

**Settlers, Refugees, and Immigrants:  
Alternative Futures for Post-Settlement Cyprus**

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## OVERVIEW

The central theme of this article is the introduction of scenario planning in the negotiation of the settler, refugee, and immigration issues in Cyprus and other divided societies. While advocating support for the United Nations Plan for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Question (the “Annan Plan”), the article proposes alternative ways of linking its immigrant, Turkish settler and Greek Cypriot (GC) refugee quotas. The Turkish Cypriot (TC) community is provided with a choice between a community-homogeneous future with fewer settlers and refugees, and a multicultural one with more of each. Subsequently, an explicit link is made between the numbers of the Greek Cypriot refugees and those of the Turkish settlers, immigrants, and TC émigrés. This paper argues that a TC constituent state which accommodates more of the latter should also be in a position to welcome more GCs under a low percentage of the TC population: a potentially win-win situation. Finally, we address the scenario in which TCs opt for a multicultural future but GC refugees do not actually resettle, with a safeguard provision that compensates the GC side in another issue such as security, government, or even territory. By compensating possible losses in one area with favorable readjustments in another, these safeguards eliminate worst case scenarios for both sides, preserve the initial balance of the negotiated settlement, and maximize the negotiability and credibility of the Annan Plan. At the same time, the settler, refugee, and immigration issues are linked in new and innovative ways to emphasize a better human rights environment for all.

## INTRODUCTION

In the early morning hours of February 13, 2004, after marathon overnight negotiations in New York, the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities agreed to authorize Secretary-General Kofi Annan to finalize his plan for a settlement in Cyprus and submit it to referendums before the accession of Cyprus to the European Union on May 1, 2004.<sup>1</sup> Despite the plan's many merits, it is still unclear whether the two sides or the Cypriot communities themselves will endorse it either now or in the future. For one thing, the Greek Cypriots (GCs) are bitter about the quotas introduced for GC refugees willing to resettle to the future Turkish Cypriot (TC) state but more importantly, they are worried that large numbers of settlers and future migrants from Turkey might upset the island's demographic settings. Likewise, Turkey—which controls the current process—is uneasy with the resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees in the future TC constituent state while the settlers fear their involuntary resettlement to Turkey.<sup>2</sup>

This article aims to balance these antithetical fears by introducing innovative and feasible amendments to the current plan. The key question is the following: How can we guarantee a better human rights environment for all groups in Cyprus while maximizing the negotiability of the plan? By relying on mutually advantageous linkages between issues, effective safeguards, and scenario planning, the plan becomes more attractive to the current leaderships in Cyprus and the two “motherlands,” as well as more conducive to the human rights agenda on the island. This paper summarizes and critiques the current provisions of the Annan Plan with respect to the

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<sup>1</sup> Warren Hoge, “Cyprus Greeks and Turks Agree on Plan to End 40-Year Conflict,” *New York Times*, February 14, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> For details on the positions of the two sides after the New York agreement as these were reported by the press see *Cyprus Mail* and *Turkish Daily News*, both February 20, 2004.

settlers, refugees, and immigrants. It argues that the current plan discourages mutually beneficial tradeoffs in these issues by compensating the Greek Cypriots refugees too little and too late, if at all. We also question the underlying principles of time quotas arguing that migration figures are better proxies of readiness to absorb resettling refugees of a different ethnic background. We then present our own formula and its implications for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as well as for Turkey.

## **BACKGROUND**

Scenario planning involves a diagnostic element assessing the potential uncertainties of the two sides and a prognostic element evaluating amendments which can minimize these uncertainties or their overall effects. Negotiation theorists have developed practical knowledge and mechanisms that minimize the effects of uncertainties for the net interest calculations of the actor(s).<sup>3</sup> It is not enough to identify issues and options for mutual gains in the negotiations;<sup>4</sup> one must also produce alternative scenarios that demonstrate the durability of those gains. By compensating possible losses in one issue with favorable readjustments in another, scenario planning preserves the initial benefits which derive from a negotiated settlement while eliminating critical uncertainties or their overall effects. Because demographic uncertainty in Cyprus is inevitable, scenario planning is essential in maintaining the credibility of mutually-advantageous linkages and commitments. Safeguards or credible commitments are needed on the

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<sup>3</sup> For example, Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie, "Strategy under Uncertainty," *Harvard Business Review*, November-December 1997, pp. 67-79; Gill Ringland, *Scenario Planning: Managing for the Future*, (Chichester: Wiley, 1998); and Peter Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World* (New York: Currency and Doubleday, 1991).

<sup>4</sup> Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 56-80.

island to effectively reassure the two sides that neither will break an agreement in the future.<sup>5</sup>

One such mechanism would stabilize demographic settings and group relations under different scenarios by compensating both communities for adverse demographic shifts.

