BUILDING A GENUINE U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

As Russia's economy improves and its government becomes more assertive, a shift from a donor-recipient relationship to a more genuine partnership is likely to be essential to the success of cooperative efforts to improve nuclear security and accounting – particularly to achieving the working-level Russian "buy-in" to the new security and accounting approaches so crucial to long-term sustainability. Substantial evidence from other types of assistance indicates that assistance programs that directly involve the recipients in all aspects of the conception, design, implementation, and evaluation of the effort have far higher success rates than those that do not. This paper describes specific modifications to U.S. and Russian policies that could help shift programs to improve nuclear security and accounting from a donor-recipient relationship to a more genuine partnership. To achieve a genuine partnership, Russia will have to assign more of its own resources to improving nuclear security, and change its recent practice of, in essence, not paying for anything that the United States might be convinced to pay for. The United States will have to have the flexibility to make all stages of the work truly joint efforts, with Russian experts playing key roles in all the stages just noted. The paper will provide specific examples on both sides (such as the Russian decision to cease paying the minor sums required to install U.S.-provided "quick fix" security upgrade equipment at nuclear warhead sites once discussions of U.S. funding for that effort began – despite incidents of terrorist reconnaissance at those warhead sites, and the U.S. practice of having an evaluation team assessing each nuclear material security project that includes no Russian members and little Russian input). The paper will also outline possibilities for the United States and Russia, following through on the Bratislava summit statement, to work in partnership to improve nuclear security in other countries around the world – an approach that would also be likely to improve the political atmosphere for nuclear security cooperation within Russia.

INTRODUCTION

There is now broad agreement, at least in rhetoric, that U.S.-Russian cooperation to secure nuclear stockpiles and prevent proliferation must be transformed from a donor-recipient relationship to a true partnership. That is seen by many on both sides as the thrust of the Bush-Putin summit statement on nuclear security agreed to in Bratislava in February 2005.[1]

How would a real, and not just rhetorical, shift from assistance to partnership actually be different? A genuine partnership is based on pursuit of common interests; a balanced contribution of resources from each side; integrating the ideas and approaches of each side; a good-faith effort by each side to address the concerns of the other (e.g., finding means to assure that U.S. taxpayers funds are spent appropriately without unduly compromising Russian secrets); a balanced sharing of the burdens of the effort (e.g., offering reciprocal access to comparable U.S. facilities); and a willingness to pursue not just the key priorities of one side, but the key priorities of both, as long as that pursuit serves the interests of both.

To build such a partnership, both the United States and Russia would have to change some of their past approaches to this work. High-level political leaders on both sides would have to invest more sustained effort in overcoming the obstacles to cooperation. Russia would have to assign more of its own resources to the effort, and be willing to openly discuss key issues such as how nuclear security arrangements are and will be funded, or how good security performance by managers, guards, and workers is and will be rewarded.

The United States will have to have the flexibility to genuinely involve Russian experts in all aspects of the conception, design, implementation, and evaluation of the effort, making it truly a joint enterprise.

Both sides will have to put continued emphasis on maintaining the continuity of implementation teams at particular sites, so that experts can build the personal relationships and trust that are crucial to real partnership over time. To build a stronger partnership, the United States should be willing to engage with Russia on a broader agenda that is of particular interest to Russian experts (and still serves U.S. interests), including cooperation on proliferation-resistant approaches to the future of nuclear energy. And both sides will have to work to address the political and strategic issues that have been undermining trust and the spirit of partnership at the political level in recent years.

Building such a genuine partnership will contribute to building the much-needed sense of urgency and commitment on the Russian side to the joint agenda of ensuring effective security and accounting for nuclear stockpiles worldwide; but there are other steps that can and should be taken to help build that sense of urgency in Russia, which in turn will contribute to full Russian participation in such a partnership. And such partnership and commitment-building approaches can help bring the needed players into a fast-paced global effort to lock down all the world's nuclear stockpiles before terrorists and criminals can get to them.[2]

