

RECANATI-KAPLAN FELLOWSHIP SERIES

Understanding Contemporary Anarchism

and Its Implications for the
United States Intelligence Community

Jeffrey Anchukaitis



HARVARD Kennedy School

BELFER CENTER

for Science and International Affairs

RECANATI-KAPLAN FELLOW PAPER

JUNE 2016



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The circle-A symbol is seen on a wall in the Whitechapel district of London, United Kingdom, January 20, 2007
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“To be GOVERNED is to be watched, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-driven, numbered, regulated, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, checked, estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have neither the right nor the wisdom nor the virtue to do so. To be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction noted, registered, counted, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, prevented, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be place[d] under contribution, drilled, fleeced, exploited, monopolized, extorted from, squeezed, hoaxed, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, vilified, harassed, hunted down, abused, clubbed, disarmed, bound, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, derided, outraged, dishonored.

That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality.”

—**Pierre-Joseph Proudhon**,
The General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century¹

¹ As quoted in Mills, Jon L. “Privacy: The Lost Right.” p 26. Originally Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph “The General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century.”

Determinism is an evolutionary advantage of human beings; it allows us to mythologize the past, bring order to chaos, and make sense of the senseless. Accordingly, the goals of revolutionaries often seem obvious to us in hindsight. But as Henry Kissinger asked, rhetorically, in his biography of the great Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck, “What is a revolutionary? If the answer to this question were not ambiguous, few revolutionaries could succeed; the aims of revolutionaries seem self-evident only to posterity.” Kissinger continued, “The refusal to believe in irreconcilable antagonism is the reverse side of a state of mind to which basic transformations have become inconceivable².” In short, human beings’ limited ability to conceptualize presents and futures outside the narrative of the past severely impedes our ability to grasp the challenges presented to us. Practically speaking, it prevents us from adjusting sufficiently quickly to changing cultural norms. Our history often elides the brutish details before and after times of unrest and chaos; instead painting a picture of times when anti-government movements sprung up, challenged the established political, cultural, and economic order, and then peacefully receded. In fact, many of those times of unrest were uneven: the slow buildup of resentment, violence, the slow progress of reformers; many apogees and nadirs of violence and reform before and after the most notable events. The intellectual foundation of many of these movements—*anarchism*—has ebbed and flowed since its founding in the early 19th Century. A clear connection can be drawn from the original anarchists—Enlightenment-era thinkers who sought to free humankind from undue coercion of property owners—to the “Spirit of ’68”—a group of students who protested against the State for individual rights and an end to war in Southeast Asia—to the contemporary manifestation of the ideology. This paper argues that anarchist ideology is once again ascendant, and will play an increasingly important role in global politics over the next several decades, one that demands proactive and revolutionary changes by the United States government, generally, and the United States intelligence community, specifically. This paper concerns itself only with the policies and procedures of the intelligence community; it makes recommendations for increasing transparency and changing our strategic messaging to better meet contemporary challenges.

2 Kissinger, Henry A. “The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck” *Daedalus*, Vol. 97, No. 3, *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership* (Summer, 1968), p. 888-889 MIT Press

First, a note for the reader: why does it matter if we understand motivations or movements, generally? And then, why specifically those of anarchists? The answer to the first seems fairly intuitive, and yet US counterterrorism policy is still, 15 years after the attacks of September 11, hampered by policymakers and commentators who wonder, rhetorically, ‘why do they hate us?’ suggesting that violence, or the rhetorical or financial support of violence, is simply incomprehensible³. If terrorism as espoused by violent Salafists is simply incomprehensible, or illogical, then the policies proposed and implemented to stop it will fall dreadfully short, at best. At worst, they can exacerbate the problem. Certainly, some policies which in the short term exacerbate problems may be preferable over the long run, but policymakers nonetheless need to make those decisions with a full understanding of the tradeoffs.

It’s easy to see the action of Edward Snowden—the massive theft of legally classified government documents, the vast majority of which had nothing to do with his stated purpose of defending American civil liberties—as equally irrational to those of the violent terrorist. Better put, seeing him as a self-absorbed, underachieving narcissist who has failed at everything in life (which he very well may be), and who sought to show his tormenters how smart he really was (as is an ascribed motivation by his detractors), risks missing the revolutionary aims of the intellectual theory that his supporters use to justify, promulgate and effectuate his actions. Condemning his naivety, or demonstrating his status as a ‘useful idiot’ for foreign powers, threatens to miss the greater cultural movements his actions represent. It behooves his critics to understand his motivations, the movement that undergirds them, and the implications for the cultural milieu in which they’ve flourished. And so, this paper is not about a former systems administrator, nor any journalist, or academic, but a study of the much broader movement which not only sanctions but encourages such actions, why it will continue to only increase in resonance, and why and how the US intelligence community should respond, if it seeks to remain relevant and effective in this new cultural milieu. Just as important, understanding the specific motivations of ideological actors allows us to see the long-term roadblocks the intelligence community faces. If we can’t understand why the anarchist movement resonates in online communities, or classrooms,

³ Schleifer, Theodore *CNN* “Donald Trump: ‘I think Islam hates us’” Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/>

how can we effectively recruit the next generation of mathematicians and computer scientists, or case officers and analysts?

Further, is the importance of understanding American—and our partners' and allies'—security in as broad a framework possible. The broader a conception of security we have, the more policy makers can make balanced and informed tradeoffs. Former Director of NSA, CIA and Principle Deputy Director of National Intelligence Michael Hayden has argued that his decision to support—as NSA director—a lift on the ban on American companies exporting technology that could perform millions of operations per second increased American economic competitiveness, which overcame any loss in code breaking potential⁴. In the future, the equation for security will be: does allowing the public insight on secret X, allow us the credibility to keep top secret program Y?

Finally, and perhaps most important, is understanding as best we can the cultural milieu in which one serves. Karl Marx famously remarked that “the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.” Marx’s technological determinism was economically based, but its implications are much broader. Each new technology and economy also drives civil society changes: new social norms of behavior, new civil-society organizations, and new laws and regulations from the state.

The Industrial Revolution best demonstrates how new technology drove economic changes, and the unrest that followed should not have surprised anyone. Protest among the working class most often took the form of a riot: violent demands that their specific grievances be met with commensurate changes⁵⁶. Threshing was an important part of the British economy, but by 1830 the hand thresher had been replaced by the threshing machine. The loss of those jobs provided by the demand for hand threshers forced laborers to the streets in organized gangs⁷. In late August 1830, violence broke

4 Hayden, Michael *Washington Post* “Getting Past the Zero-sum Game Online” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-let-america-be-boxed-in-by-its-own-computers/2015/04/02/30742192-cc04-11e4-8a46-b1dc9be5a8ff_story.html

5 Harrison, J.F.C. “The Common People” (Kent: Croom Helm, 1984) p. 243-246.

6 Thomis, Malcolm I. “The Town Laborer and the Industrial Revolution (London: B.T. Batsford Limited, 1974) p. 18-19.

7 *ibid.* 250.

out, first in Hardres, where 400 laborers destroyed threshing machines⁸. The violence spread to other counties as word of the events in Hardres spread. Demands of rioters ran from increasing minimum wages, to the destruction of advanced farming technology. It was ugly and violent—but this ability for civil society to react and adjust and ultimately drive change in the government is, in fact, a necessary (but not sufficient) sign of a healthy democracy.

In the case of industrializing England, a new Whig government passed the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, which created a new floor for social welfare programs, and the Reform Act of 1832 leveled influence in the House of Commons by taking it from small, wealthy towns and giving it to new industrial areas—though true reform took several more decades⁹. Contemporarily, all else being equal we might be willing to sit back and let history’s warm embrace lull us into a sense that, in the end, it’ll all just work out. But for the intelligence community, this inflection point in history comes at a perilous time. As the Director of National Intelligence has testified, never has he seen a more diverse array of threats levied against the United States. “Violent extremists are operationally active in about 40 countries; seven countries are experiencing a collapse of central government authority; 14 others face regime-threatening or violent instability or both; another 59 countries face a significant risk of instability through 2016,” Clapper told the Senate Armed Forces Committee in February 2016¹⁰. The point here isn’t to imply an imminent existential threat to the United States, rather, the point—like Kissinger on Bismarck—is to recognize and adjust for our inability to imagine new presents and futures outside the narratives we’ve created about the past, and create policy and procedures before crisis forces them on us.

8 Harrison, J.F.C. “The Common People” (Kent: Croom Helm, 1984) p. 249.

9 *ibid.* 253-270

10 “Key Moments From The U.S. Spy Chief’s Annual ‘Litany Of Doom’” Available at <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/09/466139494/key-moments-from-the-u-s-spy-chiefs-annual-litany-of-doom>

Brief Historiography of Anarchism

In his preface to *Antologija Anarhizma*, famed linguist and scholar Noam Chomsky approvingly cites Johan Rudolf Rocker describing anarchy as “the confluence of two great currents, which during and since the French Revolution have found such characteristic expression in the intellectual life of Europe: Socialism and Liberalism¹¹.”

The Frenchman Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was the first to wear the 18th century epithet “anarchist” with pride¹². Echoing Enlightenment themes of reason over tradition, and social progress against what was seen as an intolerant and outmoded church and state model, Proudhon’s intellectual emphasis was on the role of labor and possession, with strong themes of economic justice. Proudhon argued that “property” conflated two distinct entities which were at once used to cement tyranny and protect liberty. He believed that the result of an individual’s labor—shoes from a cobbler, arrows from a fletcher, or the wheat a farmhand threshed—was legitimate property and could ensure the common man’s liberty. The land itself, on the other hand, could not be considered property. In *What is Property?* Proudhon associates possession of land with tyranny:

“The proprietor, the robber, the hero, the sovereign...imposes his will as law, and suffers neither contradiction nor control; that is, he pretends to be the legislative and the executive power at once ... [and so] property engenders despotism ... That is so clearly the essence of property that, to be convinced of it, one need but remember what it is, and observe what happens around him. Property is the right to use and abuse ... if goods are property, why should not the proprietors be kings, and despotic kings—kings in proportion to their *facultes bonitaires*? And if each proprietor is sovereign lord within the sphere of his property, absolute king throughout his own domain, how could a government of proprietors be any thing but chaos and confusion¹³?”

11 Noam Chomsky, “Preface to Antologija Anarhizma,” *Chomsky on Anarchism*, ed. Barry Pateman (Oakland: AK Press, 2005) p. 149.

12 Woodcock, George “Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: His Life and Work.” (New York: Schocken, 1972) p. 50.

13 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph “What is Property?” (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007) p. 193.

Proudhon explicitly ties the ownership of property to the suppression of the polity:

“Capital’... in the political field is analogous to ‘government’... The economic idea of capitalism, the politics of government or of authority, and the theological idea of the Church are three identical ideas, linked in various ways. To attack one of them is equivalent to attacking all of them . . . What capital does to labour, and the State to liberty, the Church does to the spirit. This trinity of absolutism is as baneful in practice as it is in philosophy. The most effective means for oppressing the people would be simultaneously to enslave its body, its will and its reason¹⁴.”

