Ecopolitics:
Changing the Regional Context of Arab-Israeli Peacemaking

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Preface

This paper was co-authored during six weeks at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, from mid-July to the end of August 2003. We are indebted to Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center, for recognizing the importance of shaping the Middle East regional environment in a way that makes it more conducive for peace, and for offering an ideal setting for the conduct of such an exploration. We are also grateful to Steven Miller, director of the Center's International Security Program, for helping to translate Graham's concept into reality and for inviting us to share our ideas within the framework of this project. We are also truly indebted to the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and to the Harold Grinspoon Foundation for providing the funds that were required to implement this project.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the many members of the Belfer Center and the Kennedy School's administrative and technical staffs who guided us through the maze of the Harvard University bureaucracy. Without them, we would still be lost in one of the great university's "corridors of power."

The paper is written by the directors of two prestigious research institutes: the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo and Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. However, it is important to emphasize that we were engaged in this project as individuals—the views we present are our own and do not reflect our respective institutes, their officers, or the members of their governing institutions.

I. Introduction

In the post–Iraq War era, there are at least two building blocks which together—if properly developed—provide an array of hope for advancing the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace, despite the many obvious reasons for despair with regard to such prospects. The first of these building blocks is the Saudi Initiative as amended and adopted by the 2002 Arab League Summit in Beirut. The Initiative constituted the first attempt by the Arab world at large to shape the regional environment in an effort to pave the road to Palestinian-Israeli peace. The second is the "road map" concluded by the "quartet" (the United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia) in April 2003. The map comprises the first framework accepted, albeit with some reservations, by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) since the outbreak of violence in September 2000.

This paper focuses on this array of hope and suggests a *modus operandi* for using these building blocks to enhance the prospects of Arab-Israeli peace. Thus, rather than proposing formulas for resolving the various issues that divide Palestinians and Israelis or suggesting alternative approaches to the negotiations process, it focuses on shaping the regional environment for Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking and on weaving the steps entailed in such improvement into the road map framework. In other words, it is an effort to affect the two parties' incentive structures in ways that would make it easier for them to travel down the road marked on the quartet-inspired map.

In so doing, the ecology of the political process will change to allow the parties to enter into a process of constructive bargaining. The resulting more positive ecopolitics of the conflict would allow the parties' leaders not only greater maneuverability in dealing with the issues, but also a better vantage point from which they would be able to mobilize their respective constituencies for peace.

In adopting this ecopolitical approach, we assume that the components of ultimate Israeli-Palestinian peace will not deviate significantly from the "bridging proposals" presented by President Bill Clinton to the two parties in late December 2000—principles that were referred to publicly in a speech delivered by the president in New York in early January 2001 (see Appendix A). These proposals, which later in the month served as the basis for the Palestinian-Israeli talks at Taba, were aimed at establishing peace based on Israel's withdrawal more or less to the 1967 lines, the establishment of a non-militarized Palestinian state, the division of Jerusalem, and a just solution for the Palestinian refugees that does not compromise Israel's character as a Jewish state and is subject to the sovereign decision of the states involved. This still leaves the parties with an enormous challenge: to figure out how to get "from here to there"—from continued confrontation to negotiating and implementing an agreement or set of agreements that would bring their conflict to an end.

Our focus on shaping the regional environment does not detract from the importance of other approaches to improving the chances of Palestinian-Israeli peace. These other approaches include suggesting different phases for progress toward ultimate peace—the road map proposed by the quartet in April 2003 constitutes precisely such a suggestion. Equally, it is important to continue thinking about the components of a permanent status agreement. The detailed document concluded in early 2003 by Yossi Beilin and Yassir Abdul Rabu constitutes a real contribution toward such an endeavor. The emphasis placed here on the regional environment of the negotiations process is meant to supplement—not substitute for—these other approaches.

In exploring the possibility of shaping the Middle East regional environment, emphasis is placed here on the role of key Arab states: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. For different reasons, these states possess the standing,

hold the prestige, and carry the weight allowing them great influence over the region's shape. But such standing, prestige, and weight also bestow upon these countries a special responsibility: together with the United States, they should do everything possible to create the conditions for the Israelis and Palestinians to overcome their differences. Indeed, what these countries can do in the service of Palestinian-Israeli peace is a main focus of this paper.

The importance we attach to the regional environment of the negotiations process is at least partly propelled by our view that the parties' positions in these negotiations are largely a product of their respective domestic debates. Accordingly, Israel and the Palestinians can both be seen as arenas of struggle between moderates and extremists; between those committed to co-existence and making every effort to seek a resolution to the conflict, and those who seek to exist at the expense of the other—to seek the other side's defeat. Thus a different way to formulate the question we address is to ask: What can the region's key states do to affect the domestic debates among Israelis and among Palestinians so that the moderates on both sides would have a better chance to prevail?

Our main hypothesis is that this question is not abstract—the moderates on both sides may ultimately triumph, but for this to happen, a friendlier regional environment is necessary. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that, in making this assumption, we are not unrealistic. In their struggle against the fanatics and extremists, these moderates have acquired a number of important assets over the years.

First is the gradual transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from an existential conflict to a struggle about the *modus vivendi* between the Jewish state and the Arab states in the Middle East. Indeed, under present conditions, conducting full-scale conventional wars similar to the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars is no longer conceivable. Even the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute—the most complex component of the Arab-Israeli conflict—has changed in the aftermath of Oslo, with Israel's recognition of the PLO and the Palestinians' commitment to a negotiated end of the conflict.

Second, the peace treaties concluded between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Jordan in 1979 and in 1994, respectively, have not been reneged upon or violated. Although these treaties have experienced a significant cooling as a result of the second Intifada—Egypt recalled its ambassador and Jordan has refrained from nominating a new one—they have endured many pressures. This is particularly true for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, now in its twenty-fourth year. The latter has sustained years of tension and violence on the Palestinian front (including the first Intifada), an extended legal dispute with Israel over Taba, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and its presence there during the following eighteen years. All efforts by radicals in the region to persuade Egypt to abandon its peace with Israel and to return to a

policy of confrontation have failed. Instead, President Mubarak has made it clear that Egypt has no intention of heeding such advice.

Third, there is significant evolution in Palestinian and Israeli public opinion favoring a move toward accommodation. While many Palestinians admire the young martyrs willing to sacrifice their lives in a desperate effort to balance Israel's preponderance of power, most support a return to negotiations that might result in Palestinian independence through diplomacy, not violence. Meanwhile, a growing number of Israelis—for a variety of demographic, economic, and other reasons—favor separation from the Palestinians. Ultimately, such separation is bound to result in the end of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Fourth is an emerging international consensus that the consequences of failing to end the Middle East conflict may be horrific. Such costs range from the further fueling of international terrorism—as hatred of the United States seems to be tied to the perception that it provides unqualified support to Israel's policy in the conflict—to the possible use of weapons of mass destruction in an era characterized by the further spread of such weapons.

In turn, fear of the consequences of failing to resolve the conflict seems to contribute to a new international consensus to the effect that the Arab-Israeli conflict must be brought to an end. While not all members of this new consensus necessarily agree on the causes of the conflict and on the measures that must be taken to bring the dispute to an end, the road map adopted by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia represents a common front favoring a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Fifth, the Iraq War has resulted in the elimination of one of the most radical regimes in the Middle East—tilting the balance of power in the region decidedly in favor of its more moderate governments. In its orientation toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, the new Iraqi political elite does not deviate much from its counterparts in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf states. These countries seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict based on the principle of exchanging land for peace. In addition, the military capabilities of Iraq, a country Israel considered a major threat, have been eliminated, bringing an end to any serious talk of possible creation of an "eastern front" against Israel. This, in turn, should make Israel more flexible with regard to certain assets that were previously considered essential to its defense.

Finally, the war in Iraq has induced the United States to re-involve itself in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Such involvement has been a central element of the Middle East peace process over the past three decades. This was the case not because the Arab states or the Palestinians considered Washington to be an honest broker and not because Israel expected the United States to act like one, but rather because the Arab side has come to recognize that the United States is the only power capable of affecting Israel's priorities, positions, and policies. In

the aftermath of the war in Iraq, the need to balance its current image in the Arab world as a bully determined to exercise military hegemony, if not neo-colonialism, in the Middle East—and the parallel desire to meet the priority of its principle ally in the war, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair—have combined to induce the Bush administration to launch a new effort to resolve the conflict.

While these assets are quite robust, they face a set of factors that weigh in favor of perpetuating the conflict.

First, among both Israelis and Palestinians, many are committed, on ideological and other grounds, to reject if not actively prevent any resolution of the conflict that requires compromising the purity of their beliefs. Many Arabs continue to oppose Israel's existence, viewing it as a foreign element in the Middle East and as a colonial power that must be fought in the same way that other colonial powers have been fought and defeated. And some Israelis, who insist on their country's responsibility to exercise the Jewish people's historical right to the entire Land of Israel, continue to be adamantly opposed to any peace plan based on the re-partition of Palestine.

Second, the extremists on both sides tacitly support one another in their effort to influence the mainstream in the two societies. Thus, extremists among both Israelis and Palestinians can point to the extremists on the other side—and to evidence that the other side's leadership is a captive of such extremists—to argue that the chances of reaching accommodation are meager at best. Each side cites the statements produced by the extremists on the other side and takes them as representing a monolithic position of the other party.

Third, extremism on both sides is fueled by reciprocal fear and much mirror imaging. Thus, Palestinians suspect that Israel is bent on colonizing the West Bank and Gaza; they fear that whenever an opportunity to do so would arise, Israel would use its preponderant power to freeze any peace process after the Palestinians make major concessions but before they achieve a viable independent state.

Similarly, many Israelis fear that the Palestinians are determined to destroy the Jewish state, and that even if tactical considerations propel them to reach agreements with Israel, these agreements will be violated at the first opportunity—either because a deeply embedded "culture of violence" would induce the Palestinians to revert to terror and violence the instant that any disagreement might arise, or because once present demographic trends have taken their course, the Palestinians would renege on their commitment to a two-state solution and demand that Israel-Palestine become one state in which Jews lose their majority status.

Finally, extremism on both sides is fed by domestic politics. Thus, struggles over succession among Palestinians as well as in Israel are often waged by accusing rivals of "caving in" to the other side—very rarely do contenders for power compete for pragmatism or sensitivity to the other side's needs. In

Israel, a sure way for the Likud party to have defeated Labor leaders was to accuse them of proposing to "divide Jerusalem." Similarly, moderate Palestinians were defeated by depicting them as neglecting to insist on the refugees' "Right of Return." This, despite the fact that some survey data suggest that few Palestinian refugees expect to be able to exercise this right inside Israel.

The purpose of this paper is to ascertain ways in which the ecopolitics of the conflict can be rearranged to shift the balance between these contending forces in the Israeli and Palestinian societies away from conflict and violence and toward coexistence and moderation. Significantly, the exploration is embedded in reality. Hence, instead of suggesting some other framework for attempts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict—which is in and of itself also an important and worthy task—this study takes the road map as a point of departure. That is, it assumes that current efforts to implement the road map are "the only game in town." Hence, the question addressed here is: Can the ecology of the peace process be shaped in a way that increases the odds that the road map will be implemented effectively?

Following this brief introduction, the study consists of five parts.

The first part explains the fate of the two parties' first attempt to resolve their conflict. It describes the essence of the Oslo "grand bargain"; it portrays the competing narratives about the reasons for the failure of Oslo; it elaborates the structural deficiencies of the Oslo process; it explains how, in the summer of 2000, the two parties tried to compensate for these deficiencies by negotiating a comprehensive "permanent status" agreement; and, finally, it illustrates how the failure of that bold attempt led, by late 2000, to the initiation of three years of terrible violence.

The second part of the study shows how the Palestinians' failure to achieve anything through violence—and Israel's failure to suppress the violence solely through the application of military means—has caused a change of heart on both sides. It also analyzes the effects of the war in Iraq on the prospects for Palestinian-Israeli peace and shows how the war led to the present attempts to rekindle the peace process.

The third part of the paper elucidates the two essential building blocks for a newly invigorated process: the Saudi Initiative—the first proposal to shape the regional environment in an effort to improve the road to Palestinian-Israeli peace—and the road map concluded by the quartet and launched by the Bush administration in April 2003. The chapter will show how and with what amendments the Saudi Initiative was adopted by the Arab League during its 2002 summit meeting in Beirut. It will attempt to explain why nothing has happened on that front since the League's 2002 meeting—why no effort was made since the summit to compel the parties to implement the plan. And, finally, the chapter will illuminate the road map—explaining its logic and the various phases it envisions for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.

