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What Leads Voters to Support the Opposition under Authoritarianism? Evidence from Survey Research in Jordan

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Abstract: Voters in authoritarian countries face a much different calculus than voters in democratic societies when choosing which candidate to support. Current explanations of their behavior rely on material incentives, arguing that these voters support pro-regime candidates who they believe can deliver economic resources to them or their regions. However, despite these economic incentives, some voters still choose to support the opposition. This paper examines the factors that lead some citizens to act in this way using a post-election survey in the case of Jordan. It argues that discontent, socio-economic status, and personal connections are key determinants of voters decision to vote for the opposition.

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Introduction

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.

The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. For example, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Yet, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Rather, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995).

While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. In fact, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Yet, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the regime.

Accordingly, this paper examines what leads some ordinary citizens to vote for the opposition based on a representative public opinion survey taken after the 2007 Jordanian parliamentary election. Using a multinomial logit model, it seeks to identify the factors that lead individuals to vote against the regime, even though it seems to be against their short-term material interest. As such, this paper represents a contribution to the literature on voter behavior in non-democratic societies.

Elections under Authoritarianism

Elections play an important role in authoritarian societies. Perhaps most importantly, they can serve to buttress the existing regime in a variety of manners. First, it is possible for elections to relieve pressure on the regime by giving ordinary citizens some voice in the system (Norton 1999, 36). Citizens are thus included in some aspect of the regime and have the ability to communicate their sentiments to the regime in a controlled manner. If the regime has performed badly, individuals can voice this anger at the ballot box rather than in the streets.

Second, elections can provide the existing regime with a form of democratic veneer (Huntington 1993, 47). In many instances, authoritarian regimes refer to the democratization process and point to elections as a critical element in what they claim is an ongoing transition towards this type of system. Elections can be used both to try to pacify the domestic public by pointing to progress towards greater inclusion as well as to outside powers. Often, even minimal gains in the quality or fairness of elections are heralded by the regime as major step in democratization. For example, the Egyptian regime allowed an opposition candidate to contest the presidential election for the first

time in 2007. While this individual had no chance of winning the election, this step was widely promoted by the as progress towards real democracy.

Third, regimes can use elections to frustrate democratic development (Robbins and Tessler, 2006). In cases where elections are not present, outside forces have a clear demand for this form of political inclusion. Yet, in cases where elections are held, especially in cases where voting itself appears to be reasonably free and fair, elections themselves can be used to help frustrate the democratic process. In such cases, regimes may allow for a free and fair vote but disguise election fraud in other manners. For example, districts can be gerrymandered or electoral rules devised to affect the outcome of elections and limit opposition success (see Sisk and Reynolds, 1998). Similarly, by holding elections for powerless bodies, regimes can allow for inclusion in the system but frustrate opponents by not allowing any meaningful change. Thus, the more complex demand for changing electoral rules or reforming certain political bodies creates a more challenging environment for opposition leaders to rally support against the regime compared to simply calling for elections.

Yet, while regimes can use elections to their advantage, the mere presence of elections implies a certain risk for the regime. If turnout is extremely low, it can help show citizens that their fellow countrymen do not support the regime (Quandt 1998, 76). This decreased legitimacy for the regime can embolden the opposition in certain cases.

Likewise, if the opposition is allowed to participate, it can sometimes challenge and even overtake the regime (see Eisenstadt 2003). With sufficient strategy and public support, the opposition can make critical gains in elections that it can use to build on for the future. If citizens discover that support for the opposition is high, they too may be

inclined to support the opposition party. For example, in polls taken after the Hamas victory in the West Bank and Gaza, overall support for Hamas was shown to be significantly higher than its vote share during the election (Arab Barometer 2006). Thus, if the opposition party is shown to be popular, then it can possibly win support from those with higher thresholds for opposing the regime (see Kuran 1995).

Voting Behavior in Authoritarian Settings

While there is a rich literature on voter behavior in democratic societies, voters within authoritarian societies face a different calculus. Rarely, are they given any real power over the actual decisions of government or the direction of their society. Real power is concentrated either in offices that are not elected or the election is so stacked in favor of the regime's candidate that the odds of a defeat for the regime are extremely low. Given that change often appears to be impossible through the ballot box, most often voters in these societies are portrayed as apathetic.

