

**Defense Leadership in Russia:
The General Staff and Strategic
Management in a Comparative Perspective**

A.A. Kokoshin

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Michelle Von Euw
Editor, ISP Discussion Paper Series
International Security Program
Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
telephone (617) 495-1914; facsimile (617) 496-4403
email is@harvard.edu.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Andrei Afanasievich Kokoshin is a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and section of World Economics and International Relations. He is currently a member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, and the Russian Academy of Social Sciences, member of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Services. He graduated from Moscow State Technological University named after N. E. Bauman in 1969, as an engineer in radio electronics. From 1969-1991 he worked in the Russian Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in the Institute of the U.S.A and Canada. From 1992-1997 he occupied the post of First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. From 1997-1998 he served as a State Military Inspector and Secretary of the Defense Council of the Russian Federation, then Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and a Standing member of the Security Council of Russia. In 1998-1999, he was acting Vice-President of the Russian National Academy of Sciences. Since 2000, he is a Deputy to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian federation. Currently, he heads the Institute of International Security of the Russian Academy of Sciences and is a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. He is a Member of the Board of Ted Turner and Sam Nunn's Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc., USA. He is member of the International Advisory Council of the Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.

Note from the Author

Dedicated to the memory of my comrades who lost their lives serving the Russian Ministry of Defense—wonderful Russian and Soviet officers—Generals Gelii Viktorovich Batenin, Viktor Petrovich Dubynin, Vyacheslav Petrovich Mironov, and Admiral Valerii Vasilievich Grishanov.

Note from the Editor

Translated from Russian by Allison Gill. Endnotes translated by Roman Ilto. Earlier versions of this paper were edited by Danielle Lussier and Kathleen Siddell of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

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Introduction To American Edition

This monograph was written in the beginning of 2001 and was passed to Harvard later that year. It was a reaction to a new wave of debate on the military reform, the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the role of the General Staff, which took place in the Russian Federation in that period. The work was entirely addressed to the Russian domestic audience.

Then I thought it might be expedient to discuss it with high-ranking Russian state officials. So the manuscript was distributed among state authorities both in civilian and military quarters. That caused a discussion. The critique, comments, and suggestions I got in the course of it were so valuable and thought-provoking that I could not stop and I had to continue my work on the monograph. Finally it resulted in a new book on strategic management which is expected to be published in Moscow in 2002 or early 2003.

The theme of both this monograph and the forthcoming book continues to be the subject of my direct dialogue with top Russian state officials and in particular the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Security Council staff, and other bodies which deal with matters of national security and defense.

I am very thankful to the organizers and participants of the seminar on this monograph which was held in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University in May 2002 – to Professor Graham Allison, Professor Paul Doty, Dean Joseph Nye, The Honorable John White, General John Reppert and other distinguished colleagues.

Andrei Kokoshin

July 22, 2002

Preface

This work is primarily intended for specialists on national security. At the same time however, the author hopes that faculty and students, as well as a wider audience interested in issues of the military, politics, and government management as a whole, will find it useful.

This work is not intended to be all encompassing, but rather offers a brief overview.

This work relies on experience the author received while serving as the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, a State Military Inspector and Secretary of the Defense Council, and the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (1992-1998), and a Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly (since December 1999). It also relies on his research into strategic management and strategic leadership in other countries as well as the history of Russia and the Soviet Union (in Russian – “strateghicheskoe rukovodstvo” or “strateghicheskoe upravlenje”).

The author was greatly assisted in this work by his contacts with many colleagues from other countries—former United States Secretaries of Defense B. Perry, G. Brown, R. McNamara and B. Cohen, former National Security Advisors B. Scowcroft and S. Berger, former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff P. Jones, J. Shalikashvili, B. Crowe and others, former Assistant Secretaries of Defense G. Allison, A. Carter and Deputy Secretary of Defense J. White, the Ministers of Defense of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, R. Portillo and Robertson, the Ministers of Defense of France F. Leotar, Richard, the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany F. Rue, the Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the people’s Republic of China, Liu Huaqing, the Minister of Defense of China, Chi Haotian, (and other members of the Central Military Council of China), as well as other leaders in defense and national security in various countries.

For the useful notes and suggestions made during the preparation of this work the author would like to express his gratitude to Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, Major General V. A. Zolotarev (PhD in history), General of the Army M. P. Kolesnikov, Colonel General V.I. Mironov, Deputy of the State Duma General of the Army I.N. Rodionov, Vice Chairman of the State Duma Committee on National Defense A.G. Arbatov (PhD in history), Colonel General V.L. Manieov, and Colonel General A.M. Moskovskii.

S.D. Tikhonov, K.V. Masyuk, V.V. Vesylvovii, Y. A. Ushanovii (PhD candidate in economics) and many other colleagues provided the author with extremely helpful materials and editorial suggestions.

This work was made possible by the fact that the Russian government leadership, a significant portion of the Russian Parliament, and society as a whole has once again focused their attention and decision-making on military reform in Russia.

The author begins with the presumption that questions of strategic management are among the most central to carrying out reforms. These questions must be addressed utilizing Russian experience, as well utilizing the most valuable international experience, particularly of those countries with established democratic systems.

Some original ideas for this particular monograph were explored by the author in his book, "Army and Policy," Moscow, International Relations Publishing House, 1995. (Published in English under the title "Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-1991. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA , 1998, London, England, 1998.)

Introduction

In Russia today, little is understood about the strategic leadership of the national defense system, including the armed forces and their management. Yet strategic leadership represents one of the most vital issues for Russia's national defense capability and thus, its real sovereignty. It is also an important factor in its potential to restore its status as a major power — this time with an authentic democratic political system and a modern market economy.

The strategic management system of national defense and of the country's armed forces must be capable of dealing with the modern character of wars and armed conflicts that Russia is likely to face in the next twenty or twenty-five years. No less important, the system of strategic management must also be prepared to deal with the political conditions and challenges faced by the armed forces, the defense industry, and other components of the defense system, in accordance with national interests in such areas as economic, social, and cultural development of Russia.

The character of any national strategic defense management initiatives undertaken by the Russian military forces will, to a large extent, be determined by international legal norms in accordance with Russia's obligations in the military and political realms, as well as in a variety of other areas. However, the observance of these norms will depend greatly on the behavior of the United States, which, as the remaining single superpower, bears a special responsibility to the international community and its own people for international security.

A wide range of factors and circumstances determines the character of wars and armed conflicts. Without getting into detailed classifications, these factors include the character of the respective period of development of international political and economic relations, and the acuteness and depth of conflicts between their subjects, which are expressed by the country's dominant ideologies and of the prevailing political elite. The bipolar system, a juxtaposition of two superpowers — the United States and the USSR — and their blocs, was unprecedented in world

history. Since the collapse of this system, international relations have been altered by the absence of this kind of confrontation of two countries and systems with antagonistic ideologies.

At the same time, the number of ethnic, racial, and religious conflicts in the world has increased sharply. Many of these remained dormant for decades, restrained by the possibility of confrontation between the two superpowers. These conflicts are increasing in the context of the globalization of the world economy and the expansion of the scale of postindustrial civilization, which has a deep effect on world politics as well as on the domestic politics of nearly every state. The foundations for the system of strategic stability that was created in the 1970s and the 1980s continue to exist today through we have quite different kinds of political relations. The strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia, as the successor state to the USSR, continues to be at the center of this system. This relationship has been shaped by a series of treaties and agreements mostly negotiated and signed during the periods of the Cold War when a *détente*, a substantial relaxation of tension, existed between the superpowers. Processes for the implementation of this treaty system have been developed that substantially increase the predictability of international military-political relations.

In the 1990s, a majority of the political elite in most countries began to focus less on ideology and more on economics and technology. The overwhelming majority of states aimed their policies at trying to gain concrete economic advantages for their own entrepreneurs and constituents. Even those states whose underdeveloped potential has the capability of shifting the world order, such as China and India, have begun to look to modernization in its contemporary forms of globalization and postindustrial society, to attempt to maximize their gains in the economic, scientific, and technological spheres. This trend largely predetermines the framework and limits within which the armed conflicts and wars of the future can be examined. However, the

potential for a reemphasis on ideology in international relations should not be overlooked, including on the part of the United States.

For Russia, one of the most important challenges of national development is to be more involved in the process of world development: It must fight for a place in the global economy and in world politics as a democratic state with a contemporary market economy.¹ Starting from the Ministry of Defense, Russian agencies involved in national defense are called upon to comply with the norms of building a democratic state. This is not a question of new ideology or the implementation of abstract principles. It is a question of choosing the most rational system for a functioning society and state. Democracy in the long-term, despite the existence of many problems and deficiencies, has proven its viability and effectiveness in the West.

The history of Russia — as well as the history of other countries — provide many examples of rash and poorly considered decisions to change the strategic leadership of national defense. Often, such changes followed shake-ups in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, causing abnormal re-alignments and break-ups. These impulsive changes also resulted in personnel upheavals as well as in the destruction of the work done by established formal and informal collectives. In Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation, these shakeups left the armed forces without stable and dependable management for months and sometimes years.

Many strategic management issues in Russia are still unregulated by appropriate laws. The question of creating effective civilian control over the armed forces and other armed services according to the standards of the modern democratic state remains unanswered. This system, as is accepted in developed states, must include civilian ministry of defense (consisting namely of the minister, deputy minister, and civilian department heads with the relationships and hierarchies regulated by law) and parliamentary control over the armed forces. The president, as commander in chief, must also have control over the armed services, in keeping with the demands of a modern

legal state system of management, as well as the greater role of different non-governmental organizations and media.²

Civilian control via parliament and the government implies a high level of responsibility for the condition of the armed forces and the defense industry, for the level of mobilization readiness, and for ensuring national defense capability. These issues have not yet been satisfactorily addressed in Russia in spite of all the radical changes that have occurred since 1991.

In this overview, the author attempts only to highlight the array of issues relevant to the management of the armed forces and the role that can and should be played by the Ministry of Defense and its main departments, first and foremost the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, an integral part of the ministry.

Of course, these questions cannot be considered without an understanding of the entire system of government management, including what the role of the commander in chief is today, or what government must do to ensure national defense capability, according to law as well as in practice, including the role played by the head of government in the system of strategic management. It is also necessary to at least touch upon the role played by the Security Council of the Russian Federation, as well as both houses of the Federal Assembly. Further works in this series propose to discuss in greater detail the roles of these organizations in national defense strategic decision-making.

Public discussions in Russia often refer to the “division of labor” between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, while in other countries the Ministry of Defense has long been headed by civilian leadership. This begs the question of whether a civilian minister of defense (as well as the agencies directly subordinate to him and his deputies) must deal exclusively with administrative and economic issues while the General Staff deals with operational and other such issues.³ Many of these arguments are surprisingly reminiscent of those in analogous situations in

decades past, such as those made during the reforms of the Army and Navy in the Russian Empire after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Many contemporary Russian authorities and authors have a wrong interpretation of the real USSR Red Army during World War II in 1941-45.

There is a misperception that in the United States, the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as the other armed services⁴ are subordinate to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff report directly to the president of the United States and not to the secretary of defense. In reality, however, this is not the case, a matter that will be discussed in a later section of this work.

Disagreements about the role of the General Staff in the system of strategic defense management had a place (and to a certain extent continue to do so) in some former Eastern European countries, particularly in Poland. Immediately following the establishment of a new government, after its exit from the Warsaw Pact and before it became part of NATO, Poland created the position of a civilian minister of defense. In the opinion of many specialists, the then leadership of Poland, a country with a tradition of military rule, did not give consistent attention to real reforms of the Polish armed forces. It is sufficient to remember the experience of military rule by the Marshal Y. Pilsudskii in the 1920s and by General V. Jaruzelskii in the 1980s. The civilian minister of defense was not in the position to formulate clear goals and aims in carrying out military reforms and ensure the Polish Army had at least a minimum of resources. As a result there was a “general’s uprising” of sorts, after which the Polish General Staff for some time subordinated directly to the president as commander in chief while there was a civilian minister of defense. Then came major changes in the government structure in Poland, and now, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces is subordinate to a civilian minister of defense and has access to the president and prime minister only through him. However, that result required a serious strengthening of the leadership of the ministry of defense to develop the necessary normative base.

But for Poland this question does not carry the same important connotation that it does for Russia. In Russia, the military has always played an enormous role in the state, not only during the 70-year period of Soviet power, but also throughout the existence of the Russian state. The roles of the armed forces, the defense industry and military machinery as a whole, and the military organization of the state have always been substantial. Therefore, military reforms are one of the most important components of governmental reform and reform of the system of government management as a whole. Without wide-reaching military reforms, it will not be possible to build a contemporary democratic state. This also relates, of course, to reform of the rest of the nation's "power structures," which requires special analysis. They include the Ministry of Interior, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry for Emergency Situations, the Federal Border Guard Service, the Federal Agency for the Government Communications and Information, and several others.

All this reflects the difficulty of the excessively drawn-out transformation of the system of defense management in Russia, including direct management by the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin has paid more attention to the problems of military reform. Meetings of the Security Council have begun to take place on a regular basis regarding this important problem. They have begun to make difficult and painful but concrete decisions that are absolutely essential for the nation and the defense of Russia. It is very important for the Security Council to play a major role in military reform.⁵ Among the most difficult but fully justified decisions made by the president and the Security Council was to reduce the size of the Armed Forces and other military organizations through troop and staff reductions.

The current leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and several top officials of the Security Council staff took the initiative for concrete military reform in

1999—2001. During the last few years, they undertook a serious analysis of these problems together with other departments within the Ministry of Defense.

Regardless of the efforts undertaken by the government concerning military reform, the state of affairs in this area remains difficult and far from tantamount. It is largely connected to the lack of development of a whole array of strategic management problems for the system of national defense.

Strategic leadership requires, firstly, the normative-legal basis that regulates all issues of the development and implementation of national and global defense goals, in peace and in wartime, as well as regulates relations between agencies dealing with national defense.

In discussions about what the functions of the minister of defense, the General Staff, and other departments of the military structure should be, it is often said that in the peacetime the General Staff should subordinate to the minister of defense, while in the wartime it should report directly to the commander in chief. However, few probe deeper and attempt to understand what wartime really means today. Often it is assumed that wartime refers only to conflict on the scale of the Second World War.

World War II was an absolute war in which the sides were motivated by major political goals, the realization of which demanded an even greater dedication of military resources than WW I, which had already seemed for many countries to be a total war. Moreover, these political goals were established not only by the aggressors—Hitler’s Germany—and by the major actor—the Soviet Union—but also by the other members of the Anti-Hitler coalition.⁶

The potential Third World War, “if provoked by the imperialists,” to use an old Soviet expression, was seen in Soviet as well as military and political thought as the decisive confrontation between capitalism and socialism, that is, an absolute war in its most radical incarnation. In reality, however, the period following the Second World War, the Cold War, was primarily characterized by many limited wars of varying sizes and comparatively limited armed conflicts, never requiring the

use of the mechanisms of strategic management developed in the course of the Second World War and intended for use in World War III.

Now, officially and unofficially, all the major actors that ensure the defense capability of the country, including the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, admit that the possibility of a third world war in the foreseeable future is almost non-existent and the probability of large-scale aggression against Russia employing weapons of mass destruction or even one using only conventional weapons is similarly small. But the idea of creating a system of strategic management that would serve the requirements of a war like World War II remains actively propounded.

In the first place, the conversation should consist instead of ideas for developing a system of strategic management that would allow for victory or, to use the expression of Sun-Tzu, “for an advantage” first and foremost in limited wars with sharply defined strategic, political and economic goals, and with defined limits in time and space for taking military action. That kind of war supposes a very deep involvement of politics, not only in military strategy, but also in the carrying out of specific operations.

At the same time, these kinds of wars often do not require the constant and total involvement of the highest-ranking government officials (such as the president, prime minister or chancellor) as was required, for example, of Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, or Hitler during the Second World War. Furthermore, if such involvement is required then, as a rule, it is only for a relatively short period of time, determined by the duration of a limited war and the period of preparation for it, or the time required to carry out only the most important operations during its course.

Peace operations also have their own specific requirements, where the actions of even relatively small units can have an enormous political effect requiring painstaking attention, primarily from the political leadership of the particular military department.

More importantly for the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense is beginning to serve the function not only of containing aggression against Russia, its allies, and partners, but also to prevent wars fraught with political conflicts at their early stages. Obviously, this task must be accomplished by the Ministry of Defense in close cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency of Governmental Communications and Information (FAPSI), and other government agencies.⁷

Besides this, the highest leadership of the country should certainly not always take on the entire responsibility for conducting military actions. This problem remains particularly acute for Russia today.

The positions analyzed above are extremely important arguments in support of a political figure to lead the armed forces who is part of the government leadership but not the head of government or the head of state. In developed countries with established systems of political democracies, civilian ministers of defense fill this role.

