



A Report for the U.K. Foreign
and Commonwealth Office

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The Language of Counter-Terrorism: When Message Received is *Not* Message Intended

Harvard Kennedy School Policy Analysis Exercise

April 2008



Seminar Leader: Monica Duffy Toft
Faculty Advisor: Eric Rosenbach





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British Consulate-General, New England

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About the Policy Analysis Exercise: The Policy Analysis Exercise (PAE) is the capstone of the Harvard Kennedy School Master in Public Policy degree curriculum. The PAE is an analytic and consultative professional product which emanates from the student's work with a real-world client, under the close supervision of a faculty advisor with expertise in the topic area.

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executive summary

executive summary

background

Small changes in Western political language can **deny terrorists' power** to use our words against us.

Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks frequently manipulate Western leaders' words and use them as tools to rally others to the cause of extremism. While policymakers **cannot control** how people will *perceive* what they say, they have tremendous power over *what* they say. The incredible power of language and the ways in which we characterize our intentions can be an effective tool that policymakers employ to combat terrorism.

The British Government (Her Majesty's Government, or HMG) recognizes the critical role of language as part of its larger arsenal in its counter-terrorism operations. HMG understands that **its language can be used against it**, to radicalize people – particularly vulnerable members of marginalized communities at home and abroad – to commit acts of violence.

Al Qaeda and others are also eager to use our actions to bolster their narratives. Extremist recruiters wishing to enhance their anti-Western arguments will cite the presence of our troops in Iraq and elsewhere. While our global engagement is indeed a necessary part of our military operations, those seeking to pervert the nature of our efforts will portray our actions and policies in a negative light.

Therefore, the ways in which we characterize our actions and policies, the engagements we seek, the laws we create, as well as our responses to specific incidents **can do much to contradict the negative narrative others may wish to promote**.

HMG's PREVENT strategy forms part of the four-pronged Counter International Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), that includes harder elements of engagement, protection, and enforcement (at home and with international partners) as well as the recognition that **language too has tremendous power**. HMG has thus created its PREVENT strategy to address language changes as a part of a broader messaging agenda.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) wants to understand ways to best engage in this "Battle of Ideas" and this paper informs that effort.

The PREVENT strand of HMG's broader counter-terrorism strategy is vitally important because it:

1) **addresses the problem** of radicalization at its roots, 2) is the **most proactive** in terms of combating the causes of radicalization, and 3) **features long- and short-term programs** of action, at home and abroad.

PREVENT offers the opportunity to stop others from using our own words as tools to rally and recruit new extremists.

The U.K.'s **top law enforcement officials** believe PREVENT deserves equal merit alongside the other strands; they told us PREVENT is the most sensible way to address future radicalization.

findings

- * Any successful language shift must be “top down” (i.e., originate with Prime Minister/President).
- * Language shifts do not require major policy changes.
- * News media cannot be forced to adopt new language, but over time will follow government’s lead.
- * U.K. is on the right track, but can expect a long wait before seeing concrete results (which will require sophisticated measurement mechanisms to track and to analyze).
- * Muslim leaders in the U.K. have noticed and have appreciated the changes so far, but remain skeptical of HMG’s intentions and future plans. They are open to PREVENT’s concepts so long as they are firmly embedded within wider government – i.e., if they are not abandoned in the wake of another violent incident.
- * The Muslim community rejects being addressed as a monolith; targeted approaches are best.
- * The U.S. is a critical partner to implement language change.
- * Words that appeal to a domestic population may repel an international audience. This erodes Western “soft” and “hard” power and thereby threatens the safety and security of Western troops serving abroad.

conclusion

Changing language changes minds. By modifying the words they use to talk about international terrorism, Western leaders begin the process of winning Muslim hearts and minds. The way we talk about terrorism can enhance intellectual debate among elected leaders, news media, and citizens rather than embolden radical forces.

Our findings are based in the latest research about and from members of the Muslim community. Their explanations of the power of language are instructive.

We did not write this report to put words in policymakers’ mouths. Yet, we believe officials should examine our findings with regard to the impact of language, as well as its unintended consequences. A senior FCO official told us he is continually “amaz[ed] how a given sentence explodes in the Arab street” in ways unimagined when HMG originally crafted the words. In short, **we do not attempt to tell leaders what to say; rather, we offer evidence of how different audiences will hear what they choose to say.**

The disconnect between what is said and what is heard can be striking – the impacts, deadly.

overview

overview

The Language of Counter-Terrorism: When Message Received is *Not* Message Intended:

- * Summarizes the United Kingdom's current counter-terrorism strategy;
- * Analyzes how language has been used as a counter-terrorism mechanism;
- * Examines ways for language to be incorporated in an effective messaging strategy to counter terrorist recruitment narratives; and
- * Explores the role of messaging in the United States government via the language used by its political figures.

This report was prepared for the United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) through an association with the office of the British Consulate-General, New England.

This report is comprised of several individual sections, each of which is meant to serve both as a stand-alone product and a part of the larger whole. Our aim is to make our findings, research, and analysis as useful as possible to relevant policymakers.

"The only way forward is to seriously, seriously think about prevention."

*Tarique Ghaffur, Assistant Commissioner,
Metropolitan Police*

u.k. strategy is an analysis of British efforts to date. HMG has placed renewed focus on preventative measures to counter terrorism and has actively implemented PREVENT, one strand of its four-part national counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), to prevent radicalization in the U.K. and around the world. Leadership recognizes that the Muslim world scrutinizes Western language. As the Research, Information and Communities Unit (RICU)'s Michael Nevin explained to us, even the most well-intentioned messages can easily end up manipulated and misinterpreted when heard overseas in different languages and different cultural contexts. Such speech is used by those who wish to perpetuate the narrative of radicalization. HMG recognizes that implementing language changes empowers Western governments to play against, rather than into, these narratives.

speech analysis applies PREVENT's techniques and suggestions to the speeches of U.S. presidential candidates. We change very little of the substance of the arguments being made. Yet, we are able to provide examples of how speeches can be edited in such a way that many members of marginalized communities, particularly Muslims, are less likely to find inflammatory.

memos provide sample memoranda that the FCO may find useful when approaching U.S. policymakers about PREVENT. They are intended for members of an incoming presidential administration. One memo is written for a Democratic audience; the other is for a Republican audience. In both cases, we anticipate arguments that might induce a staffer or politician to reject the idea of a language shift.

u.s. capabilities looks forward to the internationalization of PREVENT. HMG recognizes that perceptions about the United States can influence and confound perceptions of the U.K. because both are seen as the "West." Actions by the U.S. can be perceived as actions by the U.K. and vice versa. Thus the two governments frequently collaborate to ensure actions by one do not contradict the other. To that end, we use a stakeholder analysis to understand existing messaging capabilities at U.S. federal agencies and to identify challenges agencies face in creating a national messaging strategy akin to PREVENT. This report includes both an examination of the scope of the problem and an analysis of the extent to which current British programs are addressing it. Additionally, this report serves as a starting point from which HMG can engage American stakeholders about implementing similar language changes in U.S. policy.

messaging theory summarizes and explains the theoretical background behind the effects of framing and language on an audience. We pay special attention to the political framing in the West of events related to international terrorism.

"We can't arrest our way of this. We need to be further upstream."

Ian Larnder, National Community Tension Team, Association of Chief Police Officers (U.K.)

numbers also uses some of the most recent data available to discern public opinion about the Muslim world. It also reports on the opinions of the Muslim world with regard to Western countries. This analysis allows us to put a finer point on our messaging, as we can keep a closer eye on attitudes and opinions. In the event of widespread usage of language changes, baseline surveys like this will also become crucial to measuring effectiveness.

methodology

Literature Review

Our examination of relevant literature took two forms. In the first instance, we read extensively about major issues and challenges associated with the war of ideas and concomitant public diplomacy mechanisms used to wage an ideological battle. This included, but was not limited to, recently declassified HMG and USG documents, news media accounts, and various reports of non-profit agencies and non-governmental organizations that target Muslim radicalization. In the second instance, we focused heavily on the writings of theorists whose research seeks to understand the psychological means through which a change in language may impact an audience.

Interviews

We were eager to take advantage of our proximity to some of the most prominent scholars in our subject area. To that end, our interviews included academics based at Harvard and in Cambridge as well as policymakers in Washington, D.C. The generous assistance of the FCO allowed us to conduct a full week of research and interviews in the U.K. During that time, we met with government officials, Muslim leaders, and community stakeholders. When in-person meetings were not feasible, we gathered information over the phone and by e-mail. A complete list of our interviews is provided in Appendix II.

Quantitative Analysis

We referenced the last three years' worth of polling on the state of relations between Muslim communities and the West. The Gallup and Pew organizations conducted the original polls. The surveys feature responses from members of Muslim and non-Muslim communities from around the world. We benefited from analyses conducted by senior researchers at Gallup and Pew, as well as previous research by fellow Harvard graduate students.

limitations

We recognize that language has limited power to change public opinion or to dissuade a criminal. Even a well-designed, orchestrated, and implemented language shift will not remove the threat of terrorism. As we heard time and again in our discussions with stakeholders both in the U.S. and the U.K., words cannot stand alone. They must be matched with action. They must be spoken by credible sources.

"Each new conflict between the West and the Muslim world fuels radical activity."

Jocelyne Cesari, from Muslims in Europe and the Risk of Radicalism

Further, we acknowledge language loses much of its force when faced with contradictory policy decisions. As RICU's Nevin further explained to us, the benefits the U.K. obtains from language shifts may well be "offset by Iraq". His is not the minority view. The policies of the U.S. and U.K. governments over the last few years have offered ample recruitment opportunities for those who wish to radicalize (as have Western positions with regard to the ongoing Israeli/Palestinian conflict). In the words of one British Muslim journalist with whom we spoke, it is going to take a long time to undo what has been done.

Finally, we appreciate that some characteristics of current language are permanent. Our interviewees widely agreed that despite HMG's wishes to the contrary, the phrase "War on Terror" is here to stay, as are the ripple effects from George W. Bush's use of the word "crusade". The latter example plays heavily among Muslims looking for proof of the West's nefarious intentions. Even Osama bin Laden himself specifically cites it.¹ Clearly, language and its repercussions are far-reaching. Our hope is to inject a counter-narrative into the information stream.

next steps

PREVENT is a long-range strategy that requires more time and increased commitment in order to continue to generate results. Encouragingly, Muslim community leaders surveyed by FCO and independent agencies report that much can be gained by a careful attention to language. Without substantial policy overhauls, HMG can send the domestic and international Muslim community the message that it is working to dispel myths that Muslims support violence and that the tenets of Islam encourage terrorism.²

Our analysis of the U.K.'s implementation of PREVENT reveals largely successful early steps towards understanding and undermining the narrative of radicalization. Most governmental stakeholders we met were eager to consider, and in some cases fully embrace, HMG language modifications. As noted by FCO Senior Research Analyst Zaheer Kazmi, HMG achieved its current success without instituting massive policy changes. "Small shifts in language, perhaps only with brief omissions [of problematic language], can make the difference," according to Dr. Kazmi.

This is an instructive observation for U.S.-based policymakers. Our report expands on ways in which American governmental officials can take advantage of progress made across the pond. As HMG experts learned, a change in elected leadership at the highest levels offers a strong chance for language policy to be shifted. We explore this topic further below, noting its relevance to the current state of American affairs.

¹ <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html>

² Masood, Ehsan. "British Muslims: Media Guide." The British Council & The Association of Muslim Social Scientists. (2006)

u.k. strategy

u.k. strategy

In 2003, the United Kingdom government developed a national counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST (**C**ounter **I**nternational **T**errorism **S**trategy). CONTEST is comprised of four complementary strands:

- ***PURSUE** terrorists and their sponsors;
- ***PROTECT** the public, key U.K. services, and interests abroad;
- ***PREPARE** for the consequences of a terrorist attack; and
- ***PREVENT** domestic and international radicalization.

what is PREVENT?

