

3RD HARVARD KOREAN SECURITY SUMMIT:  
“KOREA – A CATALYST OF GLOBAL TRENDS”  
ENHANCING SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA  
TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2022  
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**DR. JOHN PARK:** Welcome to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Harvard Korean Security Summit. My name is John Park, Director of the Korea Project at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The goal of our annual event is to grow the Korean Security Studies field by bringing together top researchers, senior ROK and US practitioners, and next generation scholars. Convened by the Belfer Center's Korea Project, the Summit is the anchor event for the Korean Security Studies field at Harvard University. Our thanks to the Korea Foundation for their generous support of the Korea Project and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Harvard Korean Summit.

This year, our theme is “Korea-A Catalyst of Global Trends.” To further explore this theme, our panels over the next three days will cover the following topics:

Panel 1 examines “Enhancing Security on the Korean Peninsula.”

Panel 2 focuses on “Building Mutual Prosperity Through Resilient Technology Supply Chains.”

And Panel 3 centers on “Addressing North Korea's Cybercriminal Statecraft Activities.”

Our day 2 keynote speaker will be Tami Overby, President of Asia Pathfinders and former President of the US-Korea Business Council. Our day 3 keynote speaker will be Jean Lee, host of the BBC World Service Podcast “The Lazarus Heist” and former Pyongyang Bureau Chief with the Associated Press. We'll have closing remarks by Consul General Kijun You of the Korean Consulate General here in Boston.

For our kickoff today, it's my pleasure to introduce Natalie Colbert, who will be giving the US opening remarks. Natalie is Executive Director of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. Before coming to the Center, Natalie served in the Central Intelligence Agency for 13 years. Most recently, she was Director of Analytic Resources and Corporate Programs for the Near East Mission Center, where she led strategic management of analytic personnel resources, and created a career development seminar for midlevel analysts. We're excited to have you launch our Summit today. Over to you, Natalie.

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**NATALIE COLBERT:** Great. Thank you so much, John. It's my pleasure to be here on behalf of the Belfer Center and Belfer Center leadership. And so I'd like to add my welcome to you all to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual Korean Security Summit hosted here at HKS and the Belfer Center. As John mentioned, this annual summit brings together top researchers of Korean security studies, as well as senior ROK and US practitioners and next-generation scholars.

And, as John highlighted for the panels upcoming in the conference, among our distinguished participants, we are really truly privileged to have the Honorable Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Dr. Park Jin, and the Korea Foundation President, Dr. Geun Lee with us today, for their addresses. So my thanks to you both for joining us.

As John introduced, the theme of this year's summit, “Korea – A Catalyst of Global Trends” is really intended to explore how quickly various Korea-related functional issues play out in ways that can really have global implications. And in that sense, Korea cases often provide sort of a unique and leading insights into global trends that range from everything from ongoing efforts to change leader-level calculus, for example, during the 2017 Korean missile crisis, to the Republic of Korea's designs for bolstering tech supply chain resilience, as well as the DPRK's expanding use of cryptocurrency theft, for funding the regime. So really thinking about some of the ways in which the dynamics happening on the Peninsula are shaping the way we view some of these larger trends globally.

But, what I wanted to do, is take a minute, as reflecting on the Belfer Center here, as we prepare to launch into these discussions, I want to take a moment to connect the convening of this summit to the Belfer Center and the Korea Project, and what makes us unique as a place to convene these discussions.

So, as many of you know, we have two traditions that drive our work here. The first is bringing together leading scholars, senior practitioners, to unpack, to examine, and really try to make sense of the underlying factors behind complex policy challenges. The second tradition is

mentoring the next generation of leaders, both scholars and practitioners. And the Belfer Center has longstanding programs that are designed to cultivate and create early opportunities for the talented next generation of thought leaders, to really join study groups, advance research, and take on a role in shaping what we think of as policy-relevant research, and engage with senior practitioners working on these challenges. And many of the members of our community, in this sense, go on to serve at some of the highest levels of government.

And, as a graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School myself, and now as a member of the Center, working to advance this work, I can speak firsthand to the impact that this mentoring can have on new generations of leaders. And in my time as the Executive Director here, I can really say that the Korea Project stands out, to me, for the innovative and proactive ways that it advances these traditions. And it's these two driving forces that are behind the Korea Project's vision for this summit, and more broadly, for the work that it does to grow the field of Korean security studies.

So with that, I'll add my thanks in advance to all of the terrific speakers and the moderators that we have lined up for the panel sessions throughout the next few days. And as well, I would also like to thank members of the audience who I know are joining us from three continents, multiple time zones. So appreciate everyone taking the time to join the Korea Project, the Belfer Center, and the participants in this conference to really engage on these topics. So with that, John, I'll pass it back to you.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Natalie, thank you very much. Thank you for officially getting us underway for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Harvard Korean Security Summit. For our ROK opening remarks, we now turn to Dr. Geun Lee. Dr. Lee was appointed President of the Korea Foundation in September, 2019. Prior to his appointment, he was professor of international relations at Seoul National University in the Graduate School of International Studies, where he was also Dean of the Office of International Affairs. We'll now turn to Dr. Lee's ROK opening remarks.

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**DR. GEUN LEE:** Good evening, and good morning everyone. I'm Geun Lee, President of the Korea Foundation. It is my honor to welcome you all to the 2022 Harvard Korean Security Summit, the third iteration of this annual forum, which serves as an anchor event of the Korea Project. First and foremost, I would like to thank the Honorable Dr. Ash Carter, Director of the Belfer Center, and Dr. John Park, Director of the Korea Project, for organizing this meaningful and timely event.

The Korea Foundation is very proud to support the Korea Project and the Korean Security Summit, which have successfully served as a comprehensive dialogue channel for the discussion of critical matters that affect our common interests. Taking this opportunity, please allow me to briefly introduce the activities of the Korea Foundation.

The Korea Foundation carries out a diverse array of international exchange programs around the world, including the promotion of Korean studies, networking to foster international cooperation, arts and cultural exchanges, and media projects. Over the past three decades, our unwavering commitment to Korea-US cooperation has remained especially strong with a heavy emphasis on programs with US partners, which include prominent research institutes and universities.

Dear guests, today's forum could not have come at a more opportune time, since we observed significant policy changes and initiatives following the launch of the new Korean government on the President Yoon Suk-yeol, in May. During his first summit meeting with President Biden two weeks after his inauguration, the two leaders agreed to upgrade our countries' bilateral alliance to a global comprehensive strategic alliance, reaffirm their common goal of the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and agreed to launch an economic security dialogue.

In fact, Korea's alliance with the United States, built on mutual trust and shared values, such as freedom, democracy, and human rights, is stronger than ever. Moreover, our alliance is no longer defined by defense concerns alone, but by our strategic, economic, and technology partnership. I

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am truly confident that, together, the United States and the ROK can tackle the pressing challenges presented before us, in Northeast Asia and beyond.

As the world's 10<sup>th</sup> largest economy, and equipped with a modern military force, Korea cannot merely remain a local or regional power, but also contribute to the peace and wellbeing of the global village and planet Earth as a global leader. Korea could not have accomplished its economic success without an open global market, and a stable rules-based international order. I believe that Korea is on an irreversible path to transforming itself into a genuine global pivot state. And, as a global stakeholder, now is the time for Korea to propose to and show the world how it can strengthen and enhance global public goods, together with like-minded nations, especially the United States, Korea's strongest and most important ally for over 70 years.

Dear colleagues, the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula has never been as challenging as it is today. North Korea's pursuit of nuclear capability has never been stronger. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the rise of technologically advanced China owes economic security challenges to Korea. Korea and Japan, the two like-minded democracies in Asia, still cannot find mutually agreeable solutions to their history issues. And the bilateral cooperation has never been more important.

Against this backdrop, we will, over the next three days, explore issues ranging from adverse to enhanced visual security and cybersecurity to ROK's pioneering policies to bolster supply chain resilience in key technologies and critical minerals. With the most influential scholars and opinion leaders, invited from the United States and Korea, I have no doubt that this year's summit will be a milestone on the way to establishing a truly global, comprehensive, strategic alliance between the two countries. Thank you very much.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Our thanks to Dr. Geun Lee, President of the Korea Foundation, for the ROK welcoming remarks. It is now my great pleasure to introduce the Honorable Dr. Park Jin, Minister of Foreign Affairs with the Republic of Korea. Dr. Park Jin is a proud graduate, and

certainly someone we are very proud of, in the Kennedy School community, of being an alumni of the community here. He received his DPhil from Oxford University, and also pursued additional graduate studies in the UK.

As a member of the National Assembly, and as also as a thought leader in the think tank community, we have come to regularly interact with Dr. Park Jin over the years. And today, we're very honored to have him present the congratulatory remarks for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Harvard Korean Security Summit.

**DR. PARK JIN:** Distinguished guests, friends, and fellow supporters of the ROK-US Alliance, members of the faculty, Fellows, and students of Harvard University, first of all, I would like to thank the Belfer Center of Harvard Kennedy School and Dr. John Park for your kind invitation. I myself studied at Kennedy School in the mid 1980s. And it feels like a homecoming to meet you all today, although virtually.

Distinguished guests, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Harvard Korea Security Summit could not have come at a more opportune moment as the world is facing multiple challenges. Close to our home, North Korea is posing a serious security threat, not only to the Korean Peninsula, but also to the international community. North Korea has continued to upgrade its missile and nuclear capabilities, in flagrant violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, while even threatening the preemptive use of its nuclear weapons against the South.

Over the past years, North Korea has increasingly tapped into illicit cyber activities, which may have become a lucrative source of income for its WMD programs. Moreover, our cherished universal values, and the rules-based international order are also under serious threat by Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which violates the UN Charter and international law. In the meantime, the global pandemic and climate change continue to threaten our daily lives. Against this backdrop, the Yoon Suk-yeol government has laid out a diplomatic vision of a global pivotal

state, whereby Korea commits to take on a greater role and responsibility in addressing the common challenges that we face today.