Generally, the literature suggests that the most common reason for voting in these societies is for material interest (see Kilani and Sakijha 2002). Often, the regime rewards regions with high levels of support for it, which increases the incentive to vote for the regime (Blaydes 2006). In this way, the incentive structures lead many voters to be loyal to the regime in the hopes of winning greater access to economic resources.

Similarly, especially in states with small, single-member districts, many voters seek direct access to material goods by supporting an individual who is a known friend or associate for parliament (see Lust-Okar 2006). If the candidate is elected, he or she can direct state resources to preexisting networks based on tribe, clan, or other forms of group

membership. Thus, members of the electorate would seek a candidate who has strong connections to the regime in the hopes of being able to access greater resources.

Although many citizens may support the regime in hopes of continued patronage, they are not guaranteed to vote for pro-regime candidates or parties simply because elections are being held (Cameron 1994, 125). In fact, many voters may choose to boycott the election if they believe it to be unfair. However, there is evidence to suggest that many of those who do participate in the election may in fact not vote for the regime despite the nature of the incentive structure or the dictates of local strongmen. Rather, Layne (1994) finds that voters are not always easily swayed to vote for associates or kinsmen despite their links to the regime. In the case of Jordan, she finds that is not uncommon for husbands and wives to vote for different candidates. In fact, she shows that this disagreement is a source of pride for many voters (1994, 118).

Thus, even within long-standing authoritarian regimes, it is common for many voters to support the opposition. While the opposition rarely makes significant gains and even the seats it does win generally are functionally powerless, there remains a small but significant proportion of the electorate that supports individuals who are opposed to the regime and vote accordingly. As such, what factors account for the behavior of these individuals?

It is possible that these individuals seek to register some form of discontent with the regime and, even if their candidates do not win, voting for the opposition still sends a message to the regime (Moises 1993; Tessler 1997). If this protest vote is large enough, it can lead the regime to make specific changes in an attempt to placate citizens. For example, authoritarian governments are often quite responsive to certain types of

protests. For example, in response to bread riots in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, regimes undertook programs of limited liberalization (Joffe 2002, 51). Given this and similar precedents from other regimes, it may be that opposition voters simply hope make the regime aware of their discontent in the hopes that this may lead to reform. This leads to hypothesis 1:

H1: Individuals support the opposition in the hopes of registering discontent that could lead to political or economic reform.

Second, it is possible that the individuals who support opposition candidates within authoritarian states are elites who genuinely disagree with the nature of the system. For example, liberal reformers may run and win the support of a small group of elites to their cause in the hopes of encouraging debate and attracting attention to their cause by winning or competing for a seat in parliament. These individuals would most likely be members of the elite which seeks to fundamentally alter the existing political system. This leads to hypothesis 2:

H2: Individuals who are members of the local elite are more likely to vote for the opposition.

The Jordanian Case

In order to test these hypotheses, I use the case of Jordan. Jordan is a monarchy that has never been considered to be democratic, but elections have been held regularly since King Hussein reinstated them in 1989. The 1989 elections were generally considered to be free and fair and the result was hugely surprising to most observers, including to the regime: the Muslim Brotherhood and independent Islamists captured

nearly 40% of the seats in parliament. In fact, Abdul-Latif al-Arabiyyat, a leader within the Muslim Brotherhood, became the Speaker of the Lower House and four Islamists received positions within the cabinet.

As a response to this outcome, the palace instituted a new electoral law in the hopes of limiting the success of Islamist candidates. After dissolving parliament, the king announced fresh elections under a new law commonly referred to as the "single vote". Under this system, district magnitudes were largely unchanged, but under the new system, regardless of the district magnitude, each citizen was granted a single vote. The major reason for this change was the belief by those in the palace that in the previous election individuals had cast their first vote for a member of their tribe while remaining votes were often given to Islamists (Lucas 2006).

In the 1993 elections, the newly created Islamic Action Front (IAF) party[1] and independent Islamists won only 27.5% of parliamentary seats. Other small parties won a handful of seats while tribal candidates won the majority of seats (Hourani 1995). Despite promises to amend the election law, no changes were made before the 1997 parliamentary elections, resulting in a boycott by many parties including the IAF. However, two candidates were elected from the National Constitutional Party while the Jordanian Leftist Party, the Arab Land Party, and the Ba'ath Party each had one successful candidate.

No additional changes were made to the one vote law prior to the 2003 election, but six additional seats were reserved for women representatives. Despite this lack of reform, the IAF and most other parties who choose to boycott the previous elections participated. The IAF won seventeen seats (15.5%) in parliament while the Islamic

[1] Political parties were legalized in 1992.

