

Volume 1, Number 1

NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future

**by Coit D. Blacker, Ashton B. Carter, Warren Christopher,
David A. Hamburg and William J. Perry**

Preventive Defense Project

A research collaboration of
Stanford University and
Harvard University

Co-Directors

William J. Perry
Ashton B. Carter

NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future

Conveners

**Coit D. Blacker, Ashton B. Carter, Warren Christopher,
David A. Hamburg and William J. Perry**

Keynote Speech by
Strobe Talbott

With Contributions by

**Sherman W. Garnett, David C. Gompert,
James E. Goodby, Michael McFaul, Steven E. Miller
and Kenneth A. Myers**

**A Special Report
of the
Preventive Defense Project
A Research Collaboration of
Stanford University and Harvard University**

Publications of the Preventive Defense Project

NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future

The Content of U.S. Engagement with China

*Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Partnership Between
Ukraine and NATO*

Reforming the Department of Defense: The Revolution in Business Affairs

Building U.S. and NATO Military Cooperation with Russia

Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy

The Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project

Stanford University
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
(650) 725-6501

Harvard University
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-1405

©1999 by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University and the
Board of Trustees of Harvard University

Printed in California
March 1999

This publication was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation
of New York and in part by the Christian A. Johnson Endeavor Foundation. The
statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| Foreword: Preventive Defense | v |
| Acknowledgments | ix |
| Conveners' Report | |
| NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future <i>Coit D. Blacker, Ashton B. Carter, Warren Christopher, David A. Hamburg and William J. Perry</i> | 1 |
| Keynote Address | |
| The End of the Beginning: the Emergence of a New Russia <i>Strobe Talbott</i> | 9 |
| Conference Reports | |
| The NATO Enlargement Process: Procedures for Accession to and Ratification of Accessions to the Washington Treaty <i>Kenneth A. Myers</i> | 19 |
| What should NATO's Purpose Be? <i>David C. Gompert</i> | 35 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| The Domestic Politics of NATO Expansion in Russia: Implications for American Foreign Policy <i>Michael McFaul</i> | 49 |
| Russia and the West After Madrid <i>Sherman W. Garnett</i> | 59 |
| Beyond the Madrid Three: What about the Rest of Eastern Europe? <i>Steven E. Miller</i> | 67 |
| European Security in 2007 <i>James E. Goodby</i> | 83 |
| Closing Remarks <i>William J. Perry</i> | 93 |
| Rapporteur's Report | 101 |
| Appendices/Reference Documents | |
| A. Text of the North Atlantic Treaty | 127 |
| B. Text of the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation | 133 |
| C. Text of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation | 145 |
| D. Text of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine | 157 |
| About the Conference Conveners and Contributors | 165 |
| About the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project | 173 |

Preventive Defense

Through more than four decades of Cold War, American national security strategy was difficult to implement but easy to understand. America was set on a clear course to contain Soviet expansionism anywhere in the world, all the while building a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union from using military force against it or its allies. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the underlying rationale for that strategy—the threat from the Soviet Union—has disappeared. What strategy should replace it? Much depends on finding the correct answer to this question.

The world survived three global wars this century. The first two resulted in tens of millions of deaths, but the third—the Cold War—would have been even more horrible than the others had deterrence failed. These three wars trace a path that leads to the strategy needed for the post-Cold War era.

At the end of the First World War, the victorious European allies sought revenge and reparations; what they got was a massive depression and another world war. The United States sought “normalcy” and isolation; what it got was total war and leadership in winning it. Because it failed to *prevent* and then to *deter* Germany’s aggression, America was forced to mobilize a second time to *defeat* it.

At the end of the Second World War, America initially chose a strategy based on prevention. Vowing not to repeat the mistakes made after World War I, the Truman administration created the Marshall Plan, which sought to assist the devastated nations of Europe, friends and foes alike, to rebuild. The Marshall Plan and other examples of the preventive defense strategy, aimed at preventing the conditions that would lead to a future world war, were an outstanding success in Western Europe and in Japan.

But the Soviet Union turned down the Marshall Plan and, instead, persisted in a program of expansion, trying to take advantage of the weakened condition of most of the countries of Europe. The resulting security problem was clearly articulated by George Kennan, who forecast that the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union would be replaced with a struggle for the heart of Europe and that the United States should prepare for a protracted period of confrontation. Kennan's analysis was accepted by the Truman administration, which then formulated a strategy that would get us through the Cold War: deterring another global war while containing the Soviet Union's demonstrated expansionist ambitions. Deterrence supplanted prevention: there was no other choice.

Even deterrence was a departure from earlier American military strategy. The United States had twice previously risen to defeat aggression, but it had not maintained the peacetime military establishment or the engagement in the world to deter World Wars I or II. Marshall and other defense leaders around Truman created the peacetime posture and new security institutions required. In time, as George Kennan had forecast, the Soviet Union disintegrated because of the limitations of its political and economic systems. Deterrence worked.

The result is a world today seemingly without a major threat to the United States, and the U.S. is now enjoying a period of peace and influence as never before. But while this situation is to be savored by the public, foreign policy and defense leaders should not be complacent. This period of an absence of threat challenges these leaders to find the vision and foresight to act strategically, even when events and imminent threats do not compel them to do so.

To understand the dangers and opportunities that will define our nation's strategy in the new era, we must see the post-Cold War world the way George Marshall looked upon Europe after World War II, and return to prevention. In essence, we now have another chance to realize Marshall's vision: a world not of threats to be deterred, but a world united in peace, freedom, and prosperity. To realize this vision, we should return to Marshall's strategy of preventive defense.

Preventive Defense is a concept of defense strategy for the United States in the post-Cold War Era. It stresses the need to anticipate security dangers which, if mismanaged, have the potential to re-create Cold War-scale threats to U.S. interests and survival. The foci of Preventive Defense are: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

catastrophic terrorism, “loose nukes” and other military technology from the former Soviet Union, Russia’s post-Cold War security identity, and the peaceful rise of China.

Preventive Defense is the most important mission of national security leaders and of the defense establishment. They must dedicate themselves to Preventive Defense while they deter lesser but existing threats—in Iraq and North Korea—and conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian missions—in Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and so on—where aggression occurs but where American vital interests are not directly threatened.

Ashton B. Carter

William J. Perry

Co-Directors

Preventive Defense Project

Acknowledgments

This report is the product of a conference held at Stanford University September 19th-20th, 1997, sponsored by the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. This report and the conference it is based on are motivated by the sharp debate stemming from NATO's decision at Madrid to invite three new members to join its ranks. This debate is not partisan: it cleaves parties. It is profound because it has kindled the first truly geostrategic inquiry among Americans in the post-Cold War era. This inquiry has led Americans to advance from celebrating the end of the Cold War to confronting the design of Eurasia's future security system and America's role in it.

Attending the conference were distinguished scholars of international security affairs, members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, senior officials of the Clinton and previous U.S. administrations, and journalists who cover international affairs. The judgements and recommendations in the Conveners' Report are those of the authors and organizers, and though the preparation of the report was informed by the conference, there is no suggestion or implication that it is a consensus of the participants or a summary of the discussion.

We are grateful to the contributing authors for their discussion papers and to the attendees for sharing their information, ideas, and perspectives.

We would like to thank the Attendees:

Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

Douglas Bereuter, United States House of Representatives, Nebraska

Jeff Bingaman, United States Senate, New Mexico
Robert Blackwill, Board of Directors, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Gloria Duffy, Executive Director, Commonwealth Club of San Francisco
Richard Haass, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Scholars, Brookings Institution
David Holloway, Associate Dean, Humanities, Stanford University
General (Ret.) George Joulwan, Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe
John Kerry, United States Senate, Massachusetts
Andrew Kuchins, Associate Director, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Michael May, Co-Director, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Doyle McManus, Los Angeles Times
Joseph Nye, Dean, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Condoleezza Rice, Provost, Stanford University
Jeremy Rosner, Special Advisor to the President, NATO Enlargement Ratification
Scott Sagan, Co-Director, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Brent Scowcroft, President, The Forum for International Foreign Policy; Former National Security Advisor
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Visiting Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Michael Shuster, National Public Radio
Olympia Snowe, United States Senate, Maine
David C. Speedie, III, Program Chair, Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York
John Steinbruner, Senior Fellow, Foreign Studies, Brookings Institution
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Peter Tarnoff, Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Philip Taubman, New York Times
James Thomson, President and CEO, RAND Corporation

We would like to thank the Contributing Authors:

Sherman Garnett, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

David Gompert, Senior Visiting Fellow, National Defense University; Visiting Professor, U.S. Naval Academy

James Goodby, Guest Scholar, Brookings Institution

Michael McFaul, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Stanford University

Ken Myers, Jr., Assistant to the Select Committee on Intelligence

Steven Miller, Director, International Security Program; Harvard University

We owe a special note of gratitude to Nora Bensahel for her outstanding work as the rapporteur of the conference. We would also like to thank all of the staff at IIS and CISAC, without whose assistance the conference could not have happened, and in particular those who helped organize it: Analia Bond, Hilary Driscoll, Deborah Gordon, Evelyn Kelsey, Carolyn Ledbetter, Elizabeth Nichols, and Janet Weitz.

Coit D. Blacker

Ashton B. Carter

Warren Christopher

David A. Hamburg

William J. Perry

NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future

Stanford University, September 19-20, 1997

Coit D. Blacker, Ashton B. Carter, Warren Christopher, David A. Hamburg and William J. Perry

In July 1997, NATO representatives sparked sharp debate when they met in Madrid and decided to invite three new countries to join as members. This debate continues, and it will come to a head in the U.S. when the Senate votes whether to give its consent to the Madrid decisions.

