

# **The Context for Advanced Coal and CCS in the United States and China**

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# Why is the energy problem so difficult?


- It's a “rate problem”, not an “equilibrium problem”.

Not how to match a portfolio of static supply options to static demand...

Rather: how to keep up with rapidly rising demand for energy services, using changing technologies under changing constraints

- Economic, environmental, and political objectives of energy policy are often in tension.
- All energy technologies have shortcomings vis-a-vis one or more of these objectives

# Rates: Growth of world population & prosperity 1850-2000 → brought 20-fold growth in energy use




Growth rate 1850-1950 was 1.45%/yr, driven mainly by coal.

From 1950-2000 it was 3.15%/yr, driven mainly by oil & natural gas.

# Much of the recent growth has been in Asia

**Bars show role of China & India in growth 2000-2006**



\* Based on preliminary estimates for 2006.

WEO 2007

# Some comparative data for 2007

|               | population<br>(millions) | ppp-GDP<br>(trillion \$) | energy<br>(EJ) | fossil E<br>(percent) | fossil CO <sub>2</sub><br>(MtC) |
|---------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| <b>World</b>  | 6625                     | 65.2                     | 536            | 82%                   | 8250                            |
| <b>China</b>  | 1320                     | 7.1                      | 93             | 85%                   | 1790                            |
| <b>USA</b>    | 302                      | 13.8                     | 106            | 88%                   | 1720                            |
| <b>Russia</b> | 142                      | 2.1                      | 30             | 90%                   | 440                             |
| <b>India</b>  | 1123                     | 3.1                      | 28             | 61%                   | 355                             |
| <b>Brazil</b> | 192                      | 1.8                      | 9              | 61%                   | 100                             |

**But Brazil adds 200-400 MtC/yr from deforestation.**

# Continued high growth is expected to 2030


US EIA 2007 and IEA WEO 2007 “reference” forecasts

|                           | 2006 | 2030 |
|---------------------------|------|------|
| Primary energy, exajoules |      |      |
| World                     | 526  | 800  |
| United States             | 106  | 150  |
| China                     | 86   | 175  |
| Electricity, trillion kWh |      |      |
| World                     | 19.3 | 35   |
| United States             | 4.3  | 6.0  |
| China                     | 2.8  | 7.5  |

## ...and beyond, if “business as usual” continues


- World use of primary energy reaches
  - 2.5 times the 2000 level by 2050,
  - 4 times by 2100.
- World electricity generation reaches
  - 3 times the 2000 level by 2050,
  - 5 times by 2100.

# Fossil fuels are expected to continue to dominate supply in the decades immediately ahead






# Projected growth of oil use for road transport in Asia is particularly large



# These oil demands are projected to be met mainly by imports



# Coal use for electric power is projected to grow rapidly

Coal-fired capacity, GWe, 2005 & USEIA projection

|             | <i>USA</i> | <i>China</i> | <i>India</i> | <i>World</i> |
|-------------|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>2005</i> | 314        | 299          | 79           | 1214         |
| <i>2010</i> | 320        | 478          | 96           | 1451         |
| <i>2020</i> | 349        | 756          | 140          | 1849         |
| <i>2030</i> | 414        | 1034         | 173          | 2295         |


**World coal-electric capacity goes up almost 1100 GWe by 2030, and over 800 GWe of the increase is in China and India.**

Source: US EIA, International Energy Outlook 2008

# The three biggest challenges for the future

- Supplying reliable, affordable, clean energy to meet the basic needs of the world's poorest two billion people, replacing dirty biomass fuels.
- Reducing urban & regional air pollution and the political & economic dangers of overdependence on oil despite growing global demand from the transportation system
- Providing the affordable energy needed to create & sustain prosperity everywhere without wrecking the global climate with carbon dioxide emitted by fossil-fuel burning


# The challenge of energy for basic needs: Human development index vs. energy/person



# The oil challenge: supply & security

- USA in 2006 used 21 million barrels per day of oil, importing 66% of it.
- Forecasts show US oil use rising to 28 Mb/d by 2030, with all of the increase coming from imports.
- World used 82 Mb/d in 2006, 63% of it traded internationally.
- Consumption forecasted to rise from 82 Mb/d in 2006 to 120 Mb/d in 2030.
- China's imports by 2030 expected to pass 12 Mb/d.
- It remains true that most of the world's known & suspected oil resources are in the Middle East.