With this national standing as the 10<sup>th</sup> largest economy, Korea will endeavor to do its part in promoting the rules-based international order, as well as upholding the universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Distinguished guests, during the Korea-US summit that was held just 11 days after the integration of the Yoon Suk-yeol government, our two leaders agreed to develop our partnership into a global comprehensive strategic alliance. The ROK-US military alliance, which was forged in blood seven decades ago, is still at the very core of our ties. In particular, US extended deterrence had been the key element and has become all the more critical, given North Korea's escalating missile and nuclear threats.

Also, sharing our unwavering belief in democracy and universal values, we are perfect partners in tackling the increasingly complex challenges that the world faces today, such as supply chain disruptions, and cybersecurity threats. Therefore, the theme of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Harvard Korean Security Summit, focusing on resilient technology, supply chains, and North Korea's cybercriminal statecraft activities, touches the pressing issues of our alliance.

I am confident that today's discussion will provide invaluable insight and policy recommendations to both our governments, to further strengthen our global comprehensive strategic alliance. Lastly, I sincerely look forward to meeting you, all in person, in the not so distant future. Thank you.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Our deep thanks to Foreign Minister Park for joining us this evening with his remarks. Thank you. Before turning to our first panel, I ask our speakers to remain muted with their videos on. We have a terrific group of experts to dive into the Panel 1 topic of “Enhancing Security on the Korean Peninsula.”

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Moderating Panel 1 is the award-winning correspondent Nick Schifrin. Nick is a foreign affairs and defense correspondent for PBS NewsHour in Washington, DC. He leads NewsHour's foreign reporting, and with the numerous awards, among them the highlights, the PBS NewsHour series *Inside Putin's Russia*, won a 2018 Peabody Award in the National Press Club's Edwin M. Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence. In November, 2020, Nick received the American Academy of Diplomacy's Arthur Ross Media Award for Distinguished Reporting and Analysis of Foreign Affairs. Thanks so much for joining us today, Nick. Over to you.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** John, thank you so much. And thank you, everyone, for being here for our first panel, which I'm excited to announce, “Enhancing Security on the Korean Peninsula.” And that, of course, is a combination of bolstering deterrents, and exploring the possibility for diplomacy. And so the kind of strategic situation, just to make a couple of points at the top here, we've got a new Yoon administration in Seoul, whom of course, we've just heard about their priorities. Number two, what they called a serious security threat, of course, North Korean capacity, especially improved recently, when it comes to its missile launches, 23 missile launches this year, including ICBMs, a series of launches right as President Biden left the region. And the recent announcement of strengthening deterrents along the border, which we should examine as well. A complex China nearby. And also, the US shaping its Indo-Pacific strategy with a little more specifics, and talk a little bit there about Japan as well.

So I'm honored to be joined by distinguished panelists, Dr. Yoon Young-kwan, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Republic of Korea, General Vincent Brooks, senior Fellow here at the Belfer Center, as well as former Commander, ROK-US Combined Forces Command. General Leem Ho Young, the President of the Korea Association of Military Studies and the former Deputy Commander of ROK-US Combined Forces Command. Dr. Sue Mi Terry, the Director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center, and Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. So welcome all of you.

We've got a little time here. We've got about an hour and 20 minutes or so before we're going to open up to questions. And so I'll try and get each of you really to expound on the main question that I'm going to ask. And Dr. Yoon Young-kwan, let me start with you. The key question, I think, that faces us, is how is the North Korean threat changed? And, in your opinion, what do we, all of us, need to be doing to address how the threat has changed over the last few months and the last year?

**DR. YOON YOUNG-KWAN:** As we all know, in 2019, April, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared that his policy will shift to hardline approach, strengthening military capability and trying economic rejuvenation by self-reliance. And probably other panelists will focus on military security dimension much. And I hope they will explain that aspect eloquently. So I may highlight the security implication in the latter part of Kim Jong-un's hardline policy. That is, his effort to economic rejuvenation by self-reliance.

As we all know, economic sanctions led by the United Nations and borders shut down due to COVID-19, directly affected North Korea's trade with outside world. And according to statistics, their trade decreased by 97 percent, between 2017 and 2020. And the Bank of Korea statistics tells us North Korean economy has decreased by 4.5 percent annually during the same time period. And their foreign exchange income decreased by 90 percent.

And furthermore, North Korea had a severe drought and a heatwave this spring. And many are expecting that they will have very poor agricultural production this year. So they are facing a serious economic difficulties. Furthermore, the rising energy price and grain, and grain price, will affect the economy negatively significantly. And at this time, I mean Russia and China cannot help North Korea much. Because, as we know, China is experiencing the worst economic situation this year, in the last few decades. And Russia is busy with their own war in Ukraine.

So I think all of these factors have pushed North Korea to a very difficult unprecedented economic crisis situation. And I think that North Korean residents are experiencing unusual

difficulties, economic difficulties, in their lives these days. And certainly, North Korea has shown some kind of resilience in facing this kind of economic challenges in the past. But I'm not sure what will happen inside North Korea if the current economic crisis continues for three years. I mean we have to pay attention to what happened in Sri Lanka. And there may be more countries which we will experience that kind of economic difficulties in coming years.

And nobody knows, I mean, whether North Korea will have similar experience or not. But the potential security implication of the current North Korean economic situation is huge. And we need to pay attention to this aspect as well, when we think of our securities threat coming from North Korea. Thank you.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** General Vincent Brooks, let me bring you in here, and just ask—Dr. Yoon just mentioned Sri Lanka. I mean, we've all seen the photos, the videos of protesters taking over the President's palace or house, the Prime Minister's. So I suppose I should just quickly ask you whether you actually think that's possible. But, as Dr. Yoon suggested, you know, part of this is the military. And that's between you and General Leem. So let me ask you first that question, that big over-arching question, from your perspective, how has the threat from North Korea changed in the last few months and the last year? And how do you think we, all of us, need to be addressing that change?

**GENERAL VINCENT BROOKS:** Well, thanks a lot, Nick. And it's a delight to be with you and with the rest of this distinguished panel, also. And congratulations to John Park on this third Summit. You know, North Korea continues to demonstrate that it is modernizing in a number of different ways militarily. We've seen the increasing use of short-range ballistic missiles, many of which have a different types of flight trajectory than traditional short-range missiles or medium-range missiles. And they fly a lot flatter, and getting more difficult to deal with. They still have the world's largest special operations force. They continue to use cyber operations and are one of the best in the world at that, not only for stealing currency around the world, which has already been mentioned, but also been able to conduct disruptive attacks using their cyber capabilities.

We see them, as has been highlighted, conducting repetitive tests. These are both test and demonstration. So they're testing technologies, but also demonstrating that they had these technologies and a greater sense of maturity.

It's evident that there's preparation for another nuclear test, the seventh nuclear test. And I'm sure we'll talk about that some more as we get into this. Whether they will or not is unknown. But certainly, it could be just a matter of time before they do. But the preparation is, I think, the key point here, relative to your question of how has it changed.

Let me just also add, though, North Korea's conventional forces, in my estimation, continue to atrophy. It is infrequent that they conduct substantive military training exercises that can hone the combat edge. And so it's very clear that North Korea's investments are in what we refer to as asymmetric threats, things that are not force-against-force types of capabilities, things that can hold populations at risk or induce crises and governance in South Korea, potentially in Japan, the United States, or the allies of the US. That's what we see really happening with North Korea over the last several years.

And, as Minister Yoon Young-kwan just said, they're hurting also. We need not ignore that, and view them as being invincible or 10 feet tall. Certainly, they're not. They're in a very difficult circumstance. Candidly, it's hard to imagine how they're able to sustain this rate of modernization under the current economic privation they experience. And so there is an inflection point out here.

The final point that I would make, is I think it's worthy of note that some of the measures that were introduced in 2018, especially, that were intended to lower tension, have held, even as there's evidence of hardline stances by both South Korea, US-South Korea alliance, as well as North Korea. But things like the reduction of some of the guardposts along the military demarcation line between North and South Korea, the relatively open area of the Joint Security Area, and the reduction of weapons inside of there, are they cheating? Hard to say. But the

evident aspect of it is that North Korea is still sticking by some of the agreements made in 2018, which to me says that they're not completely shut down on engagement if the conditions are ripe.

What should we do, then, to answer the last part of your question? I believe that pressure has to continue. And that pressure forms first in the strengthening of the Korea-US alliance. It's very clear that the two administrations are oriented that way. They have been absolutely clear and transparent about that, as we go around the world. The fact that they're looking globally, and not just regionally, is important. That that's pressure for North Korea, as North Korea seeks to retain the attention of US and South Korea and the international community. But an outward look takes attention away from North Korea and puts them into more difficult circumstances.

At the same time, we must always, in my opinion, keep the door open for these small glimmers of hope when they emerge. If we're only looking for preservation of the condition of hostility, we will never see the opportunities when they flicker for changing the direction of things. So I believe that has to also be part of the calculus, pressure, structure, and engagement structure, an outward look, and a very strong Korea-US Alliance that is truly ironclad and getting stronger with every day. I think that's where we have to go.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** General Leem, let me propose a couple of points that General Brooks just suggested. One, from your perspective, is the US-ROK Alliance getting stronger? One of the tenets of what he said has to happen. And two, obviously, talk about what we're seeing on the ground, preparations for what seems to be the seventh nuclear test, and North Korea's recent announcement about bolstering deterrents. You know, we all read that, and have tried to interpret that. So, from your perspective, how do you see these threats changing?