The purpose of the conference at Stanford was not to revisit the decision taken at Madrid, but to learn from the debate that ensued. The intensity of the debate revealed that there is no consensus on the wisdom of the path taken so far by the Alliance and spearheaded by the Clinton Administration. Without reexamining decisions already taken, we wish to see the path from this point charted and debated clearly in advance, so that the next steps are taken with greater agreement across the American political spectrum.

This conference and this report, then, are about the path ahead. The recommendations below are for U.S. policy and action in the next phase of NATO's evolution, assuming that the Senate and other allied legislatures do in fact consent to the decisions reached at Madrid to admit Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO.

Premises

Our judgments and recommendations are based on four premises:

1. NATO serves a vital purpose in post-Cold War Europe.

NATO should not, as some argue, be disestablished now that its founding purpose of deterring attack from the Warsaw Pact has been fulfilled. On the contrary, NATO provides the security framework for realizing at last George Marshall's vision of a Europe united in freedom, peace, and prosperity. NATO anchors the United States in Eu-

rope to the benefit of both Europe and the United States, and it constitutes the world's only standing, readily usable coalition military capability. NATO also exercises a stabilizing influence on current and future members as their militaries learn to plan together rather than against one another, and it serves as one expression of the shared values and interests of a community of member nations.

2. As a matter of principle, NATO's membership rolls have never been closed and never should be closed. Enlargement of NATO's membership has benefits, but it also carries costs and risks. Adding additional members is a grave matter and should not become automatic or routine.

3. U.S. Senate rejection of the Madrid decisions would be a major setback to U.S. credibility and to the U.S. position in Europe. Even the most pessimistic estimates of the risks and costs of enlargement cannot justify such a setback.

4. The next steps in NATO's future adaptation to the post-Cold War world should be analyzed and debated openly before being taken, and a clear course with broad bipartisan and international support should be charted. Hence this conference and report.

Judgements and Recommendations

Charting NATO's Evolving Purposes

Adding new members is not the only, or even the most important, adaptation of NATO to the post-Cold War security environment. A much larger issue looms for the Alliance: What is NATO's purpose? In fact NATO does not serve a single purpose, it serves three: the first two military and the third politico-military. First, and originally paramount, is territorial defense, which is enshrined in Article 5's pledge that an attack upon any member "shall be considered an attack against them all." Second, deriving from Article 4 as well as Article 5, is NATO's provision of a standing mechanism for the rapid formation of combined military forces with prearranged mechanisms for command and control and a habit of working together. These forces can be mobilized to protect common interests in Europe, as in the Bosnian Implementation/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR), or outside Europe, as when the U.S.-led coalition that defeated Iraq in 1991 drew upon forces and habits of cooperation forged in NATO. Third is NATO's historic role of drawing members together, encour-

aging them to resolve disputes peacefully, causing them to plan and work with rather than against one another, and fostering respect for democratic values and institutions.

The relative emphasis given to the first two military roles for NATO is changing in response to the changing security environment of Europe and the needs of its members for combined military capabilities. This evolution results because the requirement for the first role—territorial defense—has decreased, while the requirement for the second role—coalition operations in pursuit of common interests—has increased.

NATO needs to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: the danger to the security of NATO's members in this historical era is not primarily potential aggression to their collective territory but threats to their collective interests beyond NATO territory. These threats require attention to preventing deadly conflict, restoring and preserving peace, preventing regional conflict, stemming proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ensuring supply of key resources such as oil, and responding effectively to transnational dangers such as terrorism.

NATO's principal strategic and military purpose in the post-Cold War era should be to provide a mechanism for the rapid formation of militarily potent "coalitions of the willing" able to project power beyond NATO territory. In NATO parlance such a power projection force for "out-of-area" operations is called a Combined Joint Task Force, or CJTF. Shifting NATO's emphasis in an evolutionary manner from defense of member territory to defense of common interests beyond NATO territory is the strategic imperative for NATO in the post-Cold War era.

Such a shift in military mission would not supplant territorial defense. Defense of members' territory according to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would remain a solemn commitment of Allies. But NATO territory—including the territory of its new members—is not threatened today. Nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future. Russia has neither the intention nor the prospective military capability to threaten the Alliance. In the absence of imminent threat, American and allied publics will not continue to support an Alliance—enlarged or unenlarged—that appears to focus on non-existent threats of aggression in Europe rather than on today's security problems.

Neither will a shift in emphasis in its military strategy from territorial defense to power projection supplant NATO's important po-

litico-military role. Fostering good relations among its members, inducing their militaries to plan with rather than against each other, inculcating democratic and free-market values, encouraging the rule of law, and fostering civilian control of the military will continue to be vital NATO objectives. Indeed, these functions deserve strong emphasis in the next phase of NATO's history.

The evolving emphasis in NATO's mission from homeland defense to coalition operations has two important consequences. First, since territorial defense is not currently at issue, it should be clearer to all that enlargement is not drawing new lines across Europe. Second, since "coalitions of the willing" organized by NATO will include some—but not necessarily all—NATO members and will generally include non-members drawn from Partnership for Peace (PfP) (like Bosnia's IFOR/SFOR), the distinction between full membership and partnership will be less important in the new NATO.

Many of the recommendations below follow logically from the fundamental evolution in NATO's purpose that is occurring and that we support.

Integrating the New Members Chosen at Madrid

Supplementing NATO's core function to include power projection will entail additional expenses for the other members of NATO, but not for the United States. The U.S. already possesses preeminent power projection forces. Most European allies, including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, are in the process of improving the mobility and deployability of their forces. These reforms in allied forces will permit them to bear a larger share of the alliance's burden, operate without the United States if they choose to conduct a Europe-only operation, and project power to the territory of new members of NATO in the unlikely event that such operations prove necessary. These expenses would be incurred by the European allies even if no new members were being added to NATO's list. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that to make these changes the European allies collectively will need to spend about \$1 billion per year over the next decade, much of which can derive from redirection of existing defense spending rather than increases in defense budgets.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are in the process of adapting their militaries from the heavy, manpower-intensive style of the Warsaw Pact to smaller, more modern, more mobile, more pro-

fessional militaries. Once again, these are reforms that would need to be made even if these three were not joining NATO. DOD estimates that needed reform will cost Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic together about \$1 billion per year over the next decade.

Lastly, DOD estimates it will cost all the allies—including the United States—about \$1 billion per year to “connect” the new members to the Alliance: fostering interoperability, fusing command and control systems, coordinating airspace management, and so forth. These costs would not, of course, be incurred without enlargement. The U.S. will need to bear its share—currently about 25%—of this expense.

Even if DOD’s estimates are low by a considerable factor, and however the burdens among NATO members are apportioned, the costs of enlargement constitute less than one percent of the approximately \$250 billion annual U.S. defense expenditures and \$180 billion annual defense expenditures of the European allies. Despite the debate over the estimated costs of enlargement, the facts remain: all estimates of the costs to existing members of adding the three new candidate members identified at Madrid show them to be a small fraction of existing NATO expenditures, of the current U.S. burden of supporting its NATO commitments, and of the U.S. defense budget.

It makes sense that these costs are modest. Since there is no current or prospective threat to the territory of the new members, there is no need to furnish them with large stationed forces for forward defense like Cold War West Germany. The costs of assisting the new members to contribute usefully to NATO’s new power projection mission, on the other hand, will be principally borne by the new members themselves as part of their larger process of military reform and can be stretched over many years.

Policy Towards Further Enlargement

NATO should remain open in principle to membership by all states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council without exception, but contingent upon their meeting NATO’s stringent standards for admission. But no additional members should be designated for admission until the three candidates named at Madrid are fully prepared to bear the responsibilities of membership and have been integrated into the Alliance. Therefore, other security relationships and structures designed to extend stability to non-NATO members are of the

highest importance and require more attention than they have received. The future security of Europe involves economic, political, and social development that must be addressed in internationally cooperative ways.

NATO-Russia Relations

The success of Russian democracy and reform is profoundly important to the NATO allies. NATO is just one of the many integrating institutions in Europe that is reaching out to the new Russia, and Russia's relations with all these institutions are significant. But because of NATO's importance and the burden posed by a history of antagonism between Russia and NATO, forging a productive NATO-Russia relationship will require imaginative policy followed by vigorous implementation.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act (see Appendix) provides an important vehicle for pursuing the NATO-Russia relationship. Implementation of the political provisions of the Founding Act will require responsible actions on both sides. But implementation of the Founding Act's military provisions is less problematic and can provide strong benefits in both the long and short terms. Moreover, military implementation is, in effect, already underway in Bosnia. The objective of implementing the military provisions of the Founding Act should be the establishment of military-to-military relationships modeled on those forged between the NATO and Russian contingents in the (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia.

Practical cooperation in dealing with real-world problems of mutual concern is more valuable than meetings and councils; military-to-military cooperation changes attitudes by creating new, positive shared-experiences that supplant the historical memory of dedicated antagonism between NATO and Russia. Military-to-military cooperation also engages critical constituencies in the formation of the new Eurasian security order: the Russian and NATO militaries.

In order to make the NATO-Russia military cooperation forged in Bosnia broader, deeper, permanent, and institutionalized, the following steps need to be taken:

- completion of the posting of Russian liaison officers at each of NATO's major headquarters—including, in particular, at the CJTF planning cell—with NATO sharing the cost of such postings with the Russian government;

- reciprocal posting of NATO liaison officers at corresponding Russian headquarters;
- deepened cooperation in the fields of hastening nuclear reductions, ensuring safety and control of nuclear weapons, counterproliferation, and emergency planning;
- coordinated support for and assistance with Russian military reform, using western experience and example where applicable;
- continuing efforts to involve Russia in CJTFs, when and where appropriate;
- a sustained initiative to work with Russia on enhancing the competence of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in resolving regional conflicts, such as the struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh; ensuring an “open door” policy for Russian arms and spare parts sales to Central and East European states.

