The Russian Debate on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Vehicles

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PREFACE

General policy guidelines and specific steps to address problems concerning the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles, as well as related debates in the context of Russian-U.S. relations, feature prominently in joint declarations and statements made by the Russian and U.S. presidents, other government officials, as well as in general agreements and unilaterally adopted documents, and in the findings, conferences, symposiums and workshops of government and nongovernmental organizations. Over the recent years, WMD nonproliferation has been a focal issue for the Russian scientific community.

In Russia, nonproliferation issues are primarily studied by the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences; specifically, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the Institute of Europe, the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies, the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute of the Far East, and the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies. The leading nongovernmental organizations involved in this research are Russia's Center of Political Studies, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; the Carnegie Moscow Center; Center for Disarmament, Energy and Ecology of the Moscow Institute of Physical Engineering; the Scientists' Committee for Global Security; Center of Export Control Problems; Center of Strategic Nuclear Forces Problems, and a number of other organizations.

Research is conducted and expert assessments are made in cooperation with organizations in the United States such as the National Academy of Sciences, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, the Simpson Center for the

Humanities, and others. The First and Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conferences, organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center) in 2000 and 2003, as well as the Symposium on U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation organized under the NTI program and held by the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow in October 2002, were good illustrations of this cooperation. All those events were attended by senior state officials and leading scientists from Russia, the United States, and other countries.

The following is an overview of Russian and U.S. policies on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, as implemented by the top political leaderships over recent years, integrated with comments from representatives of leading Russian government and nongovernmental agencies as well as the expert community.

INTRODUCTION

In the first paragraphs of their declaration at the Evian Summit in early June 2003, the G8 leaders stated, "We recognize that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security."[1]

Three weeks later in a BBC interview, Russian President Vladimir Putin elaborated: "If you consider the major threat of the 21st century, I think it is the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction."[2] At the UN General Assembly session on September 26, 2003, he once again pointed to the growing risk of WMD proliferation.

Russia has displayed a consistent approach to the problem of WMD proliferation, as demonstrated by ongoing discussions within the expert community and, above all, in Russia's strict compliance with its commitments under the treaties and agreements on the nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technologies.

Russian representatives in various international organizations have been emphasizing that Russia, unlike the United States, has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It also proposed—much earlier than the United States—substantial cuts in strategic offensive weapons, which are a core component of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Russian analysts have reiterated this country's invariable and strict compliance with the spirit of

[1] "Nonproliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction," Declaration of the Group of Eight Industrialized Nations, Official Bulletin of the Department for Information and Mass Media of the Russian Foreign Ministry, June 5, 2003.
[2] President Vladimir Putin's interview, www.newsru.com, June 26, 2003.

the NPT in the extremely adverse environment that emerged following the breakup of the USSR., and the resulting long-drawn economic crisis.[3]

New Russia has displayed an unequivocal attitude to nuclear disarmament issues, although from exceptionally close attention to nonproliferation matters to periods when this attention became somewhat more relaxed, there have been some ups and downs. This unambiguous and consistent attitude should be largely attributed to the consensus of the main social and political forces in Russia on these issues.

Meanwhile, Russian analysts assert that U.S. President George W. Bush has noticeably eased his pressure for an all-out, uncompromising struggle against WMD proliferation. This may be evidence of certain inconveniences he is experiencing in the wake of the United States' futile attempts to unearth such weapons in Iraq. Yet as Director of the Carnegie Endowment's Nonproliferation Project Joseph Cirincione notes, Washington continues to regard the risks of WMD proliferation as extremely serious.[4]

Today the degree of such threats is higher than ever before. The Bush administration seemingly doubts the efficiency of the nonproliferation regime: Against the backdrop of significant efforts to establish the regime, the results are hardly tangible. This may explain why the U.S. administration has opted to resort to the preemptive use of force. Speaking about U.S. priorities with regard to budget allocations, Cirincione showed that the counterproliferation program has indisputably become the leading item in budget allocations—it now totals $8 billion, in contrast to $1.5 billion earmarked for nonproliferation programs.[5]

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[3] Vladimir Orlov, Roland Timirbayev, and Anton Khlopkov, "The Problems of Nuclear Nonproliferation in Russian-American Relations," PIR Center, Moscow, 2001.
[4] Joseph Cirincione, "Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Problems and Perspectives," Report at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 2003, Moscow.
[5] Ibid.

Moscow has also developed new trends toward counterproliferation. Signs of this were seen at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference held September 18-20, 2003. Russian presidential aide for strategic stability Marshal Igor Sergeev pointed to what he described as "an erosion of government control in some even relatively stable countries." Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, speaking at a major conference of leading Defense Ministry officials attended by President Vladimir Putin, contemplated the theoretical possibility of non-nuclear preemptive strikes.[6]

All these factors are indicative of Moscow's and Washington's slow but steady drifting in their nonproliferation policies away from control over the observance of existing regimes toward practical steps to prevent the looming crisis in these regimes.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

The NPT has failed to prevent nuclear arms from spreading "horizontally." India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear capabilities. Former Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Arbatov recalls this happening at a time when Russia and the United States were stalled over the issue of their strategic offensive arms reductions. He argues that they both must now claim responsibility for letting membership into the nuclear club grow.[7] Russian leadership under then President Boris Yeltsin is to blame for a long period when there was no progress in strategic arms reductions. The State Duma delayed the ratification of the Strategic Arms and Reduction Treaty (START-2) for seven years. The last permissible deadline was 1997,

[6] "Urgent Tasks in the Development of the Russian Armed Forces," Report by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov at an Expanded Session of Top Officials of the Russian Defense Ministry, October 2, 2003, Moscow.
[7] Alexei Arbatov, "Nuclear Armaments in the Contemporary World and Russia's Security," *Strategic Stability*, No. 1 (2002), Moscow.

when Russia and the United States signed agreements in New York that provided for extending the period of arms reductions under START-2 to five years (this arrangement benefited Russia a great deal), as well as for drawing a line between strategic and non-strategic anti-missile defenses. Had the State Duma ratified START-2 then, U.S. legislators would have found it far more difficult to object to the package of New York agreements. None of this ever happened. Opposition factions in the State Duma were firmly against ratification. Odd as it may seem, their resistance was backed by some top executive officials; these included former Russian Defense Minister (until May 1997) Army General Igor Rodionov, who said that START-2, signed by his direct superior, Commander-in-Chief Boris Yeltsin, was "criminal and treacherous in nature." It was with the appointment of Igor Sergeev as defense minister that consistent pressure was exerted on the State Duma in support of START-2 ratification. President Putin's intervention proved a decisive contribution to the ratification. Alas, when this eventually happened in 2001, it was already too late—not only to put START-2 into effect, but also to negotiate START-3 and upgrade the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Initially, Moscow's position on the ABM issue was firm. At the Sixth NPT Review Conference held in New York in April-May 2000, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that the observance of the ABM Treaty without any modifications was a mandatory condition for further talks on nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NNT. In the meantime, the United States had shaped a nuclear policy that provided for termination of the ABM treaty and a refusal to conclude any new START treaties.

Russia's leading nonproliferation analysts Vladimir Orlov, Roland Timerbayev, and Anton Khlopkov maintain:

> Russian-U.S. relations with regard to nonproliferation at this stage are marked by the prevalence of squabbles (primarily concerning Russia's exports to Iran) over the

> discussions about strategic approaches to this issue. Russia and the United States eventually sank into the quick sand of details and failed to provide an adequate response to such alarming challenges to the nonproliferation regime as nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998. They have so far failed to find effective, mutually acceptable instruments to prevent the growth of missile technology proliferation or end the stalemate at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Nor have they been able to reinforce the fragile progress in their attempts to elaborate a convention that would outlaw the production of fissile material for nuclear arms.[8]

It has been commonly recognized that for the NPT to remain effective, it is more important to even unilaterally reduce strategic offensive arms than it is for the United States and Russia to conclude treaties. Analysts have been quoting from the agreement that five nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) made in early May 2000—to take further unilateral measures to reduce their nuclear arsenals.[9] Such unilateral moves are crucial for keeping the NPT operable at a time when bilateral or multilateral negotiations have stalled.

In this sense, the Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) may be regarded as a treaty in its original meaning only with certain reservations because the Russian and U.S. presidents had put their signatures to unilateral strategic arms reduction plans long before the new treaty was ready for signing. Nevertheless, it has been continuously emphasized that SORT is a mandatory—albeit insufficient—condition for the NPT to remain active.[10]

Non-strategic nuclear arms reductions are no less important for attaining this goal. Official statistics about the number of non-strategic warheads Russia and the United States possess are not available. Unofficial statistics on the types and overall number of warheads vary

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[8] Orlov, et al., "The Problems of Nuclear Nonproliferation in Russian-American Relations."
[9] NTP Conference documents, 2000/01.
[10] Orlav, et al., "The Problems of Nuclear Nonproliferation in Russian-American Relations."

considerably. In 1991, the USSR was said to have 15,000-21,000 such warheads and the United States, around 10,000. Under the 1991 initiatives, the nuclear warheads were removed from operational status and transferred to central storage facilities. According to the same sources, Russia has now 3,500-3,800 warheads, and the United States has 1,100-1,670 non-strategic nuclear warheads.[11]

Non-strategic nuclear arms control issues have been raised repeatedly both before the breakup of the USSR and, of late, during official negotiations, consultations of varying stature, and in discussions by experts. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton Carter even proposed that a future Russian-U.S. strategic arms reduction treaty should also include non-strategic warheads so that either party would be able to independently decide on how many strategic offensive arms and non-strategic nuclear warheads it should have under general limitations. Yet, non-strategic nuclear arms control would invariably encounter obstacles incommensurate with those that the sides had surmounted in the process of START negotiations.