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** First of all, it's a great honor to be with you and participate in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Harvard Belfer Seminar. However, as you know, my English is not good. I will use a translator, who is the best translator in Korea. And I will speak in Korean now. [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** I would like to start by saying thank you very much for having me here today. It's a great pleasure to meet all of you here. Some of you are familiar faces. Good to be here again.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So I'll try to address all the points in as concise a manner as I can, in the interest of time.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** I'll try to stick to the military side of things, since I myself was a former soldier.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** General Brooks pointed to this already. But the military threat from North Korea, and especially as it pertains to its nuclear capability and missile capability, has increased quite significantly over the last year or two.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So, up until 2018, North Korea has conducted a total of six nuclear tests. And now we're looking at a possible seventh. In our estimate, we believe North Korea is ready to launch the test whenever it wants to. All it has to do is press a button.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So our estimate is that Kim Jong-un is ready to have this test whenever he wants, it's just a question of when is a good time for him. He's probably taking multiple factors into consideration. For instance, there has been heavy raining in North Korea this summer, which is not a particularly conducive condition for having a significant test. So we believe he's ready to have a test whenever he wants. He's just looking for an appropriate time.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** And, as General Brooks also pointed to, and as you all know, there has been—In 18 missile counts, we have seen that North Korea has the full spectrum of different types of missiles we could talk about. It has the IRBMs, short-range missiles, summary launch missiles, missiles with irregular flight patterns, and so forth.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** In short, North Korea is presenting a threat, not just for the Republic of Korea, but for Japan, for United States, and for the rest of the world.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** And the ROK military and the combined forces command to the United States and Republic of Korea, are taking these military capabilities of North Korea very seriously.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So it's very—it's, and as such, I very much welcome the new commitment to strengthen the Korea-US alliance under the present administration of President Yoon Suk-yeol. I

very much welcome the fact that the atmosphere is shifting towards restoring some of the more substantial training between Korean and US military, including field training exercises.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So my estimate to respond to the changing threats from North Korea at the Korea-US alliance's two tasks. The first task is to come up with something more concrete and specific for the concept of extended and tailored deterrents that we have. We have the concept. It needs to be fleshed out. Number two, we also need to flesh out the concept of the 4-G current missile operation. And we have to train for it. So that's what I have to offer. Thank you.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** Dr. Sue Mi Terry, if I could have you zoom us out a little bit again. So we've gone through the perspective of the military. We've also heard the idea that Sri Lanka's economic situation is so bad, it could become Sri Lanka. Perhaps you could respond to that. And the overall question that I'm asking, to frame the whole conversation, you know, how do you see the threat changing over the last few months and the last year?

**DR. SUE MI TERRY:** So Professor Yoon gave an overview of dire economic situation that the North is facing, and security implications of that. I'm not sure if it's going to get to Sri Lanka stage, but there is no question that North Korea is going through a severe internal problems, food shortages, and dire economic situation. General Brooks talked about the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear missile program, as well as cyber threat, and other threats. And General Leem just gave a great overview of the North's nuclear missile threat.

The bottom line is, despite these enormous economic difficulties that the North is facing, that Professor Yoon just talked about, this year alone, and General Leem just gave an excellent layout. The North tested 18 times, launched 33 missiles, including ICBMs. Kim Jong-un also tested new missile technologies, such as trained launched ballistic missile, new surface-to-air defense missile system, long-range strategic cruise missile, hypersonic missiles. Why? This is an

effort to perfect its own missile and deterrent capabilities, to diversify its missile arsenal, and to really defeat American missile defenses.

So what we have today, you know, is a North Korea that has amassed up to 60 nuclear warheads, some say 30, some say 40, the exact number doesn't matter. It is producing enough fissile material to make half those new bombs annually. In 2021, Rand Corporation, they had a report that projected that North Korea could have around 200 nuclear weapons, and hundreds of ballistic missiles stockpiled by 2027. And available evidence also suggests that the North can miniaturize these warheads to fit a top missile.

And Kim Jong-un is now likely moving to the next phase, which is placing multiple warheads on a single ICBM. And this morphed capability will, is again, designed to frustrate limited, you know, to frustrate US missile defenses, and to really enhance North Korea's ability to strike the US mainland with nuclear missiles, making North Korea just one of the three countries in the world, along with Russia and China, to possess this dangerous capability.

So that is a threat that we are facing. And all indications are that the North is technically prepared for another nuclear test, as General Leem just talked about. Punggye-ri, which was dismantled in 2018, restarted the restoration activities restarted on March 28<sup>th</sup>. Again, is prepared for another test, possibly next-generation tactical nuclear weapon. So given the situation, what do we do about it? I mean I hope we get to discuss it more robustly. But we do need to keep up the pressure. And, at the most basic level, we do need to strengthen our regional deterrence and defense capabilities and military readiness. And, of course, this includes enhancing theatre missile defense system around the Korean Peninsula, introduce to more advanced air and naval assets into the region, you know, developing and deploying more sophisticated US and South Korean strike capabilities, and all of that. And again, reinforcing Washington's extended deterrents, robust military US-ROK joint exercises that were scaled back during the Trump era.

So, you know, we don't have a magic solution to the North Korean problem. But the crisis that we are facing is very serious.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** Emma Chanlett-Avery, I wonder, obviously, what we just heard from Dr. Sue Mi Terry is, shall we say, kind of the stark assessment when it comes to North Korea capacity, both what it could do soon, in terms of its nuclear test, but missile test, missile capacity, and diversification, and the reasons thereof, are absolutely laid out there. I wonder if that's how you see it, how this threat has emerged. And also, how you see those little glimmers, as General Brooks suggested, that the idea for diplomacy has not been totally shut down.

**EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY:** Thank you, Nick. And let me echo the other panelists, and thanking John, and thanking the Belfer Center for inviting me. I also need to say, I work for Congressional Research Service. We work solely for Congress. So we take no positions on any piece of legislation, or any policies by the administration. So with that said, I will try to be mildly interesting in any comments that I offer here.

I mean, I think that the other panelists going before me have done a good job of laying out how the threat from North Korea has emerged, how their capabilities have certainly improved. You know, we are consumed with a lot of other things in the world. But North Korea, despite being under very harsh sanctions, despite basically locking their border in response to COVID, has still been able to plod along and demonstrate their advanced capabilities. They are still producing missile material. They still have chem and bioweapons. I mean, that is still there, even if we are mostly talking about Russia and Ukraine and Taiwan and China. And sometimes, I think that those conversations, you know, may distract us. But I don't think that they are distracting Pyongyang, while we're having these.

In terms of diplomatic paths, I mean it seems fairly dire the possibility of engaging directly with North Korea right now. And we are well past the era of love letters between the United States and the DPRK. But I do think that the attention to alliances from the Biden administration is with

an eye to enhancing our deterrent capabilities. I want to mention that I think that there have been some little indications of South Korea and Japan, or maybe even more than a little glimmers in the last just couple days, or South Korea and Japan wanting to mend relations in some way, and work together, particularly on security cooperation.

If North Korea, as other panelists have said, does decide to test a seventh nuclear weapon, those are the sorts of provocations that tend to drive closer trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea. We just saw, in the last couple days, Foreign Minister Hayashi and Foreign Minister Park meet and try to begin to resolve some of the really thorny historical issues that have divided these two countries for some time, and specific mentions of getting the GSOMIA, the information sharing agreement, more normalized, more functioning, sharing information. I think there's hope that South Korea and Japan would go back to doing some tracking, missile tracking exercises together. And we saw the Defense Ministers meet with Defense Minister Austin as well in Shangri-La, to begin these conversations.

You know, you tend to be pessimistic about the ability of Japan and South Korea to work together. But I think I'm cautiously optimistic, or you know, just waveringly pessimistic, or whatever the inverse of that would be, to see that begin. And that's because the threats from North Korea has increased. President Yoon has indicated he would like to mend this relationship.

And Japan also is in a very different situation now. Japan is, you know, not only is there, of course, Japan is well within the range of North Korean missiles, they are deeply, deeply concerned about China and its military modernization, and assertiveness in the Senkaku Islands and elsewhere. And now they're on Russia's bad list as well. So they're sort of surrounded by these threats, and feeling less secure, which may be the impetus that they need to get on the right page with South Korea.

So I hope that we get to the point where we were before, and even beyond, in having—you know, it would be to our advantage, I think. Observers might say that it would be to our

advantage, the US advantage, if we got to doing extended deterrence dialogues trilaterally, for example, where there was really a united front there. So I'll stop there. But I think that that, building that sort of strength, and that sort of unity in confronting North Korea is the best way of creating pressure on the regime to eventually get back to some sort of diplomacy. Thank you.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** And note, as observers might say, so just to reiterate, she's not positing her own opinion. But it's a very informed point, obviously. And Dr. Yoon, if I could start this next round about what we should be doing about these increased threats, all five of you laid out forms of pressure, keeping diplomatic ideas open, even if the light, to use General Brooks's metaphor, is flickering, not very brightly. But then, this point about the US-ROK alliance, but also regional efforts. So talk about that. How important is this momentum, when it comes to Japan and the ROK? And how do you see any kind of regional architecture advancing in order to deter North Korea, given the tensions, or given the relationship, I'll just leave it there, between Beijing and Washington?

**DR. YOON YOUNG-KWAN:** Thank you. But before I talk about trilateral cooperation, along with the United States and ROK and Japan, I would like to add a short comment on diplomatic efforts, that we need to do in coming years. I think considering ever-increasing military strength, coming from North Korea, it is important to strengthen extended deterrence to confront the kind of securities threat. And I think it was very appropriate for those leaders, in the last year's ROK Summit, to restrengthening extended deterrence mechanism.

But I think extended deterrence is a necessary condition, but it's not a sufficient condition, as we all know. In the past history, there are many examples of inadvertent wars caused by misperceptions and misunderstandings, or overreactions, et cetera. So as tension heightens on the Korean Peninsula, I think there will be rising possibility of that kind of escalation. So there should be some kind of economic initiatives taken by the US and ROK, I think.

For example, I would like to recommend Biden administration dispatching high level special envoy to Pyongyang. He or she may be not necessarily from the public sector. If he or she is respected by the American public, and close to President Biden and his team, it will be fine. The job of the special envoy would be exploring a possibility or resumption of dialogues, and sending a message that the United States and ROK are serious about resuming talks.

There are at least two important benefits of doing this kind of diplomatic gesture. First, facing another crisis situation in Korea would be the last thing that Biden administration would want, which is busy with handling the war in Ukraine, and competition with China, and domestic economic problems. So trying to build a deescalation mechanism through, I mean, dispatching an envoy, would be a reasonable effort for a preventive diplomacy.

And also, as I already mentioned, the economic situation of North Korea is dire. And economic issues are deeply related, their security policies. And this kind of situation, difficult situation provides more room for diplomacy, compared to the past time. So we need to try to utilize this kind of more room open to us. And I know that, I mean a kind of pessimistic mood is prevailing inside beltway. But I hope the Biden administration's policy toward North Korea, not solely be based on that kind of pessimism.

In terms of a trilateral cooperation, I think we can benefit much in various areas. For example, we can confront North Korea's securities threat more effectively through closer cooperation between Japan and ROK. And we also can benefit, in terms of achieving the goal of supply chain resilience in this time, in this time when economic security matters much. And also, those three countries will be able to defend our democracy and rules-based international order more effectively.