Proudhon’s focus on property rights was relevant to his audience at the time, who would have been working hard on the farm, or eventually in the factory, only to see their efforts enrich the land and factory owners. But this general theme is consistent throughout the anarchist history: economic freedom—freedom from capital—is a necessary condition of personal liberty¹⁵.

Proudhon, for his part, attempted to put his anarchist theory in practice when he was elected to parliament. There he introduced the concept of a national bank that would grant interest-free loans to laborers, and fiddled with the idea of setting a “just price” —his attempts to find the exact price for a good or service—but never succeeded in linking anarchism with a clear set of policies¹⁶. In fact, despite his own rejection of communism—Proudhon thought the means of production should be owned by the laborers themselves—many late 19th and early 20th century anarchists, like author Oscar Wilde, regarded anarchism as little more than ideal socialism, not a distinct movement with plans or policies¹⁸.

14 McKay, Iain. (1999). *Introduction*. In I. McKay (Ed.), “Property is Theft! A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Anthology” (Oakland: AK Press, 2011) p. 4.

15 see also Woodcock, p. 36-70.

16 Knowles, Robert. “Political Economy from Below: Economic Thought in Communitarian Anarchism 1840-1914” p. 116.

17 Bamyeh, Mohammed A. “Anarchy as Order.” (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) p. 16

18 *ibid.* 16.

Where Proudhon and Wilde failed, British author George Orwell experienced firsthand the potential fruits of anarchists' labor. During the years of the Spanish revolution, Aragon—a region west of Barcelona, East of Madrid, and lined by the Pyrenees to the north—was controlled by the anarchist unions, political parties, and militias. Though the *Catalonian Generalitat*—the autonomous regional government of Catalonia—was nominally in power, the unions were *de facto* in command of most of the economy and military force¹⁹²⁰. The period is characterized by collective land ownership, social redistribution, communalization of farmland, attempts to eliminate the influence of the Catholic Church, and economic management by laborers themselves²¹. Many landowners emigrated to more stable regions after being forced off their land—sometimes violently. Orwell's earnest love of anarchic Aragon comes through in his *Homage to Catalonia*:

“I had dropped more or less by chance into the only community of any size in Western Europe where political consciousness and disbelief in capitalism were more normal than their opposites. Up here in Aragon one was among tens of thousands of people, mainly though not entirely of working-class origin, all living at the same level and mingling on terms of equality. In theory it was perfect equality, and even in practice it was not far from it. ...Many of the normal motives of civilized life—snobbishness, money-grubbing, fear of the boss, etc.—had simply ceased to exist. The ordinary class-division of society had disappeared to an extent that is almost unthinkable in the money-tainted air of England; there was no one there except the peasants and ourselves, and no one owned anyone else as his master²².”

While the Aragon anarchism experiment ultimately fell to Soviet-backed forces in Spain, its brief success resonated with modern anarchists and their sympathizers. Chomsky, for instance, cited the success of laborers in Aragon in his 1976 discussion *The Relevance of Anarcho-Syndicalism*,

19 Bollothen, Burnett “The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution.” (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press) 1991 p. 224

20 See also Mintz, Frank “Anarchism and Workers’ Self-Management in Revolutionary Spain.” (Oakland: AK Press, 2013)

21 *ibid.* Chapter 2, “Catalonia As a Model”

22 Orwell, George “Homage to Catalonia: Down and Out in Paris and London” (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010) p. 111

calling it “extremely successful” and “a very inspiring testimony of the working poor’s ability to manage their own affairs without coercion and control” by either the state or land-owners²³.

Individual liberty as the primary goal of anarchism never received the intellectual attention that economic freedom did. It’s likely, in part, that most anarchists saw economic freedom as a necessary condition, and that personal freedom would follow naturally. Personal liberty wasn’t without its proponents, however; in the 19th century, Max Stirner wrote of the ego as the only meaningful point of reference for justice. Stirner paved the way for more personal-liberty-focused anarchists, including Frederich Nietzsche and the American, Benjamin R. Tucker. Tucker articulated an anarchism which included right of personal defense, property rights as a reward for labor, and an advocacy of free love²⁴. Building on the egoists—such as Stirner—before him, Tucker’s was an anarchism of the individual first:

“The State is said by some to be a ‘necessary evil;’ it must be made unnecessary. This century’s battles, then, are with the State: the State, that debases man; the State, that prostitutes women; the State, that corrupts children; the State, trammels love; the State, that stifles thought; the State, that monopolizes land; the State, that limits credit; the State, that restricts exchange; the State, that gives idle capital the power of increase, and, through interest, rent, profit and taxes, robs industrious labor of its products²⁵.”

The emphasis on individual liberty was not a rejection of community; in fact, Tucker saw the individual, emancipated from the coercion of the State, as destined to partner with others through “mutual agreement, social convention and individual contract.” That said, Tucker’s communalism seems an afterthought, and it’s not hard to see in Tucker a particularly American elevation of the individual over the State. It’s worth noting that Tucker was writing at a unique crossroads in American history. Slavery had been abolished—a resounding victory for individual liberty—but some saw

23 Noam Chomsky, “The Relevance of Anarcho-Syndicalism” Chomsky on Anarchism, ed. Barry Pateman (Oakland: AK Press, 2005) p. 149.

24 Charles H. Hamilton, “The Evolution of Subversive Tradition” Benjamin R. Tucker & the Champions of Liberty, A Centenary Anthology,” ed. Michael E. Coughlin, Charles H. Hamilton, and Mark A. Sullivan (St. Paul: Coughlin, 1986), p. 1-3.

25 As quoted in op. cit. Hamilton page 6. Originally Tucker, Benjamin “Our Purpose,” Liberty 1 (1881): 2.

an overreach in executive authority in the Civil War that was required to emancipate those same humans.

That said, these themes of individualism were sometimes an awkward fit with the socialist-leaning beginnings of anarchism. The global, student-led anarchic movement of the 1960s, however, showed a coming together of the economic principles of Proudhon and Aragon, with the individualism of Tucker. In January 1960 the socialist-leaning student group, Student League for Industrial Democracy renamed itself the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)²⁶. In June 1962, the SDS released the Port Huron statement declaring the group's values. Fifty years later authors of the original statement would lament that they had not foreseen some of the chaos to come, but the anarchic themes are notable and the statement would serve as the basis for the coming revolution²⁷. "We oppose the depersonalization that reduces human beings to things... means and ends are intimately related," the group intoned, echoing the ethics of Proudhon. Writing in the style of Tucker, the group addressed the belief that free beings would choose to associate, adding nuance to the egoists: "As the individualism we affirm is not egoism, the selflessness we affirm is not self-elimination. On the contrary, we believe in a generosity of a kind that imprints one's unique individual qualities in relation to other men, and to all human activity."

The latter half of the 1960's was notable for another reason. Despite the higher principles of the Port of Huron group, the student-led movement would turn violent, adding another dimension to the history of anarchism. No individual personifies anarchism's acceptance and eventual justification of a moral use of force better than Ulrik Meinhof.

Meinhof was born in northern Germany in 1934, the daughter of a school teacher and university professor, both social democrats in opposition to the National Socialist Party²⁸. She was an ambitious student, and a committed Christian pacifist. At university, Meinhof joined the German chapter of the SDS and was a founding member of the Workgroup for a Germany Free of

26 Cornell, Andrew "Unruly Equality" (Oakland: University of California Press, 1977) p. 242.

27 Roberts, Sam *New York Times* "The Port Huron Statement at 50" Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/sunday-review/the-port-huron-statement-at-50.html?_r=0

28 Aust, Stefan. "The Baader-Meinhof Complex" (London: The Bodley Head 2008) p. 12-13.

Nuclear Weapons²⁹. When, in 1958, West Germany agreed to host nuclear weapons on its soil, Meinhof wrote pamphlets to distribute: “Anyone who is more afraid of a Russian dictatorship than a nuclear war is welcome to commit suicide, but I and millions of others should be allowed to live³⁰.” She eventually started writing for the newsmagazine *konkrete* with her husband Klaus Rainer Rohland. Under Rohland and Meinhof, who eventually served as editor-in-chief, *konkrete* became a must-read for the growing number of West German leftists, with sections on culture, literature, the arts and politics³¹. Meinhof was a staunch critic of undemocratic movements in the Federal Republic of Germany, though her early writings betray an optimistic note³². For example, in her 1960 column, “*Shadows of the Summit Pointing West*,” Meinhof describes the Soviet state as “in pursuit of the aggressive politics of peace,” suggesting that West Germany serve as an intermediary in peace negotiations between the US and the Soviets³³.

If her optimism was real, so was her naïveté, and Meinhof appears to have grown increasingly less conciliatory in her writing. Thematically, she returned again and again to the idea of the dangers of remilitarization of Germany. In her column, “*Human Dignity is Violable*,” Meinhof wrote “Nuclear rearmament and democracy are irreconcilable. The statement can be cast in the negative: nuclear armament and the end of democracy are complementary; weapons of mass destruction and terror go together³⁴.”

In her column, “*Vietnam and Germany*,” Meinhof wrote:

“Here is the information being systematically spread among the populace: America is defending the freedom of the West in Vietnam. America is providing its allies with inspiring evidence of its commitment, and doing so under the toughest conditions. We should be thankful. Vietnam could be Germany tomorrow. These are all lies. The only thing that can be proven is that the people

29 Bauer, Karen. (2008). *In Search of Ulrik Meinhof*. In K. Bauer (Ed.), “Everybody Talks About the Weather...We Don't: The Writings of Ulrik Meinhof” (New York: Seven Stories, 2008) p 25.

30 *ibid.* 26

31 *ibid.* 29

32 *ibid.* 26-29.

33 Meinhof, Ulrike. (1960). *Shadows of the Summit Pointing West*. In K. Bauer (Ed.), “Everybody Talks About the Weather...We Don't: The Writings of Ulrik Meinhof” (New York: Seven Stories, 2008) p 106.

34 *ibid.* 147.

who are expected to believe this stuff, and the press that makes them believe it, and the politicians who reinforce it, have a role to play in this war³⁵.”

The inflection point, both for the German student movements and Meinhof, seems to have come in June 1967 when a police officer shot a young protestor on the occasion of the state visit of the Shah of Iran and his wife to West Germany³⁶. Shocked by the police brutality, student protests became larger and marked by increasingly violent clashes with the police. ‘The June 2nd Movement,’ a violent group which eventually joined the Revolutionary Armed Forces, was founded and named in commemoration of the shooting. Parliamentary opposition met to discuss strategies, reportedly drawing on the tenets of the Che-inspired *foco* theory, that one should not wait for revolutionary conditions, but should create them³⁷³⁸. Non-governmental opposition group talks increasingly turned to the justification of violence, with noted future RAF member Gudrun Ensslin reportedly proclaiming at a Berlin SDS meeting: “They’re going to kill us all. They are armed and we’re not. We have to get armed too³⁹.”