Adequate modern conditions for a system of strategic defense management have not existed in the Russian Federation at crucial levels, such as the Ministry of Defense, until now. Considering that the government leadership, as mentioned above, has paid more attention to the problems of military construction and military reform, one could expect and hope that the essential (but not rash, as has so often happened in Russia) decisions will be made in this area in the near future.

The General Staff in the System of Strategic Defense Management

Just what was the General Staff in the past and what is it now? What will its role be in the future? On the basis of real historical experience and the modern practice of various countries, it is possible to speak of two kinds of General Staffs. One type is a branch of analysis, prognosis, planning, and preparation of the directives and orders of the commander in chief. The second type is one involved in direct management of strategic actions and operations that issues appropriate directives and orders. The country's political leadership delegates a significant amount of authority to the latter kind of General Staff, the authority of the commander in chief himself.

Originally, the staffs were important but auxiliary rather than executive branches of the commander in chief's office. One of the most famous Chiefs of Staff in military history was Marshal Louis Bertier, a comrade in arms of Napoleon. As a loyal executor of the will of the general, the first consul to the emperor formulated his ideas, thoughts, and decisions into the appropriate commands and orders.⁸ Napoleon's staff, headed by Bertier, served as a kind of military chancellery and was extremely well organized for its time. Bertier and his few officers clearly and rigidly fulfilled all of Napoleon's directives but almost never offered their own suggestions for action. Napoleon not only led the strategic actions of his army, but was a brilliant tactician who commanded movements directly on the battlefield. This type of leader began to disappear in the nineteenth century, when the scale of wars and armed conflicts substantially increased. Logistics service, economics, domestic political stability, industry, science, and technology all played a greater factor in wartime. They required different forms and methods of management and organization.

One of the turning points in the history and art of war was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. This was the direct precursor to the total wars of the twentieth century (which continue to influence Russian military thought today, similar to the way in which Russian and French military thought were influenced by the Napoleonic wars long after they were over).

At this critical point the Prussian General Staff, headed by Helmut von Moltke (the Great Moltke or Moltke the Elder), began to distinguish itself. This organization became the model for similar organizations in other countries. It was a radical departure from Napoleon's General Staff under Bertier. In Prussian Germany at the time, there was not only a General Staff but also a Minister of the Army, General Albrecht Roon. Other European countries followed this trend. In terms of military talent as well as cultural preparation, Roon was far inferior to Moltke, so that in the actual military hierarchy the Minister of the Army quickly yielded to the primacy of the Chief of the General Staff.⁹

By the Franco-Prussian War, Moltke's General Staff had transformed from an auxiliary branch to one with direct leadership over the German Army, and Moltke himself became the "effective commander in chief," to use the words of B.M. Shaposhnikov (although officially the commander in chief remained the Prussian King and later German Emperor Wilhelm I).

In evaluating the role of the Prussian-German General Staff, Chancellor Otto von Bismark should not be overlooked. Bismark, having earned the great trust of Emperor Wilhelm I, was capable not only of balancing the enormous influence of the General Staff on foreign policy. He also ensured the predominance of political considerations in the formation of military strategy despite the many attempts of Moltke to interpret Karl von Clausewitz's famous formula concerning the primacy of politicians in regards to military plans and actions as giving a very narrow meaning to the politicians.¹⁰

The conditions in which Germany's General Staff developed and acted were largely determined by the figures of Wilhelm I, Moltke, and Bismark. Moltke's personality, his selection of personnel for his General Staff, and the success of the Prussian — then later unified German — armed forces in making major changes to the political map of Europe, gave this staff a unique place in the system of strategic management among the Armed Forces and other components of

Germany's military power. It is not surprising that this kind of General Staff became the object of much admiration and imitation. The Russian Empire and Soviet Union did not overlook this. In the opinions of M.V. Frunze, M.N. Tukhachevskii, and other prominent Soviet military leaders, high marks were given to the German art of war and German management at the strategic and especially operational levels during World War I, despite Germany's ultimate defeat.¹¹

The impact of the General Staff of Moltke is still felt today. Although many of those who follow its model do not realize its source, as many in Russia don't know the real history of the current General Staff, let alone its predecessors in Germany, which bear much of the responsibility for its destruction in two world wars. It is precisely for this reason that it is necessary to provide so much detail about the General Staff of Moltke and its role in Germany's fate.¹²

Bismark often had to restrain the appetites of the General Staff because he knew that an absolute military victory at one major policy stage could produce serious problems and even defeat at a later stage. This became clear during the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, when Bismark spoke out against the complete military destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He hoped that through liberal peace terms after the war, he could partner with it in the future in order to achieve his main goal, the military defeat of France and the creation of a German Empire under the aegis of the Prussian crown.

Bismark was able to subordinate military strategy and the operations of the army to the relatively more important international political and economic interests of Germany, securing that balance of power in Europe that would best serve his country's interests. The General Staff often did not understand this consideration, even under the leadership of such a highly educated figure as Moltke.

However, even Bismark could not restrain the German army from marching on Paris after France's first major military losses in 1870, a decision that dragged out the war and worsened

Franco-German relations for many decades to come. Bismark had to agree to the demands of the General Staff, supported by their military strategic requirements, regarding the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. This provided the French with a desire for revenge, which fed its country for forty years up until the First World War, a war that shook European civilization and led to the fall of the German and Russian Empires. Thus, the fulfillment the German General Staff's military and strategic demands in 1871 created military-political instability felt all across Europe and in international relations as a whole, eventually resulting in the destruction of the German Empire.

Although Bismark was not always a friend to Russia (though he more than once referred to himself as a student of the Chancellor of the Russian Empire, Gorchakov), he consistently spoke out against aggravating German-Russian relations, to avoid a war between the Russian and German Empires.

A new period began after the era of Bismark and Moltke the Elder. Under Wilhelm II, significantly weaker individuals came to power who were incapable of balancing the enormous institutional power of the General Staff which in turn had much weaker leaders than Moltke the Elder. His nephew, Moltke the Younger, who headed the General Staff when the German Empire entered WW I, was not as gifted as his uncle.¹³

During the final stages of the First World War, the German General Staff, headed by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, subjugated every aspect of Germany to its power.¹⁴ Domestically, German industry and agriculture were exhausted by colossal requirements of war because of this. It generated a powerful wave of dissatisfaction in German society, and led to the internal revolution of November-December 1918 in which the German Empire was liquidated without decisive military defeat on the Western Front, given the huge territory captured by the German army in Russia after the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the painful (for Russia) Brest Peace Treaty of early 1918.¹⁵

The Military in the Russian Empire at the Beginning of the Century and in the USSR until World War II

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian General Staff was not subordinated directly to the Ministry of the Army. This occurred as a result of Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, when the Defense Council was established, headed by Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, uncle of Emperor Nicholas II, who was appointed commander in chief by the Russian Armed Forces.¹⁶ The chief of the General Staff was no longer subordinate to the war minister (minister of the Army), who was directed to undertake administrative and economic affairs, including personnel policy. A main Directorate of the General Staff was created, separate from the Main Staff, as a branch of the chief of the General Staff. This was accomplished using arguments primarily tied to the German experience described in the previous chapter.

Concurrently, a similar division occurred in the Imperial Navy, where a Naval General Staff was created, separate from the Ministry of the Navy. As a result, the tsar, as the commander in chief, was surrounded by five people who handled the most vital questions of national defense: the chairman of the Defense Council, the minister of the Army, the chief of the Army General Staff, the minister of the Navy, and the chief of the Naval General Staff. This system created huge opportunities for various intrigues and misunderstandings, characteristic of any government organization, particularly a military one.¹⁷

Witnesses to these events describe the chaos that resulted from these divisions in the administration of the army and military policy as a whole: the war minister and the chief of the Army General Staff would make mutually exclusive decisions regarding identical issues. As an example, in the spring of 1908, the staff of the Kiev military district received simultaneous conflicting orders: the chief of the Army General Staff commanded them to rebuild Fort Dubno in the Dubnenkii Fortress, while the war minister ordered them to abolish the fort. Hundreds of such examples

exist.¹⁸ These collisions did not happen by chance. If one organization manages financial resources (the Ministry of Defense) while another (the General Staff) handles operational issues, there will always be a tendency to make decisions to distribute material resources based on each department's own sense of political expediency.

Further, in the context of competing leadership in the army, the autonomy of important military districts increased substantially, the commanders of which made every attempt to gain direct access to the Emperor, resulting in greater confusion in strategic management.¹⁹

As was noted by well-informed observers at the time, there was “the threat of complete disorder in the command structure of the Empire.”²⁰ The deregulation of the entire system of strategic management in the Russian Empire had its consequences: in October 1908, Emperor Nicolas II ordered that the chief of the Army General Staff, General F. Palitsin, could only address the Emperor in the presence of the war minister. But this measure did not produce a radical improvement of the situation of strategic management. As a result, in 1909, they returned to a system in which the head of the General Staff again subordinated to the war minister.²¹

A significant role in this decision was played by the recently created and elected State Duma, (Parliament) which participated on many decisions regarding defense, its role sometimes greater than that of the current State Duma of the Russian Federation.

This experiment's lack of success can be illustrated by the fact that even several years later, the General Staff was still not the “brains of the army” the way the General Staff under Moltke the Elder and A. Shliffen was. In this regard, after the Russo-Japanese War, the Navy was more successful in establishing a Naval General Staff. Through the intensive, thoughtful work of the Naval General Staff and the young officers of junior rank, it was possible to form new regulations for naval strategy, art of operations, and naval tactics that would be more responsive to contemporary experience as well as a naval ship building program. Much of the credit for the

formation of the Naval General Staff belongs to a memorandum written by Lieutenant Scheglov, “The Significance and Work of the Staff Based on the Experience of the Russo-Japanese War.” Captain First Rank L. Brusilov, the highly educated, erudite commander of the Cruiser “Gromoboi” [Thunder], was installed as the head of the Naval General Staff. At first, only fifteen people composed the Naval General Staff, and all the work fell to them. It was precisely the high level of analysis of strategic, operational, and technical questions that allowed the Navy to score a victory in the battle for resources over the War Ministry and the General Staff of the Ground Forces. The minister of Foreign Affairs, A.P. Izvolskii, also helped convince the tsar and the State Duma to dedicate major resources to the restoration of the Russian Navy. (However, I have been unable to uncover evidence that the international political goals for the Naval power on the eve of World War I were as clearly defined, as they were during the reigns of Peter the Great, Catherine II, or Alexander II.)²²

The development of new tactical regulations as well as new positions on strategy and the development of the art of operations certainly came too late. On the whole, the analytical, scholarly work in the General Staff and in the War Ministry was not good. The situation did not improve even with a return to the former “Milyutin” system, when the chief of the General Staff was once again subordinated to the Ministry of the Army, due to the personalities of the upper leadership and many military leaders. Coordinating military-strategic plans to foreign affairs objectives also did not run smoothly.

As a final result, Russia’s strategic plans, developed mostly by Chief of the General Staff G.S. Zhilinskii together with the French General Staff, primarily served the interests of France and were dedicated to preventing France’s defeat by the German army in the first major battles of the war, in accordance with the Shliffen Plan.

Neither the above-mentioned Defense Council, headed by Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, who was extremely popular with the troops, nor Emperor Nicholas II, who became commander in chief in 1915 after the Russian army suffered a series of defeats, could fulfill their essential duties.

The division of the Ministry of the Army and the General Staff in 1905-1909 effectively put a stop to military reform in Russia for several years, although reform were so vital on the eve of the horrible experiences of World War I. This act, having effectively destroyed the system of strategic management in a critical moment was, without exaggeration, one of the factors that led to Russia's defeat in World War I and gave rise to the 1917 revolution.

No one should be lulled into believing that the historical pause created by reducing the direct military threat to Russia will last forever. Delay in undertaking the necessary military reforms or rash decisions, such as dividing the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, could cost Russia dearly in the newly emerged military political context, which could seriously worsen in this decade.

* * *

Between the Russian civil war of 1918-1920 and World War II, the entire system of strategic command of the Armed Forces (first of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and then, after 1924, of the USSR) underwent numerous transformations that included frequent changes in the high leadership, especially among the General Staff of the Red Army (which replaced the main Staff of the Red Army in 1935). During this time, the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR (Red Army and Red Navy) was the people's commissar, minister for Military and Naval Affairs. The people's commissar also served as the chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the USSR (then L.D. Trotsky, M.V. Frunze and K. Y. Voroshilov).²³

Trotsky, Frunze, and Voroshilov had no formal military education, but became major military and political leaders during the Russian Civil War. Frunze also became an important military

theorist. In fact, there is sufficient basis to consider Frunze one of the preeminent scholars of "unified military doctrine" of the Red Army. His work has not lost its significance even today. In particular, Frunze highlighted two fundamental parts of the military doctrine, political and "military-technical."²⁴ The latter, according to Frunze, deals with military strategy and the art of operations while the former deals with the political components of military strategy, largely following the ideas of the relatively "polemostrategy" of B. Liddell-Hart and the "conflict strategy" of M.N. Tukhachevskii, topics which will be discussed later.

The leaders of the main Staff of the Red Army and the General Staff of the Red Army, not to mention their deputies and the heads of the various departments of the Staff were, as a rule, professional soldiers with pre-Revolutionary training. In fact, the majority of them were graduates of the pre-revolutionary Academy of the General Staff, which imparted a high level of specialized and general training, including knowledge of several foreign languages, national and international history, geography, and economics, not to mention military strategy, operational art (operativo), and tactics. The majority of these graduates were later repressed or killed by Stalin's purges, resulting in a colossal loss to the country's defense capability and to the morale of the Armed Forces, a loss which has not been made up for even today.²⁵

As a military leader, Tukhachevskii, who served as Chief of Staff of the Red Army from 1925-1928, left a brilliant mark but without some deviancies.²⁶ The vast majority of scholars who study him pay particular attention to his work on "deep operations"— and on his efforts to equip the Red Army with most major weapons. At the same time, however, it is also important to note his work on the necessity of developing updated military scholarship on war and higher strategy, referred to by Tukhachevskii as "polemostrategy." He relied on the fact that, on the whole, the high command leading the war could no longer depend on the old "pure" military strategy. He and several of his followers believed that "polemostrategy " was the foundation for the development of

the kind of military doctrine that would include the substance, methods, and means of preparing for war and the most focused use of all forces and means to victory.²⁷ Tukhachevskii's idea was largely in accord with the works of the famous British political-military theorist and military historian, Liddell-Hart. Unfortunately, this idea has not been sufficiently developed in the years that followed.

It would be impossible to omit at least some discussion of the system of civilian control that prevailed over the Armed Forces of the USSR. This control was all-encompassing and multi-faceted, with the most important role being played by the political branches of the Red Army and Red Navy and the special departments of the Armed Forces, which were, for much of the existence of the USSR, subordinate to the secret intelligence agency (VChK, OGPU, NKVD, MGB and KGB).²⁸

The political branches of the Red Army and Red Navy and later the Armed Forces of the USSR in reality were subordinate only to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks [VKP(b)]. At the head of the political branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR was the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, which operated in the capacity of a department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.²⁹

During World War II, Stalin created the Central Administration of Military Counterintelligence *smert' shpionam* (SMERSH) [death to spies] on the basis of the Special Departments of NKVD. He eventually removed it from the NKVD, which was at that time headed by Lavrentiy P. Beria, and placed it under his personal command, as people's commissar of defense. After the war, these branches were once again made part of the state security system, first at the Ministry of State Security, and, later, the KGB of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and then the KGB of the USSR. Although dissatisfaction with this system of civilian control was widespread throughout the Army and Navy, it was painstakingly kept quiet.

After the collapse of the USSR and the change in the system of government in Russia, the system of civilian control also collapsed. The political branches were liquidated: many political staff were made officers for training, and were sent for retraining, where they studied sociology, psychology, law and other humanities disciplines. The branches of military counterintelligence of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation are now significantly inferior in their prerogatives and capabilities to the former Special Departments (third main directorate) of the KGB. Thus, in practice, they now often depend on the commanders and leaders of different ranks of the armed services for material support.

The general prosecutor's office also plays a specific role in this system, as the department that serves the main military prosecutor. The general prosecutor exercises supervision over the Armed Forces and other power structures to ensure their compliance with the law.

Despite the importance of these branches, a contemporary system of civilian control over the Armed Forces that conforms to the requirements of a democratic state remains underdeveloped in Russia. Contrary to popular opinion, however, this kind of system will not result in just the appointment of a civilian to the post of minister of defense. It is essential for Russia to reform the entire military system. A system of civilian control must include specific modifications of the high branches at the presidential level, as well as create a more clearly defined role for the government of the Russian Federation and the Accounting Department. A much larger role should be played by the Parliament, as in developed democratic countries.