Moderate Party won two seats (1.8%). Additionally, the National Constitutionalist Party won eleven seats, the Jordanian Leftist Party won two seats, and the Popular Committee Movement Party won one seat.

The November 2007 parliamentary elections were carried out against the backdrop of local elections the previous July. In these elections, the IAF decided to participate, but pulled out just after noon on voting day citing electoral fraud. This action led to a significant deterioration in relations with the government. In September, however, some dovish members of the IAF reached an agreement with the palace whereby they would run a slate of moderate candidates in exchange for promises that the regime would allow a fair vote (Snaid). This move led to significant tensions between the dovish and hawkish wings within the party, especially since this agreement was reached while the party's hawkish secretary general was outside the country.

The results of the election were poor for the IAF and other parties. The IAF only won six seats (5.5%) in parliament while no other party won a single seat. The IAF, however, argues that there was significant electoral fraud against the party once again which accounted for its poor showing (Gharaibeh; Kofahi). Nevertheless, the exact means of such vote fraud was not directly apparent to many observers, although suspicions ran high. On the other hand, some accounts attributed the IAF's poor showing largely to the divide within the party between the hawks and the doves and the insistence on running moderate candidates, many of whom had lost in party primaries (Abu Rumman 2007).

Voters in Jordan

Within Jordanian politics, both analysts and the public at large tend to believe that voting occurs primarily on tribal lines. In fact, this type of voting is so highly predictable that one local businessman in Ramtha claimed he could forecast not only who would win the local election, but their vote totals. He indicated he knew the local tribal alliances, so then it was just simple addition based on knowledge of the size of each tribe in previous elections to determine the results.

A more nuanced approach suggests that this claim is somewhat overstated. A 2007 poll by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan indicates that, among voters, just over half indicated that their vote choice was influenced by tribal affiliation (CSS 2007). Moreover, when asked what type of candidate they voted for, only 44.8% of voters stated "tribal candidate", suggesting that other factors are important in determining vote choice.

As in most authoritarian regimes, material resources appear to be the primary motivation in vote choice. In Jordan, most voters are said to vote for *wasta*, meaning roughly patronage or favor, which voters seek from elected officials. Lust-Okar (2006) citing Kilani and Sakijha (2002, 58) gives the example of an individual voter who states:

> I came to seek a job from the deputy of our district. He told us that the government does not listen to them these days. I wonder why the deputies oppose the government. They should comply with and obey the government's policies so that we can take our rights, because it is up to the government to pass anything. Frankly speaking, I will not elect anyone unless the government approves of him because we want to survive.

Guaranteeing access to *wasta* appears to be the main goal even in tribal voting. For example, during an interview with a local elite in Wadi Musa prior to the 2007 election, the individual indicated that his tribe had an arrangement with three other tribes to assure they would win the parliamentary seat. The tribes had set up a rotational basis by which each tribe would be allowed to select the parliamentary candidate in one out of every four elections. Moreover, he noted that the candidate that had been chosen that year was extremely incompetent and the tribe saw him of no use in their local affairs, leading them to appoint him as the candidate. That way, they would guarantee access to *wasta* for their tribe but not lose a valuable member of society at the local level.

In light of the clear material benefits from *wasta*, it is not entirely clear why an individual would support an opposition candidate relative to a regime loyalist. Nevertheless, while most candidates are supportive of the regime, oppositional candidates are relatively common within the Jordanian political sphere. Within this group, there are two dominant strands: Islamist and non-Islamist. The first group is centered on candidates affiliated with the IAF. Additionally, some individuals have sought to win election espousing an Islamist ideology but who are not supported directly by the IAF. Often, these individuals are local religious leaders attempting to win support based on their position in society and support within the local community.

The second group includes oppositional figures that do not run on an Islamist platform. Rather, these individuals choose to run as critics of the regime or the system more generally. For example, Mustafa Hamarneh in Madaba-1 and Mohammed Bataineh in Irbid-1 both ran liberal campaigns that attempted to break from the tribal mold. These candidates sought to formulate ideological platforms and reject the use of *wasta* to win

election. While not all of these candidates are necessarily liberal reformers, all of these candidates clearly opposed the regime in some manner.

