

Appendix B: Case file of Compromised Intelligence Operations, 1985 - April 2020

SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES

<p>001-SNOWDEN: Australian SIGINT against Indonesia ('bugging' of President and First Lady's phones), 2013¹</p> <p><i>Australia // Indonesia</i></p> <p>Snowden disclosures reveal Defence Signals Directorate (DSD - now ASD) coverage of communications of Indonesian leadership, notably President Yudhoyono and his wife (dated 2009).² This significantly escalates the fallout from earlier reporting, based on Snowden disclosures, about STATEROOM (see below).</p> <p>The result was a prolonged suspension of bilateral security and intelligence cooperation, including on the (high priority to Australia) issue of illegal maritime arrivals from Indonesian territory. Recall of Indonesian Ambassador from Canberra. Direct Indonesian criticism of Australia and Prime Minister Abbott. Australia compelled to sign 'code of conduct' agreement on future intelligence activity.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL³</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL Despite Indonesia's size (and future prospects) it is considerably less economically and militarily advantaged than its neighbour.
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED Relationship regularly disrupted (eg during Timorese independence, live cattle exports scandal, over Australian returning of illegal maritime arrivals to Indonesian waters). Relations tend to swing from well-intentioned cooperation to wild misunderstandings. SBY otherwise very positive towards Australia (and thus this revelation seen as personal 'betrayal').
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC In context of broader Snowden relations, and in extensive media coverage in both countries. Still referred to in today's coverage of intelligence issues.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given particular subject ensures intimacy (especially coverage of First Lady).
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In context of broader Snowden disclosures storm Revelations came at end of final term for SBY and commencement of election for his replacement.
	<i>Response</i>	UNREPENTANT (initially) followed by APOLOGY On the day the allegations were first made public, 18 November 2013, Prime Minister Abbott told the House of Representatives "The Australian Government uses all the resources at its disposal, including information, to help our friends and our allies, not to harm them". This prompted President Yudhoyono to excoriate Abbott on Twitter, describing Australia's alleged actions as a "betrayal".. ⁴ See left for ultimate change in response.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE Indonesians very sensitive about sovereignty and acutely conscious of power dynamic. And conscious of own authoritarian governments' internal surveillance practices (pre-1998).
	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	China: MORE POWERFUL

¹ Supriyanto 2013; Barton 2013; Laughland & Anjani 2013; MacAskill & Taylor 2013; Barton 2013-B; Borger 2013

² South Korean and Singaporean support to FVEY intelligence activities targeting Indonesia was also implied. Leading to both the South Korean and Singaporean Ambassadors being called in (despite protestations their countries were not involved). See Laughland & Anjani 2013.

³ Borger (2013) goes so far as to describe "a collapse of relations between the countries". For an alternative assessment, highlighting the extent to which Australian concessionary responses (including the agreed 'Joint Understanding of a Code of Conduct') did not reflect a substantive ultimate change in the status quo, see Bachelard 2014.

⁴ Bachelard 2014

<p>002-SNOWDEN: Revelation of Australian STATEROOM interception capability, 2013⁵</p> <p><i>Australia // Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, East Timor, Malaysia, PNG & China</i></p> <p>Snowden disclosures, published first in <i>Der Spiegel</i>, reveal Defence Signals Directorate (DSD - now ASD) use of Australian diplomatic premises for SIGINT operations directed at host countries – including Indonesia and China.⁶</p> <p>China's Foreign Ministry reacted angrily to the allegation: "We demand that foreign entities and personnel in China strictly abide by [the Vienna Conventions] and other international treaties, and they must not, in any form, engage in activities that are incompatible with their position and status and that are harmful to China's national security and interests."⁷ The Foreign Ministry also made specific reference to Australia, noting that China and Australia had a consensus to increase cooperation, and "we hope and expect that Australia can work hard with China in this regard."⁸</p> <p>The Indonesian reaction prefigured the escalation noted above. Vice President Boediono stated that the Indonesian public was "concerned" about the spying allegations and "I think we must look forward to come to some arrangement which guarantees that intelligence information from each side is not used against the other... There must be a system."⁹</p> <p>The Malaysian Home Affairs Minister said his government took the reports seriously and was trying to confirm them: "It is a sensitive issue since it involves several countries".¹⁰</p>		Others: LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	China: COMPLICATED PNG: FRIENDLY Others: NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In context of broader Snowden disclosures storm
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL tending to UNREPENTANT The initial reaction, from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, was "It is the long-standing practice of Australian governments not to comment on intelligence matters." ¹² Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot made a series of comments in relation to the allegations (nb before the developments involving President Yudhoyono, including that: "All countries, all governments gather information. That's hardly a surprise. It's hardly a shock."
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	Indonesia, Malaysia, East Timor: MORE SENSITIVE Given past sensitivities to Australian 'interference' (and lingering Indonesian suspicions of Australian intentions towards the integrity of the Indonesian state) China, Thailand, Vietnam, PNG: NEUTRAL

⁵ MacAskill & Taylor 2013; Wan 2013; Perlez 2013; Dorling 2013-B

⁶ Similar allegations had been made about Australian diplomatic facilities in PNG, Indonesia and Thailand back in the 1980s. See Dorling 2013-B.

⁷ Quoted in Perlez 2013

⁸ Quoted in Perlez 2013

⁹ Quoted in MacAskill & Taylor 2013

¹⁰ Quoted in Wan 2013

¹² Quoted in Dorling 2013-B

While the Secretary-General of Thailand's National Security Council said that "we believe that Thailand and the U.S. still enjoy good and cordial relations." ¹¹		
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT		
003-SNOWDEN: Operation SOCIALIST: alleged GCHQ hacking of Belgacom 2013 & 2018¹³ <i>UK // Belgium</i> In part as result of Snowden disclosures (and partly separate Belgian inquiries) public allegation of British intelligence (ie GCHQ) hacking of Belgian telecom 'Belgacom' (now 'Proximus') in 2011-12. An unpublished Belgian prosecutors' investigative report was released in 2018. No public allegations made by Belgium directly at UK but considerable unofficial backgrounding in 2018. In October 2013 (a month after Snowden disclosures revealed SOCIALIST), UK hosted a 'Belgian-British Conference' in London (at Foreign Secretary level) – outcomes unknown publicly. Two weeks later the British Ambassador to Brussels met with Belgian Chief Prosecutor. (nb in 2016 the Belgian Communications Minister mused about whether Belgian intelligence might have actually facilitated British hacking.)	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED Both are NATO and EU member states.
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC Publicity in Europe and internationally in 2013 and then again in 2018.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE While originating from Snowden disclosures this instance has tended to not be associated with the broader storm
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL UK has refused to comment on the allegations
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR		
004-SNOWDEN: NSA operations against European Union¹⁴ <i>USA // EU (including member states Germany, France, Greece, Italy)</i> In June 2013 German media reported, based on Snowden disclosures, the details of NSA operations against the EU	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED Given NATO memberships
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC Leading news story internationally, and especially in Europe, for many months.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS In so far as the operations included close access to EU diplomatic premises and systems, as well as the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels (housing the EU Council of Ministers and Council of Europe).

¹¹ Quoted in Wan 2013

¹³ Boffey 21 September 2018 and 25 October 2018; Gallagher 2018; Corfield 2018; Paganini 2018

¹⁴ Poitras, Rosenbach, Schmid & Stark 2013; Poitras, Rosenbach & Stark 2013, MacAskill & Borger 2013

<p>within the US (including at UN Headquarters) and in Europe.</p> <p>French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius described the alleged NSA operations as “absolutely unacceptable”.¹⁵ The German Justice Minister, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, demanded an explanation, saying that if confirmed, US behaviour “was reminiscent of the actions of enemies during the cold war”.¹⁶ An EU delegation was sent to Washington to confront the US Government. Other EU figures threatened to suspend free trade talks with the US.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT¹⁷</p>		The latter was allegedly targeted from US-controlled facilities within the NATO headquarters campus.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In context of broader Snowden disclosures storm
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL A White House spokeswoman told <i>Der Spiegel</i> that the US would respond to the allegations “via diplomatic channels,” adding: “We have made it clear that we gather intelligence abroad just like any other nation.” ¹⁸
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE EU member states discomfort with American power and intentions (arguably confirmed by these revelations).
<p>005-SNOWDEN: NSA targeting of Chancellor Merkel’s communications¹⁹</p> <p><i>USA // Germany</i></p> <p>In October 2013 German and other international media reported, based by Snowden disclosures, that the NSA (and other FVEY SIGINT agencies) targeted the communications of world leaders – including Chancellor Angela Merkel, allegedly since 2002.</p> <p>Very strong public and political criticism of NSA and US Government (and to include German intelligence agencies) – including apparently sincere expressions of shock from Chancellor herself. (“This is like the Stasi”).²⁰</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED Given joint NATO membership
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC Leading news story internationally, and especially in Germany, for many months. Still referred to in today’s coverage of intelligence issues.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Per President Yudhoyono example, this reflects nature of target, not/not mode of collection.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In context of broader Snowden disclosures storm
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL (initially) followed by an implicit APOLOGY While the US would officially neither confirm nor deny the allegations - and in fact a NSA spokeswoman stated in October that “As we have made clear, the United States gathers foreign intelligence of the type gathered by all nations” - President Obama did publicly announce that he had instructed the NSA to cease any activity targeting Chancellor Merkel. ²⁵ In addition there were

¹⁵ Quoted in Poitras, Rosenbach & Stark 2013. While also noting that the French reaction to the Snowden disclosures was lesser than the German reaction – a difference Hayes (2014) attributes (based on background comments from French diplomats) to: “the French public know[ing] France has an expansive intelligence establishment, the revelations about American spying were seen as part of what [sic] modern state does in international affairs today”. Hayes also noted the indifference of (otherwise engaged with an austerity crisis) Greeks to the Snowden disclosures.

¹⁶ Quoted in MacAskill & Borger 2013

¹⁷ This case raises the issue of international costs beyond the bilateral (and multilateral) relationships concerned. Chinese officials cited the reporting of surveillance of European Governments when calling cybersecurity “a matter of sovereignty” and announcing plans to join Russia in seeking a UN proposal to address reports of US surveillance activities. (Wan 2013)

¹⁸ Quoted in Poitras, Rosenbach & Stark 2013

¹⁹ Bryant 2013; Clapper 2019 pp. 257-258; Reuters 2014; Sanger 2014; Sanger 2018 pp. 61, 75; Open Technology Institute 2014 p. 24; Lewis 2014; Faiola 2014; Landler 2014; Borger 2013. Sanger makes the case (p. 75) that the Merkel revelation document may have in fact come from another insider leak – rather than from Snowden’s trove. Sanger also notes “[t]he Snowden revelations forever changed the way Germany thought about its post-World War II ally.”

²⁰ Sanger 2018 p. 75

²⁵ But it was also made clear that there would not be other limits on US intelligence in this regard. Quoting Sanger 2018: “‘Susan Rice has been very clear to us,’ one senior German official told me at the time, referring to the US national security adviser. ‘The US is not going to set a precedent’ by vowing not to spy on an allied government.” (p. 76)

<p>Merkel refused to visit the US until a broad-ranging ‘no spy’ agreement was reached between US and Germany – although she did then visit in May 2014, during which evident tensions reflected a failure to reach such an agreement - beyond President Obama’s personal commitment to specifically not monitor Merkel’s communications. German moves to develop ‘Schengen’ routing system for European data security – but not ultimately pursued. Significantly impacted German (and other European) willingness to cooperate on intelligence matters.²¹ German parliament opened up inquiry into US intelligence activities directed at Germany.²²</p> <p>In April 2014 the German Interior Minister, a close ally of Merkel, said that the US had failed to provide sufficient assurances that it was not spying on Germany and he downplayed expectations of success for future engagement on the topic with the Americans.²³</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL²⁴</p>		<p>intimations made in background briefings that the President had not been aware of the NSA’s operations targeting ‘friendly’ foreign leaders, to the chagrin of intelligence officials.²⁶</p> <p>At a May 2014 joint press conference with Merkel, Obama stated: “It has pained me to see the degree to which the Snowden disclosures have created strains in the relationship. She should not doubt, and the German people should not doubt, how seriously we take these issues.”²⁷</p>
	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>MORE SENSITIVE²⁸</p> <p>Bitter memories of East German internal surveillance – especially on part of Chancellor Merkel herself.²⁹</p>
<p>006-SNOWDEN: FVEY coverage of Brazil by NSA, including specifically monitoring President Rousseff³⁰</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p>
	<p><i>Relationship</i></p>	<p>FRIENDLY</p>

²¹ Quoting Sanger 2018: “[I]t became clear that [then NSA Director Mike Rogers] worried about one more long-standing effect of the disclosures: they could, he said, take an unseen toll on the willingness of allies to work with the United States and share what they learned about the world... Rogers’s fear was that the need for leaders in those countries to publicly condemn American overreach would have a corrosive effect on future cooperation.” (pp. 74-75)

²² Faiola 2014

²³ Reuters 2014

²⁴ Writing in 2014 Wolfgang Krieger (p. 801) observed: “Yet the Snowden affair continues to burden German-American relations. Pessimists even think it could wreck them for good. Not since the missile crisis of the 1980s has the German-American partnership had so little public support among Germans. To be sure, most of the harsh criticism of NSA snooping comes from the far left, particularly from neo-communists, who have a strong electoral foothold in the former communist parts of Germany. But the harm done by the NSA affair reaches very far into the mainstream of the political spectrum, including Chancellor Merkel’s own political party.”

²⁶ See Memmott 2013

²⁷ Quoted in Lewis 2014

²⁸ Late 2013 polling by the German Marshall Fund indicated that 72% of Germans opposed “collecting the telephone and internet data of citizens in other allied countries as part of the effort to protect national security”. (Fullilove 2014). See also Deeks 2013 and Hayes 2014..

²⁹ Former US Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper made the case in his memoirs (2018, pp. 257-258): “So, for [Merkel], the Stasi wasn’t a mythical bogeyman. She had grown up under its oppression, and for that reason, I believe she *never* [emphasis in original] trusted intelligence organizations – hers or anyone else’s. She didn’t know and didn’t want to know what her intelligence services were doing, and the reports from *Der Spiegel* that said the BND was helping NSA spy on her and on German citizens recalled the real-life experiences of her childhood and young adult life all too well. Even worse, her experiences and biases were not – and are not – outliers among German politicians.” Borger (2013) quotes a German commentator: “Spying on an important partner like Germany and not only on an anonymous group but on Mutti [Mummy, Merkel’s nickname] herself, is very different for Germany”.

³⁰ MEMRI 2018; Clapper 2019 pp. 256-257; Trinkunas 2013; Open Technology Institute 2014 pp. 24-25; Payton 2013-A; Boadle 2013

<p><i>USA // Brazil</i></p> <p>Revelations by Snowden included that both NSA and CSE (see below) regularly conducted SIGINT collection against Brazil, including spying on the personal communications of President Rousseff and the activities of Brazilian state oil company PETROBRAS. In addition the focus of these efforts reflected the role of Brazil as major telecommunications hub in Latin America.</p> <p>Brazil announced an investigation of private firms in Brazil believed to have acted as conduits for the NSA; pursued initiatives such as mandated data storage within Brazil and mooted development of an encrypted email system to be run by the Brazilian Post Office; as well as talks with Argentina on joint cyber security efforts directed against the US. Boeing's proposed supply of F/A-18 E/F's to Brazil was also thrown into doubt. Adoption of specific bilateral US-Brazilian security initiatives (Defense Cooperation Agreement and General Security of Military Information Agreements) were similarly imperilled.</p> <p>Brazil expressed fury at the reports, including publicly from President Rousseff. President Rousseff tweeted that "The United States and its allies must immediately stop their spying activity once and for all. This is unacceptable between countries that are supposed to be partners. We repudiate this cyberwarfare."³¹</p> <p>Rousseff refused to undertake a planned state visit to the USA (was to be first Brazilian President visit in 20 years and was first time known that a state dinner invite to a foreign leader was rejected). White House forced to comment that "that [Obama] understands and regrets the concerns disclosures of alleged U.S. intelligence activities have generated in Brazil and made clear that he is committed to working together with President Rousseff and her government in diplomatic channels to move beyond this issue as a source of tension in our bilateral</p>		Noting that since 2010 the Rousseff and Obama administrations had pursued an ambitious bilateral agenda. Rousseff believed she had built a bilateral relationship of considerably greater closeness than that of her predecessor da Silva.
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC Notable news story internationally for many months. Still referred to in today's coverage of intelligence issues.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Again per Merkel et al, this reflects the targeting of the President herself
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Impending planned visit by President Rousseff to Washington. Rousseff's popularity was at a particularly low point (31% in early 2013) and with 2014 as critical election year. In addition June 2013 was marked by mass social unrest in the lead-up to the 2014 World Cup. Also, in context of broader Snowden disclosures storm.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL See US response left.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE The Brazilian public, and leading politicians like Rousseff, associated intelligence with the surveillance practices and repressive activities of Brazil's former military junta (1964-1988). ³³ In addition there was/is considerable sensitivity on the part of the Brazilian public and politicians regarding Brazil's vaunted greatness ('grandeza') and it's realities – particularly vis a vis the USA.

³¹ Quoted in Payton 2013-A.

³³ "One legacy of this period is that Brazil's constitution and legislation strictly regulates government eavesdropping on the communications of private citizens, and this practice is officially only allowed as a last resort in criminal investigations with prior judicial approval." – Trinkunas 2013

relationship". ³² In bilateral meetings Brazil demanded answers from US interlocutors to questions. Nonetheless Clapper makes case that by the Rio Olympics in 2016 the US-Brazil intelligence relationship had stabilized.		
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT		
007-SNOWDEN: FVEY coverage of Brazil by Canada³⁴ <i>Canada // Brazil</i> Revelations by Snowden included that both NSA and CSE regularly conducted SIGINT collection against Brazil. In addition to NSA's activities above, CSE's compromised activities focussed on intrusion into the Brazilian Ministry of Mines & Energy. Canada's Ambassador to Brasilia was called in for a demarche by the Brazilian Foreign Minister. President Rousseff tweeted that "The United States and its allies must immediately stop their spying activity once and for all. This is unacceptable between countries that are supposed to be partners. We repudiate this cyberwarfare." ³⁵ Rousseff also suggested that because of the significant degree of Canadian investment in Brazilian mining the alleged intelligence activities constituted industrial espionage. As of 2015 it was said that Canada's bilateral relationship had yet to recover. ³⁶ Suspicions aroused in Brazil may have tempered an enthusiasm for Canadian investment there. But it might also be assessed that Brazil's relations with Canada were strained, but not necessarily more so than in specifically trade related disputes (such as 2016 Canadian ban on Brazilian beef imports). CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC As above.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given the direct association with the NSA coverage (per above).
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Impending planned visit by President Rousseff to Washington. Rousseff's popularity was at a particularly low point (31% in early 2013) and with 2014 as critical election year. In addition June 2013 was marked by mass social unrest in the lead-up to the 2014 World Cup. Also, in context of broader Snowden disclosures storm.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Canadian authorities refused to comment on the allegations, beyond citing the legal obligations of CSEC.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE As above.
	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL

³² Quoted from White House 2014

³⁴ Heinbecker & Livermore 2015; Payton 2013-A; Ormiston 2013

³⁵ Quoted in Payton 2013-A

³⁶ See Heinbecker & Livermore 2015

008-SNOWDEN: NSA monitoring of Mexican Presidents³⁷ <i>US // Mexico</i> Further to general reference to NSA coverage of Mexico in earlier Snowden disclosures, in September 2013 <i>Der Spiegel</i> alleged that the NSA had accessed the private email account of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto (when he was a presidential candidate). In addition the NSA had also spied on former President Felipe Calderón. In reaction to the initial Snowden disclosures, President Peña Nieto had said publicly that President Obama had undertaken “to investigate the accusations and to punish those responsible, if it was found that misdeeds had taken place.” ³⁸ In September 2013 the Mexican Foreign Ministry said it had no further comment to make on the allegations, but “categorically rejects and condemns any kind of spying against Mexican citizens in breach of international law.” Furthermore “Mexico’s foreign ministry has summoned the U.S. ambassador to express its clear dismay and to demand that [a US internal] investigation be carried out.” ³⁹ However within two months the issue had effectively been glossed over by both the US and Mexican governments. ⁴⁰ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Again per Merkel et al.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In context of broader Snowden disclosures storm.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL The NSA responded as follows: “We are not going to comment publicly on every specific alleged intelligence activity, and as a matter of policy we have made clear that the United States gathers foreign intelligence of the type gathered by all nations. As the President said in his speech at the UN General Assembly, we’ve begun to review the way that we gather intelligence, so that we properly balance the legitimate security concerns of our citizens and allies with the privacy concerns that all people share.” ⁴¹
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE In his November 2013 analysis the Wilson Center’s David Shirk noted a new maturity and self-confidence in Mexican approaches to the relationship with the US – and reflected in the low-key reaction to the revelations. ⁴²
009-SNOWDEN: FVEY spying on G8 and G20 summits⁴³ <i>US, UK & Canada // G8 and G20 attendee states (especially South Africa and Turkey)</i>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	VARIED Across the memberships of both organisations
	<i>Relationship</i>	VARIED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC

³⁷ Glüsing, Poitras, Rosenbach & Stark 2013; Boadle 2013; Ford 2013; Shirk 2013; Simpson 2013; Louv 2014

³⁸ Glüsing, Poitras, Rosenbach & Stark 2013

³⁹ Quoted in Boadle 2013

⁴⁰ Shirk 2013

⁴¹ Quoted in Glüsing, Poitras, Rosenbach & Stark 2013

⁴² Shirk 2013

⁴³ MacAskill et al 2013; Manning 2013; *Evening Standard* 2013; Hennessy 2013; France 24; Simpson & Ohlheiser; Botelho 2013; Weston 2013; Payton 2013-B

<p>In June 2013 media outlets reported, based on Snowden disclosures, that NSA and GCHQ (assisted by MI6) had spied on attendees at the 2009 G20 summit (and associated meetings) in London. Agencies had used a variety of remote surveillance and close access techniques to carry out the coverage, and cited documents indicated that the operation had been carried out with the agreement of then Prime Minister Gordon Brown's government and that British Ministers had received the take. Particular targets cited in the reporting included Russia, South Africa and Turkey. Coverage of Russia specifically included efforts to break into Russian President Medvedev's communications.</p> <p>In November 2013 separate reporting based on the Snowden disclosures revealed that NSA and CSEC had spied on attendees at the 2010 G8 and G20 summits in Toronto. Unlike the reporting on the operation in the UK this reporting on the summits in Canada did not specify any particular national targets.</p> <p>The Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry directly raised the allegations with the UK Ambassador in Ankara (albeit by phone call; with the FCO specifically stating publicly that the Ambassador had not been called in – in person – by the Turks). Nonetheless the Turkish Government described a NATO ally spying on another NATO ally as "scandalous".⁴⁴</p> <p>Turkey, South Africa and Russia all formally demanded explanations from the UK Government.</p> <p>While keeping a straight face, former Russian FSB chief Nikolai Kovalev commented "To avoid diplomatic and international scandal security agencies are forbidden from doing this. And usually they don't do it."⁴⁵</p>		The issue dominated Russian press coverage of the 2013 G8 summit, with claims that it "cast a cloud" over the event. ⁴⁶
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL Given the pervasiveness of the approaches. Specific coverage of Russian President is MORE EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE The revelation concerning the G20 was timed to occur days before the UK hosted the 2013 G8 summit in Northern Ireland. Also in context of broader Snowden disclosures storm.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL UK Prime Minister David Cameron stated: "We never comment on security or intelligence issues and I am not about to start now. I don't make comments on security or intelligence issues – that would be breaking something that no government has previously done." ⁴⁷ The US State Department issued the following statement following the allegations made about the G8 and G20 in Canada: The US "recognizes the importance of privacy to its citizens and people around the world. The President has directed a review that looks across the board at our intelligence gathering to ensure that we are properly accounting for both the security of our citizens and our allies, and the privacy concerns shared by Americans and citizens around the world. This review is being led by the White House, and includes agencies from across the government. There are also important efforts underway that will enable others to review how we strike the right balance, including the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. While we are not going to comment publicly on every specific alleged intelligence activity, as a matter of policy we have made clear that the United States gathers foreign intelligence of the type gathered by all nations." ⁴⁸ Canada's Defence Minister and the head of CSEC refused to comment on the allegations, beyond pointing to the legal obligations of CSEC. ⁴⁹
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	VARIED

⁴⁴ Quoted in Hennessy 2013

⁴⁵ Quoted in Hennessy 2013

⁴⁶ Quoted in Hennessy 2013

⁴⁷ Quoted in Hennessy 2013

⁴⁸ Quoted in Weston 2013

⁴⁹ See Payton 2013-B

CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT		
<p>010-SNOWDEN: FVEY access to Indian diplomatic and missile secrets⁵⁰</p> <p><i>US (& Australia) // India</i></p> <p>In September 2013 Indian media reported that information in the Snowden disclosures indicated that the NSA had targeted the Indian embassy in Washington and the Indian mission to the UN in an attempt to access diplomatic secrets.</p> <p>The Indian External Affairs Ministry declined to comment on the allegation, as did the Indian mission to the UN. The embassy commented that “Our government has expressed concerns over the reports of monitoring of the Indian Embassy in Washington, D.C. by U.S. agencies, and the Embassy in Washington D.C. has raised these concerns with the U.S. government.”⁵¹</p> <p>Other commentators were even more phlegmatic, one former senior diplomat remarking “Everybody spies on everyone else. Some just have better gadgets. If we had their facilities, I’m sure we would do it too. The US-Indian relationship is good and stable and if they feel India merits so much attention then good for us.”⁵² Although The Hindu itself editorialised against the NSA’s actions, suggesting they made a lie of the burgeoning US-Indian relationship. And an anonymous Indian diplomat told The Hindu that, if true, the penetration of Indian diplomatic communications could have done “extensive damage” to Indian interests.⁵³</p> <p>This followed an initial reaction to the original Snowden disclosures by the Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid: “It is not actually snooping... This is not scrutiny</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED Coverage largely limited to brief patch in September 2013.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In context of broader Snowden disclosures storm.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL The response of the US ODNI to the September 2013 allegation was: “The U.S. government will respond through diplomatic channels to our partners and allies. While we are not going to comment publicly on every specific alleged intelligence activity, as a matter of policy we have made clear that the United States gathers foreign intelligence of the type gathered by all nations. We value our cooperation with all countries on issues of mutual concern.” ⁵⁵
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE Despite certain sensitivities concerning sovereignty, India’s own official attitude to espionage and surveillance as carried out by India externally and internally is strongly supportive. ⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Saxena 2013; Burke 2013; Bajoria 2014; Lee, Williams & Cooper 2017; *Hindustan Times* 2017

⁵¹ Quoted in Saxena 2013

⁵² Quoted in Burke 2013

⁵³ Quoted in Saxena 2013

⁵⁵ Quoted in Saxena 2013

⁵⁶ As observed by the Open Technology Institute (2014, p. 24) this attitude played out in the muted Indian response to the original Snowden disclosures, including those related to spying on India. See also Bajoria 2014.