The main obstacle is the complexity of exercising non-strategic nuclear arms control. The STARTs are based on regulations of counting and control, above all, of the number of delivery vehicles with warheads deployed in specific areas. With non-strategic weapons, this rule is hardly workable since the delivery vehicles employed in this case are primarily dual-use: they have no distinguishing features or permanent locations.[12]

The issue of non-strategic nuclear arms control was last brought to a focus during the meeting of the U.S. and Russian presidents in Helsinki in 1997. Ever since, the differences over

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[11] Yuri Fedorov, "Sub-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Russia's Security Interests," PIR Study Paper No. 16 (2001), Moscow; and *SIPRI Yearbook, 2002: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (Moscow: Nauka, 2003).

[12] Yuri Fyodorov, "Sub-Strategic Nuclear Armaments and Russia's Security Interests."

the ABM Treaty have kept the issue suspended, although Moscow has never shown reluctance to continue the dialogue. In December 2000, then Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev said, "As far as tactical nuclear arms are concerned, we have no intention to alter the position that was stipulated by the Joint U.S.-Russian Helsinki Summit Statement made on March 21, 1997. In the context of the START-3 negotiations we are prepared—and I would like to particularly emphasize this point—to consider measures regarding these weapons as a separate issue."[13]

Russian defense and foreign ministry officials have said more than once that the main obstacle to non-strategic nuclear arms control remains the U.S. nuclear arms deployed in Europe. Russian analysts have also pointed to the fact that the United States is the only country that has nuclear arms deployed in other countries, with the safety of those arms being much lower than that of nuclear arms located on the territory of the United States.[14]

Over a brief period of time, the arguments for preserving the U.S. non-strategic nuclear arms in Europe underwent considerable transformation, which did not go unnoticed for Russia. In 1994, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch explained this transformation by arguing that, due to the economic crisis and changes in domestic policy, Russia would hardly bring back its conventional weapons to the level of the Cold War period; its return to a more aggressive nuclear policy would be less costly. So, if the situation in Russia deteriorated, the U.S. was most likely to counter a nuclear threat.[15]

In 2001, new arguments emerged regarding the risk of proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Jan Lodal

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[13] Interview with the Russian Defense Minister, Marshal Igor Sergeyev. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, December 15, 2000.
[14] A. Borisenko and L. Chumachenko, "Problems of and Prospects for the Negotiations on Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *Yaderny Kontrol*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2002).
[15] John Deutch, comments at press conference, news released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, September 22, 1994, p. 7.

stated at that time that plans for employing nuclear weapons were centered around the policy of deterrence against the use of chemical and biological weapons. There was evidence, he said, that such a strategy had proven effective: During the Gulf War the threat of a nuclear retribution forced Saddam Hussein to refrain from using chemical and biological warheads on SCUD missiles.[16] Various U.S. studies have also asserted that the U.S. nuclear arms in Europe prevent Germany and Turkey from going nuclear; if the situation in Europe makes a sudden turn for the worse, these countries will be unable to fully rely on nuclear guarantees from France and Britain.

It is worth noting that such policies toward non-strategic nuclear arms have met with more elaborate criticism in the United States than in Russia. Criticism stems from the belief that, due to the end of the Cold War, non-strategic nuclear arms have lost their relevance. In the event of a hypothetical worsening of the situation in Europe the risk of nuclear arms being used against U.S. allies will be fully outweighed by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, and also by French and British nuclear forces.

Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies William Potter believes that the withdrawal of U.S. tactical weapons from Europe will in no way weaken U.S. guarantees. On the contrary, this measure will enhance the deterrence effect, as provocative weapons will be removed from the region, thereby widening the gap between conventional and nuclear armaments.[17]

Efforts to strengthen the NPT may suffer a considerable setback from a relatively new trend in the U.S. nuclear policy, which is currently the focus of discussion by Russian government officials and analysts.[18] It concerns the research and development (R&D) efforts to

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[16] Ibid, p. 25.
[17] Frank von Hippel, "Paring down the arsenal," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May/June 1997), p. 13.
[18] "U.S. Seeking to See the Whole World Through Nuclear Sight," www.strana.ru, June 4, 2003.

create low- and extra low-yield nuclear warheads capable of piercing soil, concrete, and rock structures to destroy WMD storage facilities in so-called ”rogue states” where there is a threat of WMD deployment against the United States or any of its allies. Opinions have been voiced in the United States about the possible termination of the 1994 law banning the creation of nuclear warheads with yields under five kilotons. Such low-yield warheads would actually erase the borderline between nuclear and conventional arms. For example, Sandia Laboratories Director C. Paul Robinson said in March 2000 that the yields of nuclear armaments left over from the Cold War are too high for addressing the deterrence requirements of a multipolar, widely proliferated world.[19]

The lack of advanced decisions and transparency in matters concerning Russian and U.S. non-strategic nuclear arms reductions, as well as the presence of this class of U.S. weapons in Europe, will most probably remain on the agenda at all levels for quite a long while. This factor cannot facilitate nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The potential emergence of extra low-yield piercing warheads will cause further drifts in the positions of the countries involved, “even though the point at issue is not yet the creation, but merely research and development of such weapons,” as Academician Roald Sagdeyev said in a commentary on Russia’s ORT TV channel in September 2003.

The expert communities in Russia and the United States share an understanding that the current threats to the NPT are rooted in the uncertainty over the nuclear status of Iran and North Korea. Besides, there is evidence that Saudi Arabia may seek to acquire a nuclear capability. The news has been leaked to the press that Saudi Arabia is prepared to buy nuclear warheads, and this possibility looks quite realistic. Some analysts maintain that Saudi Arabia will never agree to

[19] Robert N. Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons,” *FAS Public Interest Report*, Vol. 1 (2001).

remain without nuclear potential. Although that country does not regard Iran—its former opponent—as a direct threat, the possibility of Iran going nuclear together with Israel is intolerable for its leadership. Most experts interviewed on the sidelines of the Second Moscow Nonproliferation Conference shared this view. If Saudi Arabia's friendly relations with Washington are disrupted, Saudi Arabia will not be able to stay without a nuclear umbrella. Relations with the United States have been deteriorating ever since September 11, 2001. Fifteen of the nineteen terrorists who attacked New York and Washington were Saudi subjects. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Feisal admits that, "the growing misapprehension of his country by the U.S. may create an unsurpassable abyss in the relations between the two countries."[20]

Saudi Arabia may choose to take any of the three likely lines of action: acquire its own nuclear arms as a means of deterrence; establish relations of alliance with a nuclear power that would undertake to provide "nuclear guarantees" to Saudi Arabia; or try to conclude a regional agreement declaring the Middle East a nuclear weapon-free zone.

The first option looks most probable. Riyadh has long contemplated the creation of a nuclear missile potential. In 1998, Saudi Arabia purchased from China medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and reaching any target in the Middle East. Analysts say the Saudis are not likely to develop nuclear arms on their own. When North Korea launched a nuclear arms development program, Saudi Arabia was prepared to finance Pyongyang's efforts. The Saudis may also count on assistance from Pakistan, which is viewed as the main source of nuclear technology for both North Korea and Iran. In late October 2003, it was disclosed that

[20] "Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?" *Le Temps*, September 19, 2003.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had concluded a secret agreement on "nuclear cooperation" that would provide the Saudis with nuclear weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil.[21]

Speaking of the reasons behind this cooperation, the *Washington Times* noted:

> Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia see a world that is moving from non-proliferation to proliferation of nuclear weapons…. The Saudi rulers, who are Sunni Muslims, are believed to have concluded that nothing will deter the Shiite Muslims, who rule Iran, from continuing their quest for a nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan, meanwhile, is concerned about a recent arms agreement between India, its nuclear archrival, and Israel, a long-time nuclear power. To counter what Pakistani and Saudi leaders regard as multiple regional threats, the two countries have decided to quietly move ahead with an exchange of free or cheap Saudi oil for Pakistani nuclear know-how.[22]

With regards to Iran, Russia and the United States unanimously agree that it must not be permitted to acquire a nuclear capability. Their positions differ, however, with regard to Russian-Iranian cooperation in commercial nuclear energy programs and the sale of conventional weapons.