Years ago, U.S. officials too often sought to impose "made in America" approaches at Russian sites, leading some Russian experts to complain that they were being treated as the "hired help."[3] Substantial steps toward a partnership-based approach have been taken in recent years. The presidential support represented by the Bratislava summit statement; the creation of the Bodman-Rumiantsev group to oversee the effort; the development of a joint strategic plan for upgrades at both Rosatom and Ministry of Defense sites after Bratislava; the decision to allow Rosatom's security chiefs to visit sensitive U.S. sites such as Pantex, and President Bush's public offer of "equal access" to U.S. sites; the ongoing development of a joint sustainability plan that explicitly includes a schedule for phasing out U.S. assistance and phasing up Russia's own resources; the decision to discuss ongoing issues in Department of Energy (DOE) security programs, and to have Rosatom's security chiefs participate in one of the regular meetings of DOE's site security managers; and the ongoing trend toward increased "indigenization," with Russian experts doing nearly all of the vulnerability assessments, system designs, system installations, system maintenance, and training (using primarily Russian equipment) are all major steps in the right direction. Nevertheless, there is more to be done to build the kind of partnership that is needed, on both sides.

BENEFITS OF A PARTNERSHIP-BASED APPROACH

Data from a wide range of other types of international assistance efforts suggests that a partnership-based approach, with recipients deeply involved in project design and implementation, is likely to be crucial to long-term success of the MPC&A program. In one study of rural water-supply projects, for example, 68 percent of the projects with high levels of recipient participation were successful, compared to only 12 percent of those with low recipient participation.[4] Benefits of a partnership approach include:

Russian "buy-in". Only by involving Russian experts directly in conceiving, designing, installing, and testing upgraded security and accounting systems can the United States hope to convince them that these improvements were largely their idea, and are genuinely needed – beliefs crucial to ensuring that they will use these systems effectively and maintain them for the long haul.

As a current example, representatives from some Russian sites have complained that equipment is being installed by Russian contractors not connected to the site, in a way that the site security manager believes is not appropriate for that site's operations. When questioned, the contractors say their contract requires them to do it a particular way, and to do it quickly. Equipment installed under such circumstances is not likely to be used effectively and maintained – indeed, at one site it is already being torn out.[5]

Sustainability. Clearly, Russian resources to replace international funding – a key part of the partnership approach – will be essential if the upgraded MPC&A systems now being put in place are to be sustained and improved. Moreover, as just noted, the "buy-in" developed by involving Russian experts in all the key decisions from the outset will be crucial to convincing Russian sites to sustain these systems over

time. Involving Russian experts in all stages of the effort also contributes to building up domestic Russian MPC&A capabilities.

Making use of superior Russian on-the-ground knowledge. While U.S. experts have learned a great deal over the years, Russian experts will always understand Russian facilities, Russian safeguards approaches, and the Russian bureaucratic structure better than U.S. experts do. Hence, Russian experts bring to the table essential perspectives on how best to get the job done in Russia. Russian experts are also far more able to work their own system to overcome obstacles, from access to liability, and to get approval for new initiatives, than U.S. officials and experts are – and will be most motivated to do so on behalf of projects they have been deeply involved in developing.

A good example of how the kind of partnership recommended here works in practice can be found in the case of the work to improve security and accounting for the nuclear warheads and materials of the Russian Navy. In that case, a small, consistent U.S. team has been leading the effort for years, building confidence with Russian counterparts over time; a Russian team at the Kurchatov Institute has taken the lead in overseeing much of the work, and, with a daily on-the-ground presence in Moscow and Russian security clearances, has been able to overcome obstacles far more effectively than remote U.S. managers would be able to do; and a highly committed Russian Navy team with leadership from the highest levels of the Russian Navy has been willing to make the hard decisions needed to move forward, and provide Navy resources for sustaining the new security and accounting equipment once installed.[6]

INCREASED RUSSIAN RESOURCES AND FLEXIBILITY

Increased Russian financial contributions are essential to building a genuine and equal partnership for nuclear security. Russian officials argue that Russia already provides substantial resources for these efforts, and this is undoubtedly correct. But they have not provided specific data (which may not even be available in Russia, as different elements of nuclear security are paid by different institutions), and it remains clear that the level of resources now being provided is insufficient to the task. One Russian expert, in a recent public presentation, estimated that current funding for physical protection programs comes to only 30 percent of the need.[7] In March 2005, the commander of the Ministry of Interior (MVD) troops for the Moscow district said that only seven of the critical guarded facilities in the district had adequately maintained security equipment, while 39 had “serious shortcomings” in their physical protection.[8]

Moreover, Russian officials, being rational, appear to have consciously stopped assigning Russian funds to activities they expected the United States to be willing to pay for. This occurs at individual sites, some of which have become seriously dependent on U.S. assistance funds, and at headquarters. For example, the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense effectively stopped paying for any further installation of U.S.-provided “quick fix” physical protection equipment once discussions of U.S. funding for that purpose began. This approach will have to change if a genuinely equal partnership is to be built.