While the number of individuals supporting these candidates forms a minority of all voters, they represent a sizeable bloc despite the failure of the IAF in the 2007 election. In fact, even if all tribal candidates are assumed to be loyal to the regime, 17.3% of voters surveyed still indicated that they supported a candidate that was a member of the opposition (CSS 2007). While this group represents a minority, understanding the causes leading it to support the opposition has important implications for the stability underlying the current system as well as understanding voters' psychological motivations in non-democratic systems.

Hypotheses

The first hypothesis suggests that individuals who would vote for opposition parties would be likely to do so to register discontent. In Jordan, one issue that could lead to frustration among citizens is the lack of democratic development. In the 2006 Arab Barometer for Jordan, just over half of respondents stated that Jordan was closer to being a complete democracy than a complete dictatorship, indicating that many individuals believed Jordan was far from democratic (Arab Barometer 2006). Although individuals who believe that Jordan is less democratic may be less likely to vote, those that do are more likely to seek candidates that would advocate for greater democratization. This leads to hypothesis1a:

H1a: Individuals who believe that Jordan is closer to dictatorship than democracy are more likely to support opposition candidates.

While democratic legitimacy is important, individuals who are more concerned about the state of civil liberties are also more likely to support the opposition. A frustration with the lack of these liberties might lead an individual to seek a candidate who would challenge the regime and fight for reforms leading to greater freedoms. Similarly, if an individual believes that there are lower levels of justice and equality within the system, this individual is more likely to be discontented. If this individual chooses to vote, then it is more likely he or she will support an opposition candidate. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1b: Individuals who believe that civil rights are less protected are more likely to support opposition candidates.

H1c: Individuals who believe that there is less justice and equality are more likely to support opposition candidates.

In order to test the second hypothesis, that individuals who support opposition candidates tend to be elites, two socio-economic indicators are employed: education and income. This leads to the following two hypotheses:

H2a: More educated individuals are more likely to support opposition parties.

H2b: Wealthier individuals are more likely to support opposition parties.

In addition to these two hypotheses, it is possible to test a third hypothesis due to unique elements in Jordan's political system. Since tribal candidates are assumed to be pro-regime in the hopes of distributing resources, there should be minimal differences between support for tribal candidates and support for independent loyalists with the exception of the importance of tribal identity as it relates to vote choice. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H3: Individuals who vote for tribal candidates should be similar to those who support other pro-regime candidates with the exception of the importance of their tribal identity.

Data and Measures

The data used to test these hypotheses come from a public opinion survey conducted in Jordan in the days following the parliamentary elections on November 20, 2007. The survey involved face-to-face interviews with a representative national sample of households. The survey was conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan. The survey relied on stratified random sampling was used to select 100 blocks of twelve households each. Individuals over the age of 18 were then randomly selected from each household. A total of 1,133 men and women were interviewed resulting in a response rate of 94.4%.

To measure the dependent variable—vote choice—the following item was used: To which of the following orientations did you cast your vote in the parliamentary elections? (Islamic Action Front, Islamic candidate not affiliated with the IAF, Nationalist, Leftist, Tribal candidate, Independent loyalist, Independent opposition).

A total of 664 (58.6% of the sample) individuals surveyed indicated that they voted in the election and the distribution is presented in Table 1:

Trend	**Percent**
Islamic Action Front	5.6%
Islamist (non-IAF)	2.4%
Nationalist	3.5%
Leftist	0.6%
Tribal	43.0%
Independent Loyalist	39.7%

Independent Opposition	5.2%

Table 1

In order to construct the dependent variable, these items were combined into four categories: tribal candidate, independent loyalist, Islamist opposition and non-Islamist opposition. This was done by combining the IAF and the non-IAF candidates into a single group comprising the Islamist opposition and by combining the independent opposition, nationalists, and leftists into the non-Islamist opposition category.

While the non-IAF Islamist candidates are not identical to IAF candidates, their position within the opposition is relatively similar in terms of ideology. Both groups explicitly use Islam as part of their political ideology in the hopes of winning election. Similarly, while nationalist, leftist, and independent opposition candidates are not identical, they all represent ideological challenges to the predominant system implying that their supporters are likely to share similar concerns and characteristics. Importantly, these individuals are distinct from Islamist candidates in that they are less likely to use religion as the basis of their platform to win election. The full distribution of the dependent variable used to test these hypotheses is as follows in Table 2:

Trend	**Percent**
Tribal	43.0%
Independent Loyalist	39.7%
Islamist Opposition	8.0%
Non-Islamist Opposition	9.3%

Table 2

In order to test H1a, the following item was used:

Since Jordan witnessed transformations related to the exercise of democratic life in 1989 including the resumption of parliamentary life and legalization of political parties, etc... I would like to ask you a series of questions related to these issues: On a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means that Jordan is still beginning its road to democracy and 10 means that

Jordan has completed its democratic transformation, to what extent do you believe that Jordan has completed its democratic transformation? (1-10)

This item was subsequently standardized and has a mean of 0.54 with a standard deviation of 0.27.