The world was set on fire in 1968. Fanned by global opposition to the Vietnam war—the Tet Offensive was launched in January of that year—world-wide, people increasingly saw Vietnam as the symbol of the coercive power of the West over past and current colonial states. The citizen-driven civil rights movement in the United States had lit a global push for equality among individuals, and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in April 1968 set American cities ablaze. Paris students rioted—joined by sympathetic striking unionists and laborers—in May. And in August, the Soviets snuffed out the Prague Spring by invading Czechoslovakia.

In 1968 Meinhof penned several essays which signal, at least rhetorically, her growing embrace of a moral use of violence against the state. The first was “*Gegen-Gewalt*,” (“*Counter-violence*”), which defended the moral

35 *ibid.* Meinhof in Bauer (ed) “*Vietnam and Germany*” (1966) p 157.

36 Aust, Stefan “The Baader Meinhof Complex” (London: Random House, 2008) p. 26-27.

37 *Ibid.* Bauer 30.

38 See also Melzer, Patricia. “Death in the Shape of a Young Girl: Women’s Political Violence in the Red Army Faction” (New York: New York University Press, 2015) p. 48.

39 Bauer, Karen. (2008). *In Search of Ulrik Meinhof*. In K. Bauer (Ed.), “Everybody Talks About the Weather...We Don’t: The Writings of Ulrik Meinhof” (New York: Seven Stories, 2008) p 42.

imperative of some SDS members to protest and disrupt at university⁴⁰. Then “*From Protest to Resistance*,” in which she ominously intoned, “protest is when I say I refuse to go along with this any more. Resistance is when I make sure everybody else stops going along with it too⁴².” In “*Warenhausbrandstiftung*” (“*Setting Fire to Department Stores*”) she condemns the burning of a department store by her future collaborators Ensslin and Andreas Baader, but only because insurance will repay the business losses, making arson supportive of the system, and not revolutionary. She goes on to praise arson, generally, as it breaks a law that protects property, and not the people who work there. Better, she notes, to burn a department store than to possess one⁴³. One wonders if Proudhon would have agreed.

Historians tend to downplay the role of anarchism in the 1960s student movement, and yet, the movement is the most salient—and most recent—example of the various anarchist strains coming together and having an impact on the global order, though it never held territory or conquered a continent⁴⁵. Though there are doubtless many possible reasons for this, one could posit that the emergence of the embrace of violence from the largely pacifist leftist tradition, and the morphing into *bona fide* terror organizations, disincentives some sympathetic scholars from a full accounting of anarchism’s embrace of violence.

Often considered to the left of the political spectrum in the United States, in fact the anarchist movement’s most persuasive minds are just as critical, if not more so, of the modern liberal movement as they are of the right. Chomsky, in particular, spared no quarter when he compared the leftist intellectuals of our time to the platonic ideal of the “radical activist” whose errors, in the words of Rosa Luxemburg, did more to progress humankind than all the success of the “cleverest Central Committee.” “[These remarks] provide a refreshing antidote to the dogmatism so typical of discourse on the left,” wrote Chomsky, “with its arid certainties and religious fervor

40 “Violence, Culture and Identity: Essays on German and Austrian Literature, Politics and Society,” eds Chambers, Helen (Bern: European Academic Publishers, 2006) p. 291, “Violence, Gendered Language, and the Politics of Ulrik Meinhof” Colvin, Sarah

41 see also Meinhof in Bauer (ed) “Counter-violence” (1968) p. 234-238.

42 *ibid.* Meinhof in Bauer (ed) “*From Protest to Resistance*” (1968) p. 239.

43 Colvin, Sarah “Ulrike Meinhof and West German Terrorism: Language, Violence, and Identity” (Rochester: Camden House, 2009) p 31.

44 see also Meinhof in Bauer (ed) “*Setting Fire to Department Stores*” (1968) p. 244-248.

45 Cornell, Andrew “Unruly Equality” (Oakland: University of California Press, 1977) p. 240-241.

regarding matters that are barely understood—the self-destructive left-wing counterpart to the smug superficiality of the defenders of the status quo who can perceive their own ideological commitments no more than a fish can perceive that it swims in the sea⁴⁶.” It may, then, be useful to conceptualize anarchists as neither left nor right, yet borrowing social-welfare concerns we typically associate with the American left, and the Burkean distrust of American federal government we commonly associate with the libertarian right.

It’s worth noting here—as discussed above—that the principles of anarchism are not *a priori* inimitable to the American system. For example, as Chomsky notes, Wilhelm von Humboldt’s 1792 *Critique of the State* doesn’t demand a complete lack of private coercive power, suggesting that modern anarchists can easily wedge themselves into the Jeffersonian political tradition⁴⁷. In fact, contemporary anarchism fits nicely in with its intellectual roots: whatever they may call themselves—anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, anarcho-pacifists, neo-anarchists—Proudhon’s contemporary co-travelers are quick to deride what they see as the centralized and coercive power of not just the state but also of Wall Street. In this way, Wall Street is the landowner of revolutionary France; their deep and very public financial ties and support of the government forms the contemporary structure of state and landowner coercive power that Proudhon warned of. The analogy continues, bringing with it a strong yearning for the personal freedom that Tucker sought: freed from the coercive oppression of the state, Wall St. and big business, Americans would be free to seek out their authentic selves.

During the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests, *The Nation* magazine introduced the country to a former New York City school teacher and Occupy protestor, Joe Therrien, who had left his job to pursue his dream of puppetry. Thirty-five thousand dollars in debt later, but with a Master of Fine Arts in puppetry in hand, Joe was unable to find his dream job and ended up teaching part time for the city schools, at half his previous wages⁴⁸. Stepping into Therrien’s shoes offers an illustrative anecdote, though not for the

46 Chomsky, Noam “Masters of Mankind: Essays and Lectures, 1969-2013. “Knowledge and Power: Intellectuals and the Welfare-Warfare State.” (Chicago: Haymarket, 2014)

47 Noam Chomsky, “The Relevance of Anrcho-Syndicalism.” (1776) *Chomsky on Anarchism*, ed. Barry Pateman (Oakland: AK Press, 2005), p. 254.

48 Richard, Kim *The Nation* “The Audacity of Occupy Wall Street” Available at <http://www.thenation.com/article/audacity-occupy-wall-street/>

reasons that countless center-right and center-left blogs pilloried him for. Certainly in retrospect those commenters were right in pointing out that taking on debt can be dangerous; Therrien's decision had a poor financial outcome—and puppetry may never have paid the bills. But had his degree been in something more practical, it's likely that after the intervening financial crisis—the second one in a decade caused at least in part, if not in whole, by unregulated financial gambling by Wall St—Therrien would have still been struggling to find work, still paying off his debt to a bank, still not, to borrow from Proudhon, the owner of his own labor; his property. Therrien isn't alone: in quarter one of 2016, the Federal Reserve reported student debt to be at \$1,350,931,000,000.⁴⁹ As is the theme of this paper, the above isn't an attempt to defend individuals' poor financial decisions, or alleviate any responsibility for them, but to understand why temporarily the intellectual traditions of anarchy would resonate more with a generation so largely in debt for something so fundamentally American as quality education.

While modern anarchism bears closest resemblance to its intellectual forebears on issues of economic justice, issues of war and peace have taken greater divergence of thought, likely, at least in some part, due to the industrialization of warfare and the changing international system. For Proudhon, in the midst of global revolutionary fervor, it would have seemed out of place to embrace pacifism; indeed his voluminous writing on international relations make it clear that he saw the capacity for violence in humans as clearly as Hobbes before him, saying, notably, “man's belligerent nature is all that saves him from despotism⁵⁰.” Certainly no one would accuse the uprising of the Paris Commune in 1871, nor the anarchist success in Aragon, of being pacifists.

That said, there is a distinct pacifist nature to the contemporary anarchist movement. Internationally, anarchists of all flavors have condemned the use of American military power, none more eloquently or passionately than Chomsky, who underscored his lengthy discussion on the use of US

49 “Consumer Credit” Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/HIST/cc_hist_memo_levels.html?utm_source=viz&utm_medium=viz.referral&utm_campaign=viz.ref.4400&utm_viz_id=7KVUt4zqcqOh&utm_pubreferrer=www.marketwatch.com%2Fstory%2Fevery-second-ameri-cans-get-buried-under-another-3055-in-student-loan-debt-2015-06-10

50 Proudhon, *La Guerre et la Paix: recherches sur la principe et la constitution du droit des gens* (Anthony: Editions Tops, 1998) vol. 2, p. 147.

power by noting the use of the anti-Sykes-Picot agreement in an early ISIS video:

“For the people of the region, the Sykes-Picot agreement is the very symbol of the cynicism and brutality of Western imperialism. Conspiring in secret during World War I, Britain’s Mark Sykes and France’s François Georges-Picot carved up the region into artificial states to satisfy their own imperial goals, with utter disdain for the interests of the people living there and in violation of the wartime promises issued to induce Arabs to join the Allied war effort. The agreement mirrored the practices of the European states that devastated Africa in a similar manner. It transformed what had been relatively quiet provinces of the Ottoman Empire into some of the least stable and most internationally explosive states in the world⁵¹.”

The book lays out Chomsky’s specific criticism of US policy, but the above quote is illustrative of the greater dynamics of contemporary anarchic international relations theory: Western—principally American—intervention in the world has been costly, in lives and treasure and, more importantly, detrimental to the cause of world peace. It has engendered, in Chomsky’s opinion, an endless cycle of war and revolution⁵². This view of the world, of course, flies in the face of 60 years of Wilsonian intervention by both parties in the name of peace and security and economic freedom, and finds more in common with a growing strain of anti-interventionist policies on the right, embodied in the 1980’s and 90’s by Pat Buchanan, and in 2016 by presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump.

51 Chomsky, Noam “Who Rules the World?” (Metropolitan Books, the American Empire Project, 2016) 257

52 Ibid.

Contemporary Anarchist Narrative


This odd-coupling of political left and right can make it difficult to assess how widespread the resonance of contemporary anarchism—or as it is often called, neo-anarchism—may be among the polity.

The largely peaceful protesters of the aforementioned Occupy movement, the Molotov-throwing protestors of the G20, and the anti-interventionists—isolationists, in the affirmative—all share a common history and goal: a revolution to free the common person from the chain of possession, and the call for revolution of the government, and the system. Neo-anarchists see in the ties between Wall Street and the United States government, and its foreign policy—which for all the nuance in tactics, lacks any big-picture strategic difference between the two American political parties—the same economic coercion that Proudhon saw in pre-revolutionary France, Tucker saw in the 19th century expansion of the American federal government, and Meinhof saw in the Federal Republic of Germany’s indifference to suffering in Vietnam.