With a growing economy and a budget in surplus, Russia has the resources to finance nuclear security – if the Russian government assigned it the priority it deserves (a subject discussed below). There is no doubt, however, that continued U.S. assistance for MPC&A is crucial to maintaining and improving good security in the interim, until Russian government resources are increased. Indeed, representatives of two Russian sites recently independently estimated that the upgraded systems now being put in place would only last five years after U.S. assistance is phased out, if Russian support does not increase.[9]

As part of a shift to a genuine partnership, the United States and Russia should exchange enough information on what they are spending and where to make it possible for the two sides to develop joint plans that include dividing up which work will be done with Russian funds, and which with U.S. funds. For example, Russian funds could finance upgrades in areas of facilities too sensitive to permit access; if the United States continues to be unwilling to finance upgrades for sabotage-prevention, the two sides could work out joint plans in which upgrades for that purpose would be primarily funded by Russia, with the U.S. contributions focused on those upgrades with a major benefit for preventing theft.

In short, the United States should seek presidential commitments that (a) Russia will steadily increase its budgets for nuclear security, ultimately providing all of the resources needed to sustain an effective MPC&A program after international assistance phases out; and (b) Russia and the United States will exchange sufficient information on their spending in these areas to make efficient joint planning of what work will be funded with what resources possible.

Russian flexibility is as important as Russian resources. While substantial progress has been made in recent years on issues such as access, liability, and taxes, troublesome issues continue to arise. Issues such as the very lengthy notice periods for visits to Russian sites (even for individuals on approved access list who have been reviewed by Russian security agencies many times before), extended and cumbersome procedures for reviewing and agreeing to contracts, and the omnipresent interference of the Russian security agencies in matters large and small need to be addressed if these nuclear stockpiles are to be secured at the pace both U.S. and Russian security requires. President Putin needs to tell the Russian security agencies that the danger that nuclear material might be stolen by terrorists is a bigger threat to Russian security than the danger that the United States might learn one more secret.

INCREASED AMERICAN FLEXIBILITY

Increased American flexibility is equally necessary. A genuine partnership means involving Russian experts at all stages of the process, and listening to and incorporating their ideas on what should be done. Often, this will not be an easy process: managers under intense pressure to get upgrades completed quickly, and to do the upgrades that experts back home think would be most effective, would often prefer not to be diverted from doing that by working out different approaches incorporating Russian perspectives. From an American perspective, the limited sense of urgency in Russia about the nuclear theft threat, and the Russian habit of waiting for the United States to make most proposals, complicate the issue further. But the large benefits for the prospects for program success of a partnership-based approach are worth the costs.[10]

As already noted, Russian experts already are playing key roles in many stages of the MPC&A program. What would a more partnership-based approach involve? Strategic plans, timetables, and milestones should be developed jointly, using both U.S. funds and Russia's own funds, rather than in Washington alone, without Russian consultation, as has often been past practice.

The program guidelines that set the goals for the effort, and the evaluations of progress, are particularly important. Today, these are still "made in America" – the guidelines are written entirely on the U.S. side, with little Russian input, and progress is evaluated by an all-American Technical Survey Team. It is not difficult to understand the Russian reaction when a previously agreed project is canceled or modified on the basis of a review in which they had no part, and which compared the effort to guidelines they had no role in developing or approving. In a partnership-based approach, guidelines for the kinds of upgrades and the standards of security needed should be discussed and agreed wherever possible, and progress should be reviewed by experts from both sides working together.[11]

Flexibility will be required elsewhere as well. The United States will need to: moderate sometimes excessive access and liability demands (as it already has begun to do); avoid undue linkage to a variety of extraneous political concerns (as reflected in congressional certification requirements and linkages to the Iran issue); address cumbersome contracting and visa procedures that introduce unnecessary delays; and abandon negotiating approaches that reflect lingering Cold War suspicions and attitudes.[12] On access, the United States should accept that there are some areas needing upgrades where direct access by U.S. personnel is not likely to be possible, and that alternative approaches to assurances can work. And the United States should follow up on President Bush's recent offer of "equal access" to sensitive U.S. nuclear facilities, working out arrangements to demonstrate that the United States is willing to accept the same kind of access it is requesting of Russia.