The fourth part will elaborate how the Arab Initiative could be translated into reality. That is, it will attempt to answer the following question: If the Statement adopted at the end of the Arab League meeting in Beirut is to be regarded as a skeleton of a plan to shape the regional environment, what would such a scheme look like if meat and skin were to be added? And if this enhanced Arab Initiative is regarded as intending to increase the odds that the road map would be implemented, how could such an effect be maximized? How can an improved regional context increase the likelihood that the obstacles confronting the efforts to implement the road map will be overcome?

The fifth section will attempt to define what needs to happen for the proposal suggested here to be adopted. That is, if the main thrust of the paper addresses what key Arab states can do to change the incentive structure of the Palestinians and Israelis in a manner encouraging them to take greater risks for peace, this final section will ask how an incentive structure for the key Arab states can be shaped to encourage them to perform the role assigned to them in this proposal.

II. From Hope to Violence: 1993–2000

The Oslo Grand Bargain

In September 1993, after having fought one another for nearly three decades, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP) for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. The DOP, better known as the Oslo accords, comprised a grand bargain that entailed significant concessions from both sides and raised equally great expectations. Widely regarded as a historical breakthrough, the Oslo DOP won its principal signatories—Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and Chairman Yassir Arafat—the Nobel Prize for Peace.

From Israel's standpoint, the Oslo grand bargain required two significant concessions. The first was the abandonment of the dream of Israeli sovereignty over the entire Land of Israel. Instead, control over parts of the Land was to be gradually transferred to the Palestinians. As a result, the Palestinians were to gain control for the first time over territory that was previously ruled by the Ottoman Empire, British Empire, Egypt, and Jordan, and later Israel—but never before by Palestinians.

The second Israeli concession was its recognition of the PLO—previously regarded as a terrorist organization—as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin had now come around to accepting the PLO as Israel's primary interlocutor—and the PLO's leader, Yassir Arafat, as his primary partner—for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.

From the Palestinians' standpoint, the Oslo accords were associated with equally significant, if not greater, concessions. The first was the PLO's willingness for the first time to enter into an "open-ended" process—that is, one based on the gradual implementation of partial agreements that were not contingent on a prior understanding about the contours of a final agreement settling the two peoples' dispute. This, in turn, required that the Palestinians overcome their long standing fears of an open-ended process—namely, that Israel would use its superior assets to freeze the process before implementing the most painful of the concessions required of it.

The second major Palestinian concession was their stated commitment to end the armed phase of their national struggle—that is, to abandon violence as a means of achieving their aims. Thereafter, the PLO committed itself to direct all its efforts to realize the Palestinians' aspirations and goals through negotiations.

What motivated the Israelis and the Palestinians to make these enormous concessions? Primarily, each was driven by one overriding consideration. For the Israelis, ending the war with the Palestinians was meant to restore personal safety and security; that is, peace was expected to liberate Israel's civilian population from the fear of being attacked. For the Palestinians, the Oslo process was to end Israeli occupation of their land. Primarily, Palestinians expected that the humiliating aspects of Israel's control would disappear: the checkpoints, the roadblocks, and the closures.

But Israelis and Palestinians alike were soon disappointed by the outcome of the Oslo and post-Oslo agreements. Palestinians were dismayed because, for all practical purposes, many of the hardships and humiliations involved in Israel's presence in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem continued. As Israel remained in control of all access routes in the territories, most checkpoints and roadblocks—where Palestinians felt they were humiliated and harassed—were kept in place.

And where real changes did take place, they were not always for the better. Thus, with its withdrawal from the large Palestinian cities, Israel's security services could no longer exercise physical presence where most Palestinians reside. Instead, they now had to rely on defensive measures. Yet these measures—primarily the closures applied in reaction to most terrorist attacks—involved new hardships for the Palestinians, with devastating effects on their economy.

Palestinians were also disappointed with whatever transfers of territory to their control did take place because such transfers were implemented grudgingly and never on schedule. Consistent with Rabin's approach to the effect that "there are no sacred timetables," this Israeli failure to comply with agreed-upon timetables took its toll in eroding the Palestinians' confidence in the process.

Israel's continued settlement activities extracted even higher costs in eroding the Palestinians' confidence and goodwill. The latter regarded the building of new settlements and the further construction of housing units in

existing settlements as contradicting the spirit and purpose of the Oslo and post-Oslo agreements. If the purpose of the process was to end Israel's occupation and allow an amicable divorce between the two communities, why, asked the Palestinians, did Israel continue activities that were bound to make such a divorce more difficult? Hence, the building of additional settlements—often misrepresented by Israel as mere extensions of existing ones—and the construction of additional housing units in existing settlements, further eroded the Palestinians' faith in the process.

During the post-Oslo years, the Palestinians were particularly dismayed by the meager progress made during the tenure of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (1996–1999). Netanyahu was seen as making every attempt to reverse the Oslo process by delaying the transfer of territory to Palestinian hands. In fact, his insistence on strict Palestinian compliance with commitments made, and on making Israeli "delivery" contingent on such compliance, was regarded by the Palestinians as mere excuses to avoid full implementation of Israel's obligations under the post-Oslo implementation accords.

Yet Israelis were just as dismayed with the realities of the post-Oslo years. As noted earlier, the Israelis' primary expectation with regard to Oslo was that the accords reached would bring an end to the violence. For this reason, the continuation of Palestinian terrorism was a source of great disappointment. While Rabin and, later, Peres at times presented the victims of such attacks as "casualties of peace," the population refused to be comforted by such depictions. Indeed, people saw the continued terror neither as random acts nor as confined to the work of Palestinian opposition groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Rather, they came to view Arafat—Israel's primary interlocutor—as responsible for the continued killings.

The gradual evolution of Israeli perception of Arafat as "part of the problem, not part of the solution" was based on the observation that, until late 1996, Arafat avoided a confrontation with the Palestinian opposition groups; that, through what was then called the "green light-yellow light" policy, he signaled his interest in maintaining some level of violence in order to extract greater Israeli concessions; that, even after 1996, Arafat continued the policy of the "revolving door" whereby at best perpetrators of terror acts were apprehended by the PA security services only to be released shortly afterwards; and that, instead of preparing his population for peace, Arafat allowed incitement against Israelis to continue in the Palestinian media. In short, Arafat was seen as responsible for maintaining an atmosphere that remained conducive to continued acts of violence and terrorism.

The disappointment of Israelis and Palestinians with the Oslo accords was not surprising given the structural deficiencies of the process.

First, while there were ample reasons for basing the process on the principle of gradualism—at the time that the process was initiated, the gap

between the parties' positions seemed too wide for a "permanent status" agreement to be concluded—it provided those who were determined to sabotage the process with ample opportunities to do so. The opponents—who objected to the process on historical or religious grounds—could exercise violence (on the Palestinian side) or establish new settlements and strongholds (on the Israeli side) to destroy whatever measure of goodwill existed among the two communities in the immediate aftermath of Oslo. Consequently, instead of a confidence-building process, the post-Oslo period became a confidence-destroying process.

Second, confidence was further destroyed because of the inability to enforce the agreements reached and to hold the parties strictly accountable for their conduct. Thus, compliance failures were tolerated, socializing the parties to the effect that it was not necessary to adhere fully to agreements reached.

Third, instead of bringing the parties closer to the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the post-Oslo process deteriorated as each agreement became merely a partial implementation agreement of the previously concluded partial agreement. Not surprisingly, Palestinians were frustrated at the slow rate of progress toward their ultimate goal.

Fourth, the post-Oslo process suffered from the imbalance of power between the negotiating parties. As Israel enjoyed a preponderance of power and held almost all the assets, it could claim that any concession it made was "generous." It also sought to control the outcome of talks. A good example of this was the assertion of the Netanyahu government—supported by the Clinton administration—that Israel has the right to determine unilaterally the size of the third redeployment (FRD).

Fifth, this imbalance was exacerbated further by the key role played by the United States as the pre-eminent facilitator and mediator. The very close ties between the United States and Israel resulted in much suspicion on the Palestinian side that Washington's conduct was not impartial.

Sixth, the leaders and elites on both sides failed to place the process in the context of a greater geoeconomic vision. They rejected suggestions of a "new Middle East" as divorced from the region's geopolitical realities. Hence, no equivalent of the European Union was ever adopted as a reference point or desired "end state" of the process.

Finally, the peace process failed to transcend government-to-government arrangements and become a people-to-people peace. The sole exception to this was the agreed-upon economic interactions. But these were not accompanied by a serious effort to deal at the human level with the historical and cultural complexities affecting the two peoples' relations.

2000: The Effort to End the Conflict

By the year 2000, frustration with the Oslo process led to the most daring attempt to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict via a "permanent status" agreement. Under the auspices of U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat were summoned to Camp David in an effort to replicate the breakthrough achieved some 22 years earlier by U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. But despite Clinton's best efforts, Camp David II ended in failure.

There appear to be many reasons for the failure to replace the Oslo process with a negotiated end to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Most Israelis believe that, while Barak had made every attempt to reach an agreement with Arafat, the latter failed to rise to the occasion. Preferring to avoid the associated costs and the risks entailed in admitting to his Palestinian constituents—in the territories and in the Diaspora—that not all their dreams and aspirations could be fulfilled, Arafat instead opted for rejecting the deal offered.

By the later phases of the Camp David summit, Barak is said to have offered the Palestinians a state, to be located in some 90–95 percent of Gaza and the West Bank; to withdraw a very large number of Israeli settlements; and to re-divide Jerusalem, thus allowing the Palestinians to establish their capital there. In exchange, Israel demanded that these concessions "close the file," thus ending the conflict. In legal terms, this meant that, following the implementation of the deal, there would be no further recourse against one or both of the negotiating parties.

Israel's demand that negotiations for a "permanent status" agreement would result in an end to the conflict was embedded in at least two realities: first, Barak, like Clinton, sought to write his legacy, hoping to place his record in a positive light. Ending the one-hundred-year conflict with the Palestinians would have certainly ensured Barak's place in history. Second, Israel's prime minister estimated that, without the promise that the conflict would be ended, the Israeli public would not approve the far-reaching concessions that were demanded of Israel. Hence, the pragmatic basis for the "end-of-conflict" demand.

By contrast, Israelis viewed Arafat's rejection of the offers made by Barak at Camp David as a triumph of dogmatism over pragmatism. In Israel's eyes, this rejection reflected Arafat's failure to prepare the Palestinian people for peace and his unwillingness to explain to them why some of their aspirations could not be realized. It also manifested Arafat's failure to stick to the tacit understanding that the purpose of the negotiations was to undo the results of the 1967 war, not to redraw the consequences of 1948. Instead, as Arafat and his associates later boasted, they insisted at Camp David that the Palestinians' Right of Return should not be compromised.

Another component of the failure to reach an accord at Camp David was the lack of coordination among key Arab states to support Arafat's effort to negotiate an agreement with Israel. Instead, when word of what had transpired at Camp David II spread, Arafat was widely criticized in the Arab world for his willingness to negotiate some division of sovereignty over the Holy Basin (Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. The future of the city, he was told, was an Arab and a Muslim issue—not a matter for the Palestinians to decide.

To be sure, different regional players had different reasons for being less than completely supportive of the U.S.-led efforts in Camp David. For example, Egyptian leaders pointed out that, since they were never truly consulted when Clinton decided to convene the summit, it was unreasonable to expect them to support the attempt once it began to fall apart. This and other justifications notwithstanding, the important point is that, instead of encouraging Palestinian flexibility, the negotiators' regional environment appeared to be fostering greater Palestinian "intransigence," as Israelis would call it, or "steadfastness," as Arabs would call it.

The Palestinian analysis of the failure at Camp David is no less compelling. The summit, they argue, was convened prematurely, its timing dictated by the electoral calendars of Israel and the United States. While an effort to achieve a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli agreement needed much preparation, Arafat was compelled to attend the hastily prepared meeting in July, the timing of which was dictated by the fact that Clinton was about to leave office and that general elections in Israel had already been scheduled for early 2001.

Palestinians also argue that by the time the negotiators convened at Camp David, Arafat had lost all trust in Barak. This began soon after Barak came into office, when he insisted on amending the only agreement that Arafat had reached with his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu: the Wye River accords. Barak was also seen as having reneged on a number of promises that he had made, primarily those related to prisoner release and the transfer of a number of villages in the Jerusalem vicinity to the PA's control.

