



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM

The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the Arab Winter

Editors:

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HARVARD Kennedy School

BELFER CENTER

for Science and International Affairs

DISCUSSION PAPER 2017-04

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Cover and opposite page 1: An Egyptian youth carries a lit flare as supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood gather in the El-Mataria neighborhood of Cairo, Egypt, to protest the 20-year sentence for ousted president Mohammed Morsi and verdicts against other prominent figures of the Brotherhood, Friday, April 24, 2015. (AP Photo/Belal Darder, File)

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Executive Summary

Although it may seem that the Muslim Brotherhood has weakened since the onset of the “Arab Winter” in 2013 and onward, organizations with their origins in the Brotherhood still have access to power in countries as diverse as Somalia, Bahrain, Morocco, and Yemen, and might regain power in other countries as well. Most Brotherhood-affiliated movements are committed to some form of democracy, unlike many of their rivals in the Middle East. Even the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have sought allies among Brotherhood affiliates, despite banning a majority of affiliated organizations.

This paper does not suggest that dialogue with the Brotherhood and related organizations with historic ties to the Brotherhood should be uncritical. It is necessary to address gender rights and punishment for apostasy, as well as some organizations’ use of violence. Views on these issues vary among Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, however, and some organizations are attempting to move the Brotherhood’s ideological discussion in a progressive direction. A critical dialogue can promote Brotherhood thinking that supports political consensus, ease the transition to a more stable Middle East, and support a positive direction in political Islam. Banning the Muslim Brotherhood or its offshoots from participating in democratic processes, however, has not created stability.

Glossary

Al-Aqlannia: Rationality.

Al-Imama-al-Kubra: Caliph.

Al-Murshid: General leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Al-Takfir wa'l Hijra: "Excommunication and exodus," or alternately "Excommunication and emigration" or "anathema and exile." Popular name given to the radical Islamist group Jama'at al-Muslimin (Muslim group) founded by Shukri Mustafa, which emerged in Egypt in the 1960s as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the group was crushed by Egyptian security forces after it murdered an Islamic scholar and former government minister in 1977, it is said to have "left an enduring legacy" taken up by some Islamist radicals in "subsequent years and decades."

Caliph: Theoretical civil and religious ruler of all Muslims, regarded as the successor of Mohammad.

Caliphate: Unified political entity including all Muslim lands, ruled by a Caliph.

Dam Jadid: Movement in Somalia; its Arabic name means "new blood."

Dawa: Preaching.

Fikra: The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Jahiliyyah: The era of ignorance before Islam.

Mihna: Ordeal.

Mujahida: Female fighter in the path of God and outspoken woman.

Qutbism: An Islamist ideology developed by Sayyid Qutb, the figurehead of the Muslim Brotherhood. (Also called Kotebism, Qutbiyya, or Qutbiyyah.)

Salafi: The salafi movement (also called Salafist movement or Salafism), an ultra-conservative reform branch within Sunni Islam that developed in Arabia in the first half of the 18th century. It advocated a return to the traditions of the "devout ancestors" (the salaf).

Sharia: Sharia law, or Islamic law, the religious law forming part of the Islamic tradition. It is derived from the religious precepts of Islam, particularly the Quran and the Hadith. In Arabic, the term *shari'ah* refers to God's immutable divine law and is contrasted with *fiqh*, which refers to its human scholarly interpretations.

Sheikh: Arabic word meaning the elder of a tribe, a revered old man, or an Islamic scholar. (Also spelled Sheik, Shaykh, or Shaikh.)

Shura: Consultation, or council. *Shura* means presenting and testing different views until the best are identified. The principle of *shura* is considered as a basis for good government in Islam.

Tablighi Jamaat (or Jama'at at-Tabligh): The "Society for Spreading Faith," a nonpolitical global Sunni Islamic missionary movement that focuses on urging Muslims to return to primary Sunni Islam, particularly in matters of ritual, dress, and personal behavior

Takfiri: Muslim who accuses another Muslim (or an adherent of another Abrahamic faith) of apostasy. The accusation itself is called *takfir*, derived from the word *kafir* (unbeliever), and is described as when "one who is, or claims to be, a Muslim is declared impure."

Takfirism: Any ideology that is based on declaring dissent apostate, and dissenters therefore eligible to be killed by the members of the religious group.

Turabism: Ideology based on Hassan Al-Turabi's works.

Ummah: Community, very often used interchangeably with *ummat al-Islamiyah*, the Islamic community consisting of all Muslims.

Wahhabism: An Islamic doctrine and religious movement founded by 18th century preacher and activist Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It has been variously described as "ultraconservative," "austere," "fundamentalist," or "puritan(ical)." Its devotees view it as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheistic worship"; its opponents regard it as a distortion of Islam.

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An Egyptian youth carries a lit flare as supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood gather in the El-Mataria neighborhood of Cairo, Egypt, to protest the 20-year sentence for ousted president Mohammed Morsi and verdicts against other prominent figures of the Brotherhood, Friday, April 24, 2015. (AP Photo/Belal Darder, File)



Why Examine the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring?

Stig Jarle Hansen and Mohamed Husein Gaas

Since 2011 the Muslim Brotherhood has experienced a series of ups and downs. Organizations with ties to the Brotherhood held power or were a part of government coalitions in Yemen (2011 to 2014, and in the Aden-based government today), Somalia (where members of the Brotherhood's Dam Jadid offshoot have served as regional presidents and as ministers in various cabinets from 2012 to 2017), Egypt (2012–2013), Tunisia (2011–2014, 2015–2017), and Morocco (2011–2017). In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood was prominent in the umbrella organizations that dominated the opposition in the early phases of the civil war.¹ In Lebanon, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and indeed in the United Kingdom, the Muslim Brotherhood was part of government institutions and/or collaborated closely with them.² The Brotherhood had problems, however; it had been banned in Russia as early as 2003, and its offshoots were prosecuted in Israel and Russia.³

Then came the “Arab Winter,” during which organizations that originally had been offshoots from the Muslim Brotherhood fell from power in Egypt, were ousted from government in Yemen, broke up in Jordan, lost influence in Syria, and had to compromise in Tunisia. In the latter case, the originally Islamist party Ennahda declared that it

1 Hanad Askar, “Is ‘Dam Jadid’ a Serious Threat to Somalia’s Aspirations?” *Horseed Media*, November 24, 2014; Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power* (London: Saqi, 2013); Aneesh Raman et al., “Progress on Constitution; Attack Kills 30,” *CNN.com*, October 12, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/12/iraq.main/>; Stacey Philbrick Yadav, “Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Perils of Powersharing” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2015), p. 9; Ebony King, “The Future of Tunisian Islamism: The Case of Ennahda,” *Crossroads*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012), p. 5; Abdeslam Maghraoui, “Morocco: The King’s Islamists,” in Robin Wright, ed., *The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015); and Yvette Talhamy, “The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn: The Syrian Uprising,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 2012), pp. 33–40.

2 Raphaël Lefèvre, “A New Direction for Lebanon’s Muslim Brothers” (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2016), <http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/62740>.

3 J. Millard Burr, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Russia, Part 1” (New York: American Center for Democracy, December 9, 2014), <http://acdemocracy.org/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-russia-part-1/>.

was no longer Islamist, while in Yemen and Jordan Muslim Brotherhood-connected organizations denounced the Brotherhood.⁴ Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates banned the organization.⁵ In the United Kingdom, then Prime Minister David Cameron ordered an inquiry into the Muslim Brotherhood, which resulted in a written report.⁶ Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate introduced bills designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, and there are signs that the new Trump administration will follow a hostile line toward the Brotherhood.⁷

The present debate about the Brotherhood is oversimplified, often reflecting discussions that predate the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood into power in several states as a consequence of the Arab Spring. The work of Lorenzo Vidino represents one side of this debate. Vidino maintains that the Brotherhood is attempting to implement a totalitarian society based on a relatively strict interpretation of religious law, Sharia. Vidino's views have had considerable impact—for example, influencing the United Kingdom's critical government inquiry into the Muslim Brotherhood.⁸ The opposing side of the debate, advocated by Robert Leiken and Steven Brookes in a 2007 article, emphasizes the Brotherhood's ideological fluidity, insinuating that the Brotherhood is open to change.⁹ This approach lost influence in policy circles around the world after the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in

4 "Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood Formally Divided," Associated Press, March 16, 2015, <http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/jordans-muslim-brotherhood-formally-divided>; Yadav, "Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood and the Perils of Powersharing"; and Sarah Souli, "What Is Left of Tunisia's Ennahda Party?" *Al Jazeera*, May 27, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/left-tunisia-ennahda-party-160526101937131.html>.

5 Rania El Gamal, "UAE lists Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Group," Reuters, November 17, 2014; and Sebastian Usher, "Saudi Arabia Bans the Muslim Brotherhood," *BBC News*, March 7, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26487092>.

6 John Jenkins and Charles Farr, "Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings," HC679 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 2015).

7 Patrick Pool, "Muslim Brotherhood Terror Designation Bill Advances in House," *PJ Media*, February 24, 2016, <https://pjmedia.com/homeland-security/2016/02/24/muslim-brotherhood-terror-designation-bill-moves-forward-in-the-house/>. The first motion, H.R. 3892, was introduced by Mario Diaz-Balart and passed by the House Judiciary Committee. The parallel motion (S. 2230) was introduced to the Senate by then-Republican presidential candidate Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX). At the time of writing, the Republican sponsors had stalled the motion. See Ryan Mauro, "GOP Leaders Stall Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Act," *Clarion Project*, June 23, 2016, <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/gop-leaders-stall-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-act#>.

8 Lorenzo Vidino, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe," *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 25–34.

9 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (March/April 2007), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-03-01/moderate-muslim-brotherhood>.

Egypt in 2013, because of realpolitik and a disappointment with what were seen as the Muslim Brotherhood's totalitarian tendencies during its time in power in Egypt.

However, Egypt may have been an anomaly, and, as will be shown later, the local context may have influenced the outcome of that case. Given that the Muslim Brotherhood attained power in several countries after the Arab Spring, we can now study how the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots govern. Overall, the various movements that originated from the Muslim Brotherhood have displayed pragmatism when in or close to power. The variations in ideological positions among these organizations have also revealed significant regional differences. Controlling state institutions, the Brotherhood and its affiliates have faced the necessity of cooperating with other factions or political entities with different perceptions of the world. The degree of pragmatism has varied among Brotherhood organizations. In some countries, the Muslim Brotherhood or its offshoots chose to abstain from creating a wider consensus, usually with dire consequences. The Muslim Brotherhood is a diverse movement, and the ideological positions of its affiliates are subject to change and respond to local leaders and politics.

There are problems with both the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt did not clearly reject the death penalty for apostasy, as we discuss at greater length below. The rarity or absence of women in the top echelons of the Brotherhood, for example in Jordan and Egypt, is worrying. The conspiracy theories often wielded by the followers of various Brotherhoods, including use of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, as well as the belief that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were an inside job, are also worrying.¹⁰ Opponents of the Brotherhood in Yemen, Egypt, and Tunisia, as well as other critics, have called into question the Brotherhood's commitment to democracy.¹¹ Several Western powers also condemn the Brotherhood's support for Hamas, which many of those powers views as a terrorist organization and which grew out of the Brotherhood. In some areas, particularly in Egypt after the military

10 John S. Craig, *Peculiar Liaisons in War, Espionage, and Terrorism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Algora, 2005), p. 148; and Robert Satloff and Eric Trager, "Egypt's 9/11 Conspiracy Rhetoric," *Washington Post*, September 11, 2012.