Personal trust built on the basis of working together over an extended period is a key element of partnership. Key personnel should lead the effort at particular sites for extended periods of time, so they can build the site-level relationships needed for a real partnership.

A partnership approach does not necessarily mean putting U.S.-funded projects under Russian management—which might well slow projects down rather than speeding them up. Rather, it means incorporating Russian ideas fully, and giving both U.S. and Russian experts the roles they can best fulfill.

A fully equal partnership would ultimately focus on improving security measures in *both* the United States and Russia – in part by exchanging ideas and best practices for improving and maintaining security and accounting measures.[13] Although Russia is not likely to be in a position to help financially with security improvements in the United States, when Russian experts visit key U.S. nuclear facilities, the United States should actively solicit their suggestions for security improvements and should make a conscious effort to adopt in the United States any Russian equipment, software, or procedures that may be useful. Few steps could more quickly dispel the perception of Russia as a passive recipient of U.S. assistance than well-publicized U.S. adoption of an innovative piece of Russian equipment or a Russian procedure superior to U.S. approaches for improving security at U.S. nuclear facilities.

PARTNERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD

Finally, as suggested in the Bratislava statement, the United States and Russia, as the countries with the largest nuclear stockpiles and the greatest experience in securing them, should jointly lead a global effort to secure nuclear stockpiles around the world. Visible actions to cooperate in securing material in the rest of the world would go a long way toward demonstrating that this really was a partnership in which Russia has a leading part to play, therefore strengthening the effort within Russia itself. Building support in Moscow for the United States and Russia working together as joint leaders of a global effort—beginning with getting their own houses in order—will be far easier than gaining support for the notion that Russia is a weak country that needs even more U.S. help to secure its own nuclear stockpiles.

Russia's help in leading a global effort could be important in many countries, in validating the issue as not just a "U.S.-only" concern, in bringing additional experiences and best practices to the table, and in adding to the pool of available experts for security reviews, training, and the like. Russian leadership could be crucial in a number of key cases where the United States does not have the relationships to succeed:

- **North Korea.** Russia should pressure North Korea to return the significant quantity of HEU still present at the Soviet-supplied IRT research reactor in North Korea, and should accept the return of that fuel with or without help from the United States to pay for the costs.
- **Iran.** Russia should work with Iran to convince the Iranian government to allow the U.S.-supplied research reactor HEU in Iran to be removed. Russia might be able to broker a deal, for example, in which Russian experts would package and transport the material, but the material would ultimately be shipped to the United States or Europe.[14]
- **India.** As India's principal nuclear supplier, Russia should work to ensure that India puts in place adequate security measures at India's most important nuclear facilities, both military and civilian.
- **Libya.** Russia should work with Libya to accelerate the effort to convert Libya's research reactor to LEU and ship the HEU now in that reactor's core back to Russia, in cooperation with U.S. experts.

Soviet-supplied HEU. Russia should actively provide incentives for countries that received Soviet-supplied HEU to send it back to Russia as quickly as possible, instead of continuing to do nothing unless the United States pays all of Russia's costs for each step. Russia should also insist that countries that possess Soviet-supplied HEU provide stringent security for it, and should send physical protection teams to find and fix any security vulnerabilities for this material that may exist, pending removal.

Many other countries will have to join in a global effort to upgrade security and accounting for nuclear stockpiles if all the potentially vulnerable nuclear caches are to be addressed. The approaches to U.S.-Russian partnership – and to convincing the Russian security elite that nuclear theft and terrorism is a real threat to Russia's own security – described in this paper can and should be adapted to build nuclear security partnerships with other countries around the world. For many countries, framing the issue as joining with other major powers in the leadership of a global nuclear security partnership, rather than framing it as needing U.S. help to adequately control their own nuclear stockpiles, may make the effort more attractive.

PARTNERSHIP ON A BROADER NONPROLIFERATION AGENDA

In recent years, the United States has sought to accelerate cooperation with Russia on those aspects of the nonproliferation agenda the United States is interested in pursuing with Russia, without engaging seriously with Russia on other nonproliferation issues of interest to Russian experts.