<p>and access to actual messages. It is only computer analysis of patterns of calls and emails that are being sent. It is not actually snooping on specifically on content of anybody's message or conversation... Some of the information they got out of their scrutiny, they were able to use it to prevent serious terrorist attacks in several countries."⁵⁴</p> <p>In September 2017 <i>The Intercept</i>, publishing further internal NSA documents from the Snowden disclosures, revealed that NSA, using an Australian collection site (and NSA sites in Thailand), obtained secret information concerning Indian missile developments – including the Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile system.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
<p>011-SNOWDEN: Alleged spying by GCSB on the Solomon Islands⁵⁷</p> <p><i>New Zealand // Solomon Islands</i></p> <p>In March 2015 NZ media reported on information from the Snowden disclosures indicating that NZ's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) spied on the Prime Minister's Office in the Solomon Islands and other governmental and non-governmental figures there.</p> <p>While Solomon Islanders outside of government (including those who had been targeted while serving in previous administrations) were publicly outraged by the allegations, the response from the government in Honiara itself was muted.⁵⁸</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED Little coverage beyond initial report.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL PMO communications, rather than specific reference to Prime Minister personally.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE Outside of the 2013 Snowden disclosures storm
	<i>Response</i>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>The NZ Foreign Minister downplayed the allegations: "I'm sure that politicians in the Solomon Islands, as elsewhere in the Pacific, are smart enough not to believe what they read in New Zealand newspapers... But, anything that they want to ask us we will be happy to discuss with them, and obviously if we have got anything to say to them then I will do them the courtesy of saying it directly rather than through the news media." He also praised Pacific leaders for their measured response to Snowden disclosures concerning NZ and Australian intelligence operations in the Pacific: "We are in the fortunate position that political leaders in Pacific countries, as in New Zealand, treat carefully statements that are made in the New Zealand news media... And we have been pleased to see the measured reactions that have been evident."⁵⁹</p> <p>The official statement from the NZ government was: "The Government will not be responding to claims made from documents stolen by Edward Snowden. The Snowden documents were taken</p>

⁵⁴ Quoted in *The Hindu* 2013

⁵⁷ Radio New Zealand 2015; Fisher 2015

⁵⁸ See Radio New Zealand 2015 for analysis by Prof. Steven Ratuva of Canterbury University noting the consistent reluctance of Pacific Island Countries to criticise Australia and New Zealand for alleged intelligence activities and attributing that reluctance to their dependence on Australian New Zealand aid.

⁵⁹ Quoted in Fisher 2015

		some time ago and many are old, out of date, and we can't discount that some of what is being put forward may even be fabricated." ⁶⁰
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

⁶⁰ Quoted in Radio New Zealand 2015

BODY OF CASES

Australia⁶¹

<p>012-Allegations made in ABC TV's 'Code Name Mantra' Four Corners episode, 1994⁶²</p> <p><i>Australia // Philippines; Argentina; China; Kuwait (and others); Egypt; Iraq; Pakistan</i></p> <p>On 21 February 1994 ABC TV's Four Corners program broadcast allegations about the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), including that it had:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Run an agent inside the RAM movement in the Philippines in 1987, including while RAM was attempting a coup against the Aquino Government Operated a covert communications link out of the Australian Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1982, in support of MI6 operations against Argentina Provided secondees to MI6 who undertook technical operations against the Chinese in Hong Kong from 1989, and separately against Kuwait's negotiations with foreign partners on reconstruction post-1991 (in support of UK commercial interests) Run a covert station in Cairo in 1985 (and had been discovered by the Egyptians) Mishandled the defection of an Iraqi intelligence officer in New Delhi in 1989, leading to the defector's likely capture and execution Organised the 1989 defection and resettlement in Australia of an Afghan communist official responsible for terrorist attacks against Pakistan <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	China: AS POWERFUL (* approx., this was as at 1994) Others: LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	China, Kuwait, Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan: NEUTRAL Iraq: HOSTILE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC The broadcast in Australia would help prompt the Samuels-Codd judicial inquiry into the management of ASIS, which reported in 1995. Allegations received little publicity outside of Australia except in the Philippines where there was some negative public comment by individual Philippine politicians.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Australian Government would neither confirm nor deny the allegations.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	VARIED

⁶¹ For the results of a 2014 Lowy Institute survey of Australian public attitudes to spying (that is, Australian spying on others) see Fullilove 2014. Of note, 7/10 of those polled said it was acceptable for Australia to spy on nations with which it did not have good relations and 5/10 said it was acceptable even when those relations were good (this included 51% of respondents supporting Australian spying on New Zealand!).

⁶² ABC TV, 21 February 1994

013-Alleged bugging of Chinese Embassy in Canberra 1995⁶³ <i>Australia (and US) // China</i> In 1995 Australian media revealed that Australian and US intelligence had jointly bugged the Chinese embassy during its construction. (The new embassy was first occupied in 1990.) The Chinese refused to comment on the allegations when aired. ⁶⁴ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL (* approx., this was as at 1995)
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC Allegations made in Australian media and then repeated in US media. ⁶⁵ Publicity in China unknown.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given the alleged emplacement within Chinese sovereign territory.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Australian Government would not comment and took considerable legal steps to (unsuccessfully) prevent the broadcast and publication of the allegations.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL (But from a sovereignty perspective MORE SENSITIVE , albeit not as pronounced as a similar instance would be today.)
014-Defections of Chen Yonglin and Hao Fengjun 2005⁶⁶ <i>Australia // China</i> A diplomat at the consulate in Sydney, Chen sought asylum in Australia, deeply embarrassing the Chinese Ambassador and Government. Hao, an officer of the Tianjin 610 Office, attempted to defect to Australia in February 2005, while visiting Australia. Feeling he was not getting traction with Australian intelligence he went public in July 2005. He was subsequently interviewed by ASIO, to whom he passed information about anti-dissident surveillance and other intelligence activities. The Chinese laughed off allegations made by the defectors about espionage in Australia. ⁶⁷ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED Little coverage beyond initial event.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS It was plain that Australia had done little to stimulate the defections or aggravate the situation.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE (For Chinese. For a reluctant Australia, the timing was inopportune given trade and other economic overtures to Beijing.)
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL All public indicators are that the Australian Government was as unaccommodating as it dared to be in relation to the defectors. ⁶⁸
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

⁶³ Foligot 2019 p. 321; Corcoran 2013

⁶⁴ Yi Wang 2016, p. 1; Spielmann 1995. In fact the only critical public comment came from Australian commentators who alleged that NSA control of the operational take from an Australian operation (also allegedly extracted via a relay in the neighbouring British High Commission) advantaged US over Australian economic interests with China.

⁶⁵ Milliken 1995; Rohde 1995; Spielmann 1995

⁶⁶ Foligot 2019 pp. 304-305, 310

⁶⁷ Most notably in public comments by Ambassador Fu Ying (CNN 8 June 2005).

⁶⁸ Chen was eventually, and quietly, granted asylum by Australia – see Myers & Cave 2019

Nb. questionable as to whether this should be viewed in reverse given the allegations of Chinese espionage in Australia made by the defectors.		
015-Leaked DIO documents suggest Japan is Australian intelligence target, June 2008⁶⁹ <i>Australia // Japan</i> On 14 June 2008 the <i>Canberra Times</i> reported on leaked defence intelligence briefing materials which suggested Japan was the subject of focus by the Defence Intelligence Organisation. No apparent response from Japanese Government. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED Limited only to the original reporting
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS No specific intelligence activities cited, just identification of Japan as a target
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE The article appeared shortly after Prime Minister Rudd's visit to Tokyo and call on Japanese support for Australian disarmament initiatives.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Australian Government avoided commenting.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
016-‘Witness K’, 2013 – 2022⁷⁰ <i>Australia// East Timor</i> According to media reporting the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) allegedly conducted technical operation in Dili in 2004 to support Australian position in bilateral maritime boundary negotiations. Claimed by former ASIS officer (‘Witness K’) in affidavit on behalf of Timorese Government for use in international legal proceedings between the two countries. Ongoing impact, including as result of attempted Australian prosecution of ‘Witness K’ and their lawyer. Adverse International Court of Justice findings against Australia and led to renegotiation of treaty in question (to significant economic cost for Australia). Strained bilateral relations but no expulsions.	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL Timor very much weaker economically and militarily. Reliant on Australian foreign aid and security.
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY Close neighbours but not formally allied. WW2 history. Australian intervention factor in Timorese independence. Ongoing security support.
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC Wide ranging and highly critical media coverage in both countries for over many years.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL Allegedly involved technical operation carried out in heart of Timorese government offices.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL followed by NEUTRAL Allegedly Australia made initial, private denials to East Timor (pre-media reporting and in response to demarche by East Timor in December 2012). On 3 May 2013 Australian Government acknowledged Timorese claims of espionage while stating it had carried out the negotiations in good faith. ⁷² Subsequent refusal to confirm or deny.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE Timor just having recovered from Indonesian occupation 1975-99. Most Timorese leadership spent pre-1999 lives under surveillance.

⁶⁹ Dorling 2008

⁷⁰ Dorling 2013

⁷² These claims reported in McGrath 2020. See also Barlow 2013 and Harrison 2013.

CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL⁷¹		
017-Defection of alleged Chinese ‘spy’ Wang Liqiang, 2019⁷³ <i>Australia // China</i> Wang (aka William Wang) sought asylum in Australia in October 2019, claiming to be a Chinese intelligence operative involved in foreign interference activities in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Wang met with ASIO but then made his claims public in November. ASIO subsequently stated they were taking Wang’s claims seriously - without yet agreeing to their validity. Wang’s claims – disputed by China and queried by sceptics – would later be discredited by inquiries in Taiwan and in Australia. At the time, the Chinese claimed that Wang was a convicted fraudster, wanted in Shanghai in relation to separate criminal matters, and denied all his claims. It also released what it claimed to be footage of Wang’s 2016 fraud trial. The CCP’s <i>Global Times</i> attacked Australian reporting on Wang as a “sheer lie”. ⁷⁴ Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying repudiated Wang’s claims and described reports of Chinese espionage and interference as a “shoddy soap opera”. ⁷⁵ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE Nb. this could be viewed in reverse given the allegations of Chinese espionage in Taiwan made by Wang.	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE (But notable for Taiwan, the public claims were made only weeks before presidential election there. And for Australia given a crescendo of allegations concerning Chinese espionage and political interference throughout 2019.)
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL All public indicators are that the Australian Government was as unaccommodating as it dared to be in relation to the defector. (With regard to the Chinese, see left.)
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

China (not directed at USA)

018-‘Monsieur Butterfly’ case 1986⁷⁶	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
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⁷¹ Critical rating is (as much reflective of adverse international legal consequences as strictly bilateral effects.

⁷³ McGowan 2019; Myers & Cave 2019; Knaus & Doherty 2019; Wu 2019; Walker 2019; Eftimiades 2019; *China Daily* 2019; Power 2019; Chubb 2019; Greene & Fang 2019. See also Monk 2019. Updates at Ip 2023 and Southwell 2023.

⁷⁴ Wu 2019. See also *China Daily* 2019.

⁷⁵ Power 2019

⁷⁶ Trahair & Miller 2012 p. 82; Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 213-214; Faligot 2019 pp. 131-140

<p><i>China // France</i></p> <p>In 1986 Chinese national (and [likely co-opted] MPS agent) Shi Peipu and a French diplomat whom he had recruited, Bernard Boursicot, were each sentenced to 6 years imprisonment for espionage. While posted to Beijing Boursicot had fallen in love with the transsexual Shi, who Boursicot had mistakenly believed to be a woman (and, later, apparent mother of his child), and thereafter served as a Chinese agent from 1964 until the pair's arrest in Paris in 1983 (including while Boursicot was posted to the French missions in China, Mongolia and in Southeast Asia). Boursicot maintained that all the classified material he provided to the Chinese was in relation to the Soviets and other nations and not to French national interests. In 1987 both men were pardoned by President Mitterand (in an effort to reduce Franco-Sino tensions).</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		(In 1986)
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC Given the salacious details of the case
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>019-Li Zhihao 1999⁷⁷</p> <p><i>China // Taiwan</i></p> <p>Li defected to Taiwan in the late 1980s, at the direction of the Guangdong State Security Bureau, and was later recruited by Taiwanese intelligence (from whence he reported back to China). Arrested in 1999 he was sentenced to life imprisonment.</p> <p>Li was deported to China in 2015 after an apparent prisoner exchange (for two Taiwanese intelligence officers kidnapped by China from Vietnam in 2006). This exchange was followed by talks between the Chinese and Taiwanese Presidents in Singapore.⁷⁸</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC Publicity largely associated with the link to the November 2015 leaders' talks in Singapore.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN China did not comment on original arrest.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

⁷⁷ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 236; Reuters 2015; *Taipei Times* 2015; BBC 2015-B; Fitsanakis 2015

⁷⁸ A connection between the two releases has been disputed by the Taiwanese Government -see *Taipei Times* 2015

<p>The Taiwanese President's office stated that the resolution was "based on a mutual goodwill gesture delivered by the Ma-Xi meeting".⁷⁹</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		
<p>020-Valentin Danilov 2001-2012⁸⁰</p> <p><i>China // Russia</i></p> <p>Danilov, a scientist at the Krasnoyarsk Space Research Institute in Siberia was arrested by the FSB in 2001 after providing technical information to a Chinese company on Russian satellite technology. After an initial trial at which he was acquitted, he was convicted at a second trial and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, being released on parole in 2012.</p> <p>Muted Russian response beyond the prosecution of Danilov.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>AS POWERFUL In 2001-2004.</p> <p>FRIENDLY</p> <p>PUBLIC Danilov's trial and imprisonment was somewhat of a cause celebre, especially with Human Rights observers of Russia.</p> <p>LESS EGREGIOUS Danilov maintained that the information he passed to the Chinese was in fact unclassified at the time of the offence. The direct recipient was a Chinese company.</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN No Chinese public response recorded.</p> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>
<p>021-Suicide of Japanese code clerk and related investigation 2004-6⁸¹</p> <p><i>China // Japan</i></p> <p>Unnamed Japanese communicator at Shanghai consulate committed suicide in May 2004 after blackmail attempt (and related pitch) by Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB) beginning the previous year. The demands levied by the SSSB included details of consulate staff and</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>AS POWERFUL As at 2004-6</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC This may be an incident where media coverage did drive target response (see left).</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOTABLE At the time of the media reporting of the incident (December 2005) Japan and China were in dispute over gas fields in the East China Sea and historical controversy over WW2. In addition Japan's Foreign Minister had described Chinese military build-up as a "considerable threat".⁸⁴</p> <p>DENIAL</p>

⁷⁹ Quoted in Reuters 2015

⁸⁰ Foligut 2019 p. 264; Human Rights Watch 2003; BBC 2012-D

⁸¹ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 223; MOFA Japan 2015; Nakata 2006; Chinese Foreign Ministry 2006; McCurry 2005; Yoshida 2005

⁸⁴ Quoted in McCurry 2005

<p>contacts, and schedule for transport of Japanese diplomatic pouches.</p> <p>The Japanese Government did not address the issue publicly until it was revealed in the Japanese media in December 2005. Forced to confront the issue Japan said it had “lodged strong protests” (four in total, including at the time of the incident) and blamed “impermissible acts by the Chinese” for the clerk’s death. Furthermore “The host country is expected to treat a consul with due respect and to take every measure to prevent any breach of the consul’s physical freedom and dignity.”⁸² A specific protest was delivered to the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo. Japan also claimed publicly that the Chinese actions had violated the Vienna Conventions.</p> <p>In April 2006 the Japanese Government announced its findings from an investigation into the incident. The Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that: “As a result of our investigation, we found that the direct cause of the (diplomat’s) suicide was an extraordinary threat, intimidation and similar actions by Chinese intelligence officers...We acknowledged that it was a very cruel and inhuman threat, and was intimidation.”⁸³</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		<p>On 31 December 2005 the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed in a public statement that Japanese officials had agreed that the clerk had committed suicide due to overwork. Furthermore the statement claimed that “this incident has nothing to do with Chinese government personnel.”⁸⁵ In response the Japanese MOFA contradicted the claims made by the Chinese and insisted that China owed Japan an explanation for the behaviour of its officials. The Chinese then retorted “We express our strong indignation at the Japanese Government’s disregard of the facts and their further move to purposely smear the image of China.”⁸⁶</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

<p>022-Macheksport Affair 2005⁸⁷</p> <p><i>China // Russia</i></p> <p>In November 2005 the principal of the Macheksport company, Igor Rechetin, was arrested by the FSB, along with two other executives. Macheksport was alleged to be acting on behalf of the MSS to illegally acquire and export to China space technologies applicable to missile development.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL In 2005
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED Very little coverage of, or information available about, the incident.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL No response recorded from Russians (see left).
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

⁸² All quotes from McCurry 2005.

⁸³ Quoted in Nakata 2006

⁸⁵ Quoted in MOFA Japan 2015

⁸⁶ Quoted in Chinese Foreign Ministry 2006

⁸⁷ Foligut 2019 p. 265

<p>Both Russia and China actively suppressed knowledge of the affair and while Rechetin and his two executives were charged, their MSS contacts were simply asked to quietly leave Russia. (Reflecting pre-existing level of intelligence cooperation between Russia and China.)</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		
<p>023-2PLA hacking of German Chancellery systems, 2007⁸⁸</p> <p><i>China // Germany</i></p> <p>On 27 August 2007 Prime Minister Wen Jiabo expressed his regrets to visiting German Chancellor Angela Merkel about China-originating hacking of computer systems at the German Chancellery and other ministries. This followed a story the previous day published in Der Spiegel, which attributed these trojan attacks to 2PLA.</p> <p>The Chancellor's visit proceeded successfully, with new Sino-German economic cooperation announced at its end.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL In 2007.
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY Contemporary German media noted the disappointment that the allegations had engendered in German officials given Germany's long-term overtures to Beijing. ⁸⁹
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Given the Merkel visit to Beijing.
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL followed by NEUTRAL The Chinese Embassy in Berlin castigated the allegations, describing them as "irresponsible speculation without a shred of evidence". ⁹⁰ However, during Merkel's visit to Beijing, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao "assured Merkel that measures would be taken to "rule out hacking attacks"". ⁹¹
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE Bitter memories of East German internal surveillance – including on part of Chancellor Merkel herself.
<p>024-Ho Chih-chiang 2010 & Wang Hung-ju (aka Wang Hongru) 2017⁹²</p> <p><i>China // Taiwan</i></p> <p>Ho was a China-based Taiwanese businessman recruited by Chinese intelligence in 2007 as a talent-spotter. He was arrested in 2010 after a failed pitch to a Taiwanese National Security Bureau officer (in which he sought information on NSB operations, satellite communications, and Taiwanese foreign policy). Ho's co-conspirator Wang</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

⁸⁸ Foligut 2019 p. 334; *Der Spiegel* 2007

⁸⁹ *Der Spiegel* 2007

⁹⁰ *Der Spiegel* 2007

⁹¹ *Der Spiegel* 2007

⁹² Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 231, 242; Yang 2017; Chen 2017-A; Bristow 2017; Mattis 2017

<p>was a former Taiwanese NSB officer and bodyguard to Vice President Annette Lu. After retirement in 2003 Wang resided in China. In 2009 the Shanghai State Security Bureau recruited Wang to work alongside Taiwanese businessman. It was not until 2017 that Wang was arrested, when he also unsuccessfully tried to pitch a NSB officer.</p> <p>Taiwan's Defence Ministry commented that it "has counterintelligence measures in place and warns active and soon-to-be-retired soldiers and officers against spying for China".⁹³ Rhetorical protest limited to Taiwanese Members of Parliament.⁹⁴</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
<p>025-Baibur Maihesuti 2010⁹⁵</p> <p><i>China // Sweden</i></p> <p>A Swedish citizen of Uighur background, Maihesuti was recruited by the MSS in 2008 to report on Uighur activities, primarily in Europe. He was run by MSS officers working under cover of the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm. Arrested in April 2009, in 2010 he was sentenced to 16 months in prison (increased to 22 months on appeal.).</p> <p>A Chinese diplomat was expelled from Sweden in early 2009 for spying on political refugees (including in relation to the Maihesuti case).</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>PUBLIC Reports across 2009 and 2010, including trial and appeal.</p> <p>LESS EGREGIOUS</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p>
<p>026-Lo Hsien-che 2011⁹⁶</p> <p><i>China // Taiwan</i></p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p>

⁹³ Chen 2017

⁹⁴ See, for example, Bristow 2017

⁹⁵ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 238; *The Local* 2009-A and *The Local* 2009-B; Reuters 2010-A; *The Local* 2010

⁹⁶ Trahair & Miller 2012 p. 83; Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 237; BBC 2011-A and BBC 2011-B; *Taiwan Today* 2011; Chang 2011

<p>Taiwanese Brigadier General Lo Hsien-che was recruited by the 2PLA while posted as DA in Thailand in 2004. Lo was subsequently run by a female Chinese-Australian handler resident in Thailand. He was arrested in February 2011 and charged with leaking military secrets (including in relation to air defences) to China. His confession meant he was sentenced to life imprisonment rather than death. Lo claimed that US authorities confronted him in August 2010 during a visit to the USA and that after refusing to act as a double agent a video-taped confession was handed by the US to Taiwan.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		Noting that Lo Hsien-che was the most senior Taiwanese official convicted of espionage since the 1960s. He may also have compromised the Po Sheng joint Taiwanese-US military command and control system.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
<p>027-Murder of Neil Heywood 2011⁹⁷</p> <p><i>China // UK</i></p> <p>The vicious contest between Mayor of Chongqing, and rising CCP figure, Bo Xilai, and presumptive President Xi Jinping was the context for the death in November 2011 of British expatriate (and rumoured MI6 affiliate) Neil Heywood. Heywood had been a close associate of Bo, and was said to be the paramour of Bo's wife Gu Kailai. It was Gu who is believed to have poisoned Heywood in order to contain the emerging scandal of Heywood's intelligence links – and Bo's own corruption. This affair was also tied to the ultimately unsuccessful attempt by Bo's supporter Zhou Yongkang, senior security minister, to launch a coup against Xi.</p> <p>The decisive factor in Xi's triumph, and the fall of Bo and Zhou, was the actions of senior Chongqing MSS officer Wang Lijun in February 2012, who first tried to defect to the US, fearing for his life due to his knowledge of Bo and Gu's actions, before being taken into the protection of the MSS leadership in Beijing.</p> <p>The British Consulate in Chongqing initially refused to comment, as did the British Embassy.⁹⁸</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC Covered in salacious detail in Chinese, less so in Western media.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Senior Chinese officials stated: "China is a socialist country ruled by law, and the sanctity and authority of law shall not be trampled. Whoever has broken the law will be handled in accordance with law and will not be tolerated, no matter who is involved." ¹⁰⁰
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

⁹⁷ Foligut 2019 pp. 367-374; Walker 2012; Xinhua News 2012; BBC 2012-B and BBC 2012-C; Sudworth 2012; Buckey 2012; Ruwitch 2012

⁹⁸ Walker 2012

¹⁰⁰ From Xinhua News 2012

<p>In response to news that the Chinese had commenced an investigation Prime Minister David Cameron stated: "We did ask the Chinese to hold an investigation and we are pleased that they are now doing that. It is very important we get to the truth of what happened in this very disturbing case, this very tragic case."⁹⁹</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
<p>028-Chen Wen-jen & Yuan Hsiao-feng 2011-2012¹⁰¹</p> <p><i>China // Taiwan</i></p> <p>Former Taiwanese airforce officer recruited by 2PLA while resident in China, Chen then recruited active duty colleague Yuan Hsiao-feng into providing classified information. Attempts to recruit other serving airforce officers sparked an investigation in 2011, leading to their arrests in 2012. In 2013 Chen was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Yuan was sentenced to 12 life sentences!</p> <p>No evident action taken against China by Taiwan.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN</p> <p>MORE SENSITIVE</p>
<p>029-Allegations of Chinese hacking of ASIO Headquarters building plans, 2013¹⁰²</p> <p><i>China // Australia</i></p> <p>In May 2013 Australian media reporting alleged that building plans (allegedly including power and communications wiring diagrams) for the newly constructed headquarters of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) had been stolen in a</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>Had Chinese intelligence succeeded in carrying out what was purported then it would have been a great coup, and done considerable damage to Australian interests.</p> <p>NOTABLE</p> <p>Reporting came towards end of the mammoth ASIO HQ building project, which had been reported as having significant problems and cost overruns. The report also came at a time of intelligence-related tensions between Australia and China, following the 2012 Australian decision to prohibit</p>

⁹⁹ BBC 2012-B

¹⁰¹ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 226, 242; Cole 2013; Al Jazeera 2014

¹⁰² Taylor 2013; ABC 2013; Nadin 2013; Grubb 2013; Legge 2013, Wright 2013; Butterly 2013; Godfrey 2013; Barton 2013-A. Wright and Butterly make the case that the operation was 'payback' for Australia-US bugging of the Chinese Embassy in Canberra (see above).