Throughout this it is necessary to keep in mind the various meanings given to the term "civilian control." In Russia, this term often carries a certain repressive connotation because it stirs recollections of the control that was imposed on the Armed Forces of the USSR, particularly under Stalin.³⁰ In the West, civilian control more often refers to administrative-functional duties and is

largely connected with the accountability of the military to the representative branch of government—the parliament—by obligations and procedures clearly defined by law.

Stalin and the General Staff of the Worker-Peasant Red Army

From the beginning of World War II, the commander in chief was the people's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko. Stalin was in no hurry to become commander in chief even though the military leadership proposed this more than once. All military directives from this period were signed by S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov (as the chief of the General Staff).

Many signs point to the fact that Stalin did not immediately understand the scale of the war; and that he believed Hitler had limited goals that did not demand the all-encompassing attention of the leadership of the USSR, as was eventually required. It is possible that Stalin recalled the tragic experience of Emperor Nicholas II, who took it upon himself to serve as commander in chief in 1915, a task for which he was not equipped, and a move considered by many historians as one of the crucial factors in the destruction of the monarchy and its eventual downfall in 1917.³¹

It was approximately one month into the war that Stalin realized the war would require an investment of all political, economic, and propaganda resources toward achieving one goal: the destruction of the Nazi military machine. After some vacillation, Stalin, who was recently named the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the head of government, while also remaining general secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, took on additional titles. Stalin became the chairman of the Headquarters, commander in chief, and the people's commissar of Defense of the USSR, as well as the chairman of the State Defense Committee [GKO]. Therefore, the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army of the Soviet Union directly reported to the commander in chief, chairman of the

Soviet People's Commissariat, the chairman of the State Defense Committee, and the general secretary of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the People's Defense Committee. The subordination of the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army directly to the commander in chief did not eliminate the subordination of the chief of the General Staff to the people's commissar of Defense, who was also Stalin. The first chief of the General Staff in this position was Zhukov, who was removed after a confrontation with Stalin over the situation around Kiev, which led to the big defeat of the Red Army in the Summer of 1941.

Every chief of the General Staff of this period simultaneously served as deputy of the people's commissar of Defense (for the General Staff), so the position of first deputy to the people's commissar of Defense was preserved.³² After Stalin allowed Zhukov to return to upper ranks of the country's military leadership, Zhukov became first deputy to the commander in chief. With this, he stood at the top of the hierarchy just under Stalin himself, notably positioned above the chief of the General Staff. In this position however, Zhukov, in contrast to his role as the chief of the General Staff, had a very small personal administration. The administration granted to him was generally the General Staff and other divisions of the People's Defense Committee, which were under the control of other top authorities of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In this way Stalin did not allow any opportunity for his military leaders to strengthen their positions.³³

This period in Russian military history is often referred to as one of the most remarkable for the General Staff, mainly by those who either do not remember or do not know what really happened to this most important component of strategic leadership – which became directly subordinate to Stalin as the commander in chief.

Stalin sharply reduced the level of involvement of the General Staff, taking away many of its functions and departments that had traditionally been integral parts of the General Staffs of many countries, at least since the time of the General Staff of von Moltke the Elder. Stalin removed the

logistics services from under the General Staff of the Red Army and created the position of deputy to the people's commissar of Defense for Logistics Services. He installed in that position a veteran of the Civil War (1918-1920) from his beloved First Cavalry Army, General A.V. Khrulev, who reported personally to the commander in chief as the people's commissar of Defense but not to the chief of the General Staff, as had been the system in the pre-war years (in 1942-1943 Khrulev simultaneously served as the people's commissar for Logistics of the USSR). Stalin also stripped from the General Staff other elements crucial to management, such as communications. The deputy to the people's commissar of Defense for Communications became I.T. Peresyphkin, who served simultaneously as the people's commissar for Communications for the USSR.

At another point, both strategic military intelligence and a large degree operational intelligence, which was dependent on the intelligence capabilities of the fronts (groups of armies), was removed from General Staff purview. We know from the memoirs of many military leaders, including Zhukov, that even before the war the chief of the General Staff did not know that the chief of intelligence of the Red Army, his direct subordinate, reported directly to Stalin on key military, political, and strategic issues.³⁴ This was, of course, not a normal situation.

By orders from Stalin as the people's commissar of Defense of the USSR, on February 16, 1942, the status of intelligence was raised within the framework of the General Staff. The intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Red Army was ordered to reorganize into the Chief Intelligence Administration of the General Staff.³⁵ As a result of this reorganization, many departments became directorates with greater opportunities for intelligence officers to advance professionally or to achieve a higher military rank, a benefit of exceptional importance.

However, by October 23, 1942, eight months after the formation of the Chief Intelligence Administration within the General Staff, Stalin issued a new order of the people's commissar of Defense of the USSR, removing the administration from the General Staff of the Red Army and

transferring it to the command of the people's commissar of Defense – in other words, to himself. But, as part of this process, operational and tactical intelligence was removed from under the Chief Intelligence Administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the Red Army (in point 3 of the order), and transferred to the Department of Military Intelligence, newly created in the General Staff, with the intelligence departments of the fronts and army subordinate to it. Point 5 of the same order transferred the Decoding Service of the Chief Intelligence Administration to the people's commissar of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR, which greatly weakened military intelligence for the benefit of political intelligence. The Department of Central Military Censorship was likewise removed from the administration of the Chief Intelligence Administration and became an independent department within the system of the People's Commissariat of Defense.³⁶

Meanwhile, the Administration of Military Intelligence of the General Staff and the intelligence departments of the front were forbidden from carrying out intelligence operations using agents. This was a core defect in the system of military intelligence at the height of the war and during one of its most difficult periods—the attack on Stalingrad was beginning, a breakthrough of the blockade on Leningrad was being prepared, and attacks were carried out in other directions as well. The disorganization of intelligence during this period reflected most negatively on the preparedness of the command and commanders of middle and upper ranks, and caused unnecessary losses, including agents of the Soviet military intelligence.³⁷

It is important to remember that during this period the intelligence work of the military counterintelligence administration Glavnoye Upravleniye KontrRazvedki (GUKR) [Chief Counter Intelligence Administration], SMERSH became much more active and much more productive.

Stalin removed the Burlay for mobilization management from the General Staff and formed the main administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense naming Y.A. Schadenko, another veteran from the first Cavalry Army, as its leader. He did the same with the Department of Military

Communications, which was responsible for military transportation and played a similarly important role. This department became a part of the logistics services of the Red Army and not of the General Staff, as it was before the war.

Essentially, during most of World War II the General Staff possessed only an operations department, the precursor to today's Main Operations Administration (GOU). This is certainly at the heart of any general staff, a "general staff within the General Staff."

Clearly, by moving the General Staff's traditional functions into other departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin was protecting himself from the consolidation of too much power by any individual or group of officers who were best-positioned to be the leaders of the General Staff and who could potentially threaten his own power.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskii, who served as the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army from 1942-1945, welcomed the restriction of the functions of the General Staff in his memoirs. He wrote: "Freeing the General Staff from direct participation in the staffing and formation Red Army troops and from managing the logistics services of the Armed Forces (it was only left with the right of supervision) allowed it to focus the bulk of its attention on providing assistance to the commander in chief in addressing operational and strategic issues."³⁸ It is notable that he neither criticizes nor supports Stalin's decision to remove the systems of communications and strategic military intelligence from the control of the General Staff.

Stalin began to use the General Staff as the main branch for military planning and management only toward the middle of World War II.³⁹ Before that, he often took action without the involvement of the General Staff or by circumventing it, more than once violating the major principles of strategic leadership. Veterans of military intelligence note that Stalin only began to trust strategic and political military intelligence sometime in mid-1943.⁴⁰ Moreover, the military and political intelligence of the USSR during this period was among the most effective intelligence

agencies in world history, despite the horrible losses it suffered during the course of the pre-war Stalinist brutal repressions when many of the leaders and members of the central apparatuses were killed, as were citizens who answered their homeland's call.

Again, according to Vasilievskii, Stalin was able to use the methods and forms of "leadership of armed conflict in the new way... at least during the battle on the Kursk Salient,"⁴¹ more than two years after the first bloody Russian battles of World War II and almost four years after the beginning of the Second World War in Europe.

It is impossible not to note that this was a period of drawn out training for the commander in chief, which cost the USSR millions of additional victims of war and enormous losses of materials and morale, the effects of which are still felt to this day. All of this speaks to the necessity of advance preparation of a particular group of civilian politicians to carry out the duties of strategic management in the sphere of defense.

The General Staff in the System of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR after World War II

After World War II the General Staff began to slowly regain its former position as all military communications and their management were returned to its authority. Across the country Main Organizational Mobilization Departments with military commissariats sprang up, which, during the draft system, gave the General Staff influence in the system of civilian management as well. Regional, municipal, and state level military commissariats, under the authority of the Main Organizational Mobilization Department of the General Staff, play an extremely important social and political role, even though few outsiders notice it. Clearly this role will be different upon the arrival of a volunteer-based, contract system of staffing the Armed Forces of Russia with enlisted men and officers.

Responsibility for strategic intelligence was also returned to the General Staff.⁴² It was again subordinated to the chief of the General Staff, although in practice the minister of defense often took control of it himself.⁴³ Aside from this, in the post war period the head of the chemical forces and the head of the engineering forces, as well as a whole array of services not included in the General Staff structure, were placed under the control of the chief of the General Staff. This extremely overburdened that position, distracting him from his crucial analytic and strategic planning work and from organizing essential research and reports. Not surprisingly, after World War II not a single active Chief of the General Staff presented his own work on military theory akin to that, for example, undertaken by Tukhachevskii or Shaposhnikov in the 1920s and 1930s.⁴⁴

But the Logistics (Rear) Services of the Armed Forces did not return to the General Staff, where it had been in the pre-war years. The Rear Services now fall within the framework of the Ministry of Defense of Russia as a service under the direct command of the Ministry of Defense with the deputy of the Ministry of Defense acting as the head of the Rear (Logistics) Services.

At some point the chief of the General Staff became the first deputy of the minister of Defense of the USSR (as mentioned above, before this the chief of the General Staff had held the rank of the deputy People's Commissar of Defense, but not first deputy). With this, the chief of the General Staff became the second person in the hierarchy of the Ministry of Defense—on par with the so called "absolute" first deputy minister of Defense, who at separate periods answered for the testimonials of the high command staff and finances of the Armed Forces. Many veterans of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR note that the relationship between the chief of the General Staff and the first deputy minister were among the most conflicted in the system, although because of the fact that they both held second place in the Ministry of Defense. As a result, it was far from always clear who, in the absence of the minister of defense, actually commanded military affairs and the Armed Forces. At this time, these types of problems cropped up frequently.

In the party and the government hierarchy, the minister of defense of the USSR always stood above the chief of the General Staff. The chief of the General Staff could never really circumvent the minister of defense and report directly to the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). From the time of Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, the minister of defense again became a member (in 1975) of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (his predecessor, Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Y. Malinovskii, installed by N.S. Khrushchev to replace G.K. Zhukov, who was accused of "Bonaparte aspirations," was not a member of the Politburo). Meanwhile, the chief of the General Staff, as well as the first deputy of the minister of defense, was only a member of the Central Committee.

The distance between a member of the Politburo and a member of the Central Committee had always been palpable. It was manifested, for instance, when Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov and the Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov had a sharp disagreement in the early 1980s. They were both marshals of the Soviet Union but Ustinov, as the minister, was a member of the Politburo, while Ogarkov was only a member of the Central Committee. As a result, Ogarkov, one of the most accomplished chiefs of the General Staff in Russian and Soviet history, was removed from his post and became commander in chief of the Western strategic front "Napravlenje." His departure came at great cost to the Armed Forces of the USSR and the entire system of national defense, as he always made extremely rational proposals for limiting the number of nuclear weapons on strategic carriers and sought new solutions for essential military technology for the Ground Forces, Navy, and Air Force, as the early advocate of "the revolution in military affairs." In political relations he was considered a "hawk" more than Ustinov or his successor to the post, S.F. Akhromeev.⁴⁵

Ogarkov, as did any chief of the General Staff, had to have the opportunity to present his positions to the highest political leadership of the country, but in the presence of the minister of

defense. In the post-war period, as in the time before World War II, the General Staff without a doubt belonged to the structure of the Ministry of Defense.⁴⁶ The Ministry of Defense of the USSR had full responsibility before the Central Committee of the CPSU and Soviet government for the ongoing and future development of the Armed Forces, their battle-readiness, their supply of weapons and military technology, political and moral support and military discipline, as well as for planning and implementing joint programs with local governments for the civilian defense of the country. It was the Ministry of Defense and not the General Staff that provided leadership for large operational formations, divisions, and units, as well as for institutions of military education of the Armed Forces—directly or through the management of one of the branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, groups of troops, anti-aircraft defense districts, and the Navy. Local branches of military administration-military commissariats became subject to the Ministry of Defense through the General Staff.

Modern Strategic Management in the United States, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and other NATO Countries

In order to understand Russia's best options, it is important to examine how strategic defense command has developed in other countries. Russia should not blindly copy them, but take into account their strengths and weaknesses.

United States

Russia looks most often to the United States, since as the only two superpowers, the United States and the USSR constantly compared themselves to one another. Some U.S. specialists have noted the many of the advantages of the Soviet military system, in particular, the function of the

General Staff of the Armed Forces above all branches of the armed forces, a feature absent in the U.S. military system.

After almost ten years of work, in 1986 the U.S. Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols bill, which clearly regimented the role of the highest-ranking members of the Department of Defense. The bill instituted this hierarchy: the secretary of defense, followed by the deputy secretary of defense who has the same authority as the secretary of defense in his absence and serves as his "alter ego" on all major issues and as the main manager of military operations. Next come an array of under and assistant secretaries, including the under secretary for policy, who deal with concrete policy areas, which change according to the leadership of the Department of Defense. The assistant secretaries for special operations, low intensity armed conflicts, personal staff and personnel, and procurement, research and development, have the same rank as the under secretary for policy, lower than the rank of deputy secretary. These positions are all filled by civilians, in departments sprinkled with military personnel of different ranks.⁴⁷ Thus, the secretary of defense usually has military assistants from different branches of the armed services who are generals and admirals with two or three stars. The deputy secretary and various under secretaries likewise have military assistants with accordingly lower ranks.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff holds the third place in the Department of Defense hierarchy, after the secretary and deputy secretary of defense.

The U.S. secretary of defense is a member of the National Security Council,⁴⁸ a standing committee formed by the 1947 National Defense Law, which is headed by the U.S. president. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, like the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is not a member of the National Security Council, but serves as a consultant to it, and is required to take an active part in its meetings.⁴⁹

It is necessary to keep in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a General Staff, as stipulated in a special article of the Goldwater-Nichols bill. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a command or executive body, and does not issue military commands, which substantially decreases its power.⁵⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is comprised of the chiefs of staff, who are basically commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Services: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The Marines are also represented, but its commandant has a slightly lower rank, because he is subordinate to the leadership of the Navy.

An increasingly important role in the strategic leadership of the Armed Services in the United States is played by central territorial commands, where close cooperation among all the branches of the Armed Services is actually assured. To a certain extent these territorial commands undermine the substantially limited power not only of the Joint Chiefs, but also of the chiefs of staff (commanders in chief) of the branches of the Armed Services. By law they are subordinate to the secretary or deputy secretary of defense. The commanders in chief of the branches deal more with issues of long-term technical equipment than with problems of operational management.

Authorities such as former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, currently the Bush administration vice president, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, currently secretary of State (minister of foreign affairs), and General Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the preparation and implementation of Operation Desert Storm, as well as the allied armed services, credit the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols bill as one of the most important instruments leading to United States success in Operation Desert Storm. In the Persian Gulf, it mandated a clearer line of strategic command, along the chain of president-secretary of defense- and commander of Central Command in the theater of military operations (Schwarzkopf).⁵¹

In 1986 the position of vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created above the chiefs of staff of the branches of the Armed Services. This move raised the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to the commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Services.

For the first time in the post-World War II period the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was granted the right to report on his own behalf to the secretary of defense and president when there was no consensus among the members of the committee. (The requirement of consensus, of course, sharply reduced the weight of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, like the secretary of defense, is a main military advisor to the U.S. president, the commander in chief. At the same time, he serves as a main military advisor to the secretary of defense.

From its inception following the end of World War II, the secretary of defense has been a civilian, as army and navy ministers had been for decades in the United Kingdom, France, and many other democratic states.

Even after the creation of a unified Department of Defense in 1947, the secretaries of the branches of the Armed Services were preserved, although many specialists and legislators had reasons to consider this atavism.⁵²

The United States does not have a border guard, as Russia does. But because of its large coastline and some border patrol units, the United States does have a Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is not subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but to the Commerce Department, although it cooperates closely with the U.S. Navy as well as with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.⁵³ The United States also does not have a carabinieri corps, as in Italy, or Internal Forces, as in Russia, or gendarmes, as in France.⁵⁴ The United States has a National Guard, but this is a distinctive organization with an even longer history than that of the U.S. Army or Navy. It was created in the

former English colonies. In peacetime and non-emergency situations, the National Guard is subordinate to the governor of each individual state; in emergency situations strictly regulated by law, the National Guard becomes directly subordinate to the president of the United States; its military preparation is, on the whole, significantly less than that of the active components of the Armed Forces (with the exception of certain parts of the Air Force National Guard, where civilian pilots log a great number of flight hours).