In order to test H1b, an additive index was generated using the following items:

To what degree to you believe that "freedom of opinion" is guaranteed in Jordan: (Researcher: ask this question to all items in the same style) (to a high degree, to a moderate degree, to a low degree, not guaranteed)

1. Freedom of opinion
2. Media freedom
3. Freedom to participate in demonstrations
4. Freedom to participate in sit-ins
5. Freedom to join political parties
6. Freedom of Jordanian television to express dissenting opinions from the government
7. Freedom of Jordanian radio to express dissenting opinions from the government
8. Equal rights for citizens regardless of religion
9. Equal rights for citizens regardless of their country of origin
10. Equal rights for citizens regardless of whether they are rich or poor

This index was standardized and had a mean of 0.52 and a standard deviation of .22. The Cronbach's alpha is 0.41.

In order to test H1c, an additive index of the following two items was created:

The idea of democracy is based on the principles of justice and equality: To what degree do you believe that Jordan is a country where the principle of "equality" prevails? (Researcher: ask this question to all of the items in the same manner). 1. Equality 2. Justice. (To a high degree, to a moderate degree, to a low degree, does not exist)

These items were combined due to their similar underlying theme about the degree of fairness of the Jordanian system. The index was standardized and has a mean of .60 and a standard deviation of 0.29. The Cronbach's alpha is 0.68.

In order to test H2a, a standard item was used asking about level of education. In order to test the hypothesis regarding income, a question asking about family income per month was employed. This item was chosen rather than individual income due to the

importance of family structure in Jordan. Additionally, given the fact that many women do not work for income and since work is often delayed by young Jordanians due to high rates of unemployment (World Bank 2004), family income can serve as a more reliable measure of income than individual income in this case. As such, it is used in the analysis to follow.

In order to test H3, the following item is used:

Did any of the following reasons affect your vote choice in the last parliamentary elections? Because s/he is from my tribe (yes, no, not sure)

In addition to these items, the following control variables were also included in the model. Given the importance of personal relationships in much voting in Jordan, it is important to control for the personal factor in Jordanian vote choice. Thus, the following item was also included:

Did any of the following reasons affect your vote choice in the last parliamentary elections? Because s/he is an associate or a friend (yes, no, not sure)

Second, given that the IAF and other Islamist candidates campaign on an explicitly religious platform, the following item was used to control for a vote for Islamist opposition being solely for religious reasons:

Did any of the following reasons affect your vote choice in the last parliamentary elections? Because s/he is religious (yes, no, not sure)

Additionally, three other control variables were included for age, sex and country of origin (Jordan or Palestine). These items were asked in standard manners.

Statistical Analysis

Given the categorical nature of the dependent variable, a multinomial logistic regression technique is used to estimate the model by which hypotheses are tested. While

this model can allow for the testing of these hypotheses on a categorical dependent variable, there are some important limitations that should be noted. First, unlike standard OLS, it is necessary to specify a comparison group by which to compare the overall results.

In this case, supporters of independent loyalists were used as the comparison group. While it would have been possible to use supporters of tribal candidates, it is less certain that all of these candidates were in fact pro-regime. Moreover, these supporters have a clear tribal link to their candidates that may be of even greater importance than even the candidate's relationship with the regime. On the other hand, independent loyalists are supported because of their relationship to the regime given that individuals do not appear to share a tribal identity with this group. As such, it is used as the comparison group.

Second, this model is limited by assuming the independence of irrelevant alternatives. In practical terms, this means that including variables which are unrelated to the model can have undue influence on the findings. Thus, rather than simply biasing the results to a small degree as in OLS, in this type of model they can significantly alter the overall results.