<p>Chinese cyber-attack directed at a building contractor. The media reports also alleged other Chinese cyber-attacks on Australian Government agencies and on Australian companies.</p> <p>Then Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr (in later retirement a prominent advocate for improved Australian-Chinese relations) downplayed the allegations, stating: “We have enormous areas of cooperation with China. I won’t comment on whether the Chinese have done what is being alleged or not”.¹⁰³ Separately Carr stated: “I won’t comment on matters of intelligence and security for the obvious reason: we don’t want to share with the world and potential aggressors what we know about what they might be doing, and how they might be doing it.”¹⁰⁴</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		<p>Huawei from participating in construction of its National Broadband Network, reportedly on security grounds.</p> <p>The allegation also came shortly after a softening of Australian attitudes to China, with the publication of the 2013 Defence White Paper, which did not explicitly identify China as a threat.¹⁰⁵</p>
	<i>Response</i>	<p>DENIAL</p> <p>A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman commented in relation to the allegation: “China pays high attention to cybersecurity issues, and is firmly opposed to all forms of hacker attacks.... Groundless accusations will not help solve this issue.”¹⁰⁶</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>
<p>030-Lu Chun-chun, Chien Ching-kuo & Chang Chih-hsin 2013¹⁰⁷</p> <p><i>China // Taiwan</i></p> <p>Retired Taiwanese military officer, Lu was recruited by Chinese intelligence in the mid-2000s. Lu subsequently introduced fellow retiree Chien Ching-kuo to his handlers. Lu and Chien then similarly recruited Chang Chih-hsin, a soon to retire military officer. Arrested in 2012, the following year Lu was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment (wholly suspended), Chien to 3 years, and Chang to 15 years.</p> <p>Muted Taiwanese response.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

¹⁰³ Quoted in Taylor 2013

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Legge 2013

¹⁰⁵ Godfrey 2013

¹⁰⁶ Legge 2013, quoting *The Guardian*

¹⁰⁷ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 224-225, 226; Mattis 2014; Central News Agency 2014; AFP 2014

031-Ko Cheng-sheng 2013¹⁰⁸ <i>China // Taiwan</i> Deputy commander of the Taiwanese Navy from 2000-2003, Ko had been recruited by Chinese intelligence in 1998, as facilitated by Australian-Taiwanese businessman Shen Ping-kang. Ko retired in 2003 after which he sought to recruit several younger officers. After his arrest in 2013, Ko was sentenced in 2014 to 14 months in prison (believed to have taken into account Ko's advanced age). Shen is believed to have worked to 2PLA instructions, and he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment in 2014. Muted Taiwanese response. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL Reflecting Ko's senior position in Taiwanese armed forces.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
032-Chen Chu-fan & Chen Shu-lung 2013-2014¹⁰⁹ <i>China // Taiwan</i> Retired senior Taiwanese military officer (and KMT official) Chen was an agent for the Shanghai State Security Bureau from 2004 until his arrest. Chen helped SSSB build a broader spy network, including through introduction to former military intelligence officer Chen Shu-lung. Chen Chu-fan was convicted in 2013 and sentenced to 20 months in prison but his sentence was overturned on appeal in 2016. Chen Shu-lung provided identities of fellow Taiwanese intelligence officers to the SSSB, leading to the detention and interrogation of one such officer in Shanghai in 2007. Chen Shu-lung was sentenced to 8 years in prison, reduced to 5 years on appeal in 2014. Muted Taiwanese response. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL Reflecting Chen Chu-fan's profile within Taiwanese politics and military.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

¹⁰⁸ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 233, 240; Dorling 2014; Chen 2017-B

¹⁰⁹ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 225-226; AFP 2013; Pan 2016

033-Zhen Xiaojiang Spy Ring 2015¹¹⁰ <i>China // Taiwan</i> Zhen Xiaojiang was a former PLA officer who ran a Taiwan-based spy ring between 2005 and 2015, probably as a cooptee of Chinese military intelligence. Zhen was arrested in 2015 and sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. He was then deported to China (via Hong Kong) in 2018. Zhen's recruits included Taiwanese airforce officers providing classified information on Taiwanese military capabilities: Major General Hsu Nai-chuan who was arrested in 2015 and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment, reduced to 2 months on appeal (on basis that his own efforts within the spy ring were unsuccessful). Airforce officer Chou Chih-li arrested 2015. Airforce officer Ko Chi-hsien sentenced in 2017 to 3-10 years in prison. Retired airforce officer Liu Chi-ju served as an intermediary for Zhen and other members. Liu was indicted in 2015 but remains in China. Muted Taiwanese response. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
034-Attempt to recruit German Member of Parliament via LinkedIn, and subsequent BfV investigative report, 2016¹¹¹ <i>China // Germany</i> In (northern) summer 2016 an unidentified German MP was pitched (on-line via LinkedIn) via a cut-out found to be linked back to the MSS. The relationship ended after the intervention of German security (BfV) officials. In December 2017 the BfV publicly released a report on Chinese use of social media to attempt to spy on German MPs and policymakers. With Hans-Georg Maaßen,	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL In December 2017 the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs called the investigation "complete hearsay and groundless". ¹¹³ Also, "All I can say is that the allegations from the German organization in question are baseless... We hope the relevant German organizations, particularly government departments, can speak and act more responsibly and not do things that aren't beneficial to the development of bilateral relations." ¹¹⁴
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

¹¹⁰ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 227, 232, 233-234, 236-237, 243; Straits Times 2015; Pan 2015; Jensen 2017; Strong 2018

¹¹¹ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 223; Burgess 2017; CGTN 2017, *The Local* 2018, Deutsche Welle 2018

¹¹³ Quoted in Burgess 2017

¹¹⁴ Quoted in CGTN 2017

<p>commenting publicly: “Chinese intelligence services are active on networks like LinkedIn and have been trying for a while to extract information and find intelligence sources in this way.”¹¹²</p> <p>Followed in July 2018 by more detailed German media reporting on Chinese social media and other efforts to spy on the Bundestag.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		
<p>035-Hsieh Chia-kang & Hsin Peng-sheng 2017¹¹⁵</p> <p><i>China // Taiwan</i></p> <p>Hsin was a retired Taiwanese military officer recruited in 2006. He subsequently introduced Major General Hsieh, a former colleague, who was recruited in 2009-10. At the time the investigation of this pair began Hsieh was commander of Taiwan’s missile defence command.</p> <p>Taiwan’s Defence Ministry specifically identified China as the offending party in this case, but without criticism. No other Taiwanese reaction apparent.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL Noting Hsieh’s access to missile defence secrets.</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN</p> <p>MORE SENSITIVE</p>
<p>036-Zhou Hongxu 2017¹¹⁶</p> <p><i>China // Taiwan</i></p> <p>In March 2017 Chinese national Zhou was arrested for spying by the Taiwanese after attempting to pitch a junior Foreign Ministry official. Zhou had previously been a graduate student in Taiwan and was alleged to be operating under direction from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office. He was also later linked to a prominent pro-China Taiwanese politician.</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>LESS EGREGIOUS</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE President Tsai Ing-wen and her traditionally pro-Taiwanese autonomy Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took office in May 2017.</p> <p>DENIAL The Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office stated at the time of the arrest: “The allegation by Taiwan against our office is obviously fabricated and aimed at creating dispute.” The TAO also suggested that the</p>

¹¹² Quoted in Burgess 2017

¹¹⁵ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 231-232; Mattis 2017; The Statesman 2017; Pan 2017; Strong 2017. Note that Mattis & Brazil twice gives the date of Hsin’s recruitment as “2016”. This appears to be an error given Hsin subsequently facilitated the recruitment of Hsieh in 2009-10.

¹¹⁶ Chung 2017; AFP 2017; *Straits Times* 2018; Yang 2018; Pan 2018; Global Times 2019; Hioe 2018

<p>Zhou was imprisoned for 14 months after pleading guilty.</p> <p>At the time of the arrest Taiwanese education authorities publicly stated that the case would not affect Taiwan's willingness to host Chinese students.¹¹⁷</p> <p>After rejecting Zhou's appeal the Taiwan High Court stated in April 2018: "The defendant's actions posed serious threats to our territory and national security, given the disharmony and even hostile situation between the two sides."¹¹⁸</p> <p>Zhou was released in May 2018 but required to remain in Taiwan while investigations continued into political connections to his case. Zhou maintained his innocence on release.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		<p>arrest was linked to moves within the Taiwan Parliament to legislate for tougher penalties for Chinese espionage.¹¹⁹</p> <p>After returning to China Zhou gave an interview to China's <i>Global Times</i> in which he said he had been pressured into falsely pleading guilty. He also claimed to have experienced discrimination and bullying while a student, and implied that this had made him a target – and that the charges against him were fabricated by Taiwanese intelligence on behalf of the pro-Taiwanese autonomy government. He also claimed to have been mistreated while in Taiwanese custody.¹²⁰</p> <p>China also launched a counter-offensive (at least partly motivated by Zhou case) suggesting that Taiwanese students were engaged in mass-scale espionage inside China.¹²¹</p>
	Pre-disposition of target	MORE SENSITIVE

<p>037-Allegations NZ Member of Parliament linked to Chinese intelligence, 2017-20¹²²</p> <p><i>China // New Zealand</i></p> <p>In September 2017 NZ media reported that the NZSIS was investigating China-born National Party MP Jian Yang, following allegations he had been trained at (and lectured at) two China-based institutions associated closely with the 3-PLA (Chinese military intelligence). This was prior to his migration to NZ via Australia, and Yang had apparently not hitherto revealed these associations until interviewed by the media (although National Party officials claimed they were aware). Yang did not deny studying at the institutions in question (in fact indicated that he had been required to not name them in order to leave China)</p>	Power Dynamic	LESS POWERFUL
	Relationship	NEUTRAL¹²⁵
	Publicity	PUBLIC
	Nature of Activity	LESS EGREGIOUS
	Timing	NOT NOTABLE
	Response	UNKNOWN
	Pre-disposition of target	MORE SENSITIVE

¹¹⁷ Chung 2017

¹¹⁸ *Straits Times* 2018

¹¹⁹ Quoted in Chung 2017

¹²⁰ *Global Times* 2019

¹²¹ Hioe 2019

¹²² Jennings & Reid 2017 (updated 2020); Phillips 2017; Nippert 2019; Walters 2019; Finnigan & Noakes 2019; Christian 2020; Sachdeva 2020

¹²⁵ For a very useful account of the myriad positives and negatives of the bilateral relationship see Finnigan & Noakes 2019.

<p>but denied questioning of his loyalty to NZ and claimed that the allegations were defamatory and racist (Yang was later subject to some racist attacks on his property).</p> <p>Although Yang did confirm that he had taught students how to intercept and decipher communications but not to engage in “the physical act of spying”. “If you define those cadets or students as spies, then yes, I was teaching spies,” he said. “[But] I don’t think [they were spies] ... I just think they are collecting information through communication in China.”¹²³</p> <p>In 2019-20 the issue was re-raised when Yang accompanied and controversially arranged for a fellow National MP to meet with Chinese Minister for Public Security Guo Shengkun.¹²⁴</p> <p>Yang was reelected by the National Party in 2020.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
<p>038-Dorjee Gyantsan 2018¹²⁶</p> <p><i>China // Sweden</i></p> <p>Gyantsan provided information on other Tibetan exiles to Chinese intelligence while working at a pro-Tibet radio station in Sweden. Swedish investigators concluded that Gyantsan’s handlers included a Chinese diplomat based in Poland and Chinese journalist in Sweden. Gyantsan was sentenced to 22 months imprisonment.</p> <p>Muted Swedish response, although details of the China contacts were included in the indictment of Gyantsan.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>LESS EGREGIOUS</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>NEUTRAL The Chinese Foreign Ministry denied any knowledge of the case when asked about Gyantsan at the time he was charged.¹²⁷</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p>
	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p>

¹²³ Quoted in Phillips 2017

¹²⁴ Walters 2019; Christian 2020

¹²⁶ Chan 2018; AFP 2018-A; Håla & Lulu 2018; Poland In 2018

¹²⁷ Poland In 2018

039-DGSE officers arrested for spying for China 2017-2018¹²⁸ <i>China // France</i> <p>In December 2017 former DGSE officers Henri Manioc (former DGSE station chief in Beijing) and Pierre-Marie Winterat were arrested by French authorities for espionage on behalf of China. These arrests were made public in France in May 2018. Manioc had effectively defected to China in 1998 before later returning to France.</p> <p>In July 2020 the pair (described by authorities as ‘Henri M’ and ‘Pierre-Marie H’) were sentenced to prison after a trial lasting less than a week.¹²⁹</p> <p>No known French response to the Chinese.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED Limited to the announcement of the charges in May 2018.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL The Chinese Foreign Ministry denied any knowledge of the case when asked in May 2018.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
040-Alleged Chinese cyber-attacks against Australian Parliament, 2019¹³⁰ <i>China // Australia</i> <p>In February 2019 the Australian Government publicly announced that the computer systems of the Australian Parliament (including files and correspondence of Australian politicians) had been compromised by a state-sponsored cyber-attack.</p> <p>While the Government officially declined to attribute responsibility, China was quickly identified by unofficial reports as being responsible. Some further clarification of damage was provided in Senate Estimates testimony in November 2019. The attack on the Australian Parliament followed closely after a similar hacking of data at the</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED Notably, in September 2019 news sources alleged that the Australian Government refusal to officially attribute the attack to China (despite identifying direct Chinese responsibility before May 2019) was motivated by a wish to avoid jeopardising the close bilateral economic relationship. ¹³¹
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given the targeting of the parliament.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE The hack was detected just months before the Australian federal election, raising fears of electoral interference akin to the 2016 US Presidential Election.
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL In February 2019 Chinese foreign ministry spokesman denied any responsibility on the part of China, accusing media of undermining China’s relationship with Australia. “One should present abundant evidence when investigating and determining the nature of a cyberspace activity, instead of making baseless speculations and firing indiscriminate shots at others” and “Irresponsible reports, accusations, pressurising and sanctions will only heighten tensions and confrontation in cyberspace and poison the atmosphere for cooperation.” In line with standard Chinese responses the

¹²⁸ Foligut 2019 pp. 267, 394; France 24 2018

¹²⁹ France 24; Reuters 2020; Rogan 2020

¹³⁰ AAP 2019; Lawson 2019; Corfield 2019; Packham 2019; Kwai 2019

¹³¹ Packham 2019

<p>Australian National University in Canberra, also attributed unofficially to China.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		<p>spokesman also called on the international community to deal with cybersecurity threats through dialogue and cooperation on the basis of mutual respect.¹³²</p> <p>Responding to the news reports of September 2019, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated “When investigating and determining the nature of online incidents there must be full proof of the facts, otherwise it’s just creating rumors and smearing others, pinning labels on people indiscriminately. We would like to stress that China is also a victim of internet attacks.” And “China hopes that Australia can meet China halfway, and do more to benefit mutual trust and cooperation between the two countries.”¹³³</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>041-Death of Bo (‘Nick’) Zhao in Melbourne, 2019¹³⁴</p> <p><i>China // Australia</i></p> <p>In November 2019 allegations were published in the Australian media that a young Chinese-Australian businessman (Zhao) had informed ASIO earlier in the year that he had been recruited by business contacts (with links to Chinese intelligence) and offered AUD 1 million to run for election to the Australian Parliament. Zhao, who was experiencing financial difficulties, was found dead a few weeks after speaking to ASIO. A coronial inquiry into Zhao’s death found his death was not suspicious¹³⁵.</p> <p>Australian Prime Minister Hon Scott Morrison MP said publicly: “I would caution anyone leaping to any conclusions about these matters ... I’m not. But I do find the allegations troubling and disturbing.”¹³⁶</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>The apparent effort was unsuccessful but the alleged intention was the subversion of Australian politics and if true may be linked to the death of Zhao.</p>
	<i>Timing</i>	<p>NOTABLE</p> <p>Occurred simultaneously with a number of other cases involving Australia and China.</p>
	<i>Response</i>	<p>DENIAL</p> <p>The Chinese Government strenuously denied there was any validity to the allegations made by Zhao. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that “some Australian politicians, institutions and media “have been highly tense on China-related issues”. “Stories like ‘Chinese espionage’ or ‘China’s infiltration in Australia’, with however bizarre plots and eye-catching details, are nothing but lies.” Mr Geng urged Australian politicians, institutions and media to view China and China-Australia relations with “a healthy attitude” in the interest of bilateral relations as well as their “own physical and mental health”. He added China was not interested in interfering in other countries’ affairs.”¹³⁷</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

CHINA (directed specifically at USA)

¹³² Quoted in AAP 2019

¹³³ Quoted in Packham 2019

¹³⁴ Knaus & Doherty 2019; Chubb 2019; Channel Nine News 2019; Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2019.

¹³⁵ McKenzie & Sakal 2020

¹³⁶ Channel Nine News 2019

¹³⁷ From Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2019

042-Larry Wu-Tai Chin (aka Jin Wudai)¹³⁸ <i>China // USA</i> Chin began work as a local employee of the State Department in Shanghai in 1948 before moving to the Hong Kong consulate in 1949, and then going on to a long career with the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service, retiring in 1981. Chin was operating under the control of the Chinese Ministry of Public Safety, possibly from as early as 1948. Chin's translation support to some CIA and other USG activities meant that he was able to, for example, provide Beijing with forewarning of the Nixon Administration's rapprochement strategy towards the PRC. Chin also served as US translator during Deng Xiaoping's visit to the US in 1979. Chin confessed to FBI CI investigators in 1985 but took his own life in February 1986 while awaiting sentencing. (There are suggestions this might have been at the instigation of the Chinese, including provision for his dependents.) Chin was identified by the FBI following the defection to the US of senior MSS officer Yu Zhensan. No known US response to China. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY In 1985.
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Chin's arrest came at a moment of delicate relations on behalf of both Washington and Beijing. There was a common cause in defeating the Soviets (including cooperation on supplying the Afghan resistance).
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Chinese officials denied knowledge of Chin's case when asked at the time of his conviction.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
043-Hou Desheng & Zang Weichu 1987¹³⁹ <i>China // USA</i> Chinese diplomat Hou detained December 1987 in Washington as result of FBI double agent operation (he believed he was meeting source with access to NSA documents). Zang, a consular official in Chicago, also detained. Both Hou and Zhang were expelled from US (first such expulsions since restoration of PRC-US diplomatic ties in	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY In 1987.
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL The Chinese Foreign Ministry's official response to the expulsions was: "The charge made by the U.S. side is a frame-up against the Chinese diplomats in the United States. We have lodged a strong protest with the U.S. side against such action and reserved the right to make further reaction." ¹⁴² China also lodged a formal complaint at the treatment of their two diplomats, claiming they had been framed.

¹³⁸ Olson 2019, pp. 182-190; Minnick 1992, p. 36-37; Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 120; Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 203-204; Faligot 2019 pp. 128-131; Engelberg 1986

¹³⁹ PERSEREC 2008; Thornton 1988; Associated Press 1987

¹⁴² Quoted in Associated Press 1987

<p>1979). The US State Department “said the incident left U.S.-Chinese relations unchanged, and that the administration considers the case closed.”¹⁴⁰</p> <p>Contemporary media reporting noted that the Chinese were treated much more sensitively than comparable Soviet spy cases (such as not publicising their identities) and that (based on sources within the State Department) this was done specifically to avoid damaging the relationship between the US and China.¹⁴¹</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>044-Paul Doumitt 1988¹⁴³</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>US Embassy Beijing communicator, Doumitt was blackmailed and pitched by the MSS in 1988. The MSS was seeking details of the CIA station within the Embassy and Doumitt claims to have provided inconsequential information before confessing to the Embassy. He was sent home in disgrace.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i> <i>Relationship</i> <i>Publicity</i> <i>Nature of Activity</i> <i>Timing</i> <i>Response</i> <i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE POWERFUL FRIENDLY LIMITED LESS EGREGIOUS NOT NOTABLE UNKNOWN LESS SENSITIVE
<p>045-Yen Men Kao 1993¹⁴⁴</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>Chinese national involved in acquisition and illegal export of sensitive US military equipment on behalf of Chinese intelligence officials.</p> <p>Arrested in 1993 but dealt with through immigration (rather than criminal) proceedings and deported (to Hong Kong) rather than being prosecuted. Contemporary</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i> <i>Relationship</i> <i>Publicity</i> <i>Nature of Activity</i> <i>Timing</i> <i>Response</i> <i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE POWERFUL NEUTRAL PUBLIC LESS EGREGIOUS NOT NOTABLE UNKNOWN LESS SENSITIVE

¹⁴⁰ Associated Press 1987

¹⁴¹ Thornton 1988

¹⁴³ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 228

¹⁴⁴ PERSEREC 2008; McConnell 1994

media reporting suggested this this was done deliberately to avoid damaging US-China relations. ¹⁴⁵		
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		
046-Eric Jenott 1996¹⁴⁶ <i>China // USA</i> US soldier charged in 1996 with providing classified information (including password for US classified computer system) to Chinese national who then returned to China prior to Jenott's arrest. Court-martialled and found guilty of lesser offences but not espionage – sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. US authorities declined to charge Qihang Liu, the Chinese national in question, given a lack of evidence but he was warned by the FBI not to return to the US. ¹⁴⁷ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
047-Peter Lee 1997-1998¹⁴⁸ <i>China // USA</i> A Chinese-born (Taiwanese-US dual citizen) physicist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lee pleaded guilty in 1998 to passing national defence information to China – dating back to 1985 and relating to nuclear weapon design and submarine detection capabilities. Lee was convicted but sentencing was surprisingly lenient. ¹⁴⁹ No US sanctions against China apparent. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Coincided with American political controversy concerning Chinese political donations and influence on the Clinton Administration.
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

¹⁴⁵ McConnell 1994

¹⁴⁶ PERSEREC 2008; WRAL Channel 5 1996; Mooneyham 1996, UPI 1996

¹⁴⁷ UPI 1996

¹⁴⁸ Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 380; Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 164-165; Schmidt 2003

¹⁴⁹ Contemporary media reporting would later link the 'lenient' treatment (and flawed FBI investigation) of Lee with the Katrina Leung (and James Smith) case – see Schmidt 2003

048-Wen Ho Lee 2000¹⁵⁰ <i>China // USA</i> <p>In December 1999 Lee, a Taiwanese-American nuclear weapons engineer, was indicted for illegally removing classified data from Los Alamos National Laboratory. This followed a five year-long FBI investigation and his dismissal for security reasons in March that year. Suspicion had fallen on Lee after information from a Chinese defector in 1995 linked Chinese nuclear weapons design to work with which Lee was associated. Lee pleaded guilty in September 2000 to a single charge of illegally removing data and was immediately freed, amidst political scandal in Washington associated with his case. Lee would receive a civil settlement from the US Government and was issued a public apology by President Clinton.</p> <p>Contemporary media reporting noted concerns aired by Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson that Chinese espionage directed at US nuclear secrets was straining bilateral relations.¹⁵¹</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC Case became a cause célèbre.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
049-Katrina Leung 2003¹⁵² <i>China // USA</i> <p>A San Francisco-based double agent ostensibly reporting to the FBI but actually working to directions from Chinese intelligence (MSS) from 1984 (including provision of counter-intelligence information on the FBI), Leung was arrested (along with her FBI handler and lover James Smith) in April 2003. Leung would later be convicted of non-espionage (primarily taxation) offences and given 3 months probation (in addition to other sanctions). Espionage charges were evidently not pursued because</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

¹⁵⁰ Polmar & Allen 2004 pp. 380-381; Carroll 1999

¹⁵¹ "We are concerned that the Chinese are conducting espionage. . . we make no illusions about Chinese behaviour." – Carroll 1999

¹⁵² PERSEREC 2008; Polmar & Allen 2004 pp. 381-382; Trahair & Miller 2012 pp. 286-286; Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 235-236, 241.