This is clearest with respect to cooperation on proliferation-resistant approaches to the future of nuclear energy. Because of concerns over Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, the United States has refused to negotiate an agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy with Russia (though such an agreement was in place with the Soviet Union through the darkest days of the Cold War); has refused to negotiate an agreement for cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act that would make it possible for the United States to approve shipment of U.S.-obligated spent fuel to Russia (even though U.S.-obligated fuel represents nearly all of the potential market for Russia's offer to import foreign spent fuel); has refused to allow Russia to join the Generation IV International Forum, an international consortium working to develop new approaches to the future of nuclear energy, including approaches with improved proliferation resistance; and has declined to support the parallel IAEA-led International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) effort, in which Russia is playing a substantial role. At the same time, the United States has continued its tight trade restraints on Russian exports of uranium and enrichment work into the U.S. market. These U.S. actions have raised suspicions in Russia's nuclear establishment that the United States is attempting to freeze Russia out of world markets, and is not willing to engage in a genuine partnership.

In recent months, however, President Bush has personally complimented Russia as "understanding the dangers" of a nuclear Iran and "trying to help."[15] This suggests that the time has come to break the logjam and re-engage with Russia on matters ranging from spent fuel import to proliferation-resistant approaches to the future of nuclear energy – all of which can be pursued in a way that serves not only Russian interests but U.S. interests as well, and contributes to building a genuine U.S.-Russian nonproliferation partnership.[16]

BUILDING RUSSIAN COMMITMENT

Security for all of Russia's nuclear stockpiles sufficient to defeat the threats that terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose in Russia is critical to Russia's own security, for there is a very real chance that if extreme Chechen or other Islamic terrorists got hold of a nuclear bomb, Moscow or St. Petersburg could be their target.[17] As President Putin agreed in the Bratislava statement, nuclear terrorism is one of the "gravest threats" that Russia faces; it is not just an American problem.

But much of the nuclear technical elite in Russia – and in most countries around the world – appears to believe that the nuclear terrorist threat is far-fetched and that existing security approaches are adequate. Changing that attitude is essential to building the fast-paced nuclear security partnership that is now needed. Until President Putin concludes that better security for these stockpiles is an urgent priority for Russia's own security, he is not likely to assign the needed resources to put in place and sustain effective security for all of Russia's nuclear stockpiles, or sweep aside the obstacles to accelerated international cooperation that his agencies have raised. The Beslan tragedy, showing that the terrorists Russia faces can and will strike in force and kill even schoolchildren, has begun to undermine this complacency, but this is only a beginning.

President Putin should make it clear throughout his government that addressing this grave threat is a top Russian national security priority. U.S. officials should spare no opportunity to remind their Russian counterparts of President Putin's statement that insecure nuclear stockpiles pose a grave threat to Russian security, and to draw out the implications of that conclusion. Several specific steps might help build the needed sense of urgency among Russia's key decision-makers:

- **A fast-paced survey of nuclear security vulnerabilities.** President Bush should encourage President Putin to put together a team of Russian experts to conduct a fast-paced assessment of potential vulnerabilities and recommendations for fixing them at all Russian sites with nuclear weapons or

weapons-usable nuclear material. Any thorough review would reveal that many of these facilities are not adequately defended against either large outside attacks or significant insider conspiracies, and would give President Putin direct information on the situation, rather than relying on assurances from his nuclear officials. The United States can offer to share its own experience with such fast-paced reviews – which in some cases have led to dramatic and rapid improvements in security – and offer to help cover the cost of the needed improvements.

- **Nuclear terrorism war games.** War games and similar exercises have been effective in getting policy-makers in a number of countries to think through and face up to urgent challenges they face. A war game or series of war games for Russia's national security policymakers, focused on nuclear theft and terrorism (following up on a similar exercise recently conducted in Europe) could help convince participants that more needs to be done to secure nuclear stockpiles.[18]
- **Joint U.S.-Russian threat briefings.** A series of briefings by Russian and U.S. experts for key Russian policymakers could outline in detail terrorist desire for and efforts to get nuclear weapons, and the very real possibility that terrorists could make at least a crude nuclear bomb if they got the needed nuclear materials. Similar points should be made in ongoing training for nuclear security personnel, highlighting the urgency of maintaining high security.