As has often been noted by Russian analysts, no meeting between Russian and U.S. presidents, prime ministers or vice-presidents can do without the Iranian issue coming up. The general feeling is that differences over Iran's nuclear programs cannot be eliminated in principle: now and then controversies will flare up and die down. Even if Iran signs the IAEA Additional Protocol and pledges to have no full nuclear fuel cycle of its own, or grants IAEA inspectors permission to visit any Iranian nuclear facility, these actions will not be sufficient to dispel suspicions or settle controversies. These moves can put a strong argument in Russia's hands if it

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[21] "Pakistan Will Help Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons," October 21, 2003, 17:16, www.newsru.com, and "Islamabad Will Provide Riyadh with a Nuclear Bomb to Defend Oil," *The Washington Times*, October 22, 2003.
[22] "Islamabad Will Provide Riyadh with a Nuclear Bomb to Defend Oil."

decides to build more than one reactor in Bushehr, but they can hardly help ease the intensity of U.S. protests.

Speaking about Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear sphere and the obstacles to the negotiations on the return of spent nuclear fuel from Iran, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said that Iran lacks sufficient experience in handling spent nuclear fuel. In his opinion, the existing problems with concluding a Russian-Iranian agreement on the return of spent fuel are not of a bureaucratic, but rather of a "scientific research" nature.[23]

It is crystal-clear that Iran's refusal to cooperate would have dealt a blow to President Vladimir Putin's prestige domestically and internationally, a blow that would have been even more powerful than a projected loss of economic benefits. The U.S. administration ignores this factor; it argues that Iran's nuclear program brings the country closer to a nuclear weapons capability.

In Russia, too, there has been growing awareness that Iran has strong incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Russian specialists, when interviewed upon their return from the Bushehr facility construction site, agreed that one of Iran's aims was to master skills to carry out a military nuclear program.[24]

Work is well underway in Iran to create what may eventually prove to be the region's most powerful missile potential, enabling Iran to annually produce some 100 ballistic missiles of different types. The fact that missile programs are pegged to the development of weapons of mass destruction is fairly obvious to experts, and relevant not only to Iran.

Ballistic missiles feature low target accuracy, particularly at long ranges, so their use with conventional warheads is not cost-efficient. Even with payloads of 500 to 1,000 kg and accuracy

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[23] Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 19-20, 2003, www.carnegie.ru/en/news/67475.htm.
[24] Orlov, et al., 2001.

ranging several kilometers, missiles carrying conventional warheads are primarily intended for use against large targets taking up vast areas (cities)—mainly to produce a psychological effect on the population. The record of World War II provides perfect proof: thousands of V-2s launched against Britain were unable to significantly change the course of combat operations.

Even advanced U.S. and Russian missiles, which have a much higher accuracy, are not regarded as delivery vehicles for conventional warheads. Effective use of ballistic missiles can be ensured only by equipping them with WMD warheads, above all nuclear ones. This is third world countries' main incentive for acquiring nuclear arms. Therefore, all attempts by countries with "insecure regimes" to increase the range of ballistic missiles raises concern in the expert communities of Russia, the United States, and other countries.

All the above factors have a direct bearing on Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear arms and explain the worries of U.S. administration officials and some Russian analysts. For example, a leading Russian politician Andrey Kokoshin, in his statement at a symposium held by the Nuclear Threat Initiative program in Moscow on October 23-25, 2002, said that Russia was probably underestimating the risk of proliferation posed by Iran and North Korea. The United States made serious mistakes, too, Kokoshin said. Leaks of nuclear technology to Iran from Western countries were as serious, or even more serious, as those from Russia.[25]

U.S. officials are still more categorical. U.S. Department of State spokesman Philip Ricker said the United States has no doubts that Iran's commercial programs for developing the national energy sector mask its efforts to build a nuclear bomb.[26]

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[25] Strengthening the U.S.–Russian Partnership for Nuclear Threat Initiative, hosted by the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, October 23-25, 2002.

[26] Vladimir Dunayev, "Enriched Uranium: U.S. Claims Tehran Will Get Nuclear Arms Soon," *Izvestia*, August 5, 2003.

At the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow stated, "Iran's policy of deception and delays belies its claims of developing nuclear technology for purely peaceful purposes. In one instance, Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to take samples from a site only after denying them access for months—sufficient time to clean up the facility in question. Another example involves Iran's changing explanations of its enrichment efforts."[27]

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Lysenko said, "The existing problems can hardly be resolved by the use of simple recipes, such as the use of military force or introduction of sanctions. There must be scrupulous, daily, routine political and diplomatic work, in most cases spelling no quick dividends." He made it clear, however, that Iran should not expect unconditional support from Moscow. "Russia does everything to support the practice of concluding the Additional Protocols to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is unacceptable for Russia and for all civilized states."[28]

The Russian leadership clearly understands the cause of U.S. concern, but the economic benefits from cooperation with Iran in nuclear power engineering and the need to maintain a high profile are now regarded as more important. Russia's position on Iran was confirmed by President Vladimir Putin in an interview with the *New York Times* on October 5, 2003. "Regarding the problem of non-proliferation," Putin said, "we have full understanding with the United States, and I would even assert that on this question as on the question of the battle against terrorism, we can, in our view, be not just partners, but allies in the full sense of this word… We believe, as our American colleagues and partners believe, that Iran has no justification not to allow the overview of the IAEA over their nuclear programs." On the other

[27] Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 19-20, 2003, www.carnegie.ru/en/news/67475.htm.
[28] Ibid.

hand, Putin emphasized that Russia has its interests in Iran: "Iran is our neighbor. We have a many-century tradition of good-neighborly relations with this country." Putin pointed to the inadmissibility of discriminatory treatment of Russian businesses in Iran: "We know for certain that American and Western European companies are working in even more sensitive spheres, also nuclear ones, and they are allowed everything. What we seek to achieve is that uniform and universal rules of the game be worked out for one and all."

Later, as he touched upon the subject of Russia's cooperation with Iran in an interview granted to the Al-Jazeera television channel in Kuala Lumpur on October 18, 2003, Putin once again emphasized that the approach to nuclear arms nonproliferation should be consistent in all aspects. He said that Russia is "absolutely against proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the same rules should apply to everyone. There cannot be a selective approach. There cannot be a situation in which some countries and companies or representatives of some countries can cooperate with Iran, while those of other countries cannot. Russian firms are running up against restrictions and sanctions at every turn."

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told reporters, "Russian-Iranian cooperation in atomic energy does not lead to the development of nuclear weapons. We regard attempts to make Russia give up its cooperation with Iran in the sphere of nuclear energy as unfair competition. All these instances merely confirm that the situation involving Iran is a graphic illustration of a policy of double standards in regard to Iran. Unified rules are non-existent."[29]

Russian and U.S. leaders' attitude to the creation of a nuclear power industry in Iran has proven very hard to coordinate and will largely depend on Iran's policy. If Iran does not suspend its uranium enrichment program—as was declared by the Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal

[29] A. Shelekhov, *NewsInfo*, November 10, 2003.

Kharazi[30]—by using the excuse that the country is surrounded by nuclear powers (India, Pakistan and Israel) that have abstained from signing the NPT, Russia and the United States may take closer positions to resist Tehran's plans.

On the other hand, controversies between Moscow and Washington may be minimized if the October 2003 meeting of the Iranian, British, German and French foreign ministers in Teheran proves fruitful. At that meeting, Iran signed a declaration containing a pledge to fully cooperate with the IAEA and sign the IAEA Additional Protocol.[31] The British, French and German foreign ministers believe that the declaration was tantamount to the recognition of Iran's right to develop its nuclear power industry.

Indeed, Iran was reported to have suspended its uranium enrichment program on November 10, 2003 and later that day addressed the IAEA declaring its consent to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol. The decision was announced by the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, at a meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Iran, he said, made this move to promote a more favorable international climate; it was suspending programs for uranium enrichment, although that activity was the country's legitimate right.[32]

Regarding North Korea, Russia and the United States have coordinated their approaches within the framework of the Beijing agreements, but these attitudes will most likely drift apart if the negotiations fail and North Korea declares itself a nuclear state.

In the meantime, as has often been stressed by the Russian media, such a declaration may be regarded as mere blackmail, because there is no nuclear state (including Israel) that has

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[30] "Iran Willing to Continue Work to Enrich Uranium: A Statement by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi," *RIA Novosti*, October 7, 2003, and Yevgeny Shestakov, "Tehran Defending Its Right to Possess a Nuclear Bomb," www.Izvestia.ru, October 7, 2003.
[31] Judith Perera, "Report on a Ministerial Meeting in Teheran," www.globalcoal.com/mcis/news/searchnews.cfm/.
[32] A report on President Putin's Meeting with the Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, Channel 1, Moscow, November 10, 2003.

failed to stage at least one nuclear test. If North Korea carries out a nuclear test, the Kim Jong-il regime will have only several months to arm its missiles with nuclear heads. Then a decision will have to be made whether to let another nuclear state emerge at one end of the 'axis of evil' or take preemptive measures to disarm it by force. In the latter case it will be hard to expect a consolidated decision in favor of the use of force. Under the circumstances, the United States may decide, at its sole discretion, to attack North Korea's missile launchers and nuclear warhead manufacturing facilities.

A great deal will depend on how the internal political and economic situation in North Korea will develop in the near future. Some analysts have pointed to a gross deterioration of the economic situation in the country over the period of Kim Jong-il's rule. They predict that under certain circumstances, the country could spiral out of control and plunge into chaos. Furthermore, Seoul may be forced to provide assistance to the North Koreans, and a takeover of North Korea by the South is not ruled out either.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

Moscow and Washington strictly follow their commitments under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); however, the scales of such control vary and both countries have retarded measures that could have made the MTCR more effective.