So I would like to recommend, I mean for those three governments, to reestablish some kind of organizational framework, like TCOG. I mean Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group. And I

think that organization was a very useful frame of trilateral cooperation some time ago. Thank you.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** One of the moderator's prerogatives is to jump around a little bit, and to highlight possible differences among our panelists. And so, if I could jump to Dr. Sue Mi Terry, and ask you to take on those first points that we just heard from Dr. Yoon, that while we talk about deterrence, because of the threats that we've been discussing, there also should be economic incentives provided to North Korea. And also, the announcement of a special envoy. But what Dr. Yoon's point was, is that some kind of reassurance to North Korea that the envoy would provide. Do you think that those steps would be wise?

**DR. SUE MI TERRY:** You're trying to get me to debate Professor Yoon. Deeply respect and, you know. I'm not against the idea of envoy or trying to do what we can to engage with the North, you know. So I don't disagree with him. I am more skeptical, so I'm more on the more skeptical side. He said that he hoped that Washington, we are not too pessimistic in Washington. I think I would like to phrase it as more realistic, rather than pessimistic.

I certainly think we need to leave the door open to diplomacy, and have envoy, and send a strong signal to North Korea, that you know, that yeah, why we remain resolute in the face of North Korean provocations, you know, we're not afraid to talk to Pyongyang. That we are, we are doing what we can.

But I am not—I'm just not—Sure, we can try to do that. But the Biden administration said that we are ready to talk to the North Koreans any time, any place. We didn't have any kind of precondition. It's the North Koreans that they are not yet willing to talk to us. So I'm not sure, even if we appoint an envoy, whether they are, at this point, ready to talk to us. I think they will, at some point in the future. But I think they have a certain timeline. And that timeline is something we talked about earlier, you know, with all the testing, they're trying to get their

technical capability to another level before they return to the talks, to increase their leverage when they return to the talks.

So sure, we can. I think we need to have a human rights envoy. I think we could have, certainly, an envoy for this level of talks. I'm just not optimistic North Koreans, at this point, is ready. I just think they just have their own timeline. And that's different from ours.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** Forgive my attempt to get the debate going. But I appreciate that. So let me go back to actually a point that Dr. Sue Mi Terry made before, and turn back to General Brooks, and talk about what the solutions are, and what extended deterrence is. So Sue was taking—made a few points. We have to increase military readiness. We have to deploy more advanced assets and more strike capabilities. So take that on. Is that something that you think is wise right now? And, put it in the context of what Emma was saying before, of hey, there is this possibility of more cooperation with Japan. How important is that, from your perspective?

**GENERAL VINCENT BROOKS:** Certainly, extended deterrence is a fundamental part of the alliance system, not just the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States. And in my view, it is based on a sense of trust and belief that, if something were to happen, then the resources, the full resources of the United States could be brought to bear. It's a difficult one to demonstrate, though, because many of the assets are kept hidden. And the allies have to rely on essentially a promise.

So any efforts that can reinforce confidence between allies, that could be a visitation to some of the capabilities that deliver the nuclear portion of extended deterrence. And, oh, by the way, we shouldn't think extended deterrence automatically equals use of nuclear weapons. It doesn't. And, as the post-summit statement, joint statement that happened just 14 days after President Yoon Suk-yeol came into office, and President Biden visited him in Seoul, it's the full array of capabilities.

So all the things we've talked about are part of extended deterrence, in my way of thinking. And what are we talking about? The exercises, demonstration of capability, strengthening the alliance, engaging in cooperation in areas beyond defense, enhancing the readiness of forces on the Peninsula, and bringing visitation of forces not on the Peninsula, like the ongoing F-35 joint exercises that are happening between US F-35 aircraft and South Korean F-35 aircraft.

Continued modernization of the South Korean armed forces and the US armed forces on the Korean Peninsula, so that the capabilities that North Korea is demonstrating become less and less effective at holding the alliance at risk.

Certainly, that's what they're doing. And there's a degree of escalation that happens in this. And I acknowledge that. But I believe that the US and South Korea are far more technologically advanced. And they're certainly more economically solvent. And they have much more room to be able to create a harder and harder target for North Korea. And this opens the door, in my view, toward dialogue.

So this is extended deterrence in action, in day-to-day practice. And it leads to a condition where North Korea realizes they really just don't have any good options that will move them into a future that they can live with, if they pursue only a threatening posture. That there has to be some dialogue. And what I'm looking for is, how does the alliance get to a deeper level of dialogue with North Korea if the door does open, to really address what the deepest security concerns are of North Korea? It's not, in my view, some of the superficial things that are talked about, forces on the Korean Peninsula, the presence of strategic assets as they're called by North Korea. There's more to it than that. And, if we can't get to a deeper level, then there can't really be progress.

Now, on the trilateral aspect of it, I believe that this is an opportunity, North Korea can help to stimulate trilateral cooperation. And so does China, for that matter. They stimulate trilateral cooperation. And it's a good time for that, with the change of administration, really three administrations, in US, Japan, and South Korea, over the last two years, that creates a new

environment for going in a direction I think all three countries want to go in, but have had difficulty in moving for domestic political reasons, in each case.

But we have to be realistic about it. Sue Mi used the term realism. And I absolutely agree with realistic opportunism. I'd join the two of those together. There is an opportunity here to enhance cooperation. I think we should be realistic, though, about envisioning some sort of Northeast Asian alliance that has all three countries in the same alliance structure with mutual defense treaties. That's a step beyond where I think reality is, at the present. That could emerge in years to come. But that is certainly not the start point.

We mentioned things like the General Security of Military Information Agreement, the GSOMIA, a very important conduit for the direct sharing of information between Japan and South Korea. You know, if you imagine an equilateral triangle, that has only two sides connected, and one left open, how strong is it when pressure is put on it? The answer is not very strong. It goes flat very quickly. But, if you can join the last two points that are not connected, and that is Korea and Japan, then you have a much stronger circumstance.

Cooperation is the first level. And, as we see increased cooperation ongoing, that moves against North Korea's interests and, candidly, on a broader sense, it moves against China's interest and Russia's interest, which both include dismantling of the alliance system, or at least weakening it, and fracturing the connections between the US and South Korea and the US and Japan. This is what I think is afoot here.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** General Leem, if I could ask you to respond to those points that General Brooks made about Japan? He said this is a new environment. But there's obviously limitations. So how do you see the cooperation, the trilateral cooperation? And how important is it? And how far can it extend?

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So I believe that all of our national leaders and military leaders recognize the importance of having an alliance system in place between the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan, considering all of the threats that we'll face in the future, which is not limited to North Korea, but also includes China and others.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So the question is, if all of the leaders will recognize the importance of an alliance, of a three-way alliance, why is it so difficult to work towards it? Well, as many of you already know, there is a considerable amount of historical baggage that makes that process very difficult.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** And that baggage exists between the Republic of Korea and Japan, of course. Therefore, if we want to see enhanced cooperation between—enhanced trilateral cooperation and improved military cooperation that's trilateral, you need an improvement of—you could say that the key is to improve the bilateral relationship between Korea and Japan.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** Now there is something that I think everybody should bear in mind. Over the last 70 years, the Republic of Korea worked very hard to become a stronger country, essentially. Now analysts say that it has somewhere between the fifth and sixth largest military force in the world, is somewhere around the 10<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world That's considerable. And, if you place it in any other region throughout the world, South Korea would be a very powerful country. In the context of where we are located, in Northeast Asia, we are not the most powerful force in this region.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** And this isn't a new trend, either. Over the last 5,000 years, it has been a recurring theme for Korea, that we have always been surrounded by nations and forces that are much more powerful than ours. And we have been under threat posed by those actors that surround us. And the most recent iteration of that just happens to be the modern history and the associated baggage that we have with Japan.

So what's important for—what's critical to set in the conditions for a trilateral relationship, is resolving some of these very old tensions between the people of two countries that have been held, for political reasons, for a very long historical timeframe.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** And some of these concerns are deep-seated concerns that reside within the populous. So it's not just a single person's mind we are trying to change, we are trying to change the—we are trying to resolve the concerns of an entire people. Unfortunately, over the last number of years, senior leaders, both Korean and Japanese, have tried to use these sentiments or short-term opportunistic political maneuvers, which has brought our bilateral relationship to the lowest possible point you could imagine.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So the row over GSOMIA just happens to be one example of how political expedience was prioritized over a commitment to resolving those deep-seated concerns, so that we could have the necessary cooperation. Very fortunately, the incumbent leaders have both internally and externally expressed their commitment to improving the relationship between Korea and Japan. And I think that presents a new opportunity for us.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** I very much greeted the recent news of the death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with great concern. It was very tragic news. And I was very concerned about some of the coverage, news coverage that implied a potential connection to a religious group based in Korea. And I had concerns for how—what that might imply for the next—so for the next turn in Korea-Japanese relations.

But that, notwithstanding, in several other substantive aspects, I believe that opportunities, significant opportunities have presented themselves for improving relations between Korea and Japan. And I think it's important to take up these opportunities, and to move step by step. We have to work towards the end goal we want. And obviously, we won't be able to do that all in one fell swoop. But we have to work towards that.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So I'll close with what I think that step-by-step process would look like. Number one, we have to create an atmosphere in which is acceptable for the people of both countries, that we're going to have cooperative talks. And to do that, you can start with the lowest hanging fruits, which would be cultural exchange, sending tourists to each country, to each other's country. Start with the low-hanging fruits, and eventually use the very present security concerns presented by North Korea's nuclear missile capabilities, to have substantive security talks which will help build towards the more lasting alliances. Thank you.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** Thank you. Sue Mi Terry, I know you wanted to jump in on trilateral cooperation. We've heard from General Leem talking about a new opportunity, General Brooks going in a new environment. And we just heard General Leem suggest starting with culture. Cultural exchanges might work best. How do you see it?