Why do we care? It’s not clear that even if we had a list of committed anarchists that the numbers would have increased, nor is it clear that self-described anarchists make up a significant percentage of the polity. However—by way of analogy—the number of violent Salafists is considerably low. A 2011 Pew poll found that 72% of Muslims world-wide found that violence was *never* justified, and that number was anchored by pluralities in Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories seeing violence as “often” or “sometimes” justified. American Muslims were even more resounding in their response, with 81% saying violence is never justified. Even accounting for a social desirability bias, as a whole number, or a percent of population, al-Qa‘ida’s narrative hasn’t been effective in moving Muslim public opinion towards an acceptance of violence. But the United States government and the intelligence community worry a great deal about just that eventuality because the potential damage by one person is so great—in the loss of life and confidence in the government’s ability to provide security— and because no one is really certain what moves someone from agreeing with grievances, to accepting violence rhetorically, to committing violence in support of belief.

Public trust in government: 1958-2015

Trust the federal government to do what is right just about always/most of the time ...



Survey conducted Aug. 27-Oct. 4, 2015. Q15. Trend sources: Pew Research Center, National Election Studies, Gallup, ABC/Washington Post, CBS/New York Times, and CNN Polls. From 1976-2014 the trend line represents a three-survey moving average.

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For anarchism, we see the antecedents—grievances over state and economic coercion—of anarchism growing increasingly. Another Pew poll found a steady drop in the public trust in government from 1958 to 2015, with a precipitous drop in 2001^{53 54 55}.

In what is likely highly correlative, two Princeton University professors studied the degree of influence American voters had on lawmaking, specifically their ability to influence economic policy. They found that “multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on

53 Available at <http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/>

54 See also Nunez, Alissa “New Report Outlines Deep Public Distrust of Federal Government” Available here: <http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/new-report-outlines-skepticism-federal-government-n467366>

55 See also AEI Report: “Five Years After the Crash: What Americans Think About Wall Street, Banks, Business and Free Enterprise Available at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/-five-years-after-the-crash-what-americans-think-about-wall-street-banks-business-and-free-enterprise_083339502447.pdf

U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism⁵⁶.” In other words, while there’s no evidence of a causal relationship, its likely people perceive that they their influence over government is directly related to their wealth.

Edward Snowden—the most notorious leaker of classified documents—has never described himself as an anarchist, the epithet Proudhon proudly wore. But his actions have been claimed by contemporary anarchists, making his intention secondary to the perception. One reddit thread on r/firstworldanarchists calls him a fellow-traveler⁵⁷. Many posts in the reddit group r/anarchism include Snowden-related or engendered discussions, or include the videos and articles of journalist and Snowden defender and confidant, Glenn Greenwald⁵⁸. Snowden has become a *cause célèbre* of the anarchist movement; his rhetorical jabs at the state of the American polity on topics such as an oligarchical economy and interventionist foreign policy, echo the traditions of anarchic thought.

Further, sympathy for the grievances anarchists cite is far more widespread than formal anarchist membership. Take, for instance, the vote by the British to leave the European Union in June 2016. Exit polling suggests the “leave” vote slanted older, less educated, and was homophilous, and shared the grievances of the anarchic movement: dissatisfaction with actions of the state and its close relationship with an oligarchic-seeming business world. In that way, the anarchist ideology doesn’t need “true believers” to advance its cause⁵⁹.

56 Gilens, Martin and Page, Benjamin I. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens” Available at http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf

57 See “Edward Snowden is also a First World Anarchist” Available at https://www.reddit.com/r/firstworldanarchists/comments/4dawxn/edward_snowden_is_also_a_first_world_anarchist/

58 See “Glenn Greenwald On New Atheism, The NSA & Edward Snowden” Available at https://www.reddit.com/r/Anarchism/comments/3y4fxl/glenn_greenwald_on_new_atheism_the_nsa_edward/

59 Kirk, Ashley The Telegraph “EU referendum: Which type of person wants to leave, and who will be voting to remain?” Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/22/eu-referendum-which-type-of-person-wants-to-leave-and-who-will-b/>

The Pew polling and the Princeton study on the health of the American democracy suggest that the antecedents for the contemporary anarchist narrative—and the grievances they seek to ameliorate—are reaching an apogee, making it increasingly likely that an expanding percentage of the polity will emotionally invest in the movement’s narrative.

The contemporary anarchist ideology has a consistent, if unplanned, narrative that can be broken down into its commensurate parts. The following methodology was first used by the National Counterterrorism Center to analyze the logic and appeal of violent Salafism as espoused by al-Qa’ida. The quotes given below are exemplars of the contemporary anarchist movement’s discussion of the Snowden leak. The exemplars are not the only, or even the most noteworthy, examples of this narrative’s components. The use of a methodology employed by NCTC does not imply a similarity between violent Salafism and anarchism, only the utility in explaining movements through a structured review of the language they employ. The examples are drawn from public discussion surrounding the 2013 leak of classified National Security Agency documents, and the 2010 leak of classified military and diplomatic cables.

The left most column provides an illustrative title for each of the six elements of the narrative. To the right of that is a brief explanation of what that element asserts, in the vernacular. The middle columns explain what the purpose of each element is, and why it is necessary for full resonance. Lastly, to the far right, are the aforementioned exemplars:

Deconstructing the Contemporary Anarchist Narrative: a Structured Approach

Element:	Message:	What the element does:	Element is necessary because...	Example:
Decline	The world has gone awry...	Confirms for the audience that the world is unjust...	Without Decline, the audience sees no need to act.	"The advance of information technology epitomized by Google ...shifts the world toward authoritarianism." -Assange
Two Camps	...because of an enemy that seeks to subjugate us.	...because of the specific and intentional actions of an enemy who is evil.	Without Two Camps, there is no enemy to combat, and it ensures the audience sees the world in black and white.	"(The USG) establishes a standard where the only information the public can learn is what the U.S. government wants it to know, which is another way of saying that a classic propaganda model has been created." - Greenwald
Crisis Point	We must act now...	Creates a sense of panic that action must be taken now.	Without Crisis Point, there is no immediacy/ impulsive need to take action.	"We are at an inflection point in human history." - Tye
Modus Operandi	...by 'freeing' all information/ working against the interests of governments who seek to control that information.	Provides the appropriate, even heroic, way to resist.	Without Modus Operandi, there is no clearly defined (and sanctioned) way to defeat the enemy.	"Even if it's really risky or dangerous, that moral narrative at the heart of video games... formed part of [Snowden's] moral understanding of the world and one's obligation as an individual." - Greenwald
Inoculation	If we stay true to our course...	Prevents compromise on the part of the audience; inoculates audience from counter-messages by declaring the "enemy" lies, without needing evidence of such.	Without Inoculation, audience members might enter into dialogue with the enemy, find common ground, or explore truth themselves and discover the complexity in issues.	"I made what I thought was the very unremarkable and uncontroversial observation that the reason why we have a free press is because national security officials routinely lie to the population in order to shield their power...[the media's] role is to be loyal spokespeople to those powerful factions...." -Greenwald
Reward	...we will achieve victory and see true freedom and equality for all oppressed.	Provides a motivating vision for the audience.	Without Reward, there is no goal to work toward.	"The purpose of WikiLeaks is to promote justice" - Assange

Different components of the above narrative breakdown are delivered separately or are paired with others. Different speakers emphasize different components, and different audiences put weight in different components. When addressing the importance of each element, this paper considers audiences who sympathize with anarchists' frustration with the government, or the state of world affairs, but who do not agree with their methods of amelioration, as most important. Audiences who outright reject both grievances and methods of amelioration are unlikely to be swayed by the above. Audiences who have already emotionally invested in the above narrative are convinced of its justness, but the above components show how aligned thinkers may be moved towards actions in support of the narrative. The discussion below further explains the narrative's component parts:

Decline: *Decline* assures its audience that the world is unjust. *Decline* is the most important part of the narrative, as the idea that the world is not as it should be is the moral justification for all actions that follow.

Two Camps: *Two Camps* identifies the enemy who is responsible for the unjust world the audience finds themselves in. It also helps support *Inoculation* by creating a black and white world where compromise is not possible.

Crisis Point: *Crisis Point* is used sometimes to urge audience members to action, though also frequently to justify actions after the fact.

Modus Operandi: Narratives differ most in their *Modus Operandi*. This iteration of the anarchist narrative calls on the audience to take direct action, which includes leaking sensitive or classified information to journalists and the public. Other movements call for civil disobedience, voting, donating money, or in rare cases, such as violent Salafism, or anarchic groups like the Red Army Faction, violence. This paper is most concerned with attempts to inspire individuals to leak.

Inoculation: *Inoculation* is meant to keep audience members from being swayed by alternative viewpoints. *Inoculation* messages assert that there is only one truth and anyone disagreeing is lying, or is a threat. This is not to say *Inoculation* messages are always duplicitous; rather, many notable

anarchists genuinely believe their messages, such as those that assert the government will lie and deceive at will, are *a priori* true.

Reward: *Reward* provides the goal for the audience; it is often vague and unattainable, but always worth striving for. In his preface to *Master of Mankind*, for example, Marcus Raskin notes that the importance of Chomsky's writings is that his words become "a bellwether of what could be"⁶⁰.

Why Narratives Matter

In 1774 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe published *The Sorrows of Young Werther* in which the protagonist, a young German man, Werther, is caught in a love triangle. Realizing that for the greater happiness of all, one of the triumvirate must die, Werther kills himself. The novel was such a success that, as the story goes, German high-society was struck by a rash of suicides with Goethe having reportedly said "my friends...thought they must transform poetry into reality"⁶¹. Copycat suicides are, not surprisingly, more complicated than Goethe would have you believe, but the pithiness is a useful reminder that actions and words can inspire other people to do likewise.

At least one study on clustered suicides suggested that social learning bears some responsibility. In his study, Alex Mesoudi of the University of London used agent-based simulations to discern "the social learning processes" causing clustered suicides. Mesoudi found that one-to-one interaction did generate clusters of suicide (though Mesoudi notes that individuals' tendency to associate themselves with like-minded people could certainly bias this outcome). More worrisome, Mesoudi found that mass media could likewise create clusters of suicides despite weak social links, which

60 *ibid.* Chomsky, *Preface*, 11

61 Wyrwicka, Wanda "Imitation in Human and Animal Behavior" (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996) p. 26.

he theorized could be due to celebrity prestige⁶²⁶³. It's likely that strong-social links, prestige-bias, and homophily are necessary but not sufficient to create clustered mass suicides, though they do suggest that likelihood of anti-social, anti-normative behavior is increased when given a prestigious, mass-disseminated example, especially if that example shares some social connections to other parts of the polity.