Through actions and words, PREVENT creates a counter-narrative to the recruitment efforts of violent extremists. HMG recognizes that extremist recruiters cite Western domestic policy and foreign policy in Iraq, Israel, and Afghanistan as examples of the West's attempt to clash with Muslims and the Islamic world in a battle of civilizations. HMG also recognizes that this recruitment narrative specifically targets British Muslim communities. Therefore, through PREVENT, HMG seeks to reduce the success of extremist recruiters by starting at home. PREVENT focuses on how HMG can engage British Muslim communities to prevent violent extremism at home and how those relationships can counter the narrative to recruit abroad.

who makes PREVENT work?

PREVENT is a whole-of-government effort with multiple agencies operating PREVENT-

related programs. Key agencies include the Home Office, the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the law enforcement community including the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), as well as local police departments.

how does PREVENT work?

Agencies may operate distinct programs but PREVENT also represents interagency collaboration that comprises a national messaging strategy. HMG recognizes that its actions must be consistent across government departments or its efforts risk losing credibility. Further, HMG acknowledges that in order to reach its targeted audience, its language must be consistent or risk offsetting the potential of its efforts within those communities. More specifically, if HMG seeks to establish credible relationships with British Muslim communities, then the message it attempts to build must be consistent in action and words. Thus, agencies are developing a national messaging strategy through language and programmatic mechanisms. The following summaries provide details about what specific agencies are doing to support PREVENT based on field interviews conducted in London.

Home Office

One of the Home Office's primary roles in implementing PREVENT is to guide the language HMG uses to describe its counter-terrorism initiatives and engagements with British Muslim communities. The Home Office is the parent agency of the Research, Information, and Communication Unit (RICU), which develops "coherent and effective communications across

The Prevent strand is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals, both in the UK and elsewhere, which sustains the international terrorist threat. The Government seeks to do this by:

- *tackling disadvantage and supporting reform by addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination*
- *detering those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate*
- *engaging in the battle of ideas by challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so.*

Source: Home Office. "About the Counter-terrorism Strategy," <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/about-the-strategy/>

Government in countering terrorism.”³ To advance its efforts, RICU has conducted focus groups to understand how certain language and phrases are heard by British Muslim communities. Using this data, RICU developed an advisory language guide that informs policymakers about the impact of the language they use and recommends preferable language alternatives.⁴ RICU serves all of HMG and has staff from and reports to three government offices including the Home Office, FCO and DCLG.

Department of Communities and Local Governments

The Department of Communities and Local Governments’ PREVENT strategy aims “to engage “local communities...to be able to challenge robustly the ideas of those extremists who seek to undermine our way of life.”⁵ To advance its efforts, DCLG promotes shared values, supports local solutions, builds civic capacity and leadership, and strengthens the role of faith institutions and leader. DCLG collaborates with communities to sponsor government programs. One example includes “Forums on Extremism and Islamophobia,” that create an opportunity for discussion among Muslims, local government officials, police and other stakeholders. DCLG also supports community-driven initiatives by providing grant funding. In 2007/2008, DCLG disbursed £6 million to support 70 community-proposed programs.⁶ Examples of programs receiving funding include, but are not limited to, interfaith forums bringing Muslims and Christians together for dialogue, civic leadership programs for young Muslims, training programs to foster a new generation of “home grown’ British imams.”⁷ In effect, DCLG attempts to break down barriers between the government and communities by giving a face to who the government is and by empowering civic engagement.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s PREVENT strategy aims to use public diplomacy to engage Muslim communities outside of the U.K. and to partner with nations who are committed to countering the violent ideology.

Misrepresentation and misinterpretation of U.K. policy happens at home and abroad. To advance its efforts, FCO raises awareness about U.K. policy by working closely with Arabic language media to reach Arabic-reading audiences and by sending delegations of British Muslims to exchange with Muslim communities outside of the U.K. Finally, the FCO also works with allied nations in the international community to exchange best practices about how to derail the extremist narrative and how to engage domestic Muslim communities who are targeted by the narrative.

Law Enforcement Agencies

Law enforcement agencies – at the national and local levels – have varying strategies but a common aim to prevent violent crimes from occurring. To advance their efforts, local police departments are taking active roles in community engagement programs. This decision allows law enforcement officials to demonstrate their shared values with Muslim communities and to establish trust and collaborative relationships with British Muslims. Examples include local police participation in DCLG’s projects (cited above). And, in the case of the Metropolitan Police Service, which serves 7.2 million people, more than ten percent of the U.K. population, the Association of Muslim Police independently organizes community programs like interfaith sports events for youth. Finally, through national associations like the National Association of Muslim Police and the Association of Chief Police Officers, local police are increasing communication among each other to raise awareness about best practices and community trends.

British Muslim Partners

This summary of PREVENT stakeholders must also acknowledge the significant role that British Muslim leaders, advocates, and organizations play in implementing PREVENT. HMG cannot make progress in preventing violent extremism alone. If extremist recruiters are successfully using government actions and words to recruit from Muslim communities, then the government must work within those same

³ “Research, Information and Communications Unit”, excerpt from the official transcript of U.K. Parliament session of December 11, 2007. See: <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm071211/text/71211w0032.htm>

⁴ Additional information about RICU’s work, including the language guide it has developed for government officials, is discussed in the speech analysis section of this report. See “speech analysis.”

⁵ Department of Communities and Local Government. Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning Hearts and Minds, Apr, 2007. p. 4.

⁶ Department of Communities and Local Governments. “Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund 2007/08: Case Studies,” Communities and Local Government: Apr. 2007. p. 4.

⁷ Department of Communities and Local Governments. “Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund 2007/08: Case Studies,” Communities and Local Government: Apr. 2007. p. 6.

communities to understand how it can reframe its actions and words to deny extremists this opportunity. HMG needs the consultation and assistance of British Muslim communities – the vast majority of whom seek peace and do not condone the violent acts committed by a few who claim to belong to the same faith. The British Muslim communities represent HMG's most important allies in battling extremism as represented by their overwhelming willingness to collaborate with the government.

summary

PREVENT's efforts to engage British Muslim communities and counteract the efforts of extremist recruiters looks to achieve two goals:

- *stronger relationships with British Muslims who are critical partners to counter violent extremism domestically, and
- *stronger examples of government engagement with Muslim communities to counter violent extremism outside of the U.K.

Since CONTEST's inception, PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE have been actively promoted across HMG while PREVENT has only more recently emerged. This section explains what PREVENT is, who makes PREVENT work, and explores in detail how PREVENT engages in the "battle of ideas."

speech analysis

speech analysis

This section describes the mechanisms used by the United Kingdom government (HMG; Her Majesty's Government) to modify government language and to change its counter-terrorism message. We provide an overview of the U.K. model and examine how the model can be applied in the U.S. by analyzing speeches made by current American presidential candidates.

establishment of RICU

In March 2007, HMG established the Research, Information and Communication Unit (RICU), a cross-governmental office that develops language guidance to support HMG's PREVENT strategy.⁸ RICU specifically addresses one of PREVENT's goals, which is to engage the "Battle of Ideas" and "to challenge the ideological motivations that extremists believe justify the use of violence."⁹ "The decision to create this Unit was taken to address the need for coherent and effective communications across Government in countering terrorism," according to Tony McNulty, the Home Office Minister of State for Security, Counter-terrorism, Crime and Policing.¹⁰ RICU is expected to become the leader and coordinator of the U.K.'s "international and domestic approach to counter the ideological and other factors which drive groups and individuals into violent extremism."¹¹

Language and messaging are among the top issues on RICU's agenda. Its main task is to analyze the way in which key audiences at home and abroad react to messages from the government and to try to give more coherence to

"[RICU's] job is to build and promote a counter-narrative to the single narrative that Al-Qaeda and its allies propagate."

*Gordon Corera,
BBC security correspondent*

those messages to undermine the ideology of Al Qaeda (AQ).¹²

counter-terrorism communications guidance

"This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are confronted, head-on, in their essence, at their core."

*Former Prime Minister Tony Blair
March 2006*

One of RICU's first products was a document titled "Counter Terrorism Communications Guidance/Communicating Effectively with Community Audiences." The document, published in September 2007, was distributed to all relevant government agencies.

The writers open by explaining the goal of the guide: "To engage effectively with local communities, we need consistently clear and appropriate communications. If our messages are ambiguous or untargeted, they will not reach or be understood by those who need to hear them, and we risk having a negative impact on our audiences."¹³

The document has three parts:

- 1) The main Counter-Terrorism Messages (see summary in box #1)
- 2) General Communication Principles (see summary in box #2)
- 3) Guidance on the use of specific terminology (see RICU Language Table)

The guidelines incorporate feedback from government press officers in the U.K. and abroad, the results of careful monitoring of various media channels (including extreme websites), and targeted U.K.-based focus groups. The focus groups, conducted in 2007, represented diverse

⁸ PREVENT is one part of the U.K.'s four-pronged counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, and aims to create a counternarrative to the recruitment efforts of violent extremists. Additional information about PREVENT is provided in "u.k. strategy."

⁹ "About the counter-terrorism strategy," p. 13.

¹⁰ "Research, Information and Communications Unit", excerpt from the official transcript of U.K. Parliament session of December 11, 2007. See: <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm071211/text/71211w0032.htm>

¹¹ "Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 days, intercept and post-charge questioning", Report by the House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, July 2007, p. 64. see:

<http://www.publications.parliament.U.K./pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/157/157.pdf>; http://www.policingtoday.co.U.K./index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=157&Itemid=32

¹² Corera Gordon, "Don't look now, Britain's real spooks are right behind you", *Sunday Times*, December 2, 2007, p. 7.

¹³ "Counter Terrorism Communications Guidance / Communicating effectively with community audiences", Research, Information and Communication Unit, September 2007, p. 1.

Muslim populations residing in the U.K., including but not limited to different countries of origin, areas of residency in the U.K., age, and socio-economic background. The research used qualitative methods (in-depth interviews and group discussions) to access a broad range of views as well as assess individual reactions.

While we believe American policy-makers will find RICU's efforts to be generally insightful in addressing the international terrorism challenge, we believe the specific RICU Language Table can be particularly useful. This analysis of how Muslim audiences hear specific words and phrases will help speakers and policymakers assess the impact of their words on radicalization.

RICU emphasizes that the chart "is not intended as a definitive list of 'what not to say', but rather to highlight terms which risk being misunderstood and therefore prevent the effective reception of the message. This is not about political correctness, but effectiveness - evidence shows that people stop listening if they think you're attacking them."¹⁴ They add that "any assessment of the language to be used must take account of the context in which messages will be delivered and the crucial role of the messenger."¹⁵

Box #1 RICU Top-line Counter-terrorism-Messages

- 1) Terrorism is a real and serious threat to us all.
- 2) Terrorists are criminals and murderers; they attack the values that we all share.
- 3) We all need to work together to tackle the terrorist challenge.

Source: "Counter Terrorism Communications Guidance," RICU, Sept. 2007, p. 2.

Box #2 RICU General Communications Principles

- * Demonstrate that you **listened to and understand the concerns** of your audience.
- * The messages and language you use should be **clear and straightforward**.
- * **Avoid implying that specific communities are to blame for terror.**
- * Be aware of "**direct**" and "**overhearing**" audiences.
- * If you recycle language used by terrorists, you risk **reinforcing their message**, thereby conferring legitimacy upon terrorist groups.

Source: "Counter Terrorism Communications Guidance", RICU, Sept. 2007, p. 1-2.

application of RICU guide in U.K.

All relevant government agencies received the RICU guide. For example, in our interview with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)¹⁶, we learned that the guide was sent all the way down to local police stations to increase awareness to language sensitivities among police officers through their daily work. By February, 2008 the RICU guidelines were open for public consumption following the publication of a detailed story on the front page of The Guardian.¹⁷

However, as messaging theory suggests, in order to create a shift in language and messaging that the public embraces, the change needs to come from the political elites¹⁸. Such a change is actually taking place in the U.K. Government officials took advantage of an opportunity to introduce modified language during the summer of 2007, after the attempted bombings in London's West End and at the Glasgow airport. Both newly-elected Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Home Secretary Jacqui Smith gave speeches featuring carefully-crafted language that was meant to avoid

¹⁴ "Counter Terrorism Communications Guidance / Communicating effectively with community audiences," Research, Information and Communication Unit, September 2007, p. 7.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ ACPO leads and coordinates the direction and development of the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

¹⁷ Travis, Alan, "Whitehall draws up new rules on language of terror", The Guardian, 4/2/2008, p. 1. See article at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/feb/04/U.K.terrorism>

¹⁸ See "messaging theory" for more analysis.