11 Hege Storhaug, "De omstridte brødrene" [They disputed the brothers] (Oslo: Human Rights Services, July 7, 2012), <https://www.rights.no/2012/07/de-omstridte-brodrene/>.

coup, the Muslim Brotherhood has supported sectarian violence. The Brotherhood and several of its offshoots have been accused of aiding terror as well as proselytizing in favor of sexism, homophobia, and violence toward Christian minorities and converts away from Islam.¹²

To create effective policies for dealing with the various Muslim Brotherhood-connected organizations, it is necessary to understand the Brotherhood's ideology. That ideology is the *fikra*, and is based on the works of the original Egyptian Brotherhood leaders. What does the *fikra* mean for practical policymaking? We argue that extremist strands within the Brotherhood do exist, but that the Brotherhood ideology is varied, flexible, and has many positive aspects. Some of its offshoots have developed their own ideological elements, which in turn influence the wider movement. Policymakers should support these positive aspects, discourage the negative elements, and protect human rights.

This working paper will show how the Brotherhood can be an ally in promoting human rights, higher living standards, and democracy. Indeed, many of those pushing for a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, have a much worse track record than most of the organizations studied in this report with respect to democracy, human rights, and the empowerment of women.¹³ As will be shown, most Muslim Brotherhood organizations and offshoots have expressed a clear dedication to democracy, whereas Saudi Arabia, for example, has not. The latter also allows less press freedom than did Egypt under President Mohammed Morsi's regime.

The Brotherhood organizations and their offshoots should be held to the same standards as other political organizations. A coup against a democratically elected Brotherhood organization, like the one in Egypt, should

12 "The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK" (London: Quilliam Foundation, August 28, 2014), <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/shop/e-publications/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-the-uk/>.

13 Human Rights Watch, "Boxed In: Women and Saudi Arabia's Male Guardianship System" (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2016), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/16/boxed/women-and-saudi-arabias-male-guardianship-system>; Human Rights Watch, "Challenging the Red Lines: Stories of Rights Activists in Saudi Arabia" (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 17, 2013), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/17/challenging-red-lines/stories-rights-activists-saudi-arabia>; and Human Rights Watch, "Looser Rein, Uncertain Gain: A Human Rights Assessment of Five Years of King Abdullah's Reforms in Saudi Arabia" (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 27, 2010), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/09/27/looser-rein-uncertain-gain/human-rights-assessment-five-years-king-abdullahs>.

be condemned, just as other coups should be; and the Brotherhood's opinions should be contested if they are wrong, just like those of other organizations. Policymakers should also understand that the path of the various Brotherhood organizations is under development and might change, and that states and other international actors' actions toward the various organizations will influence that path.

This report sees the Brotherhood ideology, indeed religion itself, as a changing field of interaction. The success rates of the various organizations will determine effective moves to push the wider discussion in a specific direction, as will individual ideologists. For instance, a majority of the respondents within Brotherhood organizations said that Saudi scholar Salman Alodah inspired them, even though he defines himself as non-Brotherhood. The report attempts to identify the organizational “movers and shakers” in the wider discussions, transcending a view of the Brotherhood as malign or benign, but rather seeing it as having a large potential as a partner in global governance. In many contexts, the Brotherhood can be an important promoter of both peace and human rights. Indeed, it can be an ally, as it was in the United Kingdom against Al-Qaida and the Islamic State.

The paper first provides a short overview of methodology, and then discusses the ideological currents within the Brotherhood movement. Subsequently it maps the three most important Brotherhood-influenced organizations, as well as the Brotherhood's views on gender.

A Short Note on Methodology

Stig Jarle Hansen

The paper is based on field studies in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Somalia, Syria (covered from Turkey), Tunisia, and the United Kingdom, including qualitative interviews with members of the Brotherhood (40 interviews), opponents of the Brotherhood, journalists, human rights activists, and political leaders in these countries. Other sources include secondary materials such as books and reports. Some respondents may have given answers designed to further strategic or political goals. However, by triangulating sources (including sources critical of the Brotherhood), we hope to detect such strategies.

This report employs a broad definition of the Muslim Brotherhood. We follow Lorenzo Vidino in taking into account network connections and organizational overlaps in our definition.¹⁴ Others have adopted narrower definitions. For instance, Mesøy and Hansen included only organizations with members in the International Shura Council, the governing body of the official affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood. Such an approach is precise, only including organizations that clearly label themselves as part of the Brotherhood. It does, however, leave out many organizations, including Tunisia's Ennahda and the National Islamic Front in Sudan, that our research found had a large impact on ideological discussions within organizations that defined themselves as members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the end, after studying our results and interviews, we settled for a wider definition and focus for this report. Using statements of both members and former members, we included organizations that the original Brotherhood played a role in founding, that are themselves offshoots from such organizations, or that were seriously influenced by the Brotherhood or offshoot organizations. Thus, organizations such as Ennahda that do not claim membership in the Brotherhood are nonetheless discussed in this paper. The paper examines the statements of individuals within these organizations, as well as those of outside observers with no formal bond to the organizations.

¹⁴ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2011); and Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesøy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa" (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2009).

The Ideological Arena of the Wider Muslim Brotherhood

Stig Jarle Hansen and Mohamed Husein Gaas

The ideology of the Brotherhood, the *fikra*, continues to develop around the loose core tenets that the organization's founder, Hassan Al-Banna, stipulated. During the 1940s–60s, the Egyptian Brotherhood held primacy within the international Brotherhood movement. Today, influential ideologists can be found in countries besides Egypt. Various organizations around the world have added arguments to the Brotherhood's ideological discussions, and there is no clear distinction between Brotherhood ideology and ideas introduced by thinkers like Hassan Al-Turabi and Rached Ghannouchi, who both came from organizations which either they or others did not view as part of the Brotherhood.

Further, throughout its history, the Brotherhood has had a tradition of pragmatism and has adjusted to new political realities; this is still the case today. The Egyptian Brotherhood became less important and lost prestige in the eyes of other Brotherhood organizations after its fall from power in 2013, which occurred in part because of the Egyptian Brotherhood's mistakes, such as lack of inclusiveness in its political process.¹⁵ On the other hand, the successes of Ennahda in Tunisia have brought its leader, Rached Ghannouchi, considerable respect. All the Brotherhood members interviewed in this report identified Ghannouchi as one of the most important Brotherhood thinkers, even though some of them clearly had variances with the stands of Ennahda (the interviews were recorded before Ennahda had distanced itself from Islamism). Respondents in Al-Islah (Yemen), Al-Islaax (Somalia), Hamas, the Islamic Action Front (Jordan), and the Islamic Front (Lebanon) especially pointed to Ghannouchi as the most important name among Brotherhood philosophers today. Recognition by outsiders can also shift Brotherhood members' ideological affiliations.

¹⁵ Ahmad Abdalaziz, a leader of the Egyptian Brotherhood, interviewed by Stig Jarle Hansen, Istanbul, Turkey, 2013; Demma Tahbob, Islamic Action Front leader, interviewed by Stig Jarle Hansen, Amman, Jordan, June 20, 2014; Malik Shamsan, Al-Islah leader, interviewed by Abdulsalam Mohammed, Sana'a, Yemen, 2013; Osama Hamdan, top representative of Hamas in Lebanon, interviewed by Stig Jarle Hansen, Pretoria, South Africa, April 21, 2015; and Sheikh Barud Nur Gurhan, a leader of Dam Jadid, interviewed by Stig Jarle Hansen, Mogadishu, Somalia, December 19, 2016.

The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Tawakkol Karman, of Al-Islah, a Yemeni Islamist party dominated by the Yemeni Brotherhood, seems to have inspired female members of the Brotherhood in many countries in the Middle East.¹⁶ As Roel Meijer has suggested, some terms and assumptions that were once central to Brotherhood ideology have become peripheral, with others taking their place.¹⁷

We mapped what ideologies and ideologists Muslim Brotherhood leaders claim to be influenced by, as well as those that their critics claim influence the Brotherhood. This type of mapping sheds light on the fluid discourse that forms the Brotherhood today.

A Basis Open for Different Interpretations

The original Brotherhood organization was founded by schoolteacher and religious leader Hassan Al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, and the Egyptian national and historical context influenced its ideology. Lorenzo Vidino correctly describes the original message of the Muslim Brotherhood as “a sort of anti-colonial nationalism based not on ethnic origin, but on common faith.”¹⁸ The message resonated in Egypt, which felt humiliated by British colonialism, as well as in the wider Middle East, which experienced political instability as it transitioned from Ottoman sovereignty, through British and French control, to independent nations. Al-Banna aligned his activism with the goals of Egyptian nationalists, while claiming that nationalism could only be permitted in combination with loyalty toward the global Muslim community (*ummah*).¹⁹ Tension continues within the Muslim Brotherhood between prioritizing Muslim political unity and prioritizing the goals of individual states, although the latter currently holds the upper hand.

16 Tahbob, interviewed by Hansen.

17 Roel Meijer, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Political: An Exercise in Ambiguity,” in Meijer and Edwin Bakker, eds., *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 295–320.

18 Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*.

19 Hassan Al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hassan Al-Banna*, Charles Wendell, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

Aligning with nationalists allowed Al-Banna to harness support from Islamic activists beyond Egypt.²⁰ Al-Banna rejected colonialism and was strongly skeptical of Western values and materialism, setting the stage for Sayyid Qutb's critique of the West and influencing non-Egyptian students in Egypt. However, Al-Banna also praised Western applied sciences, which he saw as a vital tool to resurrect Egyptian and Muslim dignity in the face of the West. Similarly, he criticized traditional Islamic practices and assumed that human reason had to be applied to understand Sharia, thus allowing for some flexibility when it came to practical applications of the latter.²¹ Al-Banna also saw education as a tool to change society, though he did not clearly define what a successful transformation would consist of.

Al-Banna's attitude to democracy was ambiguous and probably varied during his life. His opinion that the beliefs of Islam should constrain and form governance remained constant, however. Al-Banna criticized the party system, seeing it as promoting selfishness, egotism, and fragmentation among Muslims. In rejecting the party system, he may have mirrored fascist rhetoric popular in Egypt before the defeat of Axis powers in World War II. However, Al-Banna later pragmatically argued for participating in the party system.²²

The same pragmatism informed Al-Banna's approach to violence and to the hypothetical Islamic State. Al-Banna both condemned and employed violence, depending on which approach served him best at any given time. His description of the Islamic state remained largely non-specific. He portrayed Sharia as a foundation of legislation in the state; he also indicated that the state should do *dawa* (propagation of the faith or "call to Islam") and curb atheism and poor morals, and that any ruler must seek council. Al-Banna also embraced a form of contractual theory that emphasized loyalty to a ruler if he abided by Islam, but argued for a right to withdraw support if the ruler failed the faith and the people.²³

20 The discussions of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), originating in institutions created by Sheikh Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf, who had studied in Egypt in the 1940s, are also an illustrative example. The entity originally established broader conceptions of the Islamic *ummah*, wanting to transcend the Iraqi border. Again, the split created by tension between loyalty toward an *ummah* and toward a nation was highlighted.

21 Jocelyn Cesari, *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

22 Ibid.

23 Hansen and Mesøy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa," p. 33.

The second leader of the Egyptian Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Hudaybi, served from 1951 to 1973, and turned the Brotherhood in a more nonviolent direction. Al-Hudaybi, although regarded by many as a weak leader, did contribute to the Brotherhood's ideology. He advocated for nonviolence much more consistently than Al-Banna. His showdown with the Brotherhood's militants, who had previously been sponsored by Al-Banna, indicated less tolerance for violent strategies. His book, *Duat La Qudat* (Preachers, not judges), rejected what was later called "Qutbism"—advocacy of condemning other Muslims as non-believers and violence based on this judgment.