<p>of the fear of revealing classified US information in court (and an initial dismissal on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct related to the plea deal offered Smith).</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
<p>050-Ronald Montaperto 2003¹⁵³</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>Former DIA analyst admitted in late 2003 to having provided classified US information to the Chinese between 1989 and 2001. Montaperto claimed to have inadvertently provided this information during verbal briefings but also failed to report his meetings with those officials. US authorities stated that, in addition, Montaperto had facilitated Chinese deception of US intelligence efforts. In 2006 Montaperto was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment (and other sanctions).</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>051-Noshir Gowadia 2005-2011¹⁵⁴</p> <p><i>China / USA</i></p> <p>Former B2 designer Gowadia was indicted in November 2005 for selling US military secrets to China between 2003 and 2005 (principally related to stealth capabilities). Gowadia also travelled to China on multiple occasions to actively work with Chinese engineers on their related derivative designs. Convicted in 2010, and in 2011 he was sentenced to 32 years imprisonment (also for tax offences).</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

¹⁵³ PERSEREC 2008; Clark 2015; Washington Times 2006

¹⁵⁴ Clark 2015; Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 155

CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		
052-Chi Mak and Greg Chung 2005-2010¹⁵⁵ <i>China / USA</i> Arrested in 2005 along with members of his family, Mak provided sensitive military information to China (likely 2PLA) while employed by a defence contractor (notably in relation to USN submarine capabilities). In 2007 he was sentenced to over 24 years imprisonment and other family members were also imprisoned. Chi Mak had also served as a go-between for another Chinese agent: Dongfan 'Greg' Chung, a Boeing engineer. Arrested in 2008, and convicted in 2009, in 2010 Chung was sentenced to more than 15 years imprisonment for passing space and military aviation secrets to China. No specific US action against China identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
053-James Fondren 2008-10¹⁵⁶ <i>China // USA</i> Deputy Director of PACOM liaison in Washington, former USAF officer Fondren was arrested in 2008, having first been recruited by Chinese intelligence in the 1990s. Co-conspirator was Kuo Tsai-shen (see below), with whom Fondren shared classified material. Fondren was convicted in 2009 and the following year was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. No specific US action against China identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL The Chinese Foreign Ministry vehemently denied any Chinese involvement in the case and claimed there were unspecified ulterior motives in attributing blame to China: "We urge the U.S. to discard its Cold War mentality and stop its groundless accusations against China... We urge the U.S. to do more things to help enhance mutual trust ... and friendship between the two peoples." ¹⁵⁷
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

¹⁵⁵ PERSEREC 2008; Olson 2019 pp. 132-137; Trahair & Miller 2012 pp. 82-83; Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 152, 238-239; Grier 2005; CBS News 2009; Associated Press 2010; Bhattacharjee 2014

¹⁵⁶ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 229; Ryan 2009; Associated Press 2009; NBC News 2009; CBS News 2009; CNN 2009

¹⁵⁷ Associated Press 2009

054-Kuo Tai-shen and Gregg Bergersen 2008¹⁵⁸ <i>China // USA</i> While actually working to Chinese intelligence directions, the New Orleans-based Kuo masqueraded as a Taiwanese agent in order to obtain classified information from US defence analyst Gregg Bergersen concerning US military sales to Taiwan, between March 2007 and February 2008. Kuo was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment in 2008, and Bergersen to 5 years. Separately a former USAF officer James Fondren (see above) was also charged with giving classified information to Kuo. No specific US action against China identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL The Chinese Foreign Ministry denied any Chinese involvement in the case, calling the allegations groundless and saying that the charges were an attempt to foster a misperception of China as a threat to the West. ¹⁵⁹
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
055-Chao Tah-wei 2008-9¹⁶⁰ <i>China // USA</i> Chinese national, attempted to illegally export thermal-imaging cameras from US to China. Arrested with co-conspirator Guo Zhiyong in 2008 while at LAX. Ultimate recipients identified as Chinese MPS and People's Armed Police. Chao pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 20 months imprisonment. No specific US action against China identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
056-Kuok Chi-Tong 2009-2010¹⁶¹ <i>China // USA (and NATO)</i>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL

¹⁵⁸ PERSEREC 2008; Clark 2015; Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 224, 234; Voice of America 2009, Associated Press 2008; Gertz 2010

¹⁵⁹ Voice of America 2009

¹⁶⁰ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 149; Ryan 2008

¹⁶¹ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 162-163; *Washington Examiner* 2012; Song 2010; Poulsen 2010

<p>Macau businessman Kuok was arrested in Atlanta in 2009 while transiting to Panama where he expected to meet Chinese intelligence. Kuok would later claim that, beginning in the early 2000s, he was coerced under duress from a Chinese diplomatic official ('Zheng Kung-Pen') into attempting to acquire US and NATO military technologies (including encryption devices associated with the US SIPRNET classified system). Initially convicted in 2009, in 2012 two of the four counts were overturned when a US Appeals Court accepted that he had been acting under duress.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL The Chinese Embassy in Washington was reported by the Chinese state media as saying these allegations of China conducting spying activities against the US are groundless and unwarranted (although the reference may have been broader than just the Kuok Chi-Tong case). ¹⁶²
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>057-Gao ('Helen') Xiaoming 2010¹⁶³</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>A contractor translator, Gao was approached by Chinese intelligence in 2007 prior to commencing work for the State Department in 2010. She is also suspected of passing information on US diplomatic facilities as a result of her association with a State Department architect. Detained in 2010, Gao was not ultimately prosecuted.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>058-Glenn Shriver 2010-2011¹⁶⁴</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>After pleading guilty in October 2010, in January 2011 Shriver was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment after being recruited to spy for the Shanghai State Security</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS While nonetheless deeply concerning to (and influential within) the US Intelligence Community.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL

¹⁶² Song 2010

¹⁶³ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 229; Herridge 2015

¹⁶⁴ Clark 2015; Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 240-241; Stein 2010; Mattis 2010; Pelofsky 2010; Golden 2010 (Chapter 5: 'Shanghaied')

Bureau while resident as a student in Shanghai in 2004. Shriver was directed by his handlers to apply for positions in the USIC but was detected after a CIA polygraph examination. No specific US action against China identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		At the time of Shriver's guilty plea the Chinese Embassy in Washington stated that China: "never engages itself in activities that'll harm other countries' national interests, and it's sincere in developing Sino-U.S. relations of mutual benefit... Any attempts to defame China with fabricated allegations will prove futile." ¹⁶⁵
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
059-Jin Hanjuan 2007-2012¹⁶⁶ <i>China // USA</i> Naturalised US citizen Jin was arrested in February 2007 while transporting Motorola company secrets to China (where the Motorola employee intended to establish her own company). Jin was also associated with a Chinese supplier to the PLA, Sun Kaisens. In Jin's possession were specific PLA requirements for future telecommunications projects. Jin was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment (and three years of court supervision, ended early in 2018). No specific US action against China identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL to COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
060-Benjamin Bishop 2014¹⁶⁷ <i>China // USA</i> A former US Army officer and contractor at PACOM, Bishop became romantically involved with Chinese national Claudia He in 2011. Bishop commenced providing He with classified information which Bishop believed was to be used for her studies. In actuality she was in contact with the MSS, who paid He to provide them with papers on security issues derived from the information provided by Bishop. In 2014 Bishop was sentenced to 7 years in prison.	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

¹⁶⁵ Quoted in Pelofsky 2010

¹⁶⁶ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 161-162; Goudie & Markoff 2018; Kelleher 2012

¹⁶⁷ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 224, 231; *South China Morning Post* 2014; NBC News 2014; CBS News 2014; Martin 2013; CNN 2013

No specific US action against China identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		
061-Indictment of Unit 61398 in 2014¹⁶⁸ <i>China // USA</i> In May 2014 the US DoJ indicted five individuals identified as members of a Chinese SIGINT unit ('Unit 61398') for hacking into US companies (including Westinghouse, US Steel and Alcoa, SolarWorld AG and Allegheny Technologies), as well as the Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union. Individuals were Huang Zhenyu, Gu Chunhui, Sun Kailiang, Wang Dong and Wen Xinyu. This was the first time the DOJ had indicted state-sponsored hackers and represented a form of 'attribution by indictment'. ¹⁶⁹ The following year the US threatened China with related economic sanctions, resulting in a late 2015 joint agreement not to engage in economic espionage. ¹⁷⁰ (During a September 2015 visit to Washington President Xi Jinping pledged that China would not conduct cyberespionage for commercial purposes: "China strongly opposes and combats the theft of commercial secrets and other kinds of hacking attacks." ¹⁷¹ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL Estimates of the economic value/damage of Chinese cyberespionage at the time vary by hundreds of billions of dollars. See also the indictment itself. ¹⁷²
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Contemporary media reporting noted that the US indictments were launched while the 2013 Snowden disclosures continued to colour global perceptions of US cyberespionage. Chinese authorities made the same point. ¹⁷³
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL At the time of the indictment the Chinese Foreign Ministry demanded that the charges be withdrawn: "The Chinese government, the Chinese military and their relevant personnel have never engaged or participated in cyber theft of trade secrets," Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang said in a statement. "The U.S. accusation against Chinese personnel is purely ungrounded and absurd." Chinese officials also threatened to suspend participation in the China-U.S. Cyber Working Group, established in 2013. ¹⁷⁴
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

¹⁶⁸ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 161, 180, 181, 183; Greenberg 2016; Nakashima 2015-B; Council on Foreign Relations 2014; Phelps & Makinen 2014; Li 2014; Ackerman & Kaiman 2014; Dews 2014; Simon 2017; Culafi 2020

¹⁶⁹ See Assistant Attorney General John Carlin's comments at the Brookings Institution (Dews 2014).

¹⁷⁰ Greenberg 2016 notes comments from US cyber-security firms suggesting that Chinese cyber-attacks targeting US firms subsequently declined by up to 90%. See also Nakashima 2015-B, Simon 2017 and Culafi 2020

¹⁷¹ Quoted in Nakashima 2015

¹⁷² US Department of Justice 2014

¹⁷³ Phelps & Makinen 2014. "For a long time, American authorities have conducted large-scale, organized cyber-theft and cyber-espionage activities against foreign dignitaries, companies and individuals... This is already common knowledge." – Chinese Foreign Ministry quoted in Ackerman & Kaiman 2014

¹⁷⁴ Quoted in Phelps & Makinen 2014

062-Shen Huisheng & Chang ('Alice') Huanling 2014¹⁷⁵ <i>China // USA</i> <p>Taiwanese nationals Chang and Shen attempted to acquire sensitive defence technology on behalf of a Chinese intelligence service, during a sting operated by the FBI. In 2012 they specifically sought information on US military aircraft and missiles. Furthermore they transferred to their undercover FBI interlocutors a codebook to protect future communications. They were arrested in 2012 and at a 2014-2015 trial Chang pleaded guilty and received time served. Shen also pleaded guilty but received 49 months imprisonment.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
063-Chinese hack of the US Office of Personnel Management, 2015¹⁷⁶ <i>China // USA</i> <p>In April 2015 the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) discovered that large quantities of sensitive personnel information from across US Government (totalling 21.5 million personal files) had been stolen from its holdings. This attack then became public knowledge in the US in June – as was direct attribution to China. It is now understood that the hacking intrusions, originating in China, first began in 2013 and were in fact detected by OPM in 2014, initiating a system-wide reset in July, intended to purge the intruders. As it turns out this failed and in fact the bulk of the data theft then occurred between July 2014 and April 2015.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL <p>Although the data stolen was 'unclassified' it was extremely sensitive and the quantity stolen was massive. In addition to the security damage done to the US (likely enduring for decades), the economic cost was also significant. While law suits against the USG by affected employees remain in appeals stage following a dismissal in 2017, the cost of required additional services such as credit checks and monitoring is estimated to be up to a USD 1 billion over the long term.</p>
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL <p>China denied any responsibility for the attack, claiming that the allegations made by US officials were irresponsible. In the immediate wake of the public revelations, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated: "China itself is also a victim of cyberattacks" and "China resolutely tackles cyberattack activities in all forms." Also, China in fact desired more global cooperation "to build a peaceful and safe, open and collaborative cyberspace." Furthermore he also called on the US not to make groundless accusations about China's involvement "but instead add more trust and cooperating in this field." Similarly the Chinese Embassy objected to allegations of Chinese responsibility: "Cyberattacks conducted across countries are hard to track, and therefore the source</p>

¹⁷⁵ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 148, 177; Esposito & Ferran 2012; Lowther 2012

¹⁷⁶ Quoting Sanger 2018: "China paid no price for stealing the most private details of about 21 million Americans." (p. xix); Giglio 2019; Fruhlinger 2020; Boyd 2016; Perez 2017; Liptak *et al* 2015; Koerner 2016; Nakashima 2015-A

<p>A congressional investigation of OPM was launched, and top OPM executives were forced to resign.</p> <p>In August 2017 Chinese national Yu Pingan was arrested by the FBI while visiting the US, on charges later linked to the hack. In September 2018 then US National Security Adviser John Bolton explicitly blamed China for the attack. In February 2020 US authorities charged four Chinese nationals associated with the Chinese military with the similar hacking of Equifax, and that attack was tied by US authorities to the attack on the OPM. That US authorities formally charged offshore foreign intelligence operatives arguably reflects the seriousness with which this attack was regarded.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT</p>		of attacks is difficult to identify. Jumping to conclusions and making (a) hypothetical accusation is not responsible and counterproductive.” ¹⁷⁷
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>064-Wenxia (‘Wency’) Man 2015-2016¹⁷⁸</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>Man was a California-based businesswoman who conspired with Zhang Xinsheng (described by Man as a PLA ‘technology spy’) to illegally acquire and export US jet engines and other defence technology. Man’s firm was linked to Xifei Aviation Components Company, a supplier to the PLA. Arrested in 2015, in 2016 Man was sentenced to 4 years in prison.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL The Chinese Embassy in Washington declined to comment at the time of Man’s sentencing. ¹⁷⁹ Nor did the Chinese Foreign Ministry respond at the time of her conviction. ¹⁸⁰
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>065-Kun Shan (‘Joey’) Chun 2016-2017¹⁸¹</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL

¹⁷⁷ Quoted in Liptak *et al* 2015

¹⁷⁸ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 171-172, 191-192; Macchi 2016; Yan 2016; Choi 2016

¹⁷⁹ Macchi 2016

¹⁸⁰ Yan 2016

¹⁸¹ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 227; Giglio 2019; Whitehouse 2017; Raymond & Pierson 2017; Westcott & Berlinger 2016; Lewontin 2016; Goldman 2016

<p>An electronic technician for the FBI, between 2006 and 2011 Chun undertook consulting work for Chinese associates before being introduced to an intelligence officer in 2011 and tasked with providing counter-intelligence information on the FBI. After his arrest in 2016 Chun pleaded guilty to being an unregistered agent of a foreign power and was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment in 2017.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>066-Candice Claiborne 2017¹⁸²</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>A State Department office manager, Claiborne was approached by the Shanghai State Security Bureau while posted to the Shanghai consulate from 2003-2005. SSSB acquired leverage over Claiborne while supporting her son, resident in China. (nb Hvistendahl writes that the “friendly Mr Wu” and his colleague ‘Mr Zhang’ were MSS agents – the SSSB is a bureau within the MSS.) Arrested in 2017 and, after pleading guilty to a (lesser but related) charge of defrauding the USG, in 2019 she was sentenced to 40 months in prison and a \$40,000 fine.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL At a 10 July 2019 press conference a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied any knowledge of the Claiborne case. ¹⁸³
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>067-Ron Hansen 2018-2019¹⁸⁴</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>Former DIA officer Hansen was arrested in June 2018, after admitting to the FBI that he had been pitched and</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN

¹⁸² Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 227-228; Hvistendahl 2020; Giglio 2019; Swaine 2017; Hsu 2019; Chinese Foreign Ministry 2019

¹⁸³ Chinese Foreign Ministry 2019

¹⁸⁴ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 230-231; Giglio 2019; Yilek 2019; Associated Press 2019

<p>recruited in 2014 by the MSS and had subsequently provided information on former colleagues, analysis based on classified information, and export-controlled forensics equipment. Hansen had also persistently attempted to re-join the USIC. In September 2019 Hansen was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>
<p>068-Indictment of Jiangsu State Security Department 2018¹⁸⁵</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>In September and October 2018 the US DoJ released indictments of Jiangsu SSD for its efforts to illegally acquire US aircraft engine technology from 2010 to 2015. The JSSD apparently used both recruitments inside aerospace companies and hacking to pursue this technology. The US lured an implicated JSSD officer (Xu Yanjun) to Belgium in October 2018 where he was arrested and extradited to the US.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p>
	<p><i>Relationship</i></p>	<p>COMPLICATED</p>
	<p><i>Publicity</i></p>	<p>PUBLIC</p>
	<p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p>
	<p><i>Timing</i></p>	<p>NOTABLE Indictment and Xu Yanjun's extradition occurred during escalated trade and other tensions between China and the Trump Administration.</p>
	<p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>DENIAL The Chinese Foreign Ministry said the charges were groundless: "The relevant accusations are pure fiction and totally fabricated."¹⁸⁶</p>
	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>
<p>069-Jerry Chun Shing Lee 2018¹⁸⁷</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>Former CIA case officer Lee retired in 2007 and in 2010 was recruited by the MSS's Guangdong State Security Department. Lee was tasked to collect on CIA and national defence information. In 2012 Lee's belongings were searched while visiting the US and notebooks detailing CIA information found in his possession. Lee also appears to have provided information to the MSS that led to a separate approach to a CIA case officer in 2013. Lee</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p>
	<p><i>Relationship</i></p>	<p>COMPLICATED</p>
	<p><i>Publicity</i></p>	<p>PUBLIC</p>
	<p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p>
	<p><i>Timing</i></p>	<p>NOT NOTABLE</p>
	<p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>UNKNOWN</p>
	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

¹⁸⁵ Mattis & Brazil 2019 pp. 232-233; Nakashima 2018-A and 2018-B; The Guardian 2018; Delaney 2018

¹⁸⁶ Delaney 2018

¹⁸⁷ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 235; Giglio 2019; Haas 2018; Weiner & Harris 2019; Booker 2019

<p>was arrested in January 2018. After pleading guilty he was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment in November 2019.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
<p>070-Kevin Mallory 2017-19¹⁸⁸</p> <p><i>China // USA</i></p> <p>A defence contactor, and former CIA and State Department officer, Mallory was recruited in 2017 by the Shanghai State Security Department, to whom he sold classified documents and for whom he wrote research papers. The recruitment was carried out under guise of an academic exchange and Mallory was run via covert communications methods. In June 2018 Mallory was convicted of lying to investigators and providing defense information to a foreign government. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in 2019.</p> <p>No specific US action against China identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	<p>DENIAL</p> <p>When Mallory was arrested the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied any Chinese involvement in the case: “We never do such things as interference or infiltration... That is definitely not Chinese style.”¹⁸⁹</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

Cuba

<p>071-The Red Wasp Network (‘La Red Avispa’ aka ‘The Cuban Five’), Cuban spy ring in south Florida, 1998-2001¹⁹⁰</p> <p><i>Cuba // USA</i></p> <p>Ten members of this ring were arrested in September 1998 – with their trial only concluding in December 2001. (Subsequently the number of arrests increased to 14.)</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	<p>VERY PUBLIC</p> <p>The case became a cause celebre in international left-wing circles.</p>
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	<p>NOTABLE</p> <p>The trial occurred soon after the national controversy concerning Elian Gonzalez’s repatriation to Cuba.</p>
	<i>Response</i>	UNREPENTANT

¹⁸⁸ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 239; AFP 20 May 2019; Giglio 2019; McKelvery 2019; Dilanian 2019; Jackman 2019

¹⁸⁹ McKelvery 2019

¹⁹⁰ PERSEREC 2008; Clark 2015; Roig-Franzia 2006; Campbell 2008; *Latin American Herald Tribune* 2010; Labott 2014

<p>The ring (run for at least six years) was recruited by Cuban intelligence to penetrate US-based Cuban exile groups and report on US military activities in Florida. Gerardo Hernandez, a captain in Cuban military intelligence, was the ring-leader. He, along with Fernando Gonzalez and Ramon Labanino (also a Cuban intelligence officer), was in direct contact with Cuban intelligence. Red Wasp Network case also became enmeshed with the fatal shooting down in February 1996 of four pilots from the anti-Castro ‘Brothers to the Rescue’ group based in the USA.</p> <p>In 2014 the release of the remaining three of the five (two having previously served their sentences and returned to Cuba) occurred in a spy exchange, and was hailed as a positive thawing in relations between the two countries.¹⁹¹</p> <p>No specific US action against Cuba identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		<p>The ‘Cuban Five’ were lauded as folk heroes by the Cuban Government for two decades. With the President of the Cuban National Assembly vowing that Cuba would send more agents to the US to combat ‘terrorism’.¹⁹²</p> <p>The Cuban Government has indeed since acknowledged that the five were Cuban intelligence agents but insisted their mission was legitimate as it was directed at the Cuban exile community and not the US Government.¹⁹³</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

<p>072-Mariano Faget 2000-02¹⁹⁴</p> <p><i>Cuba // USA</i></p> <p>A senior US Immigration & Naturalization Service official, Faget was arrested in 2000 for supplying classified information to Cuban intelligence. Under FBI suspicion since 1999, Faget was provided access to fake information concerning an impending Cuban defection to the US and then detected immediately communicating this to a cut-out. Sentenced to 5 years imprisonment in 2001.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	<p>DENIAL</p> <p>Cuba forcefully rejected the accusation that their diplomat was involved in espionage and made this a cause celebre for over a month.¹⁹⁵</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

¹⁹¹ Labott 2014

¹⁹² Roig-Franzia 2006

¹⁹³ *Latin American Herald Tribune* 2010

¹⁹⁴ PERSEREC 2008; Clark 2015

¹⁹⁵ The Cuban Interests Section in the USA claimed the “total falseness” of the accusations directed at their official (Second Secretary Jose Imperatori). Furthermore Cuba refused to remove Imperatori from his posting – to the considerable chagrin of the US. Imperatori was subsequently taken into custody by the FBI on 26 February 2000 and forcibly deported to Canada. Imperatori then went on a public hunger strike at the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa. He was subsequently expelled by the Canadian Government and returned to a hero’s welcome in Havana on 2 March 2000.

<p>A member of the Cuban diplomatic mission, who had been a contact for Faget, was expelled from the USA.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		
<p>073-Ana Montes 2001-4¹⁹⁶</p> <p><i>Cuba // USA</i></p> <p>DIA analyst Montes was arrested in 2001 having spied for the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence since at least 1985. Montes both provided extensive classified information to Cuba and served as an agent of influence in the development of US intelligence assessments and policy. In 2002 she was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. In 2004 Marta Velazquez, former State Department lawyer and friend of Montes, was indicted on the basis of having introduced Montes to Cuban intelligence and aided Montes in joining the DIA. Velzquez remains resident in Sweden, having fled the USA in 2002. Montes was released in 2023 and now resides in Puerto Rico.</p> <p>No specific US action against Cuba identified. At various times the proposal has been floated that Montes should be part of spy swaps between the US and Cuba, to no result.¹⁹⁷ (It is understood that a Cuban intelligence officer released to the US in exchange for remaining members of the Cuban 5 – see above – was involved in the unmasking of Montes by US authorities.)¹⁹⁸</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC Although her arrest was overshadowed by the events of 9/11.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given Montes' extraordinary access and influence on Latin American issues within the US national security community.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In reverse (that is, in dampening coverage), see above.
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>074-Carlos Alvarez¹⁹⁹</p> <p><i>Cuba // USA</i></p> <p>Former university professor Alvarez was arrested in 2006 for spying on the Cuban exile community on behalf of</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN

¹⁹⁶ PERSEREC 2008; Clark 2015; Olson 2019 pp. 137-143; Polmar & Allen 2004 pp. 429-430; Popkin 2013; Latell 2014; McCoy 2014; Patterson 2018

¹⁹⁷ Patterson 2018

¹⁹⁸ McCoy 2014

¹⁹⁹ Clark 2015; Martin & Johnston 2017; CNN 2006; Chardy 2016; Bell 2006

<p>Cuban intelligence, in a relationship stretching back to 1977. He was ultimately charged with being an unregistered agent of a foreign power, and pleaded guilty. Alvarez's wife was also charged. He received five years in prison, she received three years.</p> <p>No specific US action against Cuba identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>															
<table border="1"> <tr> <td data-bbox="192 483 719 898" rowspan="7"> <p>075-Walter & Gwendolyn Myers²⁰⁰</p> <p>Former State Department official Walter Myers and his wife Gwendolyn were arrested in June 2009 for having spied for Cuban intelligence for nearly 30 years. They communicated with Cuban intelligence officers via shortwave radio, and in meetings in Latin America. The Myers also met with Fidel Castro in 1995 to thank them for their service to Cuba. Walter was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2010 while Gwendolyn was imprisoned for over 6 years.</p> <p>No specific US action against Cuba identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p> </td><td data-bbox="719 483 913 512"> <p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> </td><td data-bbox="913 483 1809 512"> <p>MORE POWERFUL</p> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="719 512 913 541"> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> </td><td data-bbox="913 512 1809 541"> <p>ADVERSE</p> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="719 541 913 569"> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> </td><td data-bbox="913 541 1809 569"> <p>PUBLIC</p> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="719 569 913 598"> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> </td><td data-bbox="913 569 1809 598"> <p>NEUTRAL</p> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="719 598 913 727"> <p><i>Timing</i></p> </td><td data-bbox="913 598 1809 727"> <p>NOTABLE The charges against the Myers came amidst a fledgling opening up to Cuba by the new Obama Administration.²⁰¹ President Castro also called into question the timing of the FBI's 'entrapment' of the Myers, occurring a day after the OAS voted to lift the suspension of Cuba's membership.²⁰²</p> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="719 727 913 807"> <p><i>Response</i></p> </td><td data-bbox="913 727 1809 807"> <p>DENIAL President Castro claimed that the charges against the Myers were a "ridiculous tale", while also praising their actions as honourable.²⁰³</p> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="719 807 913 898"> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p> </td><td data-bbox="913 807 1809 898"> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p> </td></tr> </table>			<p>075-Walter & Gwendolyn Myers²⁰⁰</p> <p>Former State Department official Walter Myers and his wife Gwendolyn were arrested in June 2009 for having spied for Cuban intelligence for nearly 30 years. They communicated with Cuban intelligence officers via shortwave radio, and in meetings in Latin America. The Myers also met with Fidel Castro in 1995 to thank them for their service to Cuba. Walter was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2010 while Gwendolyn was imprisoned for over 6 years.</p> <p>No specific US action against Cuba identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p>	<p><i>Relationship</i></p>	<p>ADVERSE</p>	<p><i>Publicity</i></p>	<p>PUBLIC</p>	<p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p>	<p><i>Timing</i></p>	<p>NOTABLE The charges against the Myers came amidst a fledgling opening up to Cuba by the new Obama Administration.²⁰¹ President Castro also called into question the timing of the FBI's 'entrapment' of the Myers, occurring a day after the OAS voted to lift the suspension of Cuba's membership.²⁰²</p>	<p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>DENIAL President Castro claimed that the charges against the Myers were a "ridiculous tale", while also praising their actions as honourable.²⁰³</p>	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>
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Ecuador

<p>076-Frederick Hamilton²⁰⁴</p> <p><i>Ecuador // USA</i></p> <p>In 1991 Hamilton, a then DIA official based at the US Embassy in Lima, passed classified information (primarily on Peruvian military but including sensitive details of US intelligence capabilities and sources) to Ecuadorian</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p>
	<p><i>Relationship</i></p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p>
	<p><i>Publicity</i></p>	<p>LIMITED</p>
	<p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p>
	<p><i>Timing</i></p>	<p>NOT NOTABLE</p>
	<p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>UNKNOWN</p>
	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

²⁰⁰ Clark 2015; Trahair & Miller 2012 p. 98, pp. 331-332; Gerstein 2009; Wilber & Sheridan 2009; *The Independent* 2009; Harnden 2009; Ryan 2010

²⁰¹ Wilber & Sheridan 2009

²⁰² Trahair & Miller 2012 p. 332

²⁰³ Quoted in Trahair & Miller 2012 p. 332; see also *The Independent* 2009

²⁰⁴ PERSEREC 2008; Bates 1993

<p>officials. At his trial in 1993 he was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment.</p> <p>No specific US action against Ecuador identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
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El Salvador

<p>077-Phillip Seldon²⁰⁵</p> <p><i>El Salvador // USA</i></p> <p>Seldon passed classified documents to the Salvadorean military from November 1992 to July 1993, while stationed as a US army officer in El Salvador. Seldon's actions were detected during a polygraph when later seeking employment with the CIA. In 1996 he was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment.</p> <p>No specific US action against El Salvador identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

France

<p>078-Operation SATANIC 1985²⁰⁶</p> <p><i>France // New Zealand (and Switzerland)</i></p> <p>On 10 July 1985 a DGSE sabotage operation targeting the vessel <i>Rainbow Warrior</i> in Auckland harbor accidentally killed a Greenpeace crew member. DGSE officers Alain Mafart and Dominique Prieur, travelling on fake Swiss passports, were detained while trying to leave New Zealand. DGSE officer Christine-Huguette Cabon was identified as a mole within Greenpeace itself (including reporting on the organisation's plans to protest French nuclear testing).</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC Major global news story for weeks.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Involving sabotage and a resulting death.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In that it occurred during broader disquiet in the Pacific against French nuclear testing (the intention of the operation being – ironically – to prevent further bad publicity and interference in tests).
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL Initially DGSE tried to run a disinformation campaign blaming the KGB for the attack (in order to allegedly embarrass France). Then at the end of August 1985 an official French Government report tried to claim it had never been intended to damage the <i>Rainbow Warrior</i> – a claim panned by the French media and soon followed by Hernu and Lacoste's resignations.