"Too often have governments tried to push out their message, without putting the audience first and seeing how the objectives of the message can best resonate with them."

Michael Nevin, Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU)

alienating Muslim communities – along the lines of RICU's recommendations. In our subsequent meetings with Muslim leaders in London, all agreed that the change was notable and accepted positively in the communities. This assessment was later confirmed by RICU research completed in early 2008.

The Associated Press documented and confirmed the sentiments of Muslim leaders as expressed to us in a story it published titled "Britons Cheer Brown for Attacks Response". The story, published days after the events, compared the language of Brown and Smith to that of their predecessors:

"Hours after four suicide bombers killed 52 London bus and subway passengers on July 7, 2005, Blair delivered a speech with echoes of Winston Churchill, vowing: 'When they try to intimidate us, we will not be intimidated ... we will not be changed.' Brown's message—in one brief televised statement and a longer TV interview—can be summarized as 'keep calm and carry on.' Speaking in the gruff Scottish brogue that is his trademark, he said the country faced a 'sustained' threat and urged Britons to 'stand together, united, resolute and strong.'

[...] The low-key Smith also stands in contrast to her pugnacious predecessor, John Reid, whose tough talk on terrorism was sometimes criticized for inflaming ethnic and religious tensions. In a speech to lawmakers Monday, Smith called terrorists 'criminals whose victims come from all walks of life, communities and religious backgrounds.' Brown has spoken of 'al-Qaida' attackers but not of 'Islamic' or 'Muslim' terrorists."¹⁹

¹⁹ Lawless Jill (Associated Press Writer), "Britons Cheer Brown for Attacks Response", AP, 7/3/2007. See the AP story for example at: http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8Q588R80&show_article=1

RICU Language Table		
what is said	what is heard	possible alternatives
The dividing line is between terrorists and the rest of us	This can be a positive message, but only with a credible messenger and if explained clearly	Ensure the context is clear
Communities need to stand up to extremism/weed out terrorist sympathizers	"Communities are to blame for extremism and are responsible for hiding terrorists in their midst"	We all share responsibility for tackling violent extremism, and there are specific tasks that communities can help us with
Struggle for values/ battle for ideas	"Confrontation/clash between civilizations/ cultures"	The idea of shared values works much more effectively
War/battle/clash	"Terrorists/criminals are warriors/soldiers fighting a cause"	Challenge/threat
Radicalization	"Terrorism is a product of Islam" (not easily understood or translated into Urdu/Arabic)	Brainwashing or indoctrination
Grooming or conditioning	Can be useful terms to describe 'radicalization' process without reinforcing the link with religion, however not generally understood by all audiences	Brainwashing or indoctrination
De-radicalization	As above, not easily understood or translatable to all audiences	Rehabilitation
Islamic/ Muslim	Be aware of the distinction – the former refers to the belief; the latter to the believer/individual	
Moderate/radical	Perceived as a means of splitting Muslim communities or stigmatizing points of view/ lifestyles that are deemed to be less favorable to Government	Muslims (where necessary mainstream Muslims)
Islamic/Islamist/ Muslim extremism	"Extremism is the fault of Muslims/Islam"	Terrorism/violent extremism (including from non-Muslims)
Jihadi/ fundamentalist	"There is an explicit link between Islam and terrorism"	Criminal/murderer/thug
Islamic/Muslim community/world, "The West"	"Muslims form a homogenous community/ world (in opposition to "The West")"	Highlight diversity, rather than reinforcing the concept of a homogenous Muslim world. Use national/ ethnic/ geographical identifiers or Muslim communities/societies
Islamophobia	Can be misunderstood as a slur on Islam and perceived as singling out Muslims (even though it indicates that we are positively addressing their concerns)	Discrimination
Source: "Counter Terrorism Communications Guidance", RICU, Sept. 2007, p. 7-8.		

Analysis of U.S. Presidential Candidate Speeches

To demonstrate how the RICU language assessment can be used by American policy-makers, we will use its general guidelines to analyze excerpts from speeches made by Democratic candidates, as of this writing, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator Barack Obama and Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain.

The language we chose to analyze is featured on the candidates' websites and identified as key speeches that describe their respective policies for national security and counter-terrorism.²⁰ We study selected quotes from the speeches that include terms and phrases pointed out by RICU, using the same 3-layer model (What is said/What is heard/Possible alternatives) used in the RICU document.

This analysis has two goals:

- 1) Specific: To share with American thought-leaders the results of RICU's research and to explain the potential benefits of adopting similar language changes. In particular, this analysis aims to explain PREVENT's merits and possibilities to the three leading presidential candidates. This is important not only because one of them will be the next American president, but also because during the rest of the campaign they will deliver hundreds of speeches that will be heard by Muslim audiences all over the world.
- 2) General: To demonstrate to all U.S. policy-makers that PREVENT is relevant for American speakers, and to show how it can be applied.

This analysis is not meant to be a universal prescription for how to speak about terrorism. We are well aware that every speech is tailored to its audience, and the words reflect the speaker's ideology and political views.

Nonetheless, our goal is to offer feedback and theoretical alternatives in order to stimulate thinking about these language-related concerns when crafting messages. In "memos" we will offer an analysis of the language modification idea through a U.S.-political perspective.

analysis by expression: "war"

All candidates – Democrats and Republicans – use expressions and language specifically addressed by the RICU language guide. To demonstrate that this issue is relevant regardless of political party, we chose to start by analyzing an expression that is used by each of the candidates: "War on Terror."

According to RICU's guide, when the speaker defines terror attacks as a war, what is heard is the "terrorists/criminals are warriors/soldiers fighting a cause". This interpretation plays into and bolsters the narrative framework of Al Qaeda (AQ) and its allies, boosting and exaggerating their prominence on the world stage. RICU's Possible Alternatives to war are "Challenge" or "Threat".

It is worth noting that American scholars, think tank analysts, and career government officials have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of using the phrase "Global War on Terror" (GWOT). In January, 2008 the Center for New American Security, a Washington, D.C.-based think-tank, held a conference titled "Rethinking 'the Global War on Terror' / Towards a new U.S. Strategy for Defeating al-Qaeda." Two of the recommendations discussed in the conference were to "Abandon use of 'GWOT'" and "Reduce glory of jihad, treat terrorists as criminals."²¹

Provide are examples of the use of the word "war" by the three candidates.

²⁰ All the quotes from speeches in the following pages are taken from these 3 documents:

Clinton: <http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/speech/view/?id=3884>

Obama: http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/remarks_of_senator_obama_the_w_1.php

McCain: <http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/News/Speeches/73b7abb7-776d-4842-afb6-1ef97ed762c5.htm>

The Clinton campaign website and the Obama campaign website specifically direct to these speeches as the candidates' CT Policy. The McCain website has a short paragraph that summarizes his CT policy, so it does not direct to this speech specifically. However, this is the most recent speech on the McCain website that was fully devoted to these issues.

²¹ Flournoy, A., Michele and Hunt, Alice, "Rethinking 'the Global War on Terror – Towards a New U.S Strategy for Defeating al-Qaeda' / Solarium II – January 23, 2008, Center for New American Security, p. 30.

Example #1
what is said
<p><i>"...The terrorists are at war with us. The threat is from violent extremists who are a small minority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims, but the threat is real. They distort Islam. They kill man, woman and child; Christian and Hindu, Jew and Muslim. They seek to create a repressive caliphate..."</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Senator Barack Obama, August 1 2007</i></p>
what is heard
<p>This paragraph is consistent with the RICU language guide: It uses "violent extremists;" it doesn't use "moderate Muslims" but just "Muslims;" it refers to the issue mostly as a "threat;" it highlights the concept that Muslims are as much victims of terrorism as non-Muslims.</p> <p>However, since the paragraph makes an effort not to play into AQ's narrative, the use of the word "war" at the beginning may set an unnecessarily forceful tone.</p>
possible alternatives
<p>Instead of "the war" use "the threat," since the statement uses "threat" consistently after the first sentence. To make the speech more uniform, the speaker might consider "the terrorists threaten our security" or "the terrorists threaten our livelihood."</p>
<p>Source: http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/remarks_of_senator_obama_the_w_1.php</p>

Example #2
what is said
<p><i>"I want to talk today about the national security challenge of our time, the war which radical Islamist extremists have been waging against us..."</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Senator John McCain, July 13 2007</i></p>
what is heard
<p>The speaker actually emphasizes that the war is <u>waged by the terrorists</u>, which reinforces the interpretation the terrorists are soldiers and unduly inflates their status.</p>
possible alternatives
<p>Instead of <i>"the war"</i> use "the threat." Another alternative is "the Long War" which may be heard as portraying the issue as a broader longer-term challenge. The expression "the long war" is actually used later in the same text (see example #8 below), so perhaps the speaker might use it throughout.</p>
<p>Source: http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/News/Speeches/73b7abb7-776d-4842-afb6-1ef97ed762c5.htm</p>

Example #3

what is said

- *“...And we must also realize that the global threat of terror demands that we secure our home front, take on the terrorist networks abroad, and combat a false doctrine of hate, death and destruction...”*
- *“... There is a global threat of terrorism and we have to confront it...”*
- *“... We are in a long term struggle in which our values must be more than rhetoric...”*
- *“... The first time I visited Afghanistan in 2003, a young soldier said to me, ‘Welcome to the forgotten front line of the war against terror’.”*
- *“...President Kennedy ... said, ‘I speak of peace because of the new face of war’. [new paragraph] In this new century, we are confronted by yet another new face of war...”*

Senator Hillary Clinton, June 27 2007

what is heard

1. *“global threat of terror,” “long term struggle.”* The speaker does not view AQ terrorists as soldiers/warriors fighting for a cause.
2. *“war against terror,” “another new face of war.”* There are two options here:
 - a. The speaker quoted other people (JFK; a soldier) to make other points, and since those speakers used the word “war,” she might claim it is not necessarily her belief.
 - b. The speaker chose these quotes, so she may agree with calling the current situation a war, and therefore that AQ terrorists are soldiers/warriors fighting for a cause. Many listeners will likely not notice the distinction when hearing the speech delivered; they may just hear her use of the word “war” and draw their own conclusions.

possible alternatives

If the speaker does not believe that the global terrorism challenge is a “war,” she should avoid using the term altogether. This includes references inside of others’ quotes, which undermine the effort to alter the language.

However, we should note that by limiting the use of the word “war” to others’ quotations the speaker distances himself from events on the ground. This presents an interesting rhetorical tactic that other speakers may consider when dealing with the “war word challenge.”

Source: <http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/speech/view/?id=3884>

analysis by speaker

After demonstrating that the RICU guide can be applied to the speeches of all candidates, here is an analysis of more examples - from all three speakers.

Example #4
what is said
<p><i>“Every day the world grows smaller and history moves faster. Decisions by a factory owner in China impact the health and safety of children in Chicago. American researchers use the web to share best practices – but so do Islamist extremists. And pandemics do not know where evil nations end and good nations begin...”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Senator Hillary Clinton, June 27 2007</i></p>
what is heard
<p>This is the second paragraph of this particular speech. Opening lines are extremely significant because they often determine how - and if - an audience will listen for the rest of the speech.</p> <p>1. “...China... <i>Islamist extremists...pandemics...</i>” The listener assumes that this paragraph outlines the major national security challenges that will be addressed in the speech. Defining the challenge as Islamist, especially in the context of this list, may signal that Islam is the root of the problem.</p>
possible alternatives
<p>1. Drop the word Islamist, at least in the second paragraph:</p> <p><i>“...China... radical extremists...pandemics”</i> or <i>“violent extremists.”</i></p> <p>If the speaker wants to be more specific, use <i>“Al-Qaeda and its followers/allies.”</i></p>
<p>Source: http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/speech/view/?id=3884</p>

Example #5**what is said**

"...Allowing coercive treatment and torturous actions toward prisoners violates the rule of law, fails in intelligence gathering, and promotes radicalization. Al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden's second-in-command... has said over and over again if we would only pay attention – it is on their websites – that torture helps the cause of extremism, watering the seeds of jihad..."