By contrast, Sayyid Qutb and the school of thought that grew around him, in addition to criticizing the West, emphasized that many of the regimes that claimed to be Muslim were in fact not following Islam, were oppressing Islam's defenders, and should be treated as apostate. This allegation against Muslims of apostasy is known as takfirism and could be used to justify violence. Indeed, Qutb's writings inspired violent subgroups within the Brotherhood. The most extreme of these militant groups left and publically distanced themselves from the Brotherhood, as did Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam, future members of Al-Qaida.

Some critics of the Brotherhood—for instance, the authors of the Cameron-commissioned report and right-wing activists—overstate Qutb's influence on the movement and underestimate that of Al-Hudaybi. This misunderstanding may in part stem from various Brotherhood affiliates' connections with extremists. Some have argued that the Brotherhood did not adequately distance itself from Qutb. Al-Hudaybi did, however, distance himself from Qutb and from takfirism.²⁴ Further, Qutb, unlike Al-Hudaybi, never held the top position in the Egyptian Brotherhood. Others who focus on Qutb's influence, like Ashraf El-Sherif, maintain that even though the Brotherhood rejected designating other Muslims as non-believers, it maintained several of Qutb's other values, such as the

24 Barbara H.E. Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology* (New York: Routledge, 2009); and Hassan Al-Hudaybi, *Duat La Qudat* [Preachers, not judges] (Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi' wal-Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1977).

importance of secrecy. However, these values pre-date Qutb.²⁵ In addition, many Muslim activists, for example Abdurrahman Badio of Somalia's Al-Islaax, believe that Qutb went too far and that his writings were misunderstood. Others, such as Zainab Al-Ghazali, employ less controversial elements of Qutb's thinking to justify, for instance, female participation in the Brotherhood. Qutbism can be many different things. As Abdurrahman claims: "Qutbism is meant [sic] the ideology of resistance derived from the Islamic basic text and interpreted by Sayyid Qutb in his numerous publications. The initial objective of these works was to fortify the resilience of Islamic activists oppressed by the Egyptian regime. However, this thought was widespread in the 1970s and '80s among the Muslim Brotherhood. The Takfiri group (Al-Takfir wa'l Hijra) born in the Egyptian prisons mobilized their supporters on some selected ideas of Sayyid Qutb such as his use of the terminology of Jahiliyyah (the era of ignorance before Islam).... Qutbists are not a movement, but simply constitute study groups and circles who consider the literature produced by Sayyid Qutb as their guide in understanding Islam."²⁶ The more extreme takfirist Qutbist approach is confined to the fringes of the Brotherhood movement, exerting the strongest influence in Sudan and Yemen.

Globalization of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement

In Egypt, the era following Al-Banna's death (in 1949) and the Free Officers Movement coup in January 1952 was often referred to as "the ordeal" (*Mihna*) by the Brotherhood. Although the Brotherhood initially supported the coup, the new regime suppressed the Brotherhood and the organization in Egypt almost vanished.²⁷

However, despite the challenges for the Egyptian Brotherhood, the 1940s and 1950s also saw doctrinal developments, partly because of the globalization of the Brotherhood movement. A wave of Brotherhood

25 Ashraf El-Sherif, "What Path Will Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Choose?" (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 23, 2013), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/23/what-path-will-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-choose-pub-53070>; and Nathan Brown, "The Muslim Brotherhood's (and Egypt's) Qutb Conundrum," *Foreign Policy*, May 17, 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/17/the-muslim-brotherhoods-and-egypts-qutb-conundrum/>.

26 Abdurrahman Badio, email interview with Stig Jarle Hansen, March 5, 2017.

27 Abdullah Al-Arian, *Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat's Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 13.

organizations and organizations with affiliations to Brotherhood philosophies spread as students and businessmen with sympathies for the ideas of the Brotherhood returned from Egypt to their home countries. Mustafa Al-Siba'i created the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in 1944. Abdul Latif Abu Qura established a Brotherhood in Jordan in 1945.²⁸ In 1952, Kuwait's Islamic Guidance Society was founded, later becoming the Social Reform Society.²⁹ In Yemen, Fudai Al-Wartilani established a foothold for the Brotherhood, though not a lasting organization. The new activists and organizations did not merely copy the Egyptian original. They sparked separate ideological discussions with varied results. For instance, the Syrian Brotherhood's policies toward violence shifted depending on which ideological currents dominated the organization at any given time.³⁰

The important Sudanese Brotherhood was formally founded in 1954.³¹ This chapter grew increasingly influential, gaining more political power than the Egyptian Brotherhood had. The Sudanese Brotherhood pioneered discussions that other Brotherhood branches would later confront in the face-off between the "educationalist school" and the "political school." The former group was conservative, favoring a purist approach focusing on education and *dawa*. The latter group was more pragmatic, and argued for more direct political involvement.³² The educationalist school would often accuse the political school of potentially creating divisions and sectarianism, as Muslims would quarrel over political issues. All of the Brotherhoods discussed in this paper, save perhaps the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, have supported democracy over the last twenty years, but they did not always agree on what form political participation should take. Should there be a Brotherhood party? Should members of the Brotherhood participate individually, or should they stay out of direct politics, instead changing society through *dawa* and charities?

28 Shmuel Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1998); and Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood*.

29 Hansen and Mesøy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa," p. 33; and Nathan Brown, "Pushing toward Party Politics? Kuwait's Islamic Constitutional Movement" (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 13, 2007).

30 Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, p. 68.

31 Hansen and Mesøy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa," pp. 33, 59.

32 Ibid., p. 61.

The Sudanese Brotherhood reached a decision on this issue quite early, participating in elections through the Islamic Charter Front beginning in 1965. Other organizations, however, were hesitant and undecided.³³ The big wave of party formation among Brotherhood offshoots occurred in the 1990s, when the political school was on the offensive. Several Brotherhoods chose to build up structures for direct political participation; one of these was Yemen's Al-Islah, formed in 1990. Other examples were Kuwait's Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), formed in 1991, Jordan's Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami) formed in 1992, and Morocco's Party for Justice and Development (PJD), which was later known as the political wing of the Moroccan at-Tawhid wa'l-Islah. These organizations chose to enter party politics. Other organizations did not or could not participate in party politics, however. In Somalia, the Muslim Brotherhood had to live with an ongoing civil war and shunned politics, although aiding the organization of the Arta Peace Conference in 1998, seeing it as a tool to end the war. The Somali and Egyptian organizations also subscribed to the idea, promoted by Al-Banna, that party politics was dangerous because it divided Muslims. The Somali organization slightly amended this position with the "Dealing with Realities" politics of the 1990s, in which the Brotherhood leadership allowed members to participate in other political organizations—and even join factions in the civil war—as long as they remained at peace with each other.

Saudi Arabia influenced the development of Muslim Brotherhood discourse in two ways. First, during the Nasserite era, Saudi Arabia saw the Brotherhood as a tool to be used against its Egyptian rival. Brotherhood leaders fleeing Egypt were thus given shelter in Saudi Arabia. Although the relationship between the Egyptian Brotherhood and Egyptian authorities improved until at least 1977, Saudi Arabia provided safety and scholarships to activists from other countries as well, for example to Brotherhood sympathizers fleeing Somalia.³⁴ Indeed, the main Somali Brotherhood, Al-Islaax, was created in Riyadh in 1978. Brotherhood sympathizers and members gained important positions in the huge apparatus that the Saudi state developed to promote missionary work and Muslim charity. Saudi

33 Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, "One against All: The National Islamic Front (NIF) and Sudanese Sectarian and Secular Parties," Sudan working paper (Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2008).

34 Hansen and Mesøy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa," pp. 33, 59.

petro-dollars helped to build the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood presence in Europe and in East Africa.³⁵

However, Saudi support for the spread of its own notion of Islam, “Wahhabism” (a term not used by Wahhabists themselves), also presented the Brotherhood with a strong ideological challenger. The Brotherhood met this challenge via contestation, adaptation, or a combination of the two. The Egyptian and Tunisian Brotherhood organizations rejected Wahhabist influence.³⁶ In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood countered the challenge by slowly taking control of the student Islamist organizations, providing a strategy that outflanked Wahhabi-inspired youth activists. The Brotherhood also underscored its differences with the Wahhabist interpretation of Islamism. The leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Umar Al-Tilmisani, for example, publicly announced that he had played the Arabic lute in his younger days, contesting the ban against music in some Wahhabist circles.³⁷

In other countries, Brotherhood offshoots accommodated the Wahhabists. In Yemen, the political party dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Islah, included Wahhabists when it was founded in 1990. In Sudan, Turabism, which focused on international unity among Muslims and became an independent node within Muslim Brotherhood ideology, incorporated elements of Wahhabism. Turabism embraced violence to a greater extent than did mainstream Egyptian thinking, but it was much more liberal in relation to gender issues.³⁸

Ennahda (in Tunisia) and Hamas (in Palestine) are activist organizations, created for the purpose of gaining political power. Hamas (created in 1987) was a politicization of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza; the older generation of the Palestinian Brotherhood was initially hostile to political involvement. Hamas was also a reaction against what its members saw as the impotency of secular Palestinian

35 Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, p. 110; and Hansen and Mesøy, “The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa,” p. 40.

36 Some analysts contest this claim in the case of Egypt, as discussed later in the paper; such an analysis seems to be out of touch with the facts of the process. See the section on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

37 Al-Arian, *Answering the Call*, p. 13.

38 Hansen and Mesøy, “The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa,” p. 40.

organizations' fight against Israel. Ennahda developed a third node in Brotherhood ideology (after those of the Egyptian Brotherhood and Turabism). Its leader and main philosopher, Rached Ghannouchi, challenged the Egyptian Brotherhood's ideas, actively encouraging his party to stand for political positions. He also argued that Muslims and non-Muslims should have equal citizenship, and declared that Muslim apostates (including converts away from Islam) should not be punished by the state or by individuals. Several Brotherhood organizations, including the one in Egypt, failed to fully answer the controversial apostasy question. Other Brotherhood scholars, such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, supported the death penalty for apostasy, a fact that human rights activists have underscored.³⁹ Western Brotherhood organizations in general adopted a third position, claiming that the death penalty for apostasy could not be applied in the West, as it is governed by non-Muslim states. Ghannouchi is himself a product of the Western organizations because of his exile in the West from 1987 to 2011.

In 1982, the Brotherhood established a new international organization to coordinate ideological debates, with a general *shura*, *Al-Murshid* (leader), and guidance council. Al-Turabi opposed this new organization and the Kuwaiti Brotherhood revolted against it after the First Gulf War, in which the council favored Iraq. Similarly, the Brotherhood rejected the council's guidance when it decided to participate in the Iraqi political process after the 2003 U.S. invasion. International coordination among Brotherhood organizations remained loose and haphazard, but they were able to make some joint decisions—for example, making democracy a common goal in 1998.

39 "Interview with Yusuf Al-Qaradawi," YouTube, February 5, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=huMu8ihDIVA>.