Author and lawyer Cass Sunstein calls this social learning substantiation “an availability cascade,” which he defines as “a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse⁶⁴.” That is, the more an opinion is expressed, the more people assess it as true and begin to personally invest in it. As Sunstein notes, “individuals endorse the perception partly by learning from the apparent beliefs of others and partly by distorting their public responses in the interest of maintaining social acceptance⁶⁵.”

This phenomenon, despite “narrative” and “setting the narrative” being perhaps the two most exhausting phrases of American political horse-race discussions, is the reason the history of anarchism and its contemporary narrative is so important to understand. With a visible celebrity at the helm, strengthening social-links through sites like reddit and 4chan, twitter and facebook, and a deep historical tradition, it becomes easier and easier to morally justify anti-social actions; leaking classified documents, in this case, being the most worrisome course of action to the intelligence community.

It's also not without some cause: it would be difficult to blame anyone for not believing either their mortgage broker or Wall St after the 2008 financial collapse. Likewise, when politicians make promises on the stump

62 Mesoudi A (2009) The Cultural Dynamics of Copycat Suicide. PLoS ONE 4(9): e7252. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007252

63 see also “Changes in suicide rates following media reports on celebrity suicide: a meta-analysis” Niederkrötenhaler, et. al., *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, Vol. 66, No. 11 (November 2012), p. 1037-1042. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23275531>

64 Sunstein, Cass and Kuran, Tim, “Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation” *Stanford Law Review* Vol. 51, No. 4 (Apr., 1999), p. 683-768. Available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1229439>

65 Kuran, Timur and Sunstein, Cass R., *Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation*. *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1999; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 181; U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 384. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=138144>

and fail to deliver—even if the cause is for the sake of the greater good or compromise—it understandably helps feed a narrative of the corruption of traditional bastions of authority. Further, the intelligence community’s own spotted history, along with its *a priori* embrace of secrecy—and just as important, decades of Hollywood blockbusters peddling conerns of Big Brother, and conspiracy-mongering fringe media personalities⁶⁶—makes it an easy target for anyone looking to morally justify anti-social behavior.

Of course, it is decidedly *not* the job of the intelligence community to handle perceptions of the government as underhanded—or worse—but, in order to be an effective community with the support of the governed, it *should* be its concern. The presumptive first course of action in government is to *just tell* audiences that our actions are just, that our ideological adversaries are wrong, and expect the message to resonate. To be fair, that probably would have been sufficient for many eras; government was sufficiently credible among the polity to rely on their say-so. However, an important but understated part of the cultural milieu of the internet age is the decreasing influence of traditional bastions of authority. Lawyer and cognitive behavioral researcher Dan Kahan, in a *Harvard Law Review* foreword on the increasingly divisive cultural reception to Supreme Court rulings, attributes this lack of agreement to systemic cognitive issues. “The study of motivated reasoning,” notes Kahan, “shows that individuals are predisposed to fit their perceptions of policy-relevant facts to their group commitments. In the course of public deliberations, these facts become suffused with antagonistic meanings that transform utilitarian policy-making into occasions for symbolic status competition^{67 68}.” No doubt, cognitive biases play a deep and invisible role in how people emotionally invest in the views they hold. An October 2013 poll found 70% of Republicans called “mass electronic surveillance” unacceptable, compared to just 46% of Democrats. Eighty-nine percent of Republicans said they did not trust the Obama administration to be “a good guardian of citizens’ personal information,” compared to 32 percent of Democrats, and 58 percent of Republicans said the government would use the information for any

66 Jones, Alex “It’s Time to Admit, 9/11 Truthers Were Right.” Available at <http://www.infowars.com/its-time-to-admit-the-911-truthers-were-right/>

67 Kahan, Dan “Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law” *Harvard Law Review* Vol. 125, No. 1. (November 2011) Available at <http://harvardlawreview.org/2011/11/neutral-principles-motivated-cognition-and-some-problems-for-constitutional-law/>

68 See also Kahan “The Politically Motivated Reasoning Paradigm”

purpose it chooses, compared to 32 percent of Democrats⁶⁹. This would seem to mirror conventional wisdom: Republicans, per their Burkean tradition, are skeptical of government power. On the other hand, the polling-by-party results were the exact opposite after the revelations that former President Bush had signed an executive order significantly less restrictive than the Section 215 measure passed by the House of Representatives, suggesting that party affiliation—which is simply cognitive bias manifested as tribalism—is a strong indicator of surveillance views⁷⁰. The implication for the intelligence communities' communications is that no matter what leadership says or does, or whatever press release the intelligence community puts out, the vast majority of audience members are preconditioned to use what they hear or read to support whichever conclusions they've already invested in. Alternatively, Kahan's colleague Suzanna Sherry, while not dismissing the role of cognitive biases, finds a much more troubling trend: the devaluation of expertise. As Sherry sees it, "it is the democratization of the creation and authoritativeness of knowledge⁷¹" which sows our growing cultural disconnects.

Stephen Colbert, the entertainer, not surprisingly put it a touch more pithily than the legal scholar, Sherry, in the early days of his Comedy Central show, *The Colbert Report*. Colbert coined the phrase "truthiness" to connote something which was, in his words, "too good not to be true." Colbert promised his audience he was, "no fan of dictionary or reference books...they're elitist. Always telling us what's true or what did or didn't happen. They're all fact," he warned, "no heart⁷²." Not one to sit idly by, Colbert took his message to the people, urging them in later episodes to bring "democracy to knowledge" by logging on and getting the message out that—despite dire predictions from those elitist facts—the African elephant had recently tripled in number and was not, in fact, in danger of extinction. Sure enough, Wikipedia exploded with the news that the African elephants were just fine, thank you. Take that, zoologists.

69 Angus Reid Global, "More Canadians & Britons view Edward Snowden as "hero" than "traitor", Americans split" Available at <http://angusreidglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Snowden-Survey-October-20131.pdf>

70 "Majority Views NSA Phone Tracking as Acceptable Anti-terror Tactic" Available at <http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-phone-tracking-as-acceptable-anti-terror-tactic/>

71 Sherry, Suzanna "Democracy and the Death of Knowledge," 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1053 (2007). Available at <http://harvardlawreview.org/2011/11/democracyaes-distrust-contested-values-and-the-decline-of-expertise/>

72 "The Colbert Report: Videos: The Word (Truthiness)". October 17, 2005. Retrieved January 2, 2009.

What Colbert did for the African elephant, we've seen repeated in manifold ways, as Sherry notes in her rebuttal to Kahan^{73 74}. The erosion of traditional sources of authority have changed the way people ingest evidence: climatologists use tested empirical methods to prove that the climate is in fact, changing, and it's most certainly due to the burning of fossil fuels at an ever increasing rate. And yet, even Kahan notes that exposure to consensus scientific statements on climate change had no more of an impact than placebo statements⁷⁵. Faith-based or tribal-based science has replaced empiricism and years of study and research. Virologists have been studying vaccines since Edward Jenner, and they have tested and re-tested more modern advances, and yet a celebrity is able to so move the masses against vaccinations that in only a few short years long-eradicated diseases have reappeared^{76 77 78}. Faith-based science has replaced doctors' expertise, and with every issue, facts and debate are undermined by trolls and well-intentioned tweeters alike who "just know" that they are right.

Why do we believe the anonymous tweeter, and not the scientist? The naïf, not the expert? Psychologists at the University of Western Canada explored this question⁷⁹. They found that rejecting information—even information easily recognized as false—requires more cognitive effort. That is, it takes a lot of effort to not believe a lie. And when that false information comes in, it becomes even harder to reject if it's delivered by community members you trust, or by a community you belong to. It gets worse. Despite hopes for a newly enlightened plebiscite in the Internet age, the internet has only further sequestered us into think-alike, look-alike, groups: The George Washington University mapped the way internet users surfed the web and

73 Sherry, Suzanna "Democracy's Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline of Expertise" Responding to Dan M. Kahan, "Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review Vol. 125, No. 1 (2011) Available at http://harvardlawreview.org/2011/11/democracyaes-distrust-contested-values-and-the-decline-of-expertise/#_edn17

74 See also, Suzanna Sherry, "Democracy and the Death of Knowledge," 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1053 (2007).

75 Kahan, Dan "The Cultural Cognition Program" Available at <http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2016/5/19/serious-problems-with-the-strongest-evidence-to-date-on-cons.html>

76 "In U.S., Percentage Saying Vaccines Are Vital Dips Slightly" Available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/181844/percentage-saying-vaccines-vital-dips-slightly.aspx>

77 "Jenny McCarthy: 'We're Not An Anti-Vaccine Movement ... We're Pro-Safe Vaccine'" 23 March 2015 <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/jenny-mccarthy-were-not-an-anti-vaccine-movement-were-pro-safe-vaccine/>

78 Sifferlin, Alexandra "4 Diseases Making a Comeback Thanks to Anti-Vaxxers" 17 March 2014 Available at <http://time.com/27308/4-diseases-making-a-comeback-thanks-to-anti-vaxxers/>

79 Lewandowsky, Stephan, Ecker, Ullrich K. H., Seifert, Colleen M., Schwarz, Norbert and Cook, John "Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing" Journal of Psychologic Science in the Public Interest. September 2012 (Vol. 13, No. 3)


found they rarely interacted with blogs or news sites which they perceived to disagree with⁸⁰. It's not surprising; we humans love to have our ideas and beliefs reconfirmed; it's easier on the mind.

This is best demonstrated by the work of Gilad Lotan. Lotan is the Chief Data Scientist at Betaworks—a company that describes itself as making products that “thoughtfully combine art and science.” In an article published on the news site Medium, Lotan visually explored the relationship between social media users and how they ingest news⁸¹. In the era of network TV, newspaper and radio, credible sources delivered news to passive audience members. Lotan's visualization below shows a much different model. In this model many individuals, sometimes of indiscernible credibility, deliver information to active users who pass that information on and, by doing so, “give credibility” to the sources they re-tweet.

As explained by Lotan, nodes on the visualization are Twitter users, and their connections to other nodes represent follow relationships. The larger a node, the more followed that account is within this group, and presumably, the higher credibility it has within the group. The closer together two nodes, the more connections they share. Lotan has given different colors to help visualize disparate groups responding to a reported Israeli shelling of HAMAS positions at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency school in Beit Hanoun between July 25th and 30th, 2014. Green is pro-Palestinian, light blue pro-Israeli, dark-blue American supporters of Israel, and grey the global media.

80 Lawrence, Eric, Sides, John, and Farrell, Henry “Self-Segregation or Deliberation? Blog Readership, Participation, and Polarization in American Politics” Available at <http://home.gwu.edu/~jsides/blogs.pdf>

81 Lotan, Gilad “Israel, Gaza, War & Data: Social Networks and the Art of Personalizing Propaganda.” August 2014. Available at <https://medium.com/i-data/israel-gaza-war-data-a54969aeb23e#o19wfsul3>



Lotan’s visualization of twitter “conversations” shows that opposing viewpoints rarely interact, suggesting that pro-Palestinian communicators rarely reach pro-Israeli audiences, and vice versa, making it highly likely those communicators are simply reinforcing their own views with sympathetic audiences and not changing anyone’s mind.