Senator Hillary Clinton, June 27 2007

what is heard

1. *"promotes radicalization"* – According to the conclusions from RICU's focus groups, using the word "radicalization" might be heard as stating that "Terrorism is a product of Islam." Additionally, the word itself is not easily understood or translated into Urdu or Arabic. Although speech is intended for an American audience, the speaker should be aware that it to be translated to other languages and may be otherwise misinterpreted.
2. *"watering the seeds of jihad"* – Jihad – a "struggle", not necessarily violent - is considered a duty by most faithful Muslims. Using it in this context, according to RICU, is often understood as making an explicit link between Islam and violent criminal acts, and as a distortion of the religion.

possible alternatives

1. Instead of *"promotes radicalization"* use **"promotes brainwashing" / "promotes indoctrination"**
2. Instead of *"watering the seeds of jihad"* use **"the seeds of terror" / "seeds of violent extremism"** (Since extremism is actually already used in the sentence, maybe there is no need for the second part.)

Source: <http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/speech/view/?id=3884>

Example #6

what is said

Paragraph I: *“Al Qaeda's new recruits come from Africa and Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Many come from disaffected communities and disconnected corners of our interconnected world ... We know where extremists thrive. In conflict zones that are incubators of resentment and anarchy. In weak states that cannot control their borders or territory, or meet the basic needs of their people. The extremists encourage the exploitation of these hopeless places on their hate-filled websites.*

Paragraph II: *“And we know what the extremists say about us. America is just an occupying Army in Muslim lands, the shadow of a shrouded figure standing on a box at Abu Ghraib, the power behind the throne of a repressive leader. They say we are at war with Islam. That is the whispered line of the extremist who has nothing to offer in this battle of ideas but blame... And often he offers something along with the hate. A sense of empowerment. Maybe an education at a madrasa, some charity for your family, some basic services in the neighborhood. And then: a mission and a gun.*

Paragraph III: *“We know we are not who they say we are. America is at war with terrorists who killed on our soil. We are not at war with Islam. America is a compassionate nation that wants a better future for all people. The vast majority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims have no use for bin Ladin or his bankrupt ideas.”*
Senator Barack Obama, August 1 2007

what is heard

This segment deserves careful examination since it demonstrates the speaker already employs more careful and accurate language. Two paragraphs earlier in the speech, he states: *“the third step in my strategy will be drying up the rising well of support for extremism.”* The segment describes this *“well of support”* that should be targeted.

1. *“... an education at a madrasa, some charity for your family... and then: a mission and a gun”* – This sentence can be heard as an argument supporting an explicit link between Islam and terrorism (or as an equation: madrasa + charity = mission + gun). Just like in many other societies, Muslims view charity as a noble and necessary tradition. And as is the case for those of many faiths, religious education is valued by Muslims. This sentence may offend these two respected Muslim institutions, since it conflates all religious charity and education activities with the efforts of a minority that exploits them for recruitment purposes.
2. *“...America is just an occupying Army in Muslim lands, the shadow of a shrouded figure standing on a box at Abu Ghraib, the power behind the throne of a repressive leader... we are at war with Islam.”* – A video version of this full speech is available on-line and it would not require much editing to take away the context (this is “what extremists say about us”) and have a clip of Senator Barack Obama declaring that America is an occupying Army in Muslim lands and is actively at war with Islam. Of course, Paragraph III sets the record straight for readers and listeners, but the AQ recruiter who is in constant search for inflammatory materials to put on his website will delete those clarifying points from his audience.

Example #6 continued...

possible alternatives

1. It is important to discuss how AQ recruits members and potential terrorists and how it exploits people's weaknesses, financial distresses and need for empowerment. A great demonstration for such an analysis is offered in Paragraph I.

In other words, a possible alternative for listing the religious elements of recruitment would be to add a sentence to Paragraph I about how the extremists who recruit in these "*disaffected communities*" exploit religion. (For example: **"They approach people in need in these communities and offer them false empowerment using their distorted version of Islam."**)

2. This is a common dilemma for public speakers: are you supposed to worry about the effect of your words if someone else takes them wildly out of context? Obviously, any text can be manipulated to have a different message than the one intended.

Paragraphs II and III use a rhetorical mental model to make a point: we know what they say about us – but we know who we are = their narrative is wrong. We would just recommend remembering that extremists are watching such speeches hoping to find recruiting material. Maybe the writer should **try to arrange the phrases in a way that would make it harder to take them out of context.**

Source: http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/remarks_of_senator_obama_the_w_1.php

Example #7

what is said

"I want to talk today about the national security challenge of our time, the war which radical Islamist extremists have been waging against us..."
 Senator John McCain, July 13 2007

what is heard

This is the first sentence of the speech. As discussed in Example #4 above, it is extremely significant because it often determines how - and if - an audience will listen for the rest of the speech. This sentence was already quoted earlier because of the word "war," but we now analyze two other expressions.

1. "...challenge of our time... Islamist..." – Defining the challenge as Islamist in the first sentence may signal that Islam is the root of the problem.
2. "against us" – can be a positive message, but needs to be explained clearly.

possible alternatives

1. Drop the word Islamist, at least in the opening paragraph:
"...Challenge of our time... radical extremists..." or **"violent extremists."**
 If the speaker wants to be more specific, use *"Al-Qaeda and its followers/allies."*
2. **"against all of us – Muslims and non-Muslims"**

Source: <http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/News/Speeches/73b7abb7-776d-4842-afb6-1ef97ed762c5.htm>

Example #8

what is said

"We must not only track down and capture or kill confirmed jihadists, we must stop a new generation from joining the fight. This Long War is not with Islam but within Islam - a small minority of extremists against the majority of moderates. My administration would pour far more resources into helping moderate Muslims - women's rights campaigners, labor leaders, tolerant imams, lawyers, journalists, and many others - resist a well-financed campaign of extremism that is tearing their societies apart."

Senator John McCain, July 13 2007

what is heard

This paragraph carries a positive message in terms of preventing radicalization. However it is important to recognize some nuances that may undermine this message.

1. Location in the speech – this paragraph comes after numerous paragraphs that deal with *"Islamist Extremists."* By the time the speaker gets to it, Muslim listeners may already be offended or alienated by the speaker. At this stage, they may doubt the sincerity of the message.
2. *"Jihadists"* – According to RICU's focus groups, this term presumes the speaker believes there is an explicit link between Islam and terrorism.
3. *"...small minority of extremists against the majority of moderates"* – Obviously, this is an attempt to be inclusive of Muslims. However, RICU's analysis suggests that this distinction of Moderates vs. Radicals is perceived as a means of dividing Muslim communities or stigmatizing points of view/lifestyles that are deemed to be less favorable to government. Portraying some people as "moderate" may also weaken their standing within their communities – thus decrease their ability to positively influence others.
4. *"...campaign of extremism that is tearing their societies apart..."* – This implies that this is an internal problem of Muslim communities. In general, it creates a distinction between Muslim communities – who struggle with this challenge – and an "us" that needs to help them confront it.

possible alternatives

1. Move the paragraph up. Sending this positive message to Muslim communities early on, may help to gain their trust and their attention for the rest of the speech.
2. Instead of *"Jihadists"* use **"Terrorists"** which doesn't have a religious connotation. (RICU suggests "Criminal/murderer/thug.")
3. *"...small minority of extremists that don't represent **Muslims/Mainstream Muslims.**"*
4. *"...campaign of extremism **that poses a challenge to our society/to all of us.**"*

Source: <http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/News/Speeches/73b7abb7-776d-4842-afb6-1ef97ed762c5.htm>

memos

MEMORANDUM

To: Liberal/Democrat American politician
Re: National Security Messaging Strategy

Problem: “Global war on terror” language incites violence against U.S. citizens and military serving abroad. Language used by American politicians to describe the “global war on terror” is often manipulated and used to organize violence against U.S. citizens and military. For example, Al Qaeda (AQ) and other terrorist networks use speeches and quotes from U.S. politicians to recruit individuals.

Goal: Use less inflammatory language to build stronger ties with Muslim communities. American policymakers operate in a constrained domestic political environment. For a policy to be implemented it must appeal to the actor’s constituents and fellow policymakers. This memo explores potential arguments to: 1) convince a liberal American politician of the urgent need to modify language and communication as part of CT strategy; 2) allow a liberal American politician to justify such changes.

Action: Adopt national security language modifications in future statements and speeches. Proposed are national security language modifications. Without changing the substance of your position, the modifications reduce the likelihood that your words will be used by terrorist recruiters or used to incite violence. These modifications are consistent with the Administration’s counter-terrorism messaging efforts. **Example: rather than “violent Islamist extremism,” consider “terrorism.”**

Political Challenge: Employ messaging strategy without appearing “soft” on national security. Critics may suggest that language modifications reflect an unwillingness to use hard options for national security or as proof of “going too easy” on terrorists. Provided are arguments that can be used to explain the modifications to congressional colleagues and to constituents.

Possible Arguments for National Security Messaging Strategy:

1. **Deviate from current U.S. administration.** The militant language in the context of the terrorism threat is a “trademark” of the Bush administration. Changing the language is just another way to demonstrate your criticism of his policies and your intention to act differently.
2. **Soft Power = Hard Power.** Messaging and language do belong to the “soft power” family, but there is wide agreement today that soft power is as important as hard power. America’s ability to restore its posture and image in the world doesn’t depend entirely on its tanks, ships, and troops. American soft power is more vital than ever when it comes to promoting an American agenda abroad.
3. **It is already in the Democratic platform.** The following quotes demonstrate the need to deal with the roots of extremism:

“America must be about more than taking out terrorists and locking up weapons, or else new terrorists will rise up to take the place of every one we capture or kill. That is why the third step in my strategy will be drying up the rising well of support for extremism.” - Obama

“We must develop a comprehensive strategy focusing on education, intelligence, and law enforcement to counter not only the terrorists themselves but also the larger forces fueling support for their extremism.” - Clinton
4. **Protect lives of American soldiers.** American soldiers (and their allies) in Iraq and Afghanistan suffer lethal attacks from AQ and allies on daily basis. U.S. policy leaders should take any possible measure to reduce the number of these attacks. Language that is perceived as offensive to Islam is exploited by AQ for recruitment. Modifying the language may mean using softer words – but the benefit from changing the words may be the saved lives of American soldiers.
5. **Importance of paying attention to European Muslims.** In January, DHS Secretary Chertoff stated that radicalized members of European Muslim communities pose a significant threat to American national security. He estimates that the next major terror attack – if not stopped – will come from Europe; it will be carried out by an extremist who lives in Europe and not in the Middle East. The U.K. government examined its threat of homegrown terrorism, and concluded that changing language can reduce the threat. If British authorities and intelligence believe that this is the right move to prevent extremism, it stands to reason that the U.S. should at the least consider its applicability here?

MEMORANDUM

To: Conservative/Republican American policy-maker
Re: National Security Messaging Strategy

Problem: “Global war on terror” language incites violence against U.S. citizens and military serving abroad. Language used by American politicians to describe the “global war on terror” is often manipulated and used to organize violence against U.S. citizens and military. For example, Al Qaeda (AQ) and other terrorist networks use speeches and quotes from U.S. politicians to recruit individuals.

Goal: Prevent terrorists from using your speeches in recruitment materials to spark violence against Americans at home and overseas.

Action: Develop revised national security messaging strategy for current GWOT-related policies. This memo proposes language modifications for your statements on national security. Without changing the substance of your position, the modifications reduce the likelihood that you will be quoted in terrorist recruitment materials or that your statements will be associated with inciting violence. These modifications are consistent with the Administration’s efforts to streamline counter-terrorism messaging. **For example, rather than “jihadist,” consider “criminal” or “murderer.”**

Political Challenge: Employ messaging strategy without appearance of being weak on national security. Critics may suggest that making language modifications implies you are soft on national security or that you lack a strong commitment to fighting religious extremists. Provided below are arguments that can be used to explain the modifications to Republican colleagues and to constituents.