Preserving their own demographic security is, in the case of Cyprus, a priority for both sides.<sup>6</sup> In the negotiations, which have failed repeatedly over the past three decades, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side have worried that Greek Cypriot refugees might resettle in great numbers in the future TC constituent state. One can plausibly argue that the TCs could in fact invite everyone, but few Greek Cypriots would respond, and thus the TC state would increase both in legitimacy and security. The number of Greek Cypriot refugees who would like to resettle in the TC areas either now or in the future, however, is unpredictable.<sup>7</sup> Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are therefore unwilling to experiment with an issue they perceive might affect their security. Greek Cypriots likewise fear that large numbers of settlers or migrants from Turkey will upset the island's demographic settings. For one thing, Greek Cypriots cannot

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<sup>5</sup> Donald Rothchild and David Lake, "Containing Fear: The Management of Transnational Ethnic Conflict," in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 203-226; and James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in *ibid.*, pp.107-126.

<sup>6</sup> For similar concerns in other divided societies see: Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, (New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, 1997), pp. 259-265; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39; John McGarry, "'Demographic Engineering': The State-Directed Movement of Ethnic Groups as a Technique of Conflict Regulation," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 21, Issue 4, (July 1998), pp. 613-683; and Ian Lustick, "Israel as a Non-Arab State: The Political Implications of Mass Immigration of Non-Jews," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Summer, 1999), pp. 417-433.

<sup>7</sup> A common question in the GC polls is how many Greek Cypriot refugees will actually return under TC administration. According to a poll conducted by AC Nielsen for GC daily the overwhelming majority (77%) of Greek Cypriots is not willing to return under Turkish Cypriot administration. *Politis*, February 22, 2004; Petrides Andreas, 'The AC Nielsen Poll,' [in Greek], *Politis*, February 24, 2004. In general, refugee resettlement in similar conflict situations has tended to vary. Among other factors, security, images of the "other," relative prices of housing, emotions, and ideology can change people's preferences very quickly. Planning for alternative futures is therefore a necessity.

predict the future number of settlers and other migrants in the TC constituent state.

Compounding the problem is that while Turkish colonization is forbidden by international law,<sup>8</sup> the massive and indiscriminate expulsion of illegal settlers with their families, especially after the passage of decades, is both politically and ethically difficult to justify.<sup>9</sup>

## THE UN PLAN FOR CYPRUS

In contrast to earlier plans, the current UN plan (the February 2003 Annan Plan) contains detailed and comprehensive proposals on almost all issues.<sup>10</sup> On the issue of the settlers, it provides a detailed description of the criteria determining settlers' naturalization or residency rights. Through this plan, the majority of settlers would receive the right to remain in Cyprus as citizens, while others would be defined as immigrants with the possibility of being naturalized as Cypriots in the future. According to the plan, the latter are to be accepted through post-settlement immigration quotas of ten percent of the population for each community. In other words, immigrants from Turkey and Greece would be welcome within those ten percent quotas, with the

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<sup>8</sup> Kypros Chrysostomides, *The Republic of Cyprus: A Study of International Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000), pp. 197-215; Alfons Cuco, *Report on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities*, (Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 1994); Loukis Loucaides, *Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights* (Boston: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1995).

<sup>9</sup> Joseph H. Carens, *Culture, Citizenship, and Community (A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness)*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.217.

<sup>10</sup> For instance, it proposes a presidential council of four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots empowered to make decisions on simple majority that includes at least one Turkish Cypriot vote. It involves the presence of Greek and Turkish foreign troops of 6,000 for each country, with the provision that all forces will be withdrawn once Turkey itself joins the European Union. Finally, it introduces a territorial transfer of land to the Greek Cypriot constituent state of around 9% of the island, which includes the most highly populated pre-1974 Greek Cypriot areas see: "Basis for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem", <http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/>, third revision, February 28, 2003; For a brief and comprehensive summary of the plan see Robert Rotberg, , *Cyprus after the Annan Plan (Next Steps toward a Solution)*, (World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2003). (<http://www.cyprusaction.org/projects/WPF37CyprusafterAnnan.pdf>).



possibility of immigrant quotas being renewed at five percent of each constituent state's population every nine years.<sup>11</sup>

On the issue of refugees, the Annan Plan divides the GC refugees into two categories. The first half, about 54% of the total, or 86,000 refugees (the total with offspring would equal approximately 120,000), will return under GC administration once the territorial boundaries of the two constituent states are readjusted.<sup>12</sup> This is one of the major gains of the Greek Cypriot side of the plan, especially if one considers that resettlement under GC administration will be easier and more attractive than under TC administration. For the rest of the refugees, the plan suggests incremental caps that do not exceed 21% of the population of the TC constituent state throughout the next 15 years, with all quotas to be eliminated when Turkey itself joins the EU. The UN estimates that fewer than half of these refugees would eventually be allowed to resettle in TC areas, with priority given to those GC refugees under 65 years of age.<sup>13</sup>

### **WHY AND HOW TO IMPROVE THE ANNAN PLAN**

However innovative, balanced, and comprehensive the Annan Plan is, some of its specific provisions could be improved.<sup>14</sup> For one thing, there is no clear logic behind the lengthy time quotas prescribed in the UN plan. Time quotas do not necessarily mean that the two communities

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<sup>11</sup> *Kibris*, March 25, 2003; Basis for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, (February 2003), pp. 54-56, 61-67.