By mid-2000, Arafat was also said to have become extremely skeptical about Barak's ability to "deliver" on any agreement reached. By then, the Israeli prime minister had already lost important members of his governing coalition. Hence, it was far from certain that he would possess the votes required to obtain the Knesset's approval of an agreement with the Palestinians. At the same time, it was also unlikely that Barak could bypass the Knesset by subjecting the results of the negotiations to public approval through a national referendum. Since only a preferred majority in the Knesset could approve the precise wording of the question to be posed to the public, a prime minister who lacked a majority to ratify an agreement would also lack the majority to approve a proposed referendum.

The Palestinians further argue that it is unfair to present their approach as dogmatic and their rejection of an offer to create a state on some 90 percent of the West Bank and Gaza as unreasonable, because even a complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines would permit the establishment of a Palestinian state over no more than 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine; accepting a state limited by these boundaries is already a huge concession. Yet at Camp David, they were asked to accept even less than a complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines—leaving Palestinians with less than 22 percent of the land that they regard as their own.

Palestinians also stress that Israel's opening positions at Camp David guaranteed that the talks would be long and tiresome. In this context, they place special emphasis on Israel's opening demand to retain permanent sovereignty over Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. The Palestinians were apparently infuriated by this demand, which in their eyes signaled a lack of seriousness on the Israeli side.

Beyond these objections, additional problems seem to have hampered the effort to achieve a Palestinian-Israeli permanent status agreement. The most important of these was Barak's decision to spend most of his first year in office on an attempt to reach an agreement with Syria despite the fact that Barak was not truly prepared to reach such an accord under terms acceptable to President Assad. When, in April 2000, the Clinton-Assad summit in Geneva finally clarified that such an agreement was not to be achieved, very little time was left for a sustained effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict before Clinton was to leave office.

Another problem was associated with "ending the conflict" as the definition of the "end state" of the negotiations process. Retrospectively, the Palestinians argued that, while a peace agreement is a commonly accepted and widely understood political term, an "end of conflict" is a historical—not a political—concept. They further argue that, by bringing history to the negotiations table, Israel compelled the Palestinians to bring their history to the table as well. This in turn forced the latter to insist that the Right of Return should be fulfilled.

President Clinton, having placed his personal prestige on the line in a last-ditch effort to achieve a breakthrough, was disappointed with both sides. However, he was especially angered by what he viewed as Arafat's refusal to engage him, let alone Barak, in an honest effort to reach an agreement. Thus, Arafat was seen as rejecting all suggestions for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli dispute without presenting serious counterproposals of his own.

The view that Arafat did not negotiate "in good faith" at Camp David led Clinton to finger-point him publicly as responsible for the failure to reach an agreement. By contrast, Barak was praised even in Europe for his daring and courage to abandon almost every "article of faith" of Israeli politico-military

history since 1967: re-partition of the land, re-division of Jerusalem, and withdrawal from settlements. However, the failure of the Camp David process had changed the ecopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian interactions from negotiations and bargaining to confrontation: the second Intifada and the election of the Sharon-led Likud government.

The Violence of 2000–2003

A highly charged visit to Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem by Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon on September 28, 2000, led to large-scale Palestinian protests. These escalated following the results of the initial clash between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli police—seven Palestinians dead. This, in turn, led to large-scale clashes between Israeli Arabs and the police, leaving some 13 Israeli Arabs dead. The nearly three years of violent struggle between Palestinians and Israelis that ensued have come to be known as "the second Intifada" (the "first Intifada" refers to the clashes in 1988–1990 that preceded the Oslo accords).

From an Israeli point of view, Arafat's decision to permit the violence to develop—if not to encourage its escalation—was initially propelled by tactical considerations. Portrayed in the United States and Europe as responsible for the collapse of the Camp David summit, Arafat was quick to realize the opportunities embedded in the evolving violence. Now, instead of dwelling on his failings, television screens all over the world were filled with scenes of well-armed Israeli soldiers attempting to suppress rock-throwing Palestinian youth. From the Palestinians' standpoint, nothing could better illustrate which side constitutes the "David" and which constitutes the "Goliath" in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

With time, Israelis viewed Arafat as having supplemented this tactical advantage by a number of strategic objectives. Most important among them was the hope that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would be internationalized as was the conflict in the Balkans, with foreign troops sent to impose and enforce peace. But for this to take place, the international community had to first be convinced that Israel was "a second Serbia." To that end, Israel needed to be enticed to apply draconian measures to stem the violence.

As understood by Israelis, Arafat's second strategic hope was that the cumulative weight of the violence, including its many indirect effects, would break the will of Israelis in much the same fashion as Hizbollah did in South Lebanon. If this were achieved, the Palestinians could chase Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza without making any compromises, without undertaking any commitments, and without assuming any obligations.

As noted earlier, the Palestinians have made some tactical gains—they have made the most of the television pictures that the second Intifada had produced, especially in its earlier phases. Moreover, they have succeeded in

persuading the international community that the struggle was about Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, and that once this occupation ends, the conflict will be over. But this gain was partial and temporary. As Palestinian resistance became more violent, and especially as suicide bombings with horrific consequences to innocent civilians became more frequent, the Palestinians lost much of the moral high ground gained in the opening weeks and months of the second Intifada.

The failure of Camp David affected political behavior in Israel as well. Primarily, it strengthened those on the right who had argued that the willingness of the Labor-led government to make far-reaching concessions was to no avail. Not only did Barak fail to achieve peace, but the result was also the eruption of Palestinian violence. Not surprisingly, this change led to the landslide victory of the Sharon-led Likud in the February 6, 2001, Israeli elections.

Sharon assumed, first, that peace with the Arab states—certainly with the Palestinians—was not possible under conditions acceptable to Israel. Instead, Israel would strive for interim arrangements that would allow the Palestinians control over 42 percent of the West Bank. The rest would be determined in the framework of future negotiations after the Palestinians proved their willingness to co-exist peacefully alongside Israel. At any rate, even in the framework of permanent status negotiations, Israel was to retain control of the Jordan Valley. There would be no discussion of eliminating existing settlements, accepting Palestinian refugees, or dividing Jerusalem.

Second, Sharon assumed that, in order to return to the negotiations table, Israeli deterrence must first be restored. Such deterrence was seen as having been damaged seriously as a result of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, so much so that the Palestinian decision to launch the second Intifada was seen as a direct consequence of Israel's hurried escape from Lebanon.

The third premise resulted from the first two: namely, given that permanent peace is impossible and that Israeli deterrence has eroded, a concerted effort must be made to reduce Palestinian expectations. This was regarded as particularly important in order to ensure that, if Palestinian-Israeli negotiations were ever renewed, the concessions discussed by Barak and his negotiators at Camp David and Taba would not become the starting point of such talks.

III. A New Beginning? From Despair to Hope

While the three years of violence and destruction have resulted in enormous despair regarding the chances of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict peacefully, by mid-2003 the costs of the violence, the Palestinians' failure to achieve anything through such violence, and Israel's failure to suppress the

violence solely through the application of military means have caused changes of heart on both sides. The consequences of the war in Iraq have reinforced this change, producing the first serious opportunity for resuming Palestinian-Israeli negotiations since the violence began in September 2000.

Changes of Heart

As a result of the cumulative costs of the violence and of the measures taken to stem it, by mid-2003, both Israelis and Palestinians have shown signs of exhaustion. The Palestinians have suffered much higher casualties—their total dead had reached over 3,000, according to reliable estimates. Also, their economy was completely shattered by devastation and the inability of tens of thousands of Palestinians to reach their places of employment in Israel. Concurrently, an increasing number of Palestinians and Israelis had reached the conclusion that their strategic objectives cannot be achieved through confrontation and war.

Indeed, despite the many hardships they endured, the Palestinians failed to achieve anything of strategic significance during these years of rage. The conflict was not to be internationalized—even the claim made by the PA in April 2002 that a massacre had taken place in Jenin did not galvanize the international community to inject forces into the region. Nor was the will of Israelis broken to produce results similar to those achieved by Hizbollah in South Lebanon. To the Palestinians' chagrin, there has been no significant outcry within Israel against the government's policy and there has been no significant call for unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Quite the opposite—Israelis continue to support every measure that their government has taken to stem the violence, including the "targeted killing" of terrorists and terror leaders. Politically, this hard line was manifested in the election and re-election of Ariel Sharon as prime minister.

The extent of the strategic catastrophe experienced by the Palestinians as a result of the nearly three years of violence can be appreciated by noting their losses in three additional realms. First, their efforts to build government institutions have been set back significantly, destroying much of their initial successes in building "state-in-being" structures. Second, the Palestinians' turn to violence has taken the rug out from under the "pro-peace camp" in Israel, discrediting those who have made the Palestinians' case within Israel's internal debate.

Finally, but very significantly, the U.S. attitude toward them has suffered a huge setback. This is manifested in a dramatic change from the close ties that Arafat had built with President Clinton during the 1990s—with their peak in Clinton's opening of the international airport in Gaza and his speech in the Palestinian National Council in 1998—to the refusal of President Bush to meet with him.

By early 2002, many Palestinian leaders had already reached the conclusion that the militarization of the Intifada was a huge mistake. However, for some time they refrained from expressing their misgivings about Arafat's strategy except in closed quarters. Only a year later, in early 2003, in an article by Nabil Amre and later in a speech by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), have these leaders made their self-critical analysis of the consequences of the violence public.

The sharp change of heart at the leadership level of the political mainstream coincided with the cumulative effect of the costs of the violence on the Palestinian street. By mid-2003, even the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad—the main Palestinian Islamic opposition groups—had no choice but to heed the cries of their rank and file for a respite in the hardships resulting from the measures taken by Israel to stem the violence. Consequently, they could not sustain their resistance to Egypt's efforts to persuade them to accept an armistice in the struggle against Israel.

Meanwhile, a number of significant parallel developments on the Israeli side have joined to create the conditions for a re-launching of peacemaking efforts. The first has been the growing perception in Israel that Palestinian violence—and the heavy toll it extracts in human lives, in economic costs, in affecting the Israelis' sense of security, and in forcing a change in their lifestyle—will not be ended by military means alone and that, consequently, Israel's security problems cannot be solved solely by the application of coercive means. And, in the view of some Arabs, the Israeli government gradually also realized that its strategic objective of lowering the expectations of the Palestinians did not materialize.

In addition, Israelis have become increasingly concerned that their efforts to suppress Palestinian violence through the application of superior firepower have resulted in a public relations debacle (particularly in Europe) and a significant cooling in their relations with Arab states (particularly Egypt and Jordan, but also with the North African and Persian Gulf states) while failing to affect the Palestinians' ultimate objectives.

The second development on the Israeli side has been the growing sensitivity to demography—the fact that Jews comprise only 53 percent of the population residing between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River and that among the population under the age of 15, Palestinians already constitute a large majority. With the latter statistic pointing to the direction of the present demographic trend, an increasing number of Israelis have reached the conclusion that, in the long run, it would be impossible to maintain Israel's character as both a Jewish and a democratic state unless it disassociates itself from its Palestinian neighbors by granting the latter independent statehood. While most Israelis prefer that such a divorce be negotiated, the urgency they have come to attribute to this imperative can be deduced by the

degree to which they now express support for implementing such separation unilaterally.

The third development concerns the cumulative economic effects of the violence. The economic costs sustained by Israel as a result of the second Intifada are difficult to measure, because the sharp decline in economic growth sustained since late 2000 can be attributed, at least in part, to two other factors: first, the general slow-down in the global markets to which Israel's economy is heavily tied; and second, the particular crisis in the global high-tech sector—the prime locomotive of the economic growth that Israel experienced in the 1990s. By mid-2003, however, an increasing number of Israelis have become convinced that even if the present negative global economic trends are reversed, and even if Israel's macro-economic policy is perfected, its national economy will not experience renewed growth unless the cycle of violence and counter-violence is ended and a climate conducive to investments is recreated.

The Effects of the War in Iraq

The war in Iraq has had a number of consequences that have boosted the impact of the developments that took place in the region at large and among Israel and the Palestinians in particular, over the previous year and a half. The first important result of the war was the elimination of Saddam Hussein's regime—the most reckless in the region—and the destruction of Iraq's offensive military capabilities. In turn, these developments have shifted the balance of power in the region away from the radicals and in favor of the more moderate and pragmatic leaders in the region.