Possible Arguments Supporting National Security Messaging Strategy:

1. **Protect lives of American soldiers.** American soldiers (and their allies) in Iraq and Afghanistan suffer lethal attacks from AQ and allies on daily basis. U.S. policy leaders should take any possible measure to reduce the number of these attacks. Language that is perceived as offensive to Islam is exploited by AQ for recruitment. Modifying the language may mean using softer words – but the benefit from changing the words may be the saved lives of American soldiers.
2. **Importance of paying attention to European Muslims.** In January, DHS Secretary Chertoff stated that radicalized members of European Muslim communities pose a significant threat to American national security. Further, he estimates that the next major terror attack – if not stopped – will come from Europe. It will be carried out by an extremist who lives in Europe and not in the Middle East. The U.K. government examined its threat of homegrown terrorism, and arrived to the conclusion that changing the language is essential to reduce the threat. If British authorities and intelligence believe that this is the right move to prevent extremism, it stands to reason that the U.S. should at the least consider its applicability here?
3. **Appreciating “Message Received.”** Language modifications have nothing to do with “surrendering” to terrorism or putting the needs of another community, nation, or religion before those of America. Rather, being mindful of the words we use demonstrates an understanding that global audiences likely will not hear them the way we want them to. Foreign and domestic audiences almost certainly will receive the same words and phrases very differently. This can have serious if not deadly implications.
4. **It is already in the current Republican platform.** The following quote, taken from a speech of the Republican Presidential nominee, Senator McCain, shows that the need to change messaging is already an agreed objective among members of the GOP:
“As president, I would revitalize our public diplomacy. In 1998, the Clinton Administration and Congress agreed to abolish the United States Information Agency and put its public diplomacy functions inside the State Department. This was a mistake. Dismantling an agency dedicated to promoting America’s message amounted to unilateral disarmament in the struggle of ideas. Communicating our government’s views on day-to-day issues is what the State Department does. But communicating the idea of America, our purpose, our past and our future is a different task. We need to re-create an independent agency with the sole purpose of getting America’s message to the world - a critical element in combating Islamic extremism.” - McCain

u.s. capabilities

u.s. messaging capabilities

Less than a year has passed since the United States government (USG) released the National Strategy for Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy. Already, efforts to coordinate federal agency messages and themes have stalled. This is troubling because interagency strategic messaging is a critical counter-terrorism mechanism to engage in the "battle of ideas." Al Qaeda and other criminal networks exploit U.S. government actions, messages, and speeches to recruit violent extremists. Yet lack of collaboration among federal agencies and lack of coordination of messaging strategies persist. Consequently, the United States remains vulnerable to potential violence provoked by its own messaging and language.

This overview summarizes and analyzes current strategic counter-terrorism messaging and their operational capabilities conducted by federal agencies. Agencies responsible for setting the national messaging policy include the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (State). Agencies responsible for the operational implementation of messaging policy include, in addition to DoD and State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

background on national strategy

Since the attacks on September 11th, 2001, agencies within the United States government have recognized the importance of strategic communications to counter-terrorism strategy. However, efforts have largely pursued agency-specific messaging objectives and have been criticized and considered only limitedly effective. In 2006, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, "If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a 'D' or a 'D-plus' as a

country as to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today. I'm not going to suggest that it's easy, but we have not found the formula as a country[for countering the extremists' message]."²²

In an effort to unify the themes and messages across government, in April 2006, President George W. Bush tasked Department of State Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes to serve as chair of the interagency Policy Coordinating Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications (PCC-PDSC). Under Hughes' leadership, in May 2007, the PCC-PDSC announced the National Strategy for Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy and outlined the USG strategy, objectives and priorities. The Strategy also outlines

next steps for interagency coordination by creating a permanent, full-time Counterterrorism Communications Center (CTCC) under State and a crisis situation Interagency Crisis Communications Team under the National Security Council (NSC).²³

Strategy Not Detailed Enough, Additional Guidance and Steps Needed

The national strategy provides objectives for USG strategic communications but offers limited guidance for interagency coordination. The strategy fails to identify which agencies beyond State and DoD should be involved and to what degree, fails to envision how domestic agencies, like DHS and the FBI, may be relevant stakeholders in USG strategic messaging, and fails to acknowledge that domestic policy and foreign policy objectives may be achieved through the same strategic messaging initiatives. To advance strategic messaging from the strategy's weaknesses, additional steps are necessary to **ensure consistent leadership** and to **envision how domestic policy-focused agencies should be involved**. National security is comprised of domestic and foreign elements, not just foreign policy.

*"If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a 'D' or a 'D-plus' as a country as to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today."
- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
March 2006*

²² Associated Press. "Rumsfeld: U.S. Losing War of Ideas," 26 Mar, 2006. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/27/terror/main1442811.shtml>

²³ See Appendix I for additional details about the National Strategy for Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy's mission, objectives and priorities.

Leadership. Established interagency coordination requires strong, top-level leadership and efforts to create new interagency strategic messaging require even more robust leadership. Career staff possesses the experience and capability to develop organizational stability but a political appointee can uniquely foster political support from colleagues across federal agencies, White House staff in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and members of Congress and their staff members.

Unfortunately, for more than four months since Under Secretary Hughes' resignation in December 2007, interagency coordination for strategic communications has lacked a political appointee who can provide that leadership.²⁴ As a result of the vacancy, the PCC-PDSC has not convened once to review the progress of the strategy's implementation. The newly created CTCC also remains funded by supplemental appropriations, signaling that Congress and OMB may not completely support the CTCC. Until the CTCC becomes a part of the baseline budget, which would require negotiation on the part of a new political appointee with Congress and OMB, the funding environment makes interagency coordination difficult. Without guidance, agencies may easily estimate that counter-terrorism messaging is not an Administration priority; as new programs, the CTCC and other strategy initiatives require the authority derived from being in the baseline budget in order to be taken seriously.

With the 2008 Presidential and Congressional elections only months away, it is unlikely the CTCC will gain a strong political advocate before the next presidential administration assumes office in early 2009. Even if a new appointee is confirmed before the end of 2008, he will have limited time to affect change or to restore momentum. In looking forward, the next administration should carefully examine its nominee for the post responsible for coordinating USG strategic messaging and ensure the nominee's commitment to developing messaging as a counter-terrorism tool.²⁵

Nexus of domestic policy and foreign policy. The national strategy fails to recognize

how domestic policy and foreign policy interact in achieving a common objective, to counter terrorism. Instead, the strategy focuses only on foreign policy and proposes an application of strategic communications and public diplomacy that targets foreign audiences. Given the number of terrorism threats originating from outside of U.S. borders, there is merit to this approach. However, a major limitation is that the approach does not direct the coordination of messaging intended for foreign and domestic audiences. It is unrealistic to expect that foreign audiences will only receive the messaging intended for them. We must recognize that domestic messages will reach and affect foreign audiences. Domestic messages and themes cannot be contained within U.S. borders. What is said in the U.S. can be broadcast and reach foreign audiences through television, print media, or the internet, and likewise what is said abroad can reach the American audience.

Thus, agencies like DHS and DOJ – which are just as vital as State and DoD when it comes to national security matters – should be active participants in strategic and interagency coordination of messaging. While the strategy does not envision how DHS or DOJ's FBI can support strategic communications, each agency has significant messaging capabilities that can inform communications countering violent ideology; both already work together to counter domestic threats.

The background on the national strategy highlights the challenges facing national strategic counter-terrorism communications and interagency coordination. In addition, the high-level problems are critical to understanding why agencies are pursuing independent messaging strategies and what incentives and disincentives exist for interagency coordination.

federal agency stakeholders

The Department of Defense and the Department of State are the two primary agencies


²⁴ In October 2007, Under Secretary Hughes announced her resignation effective in December 2007. In December 2007, President Bush nominated her replacement, James K. Glassman. In January 2008, the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing to confirm Glassman and reported his name for final confirmation and vote by the full body of the Senate. At the time of this writing, in April 2008, Glassman remains unconfirmed.

²⁵ Under Secretary Hughes's received strong criticism for being unable to affect opinions among Muslim communities overseas as measured by the Pew Research Center polling numbers and at worst, for having a "lack of understanding of the [Middle East]." (CNN. Bush Adviser to Leave Job as Booster of U.S. Image Abroad, 31 Oct, 2007. <http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/31/karen.hughes/index.html>). It would be unnecessarily speculative to estimate whether Hughes's leadership would have significantly changed the direction and present outcome of the Strategy's implementation of interagency coordination. However, consistent leadership through her presence would have ensured that regular meetings of the PCC-PCSD continued, and therefore ensured regular monitoring and assessment of the implementation.

with institutionalized capabilities and designated authority to establish federal counter-terrorism messaging policy. Meanwhile, additional agencies and government entities, including DHS and FBI are developing strategies to effectively communicate with populations targeted for recruitment by violent extremists. This overview

aims to summarize and analyze what each agency is doing related to counter-terrorism messaging.

Organizational Chart Representing Existing USG Counter-terrorism Communications Capabilities.



Department of State – Counterterrorism Communications Center

The Counterterrorism Communication Center exists under the State Department's Bureau of International Information Programs, which reports to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Staffed by officials from State, DoD, the intelligence community, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the CTCC "[coordinates] overall overt USG strategic communications messaging in the war of ideas and [produces and disseminates] effective messaging to counter terrorist ideology, especially

in the Arab and Muslim world but also in Europe and elsewhere."²⁶ To achieve these aims, the CTCC develops strategic communications plans, messages and themes for use by officials at State and DoD, collaborates with State's Rapid Response Unit on a daily anti-terrorism message, which reaches all the Embassies and military combatant commands.²⁷

Since it has been operating for less than a year, it may be too early to evaluate CTCC's success in countering extremist ideology. Still, several present, emerging, and future challenges are apparent. Although the challenges are not

²⁶ MacInnes, Duncan. "Strategic Communication and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism" Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. 15 Nov., 2007.

²⁷ The Rapid Response Unit is responsible for constant monitoring of media around the globe and provides press guidance for Embassies and consulates. The key distinction between the Unit and the CTCC is that the Unit primarily focuses and responds to current events where as the CTCC develops the message and themes for long-term purposes.

uncommon to a new organization, the CTCC has a demanding task to coordinate a government-wide strategy and will need to resolve its many challenges early into the next administration. The

challenges include present levels of funding, funding mismatch and staff, emerging challenges in authority, and future challenges in program measurement and leadership.

Department of State, Counterterrorism Communications Center Challenges	
Present	Staff. The CTCC's staff size is disproportionately small for its task. Roughly 12 persons from State, DoD, NCTC, and CIA work full-time at the CTCC and are responsible for coordinating the overall USG counterterrorism messaging strategy. The CTCC needs additional funding to hire permanent staff and flexibility to revisit the number of permissible full-time employees allowed by OMB.
	Funding. The CTCC needs political advocates from the White House and Congress to place its programs in the baseline budget. Without a permanent place in the budget, the CTCC will be subject to sporadic supplemental appropriations bills and will not be able to effectively create a long-term plan for its operations.
	Funding Mismatch. The CTCC needs funding levels equal to those of DoD's Office for Support to Public Diplomacy (SPD). Although SPD's head acknowledges, "State absolutely has the lead," funding commitments suggest that DoD has the resources to lead national messaging whereas the CTCC does not. The CTCC needs both the political and funding commitment to support national messaging strategy.
Emerging	Authority. The CTCC needs greater authority to effectively coordinate a national messaging strategy. Currently, the CTCC's aims and staff composition more accurately represent efforts on behalf of a small community within the government, specifically agencies with primary operations overseas, instead of the entire USG. In addition to budget authority, the CTCC needs changes in existing laws to allow greater collaboration between State and DoD with domestic agencies like DHS and the FBI.
Future	Measurement. The CTCC must develop a mechanism to measure the short- and long-term impact of messaging and strategic themes on targeted audiences. Polling is one commonly-used mechanism but it is often subject to error and used to measure short-term change and not long-term effect.
	Leadership. The CTCC needs leadership from the highest-level of government including the President and the Secretary of State, in addition to advocacy at the Under Secretary level. Messaging theory suggests that effective framing requires top-down implementation - see "messaging theory." Only the President in collaboration with the Secretary of State can mobilize cross-government support to coordinate this strategy.