**DR. SUE MI TERRY:** No. I agree with that. You know, General Brooks talked about having realistic expectation when it comes to the bilateral relationship. And I agree with that. You know, I worry that, even with President Yoon saying he wants to repair the bilateral relationship, you know, I'm concerned that there might be a gap between the reality, the rhetoric and the reality. But, you know, I just wanted to point out this, with Prime Minister Abe's assassination, you know, just shocking assassination, deeply, deeply shocking event, I wonder, you know, that they would further undermine—this event will further undermine Japanese confidence, that you know, they're a country, that it can continue to be a safe and peaceful place that it has been since World War II, you know. The Japanese have been dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate change, you know, Chinese behavior, there's rising fears of potential conflict in Taiwan Strait, North Korea's expanding WMD program that we just talked about,. Disarray in the United States, right. Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And the downward relationship between Russia and Japan since then.

And then, this shocking incident of assassination of Prime Minister Abe. It's all of this is bound to make Japanese more concerned about its security environment. But I wanted to—I bring this out because I think, you know, when you look back at history, it's precisely these moments when Japan and Korea's relationship, when they were concerned about security, there were actual opportunities for cooperation. And I just wanted to point out, even for example, in 1998, when President Kim Dae-jung went to Japan, and there was Kim and Prime Minister Obuchi declared the Kim-Obuchi declaration, their intent to improve their relationship, Korea-Japan relationship through a political, societal, economic, and cultural exchanges.

And what led to that declaration? There were motivating factors on both sides, leading up to that. There was a security crisis the year before. There was North Korea's missile test that Japan was concerned about its security. There was also a financial crisis, IMF financial crisis in 1997. So these, my point, I guess, is that history suggests that it is possible for this very low point of

Korea-Japan relationship could yield to another period of increased cooperation, in light of increased security concerns.

And then, if there is a right leadership, I think that's another key. So we'll see. I'm very mindful of what General Brooks said about having a realistic expectation, particularly when it comes to this bilateral relationship. But I just point this out as we'll see if this is potentially an opportunity for Korea and Japan's bilateral relationship and trilateral relationship with the United States.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** Emma Chanlett-Avery, you rightly brought us to trilateral cooperation. So I'll let you respond to what we've been talking about. But also help us zoom out even further, and talk about China. What should we know about what China, as far as we can tell, is thinking when it comes to North Korea, acting towards North Korea, and also, you know the administration's policy on Indo-Pacific, and the relationship with Beijing. How does that fit into this regional architecture, really, even if it's just Japan-ROK that we're talking about, this regional architecture that I think we're heading toward, or at least we're envisioning a little bit?

**EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY:** Thanks, Nick. And thanks for bringing us to expand the aperture a little bit on looking at the region. And firstly, I do want to say, you know, no one's talking about a trilateral alliance, a treaty alliance. Like that is cruising for a bruising, as my mom would say. Like getting on better footing, I think, is in everyone's interest. We can also talk, I can talk at great length about Abe's assassination, and how this may or may not affect relationships on the Korean Peninsula.

But, for a second, let me just talk about Yoon's emphasis on Korea being a more global player, and how that might fit in with this. Yoon has, you know, done things like—I think he's the first Prime Minister ever to go to the NATO Summit. He joined the IPEF, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Yeah, and he has indicated that he's interested in cooperating with the Quad, the Quadrilateral security dialogue among the US, Japan, India, and Australia.

And I think that there's real opportunity there, particularly if the Quad's activities aren't seen as sort of direct hard security areas, and things that China would respond particularly poorly to. You know, you can see vaccine partnerships, or working on climate issues, as among those areas that South Korea has a lot to offer regionally, and would be the kind of things that would not directly offend Beijing quite as much as some of the areas.

So I do hope that that's going to be examined as part of the portfolio of becoming a more global player, and more of a regional player, and more engaged in the regional architecture. I think that the Quad has been emphasized by the Biden administration as one of the centerpieces of how it will engage with the region, and that it's hard for South Korea to engage with the Quad's activities without getting on a better footing with Japan, because Japan was one of the founding members of the Quad.

The other area that I wanted to mention was that, just going back for just a second to Japan and Korea, keep in mind that Kishida was the Foreign Minister who negotiated the Comfort Women Agreement in 2015. And, despite the fate of that particular agreement, he was, I think, seen as engaging in productive ways with South Korea, despite what may have happened politically to the foundation it was founded for that.

So I hope that we could sort of expand, and talk about South Korea's involvement with the rest of the region. They have made efforts, even Moon Jae-in made a very high profile visit to Australia, to try and work on that relationship. So I think that there is some fertile ground for South Korea to engage beyond the Peninsula with the region.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** So Dr. Yoon, why don't you take that. So as Emma points out, we have seen the Yoon administration state publicly, one of its policies is to be a global player. Do you see that as a good thing? And do you see that as different or advancing the work that you were doing? And bring us back to Beijing as well. I'll go back to that. How do you see what China is and isn't doing, whether it's helpful or not?

**DR. YOON YOUNG-KWAN:** Let me answer your second question first. In terms of the role of China, I'm somewhat skeptical about that, because if we look back the recent history of the three decades, actually, since the beginning of the North Korean nuclear crisis, China's role on denuclearizing North Korea was not that much helpful. In the 1990s, they tended to regard nuclear issue as a matter just between the United States and North Korea. And in 2000, China tended to take the role of third party mediator between the United States and North Korea, when they hosted the six party talks.

In the 2010s, when North Korea began to accumulate their nuclear stockpile, they were rather quick in accepting, I mean, North Korea as a nuclear state, and regarded that kind of happening as a *fait accompli*. And nowadays, they began to veto—I mean US-led effort to impose additional sanction against North Korea. So I think it's time for the US government to devise a new fresh approach to North Korea. And I'm not sure whether the Biden administration will be able to do that or not. But I think to fix the problem of North Korea nuclear problem, I think we need a new approach, considering their kind of changing the situation.

And if that can happen, I think the United States will be able to achieve the goal of denuclearization, and taking more advantages position in competition with China in theory. But I don't know whether that will be possible or not. What I'm saying is, making North Korea as a kind of Vietnam in Northeast Asia. What I'm saying is, Vietnam was a kind of hostile country, fought with the United States. And it became a kind of partner and help the US foreign policy in checking China in one way or another.

So, I mean, it's a kind of theoretical answer. But I don't know whether that kind of solution can be found in the near future, because it would be very difficult to shift American paradigms on this nuclear issue toward that direction, and even the current political mood inside Washington, DC.

In terms of South Korea taking the—I mean the more active role in global community, for example becoming a pivotal state, I think it's very desirable, actually. I think the war in Ukraine and the election of President Trump in 2000[sic] were the two most important political events that reminded South Korean people of the importance of the value factor in Korea's diplomacy. And I think the election of President Yoon and resetting South Korea's diplomacy towards strengthening bilateral alliance with the United States was, in some sense, a response to these new developments in changing South Korean perception.

And I was happy to read, I mean the contents of the joint statement of both leaders this May. And I sincerely hope that South Korea can become—I mean can achieve that kind of goal of becoming a pivotal state in global affairs, and be able to, I hope South Korea be able to provide an international public course in global community further. So I think that's a good direction. Even though North Korean security strength is huge for South Koreans, we need to broaden our diplomatic perspective as a kind of advanced country. I mean 10<sup>th</sup> biggest economy in the world. Thank you.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** General Brooks, moderator's prerogative here. And I'm going to have you respond to an administration policy. Obviously, you can decline to judge it. But General Yoon—sorry, Dr. Yoon just called for a new fresh approach from the US. The US has left the door open to diplomacy, as you suggested. Jake Sullivan, when he gave some remarks a few months ago, I'm sure we all saw, said that the new approach was somewhere between strategic patience and the grand bargain. And I think he used incremental approach, I think is the phrase that he suggested, providing partial compensation, perhaps sanctions relief in exchange for partial dismantlement. I think that was the point. So take that on. You know, you brought up diplomacy, the importance of keeping that door open. Is the current administration's approach sufficient?

**GENERAL VINCENT BROOKS:** No, it's never sufficient until you achieve success. But it's clear that it's not the same as what has been seen in the last two administrations, or the ones before that. There will always be some degrees of continuity. I mean we're dealing with the

same, same part—the same world, and the same challenges within that world, with new ones having been added.

But I do believe this idea—I'll refer to it as strategic deliberateness, of knowing where it is you want to go, and not foreclosing any road that leads to it. And yet, trying to create pressures so that there are choices made to go down the ones that are most likely to be productive. And so we have to be, I think the administrations have to be very careful in balancing this idea of keeping the door open without conditions, and yet not reinforcing negative behaviors to the extent where it's simply pocketed by North Korea, as it has been done so many times.

There are plenty of reasons to be pessimistic about trying to move forward with North Korea. But to find that very thin road that leads to one of those flickering lights that I alluded to before, is much more challenging. And so that requires thinking about it differently, assessing it constantly, and in my personal opinion, trying to change the point of view from which we look at the problem set.

For example, are we looking at it from the eyes of the alliance? Or are we looking at it—trying to look at it from the eyes of North Korea? Difficult to understand. They're so opaque, it's difficult to really know what they're thinking. But what is it that we're really contemplating? Are we seeing where North Korea views itself relative to China? Are they satisfied at having China control their economy in such a way that they've been left a basket case for decades? Is that something North Korea wants to have endure? Do we think that they're an ally of China if that's the case? If we change the point of view, as we look at the problem, we may find that there are new things to be considered that we haven't contemplated before.

And I think, fundamentally, centering on what is deeply in North Korea's interest, economic security for example may be one of those, security of the regime, clearly is another one as well. But I don't know if it's going to be continued reliance on China. So does the approach, then, require a tactical approach toward North Korea that keeps the door open, without reinforcing

negative behaviors, while coupled with a larger view of the geopolitical realities that are out there, and how they might change if North Korea changes? That's something I believe that is worthy of the consideration of this administration.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** It is just after 6:30. We've got 12 more minutes to finish this round. And then, John's going to jump in and do some moderated questions and answers. So please, everyone, think about your questions now, and submit them as you think of them into the Q and A. And I see there's actually already a couple. But General Leem, let me come to you with that fascinating point that General Brooks just made. If we think of it from not the alliance perspective, but from North Korea's perspective, and he talked about providing economic security options, regime security options, I wonder how you see that, whether that is an approach that you could see bearing fruit?