This shift in the balance was further reinforced by the psychological impact of the war on a number of other governments in the region, notably Syria and Iran. With the United States having established itself as these countries' neighbor and having just demonstrated its will and capacity to liquidate a member of the "axis of evil," the leaders of Syria and Iran had no choice but to exercise caution in the support they provide and in the freedom of action which they allow groups and movements like Hamas and Hizbollah. This explains, at least in part, why Hizbollah has refrained from initiating major incidents along the Israel-Lebanon border during most of 2003.

In addition, the war in Iraq has intensified Egypt's involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli sphere. This was manifested in the key role that Egypt had played in persuading the Palestinian opposition groups to accept an armistice in the violent struggle against Israel and in compelling Arafat to allow the nomination of a new Palestinian cabinet that included Muhammad Dahlan as minister of internal security.

On the Palestinian side, the most significant development has been the nomination of a new cabinet originally headed by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu

Mazen). This was very important because Abbas and Dahlan have been among the most vocal in arguing that the turn to violence has been a strategic disaster for the Palestinians and that this course must be reversed. Thus, their nominations signified that in the immediate post-war environment, those who favor an end to the violence and a return to diplomacy have gained the upper hand.

On the Israeli side, the war in Iraq has had a number of ramifications favoring greater moderation. First, the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime and the resulting relative strengthening of the more moderate governments in the region have increased Israel's sense of confidence, and correspondingly, its assessment that it can take greater risks for peace.

Second, Iraq's defeat, and with it the collapse of any danger that an "eastern front" threatening Israel might emerge, has diminished the importance of certain assets that previously were considered a key to Israel's defense, e.g., the Jordan Valley. In principle, this should provide Israel greater flexibility in future negotiations.

Third, the war provided another manifestation of the close ties that have developed between the United States and Israel, and more recently, between the Bush administration and the Sharon government. These close ties were reflected in the stationing in Israel of U.S. missile defense units and their training with their Israeli counterparts; in the detailed coordination between Bush and Sharon regarding the manner in which Israel might have responded in case it were attacked; and, in the direct financial assistance and government loan guarantees provided by the United States to Israel.

In turn, the close U.S.-Israeli ties have had two effects on the Israeli discourse. First, they provided another layer to Israel's confidence. Second, it increased Israel's dependence on the Bush administration. With his investment in building relations with the United States having paid off, Prime Minister Sharon now found himself unable to say "no" to President Bush.

All these developments resulted in—and were simultaneously affected by—the most important ramification of the war in Iraq for Arab-Israeli peacemaking: the dramatic change in the depth of U.S. involvement in the process. Thus, an administration that began its first term vowing never to engage in Clinton-style micro-management of the peace process now found itself doing just that. By mid-July 2003, top U.S. policymakers became immersed in the precise demarcation of the fence and in Israeli-Palestinian discussions regarding the specific categories of prisoners who would be eligible for release.

There are a number of reasons why the war in Iraq propelled the United States to a much deeper involvement in Mideast peacemaking. First, the war created an imperative to balance the image evolving in Arab states to the effect that the United States is determined to establish military hegemony in the Middle East. Thus, its military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq needed to

be supplemented by a highly visible diplomatic effort. The summits in Sharm al-Sheikh and Aqaba provided exactly that level of visibility.

Second, the Bush White House viewed itself as unable to ignore the political survival requirements of Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, who sought to diminish the magnitude of the wartime and post-war transatlantic rift by narrowing the gaps between the United States and key European governments, especially on issues related to the Middle East. At the same time, it was important for Washington to demonstrate that U.S. policy can be influenced only through partnership and shared responsibilities. Hence, it was important that Blair be rewarded by heeding his calls for deeper U.S. involvement in Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

Third, in the war's aftermath, such deeper U.S. involvement was politically less risky. The popularity of President Bush was now very high, allowing some political capital to be spent without jeopardizing his re-election prospects. More important, developments on the Israeli side—resulting in Prime Minister Sharon's decision to refrain from actively opposing the "road map"—prevented the creation of any serious domestic opposition in the United States to deeper involvement in the process, either by significant parts of the Jewish community or by the Christian Right. Neither would wage such a campaign once Sharon had signaled that he was determined to avoid a confrontation with President Bush.

Fourth, developments on the Palestinian side had met some of the conditions defined by the Bush administration as prerequisites to renewed involvement. Having become convinced in the aftermath of the Karin-A incident that Arafat was personally involved in terrorist activity and that he was "a liar and a cheat," the administration refrained from deep involvement in Palestinian-Israeli mediation after the mission of Anthony Zinni collapsed in March 2002. Consequently, in the speech he delivered on June 24, 2002, President Bush defined the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership not tainted in violence and terrorism as a prerequisite to renewed U.S. involvement. Having made his opposition to the violence public, Mahmoud Abbas' nomination in March 2003 as the Palestinian prime minister was interpreted by Washington as meeting its requirements for re-involvement.

The net effect of these developments has been creation of the first opportunity since the violence began in late 2000 to move the peace process forward despite what to many appears to be a hopeless quagmire. The two ingredients for restarting the process already exist: the Arab Initiative and the road map. These ingredients must now be galvanized by weaving the former into the latter. But before this is done, the essence of these two must be fully understood. The next section of this paper is devoted to this exploration.

IV. Building Blocks: The Arab Initiative and the Road Map

While the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, re-launched in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, still faces enormous obstacles, the combined effect of the various developments described earlier provides it at least some chance of success. In order to understand how a better regional environment can contribute to the odds of such success, the two building blocks of this proposal need to be elaborated: the Saudi Initiative, amended, developed, and then adopted by the March 2002 summit meeting of the Arab League in Beirut, and the road map authored by the quartet and launched by the United States in April 2003.

The Saudi Initiative

The Initiative proposed by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah in early 2002 was not the first Saudi effort to encourage Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Twenty-one years earlier, on August 7, 1981, then-Crown Prince (later King) Fahd announced an eight-point plan for Palestinian-Israeli peace. The plan called for the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Arab interpretation of the plan was that it recognized Israel, but the text of the proposal does not mention Israel by name.

At first, during the Arab summit convened in Fez in November 1981, the Fahd plan was rejected. The meeting did not last more than four hours. At that time, even the implicit recognition of Israel was enough to propel Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and the PLO to reject the plan. A year later, in September 1982, following Israel's invasion of Lebanon, a subsequent Arab summit endorsed the Saudi plan. But the complexity of the bargaining involved seems to have dissuaded the Saudis from further involvement in such efforts during the following twenty years.

The second Saudi plan evolved on February 17, 2002, when *New York Times* journalist Thomas Friedman quoted Crown Prince Abdullah to the effect that his ideas were "virtually identical" to a suggestion that Friedman had made in a NYT article ten days earlier—that in exchange for Israel's withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines, the Arab states would provide Israel with "full peace and security guarantees." Indeed, in an interview with Roula Khalaf almost a year earlier, Abdullah had conveyed the same idea to London's *Financial Times*, but the report, published on June 25, 2001, received very little attention.[1] Friedman further relayed Abdullah's intention to present his proposal at the next meeting of the Arab League, then scheduled to meet in Beirut some five weeks later.

The Saudi Initiative represented an innovative strategy for attaining political results. Alongside the more commonly adopted strategies that attempt to

extract outcomes through coercion, "tit-for-tat" negotiations, the exchange of economic "trade-offs," etc., the Initiative signaled an effort by an Arab "third party" to extract desired Israeli decisions by affecting the regional environment of the bilateral Palestinian-Israeli process. In effect, the Initiative proposed to supplement one of the two sides to the bilateral process (the Palestinians), by offering publicly, on behalf of the Arab League's 22 member states, to provide Israel, in exchange for its withdrawal to the 1967 lines, what the Palestinians are not in a position to grant: full integration into the regional environment.

While internationally the Saudi Initiative received considerable attention, in the Middle East, it was greeted by a mix of anxiety and dismissal. Israeli and Arab commentators alike tended to doubt its seriousness, arguing that it merely represented a public relations offensive designed to reverse the deterioration of Saudi Arabia's image in the United States following the September 11 attacks. Both sides also saw nothing in the Initiative except its call for normalization. In Israel, it was thought that a meeting between Saudi and Israeli officials, particularly between Prime Minister Sharon and Crown Prince Abdullah, would be a true test of the sincerity of the Saudi intentions. On the other hand, the majority of the Arab media referred to the Initiative as nothing more than an attempt by Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states to get into the "normalization business" with Israel.

At the same time, Palestinians were clearly alarmed by the Initiative. Specifically, they were disappointed that Abdullah's formulation failed to mention the Palestinian Right of Return. Lebanese leaders were similarly alarmed by the possibility that the formula proposed by the Saudis might leave hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

The Arab League Statement

The Saudi Initiative became the Arab Initiative when it was adopted by the Arab League Summit Meeting in Beirut on March 28, 2002. As a result of the pressures and counter-pressures exerted on Crown Prince Abdullah, during the five weeks between Tom Friedman's report and the Beirut meeting, his suggestion expanded from two sentences to two pages. Now, it contained four distinct parts: a preamble, an elaboration of the proposed grand bargain, a statement about a shared Arab-Israeli future, and a conclusion.

The document's preamble contains three elements: the first illustrates the Arab states' general position to the effect that "achieving a just and comprehensive peace is a strategic choice and goal for the Arab states." The second notes the proposal made by Crown Prince Abdullah, calling for the establishment of normal relations with Israel "in the context of comprehensive peace" in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. Finally, the preamble challenges Israel to walk the same path by calling upon its govern-

ment "to review its policy and resort to peace while declaring that just peace is its strategic option."

The second part of the statement elaborates the grand bargain offered by defining each side's obligations if peace is to be achieved. Israel would have to withdraw from Arab territories occupied in June 1967, to accept the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and to find an agreed and just solution to the Palestinian refugees problem in accordance with U.N. Resolution 194. In exchange, the Arab states will declare the Arab-Israeli conflict over and enter into peace treaties with Israel. To consolidate this, they will establish normal relations with Israel and achieve security for all the region's states.

The third part projects the grand bargain into the future, calling upon Israel to join the Arab countries in a common endeavor. The statement "calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this Initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity."

Finally, the fourth part of the Initiative calls upon the international community to support it. In this framework, the League asked its presidency to contact the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia—who would later constitute the quartet—to obtain their support of the proposal.

The adoption of the Statement by the Arab League constituted a complete reversal of the Arab states' approach to Israel reflected in the 1968 Khartoum declaration. Then, in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war, the Arab states declared that they would not recognize, negotiate, and co-exist with the Jewish state. Now the Arab League had adopted the opposite message: if Israel were to restore the 1967 territorial status quo ante, the 22 members of the League would embrace her and integrate her into the region.

Yet by the end of the meeting in Beirut, the Arab League itself contributed to diluting, if not confusing, the message it was sending. It did this by adopting a set of decisions that seemed to contradict, at least in part, the text as well as the spirit of the Arab Initiative. Most importantly, in reference to the Palestinian refugee problem, the decisions adopted at the conclusion of the League meeting insisted on the Palestinian refugees' "right of repatriation and self determination." By contrast, the Initiative merely called for a "just" and "agreed" solution to the refugee problem based on U.N. Resolution 194.

The Arab League meeting ended in a press conference that exposed the different agendas of the Arab leaders who were party to the consensus approving the Initiative. For the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the Initiative's original structure remained intact: "We are proposing comprehensive peace in exchange for the return of all the territories. This is

the basic equation." Not so for Lebanon's Foreign Minister Mahmud Hammud, who argued that the Arab states remain adamant that the Palestinians must be able to exercise the "Right of Return." While the Initiative assured "the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries," Hammud argued that the Initiative "includes an assurance that all forms of resettlement of the Palestinians are rejected." Not surprisingly Israelis took this to mean that the League members will reject any solution to the Palestinian refugee problem except a return.

Given the confusion created by the tension between the Initiative adopted by the League—which evolved from Prince Abdullah's proposal—and the decisions adopted and the press conference held at the conclusion of the League's meeting, it was not surprising that the reactions to the Arab Initiative in Israel were negative. Indeed, most Israelis viewed its origins as a fraud and its ultimate formulation as a trap: the Saudis were said to have publicized the Initiative in a desperate attempt to repair their image, which was tainted by the perception that Saudis were the main culprits in the September 11 attacks. And the Initiative's ultimate formulation was seen as an attempt to destroy the Jewish character of Israel by wrapping the demand for exercising the Right of Return in a promise by the Arab world to embrace it.