Russia should be encouraged to participate more vigorously in Partnership for Peace, and NATO should be prepared to help defray the costs of Russian participation in PfP exercises and other activities. U.S.-Russia bilateral military cooperation, including those initiatives overseen by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, should continue and be enhanced.

NATO'S Relationship with other Non-Members

Only three of the twenty-three members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are being admitted to NATO. The security concerns of the great majority of the new Eurasian states will need to be addressed outside the context of membership, and the United States and NATO will play a crucial role.

As with Russia, military-to-military cooperation is a central mechanism by which stability can be extended eastward to states and regions not designated to join NATO. NATO's principal mechanism for military-to-military cooperation is Partnership for Peace. PfP should receive attention comparable to that devoted to enlargement. In particular, PfP should receive substantial additional funding from NATO members at the same time they provide funds for enlargement. Moreover, PfP's military content should be enhanced beyond today's emphasis on peacekeeping. The objective of PfP should be to prepare partners to operate alongside NATO members in “coalitions of the willing” covering the full range of NATO's new power projection missions. NATO's objective should be to make the experience of PfP

membership for non-NATO members as similar as possible to the experience of NATO membership.

The NATO-Ukraine Charter, like the NATO-Russia Founding Act, should be vigorously implemented with an emphasis on practical military cooperation. NATO should also continue to encourage and support regional military cooperation among PfP members, such as the Baltbatt, Centrasbatt, and the Polish-Ukrainian joint peacekeeping battalion.

The United States should strengthen its bilateral programs of military-to-military cooperation with PfP members who are not members of NATO. These relationships were inaugurated with great vision, but the resources devoted to their implementation have not been commensurate with the stakes the United States has in Eurasia. And the United States should continue to encourage good relations between non-members and Russia.

The End of the Beginning: The Emergence of a New Russia

Strobe Talbott

Thanks, Chris [Warren Christopher], to you, to Bill Perry and to David Hamburg for the chance to return to Stanford, where I spent quite a bit of time in the late '60s and early '70s. In those days I had an academic pretext for hanging around this campus—something to do with multi-archival research on early 20th century Russian history at the Hoover Institution. But that was a cover story. My real mission was to court a Stanford undergraduate. I'm courting her still, and she's here with me today, looking at me somewhat askance and hoping I'll get on with this speech.

I also want to thank Chris and Bill for the chance to work at their sides for four years. That work was far-ranging, fascinating and often—I can admit this because I'm among friends—fun.

Among the most important of the many enterprises on which we worked was the one that you are discussing at this conference: the design and construction of a new security architecture in Europe—one that recognizes and encourages the full and vigorous participation of a new and reforming Russia.

It is about Russia that I would like to speak to you this evening. I believe Russia is at a turning point. Let me explain that assertion by doing something that I've heard Bill Perry do on any number of occasions—by quoting Winston Churchill. In November 1942, just after the British victory over General Rommel in North Africa, Churchill said, "Now is not the end. It is perhaps not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning."

Churchill was saying that the Battle of El Alamein was a hopeful moment. But he was also warning that the war would go on for a long time. He was exhorting a combination of confidence, patience and fortitude. The parallel I'm suggesting is this:

Like Britain in 1942, Russia in 1997 is still in the throes of a titanic struggle. We Americans have a huge stake in how that struggle turns out. Our goal, like that of many Russians, is to see Russia become a normal, modern state—democratic in its governance, abiding by its own constitution and by its own laws, market-oriented and prosperous in its economic development, at peace with itself and with the rest of the world. That, in a nutshell, is what we mean—and more to the point, what many Russians mean—by the word reform.

The forces complicating, impeding and often opposing Russian reform include various demons of Russian history. We all know the litany of experiences from Russia's past that cast a shadow over its future: subjugation for nearly three centuries to the Golden Horde from the East, followed by four centuries of imperialist expansion combined with vulnerability to invasion from the West. Internally, Russia long ago adopted an autocratic order. Along the way, it missed the advent of the modern nation-state in the 16th century, the Enlightenment in the 18th and the Industrial Revolution of the 19th. Those blank spots prefigured the tragedy of the 20th. The Bolshevik coup d'état plunged the old Russia into misery, brutality, isolation and confrontation with the outside world.

Against that background, the new Russia faces a particularly difficult set of challenges. Like every country on earth, Russia wants to be strong and secure. But how should it define strength and security? I'll rephrase the question using Joe Nye's terminology: what is the optimum mixture of hard power and soft power appropriate to today's world?

All states face some version of this issue. But for Russia—as Churchill might put it—the political quandary is wrapped in an existential dilemma. It is an issue not just of what Russia wants to do, but of what Russia wants to be. It's a matter of how Russia will define statehood itself. Will it be in terms of Russia's specialness and separateness? Or will it be in terms of those heritages and interests it has in common with the rest of the world, particularly with Europe and the West?

The Russians themselves often call this “the question of questions.” They have been grappling with it for a very long time—for hundreds of years. The search for an answer was underway during the Middle Ages in the rivalry between the absolutism and isolation of Muscovy on the one hand and, on the other, the openness and trading

culture of Novgorod. In the 19th century the issue was at the core of the schism between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. Then along came Lenin and Stalin. With their claim of championing an internationalist ideology, they forcibly suppressed expressions of ethnic and national identity. In their place arose the idea that Ukrainians, Kazaks, Armenians, Karelians, Chukchis and one hundred other nationalities were evolving into a new species, *homo sovieticus*. By Brezhnev's time, this notion was the object of much lip-service—but of much more muffled ridicule. Soviet man was everywhere on posters and pedestals, but nowhere in real life. That myth died an unmourned death with the Soviet Union itself.

Now that Russia is again Russia rather than the metropole of an empire or the headquarters of a global movement, the old debate rages anew. What is Russia? The 19th and early 20th century literary and philosophical combatants—Chadaayev, Solovyev, Berdyayev—are back in fashion, their works selling briskly in the bookstores along the Arbat and Kuznetsky Most. Last year *Rossiskaya Gazeta* ran an essay contest to see who could come up with the best statement of “the Russian national idea.” President Yeltsin has established a blue-ribbon commission on the same subject. It's hard to sit for long at a kitchen table with friends in Moscow or St. Petersburg without someone agonizing aloud about where Russia belongs and where it is headed. Needless to say, there's more than a little intellectual wind in these debates, but how they play out in Russian politics—and in Russian policy, especially foreign policy—does matter to us.

We are not neutral by-standers. There is no doubt where our own national interest lies: quite simply, we want to see the ascendancy of Russia's reformers, those who look outward and forward rather than inward and backward for the signposts of national revival. A Russia that reflects their aspirations is likely to be part of the solution to the world's many problems. Conversely, a Russia that erects barriers against what it sees as a hostile world and that believes the best defense is a good offense—such a Russia could be, in the 21st century just as it was in much of the 20th, one of the biggest of the problems we and our children will face.

There is nothing preordained about the outcome of this clash of alternative futures. But there is reason for hope that the latter-day Westernizers will prevail over the latter-day Slavophiles. Let me explain why.

During most of the first term of the Clinton Administration, we were witnessing what might be called the beginning of the beginning—that is, the first phase of Russia’s re-birth, and its self-liberation from Soviet communism. That phase is now drawing to a close. It has been a period of opportunity as well as of uncertainty and even danger.

I suspect I speak for Chris, Bill, Chip [Blacker], Ash [Carter], Liz [Sherwood-Randall] and other veterans of the first term who are here this evening when I say that all of us came to work more than once with the bracing sense that everything in Russia was up for grabs, that Russia itself was teetering on the brink of regression or chaos.

That danger has not disappeared altogether, but it has diminished, and—like Britain after El Alamein—Russia may have turned the tide; it may be on the brink of a breakthrough. It has happened with a constellation of several events, of which I’d like to single out four:

- First, in domestic politics, there was the presidential election fourteen months ago. With Boris Yeltsin’s victory over Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist electoral tide began to recede from its high-water mark.

- Second, in the economy, after five years of virtual free fall, Russia’s gross domestic product seems finally, in 1997, to be stabilizing and may be registering a real upturn. That achievement, combined with the government’s success in slaying the beast of hyperinflation, means that Russia can focus more on taking advantage of its immense human and natural resources to build a world-class market economy.

- Third, in relations between Moscow and the regions, the bellwether event was the pact signed May 12 that ended the war in Chechnya. For all the ambiguity in the terms of that agreement, and for all the suspense over its implementation, it represented a recognition, however belated, that the federation cannot, and should not, be held together by brute force; a recognition that tanks, artillery and bombers are not legitimate or, in the final analysis, efficacious instruments of governance.

- And fourth, in relations with the West, there was the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May—which I look forward to discussing with many of you in tomorrow morning’s session of this conference.

While none of these developments is decisive, each is significant in its own right. Moreover, there is a synergy among them—the whole

is more than the sum of its parts. Together they may mark a take-off point in post-Soviet Russia's evolution as a modern state.

This is not to say that Russian reform has scored a knock-out blow against crime, corruption, the uglier manifestation of nationalism and the other forces arrayed against it, or that the Russian economy is home free, or that old Soviet attitudes and habits are gone forever. But it is to say that Russians today can be more confident than a year ago that their country will make it—not just as a safe, secure, unitary state, but as a law-based, democratic society, increasingly integrated with the growing community of states that are similarly constituted and similarly oriented.