Russia focuses on the observance of missile technology nonproliferation by domestic manufacturers under a diversified export control system that President Vladimir Putin supervises personally. After President Putin approved the Regulations on the Statute of the Export Control

Commission of the Russian Federation on January 29, 2001, the mass media described him as the initiator of an export control system in Russia.

As he discussed nonproliferation and export control issues with U.S. National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, Putin said: "Russia has convincingly demonstrated commitment to enhancing export control and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our country closely studies U.S. concerns in the sphere of export control and has the right to expect reciprocal steps. However, to our great regret, the lifting of U.S. sanctions from a number of Russian enterprises and institutes remains the issue of the day. I do hope it will be resolved soon."[33]

This statement may be regarded as a reply to the many U.S. claims, which, according to Russian analysts, were aimed at putting pressure on Russia, above all, in the sphere of export of missile technologies, and to a smaller degree, of other materials.[34] The United States, along with the control over its own corporations, exercises global monitoring of all transfers of missiles and missile technologies and puts on record hundreds of violations, or suspected violations, of the missile technology control regime.[35]

For the aforementioned reasons, which stem from the tight link between missile and nuclear programs, analysts are focused on the missile potentials of the so-called "high-risk" countries, first and foremost, North Korea and Iran.

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[33] An excerpt from President Putin's conversation with Samuel Berger, ABN, www.lenta.ru, May 19, 2000.
[34] Orlov, et al., 2001.
[35] Olga Semyonova, "High Tide of Change: Lest Fruitful Experience of Russia-U.S. Cooperation Be Swept Away," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, April 13, 2001, http:/nvo.ng.ru/printed/spforces/2001-04-13/7_changes.html.

Russian analysts' assessments of the North Korean and Iranian missile programs[36]

It is common knowledge that North Korea was one of the first countries in the Asia-Pacific Region to acquire missile technology. Back in the 1960s, North Korea purchased from the USSR non-guided tactical solid-propellant missiles armed with conventional warheads, FROG-5 and FROG-7.

North Korea was particularly active in this field in the 1970s. Lacking the required scientific and research potential of its own, Pyongyang sought to maximize the use of its cooperation with China and the Soviet Union. In the second half of the 1970s, North Korean specialists participated in the Chinese program for building a missile with a range of about 600 kilometers. For various reasons, this project was not completed.

When the project failed, the North Korean leadership set eyes on Soviet missile technology. SCUD-V missiles were purchased from the Soviet Union. This move pursued a dual objective. Apart from putting the missiles on operational duty, the main emphasis was placed on mastering their production, on training North Korean engineers and technicians, and on building industrial facilities to launch the production of combat missiles.

This time the efforts bore fruit. The first North-Korean-built SCUD-V missile was tested in 1984. Next year the missiles went on combat duty.

Missile production in North Korea received the next powerful impetus after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran offered to finance the development of a new, upgraded model of SCUD-V on the condition that it would be supplied a considerable number of such missiles in exchange. Heavy financial injections helped North Korea cope with this task. According to available information, the first batch of 100 SCUDs went to Iran in 1987.

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[36] This section relies on information from *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 1 (January-February 2002), Moscow; *Yadernoye Nerasprostranenie*, No. 45 (July-September 2002), Moscow; *Proceedings of the Eleventh Amaldi Conference on Global Security Problems*, Moscow, November 18-20, 1998 (Moscow: Nauka, 1999).

Upgrade work increased the SCUD missiles' range and payload. Another upgrade attempt followed when Iran supplied fragments of Iraq's Al-Hussein missile, a version of SCUD-V. The new model, named SCUD-S, began to be produced in 1989 and was flight-tested the next year. SCUD-V and SCUD-S missiles allow North Korea to hit targets in the whole territory of South Korea and in border areas of East China and Russia's Maritime Territory (Primorye).

North Korea took foreign specialists by surprise in May 1993, when it tested the domestically developed and built Nodon-1 ballistic missile. As it turned out later, the work on the missile began back in 1988-1989. The new project was aimed at creating a medium-range missile capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads. The project was allegedly financed by Iran and Libya, which provided materials and technology acquired in Western countries in bypass of COCOM restrictions. Nodon-1 can reach targets in Japan, East China (including Beijing) and the Russian Far East (including Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and Chita).

Currently, North Korea is working on another missile, Taepodong-1, with a range of over 2,000 kilometers. Work is also underway to build its three-stage version with an advanced solid-propellant third-stage engine. The three-stage version of Taepodong-1 will be able to reach targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Russia (as far as the Ural mountains), in Okinawa and Guam, and also in Alaska. Initially, Taepodong-1 was expected to become operational in 2003-2004.

Simultaneously, work is in progress on the two-stage liquid-propellant long-range missile, Taepodong-2, capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Russia (as far as Moscow), as well as U.S. bases in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii and Alaska.

Analysts believe that the missile programs of North Korea—which has proven to be the main supplier of missile technologies to unstable regions—and Iranian missile programs pose a potential threat to the United States, Russia and many other countries. Therefore, more detailed information is required about the industrial potential and missile programs of Iran and North Korea, including the current state of research and development, missile characteristics, their equipment, progress in flight tests, and projected dates for putting the missiles into operation.

The highest quality assessment of such information may be achieved if Russian and U.S. information and intelligence systems are used comprehensively. In this respect, the policies of former and current Russian and U.S. administrations appear amazingly remiss.

Back in 1998, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton made a joint decision to create a center in Moscow to exchange information about missile launches. The center was intended not only to issue warnings in case of unintentional launches of either country's missiles, but also to monitor missile launches made from the territories of other countries and from sea and ocean areas. Such measures would allow for impartial control over missile programs, first and foremost in unstable regions, and to take concerted action. A venue for the center was chosen, human resource needs identified, and functional duties for staff and equipment described. Yet, for over five years now, the center has been unable to start operation, despite the intention stated in the joint declaration (that was signed in Moscow) to take the necessary steps for the center to start working. According to Russian Foreign Ministry officials, the project has been suspended due to the lack of agreement on decisions of civil responsibility for possible damages and on taxes.

The problem of civil responsibility is common to a significant part of joint Russia-U.S. projects. In September 2003, Rose Gottemoeller and Leonard Spector discussed this problem at

a workshop held at the Moscow Carnegie Center. In the opinion of the participating experts, obstacles preventing the center's opening could be easily eliminated, especially as possible damage from the center's operation is regarded as insignificant. Also, a precedent for other such programs could be avoided if the parties demonstrated mutual political will.

Another more serious, but not quite so obvious, obstruction is the protracted resistance, mostly from Washington—and to a certain extent from Moscow—to the joint analysis of potential missile threats from third world countries.

As noted in other sources,[37] a few years ago the CIA reported that missile threats to the United States from so-called 'rogue states' would not become a reality before 2015. This projection practically coincided with the opinion of Russian specialists. Yet not everyone in the United States was eager to agree with this assessment. In July 1998, a commission led by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld delivered a report that said that these threats might become real as early as 2005. President George W. Bush used this assessment as a powerful argument for withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty and escalating efforts to start full-scale work to develop plans for deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses.

Russia's repeated proposals for setting up a joint group for nuclear threat assessment and coordination received the cold shoulder. Anti-ballistic missile defense advocates in the United States rejected the idea as unacceptable. Moscow maintained that a joint assessment of threats would be tantamount to the recognition that missile threats to the United States were real, and this would shake loose the ABM Treaty.

A missile threat to the United States cannot emerge overnight. There has to be a long period of preparations and flight tests—something that is impossible to do covertly. The year

[37] See, for example, "Hawks Against Bush: An Outlook from Moscow," *Izvestia*, August 5, 2003, http://www.izvestia.ru/world/article36862.

2005, predicted as the time when a threat to the U.S. territory will materialize, is quite near. Therefore, Russian experts believe it would be very appropriate to address Secretary Rumsfeld and his team with the following questions: Where are the intercontinental ballistic missiles in North Korea, Iran and other countries that the Untied States calls 'rogue states'? What interests connect Secretary Rumsfeld and the corporations that have received funding to work on an anti-ballistic missile defense?

The answers to these questions should be of interest to U.S. taxpayers. As for the Russian expert community, it cannot help but notice that such a distortion of the real state of affairs does not help build the confidence required for a genuine partnership in nonproliferation issues. This gives much food for thought.

In the meantime, a center for exchange of information about missile launches could have provided unbiased, instrumentally confirmed data about missile and missile technology proliferation, especially as Russian early warning radars deployed in the south are capable of providing online information about missile launches from the "belt of instability." No other system or means available to the United States can do so.

The reasons for the long stagnation in this particular project are not confined to the lack of political will by President Putin or President Bush. Russian analysts believe they are part and parcel of Russian-U.S. relations in general, as these relations are, to a large extent, relations of mistrust between the political elites that have amassed over the Cold War years. As before, cooperation between Russia and the U.S. is limited to the same traditional spheres—international security, strategic stability, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and energy cooperation (which has never developed into a strategic partnership). The relations never go

beyond these customary lines, despite the good personal relationship between the national leaders.