Germany

In modern Germany the minister of defense (a civilian) is the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in peacetime. In wartime, the federal chancellor becomes the commander in chief of the German services. The inspector general of the Bundeswehr is in direct and complete subordination to the minister of defense, and as the highest authority in the military structure in the FRG commands all branches of the Armed Forces and their staffs, as well as the territorial command of the Armed Forces of Germany. The inspector general of the Bundeswehr has a purely military staff, and manages issues of operational planning. The minister has four civilian deputies, including two parliamentary secretaries of state, who spend much of their time in the Bundestag, lobbying for the interests of the Armed Forces in the appropriate committees of the German parliament.

The defense budget of the Bundeswehr consists of approximately 900 lines, of which the expediency and necessity of each expense must be defended in the parliament. The minister of defense has a small personal military staff, and on many issues, plays a greater role in major military-political questions than does the inspector general of the Bundeswehr or the appropriate deputy ministers of defense.⁵⁵

The minister of defense and the Ministry of Defense are, according to law, the lead agencies in relation to all branches of the Armed Forces.⁵⁶

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the secretary of state for defense heads the Ministry of Defense.⁵⁷ Next in the hierarchy are two civilian deputies, the minister of state for the armed forces and the minister of state for defense procurement.⁵⁸ At the next level of the hierarchy is the parliamentary under secretary of state for defense. These four individuals work on a standing basis with the Parliament of the United Kingdom, on which financial support for the Armed Forces depends upon. The minister of state for the armed forces is responsible for all political affairs and the implementation of military operations. The parliamentary under secretary of state for defense answers for the personnel policies of the military organization, as well as manages the divisions that administer all of the property of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom.⁵⁹ One step down in the hierarchy is the permanent under secretary of state for defense, a position unaffected by the case of changes in the cabinet, and the chief of the Defense Staff. The latter is the main military advisor to the government and the professional head of the Armed Forces.⁶⁰ They jointly lead the daily operations of the defense staff.

Every branch of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom has its own staff headed by its own chief of staff (equivalent to commanders in chief). The staff of the ground forces is called the General Staff.

It is notable that while in daily practice the commanders in chief of the Armed Forces are required to go through the chief of defense staff to contact the secretary of state for defense, they reserve the right to have direct access to the secretary of state for defense and the prime minister.⁶¹

The main branch of the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain is the Central Staffs, consisting of military and civilian specialists alike, and headed simultaneously by the vice chief of defense staff and the second permanent under secretary of state for defense (a civilian). Officers of all three branches of the Armed Forces are represented in the Central Staffs.⁶² It must be noted that this system of joint civilian-military management goes deeper. Thus, in the Central Staffs there is a bloc that is simultaneously responsible for the formation of military policy and for specific military operational, tactical, and technical means for its realization. A civilian, the “deputy of the deputy” secretary of state for political affairs and the military deputy chief of defense staff, heads this bloc.⁶³

British military theory (as is recorded in the "Military Doctrine of Great Britain") officially distinguishes four levels of military operations and military arts: the level of "grand strategy" is the sphere for the highest state leadership; the level of military strategy is the sphere of activity of the Ministry of Defense jointly with other governmental branches of power; the operational level is the level where planning and realization of specific military operations occurs, the operational level acts as the vital link between the articulated military-strategic goals and the tactical use of force; the tactical level is the level where military methods are used to resolve assigned operational problems, this is the level on which battles and combat are organized and carried out.

As an example, decision-making on the level of "grand strategy" led to the decision of the government of Her Majesty to take action in connection with Iraq's aggression in Kuwait. The general outlines of this decision were formulated by the joint announcement of U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Camp David, just after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when it was announced that the defense of Saudi Arabia and protecting the sovereignty of Kuwait fall within the sphere of national interests of the two countries.

Dividing the level of "grand strategy" into a separate category appears completely justified. It provides a clearer link of all military efforts to policy and allows for a more clear and goal-oriented

realization of the important situation of the primacy of policy on war, including on military strategy. The term "grand strategy" appeared in official British documents as far back as the 1930s. Thus, the English field charter of 1935 spoke of it as the "art of the most effective use of all the power of the state. It includes the use of diplomacy, economic pressure, negotiating advantageous treaties with allies, the mobilization of national industry and the allocation of human resources, as well as the use of all three branches of the Armed Forces for their joint operations."⁶⁴ The efforts of Liddell-Hart and other Anglo-Saxon political and military theorists and historians to painstakingly develop the theme of "grand strategy," were not in vain.

In Russia, unfortunately, this theme has not received the necessary development, although an array of specialists including this author have suggested the use of the concept of the military-political level at the level of decision-making higher than the military-strategic level itself, the level of the president and the Security Council, adapted to the conditions of the Russian Federation.

The term "polemostrategy," suggested by Tukhachevskii in the 1920s, did not take root, which was as much connected with his tragic fate as with the fact that Tukhachevskii was sufficiently prepared for a deeper analysis of many political, economic, and social problems of war. I have made a comparison made of Tukhachevskii's work to that of authors such as A.A. Svechin, A.E. Snegarev, A. Neznamov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, and many others, and it reveals that Tukhachevskii was clearly inferior in his knowledge of political history in general and the history of war in particular. Apparently Tukhachevskii's lack of academic education was manifest—he only completed the Alexandrovskii Military Academy in Moscow, but he did not go through the Academy of the General Staff, as did the other authors named.

Turkey

In the developed world today there is practically no single country in which the General Staff is not subordinate to the Minister of Defense and is not one of the branches of the Ministry of Defense. One exception exists in Turkey, where the Armed Forces headed by the General Staff serve the important political function of keeping various extremist groups, including Islamic fundamentalists, from coming to power. Over the course of the post-war decades the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey has at least three times replaced civilian power in the country and has taken over the administration of the country on itself. Later, power was restored to civilian control, however power in the form of the General Staff continues to exist as an alternative to civilian power in any situation of internal political strife in Turkey. During the cold war period the clear insufficiency of "civilian control" over the Armed Forces did not prevent Turkey's acceptance into NATO. Today, this problem is beginning to look different. Several indicators, along with the way in which Turkey deals with its problems with the Kurds, are one of the factors preventing Turkey from joining the European Union.

In turn, Turkey's membership in NATO simultaneously with its exclusion from the European Union has made the problem of the formation of a European system of defense substantively more difficult, as was made graphically apparent during the EU summit in Nice in December 2000.

The System of Strategic management in the People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has a distinctive system of strategic leadership. At the head of the entire system of strategic leadership is the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the PRC. It used to be solely a party organization. However, after the All-Chinese Assembly of People's Representatives passed a special defense law in 1997, the CMC became a branch of the state.⁶⁵ The

same people, however, occupy positions in the party and in state branches in China. The importance of the CMC is highlighted by the fact that Deng Xiaoping, when leaving all his positions in the upper leadership on China, maintained only the post of chairman of the CMC. Currently, this post is occupied by the chairman of the PRC, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Jiang Zemin. The Central Military Commission has an extremely limited number of members. Aside from the chairman, they include his first deputy, the minister of defense of the PRC, the chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA), the chief of Arms of the CPLA, the chief of Rear Services of the CPLA, and the chief of the Main Political Administration of the CPLA. The hierarchy in the CMC is as follows: first deputy chairman (currently Zhang Wannian), a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC;⁶⁶ the minister of defense as a deputy chairman (he is only a member of the Politburo); all other positions, including the chief of the General Staff and members of the Central Committee of the CPC. In spite of this, they are approximately equal in status, at a minimum they are considered ministers of the "first rank" of the government of the PRC. In theory, this is a high branch not only of military, but also of political administration, especially in emergency situations. The CMC has authority over the People's Armed Militia of the PRC (the equivalent of the Russian Internal Forces), yet not through the minister of defense, but rather directly to the chairman of the CMC, although de facto to his first deputy.⁶⁷ The minister of defense in China does not have as much authority as, for example, the minister of defense in the United States, Great Britain, or France. He is a figure of political representation, who occupies a very high position as a member of the Politburo. In practice, the Armed Forces of the PRC are led by the first deputy chairman of the Central Military Committee, who stands above the minister of defense, the General Staff, the rear services, and the armed services, as well as the other branches of strategic leadership.

The Chinese army is a distinctive institution, radically different from that not only in Europe but also from what was in the Soviet Union. The army in China has carried out large-scale military operations only a few times, but has successfully conducted partisan-type wars. It has always been preserved for securing political power. Mao Zedong subscribed to the theory that "a rifle gives birth to power." He was a real original military thinker (in comparison, for example, with Lenin and Stalin), as well as the author of a unique concept of partisan warfare, the use of which has scored a large number of victories not only in China but in other countries as well. Mao Zedong tried never to expose the Chinese Red Army (later the People's Liberation Army of China) to the risk of defeat, which would have led to the loss of its authority in China as well as abroad.⁶⁸

The leadership of the PRC has always attempted to avoid major military confrontations, despite the fact that Stalin, for example, actively applied pressure—and had every reason to do so—to Mao Zedong to lead more active military operations against the Japanese during World War II. The exception is the war in Korea from 1950-1952, when the leadership of the PRC, faced with the threat of the complete destruction of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), was forced to send a significant military contingent, Chinese People's Volunteers, led by the important Peng Dehuai. Despite their high fighting spirit, Chinese troops often found themselves in difficult situations facing American forces that were superior to them by every measure, with technical equipment, system of administration, and recent serious military experience from World War II. Only the delivery of significant Soviet military technology and air coverage of the battle field by Soviet fighter divisions allowed the Chinese People's Volunteers to escape further major losses and defeat.⁶⁹

This spirit of the Chinese Armed Forces was largely preserved until the end of the 1990s. Over the last two years the CPLA has experienced significant changes in direction, transforming it into a completely new fighting force.⁷⁰ The leadership of the PRC has clearly created a modern

armed forces, by equipping them with the most modern technology, which, other than specific, relatively narrow segments, it lacked until recently. Judging by many widely available publications, the spirit of military thought of the CPLA in the last two years has begun to change in the direction of more action and offensive decisiveness—but within the framework of limited, carefully defined political and military-strategic goals.⁷¹ The process of transforming the CPLA and the creation of a modern armed force responsive to the demands of the twenty-first century in the PRC will require 20-25 years, or perhaps even longer, barring interruption. However, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, many elements of the contemporary armed forces will be apparent.

In his works on military issues, Mao Zedong depended largely on the great Chinese military thinker and ancient military leader Sun Tzu.⁷² The spirit of Sun Tzu's strategy differs significantly from that of Napoleon, Clausewitz, Moltke, Schliffen, Tukhachevskii, Sokolovskii, and his colleagues. At the same time, the ideas of Sun Tzu have something in common with the strategic operations of Peter the Great after the defeat of the Russian army at Narva by the Swedes, led by Karl XII, which later resulted in the major strategic success at Poltava (in 1709); the strategy of M.B. Barkley-de Tolly and M.I. Kutuzov against Napoleon in 1812; and the ideas of Russian and Soviet military theorists of the twentieth century such as A. Svechin, A. Neznamov, and A. Verkhovskii. Sun Tzu's ideas "to succeed mentally" remain relevant even today. Sun Tzu is now studied in Chinese military schools and certainly in military academies even more thoroughly than before.⁷³ By relying on his ideas, the Chinese Armed Forces will attempt to solve the problem of securing Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan as well as resolve the many other major political issues facing this nascent "secondary superpower" of the twenty-first century.⁷⁴

Military Industrial Policy in the Framework of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Optimizing Contracts for Arms, Military Technology, and Research and Development

In the Soviet Union, step by step, beginning in the 1930s, other government branches began to play a greater role in the system of strategic defense leadership, primarily in development of arms and military technology.

In the 1970s, the so-called "group of nine" defense industry ministries was formed, with the appropriate oversight department of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Military-Industrial Commission Council of Ministers of the USSR, which successfully managed questions of scientific research and development. An extremely important role was played by the corresponding Consolidated Department of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, which was called the "tenth floor" after the building on Okhotnii Ryad, where the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation is now located.

A significant part of the appropriation for technical equipment for the Armed Forces of the USSR bypassed the Ministry of Defense, especially to research and development units with a defense focus. The Ministry of Defense (including the General Staff) did not always determine what kind of research and experiments to conduct and technology to procure. This caused private (not public) protests on more than one occasion from the Ministry of Defense, especially from the deputy minister of defense of the USSR for Armaments⁷⁵ and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Marshal N. Ograkov, described the conflict more than once in conversation.

Neither the State Committee of Defense Industry, formed in 1992, nor the Ministry of Defense Industry, which absorbed the remainders of eight of the nine defense industry ministries in 1996 (for less than a year), had either the administrative or the financial resources to fulfill

government defense contracts. They did have programs for the conversion of defense industries and "civilian programs for the State Committee on Defense Industry," which could have been important instruments for the formation of a general scientific industrial base for ensuring national defense capability. The State Committee on Defense Industry and the Ministry of Defense Industry attempted many times to provide contracts for armaments and military technology, particularly in research and development, to recoup at least a little of these forgotten expenses. To this end, an appropriate version of the "State Defense Contract" law was developed, which anticipated that not only the Ministry of Defense, but also other power structures (meaning, at that time, the State Committee of Defense Industry) would provide contracts for research and development and other departments.

However, in the end, this version of the law was not passed and, as a result, government defense contracts were limited only to those departments which then exploit and use military departments and military technology, starting with the Ministry of Defense. This established a very important principle, in accordance with those of modern democratic countries, which allowed for greater clarity in the administration of this vital component of ensuring national defense capability.

During the debates on the proposed "State Defense Contract" law, several times it was expressed that the military cannot be the only branch that defines the basic direction of the development of military technology, in accordance with necessary exploratory research. It is necessary to admit that this critique was largely correct. The General Staff and other services of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR did not even formulate the demands of the Armed Forces for one or another type of armament, let alone research and development problems, in a consistently optimal way. Industrial research institutes and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (now the Russian Academy of Sciences) often presented significantly better proposals for many arms systems, as well as, in many cases, issues of their use in battle.

The author, who was named the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1992, made efforts to give these research institutes a more active role in the development of a wide variety of important issues of long-term military-technical policy in Russia and of the principle problems of the military-technical course of the country, by sending their recommendations and proposed decisions to the president of Russia, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the Russian Federation. It is crucial to develop this kind of practice in the future, to provide constant intellectual support for the General Staff and other departments of the Ministry of Defense in the form of comparatively independent research organizations, including state scientific centers such as the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

* * *

Changes have long since ripened in the system of defense contracts and military technology in the Ministry of Defense. A substantive decrease in the quantity of resources dedicated to these goals, the lack of any real possibility of an increase, and a significant number of layoffs among the personnel of the Armed Forces all objectively push the task of using budget resources in a maximally rational way to the forefront.

Retaining the current Ministry of Defense system for administering the process of providing technical equipment for the Armed Forces was still feasible two or three years ago, but is simply becoming dangerous today, considering the influence of relevant issues that have accumulated on the perspectives for military technical development, not only of the army and navy, but of the country as a whole.

In the general process of layoffs among the Armed Forces, the number of branches that administer contracts has also significantly decreased, and an array of structural and organizational changes has taken place. At the same time, administrative branches have often been reduced according to a fixed percentage that is formulated without the necessary level of preliminary

quantitative analysis. In many cases this has led to the disruption, or sometimes total destruction of, continuity of personnel as well as the waste of priceless practical experience in resolving the complex technical, organizational, financial, and legal problems of administering the fulfillment of government defense contracts, the frequency of which has constantly increased relative to the decrease in quantity of resources allocated.

Parallel with personnel reductions, the economic and legal basis for cooperation between government contracting agencies and industrial entrepreneurial organizations has also endured substantive changes. The formation in economics of a new normative legal basis in accordance with the market transformation, changes in the forms of ownership of many defense enterprises, and the government's loss of effective levers for managing state enterprises—all in combination with the lack of financing, and organizational and staffing problems among the contracting agencies of the Ministry of Defense present by 1995—demanded substantially increased centralization of decision-making and control over implementation. These attempts were actively undertaken. From 1995-97 the author more than once formulated proposals to improve the organization of the contracting system and presented them to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the government. However, despite formal approval of these proposals, concrete measures at the very initial stages of implementation encountered such opposition that few actually took effect and did not principally change the existing structure and system of interrelations.⁷⁶

Today, the Ministry of Defense still has more than thirty major branches that contract for the development or provision of arms and military technology. Yet they do not have a unified administrative center, despite the existence of the chief of armaments and his apparatus in the composition of several agencies. Under the current conditions, these contracting agencies should be subordinate to a single center, not only functionally but also administratively, which is particularly

important in light of the conditions that have developed. Each one of these kinds of agencies has, as a rule, its own financial administration or service.