The Western Experience

Brotherhood leaders have often been forced to flee their countries of origin. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologist Yusuf Al-Qaradawi fled to Qatar. Syrian Brotherhood members fled to Western Europe in the late 1970s when they faced an increasingly violent Syrian regime. Educational opportunities drew many to Europe (as to Saudi Arabia).⁴⁰ A small elite established European Muslim Brotherhood organizations. These founders attempted to include non-Brotherhood Islamists and to distance themselves from the formal Brotherhood organizations. However, they struggled with ethnic organizational divisions. In Germany the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (IGD) failed in its attempt to bridge the organizational gap and merge with the Milli Gorus, a Brotherhood-sympathizing organization.⁴¹ In France, the Union des Organization Islamiques de France (UOIF) was established in 1983 around exiled Tunisians, often student members of the Movement of Islamic Tendency, the forerunner to the Tunisian Ennahda.⁴² The diaspora experience was thus important for developments among Islamists. For instance, respondents within and outside of Ennahda viewed the diaspora as having pushed the organization to become more liberal on gender issues. Yet, some diaspora-based leaders were not viewed as relevant by the non-Western based Muslim Brotherhood. For instance, non-European Muslim Brotherhood leaders interviewed for this report did not regard Tariq Ramadan, the famous Europe-based Islamic ideologist, as important.

Systematizing the Arena of Discussion

Discussing the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood movement today, four ideological debates seem to be especially important for the Brotherhood's relationship to common standards of human rights and for dialogue with the West. These four are 1) whether violence should be accepted as a political tool; 2) whether democracy is to be embraced, and if so what form of democracy and how to participate in it; 3) to what extent women are allowed to participate in the Brotherhood and hold political offices; and 4) whether and when individuals committing apostasy (leaving Islam) should be punished by death.

40 Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, p. 107.

41 Ibid., p. 168.

42 Ibid., p. 140.

Importantly, the Brotherhood's attitude toward violence varies. Some Brotherhoods and Brotherhood offshoots, for example Yemen's Al-Islah and the Syrian Brotherhoods, have participated in violent conflicts for many years. Others, such as the Egyptian Brotherhood before the Arab Spring or at-Tawhid wa'l-Islah in Morocco, have usually opposed using violence within their own countries (with notable exceptions). However, as will be shown in the next chapter, even these Brotherhoods have supported violence against non-Muslim interventions in what they saw as Muslim lands, including the Hamas struggle against Israel and the 1991 and 2003 wars in Iraq. The Somali chapter (Al-Islaax) and the Islamic Party in Iraq condemned violence against occupying forces in their own countries, and both the Syrian and the Kuwaiti chapters have defended Western military action in their countries. With some exceptions, such as the early Dam Jadid offshoot of Al-Islaax in Somalia, the most ardent opponents of foreign intervention in Muslim states are not located in the states where those interventions have taken place.

The Brotherhood seems to have settled the issue of democratic participation (politics versus *dawa*). Many Brotherhood organizations and offshoots have affiliated political parties; the former engages in *dawa*, whereas the latter tries to forge political alliances. However, an organization might participate in party politics while hoping to establish an authoritarian regime once in power, and an organization hoping to achieve or preserve democracy might choose to work outside party structures. Democratic participation is not the same as seeing democracy as an end-state. Yet, the Brotherhood offshoots and affiliates studied here all have publicly pushed for increased democracy. Notably, this picture is nuanced: Brotherhoods with a stable relationship with more authoritarian government structures, as in Bahrain and Morocco, maintain loyalty to those regimes and advocate only for gradual expansion of democracy within their countries. Moreover, when democratic regimes have collapsed in countries with Brotherhood organizations, those organizations have usually suffered.

Notably, political participation has led to some very peculiar dynamics. Brotherhood-affiliated political parties are often more open to female participation than Brotherhood organizations themselves. Several of the political organizations in, for example, Jordan, Egypt, and Somalia, have

fragmented and created offshoots in the form of new political parties or political organizations. In this sense, the political legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood has spread, but has also mutated.

The gender issue is under debate within the Brotherhood. Most Brotherhood offshoots and affiliates wish to bar women from being heads of state in their respective countries; Ennahda in Tunisia and the Sudanese Brotherhood are notable exceptions. Further, women are generally barred from leadership positions within the Brotherhood itself. Resistance to female national leaders from the Yemeni Al-Islah and the Bahraini, Egyptian, Jordanian, Kuwaiti, and Lebanese Brotherhoods shows how the Brotherhood can block influence from women. Ennahda, by contrast, has empowered women (later in the paper, we compare Ennahda's attitude toward women with that of the Egyptian Brotherhood). The Moroccan Brotherhood is also more liberal on gender issues. Female members have made many inroads within Brotherhood-affiliated political organizations. Female activists within the Brotherhood interviewed for this report also highlighted the successes of the Brotherhoods in Morocco and Tunisia, as well as the example of Tawakkol Karman, the Nobel Laureate from Yemen's Al-Islah, as showing that there were positive changes in relation to gender issues.

The issue of apostasy is also an important variable. The issue seems to remain under debate in the most important Brotherhoods—with the exception of Ennahda, the latter having come quite clearly to a conclusion that apostasy should not result in punishment at all. It should be noted that two middle-ground positions exist. The first claims that apostasy should not be punished until the righteous punishment can be given in a resurrected caliphate encompassing all Muslim lands, led by a just ruler (an entity not in existence today). The second claims that imposing the death penalty for apostasy is invalid outside an existing Muslim state.

Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated organizations and offshoots

Ranking indicators:

1= lowest ranking; 6 = highest ranking.

Category one:

1 = no use of violence

6 = part of a civil war with its own military forces

Category two:

1 = banned by government;

6 = having a member of the Brotherhood-associated organization lead the country

5 = having a member of the Brotherhood-associated organization in the cabinet

Category three

1 = no attempts to enter the political processes

6 = at least ten years of participation and consensus seeking

Organization	Attitude toward violence	Access to power	Democratic participation	Major ideological shifts	Fragmentation	Tribal recruitment or allies	Gender	Issue of apostasy
Islamic Action Front (Jordan)	2	2	5	✓	✓	✗	Neutral	<i>Not known</i>
Ennahda (Tunisia)	1	5	6	✓	✗	✗	Liberal	Opposes death penalty
Dam Jadid (Somalia)	5	5	3	✗	✗	✗	Conservative	<i>Not known</i>
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood	5	1	5	✓	✓	✗	Conservative	<i>Undecided</i>
Al-Islaax (Somalia)	1	3	5	✓	✓	✓	Neutral	<i>Undecided</i>
Al-Islah (Yemen)	6	3	4	✗	✗	✓	Conservative	Supports death penalty
Islamic Movement, Southern Branch (Israel)	2	1	5	✗	✓	✗	Neutral	Opposes death penalty
Hamas (Palestine)	5	4	3	✗	✗	✗	Conservative	Supports death penalty
Justice and Development Party (PJD) (Morocco)	2	3	5	✓	✓	✗	Liberal	<i>Undecided</i>
Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM)	5	1	5	✓	✓	✗	Liberal	Opposes death penalty
UOIF (France)	2	2	1	✗	✗	✗	Liberal	Opposes death penalty (suspended)
Al-Menbar (Bahrain)	3	3	3	✗	✗	✓	Conservative	<i>N/A</i>
Iraqi Islamic Party	2	3	5	✗	✓	✓	Neutral	<i>N/A</i>
Reform Society (Kuwait)	1	3	5	✗	✗	✗	Conservative	Supports death penalty
Lybian Brotherhood	5	3	2	✗	✓	✓	Conservative	Supports death penalty
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood	6	2	3	✓	✗	✗	Liberal	Opposes death penalty

Three Important Poles? Ennahda, Turabism, and the Egyptian Brotherhood

Stig Jarle Hansen and Rafat Faisal Al-Mohareb

Our respondents viewed the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Sudanese Brotherhood, and Ennahda as the three most important actors within the Muslim Brotherhood. In the following chapter, we discuss how the interactions among these organizations and their local contexts transformed and diversified Muslim Brotherhood views on violence, democratic participation (politics versus *dawa*), gender, and apostasy.

Heterogeneity: The Modern Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

As Abdullah Al-Arian argues, the Brotherhood was largely reformed, if not reborn, in the 1970s as old members left or passed away, and as youth/student organizations such as the Gama'a Islamiya (also known as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya) supplied members to the Brotherhood, changing its composition.⁴³ The Muslim Brotherhood of today reflects the reinvigoration that took place from the 1970s onward.

By 2005, the Egyptian Brotherhood had a broad composition, containing young and multimedia-savvy “café latte” members, a new generation of activists. They coexisted with figures such as Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh who, though often defined as moderates, embraced international conspiracy theories—for example, believing that 9/11 was an inside job.⁴⁴ These leaders were highly visible to Western journalists and politicians, and had good relationships with the students and the café latte Muslims.⁴⁵ Members of the old guard remained in control of leadership positions. They focused on education as the tool to change society and remained skeptical toward

43 Al-Arian, *Answering the Call*.

44 Eric Trager, “Why Is the Middle East Still in Thrall to 9/11 Conspiracy Theories?” *New Republic*, September 3, 2011, <https://newrepublic.com/article/94546/middle-east-radical-conspiracy-theories>.

45 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 138; and Hansen and Mesøy, “The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa.”

political participation. A conservative view on Sharia dominated the Guidance Bureau, the “cabinet” of the Brotherhood.

The existence of different factions within the Brotherhood produced ambiguous policy statements, which in turn led to accusations of double talk; some issues were not raised in the Muslim Brotherhood’s policy documents, worrying their political opponents.⁴⁶ However, some political positions clearly dominated the organization; it supported democracy, although within the limits of Sharia. The emphasis on Sharia led the Brotherhood to resist the registration of new faiths in Egypt beyond the “people of the book” (Muslims, Christians, and Jews). Women and non-Muslims were not allowed to hold the presidency in Egypt. The female section of the Brotherhood (the Sisterhood) did attempt to increase political activism among women (see the section on the Brotherhood and gender for further discussion of this issue). The Brotherhood supported Hamas in the conflict with Israel, but was in general nonviolent concerning domestic issues.

In the government-rigged 2005 elections, the Brotherhood was not allowed to stand as a party, because religious parties were still banned by the constitution. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood ran candidates as individuals rather than on a party list, and gained as much as 20 percent of the vote.⁴⁷ The Brotherhood and individual members had over the years attempted to start several political parties, including the Shura Party in 1986 and the Reform Party in 1995. In 1996, Al-Wasat Party was formed by defectors from the Brotherhood; it was based on a splinter organization with roots in the student groups that reinvigorated the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s. The party was formed as a civic party with an “Islamic” frame of reference.⁴⁸ As late as 2007, the Brotherhood made another attempt to form a party; this party was close to Al-Wasat party in configuration, portraying itself as a civic political party with a “religious frame of reference,” and stipulating

46 Jeffrey Azarva and Samuel Tadros, “The Problem of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” AEI (American Enterprise Institute) Outlook No. 4 (Washington, D.C.: AEI, November 30, 2007, <https://www.aei.org/publication/the-problem-of-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood/print/>).

47 Abdel Monem Said Aly, “Understanding the Muslim Brothers in Egypt,” Middle East Brief No. 23 (Waltham, Mass.: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, December 2007), <http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB23.pdf>.

48 Dina Shehata, “Mapping Islamic Actors in Egypt” (Cairo: Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo/ Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, March, 2012), <http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/mapping-islamic-actors---version-2.2.pdf>

a clerical council of religious scholars as part of Egyptian governance structures, although there were disagreements over the latter's role.⁴⁹ The Brotherhood leaders again publicly confirmed their support for democracy and for engaging with politics to change society in combination with a *dawa*-based approach.