The key word here—the key concept—is integration. It is crucial to our foreign policy in general, since it captures the imperative of working with other states to revitalize and, where necessary, create mutually reinforcing international organizations and arrangements to ensure peace and prosperity in an increasingly interdependent world. Integration is also key to our policy toward Russia in particular, since Russia's attainment of its most worthy aspirations will depend in large measure on its ability and willingness to integrate—that is, to participate in, contribute to, and benefit from the phenomenon of globalization.

The initial signs are auspicious. The new Russia has already gone a long way toward repudiating the old Soviet Union's delusions that autarky and self-isolation are even options for a modern state. Russia today plays an active role in organizations of which it was a founding member, such as the UN [United Nations] and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. It is also knocking at the door of those from which it has been excluded. Over the past two years, it has become a member of the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Regional Forum and the Council of Europe, agreed to join the Paris Club, and it has strengthened its ties to the European Union.

We are not just letting this happen—we are helping make it happen. We are doing what we can to ensure that the international community is as open as possible to Russia. That's why we pushed in Denver for the expansion of the G-7 agenda to become the Summit of the Eight.

That's also why, in Helsinki, President Clinton and President Yeltsin set a joint goal to work toward Russian accession in 1998 to the World

Trade Organization and to launch a dialogue in Paris that will accelerate Russia's admission to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development].

Then there's the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). When Secretary Albright and the other APEC Ministers meet in November in Vancouver, they will be setting the criteria for new members, and we will support Russia's admission to APEC as it meets those standards.

Let me here offer a general proposition. Russia's membership—even its aspiration for membership—in these bodies is welcome in and of itself, since all of them enshrine the premise that the modern state should be part of an international order that is based on certain common principles. One of the most fundamental of those principles is that there are limits to the role and writ of the state, particularly with regard to its resort to force, both in its internal regime and in its external behavior.

Since that is a principle that runs very much against the grain of Russian tradition, under Czars and commissars alike, it is one that we would like to see the new Russia associate itself with in every way possible. However, integration is not an end in itself—it is a means to an end. Now that Russia is an eager joiner, the issue remains what kind of member is Russia going to be? How will it fit in? Will it play by the rules?

There is still a lot of skepticism on this point that resonates in our national debate about Russia and U.S. policy. Many experts and commentators start from a presumption of guilt about Russia's strategic intentions. They nurture a suspicion that Russians are predisposed genetically, or at least historically, to aggression and imperialism.

I believe that's the wrong way to think about the issue. The right way is the one Ian Buruma articulated in his book *The Wages of Guilt*. He was writing about two other great nations—Germany and Japan—whose peoples were, not so long ago, feared, and hated, as inherently militaristic. “There are,” said Buruma, “no dangerous peoples; there are only dangerous situations, which are the result, not of laws of nature or history, or of national character, but of political arrangements.”

Our purpose, in working with Russia, should be to fashion the right political arrangements—in other words, to weave beneficial rela-

tionships and devise incentives that will encourage Russia to continue its democratic progress, and that will yield material benefits to the Russian people.

The idea that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can be part of that larger structure and that larger strategy is, to put it mildly, not self-evident to all Americans, including, I'm sure, some of you who are participating in this conference. And it is certainly not self-evident to all Russians.

Part of the problem here is perceptions—old perceptions. Stereotypes evaporate slowly. Just as many of our own experts and commentators cling to Cold War prejudices about Russians and what makes them tick, so many Russians have fixed in their minds a Cold War image of NATO.

I'm convinced that this disagreement is manageable. Indeed, we now have a mechanism for managing it. One week from today, Secretary Albright and her fifteen Alliance colleagues will sit down at the UN with Yevgeny Primakov for the first ministerial meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. This new institution has real promise. It can help ensure that Europe is never again divided and that a democratic Russia plays its rightful role in that new Europe.

But in order to live up to its potential, the Permanent Joint Council must be more than a talk shop. It must identify new ways and places for NATO and Russia to work together in maintaining peace, combating common threats and dismantling the vestiges of the Cold War, especially the lingering fears and suspicions that exist on both sides of the old Iron Curtain—and on both sides of the new international boundaries that used to be the internal, that is, inter-republic borders of the USSR.

That brings me to the most salient issue of Russian foreign policy for Russians and the rest of the world alike, which is how Russia relates to those new independent states that were, until only six years ago, part of the Soviet Union and, as such, subject to Russia's domination.

In this regard too, there have recently been some developments that are favorable, and encouraging—though by no means conclusive. One was President Yeltsin's landmark visit to Kyiv in May, which put Russia's relations with Ukraine on a more equitable and predictable footing. Another is the way that Russia is now attempting to end the decade-old war in Nagorno-Karabakh. This year Russia has joined

diplomatic forces with the United States and France under the aegis of the OSCE. This willingness on Russia's part to internationalize, rather than attempting to monopolize, the management of security along its periphery augurs well for the chances of equitable settlements to other conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan.

Let me say a few words about the Baltics, which represent an especially acute challenge. In our analysis, we need to bear in mind—and, in our diplomacy, we need to balance—two factors. One is the Balts' anxieties about Russian motivations and their legitimate desire to join Western institutions, including the European Union and NATO. The other factor is Russia's fear and loathing at the prospect of the Balts' fulfilling those aspirations.

Quite bluntly, Russians need to get over their neuralgia on this subject; they need to stop looking at the Baltic region as a pathway for foreign armies or as a buffer zone, not just because such oldthink offends and menaces the Balts but because it doesn't make sense, since there are no would-be aggressors to be rebuffed.

In the final analysis, Russia will have to make that adjustment itself, by its own lights and for its own reasons. But we and our European partners can help. One way is to make the idea of commercial, political, environmental and other forms of collaboration among the states along the littoral of the Baltic Sea a centerpiece of our own activity there—and an important part of our dialogue with Russia as an important regional power.

Our message to Moscow here is this: if you Russians insist on looking to the 13th century for models applicable to the 21st, then you should dwell less on the image of Alexander Nevsky defeating the Swedish knights on the ice and think instead in what might be called "Hanseatic" terms—that is, think about the Baltics not as an invasion route inward, but as a gateway outward.

This is a version of what Peter the Great, the patron figure of the Westernizers, had in mind when he opened Russia's window to the West nearly three hundred years ago. In fact, St. Petersburg is an obvious candidate for participation in a revival of the Hanseatic concept.

So too might be Novgorod and Kaliningrad, the former Kšnigsberg, both of which were associated with the original Hanseatic League. In fact, Kaliningrad is an especially tantalizing case, at least historically. Those of us who labor in the thickets of CFE—the Conventional Forces in Europe talks—tend to think of Kaliningrad as

the headquarters of the Russian 11th Guards Army with its 850 tanks and 100 combat aircraft. But it is also one corner of what is now Russia that did experience the Enlightenment. It's where Immanuel Kant lived, taught, and set forth several principles of international law intended to bind like-minded republics into a community of "civil states" that could enjoy what he called "perpetual peace."

That said, we all recognize how far this theory is from reality in that neighborhood. Few places on earth have seen as little peace of any kind as Russia and its environs. But here again, I reiterate: there is reason for optimism. In addition to the ones I've already mentioned, I'd like, in conclusion, to add one more. It's generational—or, to be even more blunt, biological. The dynamic of what is happening in Russia today is not just Westernizers versus Slavophiles; it is also young versus old—and the young have a certain advantage in at least that dimension of the larger struggle between the old and the new.

Let me illustrate the point this way:

Nearly four years ago, in a televised town meeting at Ostankino television station, President Clinton put a question to the Russian people—and to the Russian leadership—his own version of the question of questions:

"How will you define your role as a great power?" he asked. "Will you define it in yesterday's terms, or tomorrow's?" Russia, he said, has "a chance to show that a great power can promote patriotism without expansionism; that a great power can promote national pride without national prejudice...I believe the measure of your greatness in the future will be whether Russia, the big neighbor, can be the good neighbor."

Chris and I were both there when the President delivered that message, and we were both struck that his very youthful audience—an audience representing Russia's future—burst into applause. They not only thought the President was asking the right question—they clearly liked his proposed answer.

Perhaps the single most significant and hopeful statistic I've seen is this: although 65% of those Russians over the age of 65 think things got worse over the last year, 60% of those under 35 think things got better. So among the positive trends underway in Russia is perhaps the most basic one of all, the one represented by the actuarial tables.

Hence, to the extent possible, our policy toward Russia should be geared toward the younger citizens of Russia who will decide who

they are, where they belong, how they relate to Europe and to the outside world. The essence of our policy, in short, is: give them time—give them time to consolidate the reforms that constitute the good news of the past few years; give them time to beat back the forces that have generated the bad news; give them time to work out their identity and destiny in ways that will not only best serve a modern Russia's real interests but that will also be, to the greatest extent possible, compatible with our interests as well.

In other words, we need to make sure we have a policy toward Russia that contains an indispensable feature: strategic patience. That means a policy not just for coping with the issue or the crisis of the moment or the week or even of the season, or for getting through the next summit meeting; rather, it means a policy for the next century—which, by the way, begins in two years, three months, eleven days and four hours.

So the timing of this conference could not be better. Nor could the agenda be more germane and the participants more appropriate. Thank you again, Chris, Bill and David, for helping our nation grapple with what is, for us, also a question of questions—how to understand and deal with Russia—and for helping make sure that we come up with the right answer of answers.