The results of this model can be seen in table 3. The first set of comparisons is between individuals who support a tribal candidate and those who support an independent loyalist which allows for a test of hypotheses 3 which states that there should be no significant differences between these two groups other than the importance of tribal identity. In fact, there are three differences that are significant at standard levels between these two groups. First, as expected, individuals who took tribal affiliation into

consideration in their vote choice also tended to vote for tribal rather than independent candidates. This finding was highly significant, suggesting this was a major factor in the difference in vote choice between these two groups. By implication, this means that that much voting in Jordan takes place for reasons other than tribal affiliation given that nearly 40% of the electorate chose independent loyalists.

Second, individuals who choose tribal candidates were also more likely to be of Jordanian origin at a 0.1 level of significance. While not predicted, this finding is not entirely surprising and likely relates to the greater importance placed on tribal affiliation by Jordanians compared to Palestinians. The latter tend to give greater priority to regional identities within Palestine as opposed to specific tribes (Lahloh). This finding is a sign that Palestinians are less likely to support a tribal candidate perhaps for this reason, which is in line with the original hypothesis.

Third, age is statistically significant at the .01 level. This suggests that older individuals are more likely to vote for independent candidates. The underlying cause behind this difference is not entirely clear or theoretically predicted.

Of the remaining variables, none are shown to be statistically significant at standard levels, a finding which is consistent with hypothesis 3. While this can offer partial confirmation, it must also be noted that this is a negative finding which is a weaker form of inference than a positive finding. As such, while consistent with the hypothesis, the limited nature of this study cannot rule out all possibilities that there is some other important difference between individuals who support tribal candidates and those who support independent loyalists. As such, additional research would be necessary to lend greater confidence to this finding.

The second comparison group in the table is the Islamist opposition which allows for a test of hypotheses 1 and 2. In terms of hypothesis 1a, individuals who support the Islamist opposition believe that Jordan is less just and more unequal than supporters of the independent loyalists. However, at least at standard statistical levels, these individuals are no more or less likely to believe that there are fewer civil rights in Jordan or that Jordan is less democratic than supporters of independent loyalists. On the whole, this offers only moderate support for hypothesis 1 overall. While Islamist voters tend to be less content with the regime in terms of the fairness of the system, they are no more concerned about democratic development of civil rights than pro-regime voters. In fact, although highly insignificant, the sign on the coefficient reveals that these voters actually believe that Jordan is slightly more democratic than regime supporters.

In terms of hypothesis 2, there is very little evidence to suggest that these voters are a part of the local elite. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary with the signs on the coefficients for education and income being negative, although both variables are highly insignificant at standard levels.

While these variables are insignificant, younger age is highly significant which is in line with much of the literature on support for Islamist groups. This finding suggests that Islamist parties tend to be able to win the support of the disadvantaged youth across the region, perhaps capitalizing on their feelings of discontent (Tessler 1997). Given that unemployment disproportionately affects youth in Arab countries (World Bank 2004), younger individuals may feel increased resentment leading them to support the Islamist opposition.

Among the other measures, as expected, the importance of a candidate's religiosity is highly significant for these voters. Given that the Islamist opposition explicitly campaigns on increasing the role or religion in the public sphere whereas other candidates place a lesser influence on religion, this result is to be expected.

The second control variable that was shown to be significant is country of origin. In this case, individuals who support the Islamist opposition are more likely to be Palestinian compared to individuals who support regime loyalists. Given the relatively strong support for the IAF in many of the refugee camps and the poor showing by the IAF nationally, this finding is not entirely unexpected either.

Lastly, the variable tribe was highly significant with a negative coefficient. This indicates that supports of Islamist candidates were less likely to consider tribe than supporters of independent loyalists. This is somewhat surprising given that independent loyalists were less likely than tribal candidates to take tribal affiliation into account. However, given the personal nature of voting for both tribal and loyalist candidates, this finding is of particular interest. Supporters of the Islamist opposition clearly place a much lesser emphasis on tribal affiliation than both supporters of tribal candidates and of independent loyalists.

Of the remaining two control variables—sex and being an associate or friend of the candidate—neither is significant at standard levels. It should be noted though that the sign on the coefficient for sex does suggest that men are somewhat more likely to support Islamist candidates than women.