The confusion about the essence of the Initiative may also partially explain the failure of the Arab states to follow-up its adoption in any meaningful way. Thus, no effort was made to elaborate upon the "grand bargain" offered in Beirut in a way that might affect the internal debate in Israel and among the Palestinians. Nor have the Arab states accompanied their Initiative by some concrete gestures that might have illustrated to Israelis their intentions in a fashion similar to that achieved by the decision of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat in late 1977 to travel to Jerusalem. Rejecting Sadat's strategy of shaping an environment that left Israel no choice but to compromise, the Arab states now feared that making such gestures would diminish Israel's motivation to compromise its stance on the territorial issue.

This does not mean that key Arab states have not made attempts—some of them successful—to advance the peace process forward. Egypt has been very active in persuading the Palestinian opposition groups to accept a ceasefire (the `Hudna') in their violent struggle against Israel. And, more recently, Egypt has played an essential role in inducing Arafat to accept the nomination of Mahmoud Abbas as prime minister. Jordan has been helpful in other ways, including the convening of a meeting of the World Economic Forum in June 2003 on the shore of its side of the Dead Sea. Although the meeting was convened primarily to assess the potential for economic activity in the Middle East after the Iraq War, the presence of Israeli leaders and businessmen—interacting with their counterparts from throughout the Arab world—sent a strong

signal regarding the potential for integrating Israel into the region once comprehensive peace is achieved. Indeed, the meeting in Jordan was the first of its kind in the region since the outbreak of the violence in September 2000.

But these Egyptian and Jordanian efforts were largely unilateral. As a collective, the 22 members of the Arab League did nothing to develop the Initiative that they announced in late March 2002. In fact, to date, the League has not officially reversed its decision—made in October 2000 in reaction to the violence in the Palestinian-Israeli sphere—banning all manifestations of normalization with Israel.

The Road Map

The road map is the second building block for shaping the regional environment to become more conducive to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The announcement of the road map, and the Bush administration's efforts to encourage its implementation, signify an important development in its policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Since the circumstances that have led Washington to abandon its previous dispositions and become more active in Middle East peacemaking after the war in Iraq were analyzed in earlier parts of this paper, emphasis will be placed here on the substantive aspects of the evolving U.S. approach.

Procedurally, the road map ended a year of near-total U.S. abstention from involvement in Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. This abstention followed not only the collapse of President Clinton's efforts to mediate a "permanent status" agreement, but also the failure of all attempts to bring the violence to an end and induce the parties to return to the negotiations table: from the statement concluding the Sharm El-Sheik October 2000 summit to the Mitchell, Tenet, and Zinni plans. By early spring of 2002, the Bush administration seems to have concluded that Arafat was determined to derail any effort to end the violence, and that as long as he remained in power, there was no hope of bringing the parties back to the negotiation table.

The large-scale Israeli re-invasion of the population centers of the West Bank in April 2002 following the suicide bombing attack on the eve of the Passover holiday in the Park Hotel in Netanya, and the international and regional reactions to the attack, were interpreted by the Bush administration as demonstrating the dangers embedded in the continuation of the violence.

In a highly publicized speech delivered on June 24, 2002, President Bush gave expression to this apprehension, as well as to the administration's conviction that the Palestinians must undergo a benign form of "regime change" if the violence is to end.

The president's speech pointed to the corruption and inefficacy of the Palestinian Authority as the main obstacle to resurrecting the peace process. Israel's population, which found itself under the constant threat of terrorism

and violence, was portrayed as the main victim of the situation, while the Palestinians' suffering was presented as resulting from their leaders' inability to achieve democracy and peace. Consequently, while the solution to the Palestinian problem was viewed as requiring the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the implementation of this solution was contingent on the Palestinians' choosing a leadership "not compromised by terror." Moreover, the creation of a Palestinian state was seen as an evolutionary process—from a temporary to a permanent state—spanning a three-year period. During this period, the Palestinians' commitment to end violence was to be tested, determining whether they progress from temporary to permanent statehood.

The June 24 speech was a vivid example of the "moral clarity," if not "moral certainty," that President Bush had demonstrated in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Thus, it illustrated the President's inclination to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through the prism of the War on Terror. The speech identified the victims of the War (Israel) and perpetrators of the violence (the Palestinian leaders compromised by terror). It also made clear that terrorism cannot be excused; no cause, no matter how just, can justify its promotion through violent means.

While delighting Israelis, the president's speech was rejected by Arab leaders and commentators as tilting decidedly in Israel's favor. Not surprisingly, they could not accept the suggestion that Israelis were the victims of Palestinian-Israeli interactions and that Palestinians were victims only of their own leaders' behavior. They also resisted the idea that the Palestinians' ability to realize their right to independent statehood would be contingent on their choice of an alternative leadership that would be certified by outsiders as "not compromised by terror." Another fear expressed was that if the realization of permanent statehood would be made conditional upon the total elimination of terrorism, the peace process would become hostage to every fanatic in the region. Finally, the idea that no cause could justify armed resistance was completely unacceptable to Arabs.

The June 24, 2002, speech, and the debate to which it led, seems to have affected both sides to the U.S.-Palestinian discourse during the following year. These effects were manifest in Palestinian conduct as well as in the evolution of the Bush administration's approach, from the June speech to the road map published a year later. On the Palestinian side, the speech was another milestone to its evolving understanding that the view of the Bush administration regarding Arafat's culpability in the wave of terrorism experienced in the area since September 2000—and its equally clear conviction that any effort to revive the peace process would prove futile as long as Arafat remained in the Palestinians' helm—were unshakable.

In turn, as revolting as Palestinians found President Bush's distribution of blame for the present predicament and as horrified as they were by the notion

that outsiders have taken upon themselves to determine the legitimacy of their leaders, they also became persuaded that the U.S. position regarding these issues could not be ignored. This was especially the case after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, when the United States was seen as having established military hegemony—and the will and capacity to implement "regime change"—in the region.

At the same time, Palestinians also saw the post-war setting as representing a serious opportunity for peace. The U.S. resistance to the 14 amendments to the road map proposed by Sharon gave the Palestinians hope that the Bush administration's policy was not driven only by Israel's preferences. The presence of the other quartet parties—the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia—in the process also led Palestinians to believe that at least in some measure the "internationalization" of the conflict that they had been seeking has materialized.

As a result, Palestinians increasingly concluded that they would be better to accommodate Washington's judgement. Although still unwilling to part with Arafat as the symbol of Palestinian nationalism, Palestinian and other Arabs now seemed to have concluded that the peace process will have some chance of success if Palestinian leaders who meet Washington's criteria were to be nominated to key posts. The resulting naming of Mahmoud Abbas as the Palestinians' first prime minister and of Muhammad Dahlan as minister of internal security paved the way to America's renewed involvement in the peacemaking process.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration's approach went through a parallel evolution. While unwavering about its view of terrorism as fundamentally evil, and while remaining adamant that no progress can be made unless the terror organizations are dismantled and their infrastructure destroyed, the United States accepted the proposition that it must also be sensitive to Palestinian concerns—primarily that Israel was prejudicing the outcome of future negotiations to resolve the two peoples' dispute. This applied primarily to Israel's settlement activities, whether in the framework of constructing new "outposts" or the building of additional housing units in existing settlements.

More generally, the new sensitivity to Palestinian concerns now made the Bush administration more open to suggestions made by Europeans who have been arguing for years that solving the Palestinian issue requires a "more balanced" U.S. approach. Consequently, the administration now allowed the Europeans to take the lead in defining an approach that might preserve some of the logic of the president's June 24 speech while accepting the proposition that both sides would have to contribute to making the endeavor a success.

The resulting road map to Middle East peace, formulated primarily by the European Union, with input from Russia and the United Nations, and adopted by the United States on April 30, 2003, is an imperfect document containing a

number of internal contradictions. Most apparent among them is the tension between the rigid timetables listed in it as milestones to the creation of permanent Palestinian statehood, and the statement contained in its preamble to the effect that the plan was "performance based." However, with the full backing of the Bush administration, the road map at once became "the only game in town."

The first phase of the road map is designed to restore the pre-September 2000 territorial and political status quo. Importantly, the Palestinians are expected to bring violence to an end irreversibly by building their security institutions and by streamlining them under a single command. They are also to dismantle the infrastructure of the terror organizations and prohibit any incitement. More broadly, they are to institutionalize political reforms within a new constitution and hold new elections. For its part, Israel is required to withdraw its forces to their pre-September 2000 positions, to cease building new settlements, to dismantle all settlements constructed after March 21, 2001, and to ease the living conditions of the Palestinian population.

The central thrust of the second phase is the establishment of a provisional Palestinian state and the creation of a regional environment conducive to peace. The borders of the Palestinian state will be provisional, but it would enjoy the international recognition and resulting status required for negotiating a permanent peace treaty with Israel. The Arab states will restore their relations with Israel to their pre-September 2000 state and the five-basket multi-lateral negotiations that resulted from the Madrid conference will be renewed. The phase will be launched by an international conference convened by the quartet to support the provisional Palestinian state and its economic recovery. The conference will also contribute to making Arab-Israeli peace more comprehensive by initiating negotiations between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Lebanon.

The third phase of the road map is designed to achieve a fully comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, including an Israeli-Palestinian "permanent status" agreement. A second international conference is to be convened by the quartet to endorse the agreements reached between the Palestinian state and Israel, to support the other Arab-Israeli negotiations frameworks, and to normalize the relations between the Arab states and Israel.

Implementing the road map is bound to prove difficult at best. Initial signs demonstrated that both principal parties are interested in ending the violence and in proceeding to solve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Both sides have taken some steps consistent with their obligations under the first phase of the map. By negotiating an armistice (`Hudna') with the Islamic opposition groups, the Palestinian government was able to reduce the number of terror attacks significantly. In addition, there appeared to have been a significant reduction of incitements broadcast and printed in the Palestinian media, and some initial steps toward the collection of illegal arms. And, Israel had began

to withdraw its forces from Palestinian population centers in the West Bank, release its hold over some of the transportation routes (notably, the north-south road in the Gaza strip), lift some of the checkpoints, and permit a larger number of Palestinians to return to their former workplaces in Israel.

In addition, there began a serious dialogue between the Palestinians and Israelis, at both the professional and political level, in an attempt to overcome their differences. Separately, the two prime ministers were also invited to the White House in a clear attempt by the Bush administration to signal that it remains committed to seeing the process succeed.

But, to date, the Palestinians have refrained from taking any steps toward dismantling the military infrastructure of the opposition groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Instead, they argue that the continuation of the armistice, and the popular support it will enjoy, will persuade the opposition that it should abandon violence permanently and transform itself into a political and social movement. Israel, meanwhile, has failed to meet its responsibility to dismantle settlements constructed after March 21, 2002. It has also been slow in withdrawing its forces from the Palestinian population centers, arguing that it cannot implement such withdrawals safely unless the Palestinians first dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. In fact, they argue, quite the opposite has happened: under the cover of the armistice, the opposition groups have improved the performance—mostly the range—of their weaponry.

At the same time, very little was done to affect the atmosphere of the process in a positive manner. Hopes that this may be done through gestures not mentioned in the road map—such as Israel's release of Palestinian prisoners—have not materialized, as Palestinians were disappointed with the pace and dimensions of the release. Another issue that has meanwhile gained salience to produce new tensions is Israel's erection of a fence along the western side of the West Bank. While the road map does not specifically prohibit the construction of such a fence, the Palestinians argued that it contradicts the spirit of the process by prejudging the outcome of an important facet of the future permanent status negotiations: the border between the Palestinian state and Israel. Indeed, by early August, this Palestinian argument received considerable sympathy at the top ranks of the Bush administration.

Consequently, by September 2003, the future of the road map seems precarious at best. Among the Palestinians and in Israel, there is much debate about the wisdom of easing the pressure exerted through violence and the military measures to suppress the violence, respectively. On the Palestinian side, there is considerable suspicion that Israel would use its superior power to avoid the more difficult steps that it is required to take in the framework of phases II and III of the road map. The haggling over the issue of prisoners' release has made it particularly difficult for the pragmatists in the Palestinian camp to make their case.

Similarly, the failure of new Palestinian leaders to take on the infrastructure of the Palestinian terrorist groups has enabled the opponents of the process on the Israeli side to argue that the armistice is a hoax that will end in far more improved capacities in the hands of the terror groups. Within Israel's defense forces, this has led senior officers to argue that Israel must continue to take whatever measures are required to suppress the terrorist threat, including the targeted assassination of terrorist leaders, especially among the ranks of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Yet these measures are bound to provoke sharp responses by members of these Islamic opposition groups.