The NATO Enlargement Process: Procedures for Accession to and Ratification of Accessions to the Washington Treaty

Kenneth A. Myers

From Accession Negotiations to Ratification

Negotiations for accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Poland to NATO began immediately after the July 1997 Madrid Summit at which formal invitations were extended to them, with a target completion date of the negotiations of December 1997. The instruments of accession will take the form of Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty. If past expansion practices are observed, the Protocols will note the commitment of the candidate states to the principles of the Treaty and will delineate the additional geographic territory to be covered under Article 5 of the Treaty.

During the accession negotiations, NATO officials will take up several issues with each candidate state. Firstly, the process of integration into NATO's command structures will be discussed. Secondly, agreement will have to be reached on cost-sharing arrangements in NATO's three main budgets: (1) the strategic investment program (fixed installations, telecommunications installations, etc.); (2) the civil budget (the Alliance's international civilian staff); and (3) the military budget (NATO Headquarters' international military staff and the Alliance's major commands). Each member state pays an agreed portion of these budgets, calculated on the basis of gross domestic product and other economic factors.

Although the Protocols will be accompanied by a review of these issues negotiated with the candidate states, as well as needed military reforms, force structure modernization priorities, and necessary infrastructure improvements, they are not likely to contain a detailed description of the military responsibilities of each new alliance member because alliance defense requirements are classified and cannot be

fully shared with candidate members. NATO's Defense Planning Committee will decide on each member state's Defense Planning Program that will outline force goals and other actions appropriate to the common defense, and that program will be formally issued to the new members only after they become signatories to the Treaty.

Upon completion of the accession negotiations, possibly by October or November 1997, the governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will write to the NATO Secretary General to indicate that they will abide by the North Atlantic Treaty and that they affirm their commitments and obligations under the integrated command structure and the Alliance's budgets. The resulting Protocols are to be signed at the NATO Ministerial meeting on December 16, 1997. Then the accession protocols must be ratified by all current and new member countries of the alliance, presumably first by current members.

Although several allies do not view a legislative procedure as strictly necessary to permit further countries to accede to the Treaty, legislatures will likely be involved in most, if not all, Alliance member countries. Depending on the Ally concerned, the entire procedure could require from a few months to up to a year or more. Since accessions require agreement by all the Allies, more than a year could elapse between the signature of protocols of accession and the appropriate ratification notifications to allow their actual entry into force.

Accession Procedures by the New Members

Table 1 is a schematic overview of the administrative and legal procedures to be employed in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with respect to the ratification of their accessions to the Washington Treaty.

Poland

Article 89 of the new Polish Constitution specifies that ratification of an agreement concerning an international treaty or membership in an international organization requires prior consent granted by statute. Alternatively, the Prime Minister may inform the Sejm of any international agreement whose ratification (by the President) does not require prior consent granted by statute.

A majority of political parties support Poland's membership in NATO. The current Polish government is not actively considering a

national plebiscite on joining NATO, nor is one being demanded by any particular party. Public opinion polls have consistently registered an overwhelming number of Poles favoring NATO membership.

Hungary

Under Hungary's constitution, the parliament ratifies international treaties that are of outstanding significance for the external relations of the Republic of Hungary (Chapter 2, Article 19, 3f). The Government will introduce a resolution in parliament, and the relevant committees having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the agreement make recommendations regarding the resolution. Decisions before parliament are considered passed with affirmative votes of a simple majority of Members of Parliament present.

All six parties currently represented in parliament support Hungary's entry into NATO. Some extra-parliamentary parties, such as the Green Alternative, oppose Hungary's accession into NATO. On August 28, 1997, the Prime Minister called for a binding referendum on whether the country should join NATO and indicated that he would immediately submit a motion to the parliament to have the President of the Republic call the plebiscite for November 16, 1997. In recent public opinion polls, over 60% of people polled supported Hungary's membership in NATO.

The Czech Republic

According to the Czech constitution, international treaties are to be approved by the parliament in the same manner as a draft bill—i.e., by a simple majority vote in each chamber. In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty accession protocol, the Czech President will seek the consent of both chambers of parliament, each of which must approve the treaty by simple majority.

The three-party governing coalition and the largest opposition party in parliament support Czech membership in NATO. Two smaller opposition parties in parliament, the left-wing Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) and the right-wing Republican Party (SPR-RSC), oppose the Czech Republic joining NATO. However, the Czech government and opposition have been sharply divided on the question of whether to hold a referendum on NATO membership. The largest party in the opposition, the Social Democratic Party (CSSD), supports Czech membership in NATO but has insisted on a

referendum. In contrast, the Czech Prime Minister and President have discounted the necessity of holding a referendum on NATO membership. In part, the Czech Government's opposition to holding a referendum on NATO membership may reflect consistently low public support on this issue. Czech public support for admission to NATO remains below 50% in opinion polls.

TABLE 1
LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES OF CANDIDATE STATES
TO APPROVE ACCESSION TO NATO

Poland—*estimated 2-3 months to approve accession*

Legislative process: Ratification of treaty or membership in international organization requires prior Parliamentary consent by statute. Alternatively, Prime Minister may inform lower house of any international agreement whose ratification by the President does not require prior consent granted by statute. Before ratifying, President may refer an international agreement to Constitutional Tribunal.

Referendum/plebiscite: No, but if called, overwhelming support.

Potential problem areas: None, except for concerns about ultimate costs.

Hungary—*estimated 2-3 months to approve accession*

Legislative process: Parliament ratifies treaties of outstanding significance to nation's external relations. Government introduces resolution in Parliament; relevant committees make recommendations on resolution. Decision reached by simple majority of members present.

Referendum/plebiscite: Prime Minister has called for binding referendum on NATO accession and submitted motion to Parliament to have President call plebiscite for November 16, 1997.

Potential problem areas: All major political parties support Hungary's accession; public opinion polls indicate over 60% support membership.

Czech Republic—*estimated 4-5 months to approve accession*

Legislative process: President will seek consent of both chambers of Parliament, each to approve by simple majority vote. Both chambers must also consent to deployment of Czech armed forces outside national territory.

Referendum/plebiscite: Government and opposition support accession to NATO but are split over issue of referendum on membership. Social Democrats (CSSD) insist on referendum; President and Prime Minister discount need for referendum.

Potential problem areas: Government has opposed referendum in part due to low public support (below 50%) for membership. Also, Parliament would have to pass constitutional amendment on holding referendum; no such law currently exists.

Allied Views on Enlargement and Ratification Processes and Procedures

Current allied members display different concerns and perceptions about NATO enlargement. Some current members have expressed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for enlargement but have gone along with it in deference to the American leadership role in the effort and the desire to keep the United States engaged in Europe. Other current members view enlargement primarily through a regional prism, believing that stability in their part of the continent will be enhanced. Still others have set enlargement in a larger strategic context, viewing it in terms of the contribution it might make to Europe's evolution. In short, the debate over enlargement for many current members is about much more than the qualifications of individual applicants. For many current members, it is about the long-term nature of the European security system.

Thus, a range of issues relating to the missions of the Alliance has influenced the view of current members on the selection of candidate states and will affect the pace, tone, and scope of the ratification process in select allied parliaments. Current members do not want enlargement to come at the cost of the political consensus and military capability of the Alliance. By the same token, many current members believe that stability in central Europe could be reinforced by including states with a commitment to build democratic institutions, to resolve disputes with neighbors, and to open their economies to trade and investment. While few current members expect any of the candidate states to contribute meaningfully in the short term to counter Article 5 threats, the majority of current members believe that, in the current threat environment, new states should be admitted now and encouraged to develop a capacity over the next decade to contribute to collective defense while assuming other less demanding missions in the near term.

Prior to Madrid, the candidate states were evaluated by current members with several considerations in mind. Firstly, current members were concerned that NATO develop a coherent purpose at a time when more ambiguous threats such as nuclear proliferation have replaced the military threat once posed by the Soviet Union. Secondly, concerns about a nationalist backlash against enlargement in Russia prompted current member interest in a NATO-Russia Charter (The Founding Act) as well as a reticence to consider former members of

the Soviet Union for inclusion. Thirdly, some current members have questioned the political stability of some central and east European regimes and their willingness to take the tough political decisions necessary to meet the financial and military costs of membership. And finally, enlargement has not necessarily been among the top priorities for many current members who are grappling with the future course of the European Union, the European Monetary Union and attendant budgetary pressures, the European presence and staying power in Bosnia, and rapidly approaching national elections. These latter priorities have and will continue to compete in attention and resources with the process of NATO enlargement.

There are some identifiable issues and potential hurdles likely to affect enlargement ratification in current member states. Consent to enlargement is likely to proceed in a rather straightforward manner in Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Ratification could encounter a variety of procedural and political hurdles in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, but all are expected to support enlargement eventually. Greece and Turkey support enlargement but concern has been expressed that they may attempt to use the ratification process as leverage to extract concessions from other members on issues from the European Union to Cyprus. That concern has lessened since the Madrid Summit.

Table 2 is a schematic overview setting forth the administrative and legal procedures required in current member countries with respect to the ratification of accessions to the Washington Treaty, including time projections for these procedures as well as potential problem areas that might be encountered in individual states and parliaments as the ratification process proceeds. It reflects the procedures followed by the Alliance and individual allies in the case of the most recent accessions to the Treaty, when a protocol amending the Treaty entered into force upon notification of its ratification, acceptance, or approval to the U.S. depository by each of the Parties to the Treaty according to their own national procedures.