The café latte members, together with grandsons, sons, and daughters of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership such as Ibrahim Al-Hudaybi and Asma Al-Eryan (the daughter of Essam Al-Eryan, later to be deputy leader of the Brotherhood's political party), connected the Brotherhood with the upper-middle-class youth who were the shock troops of the Arab Spring, but also had access to the top leaders. The youth wanted a more activist engagement toward the government and more transparency within the organization, heavily criticizing the old-guard leadership. Younger members of the Brotherhood did not embrace moderate positions on all issues, being, for example, divided over whether the death sentence should be imposed for apostasy.⁵⁰ Some of these younger members left the organization before the Arab Spring.

The rural segments of the Brotherhood often sided with the leadership and were a more conservative force. They viewed Islamic activism as a larger whole and frequently embraced other religious trends, especially Salafism.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Power, 2011 to 2013

Many of the café latte members of the Brotherhood participated in the initial standoff with the Hosni Mubarak regime that began on January 25, 2011. The youths at the center of this uprising failed to organize themselves effectively. This set the stage for the Muslim Brotherhood to dominate the uprising through organizational power. After spending three days deciding whether to support the youth, the Muslim Brotherhood provided logistics and support, such as food for demonstrators. The initial riots and demonstrations driven by middle-class and upper-class youths failed, but the Brotherhood's superior organization made it a useful ally of the youth

49 "Platform of the Planned Muslim Brotherhood Party in Egypt," *Free Muslims*, January 17, 2008, <http://www.freemuslims.org/document.php?id=462>.

50 Hansen and Mesøy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa."

and ideally suited to gain power in the wake of the revolution. Finally, the military intervened against the Mubarak government on February 11, revealing Mubarak's inability to control the armed forces. The military and other structures of the old regime managed the transition. The state's tools of discipline, such as the police and the army, remained almost unchanged after Mubarak's removal.

Yet there was a political vacuum after the end of the regime. The former ruling party, which drew support via state patronage and charismatic leaders, remained the largest political grouping. However, it failed to reorganize itself after losing control of the state. The Muslim Brotherhood stepped in to fill the vacuum. The Brotherhood understood the power of the army, actively engaging with it and with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the junta that held ultimate power in Egypt after February 11, 2011. The Brotherhood attempted to show both moderation and discipline to demonstrate to the military that it could be a credible partner, despite internal divisions. It was rewarded with a seat on the Egyptian constitutional review committee of 2011. The committee was to produce suggestions for changes to the constitution that would be used to prepare for new elections of a president and a parliament. The president and parliament would in turn create a constitutional assembly to produce a new constitution. The Brotherhood facilitated the speed of this process and supported the final result, although the interim constitution still banned religious parties, including any that the Brotherhood might form.

The Brotherhood attempted to signal moderation by promising not to field a presidential candidate in the next election. However, it failed to maintain unity as several of its members announced their candidacies. Many youth members of the Brotherhood withdrew from the organization to create the Egyptian Current Party, as they demanded faster change and more severe punishment for the supporters of the old regime. The Brotherhood announced the founding of a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, in February, and formalized this on April 30, with Mohammed Morsi as the party's leader. The party intended to draw individuals from outside the Brotherhood into the party and to make the party a separate entity from the wider Brotherhood movement. Unlike the Brotherhood, the party had women in leadership positions—though not among the top leaders.

It had a party program that permitted female leaders of Egypt as well as non-Muslim presidents. However, the Brotherhood dominated the party and the leadership of the Brotherhood appointed all top party leaders.⁵¹ Possibly to circumvent the ban on religious parties, the Freedom and Justice Party publicly stated that it was a civic entity and not a religious party. Its party platform emphasized anti-corruption and social justice aims.

The party also attempted to draw in coalition partners from other political parties, even secular and liberal ones, creating the Democratic Alliance. This was a loose formation with little political content, but perhaps served as a tool to ease the worries of Egyptians outside the Brotherhood. The program of the Freedom and Justice Party clearly affirmed that democracy was the right direction for Egypt, but equally clearly insisted that the Egyptian economy had to be based on Islam, as did family law. Although the formulation failed to specify exactly what this meant, it scared secularists. Ambiguous statements on control of Christian charities and on press freedom created similar problems. The party stated that it would guarantee freedom of the press as long as it corresponded to “the values of society and public morals.”⁵²

The Brotherhood’s push for consensus with the secularists did not last. The superior Brotherhood organizational apparatus, as well as the support of the Democratic Alliance, gained the Brotherhood 43.4 percent of the seats in the new parliament, while the second place was held by the Salafi-dominated Islamic Alliance.⁵³ This gave the new parliament a structure that was clearly Brotherhood- and Salafist-led. Committee leaders generally belonged to one of the two parties, and, because parliament selected 50 percent of the constitutional assembly, the Democratic Alliance and Islamic Alliance dominated that assembly as well. Unclear selection criteria and nepotism also made several of the candidates withdraw from the assembly and parliament, including candidates from many of the secular parties. The latter felt that they needed quotas in the parliament and

51 Khalil al-Anani, “Egypt’s Freedom & Justice Party: To Be or Not to Be Independent” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 1, 2011), <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=44324>.

52 Freedom and Justice Party, “Election Program, Parliamentary Elections 2011” (Egypt: Freedom and Justice Party, 2011), http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/FJP_2011_English.pdf.

53 Inger Dyrnes, “Islamist Majority in the Egyptian Parliament: Will It Matter?” *Fair Observer*, December 17, 2011, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/islamist-majority-egyptian-parliament-will-it-matter.

the assembly, whereas the Brotherhood and the Islamic Alliance claimed that the composition of the parliament should represent the proportional strength of the electoral results. The Brotherhood's insistence on proportional representation aligned with democratic norms, but using quotas might have increased trust between the parties.

In April 2012, the constitutional assembly was disbanded by a court that saw it as dominated by members of parliament. A new constitutional assembly was elected during the summer of 2012, after a compromise agreement that stipulated that only 50 percent of the assembly should be Islamists. However, opposition parties felt that Islamist parties such as Al-Wasat were not included when calculating the proportion and that Islamist members of civil society groups were counted as non-Islamists. The conflicts in the constitutional assembly were severe, and helped drive a wedge between Islamists and liberals, as well as making the army nervous for the stability of Egypt. The constitutional assembly completed a draft constitution by November 29, 2012. The draft then had to be approved by the president and the parliament.

Egypt had in the meantime had a presidential election, in which the Brotherhood, despite earlier promises, chose to field a candidate (Mohammed Morsi). The presidential election was held in two rounds, with first on May 23–24, 2012, and the second on June 16–17, 2012. In the first round, Morsi received 25 percent of the vote; former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik received 24 percent; Hamdeen Sabahi, the leader of the Nasserist Dignity Party, received 21 percent; and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader who left the Brotherhood to stand as a presidential candidate, received 17 percent. The liberal favorite of the West, Amr Moussa, received 11 percent.⁵⁴ The first round indicated that the Brotherhood's popularity among the electorate had decreased since the parliamentary elections. In addition, Ahmed Shafik's candidacy illustrated the ability of members of the Mubarak regime to reassert themselves, given that he had been a member of Mubarak's cabinet from 2002 until the end, first serving as Minister of Civil Aviation, and then as Mubarak's last prime minister. Shafik and Morsi ran against each other in

54 "Egyptian Parties Agree on Constitution Compromise," AFP, March 29, 2012, <https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/29/204110.html>.

the second round, with Morsi gaining the support of parties and actors who feared a return to Mubarak's era. Despite this, Morsi's victory was rather narrow. He received 51.73 percent of the vote as against Shafik's 48.27 percent, showing that significant support remained for the leaders of the old regime. The mandate given to the president winning such a close election is small, a fact that should have led the Brotherhood to act with moderation. However, Morsi's followers decided to abandon the quest for wider consensus, using their democratic victories to push for more power, rather than striving to create trust among the various groups in Egypt.

The new president sacked the military leadership in August, and dismissed the constitutional declaration of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, a declaration that contained guarantees for both Christian and more secular representation in the parliament. The Salafists and the Brotherhood, reached a compromise with each other. The compromise was rather conservative, and adhered to the international convention on the rights of women only "as long as it does not contradict Sharia." Similarly, it was suggested that non-Muslims' ability to select their own institutional leaders should be limited.

These developments worried Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations outside Egypt. These organizations saw the Egyptian Brotherhood as too accommodating toward Salafists, and too indifferent toward secularists' interests. The Syrian Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda sent delegations to Egypt that emphasized these points. However, the Salafists increasingly persuaded and coerced the Egyptian Brotherhood to promote Sharia, including in the constitutional assembly. Secularists became marginalized, and several of them withdrew from the assembly. On November 22, 2012, Morsi issued a presidential decree granting legal immunity to parliament. The Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood together launched the new constitution.

This constitution was democratic in the sense that it stipulated multi-party elections. However, there were several worrying tendencies. The new constitution placed sovereignty in the hands of God as well as the hands of the people, underlining the importance of Sharia. Central in the discussion was the somewhat odd paragraph 219, which referred to the principles of Sharia

and the theological processes of arriving at them.⁵⁵ This was interpreted by many as the state embracing traditional and conservative interpretations of Sharia.⁵⁶ The constitution also included a paragraph allowing Al-Ahzar to have interpretive power over Islamic principles. Secularists saw these moves as creating a back door to increase the influence of a strict interpretation of Sharia. However, it seems to be a logical error to interpret the discussions around paragraph 219 as part of a long-term strategy to promote the Brotherhood. Importantly, the paragraph was introduced by the Salafists, not by the Muslim Brotherhood, which initially seemed indifferent to it.⁵⁷ Further, the paragraph would not necessarily have led to the result its critics hoped to avoid—an increased role for traditional interpretations of Sharia. This would have depended on both the Egyptian bureaucracy in the ministry of justice and future discussions in the parliament. It was a sign, however, that the Muslim Brotherhood and its then allies, the Salafists, lacked the will to reach out to the secularists.

Secular law was seen as not the only legal source; religious texts were allowed to be used to define and prosecute crimes. This, too, paved the way for stronger use of Sharia. Only the three Abrahamic religions were allowed to build religious buildings. Samuel Tadros suggests that these policies indicated a victory for the Salafists, but many are close to the principles articulated in Brotherhood publications or those of Brotherhood-affiliated ideologies.⁵⁸

The presidential decree making members of parliament immune from prosecution signaled a dismantling of Egypt's division of powers, and prompted the creation of a secular alliance called the National Salvation Front (NSF). The NSF demanded a rearranged constitutional assembly with more secularists. In addition, Morsi's reluctance to distance himself from Assem Abdel-Magid created skepticism outside Egypt. Abdel-Magid was an Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya leader who was partly responsible for the 1997 massacre of tourists in Luxor that killed 62 people. Morsi also failed to properly criticize religious leaders inciting violence against Shias.

55 Egyptian Constitution, 2012, para. 219.

56 Clark Lombardi and Nathan J. Brown, "Islam in Egypt's New Constitution," *Foreign Policy*, December 13, 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/13/islam-in-egypts-new-constitution/>.

57 Ibid.

58 Samuel Tadros, "What Is a Constitution Anyway?" (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, January 7, 2013), <https://www.hudson.org/research/9905-what-is-a-constitution-anyway->; and Hansen and Mesøy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa," pp. 35, 37.