Regarding the problem of missile technology proliferation, one has to admit that in the context of the tight link between missile and nuclear programs, the MTCR has largely coped with its role of missile technology transfer from one country to another. However, as has been noted elsewhere, the MTCR is not a legally binding agreement, so it cannot create a universal legal regime in the sphere of missile technology similar to that existing in the sphere of nuclear weapons nonproliferation. As long as the MTCR remains legally unbinding, the implementation of its principles in the domestic legislation of the participating countries will continue to be of critical importance. Russia serves as an example: Since August 2001, it has been implementing Presidential Decree No. 1005, which identifies and approves what missile-related equipment, materials and technologies are subject to export and control.

Far greater threats are now posed by the national missile programs of North Korea and Iran. The Russian media have repeatedly stressed that the risk of the emergence of nuclear missile potentials in these countries does not stem from the threat of preemptive strikes against certain regions. After all, any regime is perfectly aware that in case of retaliation it will lose all it has in an instant. On the other hand, possessing nuclear missiles is a major factor in a regime's survival in case of the use of force from outside. It should not be ruled out that forceful regime change in Iraq might induce other totalitarian, weak, and vulnerable regimes to reinforce efforts to acquire nuclear missiles.

All these factors, as demonstrated in counterproliferation analyses,[38] demand a quick and concerted response from the international community, particularly from the United States and Russia.

Meanwhile, there has been no support so far for the idea of creating a global system of missile technology control, which Russia proposed at the G8 Summit in June 1999. This global system would restrict and deter missile proliferation and establish a set of rules for countries possessing missile weapons and related technologies.

RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL (BACTERIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

Chemical Weapons

Most experts agree that chemical and biological weapons are substantially less destructive and lead to less catastrophic consequences than nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are believed to be more dangerous when used by international terrorist organizations than as an instrument of conventional warfare. Therefore, disposal of considerable stocks of chemical weapons is regarded as a key measure to prevent these armaments from falling into the hands of terrorists.

Soviet/Russian relations with the United States in the sphere of prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons in the framework of the existing international law have a decades-long history. They began with the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

[38] Vladimir Dvorkin, "Prevention vs. Punishment," *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 1 (November-December 2002); and Alexander Kalyadin, "The Role of Coercion in Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, (2003).

The USSR endorsed the Protocol in 1927. When depositing the Protocol ratification instruments, the Soviet Union made two reservations: the right to use chemical weapons against non-member countries and in retaliation for an attack. It was only in 2000 that the Russian parliament endorsed a federal law canceling the two reservations.

In 1993 Moscow signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). The document took nearly 20 years to develop. Russia's law on the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention was passed in 1997.

Issues related to Russia's cooperation with the United States and other nations in implementing the CWC are discussed in detail in the works of Natalya Kalinina, a leading Russian expert and advisor to the Russian Prime Minister.[39] The information below draws largely from her publications, as well as from the opinions of other experts on the state of Russian-U.S. cooperation in the destruction of chemical and biological weapons.

In March 1996, the Russian Government adopted a federal program, Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles in the Russian Federation, which provided for the disposal of nearly 40,000 tons of chemical weapons by the year 2009. Yet, economic difficulties made the program unfeasible. The revised version set the chemical stock disposal deadline at 2012.

Cooperation between the United States and Russia in eliminating Russia's chemical arsenals began in 1990 with the signing of the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention. American assistance began to arrive in real terms after the endorsement in 1991 of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and enactment of the

[39] Natalya Kalinina, "Efficiency of the Chemical Weapons Convention Depends on Russia's Actions," *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 1 (67), vol. 9, 2003; and Natalya Kalinina, Report at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 19-20, 2003.

seven-year agreement between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the auspices of the president of the Russian Federation on safe, reliable and ecologically sound disposal of chemical weapons. At the time, the U.S. side did not put forward any conditions that could stall the agreement's implementation. The U.S. assistance totaled $286.5 million. Only later were political restrictions imposed and special requirements set.

For all its usefulness, the program had a few weaknesses, namely:

- The size of the assistance is approved by the U.S. Congress annually, which hampers long-term planning because of the possibility of a halt in the ongoing work.
- The assistance is provided in the form of equipment supplies and payments for U.S. companies' services, not as direct funding of the Russian program. U.S. companies engage Russian organizations on a contractual basis.
- The assistance does not cover the real expenses incurred on the territory or in the interests of Russia. Between 1992 and 1999, Russian organizations received a total of $25 million. A sizeable part of the funds were used to cover U.S. administrative and other technical expenses.

Comparing the costs of the construction of the first stage of the Shchuchye facility, which the United States pledged to build independently (investing $888 million), with those of the second one, which will have a 150 percent higher capacity and will be built by Russia for only about $680 million, Natalya Kalinina concludes that, if assistance came in the form of direct financing, the U.S. expenditures could be much lower.

It should be noted that the structural deficiencies of U.S. assistance have been criticized by American experts in reference to U.S. legislation with respect not only to the chemical

weapons destruction program but also other programs, in particular, those related to the scrapping of strategic offensive arsenals. Despite concerns about the United States' increased spending on Russia's chemical weapons destruction program, the efficiency of the U.S. assistance can be objectively assessed only after the work is completed.

A far more serious barrier in the way of U.S. assistance was placed by the U.S. Congress' October 1999 decision to freeze the funding of chemical weapons destruction projects in Russia. This decision appears to be the major reason for a halt in the Shchuchye construction. This happened in early 2002, after the Bush administration declined to confirm that Moscow had been stringently abiding by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Apart from bringing to a standstill a number of older programs, the decision by the U.S. Congress stalled action on several new projects aimed at reducing the threat posed by existing WMD arsenals.

Debates over the reasons behind the situation around the Shchuchye facility, for which the blame has been alternately laid on Russia and the United States, continue unabated. The problem was discussed during George Bush's visit to Russia in May 2002. In January 2003, President Bush signed special orders to release frozen funds to help Russia in implementing its program for the elimination of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Earlier, the U.S. Congress had approved a bill giving the President the right to circumvent legislative restrictions on financial assistance to other countries, including Russia.

The president's right to circumvent legislative restrictions is only temporary—according to the Nunn-Lugar program it is valid for three years. Regarding U.S. assistance to Russia in the destruction of its chemical weapons, the right is valid for one year only (it expired on September 30, 2003). Senator Richard Lugar maintains that for the project to be implemented successfully, it is necessary to extend this right before the end of the year. He welcomed President Bush's

special orders to free the funds as they provide for both completing many ongoing projects and launching new ones. In his view, Bush's special orders mean that the elimination of Russia's nuclear, biological and chemical arsenals can now continue.[40]

Moscow appreciated President Bush's decision to release more than $310 million in frozen funds to continue financing the construction of the Shchuchye facility. Sergei Kirienko, head of the State Commission on Chemical Weapons Destruction and the Russian President's plenipotentiary representative in the Volga District, has pointed out that during his visit to the United States on a mandate from Vladimir Putin in 2002, he reached agreement with the U.S. side that a decision to unfreeze funds would "unlock that year's allocations together with the unspent balance of the previous years."[41] Commenting on the developments that had brought about the difficult situation in 2002, Kirienko said:

> The Shchuchye facility looks very peculiar indeed: right in the middle of the construction site there is wasteland because the United States fails to provide funding under the program…. We have asked the American partners to finally decide whether it will continue financing the construction or not. Similar questions have been asked by other countries as well, because Britain has financed the laying down of a gas pipeline in that particular wasteland, Canada has invested money in electric equipment, and the Netherlands, in water pipelines. We need to know for sure whether we will be building the facility in cooperation with other countries or whether our agreements [with the U.S.] are still in effect….We have fulfilled all of the U.S. requirements by destroying Category II and III weapons before the agreed deadline, and by starting to substantially fund the project on our own. These measures dispelled U.S. doubts as to Russia's ability to...fulfill its obligations. I think the U.S. decision did not come before January [2003] because they

[40] "George Bush Releases Frozen Funds to Support Former Soviet Republics," *USA Today*, January 14, 2003.
[41] *Yadernoye Nerasprostranenie*, Vol. 46, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, 2003.

> wanted to wait and see how successfully we could conclude the year, whether or not the Gorny plant would be put into operation, and how well it would perform. I figure a month of its efficient operation was quite a convincing argument for the U.S. administration's decision to be in the affirmative.[42]

The resumption of Russian-U.S. cooperation in the destruction of chemical weapons inspires optimism, albeit limited, by the U.S. Congress' recurrent debates over the feasibility of providing a new tranche.

Biological Weapons

The spread of biological weapons (BW) is seen by many experts as a more serious threat than that posed by chemical weapons because the existing types of chemical weapons are well known, no new types are being developed, and there are efficient methods of protection against such weapons. The situation with biological weapons is deemed to cause more serious concern.[43]

Specialists explain this factor by the huge variety of microorganisms—viruses, bacteria and fungi—that cause diseases in humans, plants and animals. According to estimates, man knows of only fractions of a percent of the existing viruses, and only a few percent of the existing microbes. Nature is continuously generating new pathogens, the so-called "emerging infections," and there is no end to this process. The latest evidence is the situation with a pathology dubbed SARS—severe acute respiratory syndrome. Over the past 20 years alone, more than 30 new infectious agents have been discovered, including HIV, Marburg, Ebola, Machupo and Nipah viruses, SARS, etc.; there are, to date, no efficacious means for their preventive care or treatment.

