be able to predict the intensity of great-power interventions. The theory would, for example, expect German policy to have been more unyielding in the 1911 Agadir crisis in Morocco than in the 1905 Moroccan crisis, but the opposite was the case.

Nonetheless, Taliaferro’s book is a major accomplishment. It showcases the relevance of social science research for today’s most important policy issues. It should be read by all scholars interested in foreign policy decision making and the use of force. One can only hope that it is read by policy makers as well.

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Francis Fukuyama’s important new book on nation building asks all the right questions, but it does not provide answers to them. He rightly sees that the major problem in modern international politics is not primarily when to use force, it is what to do after an invader has already succeeded and is in occupation of the disputed territory. One can win the war, and, as the United States is doing presently in Iraq, lose the peace. After the fact, this can strongly condition whether it was a right decision to go in, in the first place. The evidence for this problem is legion. The United States, the EU, and NATO won in Bosnia and Kosovo, but they have not won the peace, in the sense of leaving a stable domestic government in charge of its political fortunes. The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina still calls the shots. Nor is Kosovo—under NATO tutelage—truly independent. The United States has gone into Haiti time and again without giving Port au Prince a stable and uncorrupt government. The various interventions in Africa by the United States, France, and the African Union have not provided effective government for the countries concerned. Sierra Leone, the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia are still bleeding. There is even the possibility that intervention actually makes matters worse, in that it smashes whatever local administrative capacity there once was.

Perhaps even more interesting, the growing recognition of the “post-conquest problem” may have created even more difficulties. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—seeking to assist the failed regime—plunge in and thereby usurp the role of a domestic government. Fukuyama cites Michael Ignatieff’s colorful phrase, they “suck out” local administrative capacity. The United Nations does no better, again substituting an international capability for a needed domestic capability. Nor does International Monetary Fund (IMF) “conditionality” achieve a better result. The IMF continues to give money even in cases like Kenya where its conditions are not met.

In the process of making this argument, Fukuyama has powerfully added to the case against conquest that various writers have made in the past genera-
tion. For many observers, imperial expansion would not succeed today because of the mobilized population that invasion would confront. A nationalized population would resist the invader. But even if these writers were wrong (and the country did not resist), there would still be no effective successor regime to run the country. The Nazis (at least for a time) had the cooperation of Vichy collaborators. But there is no “Vichy” in the regimes in Eastern Europe or Africa. There is no one to mind the administrative store. Even a determined “imperialist” cannot extract the needed riches when the country is in administrative and political limbo. Invasion-intervention only heightens chaos without achieving the gains of the conquerors.

Of course, Fukuyama deals with issues in addition to the incentive to make war—although this is where his analytic payoff truly lies. He worries about all states with decaying administrative capacity—failed states—however caused. He observes, rightly again, that the effects of globalization have too often made for weak states—instead of strong states with a narrower scope of government activity. (New Zealand is one of the few post-modern polities that has reduced the scope of governmental activity while increasing its administrative power in the remaining areas.) He thereby validates the claims of Hernando de Soto (The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism, Basic Books, 1989), who argues that strong and well-protected “property rights”—currently lacking—are critical for development and administrative performance in most developing countries, even where “structural adjustment” programs get the state out of economic activity. Without them, little else can transpire in economic terms.

But this leaves the reader untutored about what to do. Every remedy seems vain—UN intervention, NGO activity, IMF supervision. Failed states remain failed, and their number is growing as civil wars break out and international intervention follows, further emasculating local administration. Is it possible that “arms-length” strategies are necessary instead? Fukuyama rightly argues that it is local demand for administrative performance that is crucial in producing a supply of that needed commodity. At the end of his persuasive book, Fukuyama questions whether European strategies may not be better at dealing with the issue than American or international ones. The EU does not force its new member states to be free, it provides incentives—political and economic—for them to move in the right direction. But everything depends upon them and on bolstering political demand in their countries to get into Europe. Thus the country candidates for EU membership do not suffer Fukuyama’s difficulties, or if they do, they must wait to be admitted. The EU has a well-nigh universal solution to the problem of failed states on its frontiers. But alas, its remedy cannot be applied everywhere. Fukuyama has provided a substantial service in opening the problem for inspection, but he has not solved it.

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