<sup>12</sup> See Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, S/2003/398, par. 118.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, par.100.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Rotberg, *Cyprus after the Annan Plan*; Anastasakis, Othon; Gilles Bertrand & Kalypso Nicolaides, "Getting to Yes: Suggestions for Embellishment of the Annan Plan for Cyprus," *South East European Studies Programme (SEESP)*, (February, 2004).

will be ready to face each other at the end of that period, or that Turkish Cypriots will then be prepared to welcome Greek Cypriots into their constituent state. Confidence and cooperation at the local level cannot occur merely because time passes but, rather, must derive from explicit incentives and mutually advantageous arrangements.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, time quotas have little normative justification, as the GC refugees have not only carried on a peaceful struggle for almost three decades, but also joined the Turkish Cypriots in an amicable encounter after the border opening in April 2003 that refuted the so-called “modern/ancient hatred thesis.”<sup>16</sup> Finally, one should note that the plan largely unlinks residency rights and the issue of reinstatement of property<sup>17</sup> and that Greek Cypriots will be spending their own compensation money in the resettlement process, thereby boosting the economy of the TC areas and indirectly funding other needs caused by the settlement itself.

The current plan is rather ambiguous with regards to the exact number of settlers to remain in Cyprus. This number could easily range from a low of 45,000 to include all currently established settlers in the island (around 90,000). As these numbers vary depending on individual interpretation, those who oppose the settlement choose to emphasize the worst case scenario for their own side. Thus, the legalization of the settlers is portrayed as not only the chief obstacle for refugee resettlement, but also a national threat for the Greek Cypriots.<sup>18</sup> It is not surprising that

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<sup>15</sup> James Fearon and David Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review*, 90:4 (December, 1996), pp. 715-35.

<sup>16</sup> For examples see, Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: a Journey through History*, (New York. St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Chaim Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No.2, (Fall 1998), pp. 120-156; Vamik Volkan, *Cyprus-War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of two Ethnic Neighbors in Conflict*, University of Virginia Press, 1979.

<sup>17</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, S/2003/398, par. 101.

<sup>18</sup> *Cyprus Mail*, July 11, 2002.

the Greek Cypriot side has raised this issue again in the negotiations: Quite possibly, without an amendment, the plan may not be endorsed.<sup>19</sup>

Despite its positive intentions, the plan has actually weakened the settlers' position with respect to Ankara. With the threat of involuntary resettlement hanging over the settlers' heads, Ankara's electoral manipulation has continued; it has become clear that it will determine any selection process and punish all "disobedient" settlers.<sup>20</sup> Though some signs of pro-solution activism have appeared among the settlers,<sup>21</sup> it was the settler vote that prevented the pro-Annan Turkish Cypriot opposition from winning the December 2003 elections.<sup>22</sup> These examples suggest that alternative ways of thinking about the settlers and refugees are needed.

### **AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULA**

The formula we propose calls for the creation of a demography board (by merging Alien and Citizenship Boards) which will be assigned greater authority over refugee, settler, and immigration issues. As currently suggested in the plan, the board will be composed of six persons, three from each constituent state and three non-Cypriots.<sup>23</sup> As one of its mandates, the

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<sup>19</sup> *Cyprus Mail*, February 20, 2004; *Politis*, February 22, 2004; *Politis*, February 24, 2004.

<sup>20</sup> Nuri Cevikel, the leader of the Turkish Settler Association declared support for the UN plan and endorsed GC refugee resettlement. "The President of the Settler Association Talks with Politis" [in Greek], *Politis*; "The Settlers in Favor of the Settlement" [in Greek], *Politis*, June 12, 2003. He also made a warning to boycott celebrations of the 1974 Turkish invasion see "Denktash has a Lot of Troubles" [in Turkish], *Radikal*, July 7, 2003. Dr. Cevikel was subsequently fired from his position at Eastern Mediterranean University, but elected as an MP with the opposition party of Mehmet Ali Talat in the December 2003 elections. Kerin Hope, "Turkish Settlers Hold Key to Cyprus Future," *Financial Times*, December 13, 2003; *Kibris*, December 16, 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Gokhan Tezgor, "Settlers in the North: a Complex Mosaic of Identity," *Cyprus Mail*, June 17, 2003; *Yeni Duzen*, May 12, 2003; *Kibris*, May 9, 2003.

<sup>22</sup> See report and collection of related evidence by Turgut Durduran, et al., "Election 2003: How the Turkish Cypriot Community was Prevented from Expressing its Political Will," *Cyprus Action Network*, January 24, 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Basis for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, p. 66.

board will keep the percentage of GCs in the TC area as low as 28%.<sup>24</sup> At the same time, the board will maximize the number of GCs resettling under TC administration and ideally create an option where the *acquis communautaire* on the freedom of settlement will be applicable to all GC refugees. To be effective, the board will rely on the presence of settlers, making their naturalization as Cypriot citizens partly conditional on their treatment of resettling GCs. The board should also create incentives for the return of TCs from the diaspora to the TC constituent state, and if necessary, turn to future immigration from Turkey and Greece.