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[42] Ibid.

[43] *Proceedings of the Eleventh Amaldi Conference on Global Security Problems*; and Committee on R&D Needs for Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Incidents, *Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999).

An outburst of a disease in any part of the world can be regarded as a threat to any other region. As soon as an infectious disease or its carriers (insects and animals) penetrate another country or continent, the spread of the disease becomes very difficult or impossible to control. Even economically developed countries cannot place barriers to the spread of such infections.

Scenarios of bioterrorist acts are extremely pessimistic from the point of view of human casualties, the costs involved in efforts to eliminate their aftermath, losses incurred due to disorganization of a region's economy, and effects of the psychological stress on the population.[44] The United States, a country with impressive experience in fighting infections, developed a national strategic plan for preparedness and response to biological and chemical terrorism only in 2000.[45] The plan provides for the coordinated action of a dozen government agencies of various profiles to reveal and eliminate such incidents. Back in 1984, Oregon came under an attack by terrorists using Salmonella bacteria. More than 700 residents were infected as a result. At first, the infection was treated as a natural outbreak of the disease, and only a year later experts proved that the incident had been masterminded by religious extremists hoping to upset an election. The American public learned about the incident years later.[46]

Thus, a global system of control over potential epidemiological outbursts, both natural and manmade, is deemed to be far more difficult to create than a system of control over the use of chemical agents or explosives.

Russia cooperates with the United States in BW nonproliferation in the framework of the Geneva Protocol; Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), which bans the

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[44] Richard Preston, "The Bioweaponeers," *The New Yorker*, March 9, 1998, p. 52-65; and Richard Preston, "Bio-Warfare-Fiction and Reality," *Genetic Engineering News*, March 1, 1998, p. 6-39.

[45] CDC Strategic Planning Workgroup, "Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response," April 21, 2000, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr4904a1.htm; and L. Sandakhchiyev, R. Martynyuk, and S. Netesov, "Proposals for a Program for Counteracting Terrorism: International Centers as a Basis for Fighting Infectious Diseases and Counteracting Terrorism," Vektor State Center for Viral Research and Biotechnology at the Russian Public Healthcare Ministry, 2003.

[46] L. Sandakhchiyev, et al., "Proposals for a Program for Counteracting Terrorism."

development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxic weapons and calls for their destruction; and the documents adopted by the BTWC Review Conferences (the latest, the Fifth Conference, was held in 2001). In 1994, the states party to the BTWC set up an Ad Hoc Group to work out a binding document (Protocol) to reinforce the Convention.

Leading Russian specialists have spoken highly of the steady progress in Russia's cooperation with the United States in this area. Specifically, they appreciate the financial support from the U.S. Department of Health for the development of a concept for an International Center for the Study of Existing and Emerging Infections.[47] Such a center would boost long-term strategic cooperation that would be less dependent on the current political and economic situation. International partnership would invigorate studies of dangerous pathogens and make these studies less costly. It would facilitate the development of new efficient means of disease prevention, diagnostics and treatment that are essential for public health and counteraction to biological terrorism.

Major contributions to the promotion of Russian-U.S. cooperation have been made by Russia's Ministries of Science and Industry, Health, and Internal Affairs; Russia's Academies of Sciences and Medical Sciences; the World Health Organization; the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health, and Agriculture; the Disease Control and Prevention Center; the International Commerce and Security Center; the National Health Institute; the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; and the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation.[48]

Some experts suggest that, in order to make scientific programs more efficient, Russia and the United States should agree on simplified export control procedures in respect to the development and exchange of dual-use technologies, bacteria strains, and research-related

[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.

information. At the same time, they should reinforce mechanisms of control over leaks of biological material and technology from the research sector.

To implement research programs and ensure preparedness for natural and man-made outbreaks of infections, regional international centers should be set up to study infection causes and to counter biological terrorism. It is essential that researchers from the member-states have free access to the centers to be able to participate in joint research projects.[49]

At the same time, experts point to the differences in the approaches of Russia and the United States to certain problems that hamper not only bilateral, but also broader international cooperation.[50] Specifically, the above-mentioned Ad Hoc Group was expected to prepare a legally binding Protocol for the Fifth BTWC Review Conference. Yet, at its most recent, 24th session, the group suspended its work on the Protocol. Donald Maly, head of the U.S. delegation, argued that the proposed project might put national security and confidential business information at risk.[51] The United States did not believe that the Protocol could be an efficient deterrent from the spread of biological weapons. Washington feared that the new supervisory organizations might gain unlimited access to U.S. secret laboratories, and that the Protocol might turn U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies into targets of industrial espionage.

In August 2002, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Bolton tried to elucidate his country's stance on the draft Protocol. The U.S. had turned down the draft for three reasons: First, it was based on the traditional approach to arms control which had proven ineffective when applied to biological weapons; second, it might put national security and confidential business

[49] A.V. Pyrieva, "On the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons and Measures for Nonproliferation," *Strategicheskaya Stabilnost*, No. 3, 2002, Moscow.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.

information at risk; and third, the bioweaponeers had used biological weapons to undermine other existing regimes of international export control.[52]

Specialists point out, however, that the lack of mandatory inspections by specially trained experts (as stipulated by the Protocol) is a major deficiency because voluntary information exchange and UN-appointed commissions may prove to be insufficiently effective as instruments of control. In September 2002, U.S. administration officials said that the United States wanted the Ad Hoc Group's work to be terminated; it did not approve of any further meetings to discuss the Protocol.

A considerable drift in Russian and U.S. positions on this issue was confirmed by Oleg Ignatyev, Advisor to the General Director of Russia's Munitions Agency, in his address to the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference in September 2003. He dismissed as "provocative" the U.S. allegations that Russia, together with several other countries, is engaged in the development of biological weapons.

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP IN WMD NONPROLIFERATION

The majority of Russia's top-ranking government officials, specialists and experts see the program for Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, adopted at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, as the most important new step (after the Nunn-Lugar initiative) aimed at fostering actions to eliminate WMD and fissile material and increase their storage safety in Russia and other countries. The G8 member-states agreed to allocate around $20 billion over the next 10 years for dedicated cooperative projects—

[52] Ibid.

in Russia in the first place—to address problems of nonproliferation, disarmament, nuclear safety, and the struggle against terrorism. The greater part of the allocations—$10 billion—was to be provided by the United States.

Leading Russian experts have stressed that the Global Partnership program was one of the main items on the agenda of the G8 Summit in Evian, France, June 1-3, 2003. Although before that summit the Global Partnership program was not expected to hit the agenda (priority was given to sustainable development, ecology, ways to counter poverty, economic issues, etc.), world leaders appeared focused on the topic. A number of new documents on international security and WMD nonproliferation were endorsed: A G8 Declaration "Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," which urges North Korea and Iran to place their nuclear programs under international control; a G8 Statement "Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Securing Radioactive Sources"; and a G8 Action Plan "Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Securing the Safety of Radioactive Sources."

Russia's efforts in project coordination under the Global Partnership were recognized as the most consistent among the Partnership member-states. The interdepartmental coordination of Global Partnership projects inside Russia is supervised by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. Each agency involved in the Global Partnership program has its own coordinator at the deputy minister level. The meetings of the Coordinating Council are held every month.[53]

In Evian, the leaders of the Global Partnership member-states discussed their first accomplishments and short-term plans of action to prevent terrorists or their patrons from purchasing or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological weapons, missiles, related materials, equipment and technology. Experts point out that the Evian Summit yielded agreement

[53] Daniil Kobyakov and Vladimir Orlov, "Global Partnership After Evian," *Special Appendage by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations to SIPRI-2004*.

on increased financing of chemical disarmament programs. Additional funds are to be allocated for the construction of a chemical weapons disposal facility at Kambark, Udmurtia, and for the development at a similar facility at Shchuchye in the Kurgan region.

According to a report by a joint working group of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council,[54] the cooperative efforts of the United States, Russia and other nations, as well as the activities financed by the G8 member-states and other European countries, have proven decisive in preventing proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and delivery means. This is confirmed by the results already achieved. The safety of transportation of nuclear weapons and fissile material, in addition to the safety of the scrapping of strategic offensive arsenals, has been improved; 150 tons of highly enriched uranium and major biological weapons manufacturing plants have been destroyed; and support has been provided for the professional retraining of 40,000 researchers and specialists in chemical, biological, and missile weapons technology. At the same time, the report indicates that the greater part of the problem remains unresolved. The destruction of chemical weapons is only beginning in real terms, while many aspects of past activities related to BW development remain unknown. The Global Partnership program is expected to increase the overall efficiency of cooperation projects in the nonproliferation sphere in the next ten years. Yet insufficient funding has not been the sole barrier to more efficient cooperation. The key problems include secrecy in regimes, bureaucratic and political restrictions and other U.S.-Russian differences.

President Vladimir Putin has defined two priority areas for Russian cooperation under the Global Partnership: destruction of chemical weapons and the scrapping of nuclear-powered

[54] Ibid.

submarines. Persistent problems in these two areas are seen as the major source of threat in terms of ecology and nonproliferation, requiring prompt and effective measures.