Finally, aside from a number of specific issues that could affect the pace and tone of the ratification processes in various member states—i.e., Russia's relationship with NATO, costs of NATO enlargement and burden sharing more generally, alliance internal adaptation, and the special problems posed by the "have-not" states whose

aspirations to membership are not likely to be realized soon if ever—the presentation of multiple accession protocols by governments to their parliaments could pose special problems for the ratification process. It would likely be far easier to secure parliamentary approval for the three new states as a package than to seek approval on an individual state basis. However, it is quite likely that three separate protocols of accession will be signed at the NATO Ministerial in December 1997, and thus three separate amendments or modifications to the Treaty will require ratification by member governments and parliaments. A state-by-state vote increases the risks that a given national parliament could approve one or two but not necessarily all three invitees, thereby sending dangerous signals both to states that still aspire to membership as well as to national parliaments that have yet to vote on the protocols of accession relative to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

TABLE 2
LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES TO ACHIEVE
RATIFICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT*

Belgium—*ratification may undergo difficulty; estimated 6-12 months*

Legislative procedures: Government draft bill is submitted to Parliament with a 2/3 majority required in both houses.

Potential problem areas: Regional Assemblies may demand to be involved in decision, particularly on budgetary impact. Parliamentary interest due to criticism.

Canada—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 2-5 months*

Legislative procedures: Government can approve. Debate is likely in Cabinet and Parliament first. Cabinet decides process. A simple majority, but non-binding, vote in both houses is likely.

Potential problem areas: Cost is major issue. Government may argue that existing NATO budgets should be redirected to cover major part of the costs. Madrid Summit future commitment to “open door” a key issue, given strong interest in Ukraine owing to immigrants. Regional politics (Quebec) could complicate process.

Denmark—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 2-6 months*

Legislative procedures: MFA prepares bill for Cabinet and State approval. Debated twice in Parliament with optional committee examination in between. Simple majority vote.

*Adapted from a Table in Sean Kay and Hans Binnendijk, *After the Madrid Summit: Parliamentary Ratification of NATO Enlargement*, INSS, NDU, March 1997.

Potential problem areas: Parliament debated issue in February 1997 and supports enlargement. Strong desire to support Baltic aspirations to join Western institutions and to enhance Baltic security in interim through Nordic regional security initiatives.

France—*ratification may undergo difficulty; estimated 6-9 months*

Legislative procedures: Secretariat General prepares report for Council of State and draft law for National Assembly. Committees examine proposal before simple majority vote. Law is then voted on in Senate, where simple majority is also required.

Potential problem areas: NATO command structure rebuff an issue. April 1997 elections dramatized parliamentary debates, particularly those on the EU and security issues. Socialist Government and President put military reintegration on hold, although both expect France to remain on NATO's Military Committee and to participate in CJTF. Strongly supported Romania in first wave. Cost an issue due to budget pressures, with President vowing not pay any additional costs due to enlargement.

Germany—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 5-6 months*

Legislative procedures: MFA prepares draft law in consultation with other Ministries. Cabinet approves law before submission to Parliament. Simple majority vote in both houses required.

Potential problem areas: Cost will be a main issue due to EMU and unemployment pressure. Sensitivity to Russian concerns, CFE adjustments, Baltics, and Turkey. Coalition has majority, and Social Democratic opposition support expansion. Elections in 1998 could propel government to act expeditiously on ratification.

Greece—*serious ratification problems could arise; estimated 12 months*

Legislative procedures: Draft legislation examined by ministries before Cabinet and Legislative scrutiny. Parliamentary vote in Plenary session. Majority or QMV vote—to be decided.

Potential problem areas: Costs a major concern. Worries over whether CFE concessions will restrict Greek Armed Forces or benefit Turkey. Sympathetic on Russian position—wants her to be able to agree to enlargement details. The Turkish EU entry issue is also sensitive.

Iceland—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 1-3 months*

Legislative procedures: MFA proposes law to government. Approval by President before Althing debates. Simple majority vote in each.

Potential problem areas: Cost is main issue. Both Coalition parties favor NATO enlargement.

Italy—*ratification may undergo difficulty; estimated 4-8 months*

Legislative procedures: Draft legislation is approved by Ministries before submission to Council of Ministers. Debate in both houses, plus committee examination. Simple majority vote in each.

Potential problem areas: Timing depends on progress in EU capitals and U.S. Cost issues are likely to cause delays. Strongly advocated admission of Slovenia. Complex left-of-center coalition, but with centrist ministers. Coalition PDS solidly back government party on expansion.

Luxembourg—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 6-12 months*

Legislative procedures: MFA draft law is approved by Council of State before FA Committee examines it. Vote in Chamber of Deputies and Council of State. Two-thirds vote in each required.

Potential problem areas: Coalition has 2/3 majority and endorsed NATO at start of 5-year term. This runs through 1999, therefore ratification likely to be straightforward.

Netherlands—*ratification may undergo difficulty; estimated 12 months*

Legislative procedures: Examination by Council of Ministers before signature. Once protocol returned by NATO, Council of State prepares report. Queen approves law before Parliament votes. Simple majority required in both houses.

Potential problem areas: Parliamentary issues likely to include costs, military implications, impact on Russia and contribution to be expected from new members. The ruling coalition includes conservatives (VVD), who may oppose enlargement when it comes to a vote, which could destabilize the coalition.

Norway—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 3-6 months*

Legislative procedures: Approval could be given by King in Council, but more likely to be debated and approved in Storting first. Simple or 2/3 majority will depend on Storting.

Potential problem areas: No opposition to enlargement yet. But relationship with Russia and CFE adaptation are matters of close interest. Governing party does not have a clear majority, but larger parties all favor enlargement.

Portugal—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 6 months*

Legislative procedures: Higher Council for National Defense examines proposal, Cabinet agrees draft resolution for Parliament. After one simple majority vote, President signs.

Potential problem areas: NATO Structural change a point in interest (BERLANT). Costs also a significant concern.

Spain—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 3-6 months*

Legislative procedures: Council of State authorizes draft submission to Chamber of Deputies for debate and one simple majority vote.

Potential problem areas: New NATO structure a point of concern. A majority of deputies have already expressed support for adaptation and enlargement. Ratification is likely to be uncontentious, despite small communist opposition.

Turkey—*serious ratification problems could arise; estimated 3-12 months*

Legislative procedures: Council of Ministers must approve signature. PM forwards draft law to national Assembly. Committees examine law before Assembly votes. Simple majority required.

Potential problem areas: May threaten to slow ratification process pending commitment for EU accession negotiations. CFE flanks, Russia, Greece and Cyprus are sensitive issues. Recent removal of Refah from government puts new coalition and the Turkish military together in support of enlargement.

United Kingdom—*ratification is likely to be straightforward; estimated 3 months*

Legislative procedures: Accession Protocols laid before Parliament for 28 days. If requested, the House of Commons will debate and vote. Simple majority required. House of Lords may decide to debate issue but a vote is unlikely.

Potential problem areas: Likely to press for budgetary implication of enlargement to be specified in detail, and for the obligations of new members to be spelled out (e.g., full integration into IMS). Majority of MPs of all parties favor enlargement. Labor's election unlikely to affect ratification.

United States—*ratification may undergo difficulty; estimated 4-8 months*

Legislative procedures: President submits request to Senate. Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings before vote. Two-thirds majority required.

Potential problem areas: Controversial. Congressional elections in fall of next year (1998) and Alliance desire to complete accession process by April 1999 would require Senate action by Spring 1998. Ratification process could be complicated by controversy over deadline for U.S. military involvement in Bosnia. House of Representatives will also require hearings to gain support for funding appropriations.

The United States and Enlargement Ratification: The Process

Many current allies have expressed the hope that the United States Senate will move first to ratify enlargement, and the Senate would have to act no later than the spring of 1998 if other NATO parliaments are to meet the April 1999 ratification deadline. While the Senate must consent to the substantive modifications of the NATO Treaty entailed by alliance enlargement, the House of Representatives will play an equally important role in dealing with the costs associated with the integration of new members into NATO. If the ratification and appropriations processes in both houses are delayed and become enmeshed in the 1998 Congressional campaign, the enlargement timetable in the United States and Western Europe could be prolonged.

In commenting on the proposed NATO Treaty in 1949, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee dealt specifically with the Senate's role in regard to the admission of new members to NATO, inasmuch as the admission of additional members was seen as potentially altering U.S. obligations under the pact. The Committee noted in its Report that it was satisfied with the commitment of the President that he would treat the admission of additional members "as the conclusion of a new treaty" with such states and "would seek the advice and consent of the Senate to each admission." The Senate did not add a formal condition regarding the Senate's role to its resolution of ratification of the NATO Treaty in 1949, but the Foreign Relations Committee did state in its Report that the "Committee considers this (commitment from the President) to be an obligation binding upon the Presidential Office." And that procedure has in fact been followed with respect to all subsequent expansions of NATO—Greece and Turkey, West Germany and Spain. In each instance, a protocol has been concluded by all of the member states of NATO, and the protocol has been submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent.

The President transmits to the Senate the Protocols as substantive modifications or amendments to the Treaty, along with a letter of transmittal and any accompanying documents. After an initial reading in the Senate, the modified treaty is referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC). The Committee will schedule hearings on the Treaty modifications with executive branch officials as well as outside witnesses to provide explanations of the contents of the treaty and to answer questions. It is likely that the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Intelligence Committee will hold separate hearings on the security and intelligence implications of NATO enlargement, and the Foreign Relations Committee will probably defer its final action until those hearings have been completed and those Committees have provided reports to the SFRC.

Following appropriate hearings, the Foreign Relations Committee reports the treaty back to the full Senate, along with a report on its hearings, its recommendations, and a proposed resolution of advice and consent to ratification. If the Committee has major objections to the treaty, it may not report it back to the Senate and it could remain pending on the Committee calendar indefinitely.

