probably looking at financial interests. And I don't know, probably shouldn't even say that. I think they're looking at other elements of crime going into this investigation, would be my guess. Collusion would be pretty hard to filter down as a criminal activity other than some would argue the legal notion of using a foreign government to influence a US election. You know, they could charge with that. It's not really collusion. It's something different.

I do think that the FBI will pursue this to its ultimate conclusion. And if, in fact, it gets to that ultimate conclusion and it doesn't pass the smell test, I think you'll get these investigations in Congress. I just think we have to let the FBI do it. It's a different day than it was in Watergate. You know, the FBI is a very different organization today than it was back then. And boy, they are a dog with a bone. They will continue this investigation until they have just rung out every lead that they can find. I passionately believe that.

Again, and then there are alternatives afterward. All of the fuss on the front end is just designed to try to affirm your political belief of what you think happened. And I think that's a dangerous thing in the court of public opinion. I do think that, let them have this investigation. You don't even have to like Trump or not like Trump or love Trump or hate Trump. It doesn't, to me it doesn't matter. When you have the federal government investigating the possibility of taking away someone's freedom, there's protections for that for a reason.

And we ought to let that happen before we get engaged in again, as I said, the court of public opinion. Because the court of public opinion candidly has very low standards. Our legal system has pretty high standards. And we ought to try to keep it that way, would be my argument.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Okay. Please.

BRUCE SCHNEIER: I'm a little bit worried about the goats.

MIKE ROGERS: Okay. It was one time. We were running in the woods.

BRUCE SCHNEIER: Fair enough.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Introduce yourself and quickly a question.

BRUCE SCHNEIER: Bruce Schneier, Belfer Center. I want to ask about a kind of obscure area of this and that's the shadow brokers leaking NSA secrets, which really seems like another, very public display of capability. We don't know it's the Russians. We believe it is. Director Clapper you might know and can't tell us. But what does that say about the Intelligence communities around the world that leaking these powerful tools are now more important than keeping them secret and using them. That really feels very different to me.

JIM CLAPPER: I'm not sure I understood the question.

GRAHAM ALLISON: So say it very briefly.

BRUCE SCHNEIER: The question is about the shadow brokers and the NSA secrets that are being released.

JIM CLAPPER: The shadow brokers.

BRUCE SCHNEIER: The shadow brokers.

MIKE ROGERS: Which is the group that's leaking—

BRUCE SCHNEIER: --That's leaking the—it's not the CIA secrets. That's someone who gave them to WikiLeaks. But my question is, what does it say about the world of Intelligence that the public opinion benefit of leaking these outweighs the classified benefit of using them.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Who says that the public benefits?

MIKE ROGERS: I'm not sure that I agree with that.

BRUCE SCHNEIER: I'm assuming the person who leaked them decided that leaking them is more important than keeping them secret. Someone made that decision.

MIKE ROGERS: And, I know, did you have some strong feelings on this but I will tell you, that's why we have rules about classified information. One person does not get to make that decision. Somebody did. Somebody did. Somebody leaked that information.

BRUCE SCHNEIER: Not in the US. Someone in, if it's Russia or China or another country, someone there did it.

MIKE ROGERS: I think there's probably some—well, I think the Russians ended up getting the material. How they got it is in question. And it may be by an individual that they either co-opted or voluntarily they gave it. Which is why I think you saw the CIA director a couple of weeks ago come out very strongly and say that WikiLeaks is an agent of the Russian government. Meaning—you can just extrapolate that, that whatever material they're getting their hands on, they're purposely trying to have an outlet to publicly, I think, embarrass if you will or cause us real harm.

And by the way, it causes us real harm. And they've also exposed tools that now fall into the hands of what would normally be less capable hackers. Now they have pretty good material to come at everybody, all of us. So there's a whole host of problems with that. And I passionately believe you can't allow one person to decide that they think. Because, by the way, when you're

at that level in these Intelligence agencies, you don't get to see the whole picture. You get to see a little piece of the picture.

So you can't make the decision based on what you see that you think something awful and terrible and corrupt is happening because you have no understanding of all the things happening around it—and all the oversight that's happened, all the conclusion about why that information is classified. And I'm very worried that we've gotten this culture now that if I just decide I don't like it, I'm going to walk out and give it to the Russians. Why not?

Well, my argument is that is about as close to treasonous as you get. And we could go through a whole list of problem that actually happened overseas by these unauthorized disclosures that cause real harm to our national security and jeopardize the lives of our soldiers in the long run. And there's pretty clear evidence in that. That to me, we've got to get right in our heads here as we move forward. Because this is only going to get harder and the Russians have cracked a weakness here that they are going to try to take advantage of over and over and over again.

GRAHAM ALLISON: Thank you very much for your good. Thank you for—excuse me. You had a chance to—excuse me. There are plenty of—thank you very much. So let me say tonight we've come to the witching hour. It's 7:14. You can give your speech after we leave. I apologize for the people that have questions. Let me say thank you very much for these two gentlemen.

[Applause]

We believe strongly in free speech here but only one speech in an evening or two when we have two guests. So thank you. You're welcome to talk after we leave.

END

