

# **Future Scenarios for China's Carbon Emissions**

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**Tyndall°Centre**  
for Climate Change Research

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  - Explaining our approach
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
# Global trends and developing countries

According to the IEA World Energy Outlook 2007:

- World primary energy demand will grow 55% between 2005 and 2030: From 11.4 billion toe to 17.7 billion toe
- 74% of this increase will be due to growth in developing countries; 45% from China and India
- The developing country share of global energy demand will increase from 41% in 2005 to 47% in 2015, and over 50% in 2030
- China and India account for 45% of world coal demand. These countries will account for over 80% of the increase in coal demand to 2030


# Recent trends in China

## Primary energy demand




# Recent trends in China

## Power generation capacity




# Recent trends in China

## Carbon emissions




# National carbon emissions in 2007

## Estimates (Dutch EPA)



# Per capita emissions in 2007

## Estimates (Dutch EPA)





# China also faces serious climate change impacts

- **Chinese studies project a range of impacts, e.g.**
  - Decreases in agricultural yields and increased costs of food production
  - Decreased run-off of rain water in northern China; increased run-off in Southern China. Adds to water imbalance that is already causing problems
  - Expected increases in storms; vulnerability of prosperous coastal zones (e.g. Shanghai) to small sea level rises
- **As a result, climate change taken increasingly seriously at national level – focus is reducing energy intensity**
- **Government has a climate change co-ordinating group and has produced a climate change strategy**

# But who owns these emissions?




- The extent to which carbon emissions in China should be ‘owned’ by China has been the subject of much debate
- China has emerged as a major trading economy – with a rapidly growing trade surplus with the developed world
- How much of China’s carbon footprint is due to its exports?

# Who owns China's emissions?

- **Headline results:**
  - Emissions from exports in 2004 :1490 million tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>
  - Emissions avoided due to imports: 381 million tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>
  - Combining these, **23% of China's emissions due to net exports**
- **One reason is large (& growing) trade surplus: tripled between 2004 and 2005 to \$102bn, rose again to \$177 bn in 2006, and over \$250bn in 2007**
- **Another reason is relatively high carbon intensity of Chinese economy. In 2000, the US produced 0.5 kg CO<sub>2</sub> per dollar of economic activity whereas China produced 2.76kg per dollar**
- **This result challenges production-based emissions targets, and suggests that consumption-based targets could be better**

# Who owns China's emissions?



# Analysing future emissions


## A carbon budget approach



- The main aim of our Tyndall Centre project is to develop a set of scenarios to explore future carbon emissions in China – and analyse implications
- There are a number of scenario options – e.g. exploratory or more goal-driven
- We are using a **cumulative emissions** method so scenarios meet a specific target; used previously by Tyndall for the UK
- Tyndall's scenario tool enables us to quantify possible trends in different Chinese sectors (e.g. transport & households)
- Collaborating with organisations in the UK & China, including workshops in Beijing and London to discuss key features


# Why cumulative emissions?

## The UK Climate Change Bill



# Why cumulative emissions?

## Tyndall UK scenario for 450ppm



# Analysing future emissions

## A carbon budget approach



- **We have used IPCC Assessment Report 4 global budget**
  - 490GtC for 21st century
  - Stabilise at 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>
  - Likely range of 1.9-4.4°C temperature rise
- **Two different approaches to deciding China's cumulative emission budget for this period:**
  - Equal carbon emissions per capita
  - Equal carbon emissions intensity of GDP
- **Two medium-term pathways to connect these budgets to current policy analysis**



# Analysing future emissions

## Medium term pathways



- **Critical issues for Chinese policy (& identified in our workshops) is change in industrial structure & innovation**
- **Challenge for China is ‘rebalancing growth’**
  - Away from energy intensive investment ...
  - Away from export-led growth ...
  - ... towards domestic consumption; value added; innovation
- **Medium term pathways rebalance with different speeds / extents**
  - IEA ‘Alternative Policy’ scenario. Includes some policies but is conservative about possible shift in emissions pathway
  - ERI scenario B (2004) includes govt efficiency targets, shift from heavy industry etc. Gives ambitious emissions goal for 2020