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** It's a wonderful point, and a fascinating point indeed. As you all know, General Brooks and I worked on writing an article about the grand bargain—so-called grand bargain in 2021, submitted to Foreign Affairs. So as we discuss this point, I think it's important for us to understand the society that is North Korea.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So I personally have spent 40 years of my life confronting North Koreans along the military demarcation line. And in every case, we were looking at each other. And we were –

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So I can say I had my fair share of dealing with the people, the characters that are from North Korea. I've noticed that a lot of academics and expert analysts often try to look at North Korea through the lens of socialist society or communist society. They try to analyze North Korea as a socialist society. And I think that is the wrong footing on which to understand North Korea.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** Because I think the truth is, North Korea is the only true feudal state, true monarchy that still exists today.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** The North Korean population has never experienced anything other than a monarchy.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** Because up until 1910, the people in North Korea have experienced the monarchical state called Joseon. And then, until 1945, the monarch whose control they were under, who was the Japanese Emperor. And then after the liberation, they say they brought in communism. But what they really brought in was a monarchy that continued from Kim Il-sung down to Kim Jong-il, down to Kim Jong-un.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** And only by looking at North Korea as a monarchy can you understand the political environment in which it was possible, and it did actually happen, that it did actually manifest, wherein Kim Il-sung handed over his leadership to his son, who handed over his

leadership to his son, again. And only by considering North Korea as a monarchy can you understand the decision-making process that it has demonstrated so far.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** And the characteristic of a monarchical state is that the survival of the state is—the survival of the state is equal to the survival of the regime, of all the state's resources going to maintaining control for that particular monarchical line. The lives of its population are not as important to consider.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** We can see a similar pattern in a previous chapter in our country's history, in which even as Joseon was on this path to—was in its decline, it maintained a survival for a period by collaborating with the monarchy of Japan.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So as we consider options for how we can engage North Korea in dialogue, or whether we want to somehow bring it in to the rules-based liberal international order, what we have to bear in mind is that we have to talk to them as if they are a monarchy, assuming that they have the fears of a monarchical state, and the desires of a monarchical state. If we try to base our dialogue on anything else, say a very modern sense of ideological commitment, rather than a concern with preserving the monarchical line, our approaches will likely fail.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So I'll conclude by saying that our end goal is to bring North Korea into the fold of the liberal international order. But to do that, we can't convince the monarchy to change

its mind. So as a matter of tactics, we have to give some of what the monarchy wants, while allowing the population to acquire the values that are conducive to transforming that society to one that is willing to become a member to the liberal international order. Thank you.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** Keep the questions coming in, everyone. We only have four or five minutes. I've tried to time this perfectly. But obviously, we're running out. So I will pull back here. Sue Mi Terry, just respond to that in a couple minutes if you will, providing the monarchy some of what it wants.

**DR. SUE MI TERRY:** The monarchy? Can I just expand out? I mean the monarchy, I mean of course, North Korea is one of the most unique states in this still monarchical confusion, you know, hereditary, communist dynasty, in a very unique state. But I wonder if could just spend my last few remaining remarks just to talk a little bit about just larger—You know, I didn't get to mention about the China, the intensifying US-China competition and the war in Ukraine, and just all that, you know, having such profound implications for the region, globally and, of course, in the region, but on the North Korean challenge.

And here, I think there are two challenges. First, we didn't get to really talk about this. But I do think that it's undeniable that, for North Korea, the Ukraine war had really underscored—and it goes back to what everybody else was talking about—but really underscored the importance of nuclear weapons for its security. I mean they already got their lesson from Iraq and, you know, seeing Saddam Hussein, and from Libya and Qaddafi So it's not like they were going to even give up nuclear weapons.

But again, I think this really underscored for North Koreans. So, you know, they know that Russia would not—made it unlikely to have initiated the war if Ukraine had not given up its nuclear weapons through the Budapest Agreement in 1994. And so again, it's sort of that's the lesson we already—You know, I was already pessimistic. But I wanted to underscore that point, again, Iraq, Libya, and now the Ukraine.

But the second challenge here I want to also quickly point out, is this, you know, in addition to the US-China competition and Ukraine, we are—I think post-Ukraine, North Korea is actually in a favorable—is facing a favorable external environment in being able to also continue developing its nuclear missile program. And here is my point about China. You know, this US-China competition, and then now, Putin and Xi Jinping's really uneasy alliance, all of that has further complicated our efforts to make progress on North Korea.

You know, we talked briefly about how China is extremely unhelpful. You know, there were times when Beijing and Moscow were willing to join forces with the United States and its allies. Not often, but there were times, you know, when they were helping with, in terms of sanctions front. I'm thinking of the fall of 2017 in particular, during the maximum pressure campaign. But now, with US-China competition, and the Ukraine war, and Putin-Xi alliance, we're not going to get any help from these guys.

You saw the United Nations Security Council, they vetoed, you know—they couldn't even condemn an ICBM alliance, first of all. And they would veto against any actions on North Korea. So even when there's a nuclear test, in this situation, given this situation, even an additional nuclear test by North Korea, is unlikely, from any kind of serious action, from China, or Russia. So I think this is just one other thing that we need to be aware of. And I think it's going to, you know, pose a challenge to us.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** Emma Chanlett-Avery, last comments from you in the time we have before John starts a Q and A? Take it away. But, as Sue Mi Terry just mentioned, her perspective, it's more complicated now that Russia and China have the no limits alliance, I think, as their phrase was, right before the Olympics/the invasion. But also, North Korea has seen Ukraine as a lesson of why they need nuclear weapons.

**EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY:** I'll be brief. I mean, that's a huge question to ask at the very end of this session. I mean, I think that—I mean, I absolutely take Sue Mi's point, I mean, that they've learned that nuclear weapons are sort of a security guarantee for them. But I also think that China and Russia, despite sort of being seen as partners, I think there's limits to how far that can go. I mean, China certainly seemed to have thrown its lot in with Russia here, right now. But they've done so in a way that, so far, they have avoided sanctions specifically for that support.

And I think that the whole region is sort of taking notes on what this all means, you know, and particularly in applying it to how this affects the cross-strait situation in China and Taiwan. I mean, Japan was certainly jolted by this, and really sees that there's a parallel. But, you know, I think for China, this didn't go as smoothly as they may have thought it was going to for Russia. So maybe they're taking a pause, too, on thinking about their situation with Taiwan.

So I think it's way too early just how aware this all shakes out. But I also think that China probably doesn't like the fact that alliances have proved, like in this case, the Trans-Atlantic alliance has stood as firmly as it has, I mean as united as it has, at least so far. And that's probably a little bit of a warning to Beijing as well. So I'll stop there, because there's just way too much to discuss in talking about all of the regional players in the world.

**NICK SCHIFRIN:** So sorry to put you on the spot there. So, for the last bit, we've got our question and answers. Please keep them coming, via Q and A, or email. And for that, I turn it back over to John.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Nick, thank you so much. Great effort there in drawing out some fascinating nuances and insights from the panel discussion. We'll transition now to the Q and A portion. And to start off, Steven Ellis asks, how does Japan's increased military buildup affect future security cooperation with the ROK? If I could start with General Brooks?

**GENERAL VINCENT BROOKS:** Well, thanks John. And thanks, Nick, for moderating for us. Japan is carefully assessing its security needs. And it must do that in the context of continuing threats, some of which are becoming more significant, some Chinese aggressive behaviors, the concerns about cross-strait pressures between China and Taiwan, that have implications directly to Japanese security, and the continuing hostage-holding of the Kuril Islands by Russia. So what they may have hoped—Japan may have hoped to have had a secure northern flank at some point in time, is not secure. And certainly, in between the two sits North Korea.

And so Japan has to be mindful of, what does it take to secure Japanese territory, Japanese citizens? Having said that, any build-up of capability that would include considerations of retaliatory strike capability, precision strike at long distance from Japan into North Korea, I'll just use that as an example, since North Korea is very directly threatening Japan, has implications for South Korea.

So these are the types of things that North Korea knows, first, how to create irritation in the alliance system. And it's on matters like these. Japan's buildup has to be done with a mind toward the balancing of these disparate issues and pressures throughout the region. And much less their need to see beyond their own archipelago down into Southeast Asia, into Oceania, and across into the Indian Ocean. Japan has interests in all those as well, to sustain themselves economically. That, I think, will be the kind of framing that goes through there.

Dialogue is going to be really important. This is why that base of the trilateral is so important. The bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan must be predicated upon these. And they have to have very serious conversations about it, so as to not scare or threaten one another unintentionally.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thank you. And with that, Emma, we do see this effort with the new Yoon administration, putting a lot of early effort, in terms of connecting with Tokyo, and advancing

this type of bilateral Tokyo-Seoul security cooperation. And so, with this, as we see Steven's question here, how are you viewing it? And, if I were to look at Steven's question from another angle as well, we see two alliances playing out. You have the US-ROK alliance and the US-Japan alliance. US-ROK alliance is focusing more attention in terms of activities related to the threat coming from North Korea. Very focused on the Korean Peninsula. And then you have the US-Japan alliance that is a key pillar of the Quad going farther afield in the Indo-Pacific. How are you seeing the two alliances play out in that respect, where there are some areas of differences, where the focus and the efforts are clearly one regional and one Korean Peninsula.

**EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY:** Thanks for the question. Well, I think first, just to look at the context here, I think that both—particularly the US-ROK alliance, but also the US-Japan alliance, are a little bit bruised from their experience with the Trump administration, just because there was an open sort of skepticism of the value of alliances. And, I mean, particularly the burden-sharing, you know, negotiations with South Korea, were really difficult for the alliance to maintain. And it's not a new dynamic. I mean those were tough negotiations both, you know, it's very sort of central that these alliances are going to fear abandonment by the US at some point.

I think that there's been an emphasis on these alliances under the Biden administration. But it was a reminder that these are delicate. And there's at least a perception of the relative decline of US power in the region. So I think that both of these countries are, you know, hedging a bit, I mean looking to develop at least some degree of autonomy in their ability to defend themselves. So I think an arms race has been underway for some time. And it may accelerate. I think Japan is certainly looking into capabilities, and looking at the capabilities that would have been taboo to talk about, you know, a decade ago.