A number of innovative and feasible amendments to the original Annan Plan need to be put in place. To begin with, we provide the Turkish Cypriot community with a choice between a community-homogeneous future with fewer settlers and Greek Cypriots, and a multicultural future<sup>25</sup> with more of both. Even in the homogeneous future, we assure the residency rights of at least 25,000 Greek Cypriots<sup>26</sup> and 45,000 settlers.<sup>27</sup> In the multicultural future, however, we allow for an additional 45,000 settlers or other Turkish immigrants. Bearing in mind that this figure of 45,000 settlers is one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations, we suggest that for every two settlers that receive and exercise a right to remain in Cyprus, one more Greek

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<sup>24</sup> Compared to 21% of Annan, our figure for Greek Cypriots in the TC areas varies according to different scenarios in the range between 14% and 28% ( $\pm 7$ ). See also appendix with graphs.

<sup>25</sup> For a relevant discussion of homogenous vs. multiethnic polities see Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1-33. We use, however, these two terms as labels without engaging further to the very interesting debate on multicultural citizenship.

<sup>26</sup> The figure of 25,000 roughly corresponds to the Annan Plan quota ten years from the settlement. It is a number that poses little threat to the TC side while at the same time an important incentive for the GC one to cooperate.

<sup>27</sup> The Annan Plan calls for the Turkish Cypriot community to present a catalogue with the 45,000 settlers. We suggest, however, that the Demography Council will decide the actual names, on the basis of the criteria already set in the plan in order to avoid discriminatory treatment against eligible settlers who currently oppose Turkey's control over northern Cyprus. Basis for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, pp. 61-63.

Cypriot refugee should be allowed an unrestricted right to resettle in the TC area.<sup>28</sup> Additionally, in both the homogeneous future and the multicultural one, there will be an unlimited number of TC émigrés resettling in Cyprus; and for every one of these, the Greek Cypriots will get one more Greek Cypriot refugee in the TC areas.<sup>29</sup>

In addition to these provisions, we suggest that the actual numbers of the settlers, immigrants, and refugees, once they are known, should trigger a minor future readjustment of the plan. For instance, if the total number of immigrants and settlers reaches 90,000, but the number of resettling Greek Cypriots remains well below the 25,000 figure, we suggest a readjustment in favor of the Greek Cypriots, in at least one area such as security, government, or even territory. This would convince the GC side to accept the high ceiling for the settlers in the first place, preserve the original balance of the Annan Plan, and offer guaranteed (not probable) improvements to both sides. This arrangement eliminates free-riding and provides the assurance that neither side will renege on commitments, therefore reducing the likelihood of non-cooperation.<sup>30</sup> Our analysis below demonstrates how these minor adjustments could dramatically increase the incentives of the two sides to endorse the Annan settlement.

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<sup>28</sup> In addition there will be two Greek immigrants allowed to the South a provision that will benefit the small but growing Greek community in the island. Especially, the naturalization of Pontian Greeks will prevent discriminations reported in the past against this community. See for example *Cyprus Mail*, “Pontians Protest over Racist Attacks,” January 9, 2001.

<sup>29</sup> TC authorities claim a worldwide figure of 400, 000 TC émigrés. Although the number is grossly exaggerated the possibility of a large wave of TC émigrés and Turks immigrating in Cyprus in the future as a result of economic reconstruction is very likely. See *Toplum Postasi*, April 1 and April 2, 1997.

<sup>30</sup> These safeguard provisions between the two communities are designed to render a current agreement self-enforceable in the future. As prescribed by Fearon, neither side should fear that the other will not sustain a mutually beneficial agreement at a later stage. Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” p. 109.

## **WHAT SCENARIO PLANNING CAN DO FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS**

With scenario planning, the Turkish Cypriot side will gain more flexibility in determining the number of settlers. According to our formula, it can choose a community-homogeneous future in which there will be fewer settlers, Greek Cypriot refugees, and Turkish immigrants; or a multicultural future where there will be more of all three. The Turkish Cypriot community can make this choice whenever it feels ready and to the extent it is prepared to face the multicultural challenge. One limitation is that it cannot choose a multicultural future that includes all but Greek Cypriots. If eventually the GC side has to accept more settlers remaining in Cyprus, it will be compensated with higher numbers of resettling GCs in the TC areas. Likewise, the Turkish Cypriot leadership might include only 45,000 settlers and convince the rest to leave for Turkey. The ceiling can be raised to allow settlers multiple choices including the flexibility to relocate to Cyprus if their return to Turkey proves to be unsuccessful. If they are provided with guarantees that they will be welcomed back (something otherwise unlikely to happen for the majority), then more of them will choose to return to Turkey in the first place. In this way the TCs will profit from the establishment of a more homogenous area, since this will permit even fewer GCs to settle in the TC area.