The agencies mentioned are subordinate to the commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, the chiefs of the main administrations (geavnoje upravljenje) and the administration of the Ministry of Defense. In their place in the chain of command they are subsequently subordinate to the minister of defense, the chief of the General Staff, and the first deputy and deputy ministers of defense. This has created colossal difficulties in the formation and the realization of a unified military-technical policy of the Armed Forces.

Until 2000, the responsibility for resolving issues of technically equipping the troops for the Ministry of Defense fell to the first deputy minister, to whom was directly subordinate the chief of armaments and two major branches with rich histories, the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate and the Main Automobile and Vehicles Armored and Tank Directorate.⁷⁷ Of course, in these conditions the implementation and formation of a unified response to questions of technically equipping the troops, and ensuring control for its realization, is an exceptionally difficult task.

The concrete task of moving to a single contracting agency was laid out in the June 1998 “Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Military Construction,” signed by the president of the Russian Federation. However, just six months later, its practical implementation failed.

It is essential that a single contracting agency be understood not as some newly-created organization, but as that kind of efficient arrangement of the administrative elements of a contract system and the links between them with which the administrative command and functional unity of the management of these elements is assured (double subordination must be most decisively eliminated).

Naturally, during this kind of transformation it is essential to ensure that the financial branch is directly integrated into the procurement system in a manner that is consistent with the structures of today's arms contracting agencies divisions in order to form an array of structural units. These units should ensure the base unity and unification of the systems and elements of arms and military technology, the unity of the elemental basis, the compatibility of automated systems for managing troops, informational systems, methods and systems for administering weapons, communications, and a variety of other directives.

Only on this basis will it be possible to truly eliminate the duplication of work and ensure the rational allocation of government defense contracts among industrial enterprises. The tasks of procuring research and development projects and arms and military technology should follow an organizational procedure, distinct from the tasks of exploitation, which is left to the branches of the Armed Forces and the troops.

The Russian Ministry of Defense also requires a department similar to the U.S. Office of Test and Evaluation.

The General Staff as the “Brains” of the Russian Armed Forces

To use the term made popular by Boris M. Shaposhnikov, who wrote in the late 1920s a prominent three-volume book, “The Brain of the Army,” the General Staff must become the "brains" of the Russian Armed Forces. They must use all the resources available in the Armed Forces and outside, including the civilian independent research centers and universities. The efforts of outstanding leaders of the Soviet General Staff including Tukhachevskii, Vasilevskiy, and Antonov must not be forgotten. The Military Academy of the General Staff must serve as both an educational and scientific center. The unity of the educational and scientific research process is a sign of its success in preparing a new, brilliant assemblage of Russian military leaders who will

triumph on an intellectual level. In this center, the spirit of creativity and initiative must reign, similar to its predecessor on the eve of the First World War in the 1920s, when Soviet military thought was practically leading the world, primarily due to the efforts of the highly educated graduates of the pre-revolutionary Academy of the General Staff, who gained battle experience in World War I and the Civil War and were well-versed in the original foreign military, political, and economic literature.⁷⁸ In the 1920s, Russia enjoyed a substantial degree of academic freedom, which disappeared entirely in the late 1930s and did not begin to return until after XX Congress of the CPSU in 1956.

The General Staff, with assistance from the Military Academy of the General Staff and other scientific centers, must focus on developing new ideas and concepts directed at the preparation for and carrying out of operations, and on producing proposals for strategic actions.⁷⁹ This work should not be developed by a narrow group of in-house military specialists, who may focus primarily on the opinions of their commanding authorities, due to the particulars of military service. Today, the government leadership of Russia, especially the president, members and staff of the Security Council and the Federal Assembly must turn their attention to battle charters and manuals that regulate troop activity and power even on the traditional tactical level. This work must be carried out by specialists from the Armed Forces together with specialists from the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Federal Border Service (FPS), as well as other federal power structures, as these documents contain information about actions undertaken by the Armed Forces in cooperation with other troops and branches.

Currently, even one or two battalions or smaller units can be the subjects of big policy. A clear example of this point occurred in 1999, when the minister of defense and the minister of foreign affairs suggested a transfer of about 200 Russian commandos from Bosnia to Kosovo in

1999 on the eve of the arrival of NATO troops after the end of the NATO military action against Yugoslavia.

The development of strategic manuals must be carried out jointly by the General Staff and a special political branch of the Ministry of Defense working as a team consisting of military and civilian specialists, since political and economic considerations and calculations should play a dominant role in the development of strategy.

The tenet of Clausewitz's formula regarding the primacy of politics on military strategy itself must be carried out to the fullest extent, without distortion in any direction.

Research into the issues of limited wars, a subject that is clearly not sufficiently considered in Russian political and military thought, should hold a central place in the joint analytical work undertaken by the military-political civilian branch of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

The difficulties managing military operations on all levels under the strict political control of the democratic state, including not only those components such as the receipt, processing, and analysis of intelligence data, but also the problem of controlling one's own forces, demand a radically new conceptual formulation for Russian state leadership and military command. This is the subject where Russia should learn a lot from the United States' theory and practice.

Until now, principles and systems for managing troops that are more flexible, and give more initiative to mid-level commanders, have not been developed. Many well-known specialists note justifiably that there has been insufficient work done in Russia comparing traditional vertical management chains of command on matters of cooperation between units with horizontal management.⁸⁰ The majority of military leaders have not acquired the methods of informational warfare, the skills to use high-precision weapons, or the total use of a variety of strengths and means necessary in order to respond to modern conditions. Clearly, not enough has been done for the establishment of appropriate, highly integrated management systems for operating in real-time.

In considering the question of contemporary management systems, the following components, at a minimum, can be highlighted: (a) organizational-staffing methods and the appropriate structures; (b) technical equipment with specific characteristics and an automatically-operated product for the rapid-action, protected, clear, and adequate transmission of commands, evaluation of the situation, and reports during the course of fulfilling duties; (c) procedures regulating the cooperation of different administrative and administered branches; and (d) the staff itself for administration, personnel, and the preparation, adopting, and implementing of decisions.

Reform of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Adequate, modern principles of administration and the norms of a legal democratic state demand a clarification of the functions of the Ministry of Defense and its various branches, primarily the General Staff and the commanders in chief of the services of the Armed Services.⁸¹

The author and a group of civilian and military specialists formulated the basic directions of these transformations in 1997 in the framework of a study on military construction. They included:

- clear definition of the role and substance of the Ministry of Defense and its relation to the Armed Forces (the Ministry, including the General Staff as a part of the Ministry, not as an autonomous body is the managing branch, and the Armed Forces is the object of management);
- creation within the structure of the Ministry of Defense of strong, authoritative civilian branches, responsible for military economics and for the economics of military construction, as well as civilian branches that are responsible for the development of legislation in the field of defense, calling for an effective national defense, organization in the conditions of building a legal democratic state and forming a modern market economy;

- establishment of effective unified management command for the construction and functioning of the Armed Forces; securing this duty and responsibility to the minister of defense with clear definition of which functions of military construction he directly carries out and which ones he carries out through the General Staff and other divisions of the Ministry of Defense;
- maximum possible liberation of the General Staff from all functions (administrative, economic, political, etc. not directly linked to specific military tasks; (strategic and operational interservice, planning, development of requirements for new weapons systems and military technologies;
- transformation of the functions of the commanders in chief of the services of the Armed Forces and the maximum liberation of them from administrative and economic functions (which largely duplicate the Ministry of Defense in a lesser variant) to concentrate their efforts and responsibilities on issues defined by the specifics of each branch, its needs for combat preparation, cadres, and material-technical sufficiency.

Some action was taken but, on the whole, these directions continue to be relevant today.

Civilian branches of the Ministry of Defense other than the General Staff should be totally focused on procuring arms, contracting for research and development, and carrying out personnel policy in the civilian and military administrative branches as well as among the troops. The other branches should focus on the resolution of military-political questions that exist within the authority of the military, including active participation in the international treaty process, which is becoming a more and more important duty of the Ministry of Defense in cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies.

An expanding role is played by the cooperation of the Ministry of Defense with other government branches, both executive and legislative. The role of the appropriate branch of the Ministry of Defense should be strengthened and expanded. And, in general, this is one of the most important parts of the work not only of the appropriate division of the Ministry of Defense and the state secretary of the Ministry of Defense, but also of the minister of defense.

It is essential to create conditions (the normative-legal conditions) for the increased use of qualified civilian specialists, including lawyers, economists, financiers, and managers, in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Unsatisfactory results from attempts by the Ministry of Defense to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation over the course of many years were largely due the severe lack of civilian specialists in various areas of expertise with sufficient qualifications for effective work in the conditions of reform of social and economic relations. Removing the unfounded barriers in this area will allow civilian specialists along with qualified military personnel to be used to the fullest extent.⁸² Without this, it seems impossible to instill order in the economics of national defense, liquidate its low level, and ensure its controllability. And management, the introduction of modern methods of administration in this area, will all but play the central role in ensuring the defense capability of the Russian Armed Forces in modern conditions of severe budget restrictions.

In general, a cardinal reevaluation of the organization and operating principles of financial branches such as the Ministry of Defense, as well as other agencies, including their structures, planning, expenditures, and expense accounting is essential. As they are today, they do not ensure the possibility for effective control for the use of budget resources. As a result, all upper leadership positions in the government, beginning with the president/commander in chief, are deprived of real levers in management. In this it is necessary to follow a stage-by-stage transition to value-based

budgeting of material wealth and to existing forms of accounting records. A lack of order in the area of Armed Forces' property management persists to the present time.⁸³

At present, a significant part of the functions that should belong to other branches of the Ministry of Defense remain with the chief of the General Staff and his deputies, and as a result of the abundance of these functions, their main tasks are obscured: to implement long-term and medium-term operational and operational-strategic planning, look for new forms of carrying out armed conflict, manage military-technical research in accordance with central scientific-research institutes [TsNII] and military academies, create new concepts of preparation for national mobilization, troop mobilization-deployment, for example.

It is essential to stress again that it would not be appropriate to divide the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. In modern conditions that division practically no longer exists anywhere in the world, except Turkey.

The General Staff must be an integral part of the Ministry of Defense and subordinate to the president through the minister of defense. However, the management of the Armed Forces does not lead to the resolution of operative issues, characteristic for the General Staff. It is the minister of Defense who has the duty to lead the battle operations of the Armed Forces, their combat, and operational preparation, exclusively through the General Staff.⁸⁴ He should have an appropriately strong office to handle it, consisting of civilian and military personnel.

This comprises the particularity of strategic management in Russia, as distinct from the United States, Germany, or the United Kingdom.

On matters of combat and operational preparation, the role of the General Staff should be greater than that of the commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces, who currently have their own versions of a “general staff.” A simple reduction of the numbers of commanders in chief is not sufficient—their functions must also be considered.⁸⁵

Some movement has been made in this direction since 1997, but on the whole this problem remains far from completely resolved.⁸⁶ Several attempts were made that were not sufficiently thought out. Specifically, there was an attempt to integrate all the elements of the strategic forces under a Unified Command of the forces of strategic deterrence, which would unite with the operational administration, and coordinate the provision, content, preparation, and programs of modernization by removing the Unified Command from under the General Staff, and subordinating it to a specially-created position of yet another first deputy minister of defense.⁸⁷ Because of the deep difference between the supply systems of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) and the Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Aviation Strategic Nuclear Forces, and many other reasons, the Unified Command did not have the capability to really control supply and development. This idea was met with sharp criticism from experts and many high military leaders. Such a system does not exist in the United States, France, or China, and many believed it would not work in Russia, either.

The functions of strategic planning for nuclear weapons and capability effectively demands intensification. But this discussion must encompass all nuclear capabilities (not just strategic), and should be divided into the framework of the General Staff (the operational portion) and the special analytical branches of the Ministry of Defense (the military-political aspects and proposals on the level of “grand strategy”).

The experience of developing important documents on these issues from 1996-98 has shown that only the General Staff working in cooperation with other appropriate branches of the Ministry of Defense can bring about the necessary results.

Not only the tasks of the Ministry of Defense (as stated in the 1992 law “On Defense,” and its 1996 modification), but of the entire structure, the authority of the minister and his deputies and the chief of the General Staff must be clearly defined according to law in a way similar to what is written in the Goldwater-Nichols Bill or in similar laws in Germany, France, and the United

Kingdom. This could be accomplished with a new modification of the law "On Defense;" however it is preferable to have a law "On the Armed Forces," which would provide a clear understanding of the Armed Forces and their areas of responsibility and management objectives on the part of the Ministry of Defense.

Any ambiguities relating to the role of the General Staff that exist in the current defense law must be eliminated in new legislation. For example, it is nowhere specified that the General Staff is an integral part of the Ministry of Defense.⁸⁸ This is not mentioned either in the Ministry of Defense Regulations or in the General Staff Regulations, approved in accordance with Presidential Decrees of 2000.

During the legislative process it is essential to determine that the chief of the General Staff occupies the highest professional military position in the country and, along with the minister of defense, serves as the main military advisors to the President. The right of the chief of the General Staff to report directly to the commander in chief in urgent situations should be fixed in law, noting, however, as was done in Imperial Russia in 1908-1909 and later, that such reports should be made only in the presence of the minister of defense. The entire Ministry of Defense, including the minister himself, should be a political actor subject to all the controls of the democratic institutions including the parliamentary control.⁸⁹ In this respect the situation in Russia is still far from optimal. The minister of defense should not simply be a decorative political figure. Nor should he be the "administrator" of the Armed Forces and the "supplier" of money and other resources for the military, as has been suggested recently by some military specialists.

All the issues of managing the economics and finances of the Armed Forces should be focused directly in his hands and through his civilian deputies and assistants with the clear definition of the functions by law. Likewise, all issues of personnel policy of the Armed Forces should be focused in the hands of the minister of defense or possibly one of his civilian deputies.

Issues of rear services' (logistics) provision have likewise long been removed from the authority of General Staff, but it is far from essential to fully civilianize this area, and for some period a military person could continue to serve as the chief of the Rear Services (at the rank of a deputy minister of defense, as was instituted by Stalin at the beginning of World War II. The branches of Rear Services in the army should remain, first and foremost, military branches, as necessary by the particulars of Russia.

The chief of the General Staff could have a Main Organizational-Mobilization Department under his command, but probably with lesser authority, especially with the transition of the Armed Forces of Russia to all volunteer forces.

The subordination to the chief of the General Staff of various kinds of other services—engineering services, chemical services, etc.—requires special consideration.

It is necessary to note, of course, that political appointees to the post of minister, deputy ministers of defense (under ministers, assistants to the minister), or heads of departments of this ministry should be people competent not only in economic, administrative, and legal issues, but also competent in the issues of the contemporary Armed Forces, arms, military technology, and the introduction of modern combat operations. On the other hand, major efforts must be exerted to sufficiently raise the educational level of our command staff. It is essential that the high command staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation gain a deeper and more knowledgeable understanding of both the present international position of Russia and our national interests, understood in the broad sense of the word, and not just with a narrow focus on military issues. This is directly connected with the matter of evaluating the threats to Russia's security.⁹⁰

From the end of the 1920s to the beginning of the 1930s, any desire on the part of the high command of the Red Army to deal with these issues was totally quashed by repressive means. The events of 1937-1938 were tragic for the army and navy as well as for the country, when more than

40,000 officers of the Red Army and Red Navy were repressed (many of them were shot or died in concentration camps), which only made the situation worse.

It is of the utmost importance that the military, as well as civilian leaders of the Ministry of Defense fully understand how the federal budget is formulated and used, as well as have at least a basic understanding of the modern market economy, what goes into the system of a political democracy, and how it functions. In this respect their intended contacts with their colleagues in Western countries are very much welcomed.

The Ministry of Defense and "Other Forces"

In the 1967 law on "Military Duties and Military Service," passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ministry of Interior, not only the army and navy, but also the Border Guard of the KGB and Internal Forces of the Ministry of Interior were also classified as Armed Forces. This was done as a result of the Supreme Soviet's particularly concrete task to provide the legal base for the conscription.

At the same time, the Railroad Troops Civil Defense construction and road construction units were organized entirely as part of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.⁹¹ (In the Russian Federation the Civilian Defense troops have become part of the Ministry of Emergency Situations; the Railroad Troops have practically become an independent service and construction and road constructions units were almost abolished.)

But in no case should this lead to the conclusion that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR had any kind of authority in relation to the management of the KGB's Border Guard or of the Internal Forces of the Ministry of the Interior. These were structures that were totally subordinate to their own agencies. The Ministry of Defense, KGB, and Ministry of the Interior each

had its own supply system and its own budget although, of course, some cooperation did occur among them.