²⁰⁵ PERSEREC 2008; Hall 1996

²⁰⁶ Minnick 1992 p. 144; Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 529; Trahair & Miller 2012 384-386

<p>The head of DGSE, Pierre Lacoste, was forced to resign, as was Minister of Defence Charles Hernu. Mafart and Prieur were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment – later transferred to French custody in the Pacific as part of a broader settlement between France and the victims of the bombing. Both were later transferred back to France in circumstances that led to a UN tribunal ruling that France had acted in bad faith and should pay USD 2 million in compensation. (Both Prieur and Mafart were later promoted by the DGSE.) In 1995 the officer who had commanded the bombing team, Major General Jean-Claude Lesquer, was awarded the Legion of Honour. Despite public outrage in New Zealand and Australia, there was relatively muted public concern about the bombing in France.</p> <p>The operation caused a decades-long schism between France and New Zealand.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL</p>	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>MORE SENSITIVE</p> <p>Given New Zealand concerns about sovereignty and a nuclear-free Pacific (which had adversely affected NZ's own security relationships – ie with the USA and by extension Australia).</p>
<p>079-Paris Air Show 1993²⁰⁷</p> <p><i>France // USA</i></p> <p>In 1993 the CIA warned US aircraft firms to beware of French spying at the annual Paris Air Show. This was based on evidence that DGSE had plotted to covertly acquire technical information from 40 such firms who had registered for the show. Although some commentators suggested the matter was a misunderstanding by US officials.²⁰⁸</p> <p>The US Government confronted the French Government about the allegations, but refused to comment on the talks publicly.</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p> <p>ALLIED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>LESS EGREGIOUS</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>DENIAL followed by UNREPENTANT</p> <p>Anonymous French Government officials briefed the media that the whole farrago was confected by US intelligence.²⁰⁹</p> <p>Silberzahn defended DGSE tactics, insisting that (post Cold War) espionage was “essentially economic, scientific, technological and financial”.²¹⁰</p> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

²⁰⁷ Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 186; *New York Times* 1993; Mintz 1993; Cue 1993

²⁰⁸ Mintz 1993

²⁰⁹ Mintz 1993 and Cue 1993

²¹⁰ Quoted in Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 186

<p>In a tacit admission, DGSE head Claude Silberzahn, who was said to have decided to target US industry, was removed by the French Government.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		
<p>080-DGSE targeting of US industry 1990s²¹¹</p> <p><i>France // USA</i></p> <p>In addition to the Paris Air Show incident, FBI officials have claimed that in the 1990s French intelligence was actively targeting US industrial secrets. This included DGSE placing agents inside IBM, Texas Instruments and Corning in 1992. In addition DGSE was alleged to have bugged Air France flights used by US businessmen and French consular officials in Texas were identified searching the trash of US executives. The objectives of these activities were particularly in support of French bids for Indian fighter aircraft contracts (in competition with US manufacturers) and to benefit Airbus's competition with Boeing's 747-400 aircraft. US financial institutions and the Los Alamos National Laboratory were also alleged to have been targeted by French intelligence during this period.</p> <p>US and French intelligence had come to a 'gentleman's agreement' in 1990 relation to commercial espionage (and a French commitment to cease such activities) – choosing to keep the issue within intelligence channels. US officials would later claim this was infringed by the French, while the French claimed that French businesses had been targeted by US authorities without hard evidence of espionage.²¹² A further gentleman's agreement was reached after the 'tit for tat' compromise of CIA activity in France in 1995.²¹³</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p> <p>ALLIED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>NEUTRAL See left.</p> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

²¹¹ Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 186-187, p. 316; Cue 1993

²¹² Cuo 1993

²¹³ Risen 1995

Germany

<p>081-Andrei Dumenkov case²¹⁴</p> <p><i>Germany // Russia</i></p> <p>On 23 August 2006 Russian national Dumenkov was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment for attempting to sell state secrets (apparently on missile technology and overseas intelligence activities) to Germany. Dumenkov had been arrested in August 2005 while attempting to flee to Germany.</p> <p>Dumenkov was subsequently cited on several occasions as a possible exchange with Russian spies held in the West.²¹⁵</p> <p>No specific Russian action against Germany identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	<p>NOTABLE</p> <p>Occurred roughly same time as other (but British) espionage activities targeting Russia, including the Sergei Skripal case and 'spy rock'. Russia likely delayed its public actions against Skripal and Dumenkov until after the hosting of the July G8 meeting in St Petersburg.</p>
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

Ghana

<p>082-Sharon Scranage²¹⁶</p> <p><i>Ghana // USA</i></p> <p>Scranage was a CIA support officer posted to Ghana who provided US classified information (including details of CIA operations and agents) to Ghanaian intelligence via her lover/handler, Michael Soussoudis, from December 1983 until her arrest in May 1985. In 1985 she was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment (later reduced to 2 years).</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>Given the apparent death of a CIA informant in Ghana.²¹⁷</p>
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>"Ghana's state-run radio said today that C.I.A. activities were a flagrant interference in Ghana's affairs, but the Government has appealed to the public not to use violence against Americans there."²¹⁸</p> <p>Soussoudis was greeted as a national hero on his return to Ghana in November 1985.²¹⁹</p>

²¹⁴ Bigg 2006; Eckel 2006; Von Twickel 2012; AFP 'NATO Source' 2013

²¹⁵ Von Twickel 2012; AFP 'NATO Source' 2013

²¹⁶ Minnick 1992 pp. 201-202 Clark 2015; Olson 2019 pp. 116-121; Engelberg 1985; Hager & Ostrow 1985; Scripps-Howard News Service 1985; *Studies in Intelligence* 1990; For a unique Ghanaian view see Ogbamey 2003

²¹⁷ Engelberg 1985

²¹⁸ Engelberg 1985

²¹⁹ *Studies in Intelligence* 1990, p. 36

<p>Soussoudis, who had been lured to the US by the FBI, was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment but was swapped (apparently facilitated by Togo) for eight of the CIA's Ghanaian agents who had been detained by Ghana. Subsequent resettlement of those agents in the US is estimated to have cost USD 13 million.</p> <p>Many within the USIC believe that the information provided to Ghana was subsequently passed on to the Soviets and their allies.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>
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Greece

<p>083-Steven Lalas 1993-94²²⁰</p> <p><i>Greece // USA</i></p> <p>Lalas spied for Greek intelligence from 1977 until his arrest in 1993, as a US soldier and later as a State Department communications officer at the US Embassy in Athens. Classified information provided by Lalas included details of CIA activities and agents, military assessments, and details of US intelligence operations in the Balkans. Pleaded guilty, cooperated with the FBI and was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment in September 1994. An unrepentant Lalas went to live in Greece upon his release from prison.²²¹</p> <p>Some US officials expressed concerns that Greece might have traded some of the information provided by Lalas to the Soviets (and later, Russians).</p> <p>No specific US action against Greece identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p>
	<p><i>Relationship</i></p>	<p>ALLIED</p>
	<p><i>Publicity</i></p>	<p>LIMITED</p>
	<p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p>
	<p><i>Timing</i></p>	<p>NOTABLE Greek media claimed that the arrest of Lalas was related to Greek support for Serbia in the then running Balkan Wars.²²²</p>
	<p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>DENIAL At the time of Lalas' arrest the Greek Embassy in Washington responded that the charge against Lalas "does concern us" but "We have no details about his actions... we do not know if there is any connection other than that the name sounds Greek."²²³ The Greek Foreign Minister cast doubts on the case, suggesting Lalas had been framed, while the Prime Minister ordered an investigation into the case.²²⁴</p>
	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

²²⁰ PERSEREC 2008; Polmar & Allen 2004 pp. 373-374; Bates 1993; US Department of State 2007 (via Wikileaks); Konstandaras 1993; Miller 1993

²²¹ For insights into Lalas' reception in Greece see US Department of State cable 2007 (ironically via Wikileaks)

²²² Konstandaras 1993

²²³ Bates 1993

²²⁴ Konstandaras 1993

India

<p>084-Sarabjit Singh, alleged RAW spy in Pakistan, 1990-2013²²⁵</p> <p><i>India // Pakistan</i></p> <p>In 1990 Indian national Singh was tried and convicted by a Pakistani court for carrying out terrorist bombings in Pakistan on behalf of Indian intelligence. Singh claimed to be a poor farmer who had strayed across the border into Pakistan. Sentenced to death in 1991 Singh remained imprisoned until 2013 when he was murdered in custody, allegedly by fellow inmates (and apparently as retaliation for the Indian execution of a Pakistani terrorist).</p> <p>Singh's case continued to be a constant irritant in bilateral relations until his death, yet no specific Pakistani sanctions towards India as a direct result of the case have been identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL At least in terms of what Singh was accused of doing.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE Towards its arch-rival India.
<p>085-Kulbhushan Jadhav²²⁶</p> <p><i>India // Pakistan</i></p> <p>In March 2016 former Indian naval officer Jadhav was arrested in Baluchistan, Pakistan, as a spy for the Indian RAW. He was subsequently sentenced to death by the Pakistani courts for espionage and sabotage against Pakistan.</p> <p>Pakistan has release several tapes of what it claims are filmed confessions by Jadhav.</p> <p>In 2019 the International Court of Justice ordered Pakistan to review the death sentence for Jadhav and criticised Islamabad for denying him consular access from India.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL India has claimed that Jadhav is innocent and repeatedly denounced Pakistan, claiming that he was kidnapped from Iran by Pakistani officials. This has included a series of demarches threatening the state of bilateral relations, as well as specific protests at the death sentence hand down.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE Towards its arch-rival India, and especially given the separatist dimension associated with espionage in Baluchistan province..

²²⁵ BBC 2013

²²⁶ Times of India 2017-A and B; India Today 2017; NDTV 2017; Dawn 2018; BBC 2019; Al Jazeera 2019

Despite the threats exchanged by both sides there has been little additional effect on bilateral relations – rather a more general diminution in the relationship.		
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR		

Indonesia

086-Former Indonesian spy chief boasts that Indonesia spied on Australia, 2004²²⁷ <i>Indonesia // Australia</i> <p>Former BIN chief General Hendropriyono claimed in a 2004 interview on Australian television that during the 1999 East Timor crisis BIN had intercepted Australian Government and military communications, and – separately - had tried unsuccessfully to recruit Australians as spies.</p> <p>No public consequences and Australian Government shied away from commenting on the allegations.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Seen as riposte to Snowden disclosures of Australian activity against Indonesia.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Indonesian Government neither confirmed nor denied specific allegation (made by one of own former officials).
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		

Iran

087-Former US Air Force intelligence officer defects to Iran in 2013²²⁸ <i>Iran // USA</i> <p>Monica Witt defected to Iran in 2013 and apparently provided Iranian intelligence (likely IRGC Quds Force) with identities of US counter-intelligence officers who were then targeted in Iranian cyber attacks. She is also said to have revealed US collection capabilities to the Iranians. In February 2019 an indictment of Witt, along with individuals identified in relation to the cyber attacks, was unsealed. Witt also produced propaganda for Iran.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

²²⁷ Packham 2013; *The Age* 2004

²²⁸ Borger 2019; Zapotosky 2019; BBC 2019-B

No specific action taken by US against Iran.		
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		
088-Former Israeli Minister Gonen Segev arrested for spying for Iran, 2018²²⁹ <i>Iran // Israel</i> In February 2019 former Israeli Energy Minister Segev was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment after pleading guilty to spying for Iran. Segev allegedly met with, and briefed, Iranian intelligence officers for six years. He had also allegedly tried to entice other Israelis into meeting with Iranian intelligence officers. Segev had previously been convicted of drug and fraud offences, and had been living in disgrace in Africa prior to his arrest. His lawyers mounted a case that he was foolishly trying to act as a double agent against Iran, in the hope of redeeming his reputation in Israel. No specific Israeli action against Iran identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL The recruitment of a former Minister suggests a more intimate nature, despite the Minister's disgraced circumstances. At the time of Segev's arrest Israeli police were quoted anonymously as stating that it was "one of the most severe security breaches the country has known", ²³⁰ However other commentators questioned whether a person in Segev's position would actually have had access to sensitive, contemporary information.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL Iranian press agency ISNA, reported on the arrest: "The Zionist regime is famous for faking files against Iran, and, after the violation of the [Iran nuclear deal] by the US government, has recently launched a new round of Iranophobia. The experts have assessed this accusation [against Segev] as part of Netanyahu's effort to create fake files against Iran." ²³¹ But following claims made about Israeli espionage against Iran, a spokesman linked both cases and stated that Netanyahu, the official said, "has come under the most intense internal and foreign pressure due to leaks about an Israeli minister spying for Iran as well as the large-scale infiltration of the Zionist regime's intelligence services by those of the Islamic Republic of Iran." ²³²
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

Israel

089-Jonathan Pollard, 1985-2015²³³ <i>Israel // USA</i> Pollard was a walk-in who spent 1984-85 spying prodigiously for Israel's LAMAK (military technical intelligence). Arrested in 1985 after trying to claim asylum at Israeli Embassy. Released on parole in 2015.	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL Obvious power disparity between US and Israel.
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED A very close diplomatic and security relationship.
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC A notorious and highly public trial and subsequent public campaigns for Pollard's release.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL Humint operation but a walk-in junior-level official. No particular sensitivities in inherent nature. (Sensitivity instead around spying on 'ally'.)

²²⁹ *Times of Israel* 2019; BBC 2018; BBC 2019-A; Harel 2018; Ahren 2018

²³⁰ Quoted in Harel 2018

²³¹ Quoted in Ahren 2018

²³² Quoted in Winer 2018

²³³ See Olive 2006; Olson 2019 pp. 164-172; Minnick 1992 pp. 202-203; Trahair & Miller 2012 pp. 423-426

<p>Continuing sore in US-Israel relations for over three decades (including to this day given disputes over parole conditions). Israel compelled to 'assist' in US investigation of LAMAK officials. Pollard's recruitment viewed by US as violation of 1951 intelligence cooperation agreement with Israel.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT</p>	Timing	NOT NOTABLE Happened during 1985's 'Year of the Spy'. Arrest of Pollard happened to coincide with a visit to US by Rabin.
	Response	DENIAL followed by APOLOGY (of sorts) For over a decade Israel insisted this was a rogue LAMAK operation. Israeli governments/Knesset impolitically lobbied for Pollard's release. In 1998 PM Netanyahu acknowledged that Pollard has indeed been an Israeli agent and that the Israelis had subsequently paid his legal costs. In 2002 Netanyahu visited Pollard in prison. Nonetheless, Israeli authorities would subsequently cite the Pollard case as an inflection point beyond which Israel would not countenance espionage directed at the US. ²³⁴
	Pre-disposition of target	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>090-Ben Ami Kadish, retired US engineer arrested for spying for Israel, 2008²³⁵</p> <p><i>Israel // USA</i></p> <p>Kadish, a former US army engineer, pleaded guilty in 2008 to spying for Israel 1979-85 (including with same LAKAM handlers as Pollard), including provision of military secrets. Due to his advanced age and expressed remorse, Kadish received a non-custodial sentence, and died in 2012.</p> <p>At time of his arrest concerns were raised in Israel about possible impact on bilateral relations – although only tangible impact may have been on related impact on endeavours to get Pollard released. US Government sought to downplay bilateral consequences. Likely that this case was over-shadowed by continuing anguish of Pollard matter.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	Power Dynamic	MORE POWERFUL Obvious power disparity between US and Israel.
	Relationship	ALLIED A very close diplomatic and security relationship.
	Publicity	LIMITED Media coverage at time of arrest, trial and sentencing – but relatively limited and short-term.
	Nature of Activity	NEUTRAL Humint operation but a walk-in junior-level official. No particular sensitivities in inherent nature. (Sensitivity instead around spying on 'ally'.)
	Timing	NOTABLE US Secretary of State was to visit Israel a week after arrest (and the US President the following month). The timing that seems much more consequential here is the delay from time of offences and the subsidiary relationship to Pollard matter.
	Response	NEUTRAL Israel refused to comment publicly.
	Pre-disposition of target	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>091-Attempted Israeli assassination in Jordan – Khaled Mashal 1997²³⁶</p> <p><i>Israel // Jordan</i></p>	Power Dynamic	LESS POWERFUL
	Relationship	NEUTRAL Noting that King Hussein had continued to maintain a working relationship with Israel to this point (and both countries signed a peace treaty in 1994). Although there were significant irritations in the relationship at the time of the operation. ²³⁹

²³⁴ See Lefebvre 2006 (in the context of those authorities protesting Israeli innocence during the Franklin/AIPAC affair, p. 608).

²³⁵ Sofer 2008; Schechter 2008; Johnson 2008; Weiser 2009; PERSEREC 2008; Trahair & Miller 2012 pp. 233-234

²³⁶ Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 329; Miller 1997; CNN 1997; Abu Hilalah 2013; *The Mainichi* 2017

²³⁹ Abu Hilalah 2013

<p>On 25 September 1995 a Mossad operational team attempted to poison Hamas's political bureau chief Khaled Mashal, while he was in Amman.</p> <p>Team members were arrested and after demands from Jordan's King Hussein²³⁷ (including via President Clinton's intervention) the Israeli Government agreed to provide an antidote. In addition – a series of Hamas leaders were released (including Sheikh Ahmed Yassin) despite Israeli protestations that there was no <i>quid pro quo</i> involved.</p> <p>Bilateral relations with Jordan were severely damaged.²³⁸</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL</p>	Publicity	VERY PUBLIC
	Nature of Activity	MORE EGREGIOUS Involved a public assassination attempt.
	Timing	NOT NOTABLE
	Response	DENIAL then APOLOGY Initially Israel refused to officially acknowledge this was a Mossad operation. Although it was Prime Minister Netanyahu who contacted King Hussein to explain 'we have a problem'. ²⁴⁰ Followed by implicit Israeli admission of responsibility and provision of antidote in order to secure release of Mossad officers.
	Pre-disposition of target	NEUTRAL
<p>092-Mossad fraudulent procurement of New Zealand passports for intelligence purposes 2004²⁴¹²⁴²</p> <p><i>Israel // New Zealand</i></p> <p>In March 2004 Israelis Uriel Kelman and Eli Cara were arrested by NZ Police while trying to fraudulently procure NZ passports in the name of a disabled person. Kelman and Cara, believed to be Mossad officers, were imprisoned for three months and then deported to Israel.</p> <p>NZ Prime Minister Helen Clark sharply criticised the Israeli Government in public, claiming that Mossad's actions were breaches of international law. She subsequently cancelled a planned visit to NZ by the Israeli President. NZ also suspended certain aspects of its diplomatic relationship with Israel, and imposed new visa requirements on Israeli officials.</p>	Power Dynamic	LESS POWERFUL
	Relationship	NEUTRAL
	Publicity	PUBLIC
	Nature of Activity	NEUTRAL Given the identify fraud was carried out against a profoundly disabled person – there was a scandalised reaction in NZ.
	Timing	NOT NOTABLE
	Response	NEUTRAL* Israeli authorities consistently denied that Kelman and Cara were other than private individuals (Kelman and Cara also denied any intelligence links). However this did not stop the Israeli Foreign Minister from issuing a letter of apology to the NZ Government in June 2005, apologising for the behaviour of its citizens as private individuals. Israel also committed itself to preventing recurrences of such behaviour. Immediately after the talks in Turkey an Israeli Government statement appeared to acknowledge Mossad involvement before being retracted on the basis that the acknowledgement was a typographical error. ²⁴³
	Pre-disposition of target	MORE SENSITIVE

²³⁷ Hussein threatened to withdraw the Jordanian Ambassador (CNN 1997) and to repudiate the 1994 treaty (Abu Hilalah 2013). "I personally can't figure out what the Israeli prime minister is thinking of, and this worries me a lot." – King Hussein quoted in CNN 1997.

²³⁸ As a sidenote the operation also cruelled Israeli-Canadian relations given the use of false Canadian passports by the assassins. The Canadian Ambassador was withdrawn. (CNN 1997)

²⁴⁰ CNN 1997

²⁴¹ *New Zealand Herald* 2004 and 2005; Young 2005; Fickling 2004; Melman 2005; Dodd & Maley 2010; Myre 2005

²⁴² We have not included the possible 2011 reprise of this activity owing to New Zealand Government public denials of espionage being conducted. By way of background, in the aftermath of the devastating 22 February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch allegations were raised in the NZ media that an Israeli national killed in the earthquake (and the other Israeli nationals accompanying him) were engaged in intelligence activities (speculation linked this to passport procurement including suggestions of an attempt to access police data holdings). Other allegations were raised concerning the conduct of Israelis, including an 'unauthorised' search and rescue team deployed to the city. Prime Minister John Key formally confirmed that investigations had been undertaken by NZ security agencies but that there was no evidence of Israeli espionage. See Stuff 2011, Manhire 2011, Moran & Burr 2011, and McLean 2011.

²⁴³ Myre 2005

<p>Diplomatic relations were restored in August 2005, followed by bilateral 'reconciliation' talks in Turkey in October 2005</p> <p>As of 2011 this incident was continuing to influence the Israel-NZ relationship (see below regarding Dubai and Christchurch).</p> <p>In February 2010, in the wake of the assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh (see below) former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer recalled publicly that the Australian Government had also complained to Israel about the activities of Cara, who was based in Sydney.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL</p>		
<p>093-Assassination of senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, 2010²⁴⁴</p> <p><i>Israel // UAE (and Australia, UK, Ireland, France, Germany)</i></p> <p>On 19 January 2010 a senior Hamas official, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, was assassinated by Mossad while visiting Dubai. The assassins were later identified and it was revealed that they had been operating using the true-name identities of a number of (apparently unwitting) foreign nationals, as well as other forged passports – including from the UK, Australia, Ireland, France and Germany.</p> <p>Amidst the widespread international condemnation, several affected nations took specific actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Australia expelled the Mossad liaison officer in Canberra. Australia also abstained from a UN vote on Gaza upon which it would normally have 	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>UAE, Ireland: LESS POWERFUL Australia: AS POWERFUL UK, France, Germany: MORE POWERFUL</p>
	<p><i>Relationship</i></p>	<p>UAE: COMPLICATED Ireland, France, Germany: NEUTRAL UK, Australia: FRIENDLY</p>
	<p><i>Publicity</i></p>	<p>VERY PUBLIC Major global news story for several weeks</p>
	<p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p>	<p>MORE EGREGIOUS Both conduct of assassination and use of foreign passports.</p>
	<p><i>Timing</i></p>	<p>NOT NOTABLE</p>
	<p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>DENIAL followed by UNREPENTANT Israel's foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman stated there was no proof of Israeli responsibility, noting Israel's "policy of ambiguity" on intelligence matters.²⁴⁵ Opposition Leader Tivni Lipni went further, demanding to know why there was not international support and mocking the uproar about the use of foreign passports: "What was disproportionate this time?" she asked. "Was there a disproportionate use of passports?"²⁴⁶ In 2019 Mossad chief Yossi Cohen acknowledged Mossad's role in the assassination saying that the agency had learned from its experience and the mistakes made in Dubai.²⁴⁷</p>
	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>UAE, Ireland, Germany: MORE SENSITIVE UK, France, Australia: LESS SENSITIVE</p>

²⁴⁴ Sanger 2018 p. 27; Dodd & Maley 2010; BBC 2010; Bowen 2010; News Limited 2010; Fitzgerald 2010; Shabak 2018; Borger 2010; Hoffman 2010; Pearlman & Koutsoukis 2010; *The Australian* 2010; Frister 2010; Reuters 2010-B

²⁴⁵ Quoted in Borger 2010

²⁴⁶ Quoted in Hoffman 2010

²⁴⁷ See Bob 2019

<p>supported Israel (while denying publicly a connection with the assassination).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UK expelled the Mossad Head of Station in London. • Ireland agreed to expel an Israeli diplomat in retaliation. • France (also angered over the apparent use of Paris as a planning location for the operation) allegedly suspended intelligence exchanges with Israel. <p>The UAE's response was ultimately minimal, despite initial commentary about indicting Israeli officials and politicians for their roles in the assassination.</p> <p>In a postscript an Israeli national was arrested in Poland and extradited to Germany in relation to procurement of a German passport used in the assassination. He was subsequently released back to Israel.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT</p>		
<p>094-Assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, 2010-13²⁴⁸</p> <p><i>Israel // Iran</i></p> <p>Between 2010 and 2013 at least five scientists associated with the Iranian nuclear program were assassinated. Speculation strongly linked the assassinations to Israeli intelligence.²⁴⁹ On two occasions support networks alleged to be aiding these assassinations were disrupted, according to the public claims of Iranian authorities, and confessions made by Iranians acting on behalf of Mossad. Iran publicly blamed Israel for the attacks. (After the first wave of assassinations President Ahmadinejad quickly condemned "western governments and the Zionist</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	<p>UNREPENTANT</p> <p>Although Israel officially denied responsibility for the assassinations, there were gleeful comments from Israeli officials.</p> <p>After an assassination in January 2012 an anonymous Israeli official was quoted: ""Yeah, one more," a senior Israeli official said with a smile. "I don't feel sad for him.""²⁵⁴</p> <p>An IDF spokesman posted on Facebook: "I have no idea who targeted the Iranian scientist but I certainly don't shed a tear."²⁵⁵</p> <p>In 2015 the Israeli Defence Minister, asked about potential future assassinations, stated "We should be ready to defend ourselves. I'm not responsible for the lives of Iranian scientists."²⁵⁶</p>

²⁴⁸ Borger & Dehghan 2010; Vick & Klein 2012; Levs 2012; Hasan 2012; Vick 2013; Cockburn 2013; Buchanan 2015; Raviv 2015. Meikle 2012 has a timeline of assassinations (and acts of sabotage targeting Iranian nuclear program) to January 2012.