Table I below offers some examples of how this might work. In the community-homogeneous future, as compared to the Annan Plan, fewer Greek Cypriots resettle in the TC territories. In the multicultural and “community & diaspora” categories, the GC numbers increase compared to Annan’s plan, but not to such a degree that they could pose any demographic threat to the Turkish Cypriots. While the TC side sacrifices the fifteen-year restriction on Greek Cypriot refugee resettlement, it gains the right to stick to the community-homogeneous future. It also gains more flexibility in its settler and immigrant policies, as well as

more GC cooperation in attracting its diaspora. We should stress that this flexibility is essential for a smoother transition to the “Turkey in the EU” future where, according to Annan, all settlement restrictions will be lifted permanently. The TC leadership has demanded permanent derogations from the *acquis communautaire* on this issue which remains among the most contentious in the negotiations.<sup>31</sup>

**Table I: Alternative Futures for Settlers, Refugees and Immigrants**

	Settlers	TCs	TC Diaspora & Immigrants	GCs in TC area immediately (formula) <sup>32</sup>	GCs in TC area 15 yrs after the settlement (Annan Plan)
<b>Community-homogeneous</b>	45,000	110,000	0	25,000	41,202
<b>Multicultural</b>	90,000	110,000	80,000	87,500	74,430
<b>Community &amp; Diaspora</b>	60,000	110,000	120,000	91,000	77,088
<b>Turkey in the EU</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	NO RESTRICTIONS	NO RESTRICTIONS

### WHY SHOULD THE GREEK CYPRIOTS OPT FOR THIS FORMULA?

One of the major normative critiques against our formula is that it subordinates the rights of indigenous Greek Cypriot refugees to the arrival of newcomers with no links to Cyprus. Yet, it should be clear that the formula reflects UN-endorsed political constraints and not a normative hierarchy of group claims in the future TC state. Moreover, immigrant, settler, and diaspora figures should not be viewed as conditions, but rather as indicators that the TC state is ready to absorb more Greek Cypriot refugees. The ability to attract immigrants and émigrés is a sign of prosperity and/or security, and it is therefore a better alternative to lengthy quotas spanning

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<sup>31</sup> *Turkish Daily News*, February 20, 2004.

<sup>32</sup> Here in our model, some GCs return immediately after the settlement while others after immigrants and TC émigrés arrive in Cyprus.

decades of uncertainty. Finally, the fundamental fears of many Turkish Cypriots about a massive Greek Cypriot resettlement in TC areas must be acknowledged.<sup>33</sup> Overall, credible commitments for a demographically secure Turkish Cypriot majority in the TC state will make Greek Cypriot resettlement faster, safer, and more likely. In contrast, if there are no safeguards, it is possible that even a small number of GCs will not be able to resettle; as for Turkish nationalists who fear being outnumbered, it will make sense to take preemptive action before GC numbers rise.<sup>34</sup>

Our formula implies equitable gains for the Greek Cypriot side as well. To begin with, in the TC ethnically homogeneous future, there are effective guarantees that the number of settlers and Turkish immigrants will remain around 45,000. There will also be a minimum of 25,000 GCs who receive residence rights in the TC state immediately after the settlement. Admittedly, this is less than the 21% assigned by Annan for the first 15 years. In the event that more Greek Cypriot refugees apply for residency rights, however, the GC side will have three options: wait until the time Turkey itself joins the EU and all derogations are lifted, provide alternative tradeoffs for the TC side on other issues, or divert resources and public policy planning on TC émigrés (see “community-diaspora” scenario in Table I).

The reconstruction of the economy of northern Cyprus might eventually lead to an unavoidable increase of the Turkish Cypriot population. In the TC multicultural future, the Greek Cypriot side will have two options. If the GC refugees opt for resettlement, there will be a lively synergy of interests, conditions, and needs among all populations, leading to a genuine multicultural reality in northern Cyprus. If the refugees opt for non-resettlement, our formula

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<sup>33</sup> Harry Anastasiou, “Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 5 (2002), pp. 581-596 (on p. 584).

<sup>34</sup> The failure of refugee resettlement and property restitution following the recent Yugoslav wars speaks to this point. *ICG Balkans Report, Breaking the Logjam: Refugee Returns to Croatia*, N 49 (November, 1998).



will readjust the Annan Plan in one or more areas. We suggest a partial withdrawal of Turkish troops, less emphasis on veto power, or territory exchange as possible examples.<sup>35</sup>

### **WILL IT BE BETTER FOR TURKEY?**

Regardless of what transpires, Turkey's interests in the demographic security of the future TC state will be safeguarded. In the community-homogeneous future, there will be fewer GCs, while in even the most extreme forms of multicultural future, the Greek Cypriot percentage will fluctuate between 14% and 28%. It will only reach the 28 percent figure, if the number of the original number of Turkish Cypriots almost triples from 110 to 305 thousand. Even though the attainment of this level is statistically impossible, this presumption nonetheless illustrates the theoretical strength of the model in entertaining even the most extreme scenarios, and helps the two sides to make commitments today despite the uncertainties of future population shifts. In our findings, as Greek Cypriots increase their numbers in the TC areas, the Turkish Cypriots will compose 25% of the total Cyprus population, at most.