Department of Defense – Office for Support to Public Diplomacy

The Department of Defense has robust operational and policy capabilities to develop messaging strategies and the budgetary resources to support them. Operational capabilities include information operations (IO) and its sub-capability, psychological operations (PSYOPs), which "provides the ability to rapidly disseminate persuasive information to directly

influence the decision-making of diverse audiences, and is seen as a means for deterring aggression, and important for undermining the leadership and popular support for terrorist organizations."²⁸ The Office of Public Affairs provides additional operational capabilities and produces day-to-day messaging. While these operational capabilities are long-standing within DoD, policy capabilities have developed only more recently in response to the nature of present

²⁸ Clay Wilson. "Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues," Congressional Research Service. 20 Mar., 2007. p. 4. <http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31787.pdf>

warfare. Created in 2007, the Office of Support to Public Diplomacy (SPD) focuses on long-term messaging, strategic objectives, and coordination of agency capabilities. For the purposes of our analysis, we will analyze SPD.

SPD creates a space within DoD for much-needed leadership and strategic thinking about the new dimensions of warfare. One of Al Qaeda's most effective tactics against the U.S. includes its use of the internet to recruit and to disseminate its narrative. As a non-state actor, Al Qaeda denies other governments the chance to retaliate within formal geographical borders. Thus, protecting U.S. national security interests requires coupling traditional uses of force with hardware like ships, fighter jets and tanks, with soft power, like diplomacy, information operations and messaging. According to SPD's head, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Support to Public Diplomacy Michael Doran,

"What the war has taught us is that the Department of Defense is engaged in public diplomacy activities all the time. One of the things we emphasize is awareness of the fact that actions speak louder than words. The military on the ground is very much aware of the fact that when they carry out an operation it has a huge impact on how people perceive what we're doing. There needs to be people at Defense who are thinking about this."²⁹

Therefore, SPD embodies DoD's commitment to strategically plan all of DoD's messaging capabilities from one central place and reforms its former structure. In the same interview, Doran said,

"On the messaging sides, you had a lot of elements of the Department of Defense doing messaging or providing resources for messaging, and until this office was created there was no clear focal point for seeking policy guidance. That absence was powerfully felt. It means the guys in the field are left without guidance and they are forced to operate on the basis of watching Sunday talk shows, reading talking points and trying to figure out what is the policy framework in which they're operating. There was no clear place to get that framework."³⁰

SPD's mandate may be clear but its existence still raises questions about its long-term viability as well as how it will co-exist with the CTCC and what role it will play in national messaging. SPD will need to resolve present and emerging challenges including its authority within DoD and role in national messaging strategy.

Department of Defense, Office for Support to Public Diplomacy Challenges	
Present	Internal Authority. SPD needs to establish a clear relationship with DoD Public Affairs to define each office's role in messaging and to distinguish how they can complement one another. Public Affairs should continue to develop day-to-day messaging and proceed in collaboration with SPD's guidance on long-term messaging strategies and themes. SPD should create a strategic plan outlining its mission, objectives, activities, and current resources, to distinguish its role within DoD.
Emerging	External Authority. SPD needs to establish a clear relationship with the Counterterrorism Communications Center (CTCC) located at the State Department. SPD's head acknowledges that "State absolutely has the lead," but SPD has greater access to budgetary resources than the CTCC, which must lead and develop national messaging. SPD should engage in discussions with the CTCC about how it can support national messaging and incorporate those findings into its strategic plan.

²⁹ Katherine McIntire Peters. "Q&A: Public Diplomacy at the Pentagon," Government Executive. 10 Jan., 2008. Page 1. http://www.govexec.com/story_page_pf.cfm?articleid=38996&printerfriendlyvers=1

³⁰ Ibid.

Department of Homeland Security – Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

The Department of Homeland Security interacts with thousands of people on a daily basis and recognizes the highly visible nature of its work can easily produce experiences that may reinforce negative stereotypes about the U.S. government.³¹ Consequently, DHS has developed its own strategy that targets how to establish stronger relationships with American Arab, Muslim, Sikh and South Asian communities and how to better interact with members of those communities.

To diminish the negative stereotypes and common misconceptions, DHS aims to regularly communicate and collaborate with community leaders. Through the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS hosts, facilitates, and participates in meetings with community leaders, alongside colleagues from the DOJ, FBI, State, and the Department of Treasury. These meetings allow DHS to better understand the communities, to build collaborative relationships that inform its work, and to increase awareness about how DHS operates.

Building on these relationships, the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties creates staff training materials that create a common understanding about the communities and identify recommendations on how to conduct the agency's work without comprising civil rights and civil liberties. In short, the materials aim to help staff "do their jobs more efficiently and effectively,"³² according to Daniel Sutherland, head of the Office.

Although the national strategy does not define a role for DHS in crafting national messaging strategy, DHS plays a major role in the United States' international reputation. Like State's CTCC, DHS faces challenges associated with being a relatively new and young organization. DHS faces present, emerging and future challenges including institutional capacity, authority, interagency coordination, and measurement.

³¹ The Department of Homeland Security is the parent agency of organizations including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which screens passengers through security checkpoints at airports, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which screens passengers entering the United States.

³² Daniel Sutherland. "Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland," Testimony presented before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. 14 Mar., 2007.

Department of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	
Present	<p>Institutional Capacity. DHS needs to demonstrate its ability to operate as a major executive agency. As a young organization, formed by existing agencies, DHS has had to negotiate cultural differences amongst the founding organizations. Rather than allow those differences to hinder the agency's single identity, DHS should leverage all of its security expertise and its unique role as a point of contact between the federal government and state and local governments to prove it should be consulted in interagency projects.</p> <p>Authority. DHS needs to establish its authority among its agency peers. If DHS seeks to make significant contributions to, or even lead, interagency efforts, then it must establish and command authority. Currently, DoD and State staff who are crafting USG messaging and themes do not acknowledge DHS's potential role or ability to contribute. Building institutional capacity goes hand in hand with establishing credibility that will result in bolstering the agency's authority.</p>
Emerging	<p>Interagency Coordination. DHS should play a larger role in developing national messaging intended to serve counterterrorism objectives. Actions can speak louder than words. While State and DoD are obvious actors in shaping the U.S. image abroad, DHS plays an equally influential role through its interactions with millions of foreign airline passengers who encounter TSA and CBP officials each year. DHS can equally advance or offset the messaging strategy.</p>
Future	<p>Measurement. DHS needs to regularly measure the impact of its relationships with community leaders, who may leave their posts as frequently as elected officials do. DHS must have a mechanism to assess whether its contacts represent diverse perspectives and community-wide insights as well as whether its contacts have the influence to convey messages back to the communities about DHS and the USG.</p>

Department of Justice – Federal Bureau of Investigation

Since 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice has made its number one priority to protect the United States from terrorist attacks.³³ Accordingly, “much attention has been given to messages encouraging Muslims toward radicalization. To counter such messages, the FBI engages national Muslim organizations in the United States that have public positions against terrorism and radicalization,” according to John Miller, the assistant director for the FBI's Office of Public Affairs.³⁴ The FBI also uses its field office to host community programs that engage youth and “minority and ethnic communities...where the potential for radicalization is the greatest,”³⁵ to clarify what the FBI does, and to increase awareness about employment opportunities with the Bureau.

Like DHS, the FBI lacks a formal role in crafting messaging strategy but has cultivated valuable relationships that can inform and advance messaging. These relationships allow the USG to better understand how American Muslim communities perceive the government and to identify how the government can address grievances. Further, collaboration with American Muslims provides a counter example to terrorist recruitment narrative that claims that the West is opposed to Islam.

Other Partners in Messaging

Other government partners participate in national messaging on a limited basis, including the National Security Council (NSC), the United States Congress and local law enforcement agencies.

The NSC primarily provides policy-planning capabilities when events require decision-making from cabinet-level officials or their deputies, and operational capabilities in the

³³ Federal Bureau of Investigation. “About Us” <http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm/>

³⁴ John Miller. “Violent Islamist Extremism, Government Efforts to Defeat It” Testimony presented before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office Public Affairs. 10 May, 2007. p. 5.

³⁵ Ibid. p. 6.

hours and days immediately following a crisis situation. The NSC is not designed to operate long-term, permanent programs. Thus when not in crisis-mode, the CTCC should manage the daily operations and task agencies across the government to conduct associated operations.

The United States Congress issues policy guidance in authorizing programs, appropriates funding, and conducts oversight. Congress's periodic guidance should not surprise agency staff if members of Congress and their staff are kept fully abreast of program activities and developments. Because of the organization of congressional oversight, several committees may be responsible for or assume oversight for interagency programs like the CTCC. To better understand the number of members of congress involved with oversight and appropriations, provided is a chart on the congressional stakeholders to counter-terrorism messaging.

Local law enforcement agencies, like the Los Angeles Police Department and New York City Police Department, do not have a formal role in national messaging. However, DHS and the

FBI regularly consult and partner with local law enforcement agencies because of their presence in, relationships with, and knowledge of local communities.

summary

The United States government must overcome barriers to interagency collaboration to harness its robust policy and operational messaging capabilities in order to create a truly national messaging infrastructure. Messaging objectives intended for domestic audiences do not need to be identical to those for foreign audiences but objectives should be complementary and the language used to achieve those objectives must be consistent across the government. Creating an interagency process to develop channels of communications will be a difficult task, but a critical one to ensure independent agency messaging does not offset the messaging of other agencies, or that of the country.

Congressional Stakeholder Chart				
	Senate	House	Senate	House
	Authorizing and Oversight		Appropriations	
Committee	Foreign Relations	Foreign Affairs	State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Subcommittee	
Jurisdiction	State and CTCC		State and CTCC	
Members	Biden (DE), Chair; Lugar (IN), Ranking	Berman (CA-28), Chair; Ros-Lehtinen (FL-18), Ranking	Leahy (VT), Chair; Gregg (NH), Ranking	Lowey (NY-18), Chair; Wolf (VA-10), Ranking
Key Staff Members	Anthony Blinken, Majority Committee Staff Director; Kenneth Myers, Minority Committee Staff Director	Bob King, Majority Committee Staff Director; Yleem Poblete, Minority Committee Staff Director	Terrence Sauvain, Majority Committee Staff Director; Bruce Evans, Minority Committee Staff Director	Lucy Heenan, Asst. to Rep. Lowey; Frank Cushing, Staff Director
Committee	Armed Services		Defense Subcommittee	
Jurisdiction	DOD and SPD		DOD and SPD	
Members	Levin (MI), Chair; McCain (AZ), Ranking	Skelton (MO-4), Chair; Hunter (CA-52), Ranking	Inouye (HI), Chair; Stevens (AK), Ranking	Murtha (PA-12), Chair; Young (FL-10), Ranking
Key Staff Members	Rick DeBobes, Majority Committee Staff Director; Mike Kostiw, Minority Committee Staff Director	Erin Conaton, Majority Committee Staff Director; Bob Simmons, Minority Committee Staff Director	Terrence Sauvain, Majority Committee Staff Director; Bruce Evans, Minority Committee Staff Director	Patrick Alwine, Asst. to Rep. Murtha; Harry John Glenn, Asst. to Rep. Young
Committee	Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs	Homeland Security	Homeland Security Subcommittee	
Jurisdiction	DHS		DHS	
Members	Lieberman (CT), Chair; Collins (ME), Ranking	Thompson (MS-2), Chair; King (NY-3), Ranking	Byrd (WV), Chair; Cochran (MS), Ranking	Price (NC-4), Chair; Rogers (KY-5), Ranking
Key Staff Members	Michael Alexander, Majority Committee Staff Director; Brandon Milhorn, Minority Committee Staff Director	Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Majority Committee Staff Director; Rob O'Connor, Minority Committee Staff Director	Terrence Sauvain, Majority Committee Staff Director; Bruce Evans, Minority Committee Staff Director	Terrence Sauvain, Majority Committee Staff Director; Bruce Evans, Minority Committee Staff Director

messaging theory

messaging theory

"Headlines make a big, big difference. So take a deep breath and think about what you're going to say. Because once you say it, you can't take it back, can you?"

Dr. Shazia Malik, member, Progressive British Muslims, on her advice to political leaders readying to speak issues relating to the Muslim world and terrorism.