²⁴⁹ An earlier death, in 2007, has also been linked to the assassinations program – see Borger & Dehghan 2010 and Vick 2013.

²⁵⁴ Quoted in Vick & Klein 2012

²⁵⁵ Quoted in Levs 2012

²⁵⁶ Quoted in Buchanan 2015

<p>regime” as being responsible.²⁵⁰ In addition Western media outlets attributed Israeli responsibility, based on background briefing, as early as late 2010.²⁵¹</p> <p>Reporting has suggested that the assassinations program ceased at least in part due to pressure from the US on Israel.²⁵²</p> <p>Attempted attacks on Israeli interests by Iranian security agencies and their proxies have been linked to a reaction to the assassinations but almost all were unsuccessful due to a degradation in the external operations capabilities of Iranian intelligence.²⁵³</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: TRANSCENDS OUR SYSTEM – could be NEGLIGIBLE or even CATASTROPHIC, and all points in between. Basis for omission from aggregate analysis.</p>	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>MORE SENSITIVE</p>
<p>095-Israeli theft of Iranian nuclear archive, 2018²⁵⁷</p> <p><i>Israel // Iran</i></p> <p>In April 2018 Prime Minister Netanyahu announced publicly that Mossad had successfully stolen Iran’s nuclear archives from a warehouse on Teheran’s outskirts, and that Israel would make the contents of the archive available to prove Iranian malfeasance. US President Trump subsequently cited evidence produced from the haul in deciding to withdraw the US from the JCPOA. (Netanyahu later claimed that he had briefed Trump on the operation -carried out on the night of 31 January - shortly beforehand.)</p> <p>Iran publicly claimed that the archives were a fabrication by the Israelis. (nb Iran was immediately aware of the theft but did not comment until after the Israeli announcement.)</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>AS POWERFUL</p> <p>ADVERSE</p> <p>VERY PUBLIC</p> <p>MORE EGREGIOUS Audacious and deeply embarrassing for the Iranian regime.</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNREPENTANT Israel publicly announced that it had undertaken the operation and presented the outcomes to the international media.</p> <p>MORE SENSITIVE</p>

²⁵⁰ Quoted in Borger & Dehghan 2010

²⁵¹ See Borger & Dehghan 2010

²⁵² Raviv 2015

²⁵³ See Vick 2013.

²⁵⁷ Sanger & Bergmen 2018; Reuters 2019-A; Bob 2019; Levinson 2019

CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR		
096-Israeli Prime Minister publicly claims Israel runs spies in Iran, December 2018²⁵⁸ <i>Israel // Iran</i> In December 2018 Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was reported as having told foreign diplomats that Israeli was actively combatting the Iranian nuclear program by covert means, including the conduct of espionage inside Iran. This of course followed Israeli's publicization in April 2018 of an intelligence coup in obtaining the program's archives. Iran responded by claiming Netanyahu was lying about Israeli espionage inside Iran, and was attempting to show strength in the face of the embarrassing arrest of former Israeli Minister Segev for spying for Iran (see above). CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In context of Iranian nuclear archives case.
	<i>Response</i>	UNREPENTANT The claim was in fact made by the Israeli Prime Minister himself!
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

Japan

097-Wang Qingqian 2007²⁵⁹ <i>Japan // China</i> In (northern) autumn 2007 China Association for International Friendly Contacts (a cover organisation for 2PLA) senior official Wang Qingqian was sentenced to death for spying for Japan (suspended for life imprisonment). This followed his arrest at the beginning of the year. Wang was allegedly recruited by the Japanese while posted to the Tokyo Embassy in the 1990s. No specific action by China identified.	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL In 2007
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

²⁵⁸ Winer 2018

²⁵⁹ Foligut 2019 pp. 247-248; Chan 2007; *Japan Times* 2007

CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		
098-Four Japanese arrested in China 2015²⁶⁰ <i>Japan // China</i> Four Japanese arrested for spying. Japanese media sources intimate that these were likely expatriates tacitly tasked by Justice Ministry's Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) but not formally intelligence operatives. Chinese media coverage was heavily critical of Japan, claiming that the activities could be precursors to future Japanese military targeting. Chinese Government notes that it has engaged Japan about the matter (nfd). CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Came at a time of some thawing in bilateral relations. ²⁶¹
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL The Japanese Government denied any knowledge of espionage by those detained: "Our country is not engaged in such activity." ²⁶²
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
099-Japanese held by Chinese for spying 2017²⁶³ <i>Japan // China</i> In June 2017 twelve Japanese detained by the Chinese on espionage charges. Four were later released when their Chinese firm confirmed they had been employed to conduct a geological survey. Soon after, an additional Japanese national was arrested in Dalian – also on espionage charges. No specific action by China identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL

²⁶⁰ Samuels 2019 p. 219; BBC 2015-A; *South China Morning Post* 2015

²⁶¹ BBC 2015-A

²⁶² BBC 2015-A

²⁶³ Samuels 2019 p. 220

100-Takahiro Iwase²⁶⁴ <i>Japan // China</i> In July 2018 Iwase was sentenced to 12 years' hard labour for espionage, after being detained in May 2015 near a military facility in the Zhejiang province. The Chinese Foreign Ministry downplayed the effect on relations: "The unbiased and just handling of relevant cases will not affect the relations between our two countries." ²⁶⁵ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL At time of his conviction Japan denied Iwase was a spy but its response was particularly modulated to avoid antagonising China. ²⁶⁶
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

Jordan

101-Albert Sombolay 1991²⁶⁷ <i>Jordan // USA</i> US soldier passed classified military information to Jordan during Op DESERT SHIELD, as well as samples of US CBRN equipment. (He also tried unsuccessfully to pass information to Iraq.) Arrested by US authorities in March 1991. No specific US action against Jordan identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL In specific context of Ops DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM .
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE In context of US seeking to manage relationship per above.
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

Netherlands

102-Penetration and exposure of 'Cozy Bear' hacking network 2018²⁶⁸	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED Especially post-shooting down of MH17 in 2014.

²⁶⁴ Samuels 2019 p. 220; Yamaguchi 2018; Zheng 2019

²⁶⁵ Quoted in Yamaguchi 2018

²⁶⁶ Yamaguchi 2018

²⁶⁷ PERSEREC 2008; Associated Press 1991

²⁶⁸ Sanger 2018 p. 190; CBS News 2018; Noack 2018; Hogeveen 2018

<p><i>Netherlands // Russia</i></p> <p>In 2018 Dutch media reported that the Dutch AIVD had successfully counter-hacked the Moscow-based 'Cozy Bear' group in 2014-15, including identification of individual hackers. This information was then shared with the NSA and FBI.</p> <p>A Russian Presidential spokesman decried the Dutch actions: "If Dutch newspapers want to add fuel to the fire of anti-Russian hysteria that exists in America, this is not the most noble occupation."²⁶⁹</p> <p>There was some impact on the relationship between Dutch and US intelligence as a result of the various disclosures concerning the operation.²⁷⁰</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Dutch officials refused to comment on the particulars of the case: "[We are] very happy that we have good security services in the Netherlands that do their work well. I can't say anything about this case that has been published." ²⁷¹
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

North Korea

<p>103-Yokosuka incident 1988²⁷²</p> <p><i>North Korea // Japan</i></p> <p>Five Japanese women, who had been recruited by North Korean intelligence when living in Europe, were sent to Japan to collect intelligence on Sea of Japan coastal conditions and on the Japanese military. Once detected the women were ordered to surrender their Japanese passports.</p> <p>No specific Japanese action against North Korea identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL

²⁶⁹ Quoted in CBS News 2018

²⁷⁰ Hogeveen 2018

²⁷¹ Quoted in CBS News 2018

²⁷² Samuels 2019 p. 133

104-Mihama incident 1990²⁷³ <i>North Korea // Japan</i> In 1990 a North Korean vessel washed ashore in Fukui Prefecture. On board were the corpses of two North Koreans and a variety of intelligence equipment. No specific Japanese action against North Korea identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL The North Korean Government denied any responsibility and claimed the dead men were smugglers.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
105-North Korea admits kidnapping Japanese citizens in 1970s, 2002²⁷⁴ During PM Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in 2002 Kim Jong-il admitted that North Korea had abducted thirteen Japanese youths in the 1970s (in order to use them for intelligence purposes such as language and culture training). (This activity had been the subject of hitherto unconfirmed leaks from North Korea since the early 1980s.) At least until 2002 Japanese authorities had consciously ignored evidence of the North Korean kidnappings, including to avoid jeopardising 'normalisation' talks with Pyongyang. Ironically the North Korean admission, intended to thaw relations, served only to reinvigorate Japanese suspicions of North Korea, and saw Japanese efforts to further isolate North Korea in international fora and in economic policy over the following 12 years (easing in 2014 after renewed talks on resolving outstanding abductee issues). ²⁷⁵ This included a significant impact on US-North Korean relations. ²⁷⁶ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL (albeit delayed for three decades)	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL followed by APOLOGY (of sorts) For decades Pyongyang vehemently denied any involvement in the disappearances. While the 2002 admission by the North Korean Government was a first, it still sought to cast the perpetrators as 'freelancers' in North Korean intelligence.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

²⁷³ Samuels 2019 p. 133. See also the Japanese National Police Agency's undated paper on North Korean espionage operations in Japan.

²⁷⁴ Samuels 2019 pp. 155-159; *Washington Post* 2006; Kajimoto 2004; Wakatsuki & Mullen 2014. For a fuller account of the abductee issue see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's 2012 report.

²⁷⁵ For example see Kajimoto 2004; Wakatsuki & Mullen 2014

²⁷⁶ For example see *Washington Post* 2006

106-John Joungwoong Yai 2003²⁷⁷ <i>North Korea // USA</i> Arrested in February 2003, Yai was accused of operating in the US at the direction of North Korean intelligence between 1997 and 2000 (although it is unclear that he was ever able to access classified information). Yai did try to recruit agents in the US and was in direct clandestine contact overseas with North Korean intelligence officers. Convicted of being an unregistered foreign agent, he was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment in 2004. No specific US actions against North Korea identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
107-Sony Pictures hack 2014²⁷⁸ <i>North Korea // USA</i> On 25 November 2014 a hacker group known as ‘The Guardians of the Peace’ began leaking confidential information from the Sony Pictures corporation, apparently in retaliation for a movie satirising North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un. The leaks and associated damage to Sony’s systems caused significant economic costs for the company. On 19 December 2014 President Obama publicly attributed the cyber-attack to North Korea (a relatively rare action in itself) and vowed that the US would respond proportionately. In January 2015 the US announced some additional (to the considerable sanctions already levied) ‘weak’ economic sanctions against Pyongyang. ²⁷⁹ On 6 September 2018 a North Korean national, Park Jin-hyok, was formally charged by	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS At least to US Government.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL At the time of the original leaks North Korea disavowed any involvement but nevertheless described the attack on Sony as potentially being carried out by “righteous deed of supporters and sympathizers”. ²⁸¹ North Korea furiously denounced the US sanctions imposed in January 2015, describing them as an attempt to “groundlessly” stir up hostilities against that country. ²⁸²
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

²⁷⁷ PERSEREC 2008; CNN 2003; Anderson 2003; Sterngold 2003

²⁷⁸ Sanger 2018 pp. 144, 150; Reuters 2019-B; Sanger & Benner 2018; Sanger & Perlroth 2014

²⁷⁹ But in fact “North Korea paid little price for attacking Sony or robbing central banks.” (Sanger 2018 p. xix) See also Sanger 2018 p. 286.

²⁸¹ Quoted in Sanger & Perlroth 2014

²⁸² Quoted in Siddique 2015

<p>the US Justice Department in relation to the cyber-attack. US authorities have previously noted their intention to use such indictments specifically as a deterrent to cyber-attacks of this kind by state actors.</p> <p>Some commentators have implicitly linked several internet outages in Pyongyang in the aftermath of US attribution to possible US covert response.²⁸⁰</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT</p>		
<p>108-‘WannaCry’ cyber attack 2017²⁸³</p> <p><i>North Korea // UK (and others)</i></p> <p>In May 2017 a worldwide ransomware attack was carried out using the ‘WannaCry’ cryptoworm, based on an exploit originally stolen from the US National Security Agency by the ‘Shadowbrokers’ group. This attack infected more than 200,000 computers in over 150 countries (with particular impact in the UK where it caused significant damage within the National Health Service).</p> <p>The US, UK and Australia all publicly attributed the attack to North Korea. (The US also cited support for its conclusion by Japan, New Zealand and Canada.) Homeland Security Adviser Tom Bossert intimated that the US might act covertly in retaliation: “When we must, the US will act alone to impose costs and consequences for cyber malfeasance.”²⁸⁴</p> <p>In September 2018 a North Korean national was indicted by US authorities for the Sony Pictures Hack (see above) and their group ‘the Lazarus Group’ aka ‘Guardians of Peace’ (a subordinate element of North Korea’s</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	<p>DENIAL</p> <p>North Korea denied any responsibility for the attack. It’s deputy representative to the UN called the claims ridiculous, stating “Whenever something strange happens, it is the stereotype way of the United States and the hostile forces that kick off noisy anti-DPRK campaign deliberately linking with DPRK”.²⁸⁵</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

²⁸⁰ See, for example, Siddique 2015.

²⁸³ CBS News 2017; Sanger 2017; Nichols 2017; Bossert 2017; Uchill 2017; Reuters 2019-B

²⁸⁴ Bossert 2017

²⁸⁵ Quoted in Nichols 2017

<p>Reconnaissance General Bureau -RGB) was also linked to the Wannacry attack.²⁸⁵</p> <p>In September 2019, in response to the WannaCry attack (and earlier Sony Pictures attack, as well as other cybercrimes committed globally) the US sanctioned three North Korean groups – Lazarus, Bluenoroff and Andariel (all linked to the RGB). The sanctions ceased any US asset holdings by the groups and prohibited economic transactions with them – but it remains unclear the extent to which the sanctions were material in the circumstances.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT</p>		
<p>109-French civil servant arrested for spying for North Korea 2018²⁸⁷</p> <p><i>North Korea // France</i></p> <p>Noted supporter of North Korea, and official in the French Parliament, Benoit Quennedey was arrested in November 2018 on charges of treason and espionage on behalf of Pyongyang.</p> <p>No specific French actions against North Korea identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN</p> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

Norway

<p>110-Norwegian former border guard jailed for spying in Russia 2019²⁸⁸</p> <p>Frode Berg was arrested in 2017 and charged with espionage directed at Russia's submarine program. Berg was accused of receiving documents from a former</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN</p>
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²⁸⁵ Sanger (2018) quotes US Homeland Security Adviser Thomas Bossert on the limited action taken by the US in response to WannaCry: "President Trump has used just about every lever you can use, short of starving the people of North Korea to death, to change their behaviour." (p. 136)

²⁸⁷ AFP 2018-B; France 24 2018

²⁸⁸ Bennetts 2019; Deutsche Welle 2019; Olsen 2019; Tass 2019

<p>Russian policeman, Aleksey Zhitnyuk. Berg apparently admitted to being a courier for Norwegian intelligence but claimed to be unaware he was receiving classified documents. Berg was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and Zhitnyuk to 13 years. Possible link to Bochkarev case (see below)</p> <p>Ber was returned to Norway after being included in a November 2019 spy swap between Lithuania and Russia.</p> <p>No specific Russian action against Norway identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p>
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Pakistan

<p>111-Madhuri Gupta²⁸⁹</p> <p><i>Pakistan // India</i></p> <p>In April 2010 Gupta, an Indian diplomat posted to Islamabad, was recalled to New Delhi and arrested for spying on behalf of Pakistan. A prolonged trial (2012-2018) ended with Gupta being sentenced to three years imprisonment.</p> <p>No specific Indian action against Pakistan identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	<p>DENIAL</p> <p>Pakistan denied the allegations, and suggested that India was using the charges against Gupta to cover for its unwillingness to enter post-Mumbai negotiations with Islamabad.²⁹⁰</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>112-Arrest of ISI agent ‘Kalam’ in India, November 2015²⁹¹</p> <p><i>Pakistan // India</i></p> <p>Mohd Kalam, alleged to be an ISI agent, was arrested in Uttar Pradesh in November 2015 for spying on Indian military installations since 2013. Kalam’s entry into India</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

²⁸⁹ Chakrabarti 2010; Kumar 2018; *India Today* 2018; *Business Standard* 2018

²⁹⁰ Chakrabarti 2010

²⁹¹ Gupta 2015

<p>was allegedly facilitated by the Pakistani High Commission in Bangladesh.</p> <p>No specific Indian action against Pakistan identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
<p>113-Mehmood Akhtar 2016²⁹²</p> <p><i>Pakistan // India</i></p> <p>In October 2016 Akhtar, a Pakistani diplomat posted to New Delhi (and alleged ISI officer), was detained and then expelled for running a spy ring. Two Indian ‘accomplices’ were also detained.</p> <p>Pakistan retaliated by expelling an Indian diplomat from Islamabad.²⁹³</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL Pakistan denied the allegations as “false and unsubstantiated”. ²⁹⁴
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>114-Operation DOLPHIN’S NOSE, 2020²⁹⁵</p> <p><i>Pakistan // India</i></p> <p>Thirteen Indian Navy sailors were arrested in February 2020 (Indian Navy security’s Op DOLPHIN NOSE) for alleged membership in a Pakistani spy ring.</p> <p>No specific Indian action against Pakistan identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

Philippines

115-Michael H Allen 1986 ²⁹⁶	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
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²⁹² *Times of India* 2016; Barry 2016

²⁹³ Barry 2016

²⁹⁴ *Times of India* 2016

²⁹⁵ Srinivas 2020

²⁹⁶ Minnick 1992, p. 6; Polmar & Allen 2004 pp. 19-20; Associated Press 1986; Evje 1987

<p><i>Philippines // USA</i></p> <p>Former USN sailor and civilian employee at USN aviation station in Philippines. Arrested December 1986 for selling classified intelligence documents (principally information on insurgent forces prepared by US Naval Intelligence Service) to Philippines military. Sentenced to 8 years imprisonment.</p> <p>No specific US action against Philippines identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	Relationship	FRIENDLY
	Publicity	PUBLIC
	Nature of Activity	NEUTRAL
	Timing	NOT NOTABLE
	Response	UNKNOWN
	Pre-disposition of target	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>116-Joseph Garfield Brown 1992²⁹⁷</p> <p><i>Philippines // USA</i></p> <p>Former US airman arrested in December 1992 for spying for the Philippines (having obtained classified information from CIA Manila Station officer Virginia Baynes during 1991-92). The information primarily related to insurgent activities in Philippines.</p> <p>No specific US action against Philippines identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	Power Dynamic	MORE POWERFUL
	Relationship	FRIENDLY
	Publicity	LIMITED
	Nature of Activity	NEUTRAL
	Timing	NOT NOTABLE
	Response	UNKNOWN
<p>117-Leandro Aragoncillo 2005²⁹⁸</p> <p><i>Philippines // USA</i></p> <p>Aragoncillo spied for the Philippines, first while working at the White House and later as a FBI analyst. Following an encounter with then President Estrada at the White House in 2000, Aragoncillo, a naturalized US citizen of Filipino origin, was approached by an associate of Estrada seeking US intelligence material that could assist the Estrada Administration. Aragoncillo's contact in the US</p>	Power Dynamic	MORE POWERFUL
	Relationship	FRIENDLY
	Publicity	PUBLIC Wider coverage in Philippines (given political dimensions there) than in US.
	Nature of Activity	NEUTRAL Given links to White House and related embarrassment.
	Timing	NOT NOTABLE
	Response	NEUTRAL Former President Estrada acknowledged publicly that Aragoncillo had passed him documents at a personal meeting. Estrada also said that he was not aware of any illegal activity by Aragoncillo. ²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ PERSEREC 2008; O'Harrow 1992

²⁹⁸ PERSEREC 2008; Clark 2015; Ross & Esposito 2005; Meyer & Paddock 2005; Honan 2007

²⁹⁹ Meyer & Paddock 2005

<p>was Michael Aquino, a former senior Philippines National Police officer resident in New York. Aragoncillo provided classified information that would aid opposition politicians in Manila (following Estrada's removal from office and replacement by his Vice President, Gloria Arroyo). Aragoncillo was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in 2007, later reduced to 36-46 months (while Aquino was sentenced to over 6 years).</p> <p>No specific US action against Philippines identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
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Russia (not directed at USA)

<p>118-Yokota Airbase spy ring 1987³⁰⁰</p> <p><i>Soviet Union // Japan (and USA)</i></p> <p>Soviet diplomat Yuri Efimov was arrested in 1987, along with four Japanese sources who confessed to spying for the Soviets in a ring operating since 1979. These sources were later sentenced to terms of between 1.5 and 2.5 years imprisonment. The principal source worked as a librarian at the US Yokota Airbase. (Members of the ring are also said to have sold secrets to China.)</p> <p>Efimov was expelled from Japan.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>119-Pokrovsky incident 1987³⁰¹</p> <p><i>Soviet Union // Japan</i></p> <p>Soviet diplomat Y G Pokrovsky received information on Japanese aerospace technology after cultivating a Japanese business executive.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL The Soviets retaliated by expelling two Japanese business executives.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

³⁰⁰ Minnick 1992 p. 61; Samuels 2019 p. 132

³⁰¹ Samuels 2019 p. 132

<p>Pokrovsky and colleagues refused police interviews and departed Japan under diplomatic immunity but with the insistence of Japanese authorities.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		
<p>120-Preobrazhensky incident 1987³⁰²</p> <p><i>Soviet Union // Japan</i></p> <p>TASS correspondent (and suspected KGB officer) who cultivated Chinese student resident in Japan for information on China. He was arrested by Japanese authorities in 1985 and deported to Moscow.</p> <p>Ironically Preobrazhensky would later flee post-Soviet Russia and seek political asylum in the US in 2006.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>LIMITED</p> <p>LESS EGREGIOUS</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN</p> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>
<p>121-Arrest of Shabtai Kalmanovitch, 1987³⁰³</p> <p><i>Russia // Israel</i></p> <p>In November 2009 businessman Kalmanovitch was gunned down in Moscow. After emigrating to Israel from the Soviet Union in 1971 he became a prominent Russian-Israeli business figure. Kalmanovitch was then arrested in 1987 and in the following year was convicted of espionage on behalf of the KGB. He was imprisoned for nine years and served five (after lobbying by the Russian Government) before leaving Israel for Africa and then returning to reside in Russia.</p> <p>No specific Israeli action against Soviet Union identified. In fact in 1993 Israel pardoned Kalmanovitch in an apparent attempt to improve relations with Moscow (and secure release of Russian Jews).³⁰⁴</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>NEUTRAL The Russian Government actively lobbied for Kalmanovitch's early release from imprisonment in Israel.</p> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

³⁰² Samuels 2019 p. 132

³⁰³ BBC 2009; Harding 2009; Meisels 1988; Struck 1992; Associated Press 1993; Shpiro 2015

³⁰⁴ Associated Press 1993

CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		
122-Arrest of Shimon Levinson, 1991³⁰⁵ <i>Russia // Israel</i> A senior Israeli intelligence official, Levinson was convicted in 1991 for spying on behalf of the KGB from 1983. Sentenced to 12 years imprisonment he was released after seven, before leaving Israel to live in Thailand. No specific Israeli action against Soviet Union/Russia identified. In 2009 the Shin Bet took the unusual step of publishing an account of the Levinson case. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL Levinson was a former senior official in Mossad and Shin Bet, with access to highly classified information, he was also chief of security in the Prime Minister's office (and embarrassingly had been recommended for the position by luminaries including former PM Shimon Peres).
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
123-Litvinenko poisoning 2006³⁰⁶ <i>Russia // UK</i> In November 2006 Alexander Litvinenko, former FSB officer who had fled to UK in 2000, was poisoned with polonium 210 while meeting Russian associates in London. Litvinenko died on 22 November 2006. A UK inquiry headed by Sir Robert Owen (2014-16) concluded that the Russian associates were responsible, and were probably acting on behalf of the Russian state. The principal suspect is former Russian intelligence officer Andrey Lugovoy (aka Andrei Lugovoi) whom Russia has refused to extradite to the UK. In July 2007 the UK expelled four Russian diplomats (believed to be intelligence officers) as a sanction for Russia refusing to extradite Lugovoi. Russia retaliated by expelling four British diplomats. The UK Government also undertook to review its relationship with Russia, albeit	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL Sources associated with the Russian Government have endeavoured to claim that British authorities were actually responsible for Litvinenko's poisoning. The spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry remarking in July 2007: "Moreover, in London they should clearly realise that such provocative actions masterminded by the British authorities will not be left without an answer and cannot but entail the most serious consequences for Russian-British relations". ³⁰⁸
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

³⁰⁵ Melman 2009; Shpiro 2015. For the Shinbet account see Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) (undated).

³⁰⁶ Trahair & Miller 2012 pp. 292-293; BBC 2007 [A, B & C]; Grierson 2015; Edwards 2007

³⁰⁸ Quoted in BBC 2007-B

with regrets. ³⁰⁷ The UK also suspended certain visa processes for Russian officials (a measure also mirrored by Moscow).		
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT		
124-Russian cyber attack on Estonia, 2007³⁰⁹ <i>Russia // Estonia</i> Beginning on 27 April 2007 Estonia was beset for three weeks by a large-scale cyber attack, principally through denial of service attacks on government and commercial websites. The Estonian Government immediately attributed the attack to Russia, noting that it appeared to be instigated following a bilateral dispute concerning a Soviet-era statue and some Soviet war graves in Tallinn. (In January 2018 a 20 year-old ethnic Russian Estonian was convicted of participating in the attacks.) NATO responded to the attacks by establishing the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre in Tallinn. In addition the attacks inspired the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL In May 2017 a Russian spokesman said the allegations were “completely untrue”. ³¹⁰ Russia’s Ambassador in Brussels denied any Russian involvement: “If you are implying [the attacks] came from Russia or the Russian government, it's a serious allegation that has to be substantiated. Cyber-space is everywhere”. He added: “I don't support such behaviour, but one has to look at where they [the attacks] came from and why.” ³¹¹ Russian authorities refused to cooperate with Estonian investigations into the origins of the attack. In March 2009 a Russian Duma member proudly stated that one of his staff had orchestrated the attacks. That same month the leader of a pro-Kremlin youth group claimed responsibility.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
125-Estonian security chief convicted of being Russian spy 2008³¹² <i>Russia // Estonia</i> In December 2008 Herman Simm, head of the Estonian National Security Agency was accused of passing	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given Simm’s position within Estonia (and access to NATO secrets).
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL

³⁰⁷ Note comments by then Foreign Secretary David Milliband in BBC 2007-B.