Moreover, our formula implies fewer GCs in the TC areas until conditions mature in the Turkish Cypriot community and a transition to a multicultural future is made. In the multicultural future option, the ties between the motherland and the Turkish Cypriots will be healthier than today. Turkish citizens will be approved for immigration by the demography board, with strong

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<sup>35</sup> For the executive, the Greek Cypriot side prefers a nine (instead of six) member council where a Turkish veto will require the support of all three (instead of two) TC members. Other amendments might include cross-voting and number of soldiers. For instance, the numbers of the Turkish security personnel could positively correlate with the numbers of the resettling GC refugees and could negatively correlate with the Turkish settlers and immigrants. Concerning the issue of land redistribution, Greek Cypriots could return agricultural land across the future administrative border, whose old inhabitants might not choose to resettle, in exchange for another territory of great religious value such as the Apostolos Andreas monastery in Karpaz peninsula.

preference given to those who fit the needs of the economy and society. If there is a need to supplement net decreases in TC population, immigrants from Turkey could be encouraged to settle in Cyprus in order to keep the percentage of GCs in the TC areas below 28%. In all cases, the Greek Cypriots will have an incentive to welcome incoming Turkish Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots will be inclined to accept more refugees: evidently a win-win situation which the two sides could easily maintain in the very long term. Our formula suggests that in the context of European norms, Turkey will be repositioning itself in the island, not giving up its presence, as the Turkish opposition often accuses the arguably more moderate Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan.<sup>36</sup>

The Turkish settlers will benefit from these arrangements as well. Our formula offers incentives to the GCs to reframe the settler issue and see them as a part of the solution, not the problem. Likewise, the naturalization of the remaining 45,000 Turkish settlers should be linked to the settlers' collective contribution to the peace process and especially the process of GC resettlement.<sup>37</sup> For instance, if GCs resettle amicably in villages with an already large number of settlers, this should in turn speed the naturalization of the Turkish inhabitants. Additionally, if the GCs have an interest in the presence of the settlers and vice-versa, both groups will become less likely to harass or discriminate against each other. Thus, the groups involved in the process of reconciliation will most likely develop strong norms favoring interethnic cooperation, and

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<sup>36</sup> *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, "Turkish Government 'Blackmails' own People over Cyprus-Opposition," February 8, 2004.

<sup>37</sup> Following the Annan Plan, this process of reframing started in the GC press. See "The Settlers in Favor of the Settlement" [in Greek], *Politis*, July 12, 2003; "The President of the Settler Association Talks with Politis" [in Greek], *Politis*, June 12, 2003; and TC dailies on settlers' activism, *Yeni Duzen*, May 12, 2003; *Kibris*, June 9, 2003.

mechanisms to ensure that their ingroup members do not violate these norms. This is one way to expect higher likelihood of interethnic cooperation.<sup>38</sup>

On the other hand, settlers' rights are a source of worry for Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. Within the TC community, there has been considerable concern about the settlers overwhelming the North, while the Greek Cypriots prefer to live with TCs or their resettling diaspora. Due to Ankara's policies, the settler communities of rural northern Cyprus remain poor, uneducated, marginalized, and dependent on Turkish embassy moneys. One possibility is for Turkey to subsidize affirmative action policies for settlers until they reach the educational and financial status of the rest of the population. Another possibility is to craft a more efficient compensation system for their resettlement to Turkey or a third country while making this process both easier and more humane. The current plan guarantees a minimum of 10,000 Euros for each family of four opting to leave for Turkey or a third country. Paradoxically, this provision might actually discourage settlers from choosing to leave Cyprus, in a situation similar to that noted by Robert Jervis in his discussion of white Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) farmers.<sup>39</sup> To be consistent with Jervis' rationale, the various schemes proposed for the settlers should neither exclude nor guarantee compensations.

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<sup>38</sup> Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," pp. 715-35.

<sup>39</sup> Robert Jervis explains in game theory language how the proposed Rhodesian "safety net"—guaranteeing that whites who leave the country should be compensated—had the paradoxical effect of making it more likely for them to stay. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, 30:2, (January 1978), pp. 167-214 (on p.174). It is likely that with the current system in the Annan Plan fewer settlers will leave because they will not fear individual losses from an expected wave of resettlement by their group members. In contrast, more settlers will opt to leave sooner than later in the absence of guarantees for future compensations because late-leavers will probably get no compensations, less money for their "property" or investments and they will have fewer chances to be accepted by a third country. This is, according to Jervis, a multi-person prisoner dilemma where all settlers are willing to stay if others are willing to stay as well. However, the fear of having to do so with worse consequences in the future makes their decision to leave now more likely. Thus, guarantees that they will be compensated equally in the future, as in the Annan Plan, will have the paradoxical effect of keeping the settlers in the island, even in cases where they do not prefer to stay there.