As indicated in the reports made at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, Russia has decided to ensure stable financial support for the Global Partnership projects. In 2003 it allocated $205 million for that purpose from the national budget, and intends to spend as much in 2004. Dedicated projects have been developed and distributed among the partners. Moscow has taken measures to solve problems concerning taxes, access to facilities, transparency, and liability for possible damage. The bulk of these matters were settled in the Agreement on the Multilateral Nuclear and Environmental Program in Russia (MNEPR), signed on May 21, 2003.

Meanwhile, Russian government officials have come up with diverse assessments of the Evian Summit. Anatoly Antonov, a special envoy of the Foreign Ministry, said he had mixed feelings about the results of the first year of Global Partnership. In his view, the assistance programs to Russia have seen no radical improvements. The prospects for the future are vague, the achievements are scarce, and the discussion of potential projects is extremely difficult. Commenting on the U.S. contribution to the Global Partnership program, Antonov said that it had yielded dubious results. In his opinion, bilateral cooperation is heavily politicized. The issue of liability for nuclear damage remains the core of U.S.-Russian controversy, as the United States insists on zero liability for itself for any—including deliberate—nuclear damage. Presenting his own vision of the Global Partnership priorities, Antonov warned against interpreting the Kananaskis documents in a way that might distort their original meaning, called

for coordination of each newly proposed Global Partnership project, and indicated his support for reinforcing the Partnership's legal basis.[55]

Other Russian experts point to the fact that the Global Partnership member-states failed to reach the $20 billion financial goal mentioned at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis. The Global Partnership's financial difficulties are aggravated by the gap between pledges of assistance and the actual funds allocated for specific projects. Other problems related to the implementation of Global Partnership plans in Russia include differences between Russia and other member-states as to the priority of certain lines and programs of cooperation, insufficient cash financing, poor coordination of Russian assistance programs by the donor states, internal political barriers to the delivery of aid to Russia in some of the donor countries, and too many preliminary conditions imposed on Russia for assistance under the Global Partnership program.

The amount of financing under the Global Partnership program is still far from the $20 billion level set by the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, even though several new member-states joined the Global Partnership and the Euro's rise against the U.S. dollar in the first half of 2003 increased the dollar equivalent of the amounts of assistance pledged by some foreign states. G8 officials have turned a deaf ear to the many calls from experts (including in the donor countries) for regarding the Kananaskis-announced figure not as a ceiling but as the minimal required level of financing.

Nevertheless, despite unresolved problems, the Global Partnership seems to be gradually shifting after Evian from loud political proclamations to real cooperation. This is demonstrated by both progress in the settlement of legal problems related to the provision of assistance and allocation of new funds to finance specific Global Partnership projects.

[55] Anatoly Antonov, Report at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference.

Russian specialists have reiterated that for the Global Partnership to attain its proclaimed goals, it needs to be made sustainable and viable. One of the key questions in this context is whether or not the funds invested in the Global Partnership projects will continue to work when the influx of funds peters out upon the expiration of the program term. The list of specific measures proposed for the purpose by some experts could include, among other things, an increased financing from Russia's own budget, more efficient control over the use of funds, and conversion and commercialization of projects where possible. A major role in creating a favorable environment for the sustainable operation of the Global Partnership projects could be played by public associations and scientific research organizations. One should welcome in this connection the establishment in June 2003 of the Sustainable Partnership for Russia (SUPR) Council, an organization expected to comprehensively facilitate the implementation of the G8 Global Partnership program.[56]

Global Partnership is yet another example of the G8 becoming an increasingly effective instrument of international security over the past few years. After Russia joined it as a full-fledged member, the G8 ceased to be a purely "Western" club discussing a narrow range of issues, and became a truly global organization.

Against the backdrop of the crisis within contemporary global institutions and the persistent controversy on international security-related matters among the key international players (which has been graphically demonstrated by the situation in and around Iraq), the G8 has enhanced its role as an instrument of international policy coordination. It is through cooperation in such vital areas as WMD nonproliferation in the interests of the entire world

[56] "After Evian: How To Prevent the Diluting of Summit Documents," *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, 2003.

community that the different states can find a common ground and work out a constructive agenda to promote overall international cooperation.

THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME IN A SHORT-TERM PERSPECTIVE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Commenting on the latest challenges to the nonproliferation regime, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Nobyuasu Abe said that, "the United States and the Russian Federation bear special responsibility for the efficiency of measures in the non-proliferation area."[57] This view is shared by Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, who maintains that the spread of weapons of mass destruction can only be prevented through close Russian-American partnership.

It is not accidental, therefore, that leading Russian and American experts have resumed discussion about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Which plan of action to choose: continue reinforcing international nonproliferation regimes, deal with specific problems through targeted countermeasures, or accept the concept of counterproliferation that would include the use of force?

Experts say that, in dealing with questions of WMD nonproliferation on a global scale, the international community is somewhat confused; it needs patience and an extremely careful approach to working out recommendations and agreements in order to find mutually acceptable plans of action.

No one would now question the role of the international nonproliferation regime or the

[57] Abe Nobuyashu, "Nonproliferation and the Challenge of Compliance," Report at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 19-20, 2003, www.carnegie.ru/en/news/67475.htm.

results achieved through its observance. Yet, the question "What is be done next?" remains, and the answers to it vary considerably. For example, PIR Center Director Vladimir Orlov queries, "Is the existing nonproliferation regime viable in its present form, or will it be necessary to use heavy machinery to push the question forward?"[58] Having analyzed the most serious challenges to the present-day nonproliferation regime, he concludes, "What the patient does need is a timely and regular intake of the earlier prescribed medicines." In his address to the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, Orlov said, "No one is going to denounce or to revise the NPT Treaty. The Treaty represents a rare case when eleven small articles are protecting the world from the spread of nuclear weapons. If there were no such treaty, we would have had around forty nuclear-weapon states by now. The NPT has been working well and there is no need to revise it. In 2005 we will simply review it to see how to increase its effectiveness."[59]

The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's leading specialist, Vladimir Ostropikov, also sees the NPT and its uniting of 188 countries as the key element of the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime. The NPT was extended indefinitely and unconditionally in 1995. It has been used as a major international tool of containing the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons: without it, safeguarding regional or global stability would have been impossible. Ostropikov emphasized that NPT member-states reserve the right to develop nuclear power engineering and nuclear technology in pursuit of peaceful goals, which is an essential element of the world stability. He warned against restricting the member nations' access to peaceful nuclear

[58] Vladimir Orlov, "Prospects of Nonproliferation Following the Iraqi War," Report at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 19-20, 2003, www.carnegie.ru/en/news/67475.htm.
[59] Ibid.

technology and called to accept with due understanding any country's desire to develop a nuclear power sector of its own.[60]

Russian experts have displayed considerable interest in the ideas voiced by U.S. leading nonproliferation experts Rose Gottemoeller and Jon Wolfsthal who, while not denying the need to reinforce the NPT, have suggested that solutions to the nuclear weapons problems of Israel, India, and Pakistan should be sought in the sphere of regional security and politics, rather than within the NPT framework. In their view:

> The non-proliferation regime in itself is not a useful tool to address the proliferation issues arising from India, Israel, and Pakistan. These challenges should be addressed one-by-one, region-by-region, not as a common class defined by their non-membership in the NPT. The 'Three State' problem will be resolved by regional policy, diplomacy, and, perhaps, by military maneuvers, not by meetings of the IAEA in Vienna or the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. High-level political leaders must devote themselves to these challenges; the historically standard operating procedure of dispatching arms control and non-proliferation diplomats to deal with issues related to India's, Israel's and Pakistan's nuclear problems will yield no progress.[61]

Having analyzed in-depth the interrelation of nuclear nonproliferation problems with the processes taking place in India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Libya, the U.S. experts proposed several strategic options for ensuring regional stability. Specifically, they suggested:

> The U.S., the European community and Russia must play leading constructive roles in persuading Iran to honor its obligations under the NPT: sign and implement the IAEA

[60] Vladimir Ostropikov. Report at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 19-20, 2003. www.conference.pircenter.org

[61] Rose Gottemoeller and Jon Wolfsthal, "Israel, India and Pakistan: A Solution to be Sought in Regional Security and Politics, Not in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," Report at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 19-20, 2003, www.carnegie.ru/en/news/67475.htm.

> Additional Protocol; stop the acquisition of uranium-enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities (because these are inherently dual-use) in return for strongly guaranteed, cost-beneficial access to low-enriched uranium fuel for power reactors; and end support for organizations that conduct terrorism or otherwise physically subvert the governments of other states. Israel, for its part, must contribute significantly to reversing the Iranian nuclear challenge. The U.S., especially, must encourage Tel Aviv to take steps that would lessen proliferation pressures in Iran (and in Arab states). The U.S. (and others) should acknowledge that Israel's nuclear status is a problem that will be addressed fairly and consistently with all regional states' security.[62]

At the same time, the authors maintain that even if "Iran does soon accede to the Additional Protocol and receives Russian and European Union credit for this cooperation, the U.S., Israel and others will argue correctly that adoption of the Additional Protocol will make Iran's pursuit of weapons capability more visible without preventing it. If, at the same time, Iran (and other states) continues not to recognize Israel's existence, Tel Aviv will interpret this as an intention to destroy Israel. If this perceived intention were backed by nuclear weapon capability, Israel would feel itself mortally threatened and therefore needing to remove such threat or to deter it."[63]

Thus, Gottemoeller and Wolfsthal actually propose that the United States and Russia take concrete political and diplomatic measures to deter and check nuclear proliferation, which, in my view, may be of considerable interest to the U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Working Group.