Once reported from the Committee to the Senate, the treaty may be read a second time, after which amendments, reservations, under-

standings, declarations, etc., may be proposed on the floor. Amendments to the actual provisions of the treaty are rare and unlikely, for they could well require a renegotiation of the treaty itself. Having debated the provisions of the treaty itself, the resolution of ratification is open to debate, where decisions on floor amendments or conditions to the resolution are made by majority vote. Final approval of the resolution of ratification, as and if amended, requires a two-thirds majority of all Senators present and voting.

Following final action, the Senate returns it to the President. If the vote is positive and he accepts the conditions of the Senate as contained in the resolution of ratification, the President then signs a document called the “instruments of ratification” which includes any conditions or amendments. The ratification process is then completed by the exchange of the instruments of ratification between the parties to the treaty. In fact, in the case of NATO enlargement, the instruments of ratification are then provided to the Treaty’s depository state—the United States of America—and the depository state informs the NATO Secretary General, other NATO allies and the new members of ratification by the United States. Should the President object to any of the conditions attached by the Senate, he may resubmit the treaty to the Senate for further consideration or simply not ratify the document. There is no specified timetable for the advice and consent procedure by the United States Senate.

Enlargement and Senate Ratification: The Issues

The outcome of the Senate ratification debate is unclear. Members will have to contend with a variety of sometimes conflicting arguments: Russia will either be deemed too close or too distant from an enlarging alliance; Russia’s democratic prospects will either be enhanced or harmed by expansion; Europe will either become “whole or free” or divided between the “ins,” the “outs,” and the “in-betweens;” organizations other than NATO are incapable of or better able to play a stabilizing role in Europe; the costs are manageable or will contribute to an already dangerous commitments/resources mismatch.

The Cost/Burden Sharing Issue

The issue of burden sharing writ large and writ small will overlay the entire NATO enlargement debate. One of the foci of the critics during the ratification debate will be the anticipated or projected costs

of enlargement and how those costs will be distributed among new members and current members of the Alliance. The issue is not that there are not figures on costs floating around the Senate; it is that there are too many conflicting cost projections emanating from Brussels, new members, old members, the Pentagon, and the Congressional Budget Office, and seldom, if ever, are the assumptions behind such figures made clear. Enlargement costs and how they are to be distributed and shared could be one of the Achilles' heels of the enlargement case. There is little doubt that the cost and burden sharing issues will serve as the subject matter for many of the critical ("killer") conditions that might be proposed to the resolution of ratification by opponents of enlargement.

The "Have Nots" and the Open Door

Just as individual current members of the alliance had their "preferred" candidates at Madrid (Slovenia, Romania, etc.), so individual Members of the Senate have championed the admission of certain states that were not invited in the first round of enlargement. Any implication that the first round was the last round will cause difficulties for some senators in the enlargement debate, while others will be troubled if NATO's "open door" policy is interpreted as open ended. Some Members may insist that the resolution of ratification affirm that the open-door policy specifically applies to the Baltic states and Ukraine and that all states in Europe have the right to choose freely their security arrangements. Still others may insist that the resolution deal directly with the possibility for a "pause" following the accession of the first three states, a pause that could in effect become permanent, as one means of limiting membership. In short, the issue of further NATO enlargement beyond the three countries invited to join at Madrid will be a difficult and controversial one that is bound to complicate the Senate ratification debate.

Contending Rationales for Enlargement

One of the basic factors that will shape the outcome of the ratification process in the Senate has to do with the diverse nature of the coalition currently favoring enlargement. And the ability to hold this diverse coalition together in the interests of a two-thirds majority will depend in great part on the enunciation of the main strategic goal or objective to be accomplished by enlargement. It is not that strategic

goals have not been formulated on behalf of enlargement; it is that too many goals, some of them not so strategic and all of them somewhat vague, have been put forward to accommodate the various schools of enlargement supporters.

No member of the Senate belongs exclusively to one school and, over time, individual Senators may find themselves drifting in and out of several camps simultaneously. One school views enlargement as providing the alliance with a new *raison d'être* associated with the maintenance of security and stability in Central Europe, a mission-oriented approach to expansion. Another school, or perhaps a variation on the first, sees enlargement as a means of undoing Europe's postwar division and erasing the lines set at Yalta as an end in and of itself. A third school views enlargement primarily through a Russian "prism" and is composed of the "hopefuls" and the "hedgers," the "conciliators" and the "containers," who judge the efficacy of alliance expansion in terms of whether it will likely draw Russia closer or keep Russia at bay in the interest of a stable Europe.

The content of the Founding Act between Russia and NATO, given as it is to multiple interpretations, and the limited number of entrants selected at Madrid, do little to settle the battle between the contending groups in this school. Indeed, as the Senate debate picks up steam, the number of schools in the pro-enlargement camp could change, depending on whether the so-called "Russophiles" believe that enlargement is coming at the expense of arms control (START II) and Russian democracy or the so-called "Russophobes" believe that the NATO-Russia Founding Act is too high a price to pay for enlargement.

The Bosnian Component

Precisely because there is both a substantive and a timing relationship between the Senate debate on enlargement ratification, on the one hand, and Senate debate and action on the issue of the U.S. troop presence in Bosnia, on the other, the "Bosnian" component must be factored into any enlargement ratification strategy as well as the substantive "case" for enlargement. This is not to say that one cannot be in favor of NATO enlargement and still support a U.S. pullout from Bosnia. But it is to say that both the tenor and the outcome of the Bosnia debate in the Senate will impact on the terms of reference of the enlargement ratification debate. There are risks to

consciously postponing a decision and consequent Senate debate on the U.S. troop presence in or pullout from Bosnia until the spring of next year so that such a debate coincides with Senate consideration of NATO enlargement. While some proponents of NATO expansion think that such a coincidence will redound to the benefit of both enlargement and a continuing U.S. troop presence in Bosnia, it is primarily the critics of enlargement who believe that their interests are best served by a coupling of the two issues.

"On Balance"

At the end of the day, Senate proponents of enlargement will return to the now traditional argument that, "on balance," enlarging the alliance and taking on new commitments and missions is in the national security interests of the United States. That phrase suggests that there are both "pluses" and "minuses" for the U.S. in agreeing to take in new members but that, on balance, the "pluses" outweigh the "minuses." The critics will argue to the contrary. For that argument of proponents to be persuasive, the case for enlargement will likely have to be placed in a larger strategic context, and U.S. strategic objectives will have to be outlined in such a manner that alliance enlargement is seen as one means of achieving them.

Conclusion

The prospects may be reasonably bright that all 16 current members of the Alliance will eventually approve the NATO accession protocols for the three new members. However, the myriad of legal and administrative processes and procedures in member countries to achieve ratification of the accession protocols to the Washington Treaty, coupled with serious concerns regarding costs and additional commitments, suggests that the goal of full admission of the three new members to NATO by April 1999 will not likely be easy to meet.

What Should NATO's Purpose Be?

David C. Gompert

The Question

It is time—high time—to answer the question that is lurking around the enlargement debate: what is NATO's core function? It was not answered at the end of the Cold War, when Bush and co. were seized with whether the United States should even stay in Europe, or instead make way for Mitterrand's vision of an EU-centered (European Union) alliance. Nor was it answered by the time the current administration heard the pleas of Europe's new democracies to be let in the alliance now that they had rid themselves of the Soviets.

In fairness, these were pressing issues that could not be deferred. And two sound policies resulted: first, neither the disappearance of the Soviet threat nor progress in European integration obviates the need for a perpetual American role in European security; second, NATO's membership should not be frozen along a line drawn with force by Stalin. So without being clear about what NATO is for, we determined that it should not be replaced, and then we updated its roster. Meanwhile, NATO's peacekeeping role in Bosnia confirmed that it has some contemporary value, which relieved the pressure to explain NATO's strategic function.

So far so good. But from here on, the absence of an understood purpose will cause serious problems.

- Implementation of the enlargement decision will make it seem as if NATO's purpose is to protect its new members from some future Russian threat. Emphasizing the defense of Poland will keep open the wound between the West and Russia, focus allied militaries on the wrong problem, and set up NATO to look aimless as the idea of a Russian threat becomes ever more absurd.

- The next batch of applicants, like the first, will be considered without the aid of a strategic compass. Indeed, the question of future enlargement could cause further delay in addressing why NATO is needed. (The act of growing is already becoming confused with having a reason to exist.)

- Institutional reform will take place in the dark. Tinkering with the command structure, accommodating the European security and defense identity, engaging Russia and other PfP (Partnership for Peace) partners, and sprouting new consultative branches, unless illuminated by strategic direction, will be decided by the dangerous combination of expediency, inertia and bureaucratic churn.

- NATO force planning will remain lame. Force goals and programs must be informed by a military strategy, which in turn depends on strategic purpose. Members cannot be held accountable to steady their defense spending and restructure outdated forces if they are not told why and cannot persuade their citizens.

- The divergence between U.S. and European capabilities will widen. U.S. strategy and technology are propelled by global priorities, while European forces, suitable mainly for border defense, are largely irrelevant to those priorities. Notice that the recent U.S. defense reviews do not substantially take account of NATO, Europe, or the allies in U.S. global strategy and requirements. Unless the Europeans and we hear the same drummer, we will get hopelessly out of step.

Official speeches, citing Bosnia and enlargement, will claim that NATO is purposeful and vibrant. NATO's stewards will insist that the alliance's mission could not be clearer: NATO exists to defend its members' territory (from whom?) under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, to conduct "peace operations" in Europe (other than in the Balkans, where?), and to perform "crisis management" (a euphemism for intervention) under Article 4. In addition, finding purpose in process, NATO keeps the United States in Europe, anchors Germany, and fosters stability in Europe by adding members and engaging partners.