In principle, the system of power structures in the Soviet Union, beginning approximately in the middle of the 1960s, was fairly streamlined and stable.⁹² This remained so up until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. This streamlined system no longer exists and the balance of powers has changed completely. A system of civilian control in domestic and international interpretations exists in Russia today only in embryonic form. It requires a careful analytical development and legislative foundation.

The system of power structures contained three giants, three powerful agencies, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which never shared power with one another and cooperated only with difficulty. A specific balance of power supported by the national political leadership always existed between them.⁹³ To a significant extent, substantial antagonism also existed between them, which manifested itself in a wide variety of ways.⁹⁴

At the same time, there were plans for the Army and Navy to cooperate with the Internal Forces as well as with the Border Guard, especially after the Chinese -Soviet incident on Damanskii Island in 1969. These were formulated by the joint orders of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and the chairman of the KGB of the USSR. In fact, after the events on Damanskii Island, the Border Guard of the KGB took on a more expressed military character, and received in its allocation additional armored vehicles and helicopters with attack capability. But the Border Guard of the KGB did not have any big combat capabilities, as were proposed by the leadership of the Federal Border Service in the mid-1990s, when it became an independent agency.

If the Internal Forces withdraw from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and are turned into some kind of “federal guard” in a reserve capacity to the Ground Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, this will change the character of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of

Defense. The Ministry of Defense (and the General Staff) would then take on a much more clearly expressed internal function; apparently now the consideration of this topic has taken on a new relevance with the recent events in Chechnya. However, the events of past years have shown that Chechnya is a special case, and that despite all the efforts of the separatists, terrorists, and those who support them from the outside, they have been unsuccessful at spreading and extrapolating the conflict to Dagestan and Ingushetia, the regions of the country closest to them ethnically and religiously. Therefore, after certain successful antiterrorist operations in Chechnya in 1999-2000, it makes little sense to extrapolate the situation in Chechnya to that of the entire country and to strengthen the internal function of the Armed Forces, troops of the Ministry of Defense, including the complete transfer of the Internal Forces to the Ministry of Defense. The creation of a system of double subordination—similar to that existing in France, Spain, or Italy—is, however, possible. Certain functions of the Ministry of Defense in dealing with internal conflicts must be retained, but only for use in extreme cases, such as when all other resources and methods, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, have been exhausted.

* * *

The lack of clarity regarding the relative place and role of the General Staff must be eliminated through legislation. As mentioned, it is essential to clearly and unequivocally establish that the General Staff is one of the component parts of the Ministry of Defense. The minister of defense himself exercises leadership over the Armed Forces through the General Staff.

It is essential to raise the role of the General Staff in relation to the branches of the Armed Services and their commanders in chief. Their authority to report to their own individual opinions to the minister of defense as well as to the president in his role as commander in chief on the major, principle questions of structuring the Armed Forces and their preparation and implementation of military operations should be established by law.

In this it is important to pay attention not simply to legal regulation and documents, but to their practical implementation.

As it applies to the civilian Ministry of Defense (in the form of the minister, his deputies and departmental leaders and personnel of all the major bodies of this ministry), which will eventually have a system of strategic leadership of national defense, it cannot simply serve the needs of the Armed Forces, acquiring resources for it in a constant struggle with the Ministry of Finance and other civilian government branches. It is impossible to expect a high level of activity in the Security Council, the government and the Federal Assembly on defending the interests of national defense and the Armed Forces from a civilian minister of defense and his deputies without having the rights and duties of civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense in relation to its own Armed Forces.

Endnotes

¹ See A.A. Kokoshin, *Put Rossii v globalnoi ekonomike* [Russia's path in the global economy], (Moscow: MGU im. M.V. Lomonosova, 1999), V.L. Inozemtsev, " Perspektivy postindustrialnoi teorii v menyayushchemsya mire" [Perspectives of post-industrial theory in a changing world], *Novaya postindustrialnaya volna na zapade, Antologiya* [The new post-industrial wave in the west], (Moscow: Academia, 1999), 3-64, T. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999): A.A. Kokoshin, *Russian National Security under the Conditions of Globalization*, (Moscow: Institute for International Security, 2001).

² See A.G. Arbatov, *Bezopasnost: Rossiiskii vybor* [Security: Russia's choice], (Moscow: EPTsentr, 1999), 104-127.

³ See V.N. Lobov, *Ocherki istorii otechestvennykh voennykh reform* [Studies of the history of domestic military reform], (Moscow: Arbazo, 1995), 147. At the end of 1991, the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR General Vladimir Lobov proposed a "division of labor" between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. He raised the idea of placing Armed Forces on administrative issues under the Ministry of Defense and on operational issues in the General Staff of the Armed Forces. He proposed that coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff would occur through a "committee of joint representatives." These proposals did not receive support. Moreover, many in the armed forces believe that it is as a result of these suggestions that V. N. Lobov was removed from his position as the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

⁴ The General Staff has good reasons for suggesting that "other forces" should be placed under its command, since over the past couple of years "other forces" (besides the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) have started to turn into autonomous armies, equipped not only with heavy ground armaments (tanks, multiple rocket launchers, etc.), but also with military jets, as well as military ships (which Border Troops have always had). At the same time, each department sought to develop its own system of acquisition, operation, and maintenance of its equipment. Moreover, each department also was developing its own system of rear support. They opened new educational institutions, etc., which was more and more burdensome for the state's treasury, while the overall effectiveness of the defense and security system remained below the necessary level.

⁵ The State Military Inspectorate of Russia, established in 1997, could be one of the most important agencies for the purpose of strategic control and supervision at the highest presidential level. Under its approved statute the inspectorate has substantial power for overseeing: compliance with orders and instructions of the president and of the government of the Russian Federation; timeliness and completeness of the execution of plans for building-up and developing branches, military forces, and military units, and the implementation of the military policy and doctrine of the Russian Federation; expenditures from the federal budget made by branches, military forces, and military units.

Oversight of compliance by federal executive bodies of economic characteristics and parameters of military organization, approved in accordance with norms and priorities of military development, was defined as a very important task. The inspectorate is also responsible for control over: design and implementation of programs for development and production of armaments, military equipment, and dual-use technologies for the defense and security of the country; quality of the system of training and assignment of personnel; provision of social protection to military and civilian personnel and their families by branches, military forces, and military units. From early on, examinations of the inspectorate revealed that the state of affairs in many of these areas left a lot to be desired.

The main tasks of the inspectorate were defined as follows: control and oversight of compliance by federal and local executives bodies with the legislation regulating military development in the Russian Federation, and oversight of activities of branches, military forces, and military units, including the involvement of monetary, tax, and other authorities whenever necessary. The Inspectorate was given the authority to request written statements and explanations from officials when they are found in violation.

The State Military Inspectorate was granted the following rights: to make suggestions to the president of the Russian Federation on discharge or dismissal of officials serving in branches, military forces, and military units in positions of highest military or special ranks; to introduce proposals to the president of the Russian Federation on improvement of structure and activities of branches, military forces, and military units; to introduce in a prescribed manner proposals on improving the federal legislation and on drafting new, or changing existing orders and instructions of the president of the Russian Federation.

The activities of the State Military Inspectorate along with the Defense Council were organized according to a completely new principle when control, analysis, and preparation of decisions were integrated into a single chain of functions. Such integration was achieved as a result of organizational and structural changes of the inspectorate itself, as well as merging the positions of the state military inspector and the Defense Council secretary. In general, these principles, as well as functions and responsibilities, remained in place after the State Military Inspectorate merged with the Security Council. As a result, the president had at his disposal an agency through which he could manage power structures as provided for in the Constitution. That such an agency was created was an important step towards the improvement of the state system of control and management of the Armed Forces and other power agencies performed by the highest civilian leadership in the country.

During its short existence the Inspectorate conducted a number of comprehensive inspections on the implementation of the president–commander-in-chief's top decisions. The inspections focused on the areas of military development, management of power agencies, and economic underpinnings for military development. The results of these inspections (including the examination of economic characteristics and parameters of military organization established according to the priorities of military development) allowed the author to conclude that the economic policy failed to satisfy the needs of defense and public and state security and needed radical revision. The author raised the question about radical revision of the economic policy during a meeting of the State Commission on military development headed by Chairman of the Russian Government S.V. Kirienko in June 1998. At the time, the author was secretary of the Security Council (the State Military Inspectorate was moved under the secretary of Security Council in March 1998).

⁶ In his speech before the House of Commons on May 13, 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said, "You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival..." Michael Howard, *History of the Second World War: Grand Strategy, September 1942 - August 1943*, Translated from English, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), 14.

⁷ Among the latest Western military and political concepts, Preventive Defense deserves particular attention. It has been developed by Stanford Professor William Perry (former U.S. Secretary of Defense) and Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Professor Ashton Carter (former Assistant Secretary of Defense). They define Preventive Defense as a defense strategy for the United States in the twenty-first century that concentrates national security strategy on the dangers that, if mismanaged, have the potential to grow into true A-list-scale threats to United States survival in the next century, bringing the current era to an abrupt and painful end. These dangers are not yet threats to be defeated or deterred, they are dangers that can be prevented. See A. Carter and W. Perry, "Preventive Defense: A new Security Strategy for America," Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 1999, 12-14.

⁸ In his classic work "The Brain of the Army," B.M. Shaposhnikov ascribes to Bertier even a lesser role, "For Napoleon Bertier was not the Chief of Staff, not even the Chief of Operations, but merely a good Chief of Communications," B.M. Shaposhnikov, *The Brain of the Army*, (Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 1927), 127.

⁹ In 1873 Albrecht Roon became field marshal. The Chief of Staff Helmut Moltke was made field marshal about two years earlier – in 1871.

¹⁰ For details see A. Kokoshin, "Bismarck and Moltke," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No. 8, 129-139.

¹¹ Russian military theorist of the 1920's and 1930's, A.A. Svechin made a very accurate assessment of the German military machine of World War I, "German military commanders were gifted. They were perhaps only an inch shorter than what it took to gain victory, but that missing inch was the distance that separates a genius from a mere mortal."

¹² Helmut Moltke became chief of the General Staff at the age of 62, having a rather unusual career for a military officer. Helmut Moltke, a broad-minded person and man of the world, spoke six languages, wrote a considerable number of works in geography and history, and traveled in many countries. The largest unit he ever had command of was a company. He was the first to realize the importance of railroads as a new means of transportation. He also created a very efficient and highly organized system of control based on wireless telegraph. The schedules of troop movements created under his supervision for strategic concentration and deployment against the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1866 and, in particular, against France in 1870, and the clarity of his directives and orders, which gave some liberty in making decisions to his senior sub-leaders, are unsurpassed examples of planning by the General Staff.

¹³ Moltke the younger neglected Alfred Schlieffen's advice (concerning reinforcing the right flank of the forces deployed to defeat France in the Western Front) leaving Germany with no chance to defeat France militarily early in World War I in 1914. Alfred Schlieffen was Moltke the younger's predecessor as the German chief of the General Staff.

¹⁴ Although Erich Ludendorff was first quartermaster of the German General Staff since 1916, he was de-facto chief of Staff.

¹⁵ According to A.A. Svechin, when the allies occupied Germany after its defeat in the fall of 1918, they were very surprised to see German storage facilities full of thousands of newest artillery systems, a colossal amount of artillery shells and bullets. The idea that "there is no surplus in the war" proved wrong. Having made the German political system, economy, and the whole home front serve the goal of winning the war, Ludendorff and his comrades-in-arms at the General Staff brought Germany to its defeat.

¹⁶ Many people were members of the Defense Council of the Russian Empire at that time: the Ministers of the Army and Navy, the chief of the General Staff, several members of the State Council and the Inspectors of the Armed Services. As a result, this organization grew unwieldy and ineffective. Its meetings continued despite the recall of many members, being badly prepared and taking years to make decisions.

¹⁷ According to A.A. Svechin, when the allies occupied Germany after its defeat in the fall of 1918, they were very surprised to see German storage facilities full of thousands of newest artillery systems, a colossal amount of artillery shells and bullets. The idea that "there is no surplus in the war" proved wrong. Having made the German political system, economy, and the whole home front serve the goal of winning the war, Ludendorff and his comrades-in-arms at the General Staff brought Germany to its defeat.

¹⁸ For details see, K.F. Shatsillo, *From Portsmouth Peace to the First World War: Generals and Politics*, (Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2000), 146.

¹⁹ A.A. Kegnovskiy, *Istoriya Russkoi Armii* [History of the Russian army], Vol. 3. 1881-1915, (Moscow: Golos, 1994), 132.

²⁰ During the 1990s the author observed that some commanders in chief were trying to do just the same, often successfully.

²¹ V.N. Voeykov, *S tsarem i bez tsarya* [With and without the tsar], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1995), 112.

²² A.A. Polivanov, *Iz dnevnikov i vospominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshnikov, 1907-1916* [From diaries and recollections of the war minister and his aides, 1907-1916], (Moscow: Vysshiiy voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1922), 51.

²³ A.A. Kokoshin, *Voenna-Morskoi Flot Rossii. Iz yubileinogo trekhsotogo – vzglyad v proshloe i budushchee* [Russian Navy. Perspectives on its past and future], (Moscow: PI, 1997), 51-52; K.F. Shatsillo, 304-305.

²⁴ V.A. Zolotarev, ed., *History of Russian Military Strategy*, (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole – Poligrafresursy, 2000), 207-208.

²⁵ For details see, M.A. Gareev, *Frunze as a Military Theorist*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), 105-112.

²⁶ The author grew up in Moscow in the family of a military officer. His family shared the apartment building with other Soviet Army commanders who were repressed in 1937-40 and after the end of the World War II. Repressions, which were part of Stalin's horrendous repression campaign, continued to demoralize commanding officers of the Red Army and Navy, and later of the Soviet Army, long after their occurrence.

²⁷ According to some sources, when M.N. Tukhachevskii resigned from his position as chief of staff of the RKKA (the Red Army) he wrote in his report that he had sought to make the Red Army Staff an active and initiative-taking body, but that despite his intentions the Staff had turned into a mere technical bureau. (See L. Nikulin, *Tukhachevskii: Biographical Essay*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), 167). Later Tukhachevskii served as commander in chief of the Leningrad military district (1928-31); Chief of Armaments of the RKKA – deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (narkomvoenmor) of the USSR; and as first deputy of the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR (1930-36) and, simultaneously, as head of the military training department of the RKKA. On June 11, 1937 Tukhachevskii fell victim to the criminal case falsified against him and a large group of high-ranking Soviet military officers.

Tukhachevskii's story contains a lot of ambiguity and controversies. The origin of the case against Tukhachevskii remains unclear, although Walter Schellenberg, former chief of political intelligence of the Third Reich, in his controversial memoirs gave main credit to Reinhard Heydrich, chief of Reich Main Security Office, and himself. (For analysis of documents and materials on Tukhachevskii's case see, D.A. Volkogonov, *Stalin: Political Portrait. Book 1*, (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), pages 530-554.) According to another noteworthy version, back in the 1920s in an attempt to reduce anti-Soviet sentiment, the military intelligence service of the RKKA and political intelligence of the OGPU were feeding to White émigré circles the idea that Tukhachevskii was Bonapartist and that he along with other Red commanders were somehow an alternative to the Bolsheviks. See S.T. Minakov, *Soviet Military Elite in the 1920s (composition, evolution, social and cultural features, and political role)*, (Orel: Orelizdat, 2000), 117-119.)

Tukhachevskii is also known for his notorious actions. Among others, he destroyed the school of Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin, a renowned Russian and Soviet military theorist, who, according to some experts, was "Russian Clausewitz" of the twentieth century. See *Against Reactionary Theories on Military and Scientific Front. Criticism of Strategic, Military and Historical views of Prof. Svechin. Records of open plenary session of the section for war studies, Communist Academy of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Leningrad branch, April 25, 1931*, (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1931); A.A. Kokoshin, "Svechin on War and Politics," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No. 10, (1988), 134-135.

²⁸ ***Translators note: VChK= Vserossiiskaya chrezvychainaya komissiya po bor'be s kontrerevolyutsiei i sabotazhom= the All-Russia Emergency Commission on the Struggle with Counterrevolution and Sabotage, (existed from 1917-1922); OGPU= Ob'edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie pri Soviete Narodnykh Komissarov SSSR= The Unified State Political Administration of the Committee of People's Commissars of the USSR (existed from 1923-1934); NKVD= Narodnii komissariat vnutrennykh del= The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (existed 1934-1941); MGB= Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi

bezopasnosti SSSR= Ministry of State Security (1946-1953); KGB=Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti=Committee of State Security (1954-1991).

²⁹ See *War and Revolution*, No. 10-11 (1927), 26; V.D. Razanov, "Marxism and Military Art," *Voennyi Vestnik*, No. 3, (1926) 14-15.

³⁰ See *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), 446.