Language is power. Domestic and foreign policies succeed and fail based on how effectively elite public officials communicate with citizens. Scholars debate the exact mechanisms through which discourse determines peoples' policy perceptions, but few doubt words have tremendous impact. Generally speaking, the words we use shape our reality. Language is the key means by which people process the events taking place in the world; language, indeed, forces people to confront ideas and make decisions about them.³⁶

The following analysis reviews recent literature concerning this topic. The research we cite draws heavily on post-September 11th observations. This benefits our overall project not least because we know that most of the following studies take place in the context of an ostensibly security-minded leader or government using the language of the so-called Global War on Terror to further their objectives. Therefore, we can easily make direct comparisons to our area of interest.

When they carefully craft their language, speakers control the context with which their listeners interpret what they are saying – thereby shaping, or *framing*, the content of their listeners' opinions.³⁷ The literature on framing suggests

that elites —presidents, prime ministers, and others— attempt to frame events in a manner which serves their own purposes. Frames influence peoples' perceptions of events abroad, because they help the public process the myriad events taking place in the vast foreign policy arena.³⁸ Further, the literature agrees that democratically-elected leaders strive to earn public support in order to legitimize their decisions.

Elite politicians adeptly use the mass news media in order to deliver their messages to the general public. Journalists therefore can have tremendous influence over the ways in which news consumers understand world events.³⁹ It stands to reason, then, that the more the news media dedicate to an event or to an issue, the

"[It is] very, very, very significant and will lead to more engagement between Muslims and the government. . . [It is] an in-your-face difference."

Dal Babu, Superintendent, National Association of Muslim Police, on Prime Minister Gordon Brown's modified language.

more salient it becomes to the public.⁴⁰ As we learn below, though, journalists tend to echo government rhetoric more often than not, and attempts by individual reporters or media outlets to shape an agenda typically are ineffective.

An attempt by political elites to frame an issue in a certain way, meanwhile, is no guarantee that the public will accept that frame. When citizens face competing frames, they evaluate the credibility of the people or agencies offering them, ultimately favoring frames that

³⁶ Domke, David. (2004) *God Willing? Political Fundamentalism in the White House: The War on Terror & the Echoing Press*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

³⁷ Druckman, James N. (2001) "The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence." *Political Behavior*. 23(3):225-56.

³⁸ Entman, Robert M. (2004) "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11." *Political Communication*, 20:4, 415 – 432.

³⁹ Iyengar, Shanto and Adam Simon. (1994) "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion." In Bennett, W. Lance and David L. Paletz, editors. *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

come from sources they trust.⁴¹ It is not uncommon, however, for one frame to dominate the discourse and subsequent media coverage.⁴² Often, the most trusted sources are elected officials and members of the elite media. But how do reporters and an administration work together?

Journalists rely heavily on official government sources to create their stories, especially when dealing with foreign policy matters.⁴³ The content of news reporters' coverage of an American presidential administration, for example, hinges on the direction and volume of elite support for a given policy *within the administration*; reporting that challenges a president's foreign policy stance enhances the public's ability to think critically about such a policy.⁴⁴ In other words, when elites speak with one voice, so do the news media covering them. Particularly with regard to foreign policy, government sources exercise tremendous power over the language and tone employed by the news media, as is the case with coverage of the Middle East and issues surrounding the Muslim community.⁴⁵

"It's the media that tends to do more twisting [of events and speeches]."
Tarique Ghaffur, Assistant Commissioner,
Metropolitan Police

ideological pollution.⁴⁶ In other words, the public develops its opinions of foreign policy based on frames they receive from elite political leaders via the news media.⁴⁷ Along the chain, theorists assume that framing works because political elites, journalists, and citizens use frames as shortcuts to understanding complex issues; they are unwilling to devote a large amount of time analyzing a situation when a powerful frame can help them do it, thereby saving them cognitive energy.⁴⁸

Entman further theorizes that frames work best when they are "understandable, memorable and emotionally charged". These traits allow frames to be what Entman calls culturally congruent; the more accessible an idea is in the mind of an audience member, the easier it becomes for a leader to use those frames to get everyone —journalists and the public— thinking alike.⁴⁹

framing

Robert Entman's "cascading activation" model (*seen below*) explains the process through which an administration's frame reaches the public. In this model, an administration seeking to influence public opinion must do its best to frame its agenda in ways that are most useful to the news media, so that reporters can transmit the frame to the public with little interference or

an echoing press?

We heard repeatedly in our U.K. and U.S. interviews that the news media hinder progress. Members of the Muslim community who happily noticed the change in official government language that accompanied the Brown administration bemoaned what they saw as journalists' reluctance to follow suit. As explained below, we contend that the news media will indeed come to echo government language, but only after the language is commonly and more widely used by elites.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Druckman, James N. (2001)

⁴³ Bennett, W. Lance and David L. Paletz, editors. (1994) *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

⁴⁴ Page, Benjamin and Robert Entman. (1994) "The News Before the Storm." In Bennett & Paletz, eds. *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


⁴⁵ Nacos, Brigitte L. and Oscar Torres-Reyna. (2003) "Framing Muslim-Americans Before and After 9/11". In Norris, Kern, and Just, eds. *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public*. New York: Routledge Press.

⁴⁶ Entman, Robert M. (2003) *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

⁴⁷ Entman, Robert M. (2004)

⁴⁸ Entman, Robert M. (2003)

⁴⁹ Entman, Robert M. (2004), p. 6



Studies of post-September 11th newspaper editorials find the content overwhelmingly reflects not just the tone but in some cases the actual verbatim language of the Bush administration.⁵¹ Indeed, David Domke suggests that the news media “seamlessly” adhered official language since it was delivered in the context of immediacy; Bush and elite members of his administration spoke in terms of haste and urgency, conforming therefore to “predominant journalistic conceptions of what qualifies as news”.⁵² The lesson? Members of the news media are likely to call for fast action on

an issue if they perceive a sense of urgency on behalf of the elites about whom they are reporting.

Further, we must recognize factors other than timeliness play into reporters’ willingness to echo. As amply noted by our interviewees, profit motivates the media in both the U.S. and U.K. And profit is all-but-guaranteed by sensationalistic coverage and excessive reliance on stereotypes. It is no mean feat to convince editors and producers not to employ techniques they know will grow their audience and secure their livelihoods. Happily, the FCO has already

⁵⁰ Entman, Robert M. (2003)

⁵¹ Domke, David. (2004)

⁵² Ibid, p. 133

engaged with key journalists to begin this process.

An important note: news media alone cannot change either public policy or public opinion about that policy.⁵³ The cascading activation model (as regards general transmission of information) flows downward, with political elites at the top delivering their message via the news media to an audience below. Theorists see a similar structure emerge when talking specifically about a terrorist event. In these cases, all relevant information and elite frames reach the public only after going through the media.⁵⁴ Robert Entman doubts that individual reporters or news outlets have the power to change public policy or shift public opinion; his anecdotal evidence profiling two national reporters' failures to shift attention away from the elite Global War on Terror frame exemplifies such failures.⁵⁵ In short, frames seldom if ever get changed from the bottom-up.

media framing theory: does media matter?

Recent research may disagree over the degree to which the mass news media influence public opinion, but no one doubts the media have such power. As discussed earlier, journalists rely on frames as useful cognitive shortcuts when crafting their stories. The frames not only help journalists assemble and deliver their information, but also help news consumers in process what they observe. Indeed, people have become increasingly dependent on the news media to set their personal agendas, allowing journalists to dictate which issues and concerns should rise to the fore.⁵⁶

The media's frames can shape audience attitudes by stressing specific values and analyses over others. Whether it is through the words or the images or the sounds they choose, journalists' framing of issues can create the

cognitive lens through which news consumers focus varying, or even contradicting, information. For example, when journalists frame it as a free speech issue, people are more willing to approve of a Ku Klux Klan rally than when it is framed as a threat to public order.⁵⁷ Similarly, the media can portray the attempted bombing of an airport as the desperate act of an ostracized and deranged

criminal, or as part of a vast global plot carried out by highly sophisticated terrorists. The public's perception of such an event is clearly colored, if not determined entirely, based on which frame journalists employ.

But where do these frames come from? The short answer: government elites. The mass news media will eventually follow a change in official language, particularly when governmental elites speak with one voice. Theory supports this claim. The media have little choice but to repeat when they report. In the U.S. context, if the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and other key stakeholders all used the same modified language in the same way, we would soon observe changes in media language, which are transmitted directly to the public. A BBC journalist explained to us that something similar is

"It's possibly had the single biggest impact of anything we've done as a government within the past year."

*Ed Whiting, Central Government Division,
Department of Communities & Local
Government, on the reverberations from
official UK language changes.*

"Don't pussyfoot around with the language. People know what the issue is, and at some point playing around with the terms becomes ridiculous."

*Chief Inspector Ian Larnder, Association of Chief
Police Officers*

already happening among U.K. media outlets, who he said saw the Brown administration's arrival as a "turning point" in language usage.

If we accept the reasonable counter-argument (that in a democratic society, a free press will seldom if ever toe the party line) we find it actually furthers the mission of a government looking to influence public opinion by changing its language. As noted above, competing frames

⁵³ Entman, Robert M. (2004)

⁵⁴ Norris, Pippa; Montague Kern; Marion Just. "Framing Terrorism." Introduction In Norris, Pippa, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, eds. *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public*. New York: Routledge Press. (2003)

⁵⁵ Entman, Robert M. (2003)

⁵⁶ Iyengar, Shanto and Donald R. Kinder. *News That Matters: Television And American Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (1987)

⁵⁷ Nelson, T.E., R.A. Clawson, and Z.M. Oxley. 1997. "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 91:567-83.

induce debate. Theory predicts what we now observe happening in Britain. The language shift encouraged by the Brown administration has left the confines of Whitehall; it is now making newspaper headlines. But since the language shift has not been universal (neither domestically nor internationally), the result is debate and discussion. As citizens gradually hear that “criminals” rather than “terrorists” are behind attacks, they may call into question some of their previously-held beliefs, thereby spurring debate and conversation.

conclusion

The theoretical power of such a debate is great. Elites need to repeat their frames with some frequency before recipients (journalists or citizens) internalize them. If those frames are contradicted, people are less likely to accept them. In fact, recent research suggests that simple conversations between people who hold opposing viewpoints on a topic will mitigate the power of any frame.⁵⁸ James Druckman’s earlier work suggests citizens require competing frames to adequately analyze an issue; this research suggests a lower threshold—simple discussion—to achieve the same aim. We would like to see further research that confirms this result among varying frames. For now, though, it provides a low-effort mechanism for incorporating and processing elite frames with the public’s limited time and cognitive energy. It is also something happening as we speak.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) expressed to us their desire to do just this: inspire debate. A government speaking with one voice offers a relatively easy frame for journalists to transmit. Divergent viewpoints cause media to pause – and most transfer their internal debates to their audience. Official FCO Arabic Spokesman Barry Marston recognized that his office cannot force the U.K. news media to use the language Whitehall chooses. But among his stated goals to us is increased debate among journalists about the impact of words and phrases on radicalization.

The FCO’s efforts appear to be working, thanks to governmental language shifts underway in the United Kingdom. Our interviews have shown widespread acknowledgment of the changes and in some cases an incorporation of them into other governmental agencies. A useful

focus for further empirical research would be to measure the effect of the U.K.’s language changes on the national news media there. Coded-analysis of recent articles and programs can detect the occurrence of new language, as offered by the government. Useful follow-up might then include interviews with the news agencies responsible for the changes, if any are in fact discovered, to determine what conscious factors played a role in the adoption of said language.

It would also be illuminating to conduct language-specific polls in the U.K. that gauge the extent to which citizens are aware and appreciative of the recent changes. Substantial surveys would let policymakers observe whether and how they have affected public opinion. In the worst case scenario, political elites and journalists risk being accused of being puppets of government propaganda for using alternative language. This may deter widespread acceptance of new language. Such surveys may also be able to uncover if these fears are legitimate.

⁵⁸ Druckman, James N. and Kjersten R. Nelson. (2003) “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence.” *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4):729-45.

numbers

numbers

setting the stage

To gauge global sentiment and to judge if there is indeed a problem that language can address, we turned to the numbers. We analyzed survey data from the 2005 Gallup World Poll originally compiled in 2007 by a pair of Harvard Kennedy School graduate students. Their research revealed that “people in Muslim nations are overwhelmingly negative about both the substance of U.S. and Western foreign policies and the style of U.S. diplomatic relations, particularly the situation in Iraq”.⁵⁹ The report uncovered polling that suggests Western governments’ stances toward Palestine are responsible for the low opinion of the West on the so-called Arab street. Generally speaking, Western foreign policy generates “strongly negative opinions”. Most people in Muslim nations perceive tension between Western and Muslim cultures, and almost all respondents show considerable concern about U.S. intentions in their region.