# USA is biggest oil user, but Asia is growing



The Asia-Pacific region accounted for 30% of world oil consumption in 2005

# The oil challenge: environment

- Most oil is used in transport vehicles, and these are the largest sources of  $\text{NO}_x$  and hydrocarbon air pollution.
- The number of cars in the world is soaring, producing increased congestion and even more pollution.
- Combustion of petroleum fuels accounts for about 40% of  $\text{CO}_2$  emissions from energy – same as coal – and this is expected to continue.




# The hardest challenge of all is climate

- Climatic disruption & its impacts are growing more rapidly than predicted just a few years ago.
- Harm from these impacts is already significant, and much more is coming.
- It's too late to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference” in Earth's climate. Question is: Can we avoid catastrophic interference?
- Best chance for this requires stabilizing human influences on the atmosphere below 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent.
- Not exceeding 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-e requires emissions to be falling in industrial countries by 2015, elsewhere by 2025.
- Doing this will require much better technologies and much stronger policies all over the world.

# Climate-change impacts already happening

- monsoon changes → agriculture impacts
- extreme precipitation → more floods
- $\Delta T$  + reduced precipitation in some regions & more loss to storm runoff in others → increased drought & soil drying
- $\Delta T$  & soil drying → increased wildfires
- $\Delta T$  → more heat stress and worse air pollution
- $\Delta T$  → pest population explosions → big timber losses (Alaska, CO, CA...)
- tropical ocean  $\Delta T$  is affecting corals (bleaching)
- increased integrated power of tropical storms is probably linked to ocean  $\Delta T$

# Bigger disruption is coming: IPCC 2007 scenarios



Last time T was  $2^\circ\text{C}$  above 1900 level was 130,000 yr BP, with sea level 4-6 m higher than today.

Last time T was  $3^\circ\text{C}$  above 1900 level was ~30 million yr BP, with sea level 20-30 m higher than today.

Note: Shaded bands denote 1 standard deviation from mean in ensembles of model runs

# Tipping points aren't necessarily far off


- Arctic sea ice is shrinking much faster than expected; if it disappears and doesn't re-form, climate of N hemisphere would change drastically.
- Tundra & permafrost are warming & thawing, with potential for CO<sub>2</sub> and methane outpouring that would accelerate climate disruption overall.
- Rapid ice-sheet disintegration (1-2 m per century sea-level rise) possible for  $\Delta T_{\text{avg}} \geq 1.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ .
- Ocean acidification by dissolution of part of excess atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> further stresses corals & other ocean creatures that make CaCO<sub>3</sub> shells or skeletons, putting ocean food chains at risk.

# Pickling the oceans: a tipping point?


About 1/3 of CO<sub>2</sub> added to atmosphere is quickly taken up by the surface layer of the oceans (top 80 meters).

This lowers pH as dissolution of CO<sub>2</sub> forms weak carbonic acid (H<sub>2</sub>O + CO<sub>2</sub> → H<sub>2</sub>CO<sub>3</sub>).


Increased acidity lowers the availability of CaCO<sub>3</sub> to organisms that use it for forming their shells & skeletons, including corals.



**Sea level could rise 1-2 meters by 2100,  
3-12 m in the next few hundred years,  
up to 70 m eventually.**



What would 1-70 m of sea-level rise do to your region?



Courtesy Jeffrey Bielicki, Kennedy School of Government

# What to do?

There are only three options:

- Mitigation, meaning measures to reduce the pace & magnitude of the changes in global climate being caused by human activities.
- Adaptation, meaning measures to reduce the adverse impacts on human well-being resulting from the changes in climate that do occur.
- Suffering the adverse impacts that are not avoided by either mitigation or adaptation.

# Mitigation possibilities

## CERTAINLY

- Reduce emissions of greenhouse gases & soot from the energy sector
- Reduce deforestation; increase reforestation & afforestation
- Modify agricultural practices to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases & build up soil carbon

## CONCEIVABLY

- “Geo-engineering” to create cooling effects offsetting greenhouse heating
- “Scrub” greenhouse gases from the atmosphere technologically



# Adaptation possibilities include...

- Changing cropping patterns
- Developing heat-, drought-, and salt-resistant crop varieties
- Strengthening public-health & environmental-engineering defenses against tropical diseases
- Building new water projects for flood control & drought management
- Building dikes and storm-surge barriers against sea-level rise
- Avoiding further development on flood plains & near sea level

Some are “win-win”: They’d make sense in any case.