Of greater interest, the variable of being a friend or associate is highly insignificant but the coefficient is positive, suggesting that individuals who support

Islamist candidates may actually be more likely to be associates of the candidate than are supporters of independent loyalists. This finding implies that ideological voting may be insufficient to lead to a vote for the Islamist opposition. Given that in Jordan the personal factor in vote choice is high, this result indicates that it is not only necessary that an individual have an ideological beliefs, but also that he or she know the candidate to actually vote for the Islamist opposition. Thus, the personal factor in voting in Jordan does not appear to be limited to pro-regime candidates who have a greater likelihood of being able to deliver *wasta* to their constituents.

The third comparison group is to the non-Islamist opposition. In testing hypothesis 1, the evidence is mixed. In the case of the variable justice and equality, these individuals tend to believe that Jordan is less fair than supporters of the regime at standard levels of significance. This result is similar to the finding on the Islamist opposition, indicating that this is belief is common to all opposition supporters.

While the results are consistent with hypothesis 1c, they do not offer support for hypothesis 1a. While the sign is negative, suggesting that supporters of non-Islamist opposition candidates believe Jordan is somewhat less democratic than supporters of loyalist candidates, this finding is not significant at standard levels. Accordingly, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between these two groups cannot be rejected.

In terms of hypothesis 1b, supporters of the non-Islamist opposition believed that there were more civil rights in Jordan than supporters of loyalist candidates and the result was significant at the 0.1 level. While significant, the sign of this coefficient is the opposite of the expected sign, providing strong evidence against the stated hypothesis. As such, it appears that in fact individuals who are willing to support opposition

candidates may in fact do so because they are more confident in the civil rights provisions within the Jordanian system. Thus, rather than sending a message to the government, they may in fact be more secure in their confidence that they will not face retribution for this decision.

In terms of the second hypothesis, there is somewhat mixed evidence as well. Overall, the results indicate that supporters of non-Islamist opposition candidates are more educated than supporters of regime loyalists at the 0.1 level of significance. Accordingly, there is evidence to suggest that the members of the educated elite are more likely to support opposition candidates. Nevertheless, the results for family income are not significant, at least at standard levels. The sign on the coefficient does suggest that wealthier individuals are more likely to support opposition candidates overall, but the p-value is far from significant. As such, there is partial support for hypothesis 2 in the case of supporters of the non-Islamist opposition.

Of the remaining control variables, three are significant at standard levels. First, like supporters of Islamist candidates, supporters of non-Islamist opposition candidates are less likely to consider tribal affiliation in their vote choice when compared to loyalist candidates. While somewhat surprising, this finding strongly suggests that individuals who do vote for the opposition place very limited if any significance on voting based on tribal affiliation. In other words, to be a successful opposition candidate, one must be able to overcome or at least mitigate this key factor in Jordanian politics.

Second, the variable for a friend and associate is significant while the coefficient is positive. In other words, supporters of the non-Islamist opposition are more likely to be a friend or associate of the candidate than are supporters of loyalist candidates. As

such, it appears that for the supporters of the non-Islamist opposition, personal politics actually plays a greater role in vote choice than for supporters of pro-regime candidates.

This finding is in contrast to the basic hypotheses set forth by the theory of this paper. Rather than the pro-regime vote benefiting more from personal connections, it seems that the opposition vote is in fact more dependent upon these linkages. By this logic, some individuals may be willing to support an opposition candidate, but only if the opposition candidate is closely connected to the voter. Perhaps otherwise, voting for the opposition represents too great of a cost to the individual compared to supporting a pro-regime candidate who would be more likely to bring economic benefits to the person or the district more broadly.

The last variable that is significant at standard levels is sex, as women are more likely to support non-Islamist opposition candidates than are men. It is possible that women candidates are more likely to be in the opposition which would lead to this result, but otherwise there is no clear reason why this would prove to be the case.

Of the remaining variables, as expected the importance of religion in vote choice does not differ for supporters of non-Islamist opposition candidates and loyalist candidates. Age is also insignificant as is country of origin.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the causes of individual level support for the opposition in Jordanian elections. Given that the parliament is politically weak, except in distributing economic resources, it is unclear why certain individuals would be willing to vote for opposition candidates who, if elected, would presumably not be able to provide

their citizens with the economic benefits that pro-regime parliamentarians do routinely. Two main hypotheses were put forward—registering discontent with the regime and being a member of the liberal elite—to explain this counterintuitive behavior by nearly a fifth of the electorate.