When asked specifically about U.S. foreign policies, people in Muslim nations are more likely to associate negative traits rather than positive ones. Common adjectives used to describe American foreign policy include “ruthless,” “aggressive,” “arrogant,” and “conceited”. More positive descriptors (“friendly”, “trustworthy”, or “treats other countries respectfully”) were used only between ten and 20 per-cent of the time.⁶⁰

Relevant observations from Gallup’s 2005 World Poll, as noted by fellow Harvard researchers:

- * People in Muslim nations tend to think Western nations do not respect their values.
- * People in Muslim nations generally doubt the future will bring vastly improved relations and understanding between the West and the Arab/Muslim world.
- * Most respondents say the September 11 attacks were unjustifiable, but at the same

time they tend to disagree about whether or not it is justifiable to sacrifice one’s life for one’s beliefs.⁶¹

We found support for these findings when we analyzed a 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey (released in October, 2007). The results show Muslims and Westerners use overwhelmingly negative words to describe each other. Overall, the report “reveal[s] a disturbingly high level of negativity on both sides, with Muslims and non-Muslims associating a wide array of negative characteristics with one another”.⁶² The most recent data sets include Muslims in western countries as well as those in the Middle East and other areas of the world where Islam is generally more prevalent. This enhances the results’ relevance to our studies.

Pew notes that the term “Western” does not explicitly refer to religion, whereas the word “Muslim” does. Yet Pew adopts the attitude that “Western” is “traditionally understood to be closely related to” and connected with Christianity. This is a distinction with which we agree.

How the West Views Muslims

The Pew polls asked non-Muslim respondents which characteristics they associate with Muslims. With regard to the words tested by the survey, people polled in the United States and Great Britain were among the least likely to associate negative characteristics with Muslims. As noted below, for example, less than a third of British respondents think Muslims are “violent”; less than a fifth of Americans would call Muslims “immoral”. Contrast this with other nations (i.e., India) in which a majority consistently attaches negative characteristics to Muslims.

Further questions elicit the extent to which non-Muslims characterize Muslims positively. The U.S. and Great Britain do not fare especially well, but both nations (particularly Great Britain) are more likely than many other participating nations to call Muslims “generous” and “honest”.



⁵⁹ Han, Erica and Lymari Morales. (2007) “*Understanding Muslim Populations: What Leaders Need to Know*”. Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Policy Analysis Exercise.

⁶⁰ Ibid.






⁶¹ Han and Morales (2007).

⁶² Wike, Richard and Brian J. Grim. (October 30, 2007). *Widespread Negativity: Muslims Distrust Westerners More than Vice Versa*. Pew Global Attitudes Project and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life.

POSITIVE CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH MUSLIMS (NON-MUSLIM RESPONDENTS)⁶³



NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH MUSLIMS (NON-MUSLIM RESPONDENTS)



The above results suggest that non-Muslims in the United States and Great Britain are relatively willing to ascribe positive characteristics to Muslims. It appears that non-Muslims in these countries are among those least likely to connect negative characteristics to

Muslims. Public opinion, then, already trends toward the goals of acceptance and inclusion sought by the respective Western governments. To the extent that elite language and tone can have sway over public opinion, it appears that the effort need not be overwhelming. People seem

⁶³ All "Y" axes are "Percent Agreeing With Language"

Source: *Widespread Negativity: Muslims Distrust Westerners More than Vice Versa*. Pew Global Attitudes Project and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. (2007)


generally willing to hold Muslims at home and abroad in some esteem. The feeling, as they say, is not mutual.

How Muslims View the West

Pew asked Muslims living in ten different countries how they view Westerners. Most relevant to this report are responses of British


Muslims. Without exception, a majority of people in this category characterizes of the West (in many cases, the nation they call home) as “violent”, “arrogant”, and “immoral”. (See below) Also of note is the fact that British Muslims are more willing their European peers to ascribe negative traits to their host culture.

POSITIVE CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH WESTERNERS (MUSLIM RESPONDENTS)



European Muslims are the most willing of their global counterparts to associate positive characteristics with Westerners. As noted above, though, British Muslims tend to be at the bottom of this pack. Nevertheless, British Muslims will sometimes use words like “generous” and “honest” to talk about Westerners. Surely these numbers reflect the level of disaffection felt by modern Muslims who call the U.K. home. A recent report finds that “Muslims [in the U.K.] are among the least successful of minority groups”,

NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH WESTERNERS (MUSLIM RESPONDENTS)



with an unemployment rate three times the national average.⁶⁴ Further, Muslims in the U.K. are more than three times more likely to live in an economically “deprived district” than other Britons, and the academic performance of Muslim children remains below the national average.⁶⁵

Language, as noted at the outset of this report, has limited power to alter opinion in circumstances like these. Actual changes to domestic and foreign policies have the greatest

⁶⁴ Masood, Ehsan. (2006) “British Muslims: Media Guide”. The British Council & The Association of Muslim Social Scientists, p. 6.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

impact on the lives of the Muslim community. As Shazia Malik, of Progressive British Muslims, explained in our meeting with her, “what you do means more than the language you couch it in.” We suggest, then, that policymakers recognize the tremendous value of language coupled with action.

The results of the polls cited above do not necessarily paint a picture of despair. There remains a great deal of room for policy and language to have an impact. We chose the polls

in this section because they represent the views of people around the world. Today’s policymaker – particularly one from the U.S. or U.K. – speaks to a global audience. Each word carries with it tremendous repercussions. As we noted in “messaging theory,” language shapes peoples’ perceptions of the “other”. Therefore we have strong reason to believe that numbers such as those cited above can and will respond to continued refinement of official rhetoric.

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appendices

APPENDIX I

The National Strategy for Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy's mission and priorities, and strategic objectives are provided below. Target audiences include key influencers who can validate and spread the U.S. message, mass audiences through multimedia streams, and vulnerable populations such as youth, women and girls, and minorities.

MISSION AND PRIORITIES

The strength, success and security of the United States of America rest on our commitment to certain fundamental values and principles. These values gave birth to our nation, and govern our actions in the world. We believe all individuals, men and women, are equal and entitled to basic human rights, including freedom of speech, worship and political participation. While the forms of government will vary, we believe all people deserve to live in just societies that protect individual and common rights, fight corruption and are governed by the rule of law. Across the world, America seeks to work with other governments and nations in a spirit of partnership that supports human dignity and fosters peace and progress.

The National Security Strategy of the United States establishes eight national security objectives:

- To champion human dignity;
- To strengthen alliances against terrorism;
- To defuse regional conflicts;
- To prevent threats from weapons of mass destruction;
- To encourage global economic growth;
- To expand the circle of development;
- To cooperate with other centers of global power; and
- To transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

Public diplomacy and strategic communication should always strive to support our nation's fundamental values and national security objectives. All communication and public diplomacy activities should:

- Underscore our commitment to freedom, human rights and the dignity and equality of every human being;
- Reach out to those who share our ideals;
- Support those who struggle for freedom and democracy; and
- Counter those who espouse ideologies of hate and oppression.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The United States Government seeks to partner with nations and peoples across the world in ways that result in a better life for all of the world's citizens. As a multicultural nation founded by immigrants, America respects people of different cultures, backgrounds and faiths. We seek to be a partner for progress, prosperity and peace around the world.

We have established three strategic objectives to govern America's public diplomacy and strategic communication with foreign audiences:

I. America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in our most basic values.

These values include our deep belief in freedom, and the dignity and equality of every person. We believe all people deserve to live in just societies that are governed by the rule of law and free from corruption or intimidation. We believe people should be able to speak their minds, protest peacefully, worship freely and participate in choosing their government. We want all people, boys and girls, to be educated, because we know education expands opportunity and we believe those who are educated are more likely to be responsible citizens, tolerant and respectful of each other's differences. We want to expand the circle of prosperity so that people throughout the world can earn a living and provide for their families. America has long been a beacon of hope and opportunity for people across the world and we must continue to be that beacon of hope for a better life.

II. With our partners, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith.

We can achieve this goal by:

- Promoting democratization and good governance as a path to a positive future, in secure and pluralistic societies;
- Actively engaging Muslim communities and amplifying mainstream Muslim voices;
- Isolating and discrediting terrorist leaders, facilitators, and organizations;
- De-legitimizing terror as an acceptable tactic to achieve political ends; and
- Demonstrating that the West is open to all religions and is not in conflict with any faith.

III. America must work to nurture common interests and values between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures and faiths across the world.

Far more unites us as human beings than divides us. Especially at a time of war and common threats, America must actively nurture common interests and values. We have shared interests in expanding economic opportunity, promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts, enhancing scientific collaboration, fighting diseases that respect no border, and protecting our common environment. A cornerstone of American policy and public diplomacy must be to identify, highlight and nurture common interests and values.

APPENDIX II

List of interviews conducted.

Wednesday, November 7, 2007:

Interview with Emran Qureshi, Wertheim Fellow at the Labor & Worklife Program at Harvard Law School. Cambridge, MA.

Monday, December 10, 2007.

Conference call at the office of British Consulate-General with Tony Lord and Kelly Hysan of the Washington, D.C. British Embassy. Cambridge, MA

January 24, 2008:

Interview with Jeremy Curtin, Coordinator, Bureau of International Information Programs, Department of State. Washington, D.C.

Monday, February 4, 2008:

Interview with Michael Nevin, Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), U.K. Home Office. London.

Interviews with Team Member Alex Cole, Lead Arabic Press Spokesman Barry Marston, and Senior Researcher Zaheer Kazmi. U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. London.

Tuesday, February 5, 2008:

Interviews with Ibrar Ahmed and Superintendent Dal Babu (former Chair of National Association of Muslim Police and the Association of Muslim Police). London.

Interview with Nadeem Malik, Public Affairs Representative of Association of Muslim Police. London

Interview with Fiaz Choudhary, Association of Muslim Police. London

Interview with Dave P. Mortimer, Metropolitan Police, Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team. London.

Interview with Imam Mohammed Martin, police/community liaison, second imam at Al-Muntada Al-Islami, Parsons Green. London.

Wednesday, February 6, 2008:

Interview with Tarique Ghaffur, Metropolitan Police, Assistant Commissioner at New Scotland Yard. London.

Interviews with Ian Larnder, Marc Lyall, Simon Efford, Carl Wonfor, Association of Chief Police Officers, National Community Tension Team. London.

Interview with Ed Whiting, Departments of Communities and Local Governments. London.

Thursday, February 7, 2008:

Interview with Shazia Malik, member, Progressive British Muslims. London.

Interviews with Michael House and David Stevens, U.K. Ministry of Defence. London.

Interview with Diana Dalton, Department for International Development. London.

Interviews with Sharhabeal Lone, Yusra Khreegi, Fadi Itani, coordinators and managers, Islam is Peace Campaign. London.

Friday, February 8, 2008:

Interview with Imam Usama Hasan, Al-Tawhid Mosque. East London.

Friday, February 15, 2008:

Interview with Tony Lord, First Secretary, Justice and Home Affairs, Foreign & Security Policy Group, British Embassy. Washington, D.C.

Interview with Kelly Hysan, Public Affairs Officer, Public Affairs Team, British Embassy. Washington, D.C.

Interview with Michael Doran, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Support to Public Diplomacy, Office of Support for Public Diplomacy, Department of Defense. Arlington, VA.

Interview with Robert B. Petersen, Contractor, Counterterrorism Communications Center, Department of State. Washington, D.C.

Friday, February 22, 2008:

Telephone interview with Colonel Bill Mooney, Countering Ideology Supporting Terrorism Division Chief, Department of Defense. Cambridge, MA.

Telephone interview with Lieutenant Mark Stainbrook, Los Angeles Police Department. Cambridge, MA.

Thursday, March 13, 2008:

Discussion with Jocelyne Cesari, Director, Islam in the West. Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies. Cambridge, MA.

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