³⁰⁹ Traynor 2007; *The Economist* 2010; BBC 2008-A; Radio Free Europe 2009; Bright 2007

³¹⁰ Quoted in BBC 2008

³¹¹ Quoted in Traynor 2007

³¹² Brunnstrom 2009; Schmid & Ulrich 2010; *Baltic Times* 2019

classified information to the SVR. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 ½ years imprisonment, being released on probation in December 2019. NATO expelled two Russian diplomats (including the son of the Russian Ambassador to the EU) in what was seen by observers as a sanction for the recruitment of Simm. ³¹³ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR		Russian authorities declined to comment when Simm was arrested – and when the two Russian diplomats at NATO were expelled.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
126-Canadian naval officer Jeffrey Delisle arrested for spying for Russia, 2012³¹⁴ <i>Russia // Canada</i> Delisle was a walk-in recruited by the GRU and run as a spy within the Royal Canadian Navy (including access to FVEY intelligence systems) from 2007 until his arrest in 2012. He was subsequently sentenced to over 18 years imprisonment before being paroled in 2019. No specific action by Canada against Russia identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Delisle had access to a wide variety of classified information, up to and including Privy Council documents. Post-mortem damage assessments were reported in Canadian media as being “apocalyptic”. Of particularly significant concern to the Canadians was the betrayal of allied (including US) secrets by Delisle. ³¹⁵
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
127-Revelation of historical KGB cases inside Israel³¹⁶ <i>Russia // Israel</i> In October 2016 Israeli media published details of historical KGB espionage inside Israel, revealed as part of the Mitrokhin Archive. This included the identification of prominent Israelis as KGB assets, including a deceased Knesset member, as well as an unnamed former IDF General apparently identified in 1993 on the basis of the Mitrokhin Archive (as reported to the Israelis by British	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS Given the historical nature of the allegations. ³¹⁷
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

³¹³ Brunnstrom 2009

³¹⁴ Freeze & Taber 2012; Thomson 2018; Colley 2019. For a detailed chronology of the Delisle case up to sentencing, see CBC 2012

³¹⁵ See Freeze & Taber 2012 for extracted accounts from the damage assessments prepared by several Canadian agencies.

³¹⁶ Times of Israel 2016

³¹⁷ Arguably it simply added to an existing body of evidence concerning KGB historical activities in Israel. See especially Shpiro 2015.

<p>intelligence) but not prosecuted because of his health (and potential embarrassment to Israel).</p> <p>No specific action by Israel against Russia identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
<p>128-Skripal poisoning March 2018³¹⁸</p> <p><i>Russia // UK</i></p> <p>On 4 March 2018 former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter were found poisoned in Salisbury. After conviction of espionage offences in 2006 Skripal had gone to live in the UK in 2010 (following a US-Russia spy exchange) and this was an apparent revenge action by Russian intelligence. Nineteen other British persons suffered exposure to the toxin used by the wannabe assassins (the Skripals eventually recovered after prolonged comas but a separate resident of Salisbury died).</p> <p>In a multi-national effort led by Britain 342 Russian diplomats (and intelligence officers) were expelled from Europe, NATO, North America and Australia as specific punishment for the incident in Salisbury. (Russia retaliated by themselves expelling 189 foreign diplomats.) The UK also initiated a number of unilateral sanctions and boycotts targeting Russia:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Increasing checks on private flights, customs and freight • Freezing Russian state assets where there is evidence they may be used to threaten the life or property of UK nationals or residents • Ministers and the Royal Family boycotting the FIFA World Cup in Russia later this year • Suspending all planned high-level bilateral contacts between the UK and Russia 	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p>
	<p><i>Relationship</i></p>	<p>COMPLICATED</p>
	<p><i>Publicity</i></p>	<p>VERY PUBLIC Headline global news story.</p>
	<p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p>	<p>MORE EGREGIOUS Given this was an assassination attempt carried out in public at considerable risk to bystanders (one of whom died).</p>
	<p><i>Timing</i></p>	<p>NOT NOTABLE</p>
	<p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>DENIAL Russia did not admit to poisoning the Skripals – stating that the allegations made by the UK Government were ultimatums and “we do not speak the language of ultimatums”³²⁰ - but Russian TV and other official sources welcomed their fate as traitors. The Russian Embassy in London also tweeted: “The temperature of Russia-UK relations drops to minus 23, but we are not afraid of cold weather.”³²¹ At the United Nations the Russian Ambassador suggested the incident was a ‘false flag’ operation, potentially carried out by the UK Government itself. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov went further, stating publicly that: “Experts tell us that it may well be beneficial to the British special services, who are known for their ability to act with license to kill,” and that the Salisbury incident “could be beneficial to the British government, which has found itself in a difficult situation, unable to fulfil promises they made about Brexit.”³²² Similar counter-narratives were also widely published in Russian media.</p>
	<p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

³¹⁸ Hodge *et al* 2018; BBC 2018-A; Stewart, Walker & Borger 2018; Dearden 2018; Chugtai & Petkova 2018

³²⁰ Quoted in BBC 2018-A

³²¹ Quoted in Stewart, Walker & Borger 2018

³²² Quoted in Dearden 2018

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plans to consider new laws to increase defences against ‘hostile state activity’”.³¹⁹ <p>The US Government forced the closure of the Russian Consulate in Seattle.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL</p>		
<p>129-Russian hacking of OPCW 2018³²³</p> <p><i>Russia // Netherlands (and OPCW)</i></p> <p>In October 2018 Dutch intelligence publicly revealed Russian attempts to hack into the computer networks of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).</p> <p>The Dutch also revealed that in April they had detained and then expelled four suspected GRU officers travelling under diplomatic cover in the Netherlands and in possession of hacking equipment in the vicinity of the OPCW headquarters.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOTABLE</p> <p>In so far as Russia linked the Dutch revelations to the impending OPCW executive meeting to consider findings on the Skripal poisoning (see above).</p> <p>DENIAL</p> <p>Russia angrily denied any responsibility, claiming that the Dutch (in coordination with the US and UK) were engaged in a misinformation campaign. The Russians also claimed the four suspected GRU officers were in The Hague to test cyber-security arrangements at the Russian Embassy.³²⁴</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p>
<p>130-Retired senior Austrian military officer arrested for spying for Russians, 2018³²⁵</p> <p><i>Russia // Austria</i></p> <p>Unidentified Austrian Colonel was run as source by GRU from late 1990s (or alternatively 1988 according to RT), supplying intelligence (but not “high level classified data”), including on NATO. Arrested following tip-off from another (unidentified) EU country’s intelligence service.</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOTABLE</p> <p>Awkward period for bilateral relations given Austria’s more pro-Russia position in dealing with contemporary issues facing EU. (Austria refused to join in post-Skripal international sanctions, for example.) Austrian Foreign Minister (herself criticised widely for pro-Russian sympathies) was due to visit Moscow imminently – see left.</p> <p>DENIAL</p> <p>Russia angrily denied any responsibility, accusing Austria of treating it unfairly and launching “unsubstantiated allegations”. In fact Russia called in the Austrian Ambassador to criticise Austria’s</p>

³¹⁹ BBC 2018 [B]

³²³ Wintour & Roth 2018; Crerar, Henley & Wintour 2018; Sanders-Zakre 2018

³²⁴ Wintour & Roth 2018

³²⁵ New Europe 2018; RT 2018

<p>Some public criticism of Russia from otherwise Moscow-sympathetic government in Vienna. Austrian Foreign Minister cancelled planned visit to Moscow. Russians (via RT) implied that the scandal would undermine Austria's role as bridge between Russia and the West. Actual Austrian response was muted.³²⁶</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		behaviour! Russian proxies in Duma and academia alleged that affair was contrived or inflamed by Americans and other EU states.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
<p>131-Mikhail Bochkarev's detention and release, 2018³²⁷</p> <p><i>Russia // Norway</i></p> <p>In September 2018 Bochkarev, an employee of the Russian parliament, was detained while leaving Oslo after a conference at the Norwegian Parliament. Norwegian intelligence noted that Bochkarev was suspected of planting bugs while in the Parliament building.</p> <p>Bochkarev was released in October after a court found there was insufficient evidence to hold him. Possible link to subsequent Berger case (see above).</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL Russia denied Bochkarev was engaged in intelligence activity and publicly claimed that his detention was an attempt by Oslo to blackmail Russia into releasing Frode Berger (see above).
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
<p>132-Senior Belgian official arrested for spying for Russia 2019³²⁸</p> <p><i>Russia // Belgium</i></p> <p>In February 2019 the existence of an investigation into an unnamed senior officer of the General Intelligence & Security Service (GISS) was confirmed by the Belgian Government. The GISS officer was accused of passing classified information to a Serbian woman who was a Russian agent. (Reported at the same time was the</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

³²⁶ Quoting Chancellor Kurz in MEMRI 2018: "The issue of relations with Russia is regularly discussed throughout Europe, so Austria will not take any individual steps in this regard [expulsion of diplomats]. [...] We are a country which maintains good ties with Russia; we place our stakes on dialogue, and things will remain the same in the future... But if we suspect that the case is about espionage, we will always criticize that and protect ourselves from it, while working to independently beef up security to ensure that this will never happen again."

³²⁷ Bennetts 2019

³²⁸ Rankin 2019; Rettman 2019; *Moscow Times* 2019

<p>suspension of GISS's counter-intelligence chief, Clement Vandenborre.)</p> <p>No specific Belgian action against Russia identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
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Russia (directed at USA specifically)

<p>133-Aldrich Ames³²⁹</p> <p><i>Russia // USA</i></p> <p>Infamous CIA mole (and 'walk in') Ames spied for the Soviets (KGB) and then Russia (SVR) from 1985 until his arrest in 1994. Currently serving life sentence.</p> <p>The US expelled senior Russian intelligence officer Alexander Lysenko, linking him directly to the Ames case. In doing so they nonetheless sought to avoid harming the overall relationship with the Yeltsin government.³³⁰</p> <p>The Ames compromise played a part in Jim Woolsey's departure as CIA Director.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED As at 1994.
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given the consequences to the CIA and US intelligence more broadly (including deaths of Russian agents).
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL The Russians reacted to the Ames arrest and Lysenko's expulsion by claiming their innocence and expelling a US diplomat in response. ³³¹
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>134-Harold Nicholson³³²</p> <p><i>Russia // USA</i></p> <p>A senior CIA officer, Nicholson began spying for Russian intelligence (SVR) in June 1994 while posted to Malaysia. He provided classified information to the Russians for the following two years (most notably biographical information on fellow CIA officers). In 1997 Nicholson</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

³²⁹ PERSEREC 2008; Burns 2016; Associated Press 1996

³³⁰ Burns 2016

³³¹ Burns 2016; Associated Press 1996

³³² PERSEREC 2008; Olson 2019 pp. 149-157; Polmar & Allen 2004 pp. 453-454; Trahair & Miller 2012 pp. 335-336

<p>pleaded guilty to espionage and was sentenced to over 23 years imprisonment as part of a plea bargain.</p> <p>The Nicholson case, so soon after the Ames case, helped propel CIA Director John Deutch from office.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		
<p>135-Edwin ‘Earl’ Pitts 1996³³³</p> <p><i>Russia // USA</i></p> <p>A senior FBI officer, Pitts was arrested in December 1996 for spying for the Soviets (KGB) and then Russia (SVR) from 1987 until 1992. Pitts was a walk-in to the then Soviet mission at the UN and was later detected due to a FBI counter-espionage penetration and false-flag approach. Sentenced to 27 years imprisonment.</p> <p>No specific US action against Russia identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN</p> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>
<p>136-Daniel King 1999³³⁴</p> <p><i>Russia // USA</i></p> <p>US Navy Petty Officer King was arrested in 1999 for passing classified submarine information to Russia while serving at the NSA. Charges were later dropped, in part because of King’s mental state. And in fact King’s defence in turn filed military charges against prosecutors.</p> <p>No specific US action against Russia identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>MORE POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>LIMITED</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>UNKNOWN</p> <p>LESS SENSITIVE</p>

³³³ PERSEREC 2008; Olson 2019 pp. 127-132; Trahair & Miller 2012 pp. 422-423. Note: PERSEREC and Trahair & Miller state that the FBI source who revealed Pitts was his own SVR handler (Aleksandr Karpov). However Olson states that the FBI source was the Soviet diplomat at the UN to whom Pitts had first addressed his ‘walk-in’ letter in 1987 and it was this diplomat who the FBI presented as a ‘false flag’ to Pitts in August 1995.

³³⁴ Clark 2015

137-Robert Hanssen 2001³³⁵ <i>Russia // USA</i> Notorious FBI mole (and ‘walk-in’) Hanssen spied for the Soviets and later Russia for over 15 years. His espionage caused extraordinary damage to US counter-intelligence interests. Sentenced to life imprisonment in 2001. The US expelled 51 Russian diplomats in response to the Hanssen case (six of whom were specifically tied to the Hanssen case and immediately declared <i>persona non grata</i>). This was the largest expulsion of Russian diplomats by the US since 1986. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given damage done to US intelligence community.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Bilateral relations were problematic at the time because of perceived delays in new US President Bush meeting with President Putin and US agreement to meeting with an envoy from the rebel Chechen government.
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov claimed that there were no grounds for the US action in expelling Russian diplomats. Russia subsequently retaliated against the expulsion of their diplomats by expelling 50 American officials from Russia.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
138-GHOST STORIES 2010³³⁶ <i>Russia // USA</i> On 27 June 2010 the FBI arrested 10 suspected SVR non-official cover (aka NOC) operatives across the US. An eleventh eluded capture and managed to leave the US. This was the conclusion of a seven-year long investigation. (See also connections to Zaporozhsky, Vasilenko, Poteyev matters.) All 10 NOCs would subsequently be exchanged for US spies held by the Russians. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNREPENTANT On their return in October 2010 the SVR operatives were publicly feted by the Russian Government.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
139-‘Hack and release’ of private conversation by State Department official 2014³³⁷ <i>Russia // USA</i>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL

³³⁵ PERSEREC 2008; *The Guardian* 2001

³³⁶ Trahair & Miller 2012 pp. 459-461

³³⁷ Sanger 2018 pp. 177-182; Glasser 2018; Chiacu & Mohammed 2014; Pilkington & Harding 2014; Balmforth & Zinets 2014

<p>Amidst the Ukraine crisis of 2014 the Russians intercepted and then released publicly (an edited version of) a private conversation between Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to Kiev, including derogatory comments about the European Union.</p> <p>Although US Government statements blamed Russia for the release of the conversation there were no specific actions taken against Russia.³³⁸</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		The matter provided embarrassing for the Obama Administration, especially in its relations with EU states.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Occurred during Ukraine crisis and in the aftermath of damaged US-EU relations due to Snowden disclosures.
	<i>Response</i>	UNREPENTANT Russian Deputy Prime Minister mockingly tweeted: "Sort of controversial judgment from assistant secretary of state Victoria Nuland speaking about the EU." ³³⁹
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>140-Russian espionage in New York City 2015³⁴⁰</p> <p><i>Russia // USA</i></p> <p>In January 2015 Evgeny 'Zhenya' Buryakov, a Russian non-official cover officer (aka NOC), was arrested. This followed sloppy tradecraft (and apparent FBI bugging of SVR premises in NYC) on the part of his contacts Igor Sporyshev (Russian Trade Representative) and Victor Podobnyy (Russian mission to the UN).</p> <p>Buryakov pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment. He was deported to Russia in April 2017.</p> <p>No specific US action against Russia identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>141-Interference in US Presidential election 2016³⁴¹</p> <p><i>Russia // USA</i></p> <p>The US Government has accused Russia of attempted interference in the 2016 US Presidential election,</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS At heart of US politics. ³⁴⁵

³³⁸ Nuland herself notes her lack of success in lobbying the Obama Administration to react more forcefully to this incident and subsequent Russian activities (up to the 2016 election) (see Glasser 2018).

³³⁹ Pilkington & Harding 2014

³⁴⁰ Clark 2015; Reuters 2017; Kates 2017; Berman 2017

³⁴¹ Sanger 2018 pp. 233-235; Smith 2018; Reuters 2016; Osborn & Tsvetkova 2017; Cowan & Devitt 2016; Detrow 2016; Greenberg 2016; Higgins 2017

³⁴⁵ Detrow 2016 quotes President Obama: "There's a difference between [conduct of normal espionage] and the kind of malicious cyberattacks that steal trade secrets or engage in industrial espionage, something that we've seen the Chinese do. And there is a difference between that and activating intelligence in a way that's designed to influence elections."

<p>including through the ‘hack and release’ of information adverse to the Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton. US response was complicated by the transition in Presidential administrations after the 2016 election. In December 2016, prior to transition, 35 Russian diplomats (believed to have intelligence roles) were expelled from the US. Russian diplomatic facilities in San Francisco and, New York and Maryland were also closed down.³⁴² In addition sanctions were enacted against specific Russian individuals and organisations.³⁴³ President Obama also implied that the US would take forms of covert retaliation.³⁴⁴</p> <p>President Trump was reluctant to publicly attribute the apparent interference to Russia, nonetheless he did not withdraw the measures put in place by his predecessor.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL</p>	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Embroided in crisis of bilateral relations and internal crisis within US politics.
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL At the time of the original DNC hack, June 2016, a Kremlin spokesman stated: “I completely rule out a possibility that the (Russian) government or the government bodies have been involved in this”. ³⁴⁶ In December 2016 a Kremlin spokesman demanded that the US “finally produce some evidence” or otherwise cease accusing Russia. ³⁴⁷ On 1 June 2017 President Putin, while continuing to deny Russian Government involvement, compared hackers to free-spirited artists and intimated that “patriotically minded” Russian citizens might have been responsible. ³⁴⁸ In July 2017 Russia mused about retaliatory expulsions of US officials from Moscow and the closure of US diplomatic facilities in the city. ³⁴⁹ In March 2018 Putin told NBC news that “he couldn’t care less” about the allegations because those responsible were not connected to the Kremlin. He also suggested that US persons might have been responsible for orchestrating the interference using non-Russian nationals with Russian residency. ³⁵⁰
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

Saudi Arabia

<p>142-Michael Schwartz 1995³⁵¹</p> <p><i>Saudi Arabia // USA</i></p> <p>US naval officer charged with illegally providing classified military information to the Saudi Navy between 1992 and 1994. Schwartz entered plea agreement that avoided court martial or imprisonment but saw him discharged from USN.</p> <p>No specific US action against Saudi Arabia identified.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

³⁴² Yet Sanger quotes former NSA Director Mike Rogers commenting that “[Putin] has clearly come to the conclusion that there’s little price to pay here and that therefore ‘I can continue this activity.’” (2018 p. xix) And quoting an Obama Administration official: “the perfect nineteenth century response to a twenty-first century problem”. (2018 p. 235)

³⁴³ For details see US Treasury Department 2016.

³⁴⁴ Detrow 2016

³⁴⁶ Quoted in Reuters 2016

³⁴⁷ Quoted in Detrow 2016

³⁴⁸ Quoted in Higgins 2017

³⁴⁹ Osborn & Tsvetkova 2017

³⁵⁰ Quoted in Smith 2018

³⁵¹ PERSEREC 2008; Roper 1995; Jewish Telegraphic Agency 1995

CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		
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South Africa

143-Thomas Joseph Dolce 1988 ³⁵² <i>South Africa // USA</i> Dolce, a US Defence civilian, admitted in court in 1988 that he had spied for South Africa 1979-83. Sentenced to 10 years in prison. No specific US action against South Africa identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

South Korea

144-Robert Chaegun Kim 1996 ³⁵³ <i>Korea // USA</i> Civilian analyst working for US Navy, arrested in September 1996 for passing classified documents to Korean military intelligence over a five month period that year. Kim's handler, Korean naval attaché Captain Baek Don-II, was recalled to Korea, while Kim was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment in July 1997. He was released in 2005. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL During the court proceedings the Korean Government commented: "This is unrelated to us and we are not interested. We can not interfere with the U.S. court ruling." ³⁵⁴
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
145-Korean spying in Australia, 2013 ³⁵⁵ <i>South Korea // Australia</i>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	AS POWERFUL Comparable economies, global power
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY

³⁵² PERSEREC 2008; Valentine 1988

³⁵³ PERSEREC 2008; Clark 2015; *The Korean Herald* 2005; Schmid 1996; Masters 1997

³⁵⁴ *The Korean Herald* 2005

³⁵⁵ Dorling 2013-A

<p>Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) cultivated Australian government officials of Korean heritage in order to collect sensitive bilateral trade and other information. Detected by ASIO and NIS was warned off. Several government officials lost clearances and/or employment.</p> <p>Minimal impact on bilateral relations. Australian Government actively sought to suppress revelation of activity and NIS identities –revealed only as result of legal action in 2013 by a former Australian official whose employment had been terminated as a result of their cultivation by the NIS.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		Otherwise friendly relations, military and other cooperation. Both US allies.
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED See left. Some one-off media coverage as result of court case.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL Recruitment of officials, conduct of humint collection inside Australia under diplomatic cover.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE The FTA negotiations were completed several months after the court case publicity.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Korean Government declines to comment
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL Australians neither naïve nor jaded about espionage.

Taiwan

<p>146-Douglas Tsou 1988³⁵⁶</p> <p><i>Taiwan // USA</i></p> <p>Former FBI employee, indicted in 1988 for providing single instance of classified information to Taiwan although prosecutors claimed a more broad-ranging relationship with Taiwanese intelligence. Sentenced in 1992 to 10 years in prison.</p> <p>No specific US action against Taiwan identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE
<p>147-Donald Keyser 2004³⁵⁷</p> <p><i>Taiwan // USA</i></p> <p>Keyser was a State Department official (in fact a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary) arrested in 2004, following a</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL

³⁵⁶ PERSEREC 2008; Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 638; Marcus 1988; UPI 1991

³⁵⁷ PERSEREC 2008; Clark 2015; Gerstein 2006 and 2007. For a comprehensive account of the Keyser case see Lefebvre 2017.

<p>clandestine meeting with Taiwanese intelligence (National Security Bureau) officers in Taiwan in 2003 – and an illicit relationship with Isabelle Cheng, a NSB officer. Keyser was also found to have been removing classified information from the State Department since 1992 and retaining this at his home. in 2007 Heyser was sentenced to a year in prison and other sanctions.</p> <p>Cheng and her boss departed the US in 2005.</p> <p>Bilateral relations were strained further by a Taiwanese request for the return of classified material (including US material) taken from Cheng and forming part of the body of evidence (the request was refused).</p> <p>No specific US action against Taiwan identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		<p>The NSB withdrew a number of intelligence officers from the US on its own volition, and made a public statement reiterating its close and friendly relations with the US. The Taiwanese Government indicated publicly that it would cooperate fully with the US investigation.³⁵⁸</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

<p>148-Wo Weihan 2005-2008³⁵⁹</p> <p><i>Taiwan (and USA) // China</i></p> <p>Chinese scientist and businessman Wo Weihan was arrested in 2005 for selling ballistic missile secrets to Taiwan and the USA. He was convicted at a 2007 trial and executed in November 2008, along with his alleged accomplice Guo Wanjun, a Chinese Government missile expert.</p> <p>No specific Chinese action against Taiwan identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>Both Taiwan and the US did not publicly comment on the allegations, though the US was critical of the trial and execution from a human rights perspective.</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

United Kingdom

<p>149-Roger Cooper 1985³⁶⁰</p> <p><i>UK // Iran</i></p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC

³⁵⁸ Lefebvre 2017

³⁵⁹ France 24 2008; *Taipei Times* 2008; Branigan 2008

³⁶⁰ Minnick 1992 pp. 44-45; *Deseret News* 1991; O'Connell 2003; Davies 1991; *Eastern Daily Press* 1991

<p>Arrested by Iran in 1985, British businessman Cooper made a public statement on Iranian TV in 1987, apparently confessing to working for British intelligence and attempting to establish a spy network inside Iran. Cooper was released in a 1991 prisoner swap, and subsequently recanted his 1987 confession.</p> <p>No specific Iranian action against UK identified. Nonetheless Cooper's continuing imprisonment itself became a barrier to better relations between London and Teheran (it was regarded along with the rescinding of the fatwa on Salman Rushdie and the return of hostages held in Lebanon).³⁶¹</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL UK claimed that the confession was coerced and denied any involvement with Cooper.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
<p>150-Farzad Bazoft and Daphne Parish 1989-1990³⁶²</p> <p><i>UK (and Israel) // Iraq</i></p> <p>An Iranian-born journalist resident in the UK, Bazoft was arrested by Iraqi authorities in September 1989 and then executed in March 1990 following a conviction for spying for Britain and Israel. Bazoft had made a public admission on Iraqi TV but later recanted during his trial. Bazoft's arrest came after he attempted to report on an explosion at the Iskandaria weapons facility outside of Baghdad. British national Daphne Parish, who drove Bazoft to the site, was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. After 2003 a former Iraqi intelligence officer stated that Bazoft was known to be innocent of the espionage charges.</p> <p>The Iraqi regime organised street protests against the UK, including on the day of the execution and there was some degradation in the general level of the bilateral relationship (especially when Bazoft was executed). But this was all the initiative of Baghdad rather than London (also noting the subsequent general consensus as to Bazoft's innocence).</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL Although the British Government was reluctant to adversely affect the bilateral relationship with Iraq they did deny Bazoft and Parish were spies, and withdrew the British Ambassador from Baghdad.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

³⁶¹ Davies 1991

³⁶² Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 55; *The Observer* 1990; Vulliamy 2003; Trelford 2010; Norton-Taylor & McVeigh 2017

CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR		
151-Mitrokhin defection³⁶³ <i>UK (and USA) // Russia</i> KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin defected to the UK in 1992, in possession of extraordinarily extensive Russian intelligence archives. Then British MI6 Head of Station John Scarlett (who would later also be revealed to have been Oleg Gordievsky's case officer in the 1980s) was expelled from Moscow in 1994 as retaliation for the Mitrokhin defection. (Scarlett would later serve as the Chief of MI6 from 2004 to 2009.) This set off a series of tit for tat expulsions of (declared and suspected) Russian and UK intelligence officers – the most intensive in UK-Russian relations since the 1971 expulsion of 105 members of the Russian Embassy in London. This included the 1995 expulsion of 25 Russians and then 25 British from respective capitals, and the 1996 expulsions of 9 British and 4 Russians. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: SIGNIFICANT	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given the extraordinary nature of the British intelligence coup
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNREPENTANT The British Government openly acknowledged the defection as part of the process of producing historical works based on their contents.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
152-Allegation by former MI5 officer that MI6 tried to assassinate Muammar Gaddafi in 1996³⁶⁴ <i>UK // Libya</i> In 1998 former MI5 officer David Shayler (then in France after making separate allegations about MI5 activities) claimed publicly that MI6 had attempted to assassinate Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 1996, using proxies associated with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. An attack in the Libyan city of Sirte did occur in March 1996, missing its target Gaddafi. In November 1999 Shayler	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED Relationship between UK and Libya had been adversarial in 1980s, including after a British policewoman was killed by a shot fired at a protest rally from the Libyan Embassy in London, and after the UK supported US air strikes targeting Gaddafi in retaliation for Libyan support to terrorism in Europe. Libyan was also an active supporter of republican terrorists in Northern Ireland.
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC This aspect of the Shayler case ran publicly for four years, from his initial engagement with the media in July 1998 on this matter until the conclusion of his 2002 trial (and very occasionally thereafter).
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS

³⁶³ Sengupta & Osborn 2006; Polmar & Allen 2004, pp. 425-426; Trahair & Miller 2012, pp. 323-324; Sullivan 2004; Andrew 2004

³⁶⁴ BBC 1998; Irish Times 1998; Lashmar 2000; Bright 2000; Press Association 2000; BBC 2002-B; Bright 2002; Radnofsky 2008

<p>made a submission concerning this allegation to then UK Home Secretary Jack Straw (a similar submission was made to UK Special Branch in March 2000). Shayler also alleged that MI6 had tried to use disinformation to discredit the Libyan regime, prompting a libel writ by Gaddafi's son against the <i>Sunday Telegraph</i> newspaper. Shayler later fled the UK for France, before returning voluntarily after a failed UK extradition bid. He was tried and convicted in 2002 for offences under the <i>Official Secrets Act</i>. In 2000 a document purported to be a MI6 intelligence report was published on the internet, appearing to support the allegation. In 2002 a book published in France also claimed the allegation was accurate and that British intelligence had actively backed Islamic fundamentalists in Libya.</p> <p>Libyan public response to the allegations was muted. Although in 1998 Libya did release footage of the March 1996 attack, claiming it was the responsibility of a British intelligence agent. Nor did the allegation seem to prove problematic when MI6 led the successful effort to have Libya voluntarily shut down its fledgling nuclear program in 2003 (just a year after Shayler's trial).</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		The allegation is that British intelligence sponsored the attempted assassination of the Libyan leader. ³⁶⁵
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL UK Home Office Minister Lord Williams stated in August 1998 that "The important point is this - is it true or is it not true that there was an official plot to kill Colonel Gaddafi? It is not true." ³⁶⁶ At the time UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook described the allegation as "pure fantasy". ³⁶⁷ At the 2008 inquest into the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, former MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove described the allegation made by Shayler as "not true". ³⁶⁸
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE Given Libyan sensitivities concerning Western powers interference in developing world affairs and the ideology of the Libyan state.
<p>153-Allegation of MI6 counter-proliferation operations targeting Iran, 1999³⁶⁹</p> <p><i>UK (and Israel) // Iran</i></p> <p>Renegade former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson claimed in video-taped testimony to a 1999 trial in Israel that MI6 had penetrated Iranian intelligence and arms programs, including by supplying Iran with precursors for chemical weapons. Tomlinson also claimed that Israeli intelligence was aware of, and supported, these operations. The</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL

³⁶⁵ Hearing a related matter in July 2000 concerning the right to publish the allegations, Lord Justice Igor Judge stated "If true, it is difficult to overestimate its enormity: a conspiracy to murder the head of another state, resulting not in his death, but in the deaths of innocent people who were not its intended targets." Quoted in Bright 2000.

³⁶⁶ Quoted in BBC 1998

³⁶⁷ Quoted in Lashmar 2000

³⁶⁸ Quoted in Radnofsky 2008

³⁶⁹ Barnett, Ridley & Elam 1999; Tomlinson 2004

<p>allegations were also contained in Tomlinson's book <i>The Big Breach</i>, a synopsis of which was provided to the <i>Observer</i> newspaper in 1999.</p> <p>Iranian response to the allegation was muted.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
<p>154-Allegation that Nelson Mandela was MI6 contact, 2001³⁷⁰</p> <p><i>UK // South Africa</i></p> <p>Renegade former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson's 2001 book <i>The Big Breach</i> claimed that Nelson Mandela had an association with MI6, including having spent a day in 1990 in the UK briefing MI6 officers.</p> <p>Nelson Mandela angrily dismissed the allegation, describing it as a "disgraceful fabrication" and racist.³⁷¹ Tomlinson removed the reference to Mandela in subsequent editions of the book.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NOT RELEVANT (South Africa directed response at Tomlinson and not UK Government). Case omitted from aggregate analysis.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given Mandela's extraordinary public profile.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
<p>155-Allegation MI6 planned to assassinate Serbian President Milosevic³⁷²</p> <p><i>UK // Serbia</i></p> <p>In 2001 renegade former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson told Mohamed al-Fayed, in the context of the deaths of al-Fayed son and of Diana, Princess of Wales in 1997, that MI6 had planned the assassination of the Slobodan Milosevic using a confected car accident (based on</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL A MI6 officer responsible for drawing up the document in question testified to the 2008 inquiry that Milosevic was not the target and that the proposal had been dismissed by SIS management. Former MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove told the same inquiry that MI6 had not carried out any assassinations during his service with the organisation from 1966-2004. Dearlove also confirmed the

³⁷⁰ Norton-Taylor, Traynor & Sampson 2001; IOL 2001

³⁷¹ Quoted in Norton-Taylor, Traynor & Sampson 2001.

³⁷² BBC 2008; English 2008; Radnofsky 2008

<p>Tomlinson's sighting of a MI6 planning document in 1992). This allegation was subsequently aired publicly. At a 2008 UK inquest into Diana's death Tomlinson would cast doubt on his own account, claiming to be confused about the details of the alleged plot (including the possible target).</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		separate testimony by stating that the proposal had not related to Milosevic and that "It was not a proposal to which any serious consideration was given." ³⁷³
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
<p>156-Seregi Skripal's arrest and imprisonment, 2009³⁷⁴</p> <p>As a prelude to the poisoning of Sergei Skripal by Russian intelligence in 2018, on 9 August 2009 Skripal was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment in Russia for having passed classified information to the British MI6.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	<p>NOTABLE</p> <p>Skripal case occurred at roughly same time as the Andrei Dumenkov and the 'spy rock' cases also directed at Russia. Russia likely delayed its public actions against Skripal and Dumenkov until after the hosting of the July G8 meeting in St Petersburg.</p>
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
<p>157-'Spy Rock', Moscow, 2006 (and then re-raised 2012)³⁷⁵</p> <p>UK // Russia</p> <p>In January 2006 Russian authorities publicly announced their discovery of a UK intelligence covert communications device disguised as a rock in a Moscow park. The Russians also claimed that the intelligence operation was linked to specific intelligence operatives at the British Embassy and to Russian reformist NGOs receiving aid from British sources.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	<p>NOTABLE</p> <p>The publicising of the compromise justified new Russian legislation required NGOs (including prominent regime critics) to report all their sources of income and provide comprehensive justification for their activities. This also included the creation of a state agency tasked with policing NGO activities, announced 2 weeks before the revelation. Intimations of NGO association with foreign spies had been a prominent part of the justification for the new laws.</p>
	<i>Response</i>	<p>NEUTRAL followed by UNREPENTANT</p> <p>Russia claimed at the time of the expulsion that MI6 had specifically denied responsibility for the operation, in discussions with Russian authorities. Furthermore, the Russians claimed that their decision to reveal the operation publicly arose from this refutation, and from alleged Russian anger at the flouting of an apparent 'no spy' agreement between the two countries.</p>

³⁷³ Quoted in English 2008

³⁷⁴ Biggs 2006; BBC 2006; Norton-Taylor, Parfitt & Clark 2010

³⁷⁵ Sengupta & Osborn 2006; Norton-Taylor 2012; Biggs 2006; BBC 2012-A; Weir 2006

<p>In January 2012 a former senior British official admitted in a BBC interview that the rock had been part of a British intelligence operation, re-opening the controversy. In 2006 President Putin quipped that he had advised against expelling four British intelligence officers, on the basis that their replacements would be harder to identify and thus more effective than the four in question.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		<p>British Prime Minister Tony Blair commented at the time (ie 2006): "I'm afraid you're going to get the old stock in trade of never commenting on security matters. Except when we want to, obviously."</p> <p>In 2012 Blair's then Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell acknowledged in a TV interview that MI6 had been responsible for the operation (see left). Powell also suggested that the Russians had known about the rock for some time prior to January 2006 but had timed the public revelation to maximise damage to British interests.</p>
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
<p>158-Vyacheslav Zharko case 2007³⁷⁶</p> <p>In 2007 Zharko, a Russian FSB officer, confessed to working for British intelligence. Zharko's case officer was alleged to be Pablo Miller, operating from the UK Embassy in Tallin, who was also alleged to be Sergei Skripal's case officer.</p> <p>No specific Russian action against UK identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	MORE POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

United States

<p>159-Yu Zhensan, senior MSS officer defects to US 1985³⁷⁷</p> <p><i>USA // China</i></p> <p>Yu Zhensan (aka Yu Qiangsheng, aka Yu San), head of MSS foreign liaison, defected to the US via Hong Kong in November 1985. Information he provided would lead to the arrests of Chinese spies Larry Wu Tai Chin and Bernard Boursicot. Ironically Yu had been ordered to engage the US Embassy as a pretext to trying to cultivate a newly arrived CIA officer -identified in reporting by MSS source Larry Wu Tai Chin. Yu instead took the opportunity of the engagement to defect, and his information would subsequently identify Chin as a spy for the Chinese.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	FRIENDLY
	<i>Publicity</i>	<p>LIMITED</p> <p>Public knowledge of Zhensan's defection was limited for a year, until the aftermath of Chin's conviction and suicide. The <i>New York Times</i> correspondent John Burns was expelled from China for seeking comment from the MSS on the defection.</p>
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

³⁷⁶ Hodge *et al* 2018; *Jerusalem Post* 2007; RT 2007

³⁷⁷ Faligot 2019 p. 124-127, 131, 140; Southerl 1986

China refused to make any public comment on the matter or take any specific actions against the US. ³⁷⁸		
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE		
160-Jon Pattis 1986-87³⁷⁹ <i>USA // Iran</i> Pattis was arrested in 1986 for spying for the CIA (and allegedly Iraq) and subsequently sentenced by Iran to 10 years imprisonment. In October 1986 Pattis made a televised confession to passing information to the CIA through his company Cosmos Engineers, including information that allowed Iraq to target an Iranian telecommunications centre. Pattis also claimed to report to a CIA handler, Kavi Austin. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in 1987. On his release he recanted the confession made while in custody. No specific Iranian actions against US identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL The Reagan Administration regularly denied that Pattis had any association with the US Government. ³⁸⁰
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
161-US military officers detained in Nicaragua 1986³⁸¹ <i>USA // Nicaragua</i> Colonel Alden Cunningham and Captain Barbara Sims, both attached to US Embassy in Managua, charged with spying in 1986 after having been detained in war zone in north-eastern Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan Government issued a perfunctory protest to the US Embassy and took no further action. ³⁸² CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	LIMITED
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	LESS EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE

³⁷⁸ Southerl 1986

³⁷⁹ Minnick 1992 p. 173; Mower 1987; *Washington Post* 1996; UPI 1987

³⁸⁰ Mower 1987

³⁸¹ Minnick 1992 p. 47; Nusser 1986

³⁸² Nusser 1986

162-Defection of Cuban intelligence officer 1987³⁸³ <i>USA // Cuba</i> Major Florentino Azpillaga defected to West in 1987 while posted to Czechoslovakia (defected in Austria). Provided CIA the names of 350 Cuban agents worldwide plus identities of Cuban double agents ostensibly reporting for US intelligence. Also provided information on Panamanian President Noriega's links to Cuban intelligence. No identified action against the US Government bby Cuba, beyond rhetorical denunciation. In 1988 Azpillaga survived an assassination attempt by Cuba while in London (according to US accounts) or tried to strong-arm a Cuban diplomat into defecting, leading to a shooting (according to Cuban accounts). Regardless, the Cuban Ambassador and another Cuban diplomat were expelled by the UK as a result. ³⁸⁴ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given the counter-intelligence information provided to the US.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNREPENTANT US Government was upfront about the defection, including broadcasting interviews with Azpillaga on US Government-backed radio into Cuba. ³⁸⁵
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
163-Expulsion of CIA officers from France 1995³⁸⁶ <i>USA // France</i> In 1995 five American officials, including CIA officers, were expelled from France. This followed an apparent attempt to recruit French officials to provide economic intelligence. See also the account of French economic espionage above. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL US refused to admit any involvement in espionage directed against France.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

³⁸³ Minnick 1992 p. 9; Anderson & van Atta 1988; Adams 2012; Associated Press 1988

³⁸⁴ Associated Press 1988

³⁸⁵ Anderson & van Atta 1988

³⁸⁶ Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 247, p. 316; Risen 1995

164-European Parliament's 'ECHELON' report 2001³⁸⁷ <i>USA (and rest of FVEY) // Europe</i> In 2001 the European Parliament released a report claiming that FVEY sigint agencies – led by NSA – operated a worldwide surveillance network searching for keywords across international telecommunications (and said to be codenamed ECHELON). No further specific action, following the European Parliament's vote to accept the report. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL US authorities noted only that US intelligence activities are carried out in accordance with US law, including the <i>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act</i> . They also refused to cooperate with the European parliamentary committee.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
165-Bugging of Chinese President's aircraft 2002³⁸⁸ <i>USA // China</i> In 2002 Chinese technicians claimed to have discovered 27 listening devices implanted in the President's newly delivered Boeing 767-300ER, upon its receipt in 2000. President Jiang was furious but anger was directed at Chinese officials - 20 Chinese air force officers and two officials from the company that imported the jet were detained. ³⁸⁹ China refused to comment publicly. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE Issue emerged weeks before the US and Chinese Presidents were scheduled to attend a summit meeting.
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL The White House refused to comment: "We never discuss these types of allegations." ³⁹⁰
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
166-Aleksandr Zaporozhky³⁹¹ <i>USA // Russia</i>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC

³⁸⁷ Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 207; USA Today 2001; Ward 2001

³⁸⁸ Polmar & Allen 2004 p. 125; CNN 2002; BBC 2002-A; Pomfret 2002

³⁸⁹ CNN 2002

³⁹⁰ Quoted in CNN 2002

³⁹¹ *Irish Times* 2010; CBS News 2010; Vasilyeva 2010

<p>Head of American department of SVR who provided the CIA with the identity of Aldrich Ames. Having moved to the US in 1997, Zaporozhky visited Russia in 2001 despite being warned that Robert Hanssen had betrayed him to Russian intelligence. Imprisoned and tortured, Zaporozhky was part of the exchange for the GHOST STORIES network in 2010.</p> <p>No specific Russian action against US identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Acknowledgement implied by spy swap.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
<p>167-Gennady Vasilenko³⁹²</p> <p><i>USA //Russia</i></p> <p>Vasilenko was the Russian agent who revealed Robert Hanssen's identity to American intelligence. Imprisoned by Russia he was tortured before being exchanged for the GHOST STORIES network in 2010.</p> <p>No specific Russian action against US identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Acknowledgement implied by spy swap.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
<p>168-Aleksandr Poteyev 2011³⁹³</p> <p>Former deputy head of SVR's S section and CIA agent since 1999, Poteyev fled to the US after his information led to the GHOST STORIES network being unravelled. He was named in a Russian court in June 2011 as a defector and traitor, and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment in absentia.</p> <p>No specific Russian action against US identified. (Although Poteyev himself is believed to have been targeted for assassination by the Russians in 2015.)</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	UNKNOWN
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

³⁹² *Irish Times* 2010; CBS News 2010; Vasilyeva 2010

³⁹³ Campbell, Leopold & Blake 2018; Sputnik News 2011

169-Li Hui 2011 ³⁹⁴ <i>USA // China</i> In 2010 senior MSS officer Li Hui was recruited by the CIA in Hong Kong. Li was identified as a mole by the MSS in March 2011. This revelation led to the sacking of Li's boss, Deputy Minister Lu Zhongwei and the considerable embarrassment of MSS chief Geng Huichang. No specific Chinese action against US identified and the Chinese Foreign Ministry declined to comment when the affair became public in 2012. ³⁹⁵ CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given the fallout within the MSS (see left).
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL The US Government refused to comment on the matter. ³⁹⁶
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
170-Compromise of CIA networks in China 2010-2012 ³⁹⁷ <i>USA // China</i> Series of MSS dangles (and subsequent penetration of CIA throwaway covert communications system) identifies network of Chinese agents. At least 20 such agents arrested and executed. On 20 May 2017 the <i>New York Times</i> revealed this extensive compromise. No specific Chinese action against US identified. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS Given scale of CIA network uncovered.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL US Government refused to comment on story.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL
171-Raymond Davis incident in Pakistan, January 2011 ³⁹⁸ <i>USA // Pakistan</i>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	COMPLICATED
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC Issue dominated Pakistani media for weeks.
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	MORE EGREGIOUS

³⁹⁴ Faligot 2019 pp. 390-392; Reuters 2012; Ignatius 2016

³⁹⁵ Reuters 2012

³⁹⁶ Reuters 2012

³⁹⁷ Mattis & Brazil 2019 p. 20; Faligot 2019 pp. 387-390; Mazzetti *et al* 2017; Choi 2018

³⁹⁸ Walsh & MacAskill 2011; Perlez 2011; Goldman & Johnston 2011; Deccan Herald 2011; Khan 2011; *The Dawn* 2011; *The Express Tribune* 2011; McCarthy 2011

<p>On 27 January 2011 Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor based in Pakistan, shot and killed two Pakistanis during a confrontation in Lahore. A third Pakistani was killed in a traffic accident occasioned by an attempt to extricate Davis from the incident.³⁹⁹ Davis was arrested and charged with murder but later released and expelled following fraught engagement between Washington and Islamabad (and a USD 2 million payment to the families of the deceased).</p> <p>Pakistani authorities initially were muted in their public statements, pending determination of Davis' diplomatic status, while stating that Davis' links to the CIA were incontrovertible. But within a fortnight US-Pakistani relations had sunk to "a new low, both sides say".⁴⁰⁰ By April there were reports that all joint US-Pakistani counter-terrorism operations inside Pakistan had been suspended and Pakistan was seeking to downsize the US diplomatic (and national security) presence inside the country.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: CRITICAL</p>		Involved the public deaths of three Pakistanis on the streets of Lahore, as well as another related death.
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE The Davis incident followed the rushed departure of the CIA Chief of Station in Islamabad after his public identification in a private Pakistani law suit against the CIA, and after the naming of Pakistani ISI Chief General Shuja Pasha in a US lawsuit claiming ISI responsibility for the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.
	<i>Response</i>	DENIAL President Obama initially stated that Davis was a diplomat, and then Senator John Kerry flew to Islamabad to negotiate Davis' release. Serving Secretary of State Clinton directly lobbied the Pakistani Army Chief, claiming that Davis had been illegally detained. Some members of the US Congress sharply criticised the Pakistani Government for detaining Davis and threatened to cut US aid to Pakistan in retaliation. This possibility was echoed by Obama Administration sources, who also allegedly threatened the cancellation of a planned visit by the Pakistani President to Washington in March 2011, as well as the expulsion of the Pakistani Ambassador. ⁴⁰¹ A planned working-level trilateral meeting on Afghanistan was also postponed by the US in order to pressure Islamabad.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE Pakistani public outrage at the events in Lahore – tremendous pressure not to release Davis back to US. Background of Pakistani public hostility to US counter-terrorism efforts and activities inside Pakistan.
<p>172-Arrest of CIA officer Ryan Fogle in Russia 2013⁴⁰²</p> <p><i>USA // Russia</i></p> <p>A diplomat posted to the US Embassy in Moscow, Fogle was arrested by Russian authorities for allegedly trying to recruit a Russian counter-terrorism official. The FSB also released an audio recording of an alleged phone conversation between Fogle and the official.</p> <p>Fogle was subsequently expelled from Russia. On 17 May the FSB publicly exposed the identity of the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, evidently as a form of further punishment.</p>	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ADVERSE
	<i>Publicity</i>	VERY PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOTABLE At the time the US and Russia were involved in jointly addressing the international dimensions of the Boston Marathon bombing (on 15 April).
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL The US Government refused to confirm Fogle was an intelligence officer.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	NEUTRAL

³⁹⁹ In addition, a grief-stricken widow of one of the two shot Pakistanis later committed suicide.

⁴⁰⁰ Quoted in Perlez 2011

⁴⁰¹ Both National Security Adviser Donilon and the Pakistani Ambassador to the US denied this reporting about a private conversation between them.

⁴⁰² Associated Press in Moscow, as reported in *The Guardian* 19 May 2013; CBS News 17 May 2013

US Ambassador was also called in and carpeted by Russian Foreign Ministry.		
CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR		
173-Arrest of two Germans spying for the US⁴⁰³ <i>USA // Germany</i> In early July 2014 a German BND intelligence officer was arrested for passing classified information to the NSA. A week later a German Defence Ministry official was arrested for spying for the CIA. After the first arrest Chancellor Merkel stated that if true the allegation was a “clear contradiction of what I consider to be trusting co-operation” with the US. ⁴⁰⁴ The US Ambassador to Berlin was called in and demarched. On 17 July 2014 the CIA Station Chief in Berlin was expelled. CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	NEUTRAL Immediately after the expulsion order President Obama and Chancellor Merkel spoke by phone. Afterwards the White House said that they had “exchanged views on US-German intelligence cooperation, and the President said he'd remain in close communication on ways to improve cooperation going forward.” The German account of the meeting described “deep differences of opinion on the issue of the activities of the US intelligence services”. ⁴⁰⁵
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	MORE SENSITIVE
174-Wikileaks reveals NSA targets in Japan, 2015⁴⁰⁶ <i>USA // Japan</i> In July 2015 Wikileaks discloses 35 identified NSA targets in Japan (including Cabinet Office, Bank of Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry, JETRO, and several Japanese firms). Other revelations include NSA surveillance of Japanese mission at the UN, and emplacement of bugs in Japanese computer systems.	<i>Power Dynamic</i>	LESS POWERFUL
	<i>Relationship</i>	ALLIED
	<i>Publicity</i>	PUBLIC
	<i>Nature of Activity</i>	NEUTRAL
	<i>Timing</i>	NOT NOTABLE
	<i>Response</i>	APOLOGY US Vice President Biden apologises to Japanese Government.
	<i>Pre-disposition of target</i>	LESS SENSITIVE

⁴⁰³ BBC 2014;

⁴⁰⁴ Quoted in BBC 2014

⁴⁰⁵ Quoted in AFP 2014

⁴⁰⁶ Samuels 2019 p. 233

<p>PM Abe and other Japanese officials described the revelations as “regrettable”. No formal protest lodged. Japanese media excoriates government for its flaccid response.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: MINOR</p>		
<p>175-Arrest of Paul Whelan, 2018-ongoing⁴⁰⁷</p> <p><i>USA // Russia</i></p> <p>In December 2018 former US marine (and dual US-British citizen) Whelan was arrested by the Russian FSB and charged with espionage. He is currently awaiting trial, although he has also been connected to various possible spy swaps with the US.</p> <p>No specific Russian action against US identified. The possible inclusion of Whelan in a 2022 swap of US and Russian prisoners (including American basketballer Brittney Griner did not proceed.⁴⁰⁸</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>COMPLICATED</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>LESS EGREGIOUS</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>DENIAL The US Government maintains Whelan is not a spy.</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p>
<p>176-Iran executes/arrests alleged CIA spies 2019⁴⁰⁹</p> <p><i>USA // Iran</i></p> <p>In April 2019 Iran announced it had identified 290 US spies working against Iran. Then in June 2019 Iran executed a former aerospace contractor Jalal Hajizavar for spying for the CIA. The next month Iran announced it had arrested 17 Iranians for allegedly spying for the CIA at sensitive military and nuclear facilities (and already executed several). Iran further claimed that the spying (including installation of monitoring devices) had been unsuccessful and released information purporting to identify CIA officers working internationally.</p>	<p><i>Power Dynamic</i></p> <p><i>Relationship</i></p> <p><i>Publicity</i></p> <p><i>Nature of Activity</i></p> <p><i>Timing</i></p> <p><i>Response</i></p> <p><i>Pre-disposition of target</i></p>	<p>LESS POWERFUL</p> <p>ADVERSE</p> <p>PUBLIC</p> <p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>NOT NOTABLE</p> <p>DENIAL The US strongly denied any connection to those arrested and accused Tehran of lying. President Trump tweeted “The Report of Iran capturing CIA spies is totally false. Zero truth. Just more lies and propaganda (like their shot down drone) put out by a Religious Regime that is Badly Failing and has no idea what to do. Their Economy is dead, and will get much worse. Iran is a total mess!” Secretary of State Pompeo also denied a US connection, stating that the “Iranian regime has a long history of lying.”⁴¹⁰</p> <p>MORE SENSITIVE</p>

⁴⁰⁷ Bennetts 2019; Fieldstadt 2019; Khurshudyan 2020; Finnegan 2020

⁴⁰⁸ Liptak & Mattingly 2022

⁴⁰⁹ Reuters 22 June 2019; *The Guardian* 22 July 2019.

⁴¹⁰ Quoted in *The Guardian* 22 July 2019

<p>Apart from the announcement itself no specific Iranian actions against US identified.</p> <p>CONSEQUENCE FOR OFFENDER: NEGLIGIBLE</p>		
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