All of this puts the intelligence community in a precarious position, metaphorically on thin-ice: communicate with audiences, and some significant percentage will assume you are obfuscating. Don’t communicate, and you eventually concede the entire discussion to your ideological rivals. At the same time, credibility is hard fought, and easily lost. Gaining—or regaining—credibility is a profitable profession in the private sector. American companies have recently been sanctioned by the Federal Trade Commission for trying to manipulate public beliefs through so-called “native advertising” —an attempt to give an authentic, credible message, that doesn’t appear to be a corporate-created, big-business attempt to make a buck⁸². Even if such an approach works, the intelligence community obviously can’t—and shouldn’t—use deception to increase its credibility, and any attempt at manipulating the cultural zeitgeist must be rejected. So this begs the question of what, then, in the internet age, ethically creates or restores credibility, and how can the intelligence community go about pursuing it?

82 “FTC Issues Enforcement Policy Statement Addressing “Native” Advertising and Deceptively Formatted Advertisements: Available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/ftc-issues-enforcement-policy-statement-addressing-native>

It is the recommendation of this paper that radical transparency and a re-conceptualizing of our communications offices can engender the credibility the intelligence community needs to perform its duties in the coming decades, and in light of the increasingly powerful anarchic ideology of growing parts of the American polity. The following section posits several policy recommendations, all with the goal of making the intelligence community more transparent and more effective in our communications in an effort to restore or increase the credibility of the intelligence community executives and communicators, and ultimately secure the trust of the American polity.

During the writing of this paper, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its “Principles of Transparency,” and named Alex Joel, current Civil Liberties Protection Officer and head of the Civil Liberty and Privacy Office, as Transparency Officer⁸³. The Principles of Transparency are: Provide appropriate transparency to enhance public understanding of the IC; Be proactive and clear in making information publicly available; Protect information about intelligence sources, methods, and activities; and Align IC roles, resources, processes, and policies to support transparency implementation. The recommendations below align with those guiding principles, and build on the foundation the Director of National Intelligence and Mr. Joel have established.

Further, the following recommendations borrow from existing intelligence community offices to provide a model for implementing a transparency regime. First, under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive develops plans for information sharing—as well as information security—among intelligence agencies and monitors their implementation, as well as provides a mechanism for auditing the systems⁸⁴. Second is Mr. Joel’s primary role as the Civil Liberties Protection Officer, which charges him with “ensuring that the protection of privacy and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated in intelligence community policies and procedures, overseeing

83 “ODNI Releases Transparency Implementation Plan” Available at <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/210-press-releases-2015/1275-odni-releases-transparency-implementation-plan>

84 Corin R. Stone, Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Statement for the Record before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee*, March 10., 2011 Available at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20110310_testimony_stone.pdf

compliance by the ODNI with privacy and civil liberties laws, reviewing complaints of possible abuses of privacy and civil liberties in programs and operations administered by the ODNI, and ensuring that the use of technology sustains...privacy⁸⁵”

A note of caution for the reader: after the 9/11 attacks, the buzzword in legislative circles and among Washington policy gadflies was “sharing” of information in the intelligence community. Despite the statutory mandates in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, many inside and outside the community faulted intelligence officers for not sharing enough in advance of the failed Christmas Day bombing of North West Air flight 253 in 2009, eight-plus years after 9/11⁸⁶.

In January of 2009, the DNI issued Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 501, *Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the Intelligence Community*⁸⁷. This Directive requires that “IC elements shall treat information collected and analysis produced as national assets and, as such, shall act as stewards of information who have a predominant ‘responsibility to provide [that information].’” The Directive adds that “‘Stewards’ . . . shall fulfill their ‘responsibility to provide’ by making all information collected and analysis produced by an IC element available for discovery by automated means by authorized IC personnel, unless otherwise determined by the DNI.” While the ICD was almost certainly in the pipeline before Christmas 2008, the very need for an ICD so long after sharing was made a strategic priority by executive, congressional, and intelligence community leaders only reinforces how difficult a change it was.

This shouldn’t be surprising. For one, sharing is—to borrow a phrase from former President George Bush—really hard work. The ten year anniversary report on sharing initiatives by the Information Sharing Executive makes evident the breadth and depth of the problem of sharing information

85 Mr. Alexander Joel bio, available at <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/leadership/civil-liberties-protection-officer>

86 Goldstein, David. McClatchy News Papers “14 intelligence Failures Found in Christmas Day Bomb Attempt” Available at <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/article24583081.html>

87 Intelligence Community Directive 501. Available at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_501.pdf

across 17 intelligence community agencies, a handful of non-intelligence community federal agencies, and State, Local and Tribal partners⁸⁸.

Perhaps the bigger takeaway, however, from the 15 years since 9/11 is the difficulty of having a *strategy* that goes against *culture*⁸⁹. It's fairly easy to implement new strategies, but if they run counter to the prevailing culture they are likely to fail. How long it took for a "sharing" culture to take sufficient hold is not surprising either: as a general rule, corporate or bureaucratic culture is incredibly difficult to change⁹⁰. Thus, policy and programmatic changes need to be accompanied by cultural changes inside the IC, which will be the longer term challenge for intelligence community leadership to address.

The failure to create a sharing regime was not just the result of the difficulty of existing cultural headwinds, of course; years after the swearing in of the first Director of National Intelligence disincentives remained largely the same for rank-and-file intelligence community employees: a junior analyst was unlikely to share when there was little reason to go against the cultural default of protecting information, and had every reason to avoid accidentally oversharing (to steer clear of official sanction, and possible legal consequences). For almost fifteen years the intelligence community has gotten better and better at sharing, but through the creation of bureaucratic mechanisms meant to nudge it along, and through lessons learned the hard way, not through either strategic fiat, nor through rapid and wholesale cultural changes. It's unlikely that similar cultural changes *vis a vis* transparency will take place overnight, suggesting the need for bureaucratic mechanisms to nudge change to happen. As such, changing and strengthening the culture is an intended secondary effect of the policy recommendations below.

88 Information Sharing Environment Annual Report to Congress 2011. Available at https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/ISE_Annual_Report_to_Congress_2011.pdf

89 Merchant, *Nilofer Harvard Business Review* "Culture Trumps Strategy, Every Time" Available at <https://hbr.org/2011/03/culture-trumps-strategy-every>

90 Katzenbach, Jon R. Et. Al. *Harvard Business Review* "Cultural Change That Sticks" Available at <https://hbr.org/2012/07/cultural-change-that-sticks>

Recommendations

Communications

Returning to the detailed contemporary narrative breakdown previously discussed, the following recommends a framework for government communicators to use when assessing both responses to queries and proactive communications.

A note of caution: there exists a temptation to say what seems expedient in the moment, but not support it with the necessary corresponding action. To be clear, words without actions, or mistruths in the name of a greater good, will backfire on messengers and give further credence to anti-government narratives.

That said, for each part of the contemporary anarchist's narrative, there's an opportunity to undermine that message with audiences who sympathize with the movement's grievances, but are unsure of how to bring resolution to them. In these instances, the goal is *not* to convince the audience to like the government, but to use other methods to change the system; rallying, voting, donating to advocacy groups, rather than leaking classified information, or seeing someone else leaking information as a legitimate action.

Countering the Contemporary Anarchist Narrative: A Structured Approach:

Element:	Message:	Counter-messages should...	Possible Counter-messages include:
Decline	The world has gone awry...	Disrupt anarchist's interpretation of intelligence community intentions.	Anarchists' understanding of the subject matter is tenuous and biased, even if well-intentioned. Good intel prevents wars. Problematic programs have been continually scaled back or brought under more oversight since the shock of the years after 9/11.
Two Camps	...because of an enemy that seeks to subjugate us.	Show that policy decisions have shades of grey; disrupt claims that this is a struggle between only good and evil.	Contra the anarchists, there is significant grey area. There's no "us vs them" construct in a democracy. Eg: NSA supports robust commercial encryption.
Crisis Point	We must act now...	Ease panic that spurs individuals to immediate, extreme action, in favor of debate, demonstration, and advocacy, voting.	Our shared history shows that the arc of movement in our country, in the words of MLK, "bends towards justice."
Modus Operandi	...by 'freeing' all information/ working against the interests of governments who seek to control that information.	Undermine the belief of leaking as a positive, affirmative action.	Journalists collect awards, their sources go to jail. WH/ODNI is expanding protections and opportunities for whistleblowers. Real change comes from organizing and voting.
Inoculation	If we stay true to our course...	Undermine anarchist's use of suspicion to a priori shield their audience from intelligence community, non-anarchist arguments.	Intelligence community has multiple branches of oversight, including the peoples' elected representatives. We can be poor messengers, but we never intentionally deceive. Please judge all the evidence for yourself before you come to a conclusion: don't take our word for it, but don't take anyone else's either.
Reward	...we will achieve victory and see true freedom and equality for all oppressed.	Demonstrate how historically anarchists' methods don't lead to their stated goals.	Democracy as the "best-worst government" because of our self-correcting nature.

The following provides further analysis of the “how” and “why” of countering the anarchist narrative:

Decline messages provide the audience with a framing of the world that suggests it is unjust, and not as it was or should be, and provide the base for future arguments that will be made. Communications which emphasize progress, while acknowledging that it can be uneven, may undermine *Decline*.

President Obama, for example, in his commencement address at Rutgers University in May 2015, urged his young audience to not overinflate their sense of what life used to be like: “When you hear someone longing for the “good old days,” take it with a grain of salt. ...I guess it’s part of human nature, especially in times of change and uncertainty, to want to look backwards and long for some imaginary past when everything worked...and all politicians were wise. Guess what. It ain’t so. The good old days’ weren’t that great. In fact, by almost every measure, America is better, and the world is better, than it was 50 years ago, or 30 years ago, or even eight years ago.”

Likewise, messages that emphasize how the intelligence community has evolved since our own blighted past can help undermine the appeal of *decline*. On 27 June, 2013, The Washington Post published a question and answer with former Church Committee staffer Loch Johnson. One notable question and answer follows:

“Washington Post: How do you compare the abuses of the 1950s and 1960s to the more recent revelations of NSA spying activity?”

Loch Johnson: It’s like night and day. Before the Church Committee, these agencies were engaged in lots of things that were questionable. Operation CHAOS and COINTEL-PRO, [surveillance of domestic protesters] disrupted the lives [of protesters] and ruined their reputations. In the case of Dr. King, to attempt to get them to commit suicide. Covert actions in Chile [working to undermine the Allende

government]. All kinds of things happened when the oversight was thin.

After the Church Committee and the Rockefeller Committee [an executive branch investigation of surveillance abuses led by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller], I think the obedience to the law and the realization that it's firmly under the law and must obey the rules of oversight has been firmly entrenched."