³¹ The fact that the Soviet strategic command entered World War II utterly unprepared refutes recurring speculations that in 1941 Germany launched a preventive strike while the Soviet Union was getting ready to invade Europe. It is safe to say that on the eve of the German invasion in June 1941 the Soviet Army was not ready for either strategic assault or strategic defense. This is mainly attributable to the fact that at that time every key decision concerning war or peace was made by Stalin alone. Additionally, Stalin had no high-class analyst around him, on his personal staff whom he could use to process data and information sources, and make preliminary assessments of various opinions.

According to some documents and witnesses, the General Staff of the Red Army was indeed contemplating a preventive strike against the German army in order to disrupt strategic deployment. However, apparently, Stalin never even received any proposals for such a strike. See two books from 1941. The compilers are L.E. Reshin, L.A. Bezymenskii, V.K. Vinogradov, and others. Scientific editor V.P. Naumov, book two. (Series *Russia of the 20th Century: Documents*, edited by A.N. Yakovlev, (Moscow: International Fund "Demokratiya," 1998), 215-220). The fact that the only copy of the memorandum containing these proposals (which was reported to the author in the middle of the 1990's) was never signed by Timshenko and Zhukov reinforces this point of view even further.

Stalin's purges in 1937-40 left high echelons of the Red Army and Red Fleet badly in need of officers capable of independent thinking, and even more than that, capable of communicating their opinion on strategic issues to the leadership of the country. Almost all high-class military academics were gone. They could have provided insight into the new military/ political and operational/ strategic situation in Europe after the German victory over Poland in 1939 and over France in 1940 that would have been comprehensive and free from distractions of daily routine in the defense ministry and the General Staff. (The scope of Stalin's purges among the officers of the Red Army and Red Fleet, especially among high-ranking officers, is mind-boggling and has no logical explanation. According to some estimates, 93 percent of all officers ranked lieutenant-general and higher, and 58 percent of those ranked between major-general and colonel were killed during the purges. The purges were carried out when the military threat was clearly growing, which Stalin himself admitted. See V. Karpov, "Marshal Zhukov, His Followers and Opponents in the Years of War and Peace," *Znamya*, No. 10; V. Rapoport, Y. Geller, *Izmena Rodine* [Betrayal of the Motherland], (Moscow: Strelets, 1995), 289-291.

It is worth noting that Professor G.S. Isserson from the Military Academy of the General Staff was able to provide a far better assessment of new methods of warfare after Poland's defeat than the Commissar for Defense, or the Chief of General Staff, or the head of the operational department of General Staff. In his work titled "New forms of warfare" published in 1940, professor Isserson pointed out that the war between Germany and Poland was characterized by unprecedented strategic surprise. Germany was able to achieve such a surprise despite visibly growing tensions between Poland and Germany since late 1938 that resulted in an exchange of threats on the eve of the war. Isserson wrote: "When on September 1 (in 1939 – A.K.) the German army attacked former Poland along the whole length of the border with fully deployed forces, this was a surprise never seen before.

No one can tell now when the mobilization, concentration and deployment took place. In previous wars, in particular in the first imperialistic world war, these actions were well defined in time". See G.S. Isserson, *Novye formy borby* (*Opyt issledovaniya sovremennykh voyn*) [New forms of battle (the experience of studying contemporary wars)], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1940), 929.

³² Before the beginning of World War II, the first deputy of the People's Commissar of Defense was Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budennii. Aside from the fact that he was a rank higher than the chief of the General Staff, Budennii was also, like People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, a member of the of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks. In contrast, Zhukov as the chief of the General Staff and only a deputy (not the first deputy) to the People's Commissar of Defense, was only a candidate for membership on the Central Committee.

³³ Hitler took the same path during the war when he failed to create a joint General Staff for all of the Armed Forces of the Third Reich, the kind of "big general staff" that Helmut Moltke had created. General field marshal Keitel, the chief of staff of OKW, was merely a chief of Hitler's personal military office. In many cases the General Staff of the German Army Ground Forces, which was responsible for most of operation planning, poorly coordinated its actions with the German Luftwaffe (Air Force) and Naval Command.

³⁴ G.K. Zhukov, *Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya* [Recollections and Thoughts], (Moscow: APN, 1969), 226.

³⁵ See Russian Archives, *The Great War of the Fatherland: orders of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR July 22, 1941-1942*, (Moscow: Terra, 1992), 154.

³⁶ Ibid., 348.

³⁷ See A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov, *The Empire of the GRU: An Outline of the History of Russian Intelligence*, Vol. 1, (Moscow: OMKA-Press, 2000), 302.

³⁸ A.M. Vasilevskii, *Delo vsei zhizni* [The Work of a Whole Life], (Moscow: Politizdat, 1973), 125-126.

³⁹ One cannot but be astonished by the courage of leaders and officers of the RKKA general staff, who were brave enough to report unpleasant information to Stalin, ask difficult questions, and make extremely unpopular decisions after what had happened to their brothers in arms, many of whom used to be their classmates. This kind of courage was not seen, perhaps, in any other country.

⁴⁰ The veterans of the General Staff with whom the author had an opportunity to work in the 1970s and 1980s particularly distinguished general A.I. Antonov from among the leadership of the General Staff. Stalin never promoted Antonov to the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union although the general had accomplished more than many other military commanders who were given the rank of marshal. Aleksey Innokentievich Antonov was first deputy chief of General Staff and of the chief of operational department since December 1942; from May 1943 he served as first deputy chief of General Staff; and from 1945 – as the Chief of General Staff of Soviet Armed Forces. He finished Frunze Military Academy in 1931 and the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1937. At that time Stalin often assigned chiefs of the General Staff to coordinate the actions of front groups, therefore, Antonov managed the General Staff de-facto, succeeding in turning it into a highly professional strategic management agency.

I.V. Stalin decided not to promote Antonov to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union even though G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevskii brought up this issue with Stalin at least twice. According to his contemporaries, Antonov was always rather independent and Stalin never felt his fear or servility. In the case of Zhukov who often argued and disagreed with Stalin, Stalin could not but promote him to marshal, and award him three Stars of Hero of the Soviet Union, and give him proper honors during and right after the war. But in 1946 Zhukov was relieved of his duties as the first deputy of defense minister and Chief Commander of the Ground Forces and soon was assigned to command the Odessa and then the Urals military districts, both of little significance. At that time, Stalin was accusing Zhukov directly of exaggerating his contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany.

⁴¹ Vasilevskii, 127.

⁴² According to the memories of an array of leaders of military affairs, in the 1970s there was an attempt by the leadership of military intelligence to divide the department once again into strategic and non-strategic intelligence, subordinating strategic intelligence directly to the minister of defense, not to the chief of the General Staff.

⁴³ Except for the time when the Information Committee existed under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The committee comprised the strategic military intelligence service and the political intelligence service of the Ministry of State Security of the Soviet Union. The agency also employed people from the Foreign Ministry as analysts. The agency veterans note that the committee performed analytical jobs at particularly high level.

⁴⁴ According to Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov told him on numerous occasions that a chief of general staff should spend several hours a day away from normal routine contemplating a future war.

⁴⁵ First deputy S.F. Akhromeev was appointed instead of Chief of General Staff N.V. Ogarkov. Akhromeev was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union while he was the first deputy, which was unprecedented in Russia's and the world's practice.

⁴⁶ This was reflected in *Voenny Entziklopedicheskiy Slovar* [Military encyclopedia], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), 446, an official publication of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. It is worth noting that N.V. Ogarkov headed the main editorial commission of this military encyclopedia.

⁴⁷ Y.A. Ushanov, *Sozdanie sistem oruzhiya v SshA: organizatsionno-upravlencheskie aspekty* [The creation of the arms system in the USA: Organizational-administrative aspects], Moscow (1992) 45-47.

⁴⁸ In reality, major military and political decisions in the U.S. were not always made at the National Security Council's sessions or based on discussions within the NSC. The post-war history of the United States witnessed a number of cases when special ad-hoc entities were created under the president to deal with particular situations. For example, this was the case during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. John F. Kennedy created a so-called EX-COMM where all matters related to the crisis were discussed. For more details see: G. Allison and P. Zelikow, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Addison Wesley Educational Publisher, 1999).

⁴⁹ See A.A. Kokoshin and S.M. Rogov, *Grey Cardinals of the White House (Serye kardinaly Belogo Doma)*, (Moscow: APN, 1986), 172-222. The National Security Council (NSC) of the U.S. was formed in 1947 in accordance with the National Security text. It is comprised of four members: the president, vice president, secretary of state (minister of foreign affairs) and the secretary of defense. The NSC has its own apparatus, which often reaches considerable size. The national security advisor heads this. In the history of the U.S. there have arisen several situations in which the influence of the national security advisor has surpassed that of the secretary of state or the secretary of defense. This was especially true in the case of Harvard professor Henry Kissinger, who served as national security advisor to President Richard Nixon from 1969-1973 and was a major actor in American foreign policy, having a great influence on U.S. military policy and the activity of the intelligence community of the U.S. It was Kissinger, with his comrades in arms (who included H. Sonnenfeld, W. Highland and B. Scowcroft, (who later occupied the position of national security advisor under President Gerald Ford and returned to the position under President Bush Sr.) who ensured "breakthroughs" in U.S. foreign policy on important directives.

⁵⁰ There were hot debates around this issue when the Goldwater-Nichols Act was drafted. At some point it seemed that the advocates of turning the Joint Chiefs of Staff into a general staff like the one in France or the

Soviet Union would prevail. However, this did not happen. One can presume at least two reasons: first, the services' lobby, especially the naval and air force lobby, was fiercely opposed to this; secondly, many politicians saw a general staff as a product of an anti-democratic form of government. The influence of the Air Force and Navy in the United States is much higher than that of their counterparts in the USSR and Russia. In the end, the legislators sacrificed efficiency that could be gained by transforming the JCS into the General Staff for some autonomy of the services of Armed Forces.

⁵¹ See M. Locher and R. James, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," JFQ, Autumn 1996, 11-12.

⁵² At present service secretaries in the United States are symbolic figures standing far below deputy secretary of defense or any under or service commanders in the hierarchy of the Department of Defense. Appointees for service secretaries positions are usually those who need to be rewarded for their contributions to victory in presidential elections. This is analogous to the situation when people who are not experts in foreign policy and have no diplomatic background are appointed as U.S. ambassadors to foreign countries.

⁵³ In the early 19th century the Russian empire had a naval border guard service. Naval border guards wore the same uniform as servicemen of the Imperial Navy, but they reported to the Ministry of Finance and were responsible for providing economic security by combating first of all smuggling.

⁵⁴ The gendarmerie in France is subordinate to two agencies—it is under the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and it serves the interests of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but during war time it can be transferred to the subordination of the General Staff; the rear services of the gendarmerie is largely dependent on the supply of the French armed forces.

⁵⁵ For example, for such purposes German Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe had a small staff headed by Admiral Hugo Weisser, who was a very well educated and a strategically thinking expert.

⁵⁶ See *White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, (Federal Ministry of Defense: Bonn, 1994), 108.

⁵⁷ the secretary of state for defense heads the Defense Council of the United Kingdom, which besides him consists of both the state ministers for military affairs and for procurement, the parliamentary deputy secretary of state, the chief of staff of defense, the standing deputy secretary of state, the chiefs of staff of the branches of the Armed Forces, the vice chief of staff of defense and the second standing deputy secretary of state, the leader of the Ministry of Defense procurement and main scientific advisor.

⁵⁸ British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, (1996), 5.11-5.12.

⁵⁹ The Ministry of Defence, *The Organization and Management of Defence in United Kingdom*, (London: May 1997), 2.

⁶⁰ British Defence Doctrine, 5.12.

⁶¹ Ibid, 5.13.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ The Ministry of Defence, 8.

⁶⁴ O.A. Rzheshhevskii, Foreword to the Russian Edition; in M. Govard, *Bolshaya strategiya* [The grand strategy], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), 5.

⁶⁵ China's Law on Defense was enacted on March 14, 1997 by Chairman of the PRC Jiang Zemin's decree #84. Under Article 13 the Central Military Commission of PRC (CMC) has command over the entire Armed Forces and has the following authority to:

- exercise unified command of the entire Armed Forces;
- develop military strategy and war plans;
- oversee build-up of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA), develop and implement plans and programs;
- submit plans of defense building for consideration to the National People's Congress (NPC) and the NPC standing committee;
- enact military legislation, issue directives and orders according to the Constitutions and law;
- define the structure and organization of the Armed Forces, tasks and functions of highest military commanding bodies, military districts, and services and arms of the Armed Forces;
- make appointments to executive positions, oversee matters related to training, encouragement, and punishment of troops in accordance with civil and military legislation;
- approve plans of development and modernization of weapons and equipment, and oversee military science and production jointly with the State Council;
- manage military expenditures in conjunction with the State Council;
- perform other tasks in accordance with the law.

⁶⁶ His predecessor Colonel-General Liu Huaqing, associate of Deng Xiaoping, who retired in 1998 at the age of 82, held a higher position in the party hierarchy as a member the Standing Consultative Committee under the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, one could say it was "a Politburo within the Politburo."

⁶⁷ In 1998-2000 the strength of the People's Armed Militia (interior forces) was considerably augmented as the result of reductions in the People's Liberation Army of China. The PLA was reduced by over 500,000 people within the past two years, however, at the same time the number of servicemen in the Chinese interior forces grew by about 500,000. The interior forces replace army units in some places along the border, as well as in some areas of Sintzyan and Tibet.

⁶⁸ The CPLA of the PRC, like the Red Army of the USSR, did not forego the use of repression, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Among those repressed were many visible military leaders, including such an important figure as marshal Peng Dehuai. However, during these repressions the scale of the direct physical destruction of the command staff of the CPLA was immeasurably less than in the USSR from 1937-1938. The vast majority of the military leaders of the CPLA of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution retained their positions, as a result of which the armed forces of the PRC barely lost battle-readiness during this period.

⁶⁹ Mao preserved the strength of his troops (having taken weapons and material from Japan's Kwantun Army after it had surrendered as a result of Manchuria operation conducted between August 9 and September 2, 1945 in the face of absolute domination of the Soviet Army) for further fight (and victory) against the Kuomintang (KMT).

⁷⁰ Among Mao ZeDong's works on military issues, it is possible to single out the following works, "Strategic Issues of Revolutionary War in China" (December 1936), "Issues of Strategy in the Partisan War against Japanese Aggressors" (May 1938), "On Drawn-Out War" (May 1938), "War and Issues of Strategy" (November 6, 1938). See Mao ZeDong, *Selected Works*, translated from Chinese, Vol. 1-2, (Moscow: Izdatelstvo innostrannoi literatury, 1953). These works should be a subject of study and instruction in the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

⁷¹ Up until 1999 China's PLA managed a great number of various enterprises (some estimates put the number at about 20,000), which were not exclusively agricultural enterprises that produced food for the army. There were also textile factories, coalmines, oil refineries, transportation companies, and others. The PLA's rear services, as well as the PLA General Staff, or the Department of Foreign Relations of the Ministry of Defense, which reports directly to the Minister held considerable shares in a number of Beijing hotels. It is clear that the army shouldering such a burden (and facing a permanent problem of corruption) has a rather limited fighting capability, even from a psychological viewpoint.

⁷² One of the central concepts for Sun Tzu is obtaining "advantage" from a war: for him a war makes sense only when there is an "advantage" to be gained. For Sun Tzu the ultimate goal in the war is not a victory. The victory in itself has no value, but is a means to obtaining advantage. According to Sun Tzu, if the war is waged to gain advantage, it is much more beneficial to capture the enemy's state without destroying it; it is better to capture the enemy's army without destroying it:

"...In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army complete than to destroy it... Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. ...the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the union of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are."

For Sun Tzu, the concept of advantage applies to the matters of highest military and political or economic importance, as well as to more particular situations in a war, such as tactical situations which can affect military and strategic results and, hence, the highest political result. Sun Tzu applies the term "advantage" to the ultimate goals of a war, as well as to the purpose of each action made at the tactical level.

According to the traditional chronology, Sun Tzu lived in the Kingdom of Wu governed by Ho Lu (514-495 BC), approximately 200-250 years before Confucius, the greatest Chinese philosopher. See N.I. Konrad, *Sinology: Sun Tsu The Art of War (Sinologiya, Sun Tsu Traktat o voennom iskusstve)*, (Moscow, 1995, reprinted from 1977 edition), 27-29.

The author learned for the first time about Sun Tzu's military philosophy during his trip to China in 1986 where he represented the Academy of Science of the USSR and during several meetings at the Chinese Institute for Strategic Studies, a research organization with close ties to the Central Military Commission and the General Staff of the PLA. During his official visits to China in 1992-1998 as first deputy minister of Defense of Russia and later as the state military inspector-secretary of the Defense Council of the Russian Federation the author had an opportunity to learn in greater detail about Sun Tzu's philosophy and its place in current military thinking in China.