Thus, while in early August 2003, some 60 percent of the Palestinians polled expressed their support of the armistice, by the end of the month—following the killing of senior Hamas leaders and mass-casualty suicide bombings—Hamas and Islamic Jihad declared that the cease-fire has ended. Thus, the Hudna seems to have reached a dead end and the road map is in great jeopardy. As Israelis and Palestinians failed to advance the process by themselves, it seems that constructing a more conducive regional environment is more urgent and essential than ever if the road map is to overcome its many domestic opponents. The answer may be in the creation of a new, complimentary road map for improving the regional context of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

V. Who Should Do What: Shaping the Regional Environment

The record of peacemaking efforts in the Middle East demonstrates that such efforts are, at best, an uphill battle. Among both Israelis and Palestinians, internal struggles are waged between moderates who seek peace and normality and extremists who are determined to realize their absolute aims even at the expense of embroiling their people and the region at large in endless warfare. Consequently, Arab-Israeli peace will not be achieved unless the moderates win these internal struggles decisively.

The purpose of the Arab Initiative—alongside tactical considerations that explained the timing of the Initiative and the Saudis' decision to take a leadership role in its pursuit—was to affect the debate between moderates and extremists in Israel. Not surprisingly, the Initiative contained a challenge to Israelis to declare that peace is their strategic option.

How can Israel's internal debate be affected? Twenty-five years earlier, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat affected this debate decisively through a dramatic unconditional, unilateral step. His trip to Jerusalem constituted a break with every article of faith in the Arab world and it challenged every long-standing premise that guided Israeli policy, at least since the 1967 War. The result he achieved was a breaking of the stalemate in Israel and, consequently, the creation of Israeli public support for meeting all of Egypt's conditions for peace.

The Saudi Initiative was designed to achieve the same effect differently. Rather than taking unilateral steps that would create an environment in which Israel would have no choice but to take the requisite risks for peace, Prince Abdullah's approach was to offer Israel a "grand bargain"—in short, an offer Israel would not be able to refuse. In the words of his foreign minister, Prince Sa'ud al-Faisal: "We are demanding full acceptance, which will be fully reciprocated by the Arab states. We are proposing comprehensive peace in exchange for the return of all the territories. This is the basic equation." Yet in seeking a wide Arab consensus to back his offer, the simplicity of the Abdullah's original message was diluted, allowing Israelis to argue that the offer can and should be rejected.

But the logic of the Initiative remains intact, namely: that to affect the public debate in Israel, a vision of the future peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors needs to be articulated, and that this vision must be presented to the Israeli public if the latter is expected to decide that the payoffs of peace are worth the risks involved.

At the same time, taking into account that Israel and the Palestinians have embarked on a journey marked on a road map—but also noting that their journey is precarious at best—the challenge is to weave the logic propelling the Arab Initiative into the process defined by the road map in a way that would increase the latter's chances of success. For this to happen, the following would need to take place:

1) The Arab Initiative must be revived and reinvigorated by developing it into a fully-fledged articulation of the future peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. While not shrinking from defining clearly the territorial costs Israel would be asked to pay in the framework of the proposed "grand bargain," the articulated vision should meet Israel's basic aspirations: to divorce from the Palestinians while integrating in the region at large.
2) Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—the trio that convened with President Bush in Sharm al-Sheikh on 3 June 2003—must take the lead in articulating this vision and presenting it to the Israeli and Arab publics. Any attempt to widen the consensus behind such a vision would require accommodating Arab states that have competing agendas. If this is done, the vision would lose its clarity and the message Israelis receive will be confusing—as was the case with the original Arab Initiative, thus undermining any chances of affecting their public debate.
3) The United States must be persuaded to give its full support to the revived Initiative, while assuring the administration that the purpose is not to upstage Washington's efforts, but rather to create a regional context that would improve the chances that the U.S.-led road map will succeed. Equally, the European Union should declare its willingness to do its share in seeing the articulated vision realized in the context of comprehensive peace.

4) Palestinians must be assured that advancing the road map by presenting Israel with an elaborated vision of its future relations with the Arab states does not undermine their interests. They must also be persuaded that focus must be kept on progressing rapidly through the road map phases and toward permanent statehood. In that sense, focusing on issues such as prisoner release and the demarcation of the security fence erected by Israel is counterproductive, playing into the hands of those who seek to drown the process in endless haggling.

Developing the Grand Bargain

Developing the "grand bargain" which was at the essence of the Arab Initiative does not require that the wheel be reinvented. Indeed, many of the ideas for putting content into the term "normalization" were discussed in the framework of the multilateral talks that accompanied the Madrid process in the first half of the 1990s: on economic development, use of water and other natural resources, environmental protection, refugee resettlement, and arms control and regional security. Additional suggestions, focusing primarily on the opportunities for economic cooperation and integration, were presented at the Middle East economic summits held in Casablanca (1994), Amman (1995), Cairo (1996), and Doha (1997). Other proposals were presented and discussed in the framework of the Barcelona Process, launched in 1995 by the European Union and 12 Middle East states in the southern Mediterranean, including Syria and Lebanon.[2]

The ideas discussed in these talks should now be refreshed and integrated into a coherent vision for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. Accordingly, the Sharm al-Sheikh trio should declare that the Arab states would reciprocate an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement based on Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 lines, by embracing and integrating Israel into the region. Such incorporation would occur at the formal, institutional, and conceptual levels.

At the formal level, the Arab states would normalize their relations with Israel by signing peace agreements which will instate the full array of diplomatic relations—the establishment of embassies that include different functional attaches. Additional agreements will formalize these countries' commitment to deepen interactions with Israel by encouraging trade and tourism, scholar and student exchanges, and cultural interactions in all forms.

In this framework, Arab-Israel Chambers of Commerce will be established on a reciprocal basis to encourage trade. The Arab states and Israel will also take steps to replace hatred by mutual respect and the desire for peace by legislating laws that prohibit incitement to violence against one another and by banning expressions of anti-Semitism in the media and in religious institutions as well as in school textbooks.

The purpose of these measures would be to translate the government-to-government peace codified in the agreements reached into a people-to-people peace in which larger and larger parts of the population would develop a vested interest. The underlying premise upon which this aspiration is based is that people-to-people peace, incorporating the states' civil societies, would be more difficult to reverse than peace agreements that remain at the government-to-government level and do not trickle down in a meaningful way that affects the daily life of the citizens.

At the institutional level, the promised incorporation will translate into the creation of region-wide institutions formed to counter the challenges facing the area. The Sharm al-Sheikh trio will declare that, upon the establishment of comprehensive peace, they will make Israel a fully-fledged member of these new institutions. The highlight of this promised process would be the creation of a Middle East Regime—a Council or an Association—whose membership will include the 22 members of the Arab League, Israel, Iran, and Turkey. The Regime will become the region's forum for state-to-state interactions in all spheres of life: politics, economics, and security.

The offspring of the Regime—a Middle East Security Regime—will become the main venue for the region's states to defuse tensions and discuss and resolve regional as well as bilateral security issues. The transformation of the Middle East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction would be one of the Security Council's main goals.

But the institutional integration of the region will not be limited to the government levels. Thus, the vision should include the creation of region-wide networks of non-government organizations (NGOs) aimed at advancing the interests of the relevant civil societies.

At the conceptual level, the new relationships in the region would require a change of mindset: from geo-politics to geo-economics. The meaning of such a transformation would be the abandonment of obsession with threats (which are routinely and invariably defined as "existential") in favor of seeking venues for peaceful co-existence. Another dimension of this change would be the replacement of zero-sum thinking by the adoption of win-win strategies for economic competition.

In addition to developing and articulating the grand bargain, shaping the regional environment to encourage Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution would require that the vision embedded in the Arab Initiative be seen as representing a credible—that is, genuine—offer. For this to take place, a public education campaign would have to be launched. The purpose of the campaign would be three-fold: first, to convince Israelis of the meaning of normalization and integration by demonstrating its various facets; second, to prepare Arab publics for the real meaning of peace and the array of interactions that peace entails; and finally, to diminish potential Arab opposition to

such interactions by alleviating fears regarding the possible negative consequences of peace.

Whereas normalization has been widely espoused in the Western world as an essential element of peace and stability, in the Middle East, use of this term has raised considerable anxieties. This has been the case particularly in the Arab states, but a closer examination of Israeli attitudes to the issues involved reveals considerable reluctance to eliminate barriers to unhindered interactions where such ties might damage Israeli interests or, more commonly, the interests of particular Israeli sectors.

Indeed, in fearing normalization, Arabs and Israelis have displayed a considerable amount of mirror imaging. Thus, while Arabs express the fear that the technologically superior Israeli "few" would dominate the labor intensive Arab "many," Israelis express the opposite concern, namely that dismantling barriers would result in the "many" flooding the "few"—with cheaper goods produced by Arab states and cheaper Arab labor entering Israel and resulting in Israel's loss of jobs.

A credible offer to integrate Israel into the Middle East in exchange for the territorial concessions it is asked to make would require that the proposed public education campaign address these concerns. The proposed campaign would be designed to persuade Arabs and Israelis alike that in calling for Israel's integration into the region, every effort will be made to strike a balance between encouraging trickle-down peace that entails maximum interactions at the people-to-people level, while at the same time safeguarding the primary interests of the interacting societies.

Thus, at one level, the public education campaign would emphasize the benefits to be derived from the transformation from geo-politics to geo-economics. This could be illustrated by highlighting the experience gained in other regions—notably in Europe after World War II and particularly after the end of the Cold War; in Asia since the late 1970s, following the establishment of ASEAN as the primary forum for addressing the region's problems; and in Latin America, where wars and arms-racing (including in the nuclear realm) were abandoned in favor of focusing on the region's economic problems.

At the same time, the campaign will address Arab fears that normalization would allow Israel to utilize its capacity to generate high levels of GDP and per-capita GDP to establish "economic hegemony" in the Middle East. In this context, emphasis will be placed on Israel's focus on the global markets to which its economy is tied and, hence, on the fact that its economic interests lie elsewhere and that its economic capacity does not provide it with any significant leverage over the Arab states.

Equally, an effort will be made to address Israeli fears that the removal of barriers implied in normalization might allow the "many" to flood the "few." Even more important, Israelis would have to be persuaded that the removal

of barriers implied in the proposed integration of Israel into the region will not result in "the implementation of the Right of Return through the back door"—that is, by Palestinians exploiting the easing of restrictions on the movement of labor to settle in Israel.

Implementing the Initiative

A realistic attempt to implement a revived Arab Initiative requires that this be done in a manner that allows its weaving into the road map. This is significant not because the Arab Initiative plays an important role in the road map—it does not. Alongside other important milestones of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the preamble of the road map notes "...the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah—endorsed by the Beirut Summit—calling for acceptance of the state of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement." Yet nowhere in the operational formulation of the road map—defining each side's obligations in each of its three phases—is there a reference to the Arab Initiative.

Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the road map is currently the only conceptual framework and venue for ending the violence and reaching peace acceptable to both sides. Hence, a revived Arab Initiative would remain irrelevant if it is not related to the road map's three phases. Indeed, despite the failure to cite the Initiative directly, some of the measures implied are mentioned in the road map. Thus, within phase I, Egypt and Jordan are asked to contribute to the "U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan." In Phase II, Arab states are asked to "restore pre-Intifada links to Israel." And Phase III is to end by "Arab states' acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace."

Clearly, the key Arab states can do much more than that. Moreover, in the past, limited roles and small steps such as those proposed in the road map for these key states have proven reversible and short-lived. What is now required is an overall strategic plan—a grand design capable of changing the region's political ecology. Such a plan would inspire Israel and the Palestinians to take different, more productive measures. Within this framework the following is proposed:

Phase I of the Road Map: An effective revival of the Arab Initiative requires that it be institutionalized parallel to Phase I of the road map. In practice, this requires the following: first, the trio (Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) should issue a joint declaration—and take all measures necessary to attract maximum international attention to this declaration—articulating and elaborating the grand bargain suggested in the previous section of this chapter. Such dramatic articulation would be based on the many different ideas recorded in the early 1990s regarding possible venues for cooperation

between Israel and the Arab states in the framework of comprehensive peace. It would also involve studying the experience accumulated with the implementation of such ideas in the energy realm (between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians).