Johnson's candid answers undermine the *Decline* narrative by demonstrating how, while things are decidedly imperfect, we have come quite far from the worst abuses of power in the 1960s.

Two Camps messages frame the world in black-and-white for the audience, and like *Inoculation*, attempt to prevent compromise. Counter-messages must emphasize that there is plenty of grey area in debates about the role of the intelligence community.

Counter-messages can stress that black and white world views are not always morally right. As President Obama cautioned at South by Southwest—the annual technology, culture and music festival—on the need for compromise on encryption and security, “We’re going to have to make some decisions about how we balance those respective risks. We’ve engaged the tech community aggressively to help solve this problem. You can’t take an absolutist stance on this.”

Crisis Point messages seek to engender a need for action immediately by the audience. Much like the argument for *Reward* counter-messages below, it’s important to acknowledge that while audiences are just in their wariness of government action, a look at the evidence suggests that rather than the security state only getting more and more powerful, declassified documents have shown that certain programs came under more and more oversight. For instance, declassified documents have shown that what began in the Bush administration as an executive order, STELLARWIND, came under increasing more oversight in all three branches of government as time went on.

Others have written about the rigorous oversight that exists now: noted privacy advocate Geoffrey Stone recently expressed admiration—while noting support for additional reforms—for NSA: “The more I worked with the NSA, the more respect I had for them as far as staying within the bounds of what they were authorized to do. And they were careful and had a high degree of integrity. My superficial assumption of the NSA being a bad guy was completely wrong.”

Modus Operandi messages provide the intended audience with a course of action to right the wrong of *Decline*. The anarchist narrative of concern to the intelligence community encourages the audience to leak sensitive or classified information to journalists and the public. Other movements call for civil disobedience, voting, or, in rare cases such as the Red Army Faction, violence. Providing audiences with alternative courses of action is paramount. In this way, the government has made great strides since 2008, strengthening whistleblower protections, and providing other avenues for intelligence community employees who want to discuss potential fraud, waste, and abuse. Finding avenues to show audiences that the whistleblower system works would likely undermine *Modus Operandi* messages aimed at encouraging leaks from current and future employees.

Further, President Obama in his commencement address at Rutgers University in May 2015 urged students to use the democratic process for change:

“Have faith in democracy. Look, I know it’s not always pretty... But it’s how, bit by bit, generation by generation, we have made progress in this nation. That’s how we banned child labor. That’s how we cleaned up our air and our water... None of these changes happened overnight. They didn’t happen because some charismatic leader got everybody suddenly to agree on everything. It didn’t happen because some massive political revolution occurred. It actually happened over the course of years of advocacy, and organizing, and alliance-building, and deal-making, and the changing of public opinion. It happened because ordinary Americans who cared participated in the political process.”

Communications which emphasize the ability of Americans to bring about change at the ballot box, and through advocacy, could undermine attempts to get Americans to leak—or support leaking—sensitive documents.


Inoculation messages attempt to make sure the audience doesn't see an avenue for compromise. They make sure that the *Modus Operandi* narrative is the only path to correcting *Decline*. Messages that emphasize the government's good faith—and fallibility—are most likely to counter *Inoculation* messages. *Inoculation* works in no small part because of the history of government's abuse of its authority.

For example, it's impossible to understate the impact that the US government attempts to undermine the civil rights movement in the 1960s, and its leader Martin Luther King, Jr., have had on its credibility. It will always remain an open wound which sows distrust between the polity—particularly communities of color—and the government. Author Ta-Nehisi Coates in his best-selling novel, *Between the World and Me*, cautions his son that many Americans live in a “Dream” in which racial bias is a thing of the past, rather than the foundation on which this country is built. In the book, Coates intones: “One cannot, at once, claim to be superhuman and then plead mortal error. I propose to take our countrymen's claims of American exceptionalism seriously, which is to say I propose subjecting our country to an exceptional moral standard.”

Messages that hope to undermine *Inoculation* should take Coates' proposal. The intelligence community must hold itself to the highest standards of American exceptionalism at all times, which means a fearless and constant accounting for the sins of our predecessors.

Reward counter-messages should always acknowledge the imperfect nature of governments. But it's fair to point out that democracy—especially the American experiment in it—has a self-correcting nature that, in the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., bends towards justice. Counter-messages that acknowledge the audiences' need for vigilance against democracies encroaching on freedom and justice, while also demonstrating the long history of our democracy improving and adapting, are best used to undermine *Reward*.

Visualizing Website Construct:



Public Affairs Outreach

The continual re-conceptualizing of the public affairs office mode of communications—from one which communicated with select journalists to one that communicates with the public—should continue to be a priority of the intelligence community leadership. While the Office of the Director of National Intelligence structure created a more efficient community across several cabinets, departments and agencies—not to mention authorities and oversight, budgets and authorizations— whilst preventing, in DNI Clapper’s words, the individual departments and agencies from turning into “one bland bowl of oatmeal,” communications offices have had a harder time coalescing. One practical recommendation to address this is re-ordering the audience-facing websites around two parameters. First, while the ODNI is at the center of the 17 agency community—where each agency shares a membership in the world of intelligence—each agency still retains its unique culture and expertise. As such, it’s important to maintain individual landing pages for each agency to reinforce both their shared and unique elements. The second parameter is organizing content around three types of information central to intelligence community continuity: bureaucratic mechanisms, including legal authorizations; analysis; and recruiting.

Rather than reinventing the existing social media spaces, current architecture can be re-oriented and repurposed. ICtheRecord.tumblr.com, created at the request of the White House to give the public greater access to documents declassified during the summer of 2013, can be used as a repository for all documents relevant to intelligence community bureaucratic operations, including legal authorities, opinions, and internal Intelligence Community Directives. The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends page can be used as a repository for declassified or unclassified IC analytic products. The Global Trends page should be seen as the place for the public—including academics and other subject matter experts—to engage with intelligence community analysts. Intelligencecareers.gov could remain as it is, with an additional mission of educating the population at large. The schematic below better shows the interplay:

This reorganization aligns with the transparency principles promise that in order to “account for the new and changing ways in which information

is communicated...the IC must also make information available through other channels that the public uses.”

Authorities: IContheRecord.tumblr.com was created in response to a White House tasking to provide a website where the IC and Justice Department could house all the declassified documents related to authorities for electronic surveillance. In time, the page also housed press releases and videos of intelligence community seniors speaking at surveillance-themed academic events. Twice it hosted public question and answer sessions with the public. *IContheRecord* could be expanded to be the clearinghouse for all declassified or produced documents relating to IC legal authorities.

Analysis: Successive iterations of the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends reports have increased engagement with academics and the public, with the latest report soliciting comments from the public on their website, <https://nicglobaltrends.tumblr.com>. The website asks the public to “join the conversation.” Global Trends, generally, and the National Intelligence Council specifically, should be the intelligence community’s public-facing “think tank.”

Recruiting: One of the potential long-term challenges posed by the recent leaks is the impact on recruiting top talent, particularly computer scientists, to the intelligence community. Setting aside a page only for recruiting accomplishes several goals: first, and most pragmatic, it provides one-stop shopping for all intelligence community openings for those interested. Further, posting all the jobs in one place gives the casual reader a look into the daily work of the intelligence community; it’s not just comprised of spies and hackers but analysts, economists, doctors, engineers, and any number of vocations as well.

Moreover, just as the Global Trends site allows for public interaction, the recruiting site can also be configured to accept questions from the public. As will be discussed in the next segment, being transparent about the IC’s history and present day activities is an incredibly important component of a transparent bureaucracy.

“119ers”

Intelligence Community Directive 119 (“ICD 119”) was created to streamline the various media contact policies across the 17 agencies of the intelligence community, with the intention of simplifying the processes across departments and agencies⁹¹. The media reception was decidedly negative as journalists, academics and privacy advocates alike saw it as a reflexive bureaucratic response to stem the tide of leaks. Journalists decried a potential loss of sources, academics a loss of expert perspectives, and privacy advocates the chilling effect on potential whistleblowers. While the crafting of the ICD was a painful—if well-intentioned and necessary—bureaucratic exercise to align intelligence community guidelines, it is also not impossible that the ICD will lead to the effects its antagonists fear.

As the Principles of Transparency note, “To be effective, ...the IC should communicate with the public through social and traditional media, direct engagement with external stakeholders, and participation in academic and other conferences, and deploy a broader range of communicators.” This paper recommends creating training opportunities for designating IC analysts “119 cleared” to directly engage with such stakeholders, including think tanks and the media.

There are two principal objections to rebut: first, and most considerable, is the chance that 119ers, no matter how well trained, could accidentally leak details about operations, which could then appear in the media. The second is that analysts might appear to disagree with elected officials, and create the dreaded “Intelligence Community Disagrees with White House” headline. To the former, I’d suggest that it’s a risk worth taking in a full balancing of national security, but a trial period with only senior analysts, and addressing topics of less concern could be useful. Adopting the Transparency Principles suggests that the IC has already accepted that some risks might have to be taken in pursuit of greater transparency, which careful training and selection will mitigate. The latter, too, is mitigated by both training and careful selection of personnel, but also reflects the need to understand the paradigm shift in the way we

91 Intelligence Community Directive 119 “Media Contacts” Available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20119.pdf>

perceive our ability to control narratives. As discussed earlier, audiences increasingly self-select stories and analysis of those stories that fits their pre-determined cognitive biases, whether they be political or happenstance. In the next decade the problem is likely to be exacerbated, and the idea that a public affairs office can control audience access and perspective is a dangerous and ultimately self-defeating illusion.

As a component of the training, 119ers will need to be taught key communications tactics, such as how to ensure that their discussions are off the record, how to handle confrontational academics and journalists, and also, how to make sure they present all sides of an argument, so as not to appear wedded to one conclusion. None of these skill sets are unfamiliar to either analysts—who go through significant training on how to brief policy makers and how to engage foreign intelligence services—or the professional communicators who staff the public affairs offices of the intelligence community. The benefit to journalists and academics of having access to intelligence community analysts is not to see what the intelligence community thinks, but how it thinks, what range of conclusions are relevant, which information might be weighed more heavily and which discarded. Moreover, the opportunity to see how intelligence analysts think and work, is a valuable part of transparency.

Further, a recent DNI memo to intelligence community leaders, surveying their opinion on how a number of measures could impact classification, or over-classification, asked what the impact would be from removing CONFIDENTIAL from the classification guide⁹². Besides the arguments the DNI makes (simplifying classification procedures, focusing derivative classifications on what is most important, and aligning with allies' systems), removing CONFIDENTIAL—the standard classification for non-derived, intelligence community coordinated analysis—would open up analysts to work with think tanks, academics, and journalists as they assess publicly available information.