OVERCOMING POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO PARTNERSHIP

A genuine nuclear security partnership cannot be built in a political vacuum. Today, with its economy growing and its government stabilized, Russia is more assertive in the international arena, and less willing to compromise on sensitive matters in order to receive assistance. While President Bush and President Putin have a good relationship, and there has been far-reaching U.S.-Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism, substantial parts of the U.S. and Russian security establishments have grown increasingly suspicious of each other in recent years. In Russia, the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the expansion of NATO (to include even some countries of the former Soviet Union), the creation of U.S. bases in former Soviet states on Russia's borders, and the uprisings against pro-Russian governments in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgystan have combined to reignite Cold War-era suspicions, exacerbated by Russia's military weakness, that the United States is seeking to encircle and dominate Russia. Some Russian officials have argued that U.S. expressions of concern over nuclear security are just an effort to discredit Russia's nuclear industry, in order to weaken Russia's position in international nuclear markets. In the United States, Russia is seen by many as sliding back toward authoritarianism, waging a brutal civil war in Chechnya, seeking to dominate its neighbors, and opposing the Untied States on matters ranging the Iraq war to cooperation with Iran.

Such suspicions make the task of building real partnership in sensitive security areas more difficult, and strengthen the hand of those on both sides who raise arguments against nuclear security cooperation. Although such cooperation has been remarkably resilient through the darkest periods of U.S.-Russian relations over the last decade, disputes over issues ranging from access to sensitive sites to liability in the event of an accident are more difficult to resolve today than they were a few years ago, and the Russian security services in particular have been posing more obstacles to cooperation than before. In this atmosphere, deep structural incentives limit both sides' willingness to compromise on sensitive nuclear security issues. In both Moscow and Washington, there is much less career risk in sticking firm to a tough negotiating position, or raising another objection to a new step in cooperation, than there is in letting something go through that is later judged to have gone wrong.

Addressing these concerns will require a sustained diplomatic effort, going well beyond the scope of this paper – but it is nonetheless likely to be an important ingredient of success in reducing the threats of nuclear terrorism. As part of that larger effort, the United States should undertake a substantially increased public diplomacy effort to build support for cooperation to secure, consolidate, and eliminate nuclear stockpiles, in Russia and around the world. The United States should sponsor articles, workshops, briefings, and the like that emphasize such matters as: how much has been accomplished that serves Russia's own

security interests; how limited the access to sensitive sites the United States has requested really is, and how few nuclear secrets are actually revealed; the United States' willingness to give parallel access at its own sites; the large fraction of the equipment that is being installed that is produced by Russian manufacturers, in systems designed and installed by Russian experts, not American ones; and the benefits to the Russian public's safety and security from this cooperation. Expanded efforts should be pursued to engage the Russian Duma, the Russian press, non-government organizations, and the rest of civil society in Russia in these critical issues for Russia's national security.

THE NEED FOR SUSTAINED HIGH-LEVEL LEADERSHIP

To build a global nuclear security partnership that can act at the pace and the scale required, both President Bush and Russian President Putin will have to push persistently and creatively to overcome the political and bureaucratic impediments to action, putting this effort near the top of their national security agendas. Breaking through these obstacles requires presidential action, as many of the obstacles cut across agencies and departments, and cannot be addressed by individual ministers or cabinet secretaries acting alone, however energetic or well-intentioned they may be. Success will require not just occasional encouraging statements, but in-depth, day-to-day engagement. The effort will have to be near the top of the diplomatic agenda as well – an item to be addressed with every country with stockpiles to secure or resources to help, at every level, at every opportunity, until the job is done.

Actions by President Putin, in particular, are the key to success. If he decided to make securing nuclear stockpiles from theft a top national security priority, as he should, he has the power to assign the needed resources to install and sustain effective security for all of Russia's nuclear stockpiles, and to sweep aside the obstacles to accelerated international cooperation that his agencies have raised. If he chose to bring the power of his office to bear on the issue, President Putin could give his nuclear agencies the mission, authority, and resources to set and enforce nuclear security rules that would ensure that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material had security measures sufficient to defend against plausible terrorist and criminal threats (from both insiders and outsiders).

President Bush's critical diplomatic tasks in the aftermath of Bratislava include: using his excellent relationship with President Putin to convince the Russian president of the urgency of action, both for Russia's own security and as a central requirement of a positive relationship with the United States; pressing for agreement with Russia on key steps to strengthen and accelerate the nuclear security effort in Russia and around the world; and stepping in to overcome the obstacles to a fast-paced U.S.-Russian nuclear security partnership that still exist on the U.S. side.