Second, a permanent Forum will be created as soon as possible, comprising all the participants of the summits in Sharm al-Sheikh and Aqaba: the trio, Israel, the Palestinians, and the quartet. Led by the trio, the Forum will provide the grand bargain with international legitimacy and political backing. It will publicize the detailed offer and will take steps to attract maximum attention to this vision among the Israeli and Arab publics. In addition, the Forum will launch the public education campaign envisaged earlier in this paper, emphasizing the advantages of peace and reducing fears and concerns in the region with respect to the possible negative consequences of unrestricted interactions. It will also begin to act as a collaborative framework dealing with issues of mutual concern: terrorism, incitement, anti-Semitism, and Jerusalem.

The Forum will also discuss ways of protecting the implementation of the road map from possible fluctuations in the U.S. commitment to the process due to internal developments or new international crises requiring Washington to commit its diplomatic resources elsewhere. Finally, it will act as a preparatory committee for the first international conference, which is to be convened according to the road map at the beginning of Phase II.

Phase II of the Road Map: In Phase II, implementation of the revived Arab Initiative will take a number of forms: first, Arab states will be encouraged to demonstrate what "normal relations," according to the road map, means. This will be done by restoring ties to Israel and developing them beyond their pre-Intifada levels. Within the latter context, an effort would be made to reconvene the multilateral talks held in the early 1990s between Israel, the Palestinians, and 13 Arab states. Syria, Iraq, and Iran would now be encouraged to join these talks.

Other activities to be encouraged within this phase will include various informal dialogues such as those envisaged in a paper recently adopted by Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party. NGOs in Israel, among the Palestinians, and in the Arab states will also be encouraged to cooperate in advancing the interests of their different civil societies. A particularly benign form of such cooperation could take place among NGOs related to healing wounds on both sides—in the medical and psychological realms.

From the standpoint of the peace process, the purpose of such "down payments" would be to improve the chances that Phase II will succeed by providing intellectual and climatic "ammunition" for the moderates to argue their case.

In this phase of the road map, the Forum created to institutionalize the revived Arab Initiative will intensify its efforts. Particular emphasis will be

placed on laying the basis for economic cooperation in the region. This will be done in the framework of venues similar to the World Economic Forum meeting held on the shores of the Dead Sea in Jordan in early July 2003. In the future, such meetings might focus on specific issues or sectors such as energy, information technology, or trade.

Another major effort will be made to affect Middle East media, national as well as regional, to curtail incitement. One possible way of achieving this would be to encourage the signing of a Charter for Peace and Reconciliation that would serve as the moral guide for the press as well as the electronic and internet media in the region.

In addition, as the parties make progress in meeting their obligations under Phase II, the Forum would meet to serve as the preparatory committee of the international conference that is to be convened in the beginning of Phase III of the road map.

Phase III of the Road Map: As the provisional Palestinian state declared during the second phase of the road map is transformed into a permanent state and as a Palestinian-Israeli permanent status agreement is negotiated and implemented, the grand bargain envisaged by the revived Arab Initiative will be fully realized as well. At this point, the Middle East Regime will replace the Forum to constitute the pillar of the post-agreement regional regime. Within its framework, three sub-regimes will be formed:

a) The Middle East Security Regime—a council or an association—will become the forum for regional conflict resolution and will point the way for the transformation of the region at large to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. For such purposes, the region at large will include the 22 members of the Arab League, Israel, Iran, and Turkey.
b) The Middle East Economic Community will integrate the various association and free trade agreements that have evolved between the United States and the European Union with Middle East states into a comprehensive regime, transforming the region at large into a Free Trade Area.
c) A Middle East Cultural Association will tie the region's states in various forms of cultural cooperation emphasizing the value of peace and creating a joint Arab-Israeli front to fight anti-Semitism directed at Jews and Arabs.

Under what conditions might this take place? What kind of a Palestinian-Israeli permanent status agreement might allow the creation of the comprehensive, multi-layered Middle East Regime envisaged here? What might be the components of this agreement? The answer is that these components are unlikely to deviate significantly from the "bridging proposals" presented by President Clinton in late December 2000 to the Israeli and Palestinian delegations after the talks they held under U.S. auspices at Bolling Air Force Base. A version of these parameters were made public in a speech delivered by Presi-

dent Clinton in New York on January 7, 2001, just a few days before he left office. The relevant passages of the White House release of the speech are attached as an appendix to this document.

The point of departure for the proposals is the creation of an independent but "non-militarized" Palestinian state. While Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 lines seems to serve as the reference point for the establishment of the proposed state, in the West Bank, Israel is to retain 4–6 percent of the territory, for which the Palestinian state would be compensated by a land swap of 1–3 percent in addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza. The future of the Israeli settlements is not even mentioned in the Clinton proposals. Clearly, their fate is assumed to derive directly from the territorial dimension of the agreement reached.

Regarding the hyper-sensitive issue of Jerusalem, the Clinton proposals suggest different formulas for dividing title or ownership, and suggest that these would apply to the Old City as well. The different formulas are all based on the principle that Arab areas are Palestinian and that Jewish areas are Israeli. Accordingly, the parties are urged to draw maps that create maximum contiguity for both sides.

The solution for Palestinian refugees—the second hyper-sensitive issue addressed by the proposals—is to be based on the principle that the state of Palestine is to serve as the homeland of the Palestinian people and that the state of Israel is to serve as the homeland of the Jewish people. Israel is to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war and the need to assist the international community in addressing the problem. Importantly, implementation of the solution would be subject to the sovereign decision of the countries involved—including Israel. It will take into account Israel's refusal to accept any reference to a Right of Return that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel and would threaten Israel's character as a Jewish state. In President Clinton's words: "We cannot expect Israel to make a decision that would threaten the very foundations of the state of Israel, and would undermine the whole logic of peace."

Accordingly, the guiding principle is that the Palestinian state should be the focal point for the Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out that Israel would accept some of these refugees. The formula adopted regarding the Right of Return is to make clear that there is no specific Right of Return to Israel itself, but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.

A package stipulating the practical dimensions of addressing the Palestinian refugee problem is suggested, emphasizing that priority should be given to the refugee population in Lebanon. This package, based on the principles referred to earlier, is to constitute full implementation of U.N. Resolution 194.

VI. Why Would They Do It? The Role of the United States

The grand bargain suggested by the renewed Arab Initiative is meant to help Israelis and Palestinians proceed through the various phases of the road map to which they have given their consent. In fact, it is designed to help achieve Palestinian-Israeli peace by promising a complete political transformation of the region. Such a transformation will be supported by the promise that peace will be accompanied by Israel's complete integration in the region. This will affect Israel's incentive structure in favor of those advocating peace by emphasizing the prospective benefits of the agreements reached. In other words, Israelis will be encouraged to travel through the road map by illustrating the extent to which peace will improve their lot in all facets of life.

Yet, for this to take place, the key Arab states would have to be persuaded to invest in the process by providing "advance payments" in the normalization realm. This will be done by convincing these states that if Israel is to accept the "grand bargain," it must be persuaded that peace will allow its complete integration in the region. To achieve this, the meaning of such integration would have to be illustrated. Yet this cannot be done except by taking some risk: allowing some normalization to take place prior to reaching the third phase of the road map.

At the same time, Palestinians and Arab publics who may fear that the suggested grand bargain would prove nothing but a sham would need to be assured that this will not be the case. Indeed, such concerns can be addressed by making it perfectly clear that Israel's complete integration into the region will take place only in the framework of a comprehensive peace. That is, after the achievement of Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli agreements and after the demands of the Palestinians will have been met in the framework of a signed agreement.

Why would Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia agree to play the role assigned to them in this proposal? Why would they wish to revive the Arab Initiative and to play a key role in seeing its implementation? First, because if properly understood, these states have a direct self-interest in the success of the peace process. Lack of progress in the process will not result in a new status quo; it will result in a new slide toward violence and death by those prepared to exploit the population's discontent.

Second, a highly charged Middle East in which national and regional media constantly broadcast scenes of violence and hatred will breed greater instability, thus possibly threatening the governments of these states. And finally, a serious commitment to the peace process by key Arab states will refute the post–September 11 evolving perception in the West that Islam is intrinsically violent and that Muslim countries are interested in fostering instability. Conversely, a willingness to adopt a forward-looking approach

would do much to repair the damage made in recent years to the standing of the trio governments in the United States.

Who can affect these key Arab states and persuade them that taking the risks entailed in shaping the regional environment for Palestinian-Israeli peace is in their self-interest? Who can create an incentive structure for these states to propel them to adopt the role assigned to them in this proposal? And at the same time, who might assure these states that they would not be taken advantage of, and that having adopted the requisite measures suggested here they would not find themselves abandoned far short of achieving their goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace?

In this essential role, there appears to be no substitute to the United States. This is because no other power can compete with America's influence and standing in the region. Accordingly, the United States has the responsibility to assure the key Arab states that it will not abandon the process and that, to the contrary, it has every intention to remain engaged in providing the requisite "adult supervision" for the process to succeed. This can be done in a variety of ways:

First, by the administration issuing highly publicized declarations delineating the parameters of the peace process and affirming America's commitment to the realization of Arab-Israeli peace.

Second, by both Houses of Congress adopting resolutions that reiterate America's determination to achieve Palestinian-Israeli peace.

Third, by America's two major political parties, in their coming conventions, adopting statements committing the United States to these parameters.

Fourth, by the United States expressing a willingness to commit military observers in the framework of a multinational force to be assembled to monitor the implementation of the steps stipulated by the road map.

Finally, under U.S. auspices, the quartet could be encouraged to make parallel progress in defining a road map for peace between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. This is essential for Arab-Israeli peace to become comprehensive and for the trio governments to argue that advancing the road map by improving the ecopolitics of the conflict does not imply an abandonment of vital Arab interests.

Notes

[1]In an article published in the *New York Times* on February 21, 2002, Henry Siegman reported that Crown Prince Abdullah communicated to him a similar idea two years earlier.

[2]Additional ideas for economic cooperation between Arab states and Israel can be found in the 1978 Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords; in annexes III (Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Development Programs) and IV of the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo agreement; and in the 1994 Israel- Jordan Peace Treaty.

Appendices

Appendix A: Excerpt from Remarks by President Bill Clinton at Israel Policy Forum Gala, January 2001

…The parameters I put forward contemplate a settlement in response to each side's essential needs, if not to their utmost desires. A settlement based on sovereign homelands, security, peace and dignity for both Israelis and Palestinians. These parameters don't begin to answer every question, they just narrow the questions that have to be answered.

Here they are. First, I think there can be no genuine resolution to the conflict without a sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that accommodates Israeli's security requirements and the demographic realities. That suggests Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza, the vast majority of the West Bank, the incorporation into Israel of settlement blocks, with the goal of maximizing the number of settlers in Israel while minimizing the land annex. For Palestine to be viable, (it) must be a geographically contiguous state. (Applause.)

Now, the land annexed into Israel into settlement blocks should include as few Palestinians as possible, consistent with the logic of two separate homelands. And to make the agreement durable, I think there will have to be some territorial swaps and other arrangements.

Second, a solution will have to be found for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered a great deal—particularly some of them. A solution that allows them to return to a Palestinian state that will provide all Palestinians with a place they can safely and proudly call home. All Palestinian refugees who wish to live in this homeland should have the right to do so. All others who want to find new homes, whether in their current locations or in third countries, should be able to do so, consistent with those countries' sovereign decisions. And that includes Israel.

All refugees should receive compensation from the international community for their losses, and assistance in building new lives. Now, you all know what the rub is. That was a lot of artful language for saying that you cannot expect Israel to acknowledge an unlimited right of return to present day Israel, and at the same time, to give up Gaza and the West Bank and have the settlement blocks as compact as possible, because of where a lot of these refugees came from. We cannot expect Israel to make a decision that would threaten the very foundations of the state of Israel, and would undermine the whole logic of peace. And it shouldn't be done. (Applause.)

But I have made it very clear that the refugees will be a high priority, and that the United States will take a lead in raising the money necessary to relocate them in the most appropriate manner. (Applause.) If the government of Israel or a subsequent government of Israel ever—will be in charge of their immigration policy, just as we and the Canadians and the Europeans and others who would offer Palestinians a home would be, they would be obviously free to do that, and I think

they've indicated that they would do that, to some extent. But there cannot be an unlimited language in an agreement that would undermine the very foundations of the Israeli state or the whole reason for creating the Palestinian state. (Applause.) So that's what we're working on.