⁷³ It is worth noting that Sun Tzu's legacy is carefully studied at U.S. military academies from West Point to the National Defense University (equivalent to Russia's Military Academy of the General Staff) and its successors. References to Sun Tzu can be found in U.S. Army basic manual FM-100-5 of 1982.

⁷⁴ Many experts point out that China can be expected to use its military force (not necessarily for fighting a war) not only against Taiwan (about which no one disputes China's sovereignty), but also against the islands of Senkaku and Spratly, as well as other territories.

It is very likely that after 2010 (given a favorable economic situation) China will emerge as a naval power in its part of the Pacific, which has not been the case for several hundred years of Chinese history. The fact that China had no navy or merchant ocean-going fleet negatively impacted economic and social development, and the defense capability of this great country and civilization. In the 19th century and later on, Western colonialists used their naval supremacy to invade coastal areas and even internal territories of China. This was more than simply brutal gunboat diplomacy, this was direct military intervention into Chinese

internal affairs and brutal violation of Chinese sovereignty. Up until now China only had a coastal fleet consisting of a great number of gunboats and small ships with low sea-worthiness and range of operation. China's land-based naval aviation was also weak.

It is quite possible that after 2010 as a result of decisions by Chinese leadership the country's navy will have nuclear submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

A fleet like this will be used mainly in areas of the Pacific Ocean. It will not be strong enough to challenge U.S. naval supremacy in the world, but it will be sufficient to alter radically the operational and strategic balance, and the political and military situation in the areas of the Asian-Pacific region that are most important for China's interests, or China's "advantages" as Sun Tzu would say. These include the area around Taiwan, including a remote sea zone – the range at which Chinese naval ships and aircraft could attack aircraft carrier battle groups of "other countries".

As China is building up its ocean-going (Pacific) naval forces, it is able to postpone any clash with India, China's great neighbor in South Asia, for a long period of time (up until the last quarter of the 21st century). India will strive to develop its navy to establish its domination in the Bengal Bay and then in the Northern part of the Indian Ocean.

India, just like China, can be expected to develop a sea-based component of its strategic nuclear forces, but this is likely to occur 5-7 years after China develops sea-based nuclear forces.

⁷⁵ In the last years of the Soviet Union's existence, this position was held by important and highly distinguished figures in the Armed Forces and military-industrial complex such as Army General V.M. Shabanov, and later Colonel-General V.P. Mironov who then was appointed Chief of Armaments in Russia's Ministry of Defense.

⁷⁶ In particular, in 1997 there was a failed attempt to create a financial and legal department in place of the purely financial department. The financial and legal department would have been responsible for the implementation of unified military and technical policy and reported to first deputy of the defense minister, thus replacing the financial department that ensured delivery of payments for defense orders of the state. In fact, the idea was to keep an account of all orders for the development and purchase of weapons and equipment being placed, all orders that were being filled, and current and long-term financial obligations of the Ministry of Defense with regard to these orders. Thus, this would practically eliminate or complicate arbitrariness (at the level of services of the Armed Forces and departments of the Defense Ministry) with regard to the nomenclature and the volume of purchase or work in defense orders, which was present in almost all of the agencies that were placing orders.

⁷⁷ In reality, at the same time the Main Rocket-Artillery Administration and the Main Automobile, Armored Vehicles, and Tank Administration of the Ministry of Defense reported to the chief of the Russian General Staff on a number of issues.

⁷⁸ It is no wonder that the German Armed Forces almost completely adopted the theories of "deep combat" and "deep operation" which were similar to the concepts developed by the Germans themselves, (developed in detail by V.K. Triandafilov, M.N. Tukhachevskii, and others in the USSR). For more details see: A.A. Kokoshin, *Armiya i politika* [Army and politics], (Moscow: IMO, 1995), 74-106, 175-198.

⁷⁹ In Russian/Soviet military thinking there are three major levels – strategy, operational art ("operatica") and tactics.

⁸⁰ The author paid a great deal of attention to this aspect analyzing the results of the "first Chechen campaign" of 1994-95, when Chechen paramilitary formations were using mostly horizontal communications, while federal forces mostly were relying on traditional vertical communications.

⁸¹ The Russian General Staff until recently has the same place in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation as it had in the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the last 10-15 years of existence of the Soviet Union. The relationship between the chief of General Staff-first deputy defense minister and the “absolute” first deputy defense minister (later changed to secretary of state-first deputy defense minister) within the Ministry of Defense, established in 1992, was more efficient than in the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. This phenomenon can be attributed to a large extent to the clarity of the presidential order that defined functions and responsibilities for each position, as well as to the fact that the position of secretary of state-first deputy defense minister was given to civilians.

In 1999 the president gave the defense minister the authority to define the functions and responsibilities of his deputies independently with the exception of the chief of the General Staff as a deputy minister of defense. This is not acceptable given the particular importance of the ministry. On the contrary, those functions and responsibilities that before had been set by presidential orders, (which in Russia have the power of law when the appropriate law does not exist) should instead have been defined by a law.

⁸² This raises the issue of speeding up the training of staff for the new apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. The training should be based on a special program administered by highly qualified military and civilian instructors at the Military Academy of the General Staff and one or two civilian universities.

⁸³ On October 13, 2000 a memorandum titled “About the response of the General Prosecutor’s office of the Russian Federation to the appeals of the Auditing Chamber with regard to violations of Russian laws found during the examination of divestiture and privatization of federal property freed as a result of the military reform” was circulated in the State Duma. The memorandum took note that up to the present “the contradiction between the current practice of accounting and disposal of government property, and decrees and orders of the Russian government and the Defense Ministry on the one hand and the active laws of the Russian Federation on the other hand has not been eliminated, which creates conditions for uncontrollable and illegal disposal of the military property.” Branches of military administration and their subdivisions are not registered as juridical persons and do not have the right to manage and dispose of the federal property. The defense ministry’s contention that the law “On state secrets” places restrictions on state registration of the chief commissariat of the branches of the Armed Forces, the rear services, procurement agencies, military districts and fleets all of which engage actively in economic and other activities is legally groundless. The active order issued by the Minister of Defense of the USSR (Marshall I.D. Sergeyev) de-facto authorizes officials at administrative branches of the Armed Forces to dispose of federal property, which is in violation of the civil code and government decisions. Guided by that order the Supreme Commander of the Air Force issued inspection statements taking 196 cargo planes off the books, which was a violation of the proper procedures.

Procedures for accounting and control of movement of military property are yet to be brought in line with the current legislation. The results of the inventory conducted in 1997 across the Defense Ministry on presidential order do not reflect the real value of the military property. Proper revaluation and classification procedures are not yet in place, preventing the Defense Ministry from complete transition to value-based accounting of military property (the law “On accounting”), and fostering conditions for stealing and losses. The cited memorandum of the Auditing Chamber uncovered a number of other violations, in addition to those mentioned above.

⁸⁴ The Ministry of Defense and General Staff, as its integral part, interact not only with the Armed Forces under their control, but also with other government bodies including those which are higher up in the hierarchy. The basic principles of such interaction defined in the legislation have direct effect on the allocation of authority and tasks between the General Staff and other parts of the Ministry of Defense. Analysis of the current legislation shows that it lacks clarity and detail in these matters. In particular, the current legislation does not define clearly the status of the commander-in-chief, his duties in times of peace (which also should depend on the scale of military operations), the nature of his decisions (will they concern only the most important military and political decisions, or include the constant supervision of the Armed

Forces' military activities), the allocation of authority and duties between the commander-in-chief and the Minister of Defense, and so on. However, this is one of the main factors that determine the role of the General Staff and the extent of its autonomy.

There is also lack of clarity regarding the relationship between the government and the Ministry of Defense. The status of the Security Council, as defined by the 1992 Law on Security, which was adopted before the present Constitution, also needs clarification (this is a separate topic that goes beyond the issue of management of the Armed Forces).

⁸⁵ Until 1997 Russian Armed Forces had five services: the Ground Forces (Army), the Navy, the Air Forces, the Antiaircraft Defense of the Country, and the Strategic Rocket Forces. In 2002 there are three services: the Ground Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force.

⁸⁶ *Nezavisimaya Voennoe Obozrenie*, No. 40, October 29, 1998.

⁸⁷ Moreover, the steps that have already been made and that will be made have a structural impact only at the highest level, while the level of company, battalion, regiment, and division where orders are directly executed is of a greater importance. Here, no changes in the organization and structure of these units have occurred for decades despite the fact that their weapons and combat capabilities have changed dramatically. In particular, the principle of module has never been implemented (according to this principle, an augmented battalion capable of fighting autonomously should become the basic unit), although the author together with the chief of the General Staff (M. Kolesnikov) and the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (V. Barinkin) considered it on numerous occasions in 1996-97. Meanwhile, creating units and formations by the principle of module is the only way to ensure the effectiveness, mobility, and flexibility of deployment of these units, as well as rational and comprehensive use of their combat capabilities.

⁸⁸ The fact that the General Staff is an integral part of the Ministry of Defense has several implications, one of which is that the chief of General Staff reports to the minister of defense. Another is that the General Staff must not be an independent juridical person (all financial and economic activities should be the responsibility of the appropriate ministerial departments; there is no reason for the General Staff to become an independent economic actor). Moreover, Defense Ministry officials (first deputy and secretary of state, in particular) should have the ability to involve departments of the General Staff in order to resolve certain issues, work on documents, execute orders of the president and the government, etc. They should be able to do so indirectly--through the chief of the General Staff --, as well as directly (provided they notify him properly). The chief of the General Staff in the foreseeable future should have the same authority with regard to other departments of the defense ministry (i.e. he should be able to act as a first deputy of the minister of defense). Otherwise, the Ministry of Defense simply will lose its operational capability and ability to execute presidential and governmental orders in a timely manner.

⁸⁹ Parliamentary control is one of the key elements of the civilian control over military in the democratic society.

⁹⁰ Contrary to popular opinion, exaggeration of threats and excessive "vigilance" are just as bad as underestimation of a threat. For example, the security assessments that Y. Danilov, the First Quartermaster of the Russian General Staff, made before World War I had tragic consequences. At that time, Danilov and his colleagues regarded almost all countries, including Sweden and Japan, as potential adversaries to Russia in the future war. These threats defined the measures for the arrangement of the strategic alignment of troops, and the concentration and deployment of forces. Meanwhile, after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, Japan pursued different goals and tasks in the Far East. Sweden firmly adhered to neutrality (provided for by its still rather significant Armed Forces, including the navy, strictly for defense purposes -- during his trip to Sweden and visit to the Stockholm Navy Museum, the author had the opportunity to examine the structure and the

technical characteristics of the navy). Furthermore, Sweden was under strong influence from Britain, who, by this time had become a sound ally of the Russian Empire.

A Russian military author wrote: “This estimation of threats was only lacking a threat from Martians.” History shows that the military are prone to make estimations of the kind; in this way they insure themselves against mistakes and subsequent accusations of being off guard. The author of the paper has repeatedly come across estimations like this while working at the Ministry of Defense. It has not been easy to oppose them single-handedly or being in the minority.

Another positive historical example would be the dispute between A. A. Svechin and B. M. Shaposhnikov at the beginning of 1930s. Shaposhnikov, then head of the Red Army Main Staff (predecessor of the General Staff), told Svechin, the advisor to the Red Army Intelligence, that England in the short term could not be viewed as a potential enemy of Russia due to its current internal political situation. Shaposhnikov was absolutely correct.

Military threat assessment is a cornerstone in the formulation of a military doctrine. It is a key issue for the whole system of stationing armed forces during peacetime, as well as the question of technical military policy. If a mistake occurs in the threat assessment, it is often very difficult to correct. And it is not only a problem for the General Staff, though the General Staff and the military intelligence are very significant in this context. It is a complex and multi-faceted task. At the military department, threat assessment should as well involve civilian international relations professionals, specialists in the economic and political systems of other states and the intricacies of foreign affairs; those specialists should be following science and technological progress and its dynamics. This department of the Ministry of Defense should closely cooperate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and FAPSI. The General Staff is central here, but not everything should be defined by the General Staff position. This would present a danger of seeing the problem from the military viewpoint only.

Outside the General Staff, along with the office of military and political analysis and planning at the Ministry of Defense, there should be another office under senior level state leadership. This office would assess estimates from different bodies of political and military intelligence, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as from civil offices dealing with economic issues, for example. Under current conditions in Russia, this authority should be within the Security Council. Regular monitoring of evaluations from independent experts from academia is also necessary, as is done in all developed countries.

⁹¹ The issue of separating border, interior, railway, road-construction, and civil defense troops from the Armed Forces came up during negotiations in the 1980s with the West of cuts in the army. It turns out that legally there were as many as 6 million servicemen in the USSR, even though, according to government decrees, the above-mentioned troops were separate from the Armed Forces. As a result, the Law on defense of the Russian Federation names:

Other forces – Border troops, Interior troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, railways troop, the Federal Agency of Governmental Communications and Information under the president of the Russian Federation (FAPSI) troops, and civil defense troops;

Service agencies – the Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal Security Service, police, FAPSI;

Military Units – engineer units, road-construction units under federal executive bodies, and special units created at the time of war.

This law also states that “the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other forces, military units, and service agencies fulfill their tasks in the area of defense according to the plan on the use of military forces of the Russian Federation,” which the General Staff develops in cooperation with appropriate federal bodies, ministries, and agencies. Moreover, the General Staff is responsible for coordinating the mobilization and operational readiness of Russian forces, as well as for coordinating activities between the Russian Armed Forces and other forces, military units, and service agencies.

Government decrees or joint orders from the heads of ministries and government agencies define basic principles of coordination between the Russian Armed Forces and other forces.

According to a government decree, whenever civil defense troops, which report to the Ministry of Emergency Situations, are engaged in cooperation with the armed forces, the commander of civil defense

troops has to coordinate with the Ministry of Defense on issues related to mobilization, combat readiness, and operational tasks of the civil defense troops; territorial defense; recruitment; organization of the troops' service; and other issues over which the Ministry of Defense has jurisdiction.

The guiding principles of cooperation between the Armed Forces and interior troops are currently being developed. The draft regulation provides for use of the Armed Forces for law-enforcement purposes in emergency situations, disarming illegal military units, mobilizing and recruiting into military service, planning and implementing of the tasks of territorial defense in times of war.

⁹² The path to this was extremely difficult and, at times, a zigzag. Thus, the internal affairs organs and the state security organs more than once came together and apart, in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.

⁹³ Most countries carefully maintain a balance of power among their "power" agencies. That includes China where the Ministry of Defense and PLA exist along with the Ministry of Public Security (very similar to Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs) and Ministry of State Security. China's Ministry of Public Security has a department responsible for the security of Chinese leadership (an equivalent of "the 9th department" in the KGB, or of the Federal protection service of Russia) and a department for the protection of the constitutional form of government. This increases the influence of the Ministry of Public Security in the hierarchy of Chinese government agencies. However, its influence is counterbalanced due to the fact that the Central Military Commission exercises greater control over the People's Armed Militia than the Ministry of Public Security.

⁹⁴ In December 1993 the author, then first deputy minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, had to face this problem. At that time he together with Security Minister M.N. Glushko and First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs M.K. Yegorov had to conduct a joint anti-terrorist operation to liberate a group of Russian school children held hostages in Rostov-na-Donu and then at the airport Mineralniye Vody, where this terrorist got a helicopter. It took a lot of effort to quickly ensure closest possible cooperation among various forces in the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Defense, and Security (which then incorporated border troops), and FAPSI. Those agencies were able to overcome their disagreements and, as a result, this anti-terrorist operation was one of the most successful in the history of Russia, with all of the children liberated and ransom money recovered. (The operation was successful in great part due to the courage and resourcefulness of General Mikhailov, then commander of the 4th air force army, helicopter pilot Padalka, and helicopter navigator Stepanov.) At that time, upon the author's suggestion, one of the generals from the Ministry of Internal Affairs was given command and control over all the forces involved in the operation. He had operational command and control of the units of Special Forces of the Ministry of Defense, border troops, and FAPSI.

In order to ensure total control of the air space the Ministry of Defense was using 43 radars of the Air Defense Forces, Air Force, and Army (in the North Caucasus military district), as well as 3 A-50 aircraft ("Russian AWACS") transferred from various parts of the country upon the author's orders. Here, various forces from different ministries and agencies were used in a truly massive and coordinated operation for the sole goal of saving all children and arresting the terrorists (or eliminating them if arrest was impossible). This operation took over four days of constant work at every level of management in this crisis situation. It was a big success. All the children were liberated and all the terrorists were arrested. The three chief officers mentioned above were operating at the highest level; Air Force Commander P.S. Deinekin and Lieutenant-General Makoklyuev, a first deputy Chief of Staff of Air Defense Forces, were working at the operational level; and the staff headed by General Yesmigavev from the Ministry of Internal Affairs was working at the regional level.