There's a momentum now because of Abe's assassination to try and secure some of the elements of his more muscular posture as part of a legacy. But South Korea is doing this too. South Korea is developing some really advanced capabilities, really building up their indigenous defense industry. So I think that everyone is doing this, which is why, if we can get to some degree of

trust and information sharing, where there's not just instant skepticism and threat from South Korea or Japan building up these capabilities, then that can be—at least mitigate against instability in the region and distrust.

So I think there's a window. But it's not—it could close quickly if Japan, for example, moves quickly to revise Article 9 of its Constitution. I can't imagine that being received particularly well in South Korea. And for the record, I mean it takes a long time to do that. And this is not happening tomorrow. But I do think there will be—it sort of has a new lease on life in the aftermath of Abe's death. I'll stop there.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thanks for that, Emma. Before going to General Leem and Dr. Yoon, looking at the relationship between Russia-Ukraine conflict and the China-Taiwan potential conflict there, I wanted to turn to Sue. This is a question from Dr. Samuel Wells, who asks, what are the possibilities of the ROK reducing its economic engagement with China in order to expand global cooperation with the US, and if possible, with Japan as well?

**DR. SUE MI TERRY:** Sorry. I think this is a fundamentally—The key question that South Korea is grappling with. I think that effort has already begun. But, you know, as you know, South Korea's trade relationship with China, their trade volume is just double that of South Korea-US, South Korea-Japan combined. And that is the reality of it. But since that deployment, and China's economic coercion and retaliation to South Korea, and I think given the South Korean public perception towards China, also has been negatively trending. I mean their view of public perception of China is right now even worse than South Korea's public perception of Japan.

So South Korean leaders are aware of this. And they are trying to sort of diversify. I don't know how in reality, how far they can really pull away from that. But I do think this is a key long-term question for South Korea, going forward. And whether you call it a hedging strategy, or a balancing strategy, they have been pursuing this strategy for a very long time. President Yoon

has now promised to be tougher on China. Now they have to contend with the public opinion that is very different, that has soured in China. But we'll see again.

Here, I wonder, you know, whether the reality again—you know, we talked earlier about—when we were talking about Quadrilateral relationship with Japan, General Brooks said we need to have sort of temperate expectation of how much things can go. So again, even on China, I don't know how, in reality, how much they can really do that, given the economic situation. But I do think this is a key question for South Koreans to have to answer for themselves.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** I think we're going to be revisiting that question for years to come. Thank you for that, Sue. And now starting off with General Leem, and then I'll turn to Dr. Yoon on the same question This is from Genting Kristo. And he asks, how does a posturing of the US and NATO against both Russia, with respect to the Ukraine conflict, and China, with respect to Taiwan, influence the situation on the Korean Peninsula? Starting with you, General Leem.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** Thank you for the question, John. You mentioned that there is a certain amount of connection between China as it pertains to Taiwan, and what's happening right now in Ukraine. So I'd like to extend that discussion a little more, in answering this question.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So I'll speak in terms of the military perspective and military strategy.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So the question for us is, what is Xi Jinping's greatest concern if he is considering a potential invasion of Taiwan or otherwise planning some kind of military conflict with Taiwan? What would be his biggest concern?

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** It's most likely going to be the involvement of the United States.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** And Xi Jinping will factor that into his calculus.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So speaking in terms of the military, it is going to take a while for naval or air assets to depart from the United States and reach Taiwan. And it's going to be even more difficult to deploy land forces all the way there.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So if the United States does—If China does decide to do something about Taiwan, and project its forces there. And if the United States decides to respond to it with their military intervention, the leadership will likely have to consider moving the forces stationed in Korea and Japan and deploy them to Taiwan, rather than bringing them all the way from the Continent of the United States.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So the forces deploying out of Korea and Japan will likely be the greatest concern for Xi Jinping, should they choose to do something.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So if that's Xi Jinping's greatest problem, then what is the strategy answering that problem? Well, it's likely going to be doing what he needs to do to prevent the deployment of the forces, 28,000 US forces and 45,000 US forces in Korea and Japan expected. And he has to fix them.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So the best way to do that would be to fix those forces again where they are located, or prevent them from deploying to Taiwan. Of course, Kim Jong-un will want those forces to be absent from the region, so that they cannot be involved in conflicts with a small or a large into the Peninsula.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So one scenario in which China and North Korea both get what they want, is one in which a simultaneous military conflict in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula forces the United States to split its forces and present it with multiple fronts.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** Now one might think that the desired effect can be accomplished by just creating a small, minor military situation on the Korean Peninsula to present additional complication for the US forces as it tries to deal with a greater situation in Taiwan. But you have to bear in mind, there is one point million forces concentrated around the military demarcation

line in the Korean Peninsula. There is no minor spark in the Korean Peninsula. It will likely escalate very quickly.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So to conclude, if something happens in Taiwan, it will likely mean a significant situation here in the Korean Peninsula as well. Which means the Korea-US alliance has to be prepared for a simultaneous event in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thanks very much. And before going to General Brooks on a THAAD question that came in, the same question that we looked at here from Genting Kristo, I'd like to pose to Dr. Yoon. So just to recap, how does a posturing of the US and NATO against both Russia on the Ukraine conflict and China on Taiwan, influence this situation on the Korean Peninsula?

**DR. YOON YOUNG-KWAN:** Thank you. Let me make my answer brief. First, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as I already mentioned, reminded South Koreans of the importance of values, such as democracy and rules-based international order. And I think they began to recognize that South Korea, as a Democratic country, and as a country which benefited from liberal international order so much, should try to, I mean, take an important role in keeping and maintaining this kind of liberal international order. So I think that's the reason why South Korean government is taking in providing supports and aid to Ukraine these days.

And my second point is, as already—as Dr. Terry already mentioned, North Korea will become more—I mean more eager to develop their nuclear program as the result of Ukrainian war. And that will make the challenge of denuclearizing North Korea even more difficult. So that's one important impact.

And finally, many South Koreans tend to think that the US government, the Biden administration, may be too busy with so many urgent international and domestic issues, the Ukrainian war, competition with China, and Iran, and domestic economic difficulties, et cetera, et cetera. So they may be concerned about whether the Biden administration will have much—I mean, energy and time to focus on South Korean situation, if something happens. So that's why I emphasize the importance of taking some kind of diplomatic initiative. I mean the international situation surrounding South Korea is developing toward a negative reaction around this. Thank you.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thank you for that. And General Brooks, this is a question that comes in from William Mitchell, who's a graduate student here at Harvard. And he asks, with the advancement in North Korean missile capabilities, there appears to be the need for more robust missile defenses. But China has reacted negatively to the deployment of systems like THAAD in South Korea. How can the ROK-US alliance enhance defense capabilities without straining relations with China?

**GENERAL VINCENT BROOKS:** Well, thanks for the question I begin with a few things. First, I believe that China overplayed its hand with regard to THAAD. They overreacted on the perception that they had, perhaps to their own military advice, that the deployment of THAAD, a defensive system, would pose some sort of threat to Chinese interests and security. That was a miscalculation that caused Xi Jinping to go out too far over his skis until he could make it to his plenum.

Having said that, the principles behind the deployment of THAAD were ones that I believe are relevant to any enhancement now. The first is, it must be done to protect the Republic of Korea and, concurrently, any other allies who are threatened by North Korean systems, including the homeland of the United States. So it's about defending first.

The second principle is, it's about the alliance deciding for its own sake what is needed to create that defensive array. The third is to think of the purpose being to disable the ability of North Korea to hold at risk alliance population centers and key resources and facilities which they use for deterrence purposes. You know, this idea of we would never think about engaging in a combat operation with North Korea because Seoul would be struck. So, as people automatically finish that sentence, it's an affirmation of the deterrent value that North Korea has in being able to threaten the populated areas of Seoul.

So the purposes of these missile defense enhancements—and I would add counter-cruise missile, counter-unmanned aerial system, counter-rocket, counter-artillery, counter-mortar, the combination of those things that threaten the populated areas are the purpose. It's to take away the ability for North Korea to use it for deterrent purposes.

Now, there are some specific tactical things. And I won't go too long on this, because there are many. But the first begins with integrating the existing systems in a way that they are smarter, with regard to one another and an incoming threat. And that they're more distributed and layered. That's a bit of a term of art. But you don't want a single shield that's protecting. You want multiple layers of shield that would protect you from a given incoming threat. And that's done through integration, South Korean and US integration, and integration among the very systems themselves.

Positioning into the right spots is also important. And, candidly, given the sophistication of South Korea and the United States, especially when they work together, developing the solutions that are unique to Korea would be very, very important. They're sophisticated enough to create a unique defensive system there, that can enhance the protections as well as decrease the deterrent value that North Korea derives.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thank you. And with that, the technical analysis that General Brooks presented, Emma to you, the same question related to THAAD and how South Korea and the

ROK alliance navigates this, but also addressing legitimate concerns regarding these quick advancements. And added to that, Emma, if you could also address economic coercion question. Very briefly, we saw, in that THAAD episode, China applying an economic coercion playbook different from the US sanctions playbook, essentially shutting off access to the Chinese marketplace, and an immediate effect as well. So Emma, to you. First, that question of how the US-ROK alliance can navigate this thorny issue, relations to China, and then the economic coercion piece.

**EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY:** Well, obviously, General Brooks laid this out quite well, in terms of the technical need for it. I would just say that the THAAD episode, I think that I've heard many analysts say that there was a sense, in South Korea, that the United States didn't do enough to protect South Korea or to come to—to help them, given the tremendous economic losses that South Korean companies faced, because of Beijing's sort of unofficial boycott.

So I wonder if there's a room to talk about, and then probably our South Korean colleagues could address this the best, you know, some sort of mechanism where the United States guarantees that there would be some sort of economic assistance, if there was a similar episode with another THAAD type battery, and if China had a similar reaction. I wonder if that's sort of within the realm of alliance cooperation? And would that be reassuring?

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thank you. And to that question, if I could turn to you. So Dr. Yoon, this was an experience that very much is alive in South Korean memory, when China practiced its version of economic coercion, almost like economic disciplining in the sense that it wasn't an implementation of sanctions, or getting other countries to apply sanctions as China saw them. But a clear, subtle, and below the surface type of market restriction measures that are hard to find the concrete evidence for, in terms of bringing these kind of cases to the WTO and so forth. How do you see China's economic coercion in this space playing out, going forward? And how potentially might the Yoon administration respond to that?