## CONCLUSION

But what are the public policy implications of our research concerning the imminent question of endorsing the Annan Plan? On April 20, 2004 the two Cypriot communities will have to decide on whether they will approve a revised version of the Annan Plan in two separate referendums. It is likely that the new revised plan will be similar to the current one. Does our analysis provide any support on whether the two sides should accept the plan even in its current unrevised form? For one thing, our analysis suggests that potential tradeoffs are currently present and that these could be employed even after the settlement to improve mutual human rights or demographic needs. For another, we have shown that the Turkish desire for a demographically secure community could be achieved in many different alternative ways not necessarily by excluding Greek Cypriots from resettling under TC administration.<sup>40</sup> An alternative way to perceive and achieve TC demographic security is through gradual population increases from immigrants and TC émigrés. Finally, certain GC expectations for a more “European” settlement compatible with the *acquis communautaire* after May 1, 2004 seem to us unsubstantiated. Because of the interconnection of issues in the Annan Plan, a major change in one area might cause multiple changes in other issues. Under the current plan, for instance, the Greek Cypriot side succeeded in a mechanism that permanently<sup>41</sup> restricts the number of Turkish citizens immigrating to Cyprus, even after Turkey’s accession to the EU. If this derogation is also eliminated, then paradoxically a more “European settlement” might lead to a massive arrival of Turkish citizens without any

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<sup>40</sup> See appendix for all details.

<sup>41</sup> Permanent derogations within the EU are very exceptional. The current tendency is to accept only transitional periods.

gains for the Greek Cypriots particularly if the refugees opt not to resettle in their former villages and cities. Thus, our formula could offer a better alternative even to the so-called “European settlement” and it could be applicable in the future even if certain of its provisions are not included in the current Annan Plan.

While drawing on Annan’s propositions such as legalization of settlers, return of Turkish Cypriots from the diaspora, quotas, and the dynamics of future immigration, we provide an arrangement that is more human rights-friendly and negotiable—both now or in the future—than the current Annan Plan. Certainly, our research will have implications beyond the Cyprus situation. Modified versions of our study can apply to other conflict areas facing acute demographic and security problems such as New Caledonia, Kashmir, Tibet, Lebanon, Basque country, Northern Ireland, Western Sahara, Abkhazia, and the Arabized Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq. Our Cyprus research demonstrates that settler, refugee, and immigration issues could be linked in new and innovative ways with emphasis on a better human rights environment for all groups. It shows that scenario planning might reduce the overall risks faced by all sides in a negotiated settlement. By compensating possible losses on one issue with favorable readjustments in another area, scenario planning eliminates critical uncertainties, while preserving the initial balance of the negotiated settlement. As in Cyprus, applications of scenario planning in other societies should readily adjust to their unique historical, political, and economic conditions.


## APPENDIX: THE FORMULA MATHEMATICS

In Graph I below, “Resettling GC Refugees and the Total Population Required in the TC State,” GC<sub>1</sub> demonstrates three potential advantages when compared to the Annan Plan formula. Firstly, our formula, represented in GC<sub>1</sub> is a better arrangement for the TCs; it gives them the choice of restricting the number of GCs to around 25,000, even after 15 years (provided Turkey does not join the EU), a valuable provision in case of violence or other unpleasant developments. Secondly, in GC<sub>1</sub> these 25,000 refugees will not have to wait for up to 15 years to resettle compared to the Annan Plan model and eventually more will go a) because this line is steeper than the Annan graph and b) because it allows more settlers and immigrants compared to the quotas described in Annan. In other words, the Greek Cypriots will agree to a more flexible scheme for immigration to the TC state, until the latter reaches population levels of 200,000, but they get in return a better deal for every additional settler or newcomer. Eventually this steeper line covers all 100,000 GC refugees and their descendants who have their origins in the future TC state.<sup>42</sup> In the current Annan Plan, meanwhile, the GCs gain a mere 21 percent increase in the TC population; they have to wait for up to 15 years; and they get nothing in return if no GC resettles. At the same time in the Annan Plan, the TCs will not have free hand to accommodate the remaining 45,000 settlers neither a credible reason to expect GC support in émigré repatriation efforts.

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<sup>42</sup> For relevant numbers, see Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, par. 118.

**GRAPH I: RESETTLING GC REFUGEES AND THE TOTAL POPULATION  
REQUIRED IN THE TC STATE**




Improved demographic arrangements can be obtained if we explore miscellaneous options for the resettlement of GCs in the TC constituent state (see below for the mathematical models used for all graphs). In Graph I above we offer two additional mathematical models aiming to optimize the performance of our formula. GC<sub>2</sub> and GC<sub>3</sub> offer even better results than our GC<sub>1</sub>

because they allow more GCs to initially resettle based on comparatively lower settler and immigrant requirements. These are absolute gains for the GCs that can be traded for other issues.

All these models satisfy a larger number of GC refugees while maintaining the GC population in the TC state well below the 28 percent limit at all times. Moreover, they provide a proportionally larger incentive for the TC leadership to increase its population at the later stages of the resettlement process, which effectively acts as a safety net for the TCs. All  $R_3$ ,  $R_2$  and  $R_1$  (Graph II) corresponding to  $GC_3$ ,  $GC_2$  and  $GC_1$  respectively fulfill this requirement.