Thus, the actions of individual Brotherhood members and the adoption of slightly more conservative ideological positions alienated the secularists. This effect was compounded by Morsi embracing a “winner takes all” (Westminster) democratic model. Such an approach was perhaps justified by Morsi’s victory in the parliamentary elections, but it was far from wise, as it abstained from seeking consensus in a difficult transition for Egypt. The “winner takes all” approach increased tension, resulting in demonstrations with increasing clashes between police and demonstrators. Under the circumstances, it might have been wise to make concessions to the opposition and perhaps even to include the opposition in the cabinet. The Jordanian, Moroccan, and Tunisian Brotherhood-related movements followed this course of action, and at least two Brotherhood organizations outside Egypt recommended it to the Egyptian Brotherhood. The Brotherhood ignored this advice. Brotherhood spokesman Mahmoud Ghozlan commented: “When a Democratic Party candidate wins in the United States, does he appoint Republicans? Would they appoint their rivals?”⁵⁹ This strategy, in combination with economic decline and increasingly frequent riots, must have worried the army leadership.

In early June 2013, massive street protests took place in Cairo, and the army intervened against the Brotherhood, demanding that Morsi take action to ease the protests (which would have involved holding a new election) or resign. While Morsi’s ministers defected one by one, Morsi took no major steps to promote reconciliation. The army deposed him on July 3, 2013 and arrested the top leaders of the Brotherhood, seizing power. To the great disappointment of the Brotherhood, which had followed the constitution of Egypt, most Western powers failed to clearly acknowledge that a military coup had taken place.

The new regime moved swiftly against the Muslim Brotherhood. Initially, the Brotherhood—or at least the part of it that was free—tried to use demonstrations and sit-ins to change the course of the military coup, attempting to mimic the events of 2011 and possibly also to draw the international community’s attention. Al-Nahda Square and Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square became gathering points for large-scale sit-ins where not only the

59 Abigail Hauslohner, “Egypt’s Morsi Remakes Cabinet,” *Washington Post*, January 6, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypts-morsi-remakes-cabinet/2013/01/06/c45b1006-5810-11e2-9fa9-5fbd9530eb9_story.html?utm_term=.7da0bfd090a6.

Brotherhood, but also other Islamists, protested against the military coup. However, support for the protests from outside Egypt was lukewarm, and the Brotherhood was unable to find allies within Egypt. Whereas the Brotherhood and the secularists had worked together to achieve change in 2011, now the secularists were in general either neutral toward or opposed the Brotherhood.

In mid-August, the regime moved against the protesters in Al-Nahda Square and Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square, killing more than 817 (according to Human Rights Watch, this was the largest massacre of protesters in a single day in recent history).⁶⁰ This showed the military's determination to crack down on protests regardless of protesters' methods, indicating the limits of the protesters' nonviolent approach. After suppressing the protests, the military arrested additional members of the Brotherhood. The supreme guide (the top leader the Egyptian Brotherhood), Mohammed Badie, was arrested on August 20 after his son was killed. Mohammed Al-Beltagi, the secretary-general of the Freedom and Justice Party, who participated in the sit-ins, evaded capture for a week. Notably, Mahmoud Ezzat, the deputy supreme guide of the Brotherhood, managed to escape capture. The government arrests were more massive than any carried out against the Brotherhood by previous Egyptian regimes. In addition, an international alliance led by Saudi Arabia supported the new Egyptian regime.

The regime continued to harden its policies, and in December it categorized the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Hope for dialogue with the regime vanished, and the Brotherhood increasingly had to adapt as prominent leaders fled either to Istanbul, London, Doha, or to a lesser extent Khartoum, with London and Istanbul the preferred alternatives for top leaders. Lower-level members of the Brotherhood had to operate clandestinely under government surveillance. This hindered communication among various parts of the Brotherhood, creating a decentralization that allowed new initiatives in the organization as the old hierarchy became less important.

Despite massive pressures on the Brotherhood, it managed to hold elections in February 2014. Mohammed Badie remained the symbolic head

60 Human Rights Watch, "All According to Plan: The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt" (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2014), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt>.

of the Brotherhood, even though he was in prison. Agricultural professor Mohammed Taha Wahdan rose in the organization, taking responsibility for the crisis-management team. Over time, a divide grew within the Brotherhood. On one side were old leaders still at large, such as Mahmoud Ezzat and Mohammed Hussein. On the other side were newer members, led by Ahmed Abdel-Rahman, head of the Office for Egyptians Abroad.⁶¹ The latter group argued for an escalation of violence, given that the nonviolent strategies of the previous leadership had failed (some wanted to target infrastructure only). The younger group also argued that women should be allowed to become more actively involved in the Brotherhood. The discussion definitively concerned the wish for a change of direction and of power within the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood felt devastated by the regime's imprisonment of political activists and use of death sentences against Brotherhood members. Support from other groups in Egyptian society was slow to emerge or not forthcoming.

The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt was once the “first among equals.” Research undertaken by the authors in 2009 shows how some affiliate Brotherhood organizations sent representatives to Egypt to ask for advice. However, during Morsi's presidency, the Brotherhood followed an unwise—although legal and democratic—strategy. It did not invite consensus or collaboration with secularists, thereby promoting ambiguity in its own party program. The Brotherhood's inflexibility gained it little apart from the addition to the constitution of some ambiguous paragraphs that might have led to some forms of increased religious control in Egypt. Other Egyptian political groups' lack of support for the Brotherhood brought down the organization.

Because the Brotherhood in Egypt is currently fragmented, it can function neither as an ideological leader nor as an organizational leader for like-minded organizations. The coup was more than a blow to the power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; it was a blow to its strong position as ideological leader of the wider Muslim Brotherhood movement. In 2013, when our team collected interviews in East Africa and in the Middle East, none of the leaders of the organizations with ties to the Brotherhood pointed to the Egyptian Brotherhood as a good example to follow, rather pointing to

61 Formed after the 2014 elections to coordinate international efforts.

non-Egyptians such as Rached Ghannouchi, Salman Alodah, and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi.

The lesson to be learned from the short period of rule by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt—namely, what the refusal to make significant compromises can lead to—may have been lost as the result of oppression following the unconstitutional removal of Morsi. Yet the Brotherhood in many ways followed a path based on democracy until its ouster. After the ouster, the Brotherhood has become more fragmented and more extreme. The ouster of the Brotherhood has not stabilized Egypt. Security incidents are frequent and press censorship is severe. The Brotherhood has weakened, but it is still alive and might be revived even under the increasing oppression of the new regime in Egypt.

The Initial Challengers: The Sudanese Brotherhood and Al-Turabi

The Sudanese Brotherhood, one of the Egyptian Brotherhood's main rivals, emerged onto the world stage in the 1980s. Before the 1980s, Sudan, as seen from the Egyptian Brotherhood's point of view, had been a huge success story, gaining influence and political power.

In April 1936, the Sudanese Sheikh Abdullah Hamad, a merchant from the Omdurman area, visited the Egyptian Brotherhood's Guidance Office and met with Hassan Al-Banna, expressing his willingness to circulate the weekly magazine of the Brotherhood among Sudanese and to preach. These activities began to be more organized in 1943. Al-Banna sent Brotherhood activists Salah Abdel Hafez and Jamal Al-Din Sanhoury to spread the Brotherhood's ideas in Sudan from 1944 to 1945. They spoke at the Graduates' Club, leading to the formation of the first committee of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, headed by Ibrahim Al-Mufti. In 1946, the first effective administrative body of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan was formed and chaired by Awadh Omar Imam.

As noted previously, suppression in Egypt led a large number of Egyptian Brotherhood members to emigrate to Sudan, influencing the emergence of the Islamic Liberation Movement led by Babaker Karrar, which later

became the Islamic Socialist Party.⁶² In 1954, a merger took place between the two movements of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan (the Popular Muslim Brotherhood Movement and the Movement of the Brotherhood Students). The Sudanese Islamist movement fully adopted the ideological teachings of the Brotherhood in Egypt. However, perhaps because it could, the Sudanese Brotherhood chose to participate in politics long before its Egyptian counterpart, forming the Islamic Charter Front in October 1964, with Hassan Al-Turabi as leader. The Islamic Charter Front functioned at times as a political party and at other times as a pressure group.⁶³

Hassan Al-Turabi was to have a global influence, directly challenging the Egyptian Brotherhood. Al-Turabi and the Sudanese Brotherhood gained power, but then lost it again. In 1978, Al-Turabi became the attorney general. Although he was removed from that position in 1982, he retained considerable power until 1985, when Gaafar Al-Nimeiry's regime was toppled. He nevertheless regained influence and helped shape Sudanese foreign policy after Omar Al-Bashir's 1989 military coup, holding significant political sway until 2001.⁶⁴

Turabism itself serves as a reminder of the futility of branding Islamists as either extreme or moderate, as it is both. Al-Turabi and the Sudanese Brotherhood also demonstrated the fluidity of ideology within the Brotherhood movement, changing their stances several times. The Brotherhood was perhaps influenced by Al-Turabi's view that ideology can only be formed through discussion and that it is evolving.

Al-Turabi strove to politicize the Brotherhood. At the end of the 1970s, he rejected the focus on education as a way to bring about the "new Islamic citizen" and introduce Islam to Sudanese society. He thought that it was absurd to work at the grassroots level without attempting to change political action from above. Al-Turabi firmly believed that the state could make larger changes in the lives of individuals than could preaching

62 Mohamed M. A. Salih, "Introduction," in Salih, ed., *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 6

63 Salih, "Introduction," p. 6.

64 George Packer, "The Moderate Martyr: A Radically Peaceful Vision of Islam," *New Yorker*, September 11, 2006, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-moderate-martyr>.

In the beginning, the Sudanese Brotherhood prevented women from participating in politics and denied them the right to be nominated to or occupy positions within the movement. Al-Turabi altered the *fikra*, stating that women were to be considered for positions within the Brotherhood. In fact, Al-Turabi wrote several works on the issue, for example, *Almara'a bain Ta'aleem Aldeen wa Takaleed Almojtama'a* (The Woman between religious teachings and traditions of the society), described as “one of the most important works by a Muslim Brotherhood leader.”⁶⁵ Al-Turabi saw as self-evident women’s right to participate in the shura and to public expression, challenging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Al-Turabi therefore faced sweeping attack from many in the Sudanese Islamic Movement as well as from the Egyptian Brotherhood.

From the 1970s onwards Al-Turabi asserted that a woman was an independent human being who did not need a man to mediate her understanding of or participation in her religion. Al-Turabi contended that a woman was autonomous in the selection of her faith and in her work in Islam, according to Quranic verses (chapter 35). He affirmed that Sharia guaranteed freedom and responsibility to women, who are equal to men. A woman had the right to choose a spouse or refuse him; the right to express her opinion in public; the right to own property; the right to participate in politics; and the right to vote and to be nominated to public positions. According to Al-Turabi, the public sphere was not limited to men only, and there should be no isolation between men and women in public life.⁶⁶ After being removed from power after conflicts with President Al-Bashir in 2001, Al-Turabi expressed even more liberal ideas on gender, claiming that female head-covering was not a requirement and that Muslim women could be married to non-Muslim men and could lead mixed prayers.⁶⁷

Although Al-Turabi’s perspective on gender was relatively liberal, his human rights record was mixed at best. The death penalty for apostasy was, for example, introduced in Sudan while Al-Turabi’s political influence

65 Hassan Al-Turabi, *Almara'a bain Ta'aleem Aldeen wa Takaleed Almojtama'a* [The Woman between religious teachings and traditions of the society] (Khartoum: Alam Al-alanyah, 2000), pp. 10–12.