# Analysing future emissions

## Medium term pathways




**We will ... promote the shift from the pattern of economic growth that relies mainly on investment and exports to one that relies on a balanced combination of consumption, investment and exports.**

**Haphazard investment and unneeded development projects in energy intensive and highly polluting industries and industries with excess production capacity will be resolutely stopped.**

**Wen Jiabao, March 2008**

# Analysing future emissions

## Medium-term pathways



# Analysing future emissions


## From medium to long-term



- **Calculated budgets from 490GtC (global) using two methods**
  - Per capita gives 70GtC for China (UN population projections)
  - Per unit of GDP gives 111GtC for China (IEA growth projections)
- **Turning points in 2020 and 2030**
  - Pre 2020 thought to be too early / ambitious
  - Post 2030 risks running out of budget
- **Adjustment to lower per capita budget to make it compatible with higher medium-term pathway. Raise to 90GtC.**

# Analysing future emissions

## From medium to long-term



# Analysing future emissions

## Our four scenarios

|                               | Scenario 1         | Scenario 2    | Scenario 3 | Scenario 4 |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|------------|
| <b>Cumulative budget</b>      | 70GtC              | 111GtC        | 90GtC      | 111GtC     |
| <b>Medium-term pathway</b>    | ERI                | ERI           | IEA        | IEA        |
| <b>Year of peak</b>           | 2020               | Low Peak 2030 | 2020       | 2030       |
| <b>GDP growth rate</b>        | 2-4%               | 5-8%          | 4-6%       | 2-8%       |
| <b>Population growth rate</b> | UN 2004 prediction |               |            |            |

# Analysing future emissions

## Our four scenarios

|  | Scenario 1   | Scenario 2  | Scenario 3  | Scenario 4  |
|--|--|---|---|---|
| <b>Economic &amp; industrial Structure</b> | Service sector dominant / moderate industry; mostly 'innovative' | Moderate service sector<br>Strong 'innovative' industry | Service sector largest<br>Strong trad industry; some 'innovative' | Service & industry strong<br>Traditional manufacturing dominant |
| <b>Nature of innovation</b>                | Radical  | Radical<br>Slower diffusion than scenario 1             | Significant<br>Incremental  | Incremental<br>Focus on legacy industries                       |

# Analysing future emissions

## Our four scenarios

|                                  | Scenario 1   | Scenario 2                                       | Scenario 3   | Scenario 4                                      |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| <b>Energy demand</b>             | Slow growth  | Moderate growth                                  | Moderate growth  | High growth                                     |
| <b>Primary energy priorities</b> | Renewables<br>Fossil fuels or nuclear                  | Renewables<br>Fossil fuels                       | Nuclear<br>Fossil fuels<br>Renewables                    | Fossil fuels<br>Nuclear<br>Renewables           |
| <b>Energy demand</b>             | Stringent efficiency standards; quick behaviour change | Moderate standards<br>Slower change in behaviour | Slow efficiency progress<br>Significant behaviour change | Incremental efficiency<br>Slow behaviour change |



# Analysing future emissions

## Some emerging issues



- **Some technologies / options may be critical**
  - Hard to see how CCS can fail to be critical: speed of implementation and extent may vary
  - We may need ‘reality check’ on transport: e.g. balance of efficiency and low carbon alternatives to oil
- **Changes in institutions and governance are not developed enough within scenarios, e.g.**
  - Energy decentralisation more than a technical phenomenon
  - Extent to which behaviour change is possible
  - Relationship between central, provincial and local govt
  - Relative strength of environmental vs economic policy

# Next steps

- Draft working paper summarises scenarios so far: comments are welcome
- Iterative process with spreadsheet tool so changes in emissions in different sectors fit within overall carbon budget
- Identify critical areas for early action that are common across most scenarios
- Develop policy implications: for China and for international community (especially UK)
- Launch of final results in early 2009

**Thanks**

**<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup>**

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