The results of the analysis have demonstrated moderate support for the first hypothesis. While three possible reasons were theorized that could lead to support for the opposition, only one—a belief that there was less justice and equality in Jordan—was shared by supporters of both the Islamist and non-Islamist opposition. This finding strongly suggests that individuals who do vote for the opposition have a common resentment towards the nature of the fairness of the existing political or economic system in Jordan. Importantly, this was true while controlling for economic well-being, level of education, and country of origin, which are commonly cited as the main causes of such resentment.

Second, it is clear that frustration towards the low level of Jordan's democratic development is unrelated to voting for the opposition. While it is possible that individuals who believe there is less democracy in Jordan are less likely to vote, once individuals do decide to vote, this belief does not appear to have any significant effect on their vote choice.

In the case of the effect of civil rights, the results are somewhat unexpected. While supporters of the Islamist opposition do not vary significantly from supporters of the regime in their view of civil rights in Jordan, supporters of the non-Islamist opposition tend to believe that there are in fact more civil rights in Jordan than supporters of pro-regime candidates. It is possible that supporters of the non-Islamist opposition,

which has suffered fewer effects from repression, believes that civil rights are more protected given their own relative freedom to operate, especially relative to oppositions in other surrounding countries.

However, it also appears that the nature of the opposition an individual is likely to support is also driven in part by an individual's position in society. As this paper has shown, supporters of non-Islamist opposition candidates tend to be more educated than voters for pro-regime candidates. Family income is also positively correlated although not at significant levels. However, given the nature of patronage politics, education is probably a more accurate measure of elites in Jordan than family income. Thus, there is reasonable support for this hypothesis in the case of the non-Islamist opposition.

On the other hand, there is minimal evidence to suggest that supporters of the Islamist opposition differ significantly in socio-economic terms from supporters of the regime. Rather, it appears that in addition to their resentment regarding the system, the major factors leading to support for these candidates includes the importance of a candidate's religiosity and being of Palestinian descent. Additionally, these voters do not take tribal affiliation into account in voting, which suggests that for these individuals, religion is a more important identity than tribe.

This analysis has also pointed to another interesting finding which relates to the personal nature of Jordanian politics. While patronage is a dominant theme for pro-regime candidates, having a personal relationship to the candidate may in fact be even more important in explaining support for opposition candidates. In the case of supporters of non-Islamist candidates, they are significantly more likely to be a friend or associate of the opposition candidate. This is somewhat surprising given that the main benefits from

voting for a friend would seem to be his or her ability to provide patronage. However, it is possible that a different network exists which can provide benefits to supporters in these cases. Likewise, it is also possible that the only reason one would be willing to vote for someone who could not deliver patronage is if he or she were a close associate.

In the case of the Islamist opposition, somewhat surprisingly, being a friend or associate of the candidate was no less important than it was for pro-regime candidates. In other words, Islamist ideology appears to be insufficient for an individual to turn out absent connections to the candidate, at least in the case of Jordan. These individuals must be associated with their candidate at approximately the same level as pro-regime candidate, controlling for other factors. As such, the ability of the Islamist opposition to win votes appears dependent on the ability to nominate candidates with strong ties to the local community. Overall, however, the findings clearly show that personal voting is of great importance for both pro-regime candidates and the opposition.

Table 3

Multinomial Logistic Regression with Vote Trend Choice as Dependent Variable and Independent Loyalist as comparison group

Variable	*Tribal*	*Islamist*	*Non-Islamist*
Jordan Less Democratic	-.106	.113	-.499
	(.407)	(.797)	(.766)
Fewer Civil rights	.816	-1.322	1.763
	(.730)	(1.045)	(.986)*
Jordan Less Fair	.010	-1.472	-.973
	(.535)	(.708)**	(.604)
Voted for Tribe	1.59	-1.779	-1.167
	(.323)***	(.652)***	(.573)**
Voted for Religion	.095	1.333	.060
	(.281)	(.545)**	(.379)
Voted for Associate	.278	.117	.704
	(.279)	(.486)	(.384)*
Older Age	-1.61	-2.132	.466
	(.528)***	(1.033)**	(.831)
Female	.062	-.364	.518
	(.259)	(.413)	(.301)*
Higher Education	-.714	-.438	1.449
	(.659)	(1.153)	(.790)*
Wealthier	2.98	-3.210	2.303
	(1.95)	(4.241)	(2.602)
Palestinian	-.729	.722	.162
	(.432)*	(.442)*	(.385)
Constant	-.754	.197	-2.715
	(.553)	(.928)	(.878)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. *Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

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