**GRAPH II: GREEK CYPRIOTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE  
TOTAL POPULATION IN THE TC STATE**





But what is the incentive for the TC state to agree on a ceiling for Greek Cypriots which is as high as 28 percent? One of the major advantages of our formula is that it compensates increased population ratios for the GCs in the TC area with higher TC ratios in the overall Cyprus population. This occurs because our model does not require immigration quotas that reflect the current populations in the island (as Annan). In addition, the TCs will have a much easier time getting immigrants from Turkey than GCs from Greece. This a potential tradeoff, and one that has not appeared in any of the plans proposed hitherto. It is also a key incentive for Turkish Cypriots who are uneasy about their percentage in the overall Cyprus population. Graph III suggests that the TC population could increase as much as 26 percent of the total Cyprus population if complete refugee resettlement takes place.

**GRAPH III: TURKISH CYPRIOT PERCENTAGE OF  
THE TOTAL CYPRIOT POPULATION**



**DATA USED TO GENERATE GRAPHS IN MATLAB**

GC = Greek Cypriots

TC = Turkish Cypriots

$GC_{1-3}$  = Rate of increase of resettling GCs in TC area (calculated using different mathematical models)

$GC_{TC\&S} = 25,000$  = Initial number of GCs resettling as a result of TC and settler quotas

$GC_{INC} = 75,000$  = Maximum increase in GC refugees in addition to the initial 25,000

$GC_{TOT} = GC_{INC} + GC_{TC\&S} = 100,000$  = Total number of GC refugees and their offspring that have origins from TC area

$GC_G$  = Immigrants and GCs in the diaspora allowed into the GC state as a result of the TC population increase

$TC_{INC} = 150,000$  = Required TC growth if all GC refugees opt to resettle

$TC_{INIT} = 155,000$  = Initial TC population (including half of the settlers)

$TC_{TOT} = TC_{INIT} + TC_{INC} = 305,000$  = Total TC population

$TC_G$  = Rate of population increase of TCs (difference between new immigrants and émigrés minus migrating TCs)

Ratio 1-3 = Ratio of GCs to the Total Population in TC area (calculated using different mathematical models)

$TOT = 870,000$  = Total Cypriot Population = 715,000 (current GC) + 155,000 (TC)

Ratio 1\*-3\* = TC percentage of Total Cyprus Population (includes settlers, diaspora and immigrants calculated using different formulae based on  $GC_{1-3}$  mathematical models)

**MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR GC POPULATION IN THE TC  
CONSTITUENT STATE AS A FUNCTION OF TC POPULATION GROWTH**

*Dependent variable:  $0 \leq GC_{1-3} \leq 75,000$*

*Independent variable:  $0 \leq TC_G \leq 150,000$*

$$GC_{INC} = 75,000$$

$$TC_{INC} = 150,000$$

$$GC_1 = \frac{TC_G}{2}$$

$$GC_2 = 75,000 \times \sqrt[2]{\left(\frac{TC_G}{150,000}\right)}$$

$$GC_3 = 75,000 \times \sqrt[3]{\left(\frac{TC_G}{150,000}\right)}$$

**MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR RATIO OF GCS TO THE  
POPULATION OF THE TC CONSTITUENT STATE**

*Dependent variable:  $0 \leq GC_{1-3} \leq 75,000$*

*Independent variable:  $0 \leq TC_G \leq 150,000$*

$$GC_{TC\&S} = 25,000$$

$$TC_{INIT} = 155,000$$

$$Ratio\ 1 = \frac{GC_{TC\&S} + GC_1}{GC_{TC\&S} + GC_1 + TC_{INIT} + TC_G} \times 100\%$$

$$Ratio\ 2 = \frac{GC_{TC\&S} + GC_2}{GC_{TC\&S} + GC_2 + TC_{INIT} + TC_G} \times 100\%$$

$$Ratio\ 3 = \frac{GC_{TC\&S} + GC_3}{GC_{TC\&S} + GC_3 + TC_{INIT} + TC_G} \times 100\%$$

**MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR THE RATIO OF  
TCS TO THE TOTAL POPULATION OF THE ISLAND**

*Dependent variable:  $0 \leq GC_{1-3} \leq 75,000$*

*Independent variable:  $0 \leq TC_G \leq 150,000$*

$$TOT = 870,000$$

$$TC_{INIT} = 155,000$$

*General Formula :*

$$Ratio\ n^* = \frac{TC_{INIT} + TC_G}{TOT + 2TC_G + 2GC_G} \times 100\%$$

$$Ratio\ 1^* = \frac{TC_{INIT} + 2GC_1}{TOT + 4GC_1} \times 100\%$$

$$Ratio\ 2^* = \frac{TC_{INIT} + \left[ \left( \frac{GC_2}{75,000} \right)^2 \times 150,000 \right]}{TOT + 2 \left[ \left( \frac{GC_2}{75,000} \right)^2 \times 150,000 \right]} \times 100\%$$

$$Ratio\ 3^* = \frac{TC_{INIT} + \left[ \left( \frac{GC_3}{75,000} \right)^3 \times 150,000 \right]}{TOT + 2 \left[ \left( \frac{GC_3}{75,000} \right)^3 \times 150,000 \right]} \times 100\%$$