Finally, to build and sustain such a partnership, and to overcome the impediments to progress as they arise, new mechanisms for organizing the effort are likely to be essential – in both Washington and Moscow. The new interagency committee on nuclear security that President Bush and Russian President Putin agreed to establish at their Bratislava summit is potentially an important first step. While its co-chairmen, Rosatom Director Alexander Rumiantsev and Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman, do not have the power themselves to resolve many of the difficult obstacles that reach across agencies, this committee can and should be used as a mechanism for finding such obstacles and raising them quickly to higher political levels for action to address them. To complement the Bodman-Rumiantsev group and ensure that this effort receives the sustained presidential attention needed to move it forward as quickly as possible, both presidents should appoint a senior official, with the access needed to get a presidential decision whenever needed, with responsibility for leading efforts to ensure that all potentially vulnerable nuclear stockpiles are secured as quickly as possible. It would also be desirable to re-establish the mechanism of bilateral interagency meetings at the level of the U.S. vice president and Russian prime minister, perhaps twice per year – in the past, when these were chaired by the U.S. vice president and the Russian prime minister, these events proved a useful mechanism for bringing issues and obstacles forward to high political levels for action to move the joint cooperation forward. A joint committee of the U.S. and Russian Academies of Science has recommended the establishment of a joint high-level group, including both officials and non-government

experts (and in particular not only managers but technical experts as well) to recommend a new, partnership-based strategy for these nonproliferation efforts.[19]

Nuclear theft and nuclear terrorism pose real and urgent threats to the security of the United States, Russia, and the world. But these dangers can be drastically reduced by forging a fast-paced partnership to secure all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide.

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[4] See, for example, World Bank, *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 20-27.

[5] Discussions with Russian and U.S. participants, Obninsk, Russia, 16-20 May 2005.

[6] For an account, see, for example, Morton Bremer Maerli, "U.S.-Russian Naval Security Upgrades: Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 4 (2003).

[7] Nikolai N. Shemigon, director-general, Eleron (Rosatom's physical protection firm), remarks to "Third Russian International Conference on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting," 16-20 May 2005, Obninsk, Russia.

[8] See "Over 4,000 Trespassers Detained at Moscow District Restricted Access Facilities," *Interfax-Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey*, 18 March 2005.

[9] Discussions in Obninsk, Russia, 16-20 May, 2005.

[10] For an insightful discussion of the differences between donor-recipient and partnership approaches in another area, describing the key assumptions underlying each approach and both the difficulties and the advantages of partnership-based approaches, see Albert R. Wight, "Participation, Ownership, and Sustainable Development," in *Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries*, ed. Merilee S. Grindle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).

[11] Options for increased Russian input might include development of program guidelines by a joint U.S.-Russian team or creation of a Russian team paralleling the U.S. one, with whom the guidelines and their implications could be discussed in detail. Similarly, options for Russian participation in evaluating progress could include adding Russian experts to the Technical Survey Team, or establishing a parallel Russian survey team which would provide input both to the Russian government and to the U.S. program.

[12] See Gottemoeller and Sarkisov, *Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation*. See also "What Are the Main Impediments to Action?" in Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, *Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action* (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/2004report.asp as of 1 February 2005), pp. 74-75.

[13] For a brief listing of some of the nuclear material security issues that should be addressed in the United States, see Bunn and Wier, *Securing the Bomb 2005*, pp. 104-07.

[14] Since this material is subject to U.S. obligations under the Atomic Energy Act, it cannot be legally shipped to Russia until the United States and Russia negotiate an Agreement for Cooperation under Section 123 of the Act—which the United States has refused to do until U.S.-Russian disputes over Russia's cooperation with Iran are resolved.

[15] President George W. Bush, *Press Conference* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 28 April 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050428-9.html as of).

[16] For a good discussion of such a broader agenda, see Gottemoeller and Sarkisov, *Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation*.

[17] Simon Saradzhyan, *Russia: Grasping Reality of Nuclear Terror* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2003; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/saradzhyan_2003_02.pdf as of 22 March 2005).

[18] The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) organized the "Black Dawn" war game in Europe and are now working to organize a similar event in Moscow.

[19] Gottemoeller and Sarkisov, *Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation*.