66 Nawfal ibn Ibrahim, “Al-Tayyar Al-Turabi Fe Al-Bilad Al-Arabyya wa Al-Moraja'at” [Turabist thought in the Arab countries and the missing reviews], April 18, 2006, <https://islamselect.net/mat/26009>.

67 Lawrence Joffe, “Hassan al-Turabi Obituary,” *Guardian*, March, 11 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/11/hassan-al-turabi-obituary>.

was at its peak. Al-Turabi also fully accepted the use of violence, which can be seen in his support for Al-Qaida.⁶⁸ Al-Turabi's late moderate phase occurred after he lost access to power, and he has been criticized for having suspended his more positive views on democracy while participating in Al-Bashir's dictatorship from 1989 to 1999. Yet the 1998 constitution does show support for democracy, within the confines of the dual sovereignty (the people and God) that the Muslim Brotherhood typically embraced. In practice, this dual sovereignty manifested itself through legislation based on Sharia as a foundation for a democratic state.⁶⁹

Al-Turabi attempted to create several African and Middle Eastern umbrella organizations for both Brotherhood offshoots and non-Brotherhood Islamists, against the will of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. By 1983 the relationship between the Turabists and the Egyptians was so strained that contact ceased.⁷⁰ Al-Turabi's focus on uniting Islamists meant that Sudan supported many extremist organizations, including Al-Qaida, during the period that Al-Turabi was in government.⁷¹

Al-Turabi's influence was global, but the Ennahda movement in Tunisia may have felt it most strongly. Until the beginning of the 1990s, Tunisia was Al-Turabi's biggest breakthrough; his ideas inspired Tunisian Islamists that were to become very important in the wider discussion among Muslim Brotherhood offshoots. The leader of Ennahda, Rached Ghannouchi, published a book co-authored with Al-Turabi, *Alharakah Al-Islamiyah wa Al-Tahdeeth* [The Islamic movement and modernization].⁷² After the announcement of Al-Turabi's death on March 5, 2016, hundreds of people gathered in front of Al-Turabi's home. Ghannouchi, who was in Khartoum at the time, was one of the first to attend, and asked the Sudanese to keep the ideas of Al-Turabi alive. Ghannouchi proclaimed: "Al-Turabi's thought needs to be scrutinized and taught; Al-Turabi did not live for himself or for his family,

68 Ibid.

69 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 131–146.

70 Ibid.

71 Joffe, "Hassan al-Turabi Obituary."

72 Rached Ghannouchi and Hassan Al-Turabi, *Alharakah Al-Islamiyah wa Al-Tahdeeth* [The Islamic movement and modernization] (Beirut: Dar Al-jeel, 1984).

he lived for his nation and for Sudan.” However, Ghannouchi was to present a very different ideology than did Al-Turabi.⁷³

Ennahda, the Tunisian Renaissance Movement

Ennahda in one sense was the offshoot of Turabism, sharing Al-Turabi’s view that political participation was necessary (even to the extent of abandoning *dawa*) as well as his view on gender relations. Ennahda, however, broke with Turabism regarding the use of violence.⁷⁴ Although Ennahda denied being Islamist in 2016, the organization still sees Islam as a foundation for its activity. Ennahda has also been an important and often neglected provider of ideology for the wider debate among Muslim Brotherhood affiliates and offshoots. The organization has produced a unique approach to political Islam that enjoys considerable respect within the Middle East, partly because of its political success. Ennahda has been much more successful than the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—a fact recognized by many other Brotherhood-affiliated organizations.⁷⁵

Ennahda has been influenced by several separate ideological discussions that were of less importance in other organizations in the Muslim Brotherhood. These have been both global discussions within Islam (such as discussions about rationality) and discussions with more local focus (e.g., on public morals). To a certain extent, Ennahda has a separate path. Ennahda originated in the Tablighi movement (Tablighi Jamaat). This movement saw itself as reinvigorating Islam by active preaching. For the young Rached Ghannouchi, Tablighi Jamaat was an anchor when he spent time in turbulent late-1960s Paris. Tablighi Jamaat in general saw itself as nonpolitical. However, the Tablighi movement functioned as a shield against Tunisian secularism as implemented by the authoritarian regimes of Habib Bourguiba (1957–1987) and Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali (1987–2011), and thus had a political function. Future Ennahda leaders such as Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou also were influenced by domestic

73 Interview with Ghannouchi, Aljazeera, March 6, 2016.

74 Ennahda movement youth leader, interviewed by Stig Jarle Hansen, June 5, 2014.

75 Osama Hamdan, top representative of Hamas in Lebanon, interviewed by Stig Jarle Hansen, Pretoria, South Africa, January 12, 2011; and Stig Jarle Hansen Skype interview with Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas, May 14, 2015.

Tunisian Islamic traditions, and by the legal traditions of the University of Ez-Zitouna, established as early as 737 C.E.⁷⁶

Many members of Tablighi Jamaat participated in Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya, which had its first congress in August 1979 and was a predecessor to Ennahda. One of the first ideological debates within Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya mirrored a significant, centuries-long debate within Islam that originated in the medieval battle between the rationalist Mu'tazila tradition and the thirteenth century Islamic philosophical tradition of Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers. The latter rejected the Mu'tazila claim that scriptures had to be understood by the use of reason. In its early days, Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya was in general closer to the Mu'tazila node, stressing the principle of *Al-Aqlannia*, the use of rationality in applying text to rules stipulating how to behave. However, Ghannouchi and the circle around him felt that one of the founders of Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya, Hmida Ennaifer, went too far, particularly in praising the Bourguiba dictatorship for streamlining the Tunisian educational system according to rationalist principles. Ghannouchi viewed this as secularism. The group around Ennaifer also criticized the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood for adopting strategies not suitable for Tunisia. Ghannouchi felt that Ennaifer and his followers took their critique too far, although he also believed that the Egyptian Brotherhood focused too much on doctrine in comparison to practical experience. In the end a group, the Progressive Islamists, broke away from Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya.⁷⁷

Future Ennahda members who were a part of the Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya became more sympathetic to the left after the so-called 1978 "workers revolt," in which leftists and unions surprised the Islamists with the vigor of their popular protests against the Bourguiba regime. The Islamists then decided to connect with left-wing activists by finding a common denominator, namely social justice and workers' rights. In fact, in several speeches at the time Ghannouchi went quite far in arguing for collective ownership.

76 Monica Marks and Sayida Ounissi, "Ennahda from Within: Islamists or 'Muslim Democrats?'" (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, March 23, 2016), <https://www.brookings.edu/research/ennahda-from-within-islamists-or-muslim-democrats-a-conversation/>.

77 As far as the writer is aware, the nature and focus of this first debate that led to fragmentation was unique among Brotherhood-affiliated organizations.

He based this argument on the assertion that Tunisia was land captured in conquest by the *ummah*, and thus belonged to the *ummah* as a whole.⁷⁸

Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya was initially critical of Bourguiba's efforts to modernize gender relations in Tunisia, including his attack on polygamy. Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya also struggled against female education.⁷⁹ This was to change; Ennahda is one of the more liberal actors among Sunni Islamists in the world today. Azzam Tamimi points to influence from Al-Turabi and the Sudanese Brotherhood. What is certain is that Ghannouchi attacked the older view on gender in the party in a series of speeches. Ghannouchi declared that discrimination was not an Islamic duty, and that women had held an undeserved marginal role in societies, with little power. Moreover, Ghannouchi asserted that women were now to be encouraged to reach the highest position in society and the highest level of education.⁸⁰ This moderation increased female membership in the organization. Afifa Makhoul joined, becoming one of the more prominent female Ennahda leaders. Further, in July 1988 the party accepted the more secular personal affairs law. It is not entirely clear that the party's views on gender were fully settled after the above debate. In 2012, gender debates recurred when Ennahda was attacked by the political opposition over its description of the relationship between the genders in various draft laws, where women were said to be "complementary" rather than "equal" to males. Ennahda then changed this wording.⁸¹

These developments were also influenced by events in Tunisian society as a whole. Bourguiba and Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali, who replaced Bourguiba after a coup in 1987, both seemingly democratized and prepared for free multi-party elections, but then later cracked down on the new, more open opposition. In 1981, Bourguiba allowed political organizations to form. Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya transformed itself into a political party, formally declaring its status on June 6, 1981 and electing a *shura* council. Its manifesto committed the movement, now called the Islamic Tendency

78 Azzam S. Tamimi, *Rashid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 74.

79 Ibid., p. 75.

80 Ibid., p. 76.

81 Faisal Al Yafai, "A Losing Battle as Ennahda Tries to Define Tunisian Women's Role," *National*, August 3, 2012, <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/a-losing-battle-as-ennahda-tries-to-define-tunisian-womens-role>.

Movement, or Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) in French, to the democratic rotation of power and to pluralism. The party drew upon the ideas of Algerian philosopher Malik Bennabi, who claimed that democracy was an intrinsic part of the rule of the four righteous caliphs. Weakened by the Umayyad's successful rebellion, democracy was nevertheless argued to have been intrinsic to Islam as a religion.⁸² This led to clashes in the early 1980s with, for example, the leader of the Egyptian Brotherhood, Umar Al-Tilmisani, who believed that a political formation based on the Brotherhood might fragment Muslims.

Openness and political participation were, however, to have dramatically negative consequences for MTI. Many members were arrested, some several times. However, on November 7, 1987, Ben Ali removed Bourguiba. A new atmosphere emerged, and MTI again changed its name, to Hizb Al Nahda, dropping the reference to Islam in the party law. Again, the Islamists hoped for a democratization of Tunisia; again, they were to be disappointed. The start of Ben Ali's rule was promising, and Hizb Al Nahda (the future Ennahda) was allowed to set up a student union and participate in the Tunisian High Islamic Council.⁸³ However, by the summer of 1987, Ben Ali had cracked down on the democratic opposition. In the manipulated 1989 election, Ennahda managed to do quite well, leading Ben Ali to persecute the party even more ruthlessly.⁸⁴ By 1991, most of the leaders of the party were either in prison or in exile. In 2006 and 2007, Ben Ali released many of Ennahda's leaders, but they remained under surveillance, and ideological discussions had to be limited.⁸⁵

In December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid as a protest against the regime of Ben Ali. Large demonstrations followed. After Ben Ali's flight from Tunisia on January 14, 2011, a transitional government took power in Tunis and appointed an interim president, Fouad Mebazaa, the following day. Ennahda did not have a direct role in the early demonstrations against the regime, but on January 30, a plane with the most prominent Ennahda leaders landed in Tunisia, and Ennahda

82 Ibid.

83 King, "The Future of Tunisian Islamism."

84 Monica L. Marks, "Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution" (Doha, Qatar: Brookings Doha Center, 2014), pp. 10–12.

85 Ibid., p. 12.

became the most important oppositional force in the country. In the Tunisian Constituent Assembly election of October 23, 2011, Ennahda won a convincing victory with 37 percent of the vote, the first large electoral victory of any Brotherhood-linked party in the world, and a much more convincing victory than, for example, that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012.

Once in power, Ennahda confronted considerable problems with the Tunisian economy, as the tourist industry had declined after the Arab Spring. Ennahda also found itself facing distrust over its alleged Islamist stances. For instance, the movie *Persepolis* sparked demonstrations in Tunis because of what some viewed as its blasphemy. Ennahda was critical of the movie, but also critical of violent actions. Ennahda's handling of the *Persepolis* incident was typical for the party, which searched for a path between giving up conservative items on its agenda and creating conflict with secular forces. Ennahda eventually proved its moderation through its actions.