# Mitigation & adaptation are both essential


- No feasible amount of mitigation can stop climate change immediately.
- Adaptation efforts are already taking place and must be expanded.
- But adaptation becomes costlier & less effective as the magnitude of climate changes grows.
- The more mitigation can be achieved at affordable cost, the smaller the burdens placed on adaptation and the smaller the suffering.

# How much mitigation, how soon?

- Limiting  $\Delta T_{\text{avg}}$  to  $\leq 2^{\circ}\text{C}$  is now widely considered the most prudent target that still might be attainable.
  - EU officially embraced this target in 2002
- For 50% chance of  $\Delta T_{\text{avg}} \leq 2^{\circ}\text{C}$ , sum of human influences ( $\text{CO}_2$ , other GHG, and atmospheric particulate matter) must be stabilized at a level equivalent to 450 ppm of  $\text{CO}_2$  (“450 ppm  $\text{CO}_2\text{-e}$ ”).
  - In 2005 we were at 380 ppm  $\text{CO}_2$  and 430 ppm  $\text{CO}_2\text{-e}$  from all GHG combined.
  - Effects of particles (warming from some, cooling from others) added up to a net negative 50 ppm  $\text{CO}_2\text{-e}$ , so total human influence in 2005 was  $430 - 50 = 380$  ppm  $\text{CO}_2\text{-e}$ .


# Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions paths from 2000 that would stabilize concentration at 450 ppm

(50% chance of  $\Delta T < 2^{\circ}\text{C}$  if non-CO<sub>2</sub> effects cancel)




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# Possible focuses for policy: the option space

- Remove barriers to harvesting the low-hanging fruit (and the fruit lying on the ground)  
options include: consumer education; labeling; remedies for perverse incentives /disincentives
- Provide incentives for reaching higher into the tree  
options include: elimination of subsidies for high-emitting energy sources; provision of subsidies for low-emitting ones; charges on emissions; regulation
- Support and promote energy RD&D to lower the highest-hanging fruit  
options include: gov't funding; tax credits for private RD&D; price guarantees; international cooperation


# The role of technology: IEA 2008 Scenarios

- “ACT” scenario family (Accelerated Technology)
    - Back to 2005 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 2050 (peak 2030)
    - Based on available & almost available technology
    - “Optimistic” peak cost  $\approx$  \$50/tCO<sub>2</sub>, average less
    - Incremental cost to 2050 = \$17T ( $\sim$ \$400B/yr = 0.4% of average GWP)
  - “BLUE” scenario family
    - 50% of 2005 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2050 (peak 2020)
    - Requires accelerated technology innovation
    - “Optimistic” peak cost  $\approx$  \$100/tCO<sub>2</sub>, average less
    - Incremental cost to 2050 = \$45T ( $\sim$ \$1.1T/yr) = 1% of average GWP
- “Pessimistic” cost estimates are 2x higher.




# Supply curves for emissions reductions in 2050

(US 2005\$/tCO<sub>2</sub> below reference scenario (marginal cost))




# IEA's 2008 "BLUE" CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions scenario





*Improved efficiency and decarbonising the power sector could bring emissions back to current levels by 2050. To achieve a 50% cut we would also have to revolutionise the transport sector.*

# Distribution of emissions in IEA scenarios




# State of development and CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation potential in 2030 for high-priority technologies (IEA 2008)



# Global CCS Technology Roadmap

## Technology timeline



In this roadmap, commercialisation assumes an incentive of USD 50/t CO<sub>2</sub> saved.

# Key conclusions

- The fast path to deployment of advanced coal technologies is only possible with the help of international cooperation.
- Cooperation between the USA and China is the most important part of this.
- The current state of this cooperation is that it is quite extensive “on paper” (MOUs), but not enough is happening “on the ground”.
- The Harvard-MOST-CAS collaboration can make a big contribution by helping define the specific activities that now should be added.

Thank you!