**DR. YOON YOUNG-KWAN:** I think the Chinese government's policy of sanctioning South Korean companies a few years ago was a kind of mistaken approach, from a long-term perspective. I think Chinese sanction with South Korean companies marked a watershed, in terms of South Korean people's perception of China. It deteriorated, rapidly, South Korean people's perception of China, and became very negative after that sanction. So I think the Chinese government had left everything twice if it was to, I mean, impose similar sanctions in South Korea and also in other countries, too. That will strengthen their isolation in international society.

And on the issue of what we should do, I mean alliance, the United States and other countries can do on this economic sanction issue, is a matter which is not—I mean which is not kind of a bilateral issue only, but also a matter of a US global strategy. I think the US government, the Biden administration needs to pay attention to this matter, and probably try to build a kind of multilateral—I mean kind of negotiation, or agreements, with which they can help each other when similar things happen in the future.

So I think it's a kind of global strategy which may, I mean, pose the position of US as the leader of liberal international order in the future, if they can establish a kind of multilateral mechanism to handle this sanction issue. Thank you.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Certainly a lot of opportunities to explore that, because we are likely to see a recurrence of that in the region as well. Thank you for that, Dr. Yoon. I'd like to turn now to Sue, and question Sue here, related to, as we touched on briefly in the panel discussion, as Nick was facilitating this, pathway to negotiations. Sue, from your vantage point, when it comes to efforts to try to reengage with North Korea to get them in a negotiated settlement to give up their nuclear weapons, what role, what kinds of economic incentives do you think would help as a catalyst to get that going?

**DR. SUE MI TERRY:** So John, as you know, I am someone who thinks that, if we need to give the North Korea is not going to give up. It's going to grow up, as far as economic incentives, right. So I think economic incentives is not going to be enough. And I don't know what kind of package that we can offer to entice Kim to give up nuclear weapons. I think President Trump that he could entice him with some economic development. His expectation, as we all know, did not bear out, which was not a surprise. Because in Vietnam's case, you know, adopting Chinese style economic policies and development, this was all possible after installation of reformist leaders who turned toward liberalizing and expanding their economy after unification, after their dream of unifying all of Vietnam under their rule occurred.

This is a very difficult, different situation with North Korea. So we continue to have very difficult task of trying to convince Kim of any kind of economic incentives to give up—to abandon the nuclear arsenal that keeps his own regime safe, and to basically open up his country while his freer rival state, South Korea exists. So I think for me, you know, from—I continue to assess that economic incentives, to get them to give up nuclear weapons for economic incentives, I think this is a very tall task.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thank you for that. And Sue, you know, certainly, the challenge seems to grow. But efforts still continue in trying to find and negotiate a way through this. This is something that I think a lot of folks will continue to observe very closely.

**DR. SUE MI TERRY:** So I do think we can get to manage the crisis. I do think we can get to an interim deal. I think we can reduce the threat. I'm just saying, to get the North Koreans to give up nuclear weapons, you know, I don't think they were willing to make that trade, is what I'm trying to say.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thank you. We now move to the final round here. And I'll pose one question to all the members, as we wrap up. And, as we get to this point, and we've teased out a lot of the nuances here. And my question to each of you is related to what you see as the near-

term, the immediate opportunity that particularly the US-ROK alliance can seize, in terms of advancing, enhancing security on the Korean Peninsula. We've had a very rich discussion here. But if you were to pick one particular immediate, within grasp type of opportunity that we should focus on, what would that be? Starting with General Leem.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** So I think what the Korea-US alliance will do right now, is resume robust military training.

**GENERAL LEEM HO YOUNG:** [KOREAN]

**INTERPRETER:** I think that's an immediate task to accomplish. I think it's actually a very important task that we need to accomplish. We need to ensure that the US forces stationed in Korea have adequate conditions in which they can train up to standard, and in which there is value to the US forces being stationed in Korea, because they are constantly training. And by doing so, we need to ensure that we constantly improve our readiness, is what I have to say. Thank you.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Perfect. Thank you. And the same question to Emma.

**EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY:** I'm going to continue my theme of trilateralism. And I think that if we can get to, you know, not just back to where we were five years ago, but even enhance the cooperative security cooperation among the US, South Korea, and Japan, I think that would go a long way towards demonstrating that we can sort out some of these differences, at least keep some of the history issues that divide Seoul and Tokyo on a separate track, and work together. I think we may have that opportunity if North Korea does indeed conduct a seventh nuclear test.

But I guess the thing to look out for, most immediately, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that we're expecting, in the next month or two, that decision about whether or not to liquefy the assets that were seized from Japanese companies, I think that's—I think Tokyo is very keenly paying attention to that. And if we can find a way through that decision and cooperate, I think that will go a long way towards demonstrating that the US is demonstrating leadership in the region. South Korea and Seoul are showing they can get past as well.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Great. A very important perspective to add. Thank you. Thank you, Emma. Over to you, Sue.

**DR. SUE MI TERRY:** Is it to me? Sorry. I agree with everything, you know, what we heard so far. So I think, you know, until North Korea is interested in returning to talks, we need to continue to increase pressure, you know. And even if the UNSC does not act, because they're not going to act, we might have to act unilaterally on the sanctions front. And then, we need to increase pressure by enhancing deterrence as I talked about before, robust US-ROK joint exercises. And then bolstering trilateral intelligence capabilities, and, you know, more robust exercises also including Japan, if that's possible.

So you know, I don't necessarily think any of pressure will get North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, whatnot. But I think only way for us to get to negotiation is to just go through this crisis. And they are trying to test and perfect their capabilities, so that they can increase their leverage when they do return to dialogue. So we need to keep up the pressure, so when we return to dialogue, that we can actually have some sort of agreement and for us to increase our leverage.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thank you. Thanks so much, Sue. Next, Dr. Yoon.

**DR. YOON YOUNG-KWAN:** Yes. I think I was—and many South Koreans were reassured when both President Biden and President Yoon Suk-yeol agreed on strengthening, I mean, extended deterrence mechanism in their joint statement last May. I think that's very important.

That's the right thing for both leaders to do, when we consider North Korea's ever-increasing military strength, and increasing their capability, increasing capability of North Korea. And that's very important. And that should be the basis of alliance relationship in coming years.

But, as I already mentioned, that's a kind of necessary condition, rather than sufficient condition. So we need to consider what kind of diplomatic opportunities there will be. And I hope, I mean the Biden administration takes some kind of initiative first, rather than waiting for North Korea does something. And that's why I recommended—I mean the idea of dispatching a special envoy to North Korea.

Of course, I mean, pessimism is prevailing inside Washington, DC and in Seoul. But I think all the situation, especially the dire economic situation in North Korea, may be providing some kind of, I mean, wider room for diplomacy than we usually think. So taking some kind of diplomatic initiative that will open the opportunity for progress on this important issue. Thank you.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** Thanks, Dr. Yoon, for keeping the spotlight on the importance of diplomacy negotiations there. And finally, to General Brooks, for the final remarks to the question of, which immediate short-term priority that the US-ROK alliance can seize and advancing security on the Korean Peninsula?

**GENERAL VINCENT BROOKS:** Thanks very much. And again, it's a privilege to be part of this. I will echo some of the comments that have been made, and then maybe add a little bit of an additional twist on it. I do believe that creating an alliance that is stronger, that is harder to threaten to defeat, that is broader, in terms of its reach and its categories of cooperation and extensive linkages. I think that all these things create an alliance that is more able to take risk with regard to negotiation.

So the stronger you are, the more resilient you are, the more risk you can take with regard to negotiations. Therefore, there's a duality that I think is necessary here. North Korea understands

this duality of things. They certainly demonstrate duality in most of what they do. They clearly are a two-sided coin. The alliance must do the same thing. So, while getting stronger in all these other characteristics that I just talked about, being non-threatening to North Korea, and making it very clear that dialogue is what we seek, and it's a deep dialogue about the things that North Korea really needs, these are the immediate actions. Get stronger, get harder, get better, and be ready to take risk when North Korea ultimately decides to move in that direction. They control the pace of dialogue.

And that's absolutely clear. It's been the case for a very long time. But the alliance must be in the right posture to be seen by North Korea as, this is one that we really don't have a choice but have a conversation with. And it's not, as someone described to me during the difficult times of 2017 and '18, North Korea must retain the opportunity to come to the table with its hand out, not its hand up. And if that can be done, then I think we might find ourselves with an opportunity.

**DR. JOHN PARK:** General Brooks, Emma, General Leem, Dr. Terry, Dr. Yoon, thank you so much for joining us for Panel 1. Clearly, with clear eyes and full hearts, created a lot of momentum, drawing on a number of complex issues, but bringing a type of clarity to it that provides great foundation as we build for Panels 2 and 3 in the coming days. Thank you so much, again, for joining.

With that, I would also like to thank Nick Schifrin again for moderating panel one. We'll now move to our wrap-up session. Today's panel highlighted all of these efforts, as we see in terms of the parallel path, related to bolstering defense deterrence, the capabilities on that front, as well as trying to keep the avenues for negotiations and diplomacy open. And so with that, we'll continue to monitor these types of activities in the future. The Korea Project will be sponsoring a number of events on these threats to build out further.

For Day 2, for the Summit, as we continue tomorrow, we'll be focusing on Building Mutual Prosperity: The Resilient Technology Supply Chains. Dr. Francesca Giovannini, the Executive

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Director of managing The Atom Project at Harvard's Belfer Center will be moderating a really outstanding panel, and continuing this theme of excellent speakers. We have on that panel the Honorable Dr. Taeho Park, former ROK Minister of Trade, and President of the Lee & Ko Global Commerce Institute. We also have Ambassador Mark Lippert, Executive Vice-President and Head of US Public Affairs, as well as Chief Risk Officer at Samsung Electronics, who formerly served as a US Ambassador to the ROK.

Also joining will be Damien Ma, managing director of MacroPolo at the Paulson Institute, and Naomi Wilson, Vice-President of Policy for Asia at the Information Technology Industry Council.

My deep thanks to you all, audience members for joining. And we look forward to seeing you tomorrow for Day 2. Thank you. Good evening and good morning.

END