A key opponent to Ennahda was the Nidaa Tunis (Tunisia Appeal) party, created in 2012 as a coalition of Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally, secular leftists, progressive liberals, and Destourians (followers of Habib Bourguiba), with many supporters in the Tunisian General Labor Union and the National Employers' Union. In one sense, the Nidaa Tunis party formed to protect the secularist traditions of Tunisia, which it saw Ennahda as threatening. Yet Ennahda made no move to ban followers of Ben Ali from politics.

A caretaker government was created to last until the 2014 election. Ennahda also demonstrated its commitment to moderation in its interaction with the Salafists. Ennahda initially saw the Nidaa Tunis party as a product of the secular fundamentalism of the *ancien régime* (meaning the prosecution of religiously motivated political activists). Ennahda leaders believed that oppression had hindered teens from getting information about Islam within Tunisia, forcing them to look to the Islamist ideologies of the Gulf countries.⁸⁶ However, over time Ennahda took a stronger stance against the Salafists.⁸⁷

86 Ibid., pp. 10–12.

87 Ibid.

Although Ennahda lost the 2014 election, ruptures in the Nidaa Tunis party ensured that Ennahda gained the largest group in parliament by 2016. Ennahda also gained ministers in the new government formed after the 2016 election.

Throughout our research project, Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the Middle East expressed admiration for Ennahda and its political strategy in interviews. It is possible to claim that the Egyptian Brotherhood's failures forced Ennahda into moderation. This seems unlikely, however, as Ennahda, by allowing supporters of the *ancien régime* to participate in post-Ben Ali politics, engaged in an alliance with secular parties, even before the fall of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, Ennahda has shown moderation in its ideological publications from the mid-1990s until the present day, diverting from the Egyptian Brotherhood's path. Ennahda adopted a liberal stance on apostasy (asserting that it should not be punished in this life), promoted gender equality, and kept its focus on Tunisia, although expressing sympathy with the plights of other Brotherhood organizations. Ennahda's 2016 declaration that it would separate *dawa* from politics and develop into a "Muslim party" rather than an Islamist one was thus unsurprising. The declaration may have alienated some of Ennahda's followers in other countries, but the organization's successes have drawn attention, and it remains the most visible beacon and model for Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, having outcompeted the Egyptian Brotherhood.

The Brotherhood Movement and Gender

Ida Bary

The position of women in Muslim Brotherhood movement derives in part from the thoughts of Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Al-Banna argued that the role of women was to support the Brotherhood. Thus, he did not establish the Sisterhood section until 1933, five years after he founded the Muslim Brotherhood.⁸⁸ Al-Banna argued that Islam recognized women as having specific rights, and he employed them for political purposes, for example to spread propaganda. However, there was also a double standard in Al-Banna's work: he favored limiting women's education, restricting their roles to those of mother and wife. He emphasized that women did not need to study foreign languages or technical sciences. Furthermore, he insisted that women needed only a cursory knowledge of laws and rights.⁸⁹ In this sense, Al-Banna advocated for a role-based empowerment of women, recommending that they focus on specific tasks. They should engage in the activities that society and Islam prescribed for them. Because of his focus on families as the nucleus of the new Islamic society, Al-Banna saw women's roles as wives and mothers as important.

The Egyptian Brotherhood did develop powerful female role models, the most famous of these being Zainab Al-Ghazali. Arguing against what she saw as Westernization and a rejection of Islam among Egyptians, she established the Jama'at al-Sayyidaat al-Muslimat, or Muslim Ladies Association (MLA) in 1936. Through the MLA, Al-Ghazali encouraged women to adopt religion as a means of guiding personal life and as a tool of advancement. Although the MLA was independent from the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Ghazali herself was strongly affiliated with the Brotherhood as the supervisor of the women's section of the organization. Al-Ghazali emphasized the duality of the female role. On the one hand, a woman served in the role of *mujahida*—an outspoken fighter in the path of God who thrived in the male-dominated scene of politics and religious activism. On the other hand, a woman served

88 Hasan Al-Banna, "Letter to a Muslim Student" (Leicester, U.K., and London: Islamic Foundation/FOSIS, 1995).

89

Ibid.

in the roles of mother and wife.⁹⁰ Al-Ghazali demanded respect and rights for women within Islam, and she strongly believed that feminist goals could be achieved through Islam. Her philosophy was influenced by Qutb, who in his book, *Al-Adalah Al-Ejtemaeyya Fe Al- Islam* [Social justice in Islam], explained that Islam grants women equality with men. “Islam guarantees equality between men and women in religion, possessions, and gains.”⁹¹ However, Qutb also criticized women who worked outside the home, asserting that a woman’s work could sacrifice the psychological health of her children for an increase in her income. Qutb supported women working outside the home only if they kept a balance between their “duties” in their homes and work.⁹² Based on Qutb’s book, Zainab Al-Ghazali built her argument as a spokeswoman for the Islamic Movement.

Al-Ghazali had a large symbolic value, but she failed to secure more than a bridgehead for the Muslim Sisterhood within the Brotherhood movement. Despite the Brotherhood’s claim that women were allowed to apply for any position in the political system of a state, the position of *al-Imama-al-Kubra* (caliph) is still reserved for men. Additionally, no woman has ever been part of any of the two main leadership structures of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the Shura Council and the Guidance Bureau.

The Arab Spring led to changes in women’s role within the Brotherhood. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood founded the Freedom and Justice Party in April 2011, and the Muslim Sisterhood became active in the new party. However, the Sisterhood remained a separate entity from the Brotherhood, which controlled the party. In other words, the women’s division of the Muslim Brotherhood could be described as an organized entity but not as an integrated part of the organizational structure; women were the “Shadow Brotherhood.” It should be noted that the Sisterhood’s subordinate role could have been prompted by Egyptian culture traditionally holding conservative expectations for female roles in society. After the fall of the Morsi regime, this tendency was strengthened as Brotherhood members argued that women had to be sheltered from public persecution.

90 Pauline Lewis, “Zainab al-Ghazali: Pioneer of Islamist Feminism,” *Michigan Journal of History*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Winter 2007), pp. 1–47.

91 Sayyid Qutb, *Al-Adalah Al-Ejtemaeyya Fe Al- Islam* [Social justice in Islam], No. 10 (Cairo: Dar Al-Shouroq, 1993).

92 Sayyid Qutb, *Fi Zilal Al-Ouran* [In the shade of the Quran] (Cairo: Dar Al-Shouroq, 2002).

Women remain barred from the most important positions within the Brotherhood (though not within affiliated political parties).

Ennahda's approach to gender roles contrasts with that of the Egyptian Brotherhood. Ennahda supported female participation in politics soon after the Arab Spring; the party nominated 49 women for the election in 2012, 42 of whom were elected and became members of the Constituent Assembly.⁹³ Some accused the party of instrumentalism, asserting that it nominated female candidates because female voters were key to electoral victory. As noted previously, however, Ennahda diverged from the Egyptian Brotherhood well before the Arab Spring, being influenced by Turabist traditions. In the 2000 book *Almara'a bain Al-Quraan wa waqe'e Al-muslemeen* [Woman between Quran and the Muslim's reality], Ghannouchi asserted that political participation was a fundamental right for Muslim women.⁹⁴ As long as women were educated and had the knowledge to advise others, he claimed, they could be members of the Shura Council. For Ennahda, a female head of state is not problematic, nor is a female head of the party.⁹⁵ Ghannouchi does state that a woman would not be permitted to be caliph, but he defines a caliph as the combined religious and political leader in the resurrected caliphate, when the Muslim countries are one nation. However, no caliphate exists at the present time.

As noted previously, Ghannouchi was influenced by Al-Turabi, who suffered much criticism from Muslim religious scholars because of his opinions regarding women. Al-Turabi permitted women to be *imams*.⁹⁶ Other Muslim scholars, such as Yousef Al-Qararadwi, opposed this. Further, as noted previously, Al-Turabi permitted the marriage of Muslim women to Christian and Jewish men, which is controversial among Muslims. Al-Turabi asserted that the witness of a Muslim woman is the

93 Monika Marks, "Women's Rights before and after the Revolution," in Nouri Gana, ed., *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 224–251.

94 Ida Bary, "Women's Political Participation in Muslim Brotherhood between the Hammer of Ambiguity and the Anvil of Inclusion-Moderation: The Case of Egypt and Tunisia," master's thesis, NMBU, 2016.

95 Ibid.

96 "Imam" is the Arabic word for an Islamic leadership position. It is most commonly used as the title of a worship leader of a mosque and Muslim community among Sunni Muslims.

same as the witness of a Muslim man in court cases,⁹⁷ which apparently contradicted the following verse in the Quran: “O you who have believed, when you contract a debt for a specified term, write it down....And bring two witnesses from among your men. And if there are not two men [available], then a man and two women from those whom you accept as witnesses—so that if one of the women errs, then the other can remind her.”⁹⁸ Al-Turabi justified his argument by pointing out that during the era of the Prophet Mohammad, women had no experience in trade and finance, and therefore the witness of two women was needed to replace that of one man. Al-Turabi’s innovative approach to gender derived from two sources: a belief in using the human mind to draw on religious heritage, and a belief that the Quran should be the ultimate source of legislation.⁹⁹ Ghannouchi walked in the footsteps of Al-Turabi, believing that women and men are alike and equal.¹⁰⁰

There are still barriers to the entry of women into Tunisian politics. Tunisian culture has patriarchal traits, albeit not as strong as those of Eastern Arab culture. One of the serious obstacles preventing women from being politically active is the timing of the meetings of the assembly. Many meetings take place in the evening, making it difficult for women with children to attend, as they have family obligations in the evenings. Another obstacle is the lack of female political role models. Yet Ennahda suggests an alternative to the more conservative views of many members of the Egyptian Brotherhood. Other Muslim Brotherhood-inspired movements can choose which of these two models to follow.

97 Mohammad Taha Albashir, “Al-Turabi’s Thoughts between the Tradition and Renovation,” television interview, Al Jazeera, March 8, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews>.

98 Quran 1:282.

99 Albashir, “Al-Turabi’s Thoughts between the Tradition and Renovation.”

100 Rached Ghannouchi, *Almara’a bain Al-Quraan wa waqe’e Al-muslemeen* [Woman between Quran and the Muslim’s reality] (London : Al-Markaz Al-Maghāribī lil-Buḥūth wa-Al-Tarjamah, 2000).

Conclusions: Where Is the Field Moving?

Stig Jarle Hansen

The Muslim Brotherhood movement shows diversity and fragmentation. Its three nodes offer a variety of opinions, some of which conflict with global human rights standards and some of which promote such standards. In the past, the question has often been whether or not to engage Muslim Brotherhood organizations in discussion. The questions should instead be: What should be discussed? Who should one talk to, given that the movement is so broad? Any actor interacting with Brotherhood movements can find allies who agree with it on certain issues.

It is notable that the successful Brotherhood-affiliated movements now seem committed democracy; indeed, most are. However, two different approaches to democracy exist within the Brotherhood. The first is a consensus-based approach, where the Brotherhood in question sacrifices some influence in the short term to create trust with other political groups. The second is a “winner takes all” approach, where the Brotherhood uses democratic victories to achieve domination, a model that is democratically legitimate, but unwise. The latter approach cannot ensure peace in phases of political transition. By contrast, a consensus-based approach seems to guarantee the Brotherhood access to power and influence over time. Promoting such an approach should perhaps be a major target for those interacting with the Brotherhood. Western democracies’ lack of support for ousted democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood actors has complicated the consensus-based approach, however. One thing is for certain: the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideologies will remain a significant political force.



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