Third, there will be no peace, and no peace agreement, unless the Israeli people have lasting security guarantees. (Applause.) These need not and should not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty, or interfere with Palestinian territorial integrity. So my parameters rely on an international presence in Palestine to provide border security along the Jordan Valley and to monitor implementation of the final agreement. They rely on a non-militarized Palestine, a phased Israeli withdrawal, to address Israeli security needs in the Jordan Valley, and other essential arrangements to ensure Israel's ability to defend itself.

Fourth, I come to the issue of Jerusalem, perhaps the most emotional and sensitive of all. It is a historic, cultural and political center for both Israelis and Palestinians, a unique city sacred to all three monotheistic religions. And I believe the parameters I have established flow from four fair and logical propositions.

First, Jerusalem should be an open and undivided city, with assured freedom of access and worship for all. It should encompass the internationally recognized capitals of two states, Israel and Palestine. Second, what is Arab should be Palestinian, for why would Israel want to govern in perpetuity the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians? Third, what is Jewish should be Israeli. That would give rise to a Jewish Jerusalem, larger and more vibrant than any in history. Fourth, what is holy to both requires a special care to meet the needs of all. I was glad to hear what the Speaker said about that. No peace agreement will last if not premised on mutual respect for the religious beliefs and holy shrines of Jews, Muslims and Christians.

I have offered formulations on the Haram Ash-Shareef, and the area holy to the Jewish people, an area which for 2,000 years, as I said at Camp David, has been the focus of Jewish yearning, that I believed fairly addressed the concerns of both sides.

Fifth and, finally, any agreement will have to mark the decision to end the conflict, for neither side can afford to make these painful compromises, only to be subjected to further demands. They are both entitled to know that if they take the last drop of blood out of each other's turnip, that's it. It really will have to be the end of the struggle that has pitted Palestinians and Israelis against one another for too long. And the end of the conflict must manifest itself with concrete acts that demonstrate a new attitude and a new approach by Palestinians and Israelis toward each other, and by other states in the region toward Israel, and by the entire region toward Palestine, to help it get off to a good start.

The parties' experience with interim accords has not always been happy—too many deadlines missed, too many commitments unfulfilled on both sides. So for this to signify a real end of the conflict, there must be effective mechanisms to provide guarantees of implementation. That's a lot of stuff, isn't it? It's what I think is the outline of a fair agreement. (Applause.)

Appendix B: Arab Peace Initiative, 2002

Official translation of the full text of a Saudi-inspired peace plan adopted by the Arab Summit in Beirut on Thursday, 28 March 2002:

The Council of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th Ordinary Session:

a. Reaffirming the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo extraordinary Arab Summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli government;

b. Having listened to the statement made by His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, the Crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which His Highness presented his initiative calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land for peace principle; and Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel;

c. Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the Council:

1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well.
2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm:
   a) Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the lines of June 4, 1967, as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.
   b) Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
   c) The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 4 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
3. Consequently, the Arab Countries affirm the following:
   a) Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.
   b) Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.
4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.
5. Calls upon the Government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of

blood, enabling the Arab countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity.

6. Invites the international community and all countries and organizations to support this initiative.
7. Requests the Chairman of the Summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the Secretary General of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim States, and the European Union.

For purposes of comparison, the following is an earlier draft discussed by Arab foreign ministers on 25 March, 2002, in advance of the summit:

The Council of the Arab League, which convenes at the level of a summit on March 27–28, 2002, in Beirut, affirms the Arab position that achieving just and comprehensive peace is a strategic choice and goal for the Arab states.

After the Council heard the statement of Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz in which he called for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel, and that Israel declares its readiness to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories in compliance with United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 and Security Council Resolution 1397, enhanced by the Madrid conference and the land-for-peace principle, and the acceptance of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state with al-Quds al-Sharif as its capital, the Council calls on the Israeli government to review its policy and to resort to peace while declaring that just peace is its strategic option.

The Council also calls on Israel to assert the following:

- Complete withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including full withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and the remaining occupied parts of south Lebanon to the June 4, 1967, lines.
- To accept to find an agreed, just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees in conformity with Resolution 194.
- To accept an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on the Palestinian lands occupied since June 4, 1967, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and with Jerusalem (al-Quds al-Sharif) as its capital in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1397.

In return, the Arab states assert the following:

- To consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and to enter into a peace treaty with Israel to consolidate this.
- To achieve comprehensive peace for all the states of the region.
- To establish normal relations within the context of comprehensive peace with Israel.

The Council calls on the Israeli government and the Israelis as a whole to accept this initiative to protect the prospects of peace and to spare bloodshed so as

to enable the Arab states and Israel to coexist side by side and to provide for the coming generations a secure, stable and prosperous future.

It calls on the international community with all its organizations and states to support the initiative.

The Council calls on its presidency, its secretary general and its follow-up committee to follow up on the special contacts related to this initiative and to support it on all levels, including the United Nations, the United States, Russia, the European Union and the Security Council.

Appendix C: President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership, June 24, 2002

THE PRESIDENT: For too long, the citizens of the Middle East have lived in the midst of death and fear. The hatred of a few holds the hopes of many hostage. The forces of extremism and terror are attempting to kill progress and peace by killing the innocent. And this casts a dark shadow over an entire region. For the sake of all humanity, things must change in the Middle East.

It is untenable for Israeli citizens to live in terror. It is untenable for Palestinians to live in squalor and occupation. And the current situation offers no prospect that life will improve. Israeli citizens will continue to be victimized by terrorists, and so Israel will continue to defend herself.

In the situation the Palestinian people will grow more and more miserable. My vision is two states, living side by side in peace and security. There is simply no way to achieve that peace until all parties fight terror. Yet, at this critical moment, if all parties will break with the past and set out on a new path, we can overcome the darkness with the light of hope. Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born.

I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for independence.

And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East.

In the work ahead, we all have responsibilities. The Palestinian people are gifted and capable, and I am confident they can achieve a new birth for their nation. A Palestinian state will never be created by terror—it will be built through reform. And reform must be more than cosmetic change, or veiled attempt to preserve the status quo. True reform will require entirely new political and economic institutions, based on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism.

Today, the elected Palestinian legislature has no authority, and power is concentrated in the hands of an unaccountable few. A Palestinian state can only serve its citizens with a new constitution which separates the powers of government. The Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body. Local officials and government ministers need authority of their own and the independence to govern effectively.

The United States, along with the European Union and Arab states, will work with Palestinian leaders to create a new constitutional framework, and a working democracy for the Palestinian people. And the United States, along with others in the international community will help the Palestinians organize and monitor fair, multi-party local elections by the end of the year, with national elections to follow.

Today, the Palestinian people live in economic stagnation, made worse by official corruption. A Palestinian state will require a vibrant economy, where honest enterprise is encouraged by honest government. The United States, the international donor community and the World Bank stand ready to work with Palestinians on a major project of economic reform and development. The United States, the EU, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund are willing to oversee reforms in Palestinian finances, encouraging transparency and independent auditing.

And the United States, along with our partners in the developed world, will increase our humanitarian assistance to relieve Palestinian suffering. Today, the Palestinian people lack effective courts of law and have no means to defend and vindicate their rights. A Palestinian state will require a system of reliable justice to punish those who prey on the innocent. The United States and members of the international community stand ready to work with Palestinian leaders to establish finance—establish finance and monitor a truly independent judiciary.

Today, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing, terrorism. This is unacceptable. And the United States will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state until its leaders engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. This will require an externally supervised effort to rebuild and reform the Palestinian security services. The security system must have clear lines of authority and accountability and a unified chain of command.

America is pursuing this reform along with key regional states. The world is prepared to help, yet ultimately these steps toward statehood depend on the Palestinian people and their leaders. If they energetically take the path of reform, the rewards can come quickly. If Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a provisional state of Palestine.

With a dedicated effort, this state could rise rapidly, as it comes to terms with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on practical issues, such as security. The final borders, the capital and other aspects of this state's sovereignty will be negotiated between the parties, as part of a final settlement. Arab states have offered their help in this process, and their help is needed.

I've said in the past that nations are either with us or against us in the war on terror. To be counted on the side of peace, nations must act. Every leader actually

committed to peace will end incitement to violence in official media, and publicly denounce homicide bombings. Every nation actually committed to peace will stop the flow of money, equipment and recruits to terrorist groups seeking the destruction of Israel—including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. Every nation actually committed to peace must block the shipment of Iranian supplies to these groups, and oppose regimes that promote terror, like Iraq. And Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations.

Leaders who want to be included in the peace process must show by their deeds an undivided support for peace. And as we move toward a peaceful solution, Arab states will be expected to build closer ties of diplomacy and commerce with Israel, leading to full normalization of relations between Israel and the entire Arab world.

Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. A stable, peaceful Palestinian state is necessary to achieve the security that Israel longs for. So I challenge Israel to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state.

As we make progress towards security, Israel forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop.

The Palestinian economy must be allowed to develop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. Palestinian legislators and officials, humanitarian and international workers, must be allowed to go about the business of building a better future. And Israel should release frozen Palestinian revenues into honest, accountable hands.

I've asked Secretary Powell to work intensively with Middle Eastern and international leaders to realize the vision of a Palestinian state, focusing them on a comprehensive plan to support Palestinian reform and institution-building.

Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians must address the core issues that divide them if there is to be a real peace, resolving all claims and ending the conflict between them. This means that the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.

We must also resolve questions concerning Jerusalem, the plight and future of Palestinian refugees, and a final peace between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a Syria that supports peace and fights terror.

All who are familiar with the history of the Middle East realize that there may be setbacks in this process. Trained and determined killers, as we have seen, want to stop it. Yet the Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties with Israel remind us that with determined and responsible leadership progress can come quickly.

As new Palestinian institutions and new leaders emerge, demonstrating real performance on security and reform, I expect Israel to respond and work toward

a final status agreement. With intensive effort by all, this agreement could be reached within three years from now. And I and my country will actively lead toward that goal.

I can understand the deep anger and anguish of the Israeli people. You've lived too long with fear and funerals, having to avoid markets and public transportation, and forced to put armed guards in kindergarten classrooms. The Palestinian Authority has rejected your offer at hand, and trafficked with terrorists. You have a right to a normal life; you have a right to security; and I deeply believe that you need a reformed, responsible Palestinian partner to achieve that security.

I can understand the deep anger and despair of the Palestinian people. For decades you've been treated as pawns in the Middle East conflict. Your interests have been held hostage to a comprehensive peace agreement that never seems to come, as your lives get worse year by year. You deserve democracy and the rule of law. You deserve an open society and a thriving economy. You deserve a life of hope for your children. An end to occupation and a peaceful democratic Palestinian state may seem distant, but America and our partners throughout the world stand ready to help, help you make them possible as soon as possible.

If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions of men and women around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and oppression, equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government.

I have a hope for the people of Muslim countries. Your commitments to morality, and learning, and tolerance led to great historical achievements. And those values are alive in the Islamic world today. You have a rich culture, and you share the aspirations of men and women in every culture. Prosperity and freedom and dignity are not just American hopes, or Western hopes. They are universal, human hopes. And even in the violence and turmoil of the Middle East, America believes those hopes have the power to transform lives and nations.

This moment is both an opportunity and a test for all parties in the Middle East: an opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace; a test to show who is serious about peace and who is not. The choice here is stark and simple. The Bible says, "I have set before you life and death; therefore, choose life." The time has arrived for everyone in this conflict to choose peace, and hope, and life.

Appendix D: A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, April 3, 2003

The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet [the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia]. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.

A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come sooner than indicated in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.

A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah—endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit—calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.

Phase I: Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions—Present to May 2003

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000, and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.

At the outset of Phase I:

- Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
- Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

Security

- Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.
- Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
- GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations; attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.
- Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
- Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.–Egypt–Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.
    - All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
    - Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.
- Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
- All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.

- As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000, and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

Palestinian Institution-Building

- Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. Constitutional committee proposes draft document for submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.
- Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making body.
- GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform efforts.
- Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.
- Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.
- Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.
- As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.
- GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.
- GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.

Humanitarian Response

- Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel.

- AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.
- OI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.

Civil Society

- Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.

Settlements

- GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.
- Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

Phase II: Transition—June 2003 to December 2003

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state.

Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.

- International Conference: Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.

    - Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble to this document.
    - Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).
    - Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues.
- New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.
- Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft constitution.
- Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
- Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.
- Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.

Phase III: Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict—2004 to 2005

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.

- Second International Conference: Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
- Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.

- Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy, in preparation for final status agreement.
- Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.
- Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

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