92 Director of National Intelligence Memorandum, "Addendum to the FY 2017 Fundamental Classification Guidance Review" Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/dni-fcgr.pdf>

Cultural Nudges

As discussed previously, changing culture is incredibly difficult. And challenging normative behaviors—specifically in the case of the intelligence community, an instinctive bias towards not letting secrets out the door—can be even more difficult. Author Cass Sunstein coined the term “nudge” to define “interventions that preserve freedom of choice but that nonetheless influence people’s decisions,” which might be better considered as any non-compulsory position, law, or policy that attempts to influence behavior⁹³. The following proposals are “quick wins;” easily implementable, non-compulsory actions meant to “nudge” the intelligence community culture towards transparency.

Performance Evaluations: Adding transparency goals to mid and upper level managers’ performance evaluations will push management to better value transparency initiatives. Examples of requirements could be as innocuous as “lead annual office or group-level transparency review.”

Similarly, including goals related to engagement with outside audiences in performance evaluations would encourage more transparency across all levels of employees. Not all analysts could or should be 119ers, but participating in recruiting fairs, returning to speak to students at *alma maters*, and participating in dialogue with other colleagues and think tanks could all help nudge the IC towards a culture of transparency. In the case of changing culture, every little bit of emphasis on transparency from the top down counts.

Layered Declassification Prompts: Currently, classified intelligence reports are declassified after 25 years, barring an injunction by the executive branch to extend the classification, per Executive Order 13526⁹⁴. Those 25 years, and any action extending the classification, are meant to protect sources and methods, especially in the case of human sources where not only is protecting life and property paramount, but so is assuring future sources that their cooperation with the US government will be kept secret.

93 Sunstein, Cass R., “Which Nudges Do People Like? A National Survey “ June 22, 2015 Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2619899> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2619899>

94 “Executive Order 13526- Classified National Security Information” Available at <https://www.white-house.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information>

Creating a parallel mechanism for group-level managers to nominate on an annual or *ad hoc* basis, documents or analysis for declassification likewise could nudge culture towards transparency. Creating a mechanism for nominating pieces for *ad hoc* declassification both sends a message to the workforce of the importance of transparency, and provides an opportunity to provide information that might be useful to the public dialogue.

Resilient Social Networks: Like other Americans, intelligence community employees read twitter and engage in social media, and rumor travels quickly around the hallways. As anti-intelligence community advocates have benefited from strong social networks to encourage leaks, inside the intelligence community walls leaders should also be ensuring our social networks are strong enough to withstand the rise and fall of the polities' feelings about the intelligence community.

While security dictates employees not use their work computers to read stories on leaks, it behooves leadership to encourage employees to read the stories at home, and engage their leadership with questions. Intelligence community employees should be encouraged to discuss among themselves, and with the inspector general, *ombuds*, and general counsel, programs described in the media that make them concerned. In the absence of strong internal social networks—in which people are encouraged to discuss concerns openly—the intelligence community invites invective from the outside to poison the environment. When stories break that sufficiently enrage the public, the intelligence community must be talking to its employees, even if it means removing programs from special cabinets to allow the community to be briefed on them.

Imagining Potential Futures

As Kissinger advised his readers, there's nothing harder than conceiving of futures outside our present. The hope is that in the intelligence community's achieving an authentic transparency, it can regain lost credibility with the American people, stem a flow of future leaks, continue to recruit dedicated civil servants for decades to come, and fulfill a mission to keep the American people and our allies safe and prosperous. History suggests, however, that anarchism is unlikely to recede as a legitimate and influential political theory. As Chomsky noted, the essence of anarchism is "...the conviction that the burden of proof has to be placed on authority, and that it should be dismantled if that burden cannot be met⁹⁵." That is to say, no matter how transparent the intelligence community becomes, it will never assuage all of its critics, never be able to meet some commentators' burdens of proof, and as such, never exist without someone, somewhere, calling for its banishment.

Like Wittgenstein, I'm inclined to now ask my readers to throw away all that they have read. A brief digression: in the mid-2000s, media exposure of al-Qa'ida's penchant for killing far more Muslims than Westerners grew considerably. According to documents released by the intelligence community following the raid on Usama bin Laden, the al-Qa 'ida leader was himself very concerned that his brand had been tarnished due to this exposure, going so far as to spitball a name change with a subordinate^{96,97}. Think bankrupt Worldcom rebranding as the same company with a new name, MCI⁹⁸. It would have been logical for outside experts to think that al-Qa 'ida, faced with a tarnished brand, would stop killing their co-religionists—or at least mitigate the fall-out from incidental homicides—and thus mitigate its criticism. This action would have been damaging to al-Qa'ida's adversaries' efforts to paint them as little more than murderous thugs.

95 "Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias" ed Ludlow, Peter. (Cambridge: MIT Press 2001) 436, originally from "Red and Black Revolution," 1996

96 "Letters From Abbottabad" West Point Counterterrorism Center Available at <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined>

97 See also for example Burke, Jason "Bin Laden wanted to change al-Qaida's bloodied name" *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/24/bin-laden-documents-alqaida-struggle>

98 Elliot, Stuart "What's in a name? As WorldCom becomes MCI, history and reputation loom large." *The New York Times* <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/16/business/media-business-advertising-what-s-name-worldcom-becomes-mci-history-reputation.html>

But al-Qa'ida never re-branded, and never stopped killing more Muslims than Westerners. Instead, over time, many who ascribed to the ideology of al-Qa'ida ascribed to the ideology of ISIS, a far more nihilistic iteration. It wasn't because of any single driver, but it does demonstrate that movements, if not ameliorated, will grow increasingly more violent. Al-Qa'ida is not the only example. The Red Army Faction of Ulrik Meinhof began as a peaceful, politically-left movement created in response to social justice issues, and wary of a return of fascism in Europe. But each successive incarnation of the Red Army Faction was increasingly violent and increasingly nihilistic, beginning with the burning of a department store, rising to the kidnapping of a judge, and reaching its apogee with the hijacking of a commercial airliner. In the case of the Red Army Faction—and its chief intellectual advocate and eventual propagandist, Ulrik Meinhof—the transition was largely driven by the founders' inability to get any results from the West German government, or western governments at large, when it came to enacting emergency domestic powers in Germany and stemming the increasing violence in southeast Asia. Both al-Qa'ida and the Red Army Faction slowly morphed into ever more violent versions of their earlier selves.

Reading the history the Red Army Faction, it strikes the observer as nihilism from the start. But like the actions of Edward Snowden, it's important to see and understand the logic of violence, or direct action, on the part of the anarchist. In the case of the Red Army Faction, if you believed—as Meinhof did—that democracy was threatened, and if you believed that without democracy you would have in its place fascism akin to the National Socialist Party, and that fascism would lead to the state using its monopoly on violence in an immoral way, then there was a moral imperative to do something. In fact, the history of the movement makes one thing clear: in opposition to most theories of international relations which hold that states are the sole owners of the moral use of force, anarchists reverse the equation, giving the people ownership of the moral use of violence.

These examples aren't meant to lead to a prediction that contemporary anarchists will come to justify violence against the state as not only just but also a moral imperative—though a strain of anarchism has looked the other way or supported acts of vandalism in the protesting of global

economic bodies, such as the G20. This is, however a warning: if a sufficiently large number of people feel the US government—and the intelligence community specifically—is not an instrument used to keep people safe, and rather one to oppress, then violence is a likely outcome.

This spring, an editor for Vox—the online news magazine—was suspended for tweeting encouragement to riot whenever and wherever presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump was speaking. In follow-on tweets he clarified that his desire was to see violence against property, as well as mobs shouting-down the nominee, and not violence directed against people. The reaction was typical: pearl-clutching from his co-travelers on the left, and over-the-top indignation from the right, but few stopped to consider the logic of his words. In his blog, this editor—a committed pacifist and advocate of social equality—had written the following only weeks earlier:

“It is not a matter of simply saying ‘We will not be violent.’ The arguable necessity of force in revolutionary change is not only a matter of bad morals: it is a real problem to be solved, and I do not know how to solve it. I don’t know how to reconcile the demands of radical redistribution with the moral imperative of peace. I do not know how to safeguard against the temptations of expediency⁹⁹.”

When does, to borrow words from Kissinger again, irreconcilable antagonism come to violence? The answer may be disheartening for the intelligence community; a community so invested in keeping people safe, and so assured of our righteousness.

Let’s explore the other side then; if antagonism is *a priori* part of the relationship between anarchists and the government, what then? Better said, philosopher Arthur Applbaum in his book *Ethics for Adversaries* presents the question which Max Weber confronted so eloquently in Germany after the first world war, but before the rise of the National Socialist Party: what, then, is the role of the civil servant? In his treatment, Applbaum imagines the conversation between Charles-Henri Sanson and Louis- Sébastien

99 “Some Brief Thoughts on Political Violence.” Available at <http://emmettrens.com/blog/2016/5/14/some-brief-thoughts-on-political-violence>

Mercier. Sanson was the headsman for Louis XVI, who killed over 3,000 people—including poor Louis, when he became the headsman for the revolutionaries during the *La Terreur*. Mercier, a literary star of the time, and member of the National Convention, voted against the execution of Louis XVI. In the fictional conversation, Mercier criticizes a morality which allows Sanson to kill for whomever commissions him. Sanson defends himself, saying the following:

“When I said before that only an executioner can perform an execution, I was not quibbling about the definitions of words, but saying something important about the meaning of actions. Though all may hope that the good of order the executioner pursues is realized, and though there may be other practices in the positions that contribute to social order, only an executioner can pursue this good through violent means. For anyone other than the executioner to employ violence for the sake of reinforcing the state’s monopoly over violence would be self-defeating. If I were to act on reasons that the role requires the executioner to ignore, I would cease to be the executioner. My performance would no longer be an act of state. The purpose of my profession would be undermined, and I would become a murderous butcher. Therefore, Charles-Henri and his judgments must stay off the scaffolding¹⁰⁰.”

What Applbaum wants us to consider is whether or not Sanson’s actions were moral, given his role in the employ of the state. Certainly, a lawyer may dissemble and manipulate for a client and we consider that person a good lawyer, but dissemble and manipulate your spouse and we’d consider you a bad partner. Role-based ethics can be complicated, as the admittedly hyperbolic fictional exchange above shows. As civil servants, does our morality flow from following orders, or from our own standards we set as a community?

The point here is: policymakers often ask of the intelligence community to peer into our crystal balls and predict with some degree of certainty the outcome of events in a world so turbulent as to leave career intelligence

100 Applbaum, Arthur “Ethics for Adversaries” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) p. 41.

officials aghast at the array of unsettling events. In the end, perhaps all we can really assess with high certainty is that irreconcilable antagonism will remain a constant, and that leaves us—civil servants—with a duty to do our jobs, adhering to ideals that *we* set as a community. Those ideals—laid out in the aforementioned Principles of Transparency—should be the intelligence community’s cultural zeitgeist going forward, not because of or despite the actions and beliefs of any group of people, but because we feel they best reflect our community’s values.



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