Of the entire set of instruments of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, coercive measures have been most heatedly debated. The debate reached its climax in the wake of the U.S. and British military operation in Iraq, which resulted

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[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.

in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and the need to address numerous postwar settlement problems. Although temporary, those problems revealed profound differences in the approaches of the member-states of the newly established antiterrorist coalition.

Russian and American experts agree that the use of force may assume a variety of forms and should not necessarily involve a large-scale military operation against the states listed among the violators of the nonproliferation regime.[64] Russian experts have widely discussed the proposal by thirty authoritative U.S. analysts submitted prior to the UN Security Council discussion on Iraq in summer 2002, that WMD could be destroyed by way of "coercive inspections."

Coercive inspections could have been carried out in accordance with a decision by the UN Security Council, been backed by an authorized international force provided with sophisticated high-tech reconnaissance, and deployed in the vicinity of Iraq's borders. Similar proposals were later advanced in Russia as well, specifically by the prominent politician Grigory Yavlinsky. If approved, such a compromise option would have given a chance to disarm Iraq without resorting to a large-scale military operation. Unfortunately, those proposals were not heeded in the United States, which by then had decided to invade Iraq without securing a resolution from the UN Security Council.

The lesson learned from the Iraqi operation is transparent: consolidated counteraction to totalitarian regimes in any form, including by force, is much more effective than unilateral actions. Prospects are strong that relevant mechanisms will be worked out by the G8, whose authority in global policy has been increasing as of late. In any case, the decisions by this

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[64] Vladimir Dvorkin, "Prevention vs. Punishment," *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 1 (November-December 2002); and Alexander Kalyadin, "The Role of Coercion in Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, Moscow, 2003.

authoritative body are likely to be taken into account by the UN Security Council should there arise a need to take emergency measures to solve high-tension regional conflicts.

One joint decision by the G8 and the UN Security Council may be to legitimize UN coercive inspections, backed by various-strength international forces, with a view to verifying compliance with all existing nonproliferation regimes. The above-described coercive procedures could also be applied to the inspection of training bases and strongholds of international terrorist organizations.

Russian expert Alexander Kalyadin maintains that the upsurge of international terrorist activities, proliferation of, and ever easier access to, dual-use technologies, specifically nuclear technology, have accelerated the erosion of the traditional WMD nonproliferation regime and exposed the need to strengthen it with additional, including coercive, measures. In his view, claims that there is no alternative to political and diplomatic measures and that any use of force against violators of the nonproliferation regime is absolutely unacceptable sound even less convincing. Therefore, Kalyadin believes that given the shattered nonproliferation regimes, the international security agenda should include discussion of the need to create a collective potential (of forces and opportunities) to actively oppose violations of the established order. Furthermore, there is a sufficient legislative base in place to make proliferators observe nonproliferation norms. The problem lies in the absence of political will within the international community to use the set of coercive measures provided for by the UN Charter (Chapter VII).[65]

Today, one possible way to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means is "effective combining of the existing international regimes."[66] Two very important players in this field are the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Atomic Energy

[65] Kalyadin, "The Role of Coercion in Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction."
[66] Andrew Kuchins, Report at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 19-20, 2003, www.carnegie.ru/en/news/67475.htm.

Ministry. Their shared interests and close interaction inspire optimism over the strengthening of Russia-U.S. cooperation in dealing with the problems faced by the two countries. In his address to the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham identified the primary tasks set before the United States and Russia in the area of nuclear cooperation, including "steps to shut down reactors producing plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons, helping displaced Russian nuclear scientists and engineers find gainful employment with commercial applications, and…reducing surplus stores of plutonium."[67]

Speaking of the prospects of Russian-U.S. cooperation in the nuclear sphere, Abraham stressed that both the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry had made meaningful progress in attaining the above-described goals. He cited substantial growth of the DOE's budget allocations, specifically for cooperative programs in Russia, as a definite positive factor, and added that the U.S. Congress was certain to meet the DOE's request for increasing its 2004 budget for overall nonproliferation programs to $1.3 billion.

Among the achievements of U.S.-Russian cooperation, Abraham cited the G8 Global Partnership program, the successful implementation of a program for securing nuclear weapons' usable fissile material through comprehensive security upgrades, the HEU to LEU conversion program, and extension and broadening of the Nuclear Cities Initiative program. Commenting on the latter program, the U.S. Energy Secretary announced the allocation of $9 million for the development of a Positron Emission Center in the Russian town of Snezhinsk that would provide state-of-the art medical technologies for diagnosing cancer. He also said that the U.S.

[67] www.carnegie.ru/en/news/67475.htm.

Department of Energy, with assistance from Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry, would "return fresh highly enriched uranium from a research reactor in Romania to Russia."[68]

Abraham specially noted sustained and expanded support of programs funded by the U.S. Congress, which, however, "require[s] not only that the Congress understand that more needs to be done, but also that they believe the money they are spending is being used effectively and efficiently to both meet and exceed the goals to which it is directed."[69]

Welcoming closer bilateral cooperation, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev said, "We should be together...and actively work to ensure...nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile material. Concerning weapons that are now being developed by Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry and the U.S. Department of Energy, those refer to classified R&D information that involves very sensitive technologies. They are protected by the laws of our countries, the way state secrets should be protected. But paradoxical as it may sound, it is due to glasnost, transparency, and open cooperation that we have been able to secure their nonproliferation."[70]

CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of government decisions and actions, as well as scientific reports, surveys and expert commentaries, indicates that the coincidence or similarity of Russian and U.S. positions on the majority of problems related to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means can hardly be regarded as an achievement of the latest period alone. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime

[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.

and associated documents have been in effect for decades. The United States' cooperation with the Soviet Union in the relevant areas was never interrupted—not even during the most difficult Cold War years. The USSR/Russia and the U.S. have always been committed to nonproliferation regimes, although quite often in their activities they were guided by double standards.

In the past decade, the two countries' interaction has intensified not only due to the end of the Cold War, but also because of the emerging crisis of the nonproliferation regimes, above all in nuclear nonproliferation. This interaction has also been affected by the rapid spread of missile technology, the catastrophic aftermath of terrorist acts and the threat of new, more disastrous acts with the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. Over the past two to three years, Russian-U.S. cooperation in the sphere of WMD nonproliferation has grown particularly close, owing to the new foreign policy charted by President Putin, the rapprochement of the two countries in the assessment of new challenges and threats, and the emergence of the G8, with the United States playing the decisive role in helping Russia to implement its WMD destruction programs.

At the same time, having acknowledged Russia's inability to secure or dispose of its weapons of mass destruction on its own and thus agreeing to act as donor states, the U.S., European states and Japan frequently impose conditions on Russia for the provision of their assistance that actually impede the implementation of the WMD destruction programs. Problems related to liability for damage, tax and customs duty payments, access to nuclear facilities, etc., which often build insurmountable barriers in the way of uninterrupted financing, can only be resolved through a consistent search for compromise and, if need be, through intervention by the countries' top-ranking officials.

Most experts agree that, despite certain differences, the most stable cooperation is known to have developed between relatively independent entities, e.g., between Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry and the U.S. Department of Energy, as well as between individual scientists. The role of scientists is especially important. The October 2002 Non-Proliferation Workshop, held in Moscow under the auspices of NTI and hosted by the Russian Academy of Sciences, stated: "We are involved in a race where we bet on our own lives. We are moving neither as fast as we can nor as fast as we should. And we will not gain the required pace until our peoples and governments get a better understanding of the urgency of problems we are faced with; and they will never get that understanding unless the researchers undertake the major role of explaining things to them."[71]

It is Russian and U.S. scientists and specialists, not government officials, who have initiated the development of new lines of action to counter WMD proliferation. These initiatives include the use of coercive measures that have the best chances for being coordinated with the UN Security Council, thereby preventing unilateral actions from undermining the global consolidated effort to meet new challenges.

Recent cooperative efforts include measures to organize joint operations by intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, custom services and border guards; the construction of testing grounds for systems intended to monitor illegal transportation of nuclear and radioactive material; the development of standard radioactivity detection equipment (including mobile systems); and introduction of improved methods of transport vehicle checks.

The major conclusion to be drawn from this overview is that whatever differences the United States and Russia may have, bringing the two nuclear superpowers—who also have the world's

[71] Strengthening the U.S.–Russian Partnership for Nuclear Threat Initiative.

largest chemical and biological weapons stockpiles—closer on their positions on WMD nonproliferation and coordinating practical steps is vital because there is no alternative to their cooperation. To overcome the differences, strenuous efforts will have to be made by Russian and U.S. governments, scientists, and expert communities. Critical issues will surely require the political will of the two countries' top leaders.