These explanations notwithstanding, the Atlantic military coalition will continue to drift and deteriorate until its *raison d'être* is set. America's main alliance is not confronting any of America's main security problems, such as securing world oil supplies and countering weapons of mass destruction. Nor is there an understanding among allied governments about the conditions under which NATO might

take future military action. So what confidence have we that it will respond well to the next crisis?

We should not accept involuted explanations, buried in Talmudic communiqués, of why NATO is essential. Nor should we overlook the danger that strategic purposelessness will undermine NATO's political uses.

We are already close to having a make-work alliance. Let's admit that NATO is now living on borrowed time and that its members, starting with the United States, need to give it a strategic direction. We should do this prior to further decisions about forces, commands, structure and membership.

The Options

Conceptually, there are two. The first is for NATO to be the insurer of European security, *de facto* if not *de jure*. The rationale is that Europe is both vital and potentially insecure. So NATO's mission should dovetail with Europe's dangers. This option is implied in most conversations about NATO, which tend, often out of habit, to identify it with the European region, rather than with the security interests of its European and American members—interests that, like so many other things, are being globalized.

The second option is for NATO to be the vehicle used by Americans and Europeans to protect common interests, wherever challenged. This option subsumes the first, since dangers in Europe would obviously threaten common European-American interests. But it introduces a new idea: now that Europe is comparatively safe and stable, not to mention affluent, the Atlantic alliance can and should confront the rising threats to its members' interests beyond Europe.

If geography is the chief criterion in the first option, interests are what count in the second. The two options point toward quite different futures and suggest different approaches to everything from further enlargement to engaging PfP partners to internal reform to burden sharing to structuring forces and commands. Thus, NATO's purpose is just the sort of defining, intimidating issue from which bureaucracy instinctively flee and which leaders must therefore face.

The need for the choice is new. In the Cold War, the main common interest requiring protection was Europe itself, at least the free half. Although the United States floated the old "out of area" idea from time to time, NATO had all it could handle along Europe's East-

West divide. But now, Europe is fundamentally more secure than it has been in a century, and not temporarily so (see below). It is also more secure than the rest of the planet, apart from the Western Hemisphere.

The idea behind option one is to keep it so—a worthy objective, indisputably. The idea behind option two is to keep it so while also confronting the new dangers to the interests of NATO's European and American members, dangers that are mainly not in Europe. Option two does not take Europe's security for granted, since failure to consolidate peace there will make it all the harder to improve security elsewhere. But it holds that the alliance can and should be more than an insurance policy—and meeting venue—for an unthreatened Europe.

Implicit in option one is a belief that combating threats, even threats to common interests, outside of Europe is America's job, as it has been since NATO's birth. Europeans tend to favor this option. They have their reasons and excuses: they are less sanguine about security within Europe; they are too busy with integration; they have domestic problems; the United States does not really welcome European involvement in other regions. But mainly they favor option one because it is a good deal for them: the burdens and risks, of treasure and blood, involved in confronting the gravest and growing dangers of the new era are borne by the United States.

Some Americans would also favor option one: U.S. experts on Europe, who know how tough it is to squeeze more help from the Europeans and to change NATO, and who tend to see harmonious transatlantic relations as the transcendent goal; and elements of the U.S. military, who, truth be told, would prefer to fight real wars without the allies under foot. But because option two asks more of the (wealthy and secure) Europeans, it is more likely to find favor among Americans. Indeed, Americans might ask why the defense priorities expressed in the recent national defense review are not evident in the mission of the nation's alliance with its most capable partners, whose interests match ours.

In essence, then, option one is an extrapolation of Cold War NATO, its premise being that Europe, despite its success, still needs to import security from the United States. Option two looks to Europe, because of its success, to join the United States in exporting security where shared interest lie.

The Choice

Selecting the right option requires an analysis of the world security environment—present and future—including Europe, of course. (Some would say that the situation outside of Europe is not germane, because NATO was “not meant” to provide security except in Europe. But since NATO’s genesis was not divine, presumably its members can do what they wish, consistent with international law.)

First Europe. We have experienced three types of threats to Europe in the 20th Century:

- The hegemonic threat from within—Germany;
- The hegemonic threat from without—the Soviet Union;
- The danger of widespread ethnic conflict—e.g., Yugoslavia.

To the extent these threats will exist in the future, NATO should focus on combating them. NATO cannot get in the business of exporting security if its home market is under siege. But what of these threats?

For the hegemonic threat from within to reappear would require an implausible chain of events: the reversal of European integration; the demise of German democracy; and a newfound conviction among Germans that the period since 1945 has been a big mistake and that the prior period—the one that ended in national destruction—is really the way to go. Fear of German power, as distinct from apprehension about Germany’s economic clout, is mere superstition.

Likewise, the danger of aggression from the East is gone for good. Russia is dwarfed by Europe economically, technologically and demographically. The Polish economy alone will soon be 40% of Russia’s; the EU’s is 20 times Russia’s. Except for the Russian nouveau riche, the future is unpromising; investment is down to a trickle; industry is largely unviable, and human and scientific capital is deteriorating. Only complete economic reform can save Russia from further decline—but then as a country without the capacity or incentive to threaten the West. Even warnings of a resurgent threat way down the road do not take account of reality: the gap between Russia and the advancing world is growing.

The danger of rampant ethnic conflict is not as easily dismissed as the first two phantom threats, especially with the graves still fresh and the potential for more still high in Bosnia. Five years ago, we feared that the Yugoslav cancer would metastasize throughout ex-communist Europe, pitting Czechs against Slovaks, Slovaks against

Hungarians, Hungarians against Rumanians, Ukrainians against Russians, Russians against Latvians. It has not happened. The sobering effect of the Bosnian bloodbath, the disciplining effect of NATO membership criteria, and the salutary effect of budding democracy have cooled tribal fevers and provided non-violent ways to settle disputes. Outside the southern Balkans, the danger that Eastern Europe will be engulfed in ethnic conflict has peaked and past.¹ To suggest that the danger remains high and widespread is to declare Western policies in Eastern Europe a failure, when in fact they have worked.

Europe's security problems pale by comparison to those that loom for American and European interests elsewhere. Were this not so, why are U.S. strategy and force requirements for the next decade or two driven by threats outside of Europe? The most salient problems are these:

- Dependence on imported oil and gas is growing, and access to it remains tenuous;
- Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are spreading, endangering European and American interests (including access to oil and gas) and our ability to project power to protect those interests;
- Both the energy and the WMD dangers are concentrated in the world's most dangerous regions, the greater Middle East and the former Soviet Union;
- Failing states could produce new human disasters, including genocide—the word our diplomats are loath to utter—throughout Africa;
- The rise of China, if mismanaged, could destabilize East Asia, a region vital to the global economy.

Though these are problems not only for the United States, today only it is facing up to them. (Arguably, the energy, WMD, African and Middle East problems are even more serious for Europe than for the United States; but for our purposes, let's simply say they are shared problems.)

The question here is whether the alliance of the Euro-Atlantic democracies, including the new ones in the East, should deal with these problems or instead effectively limit itself to performing peace-keeping services, when needed, in the southern Balkans. As a practical matter, using NATO to protect common interests where threatened would not give it a global writ: its main concerns should be energy security, WMD, the Middle East (from North Africa to the Gulf), the

former Soviet Union, and Africa—all more or less contiguous to the old “NATO area.”

The allies of NATO’s “southern tier”—an expression that has been given the pejorative connotation of a farm team to the central European major league—have it essentially right: their specific worry, of course, is Islamic fundamentalism and instability in North Africa; but their instinct is that the new era’s security problems are in the world beyond the Continent. They, especially Britain and France, have a strategic outlook that is much closer to that of the United States, which explains why the British and French have opted to pattern their forces after ours.

In the absence of a new understanding about NATO’s strategic purpose along the lines of option two, burden-sharing complaints will resurface. With Europe increasingly secure and much of the rest of the world not, pressures will mount for the United States to turn over Europe’s security problems to the allies—case in point: Bosnia—and to face more or less unilaterally the greater threats outside of Europe. This will not work. The United States should not have to bear disproportionate dangers, especially as the likes of Iraq and Iran get weapons of mass destruction and terrorists pass up other targets for the “Great Satan.” Nor is it prudent to leave Europe’s problems entirely to Europeans, ignoring the 20th century’s lessons.

A workable formula, based on option two, would be for Europeans to take a leading but not sole responsibility for security in Europe (barring some new hegemonic threat), with the United States playing an active supporting role, and for the United States to have a leading but not sole responsibility to protect common interests elsewhere. The allies might provide, say, two thirds and the United States one third of the capabilities required for security in Europe, and the United States two thirds and the allies one third of what is required elsewhere.²

Devotees of NATO think of it as precious in and of itself. They will have no enthusiasm for a proposal to end what has become an arbitrary and counterstrategic restriction on NATO’s scope, fearing that it would place too much strain on their alliance. They want to protect NATO, to keep it safe from stressful issues and non-linear reform.

But if NATO is so important, why should it be limited to dealing with its members’ secondary security problems? Confronting NATO

with the most demanding threats facing the Atlantic democracies will not kill it but strengthen it.

Failure to make NATO more global—addressing at least the challenges to European and American interests in the regions south and southeast of Europe—will deprive the United States of its partners’ help in common defense. (Seeking that help ad hoc is a poor second best, as the token allied role in Desert Storm showed.) Failure to make NATO strategically useful will also widen the technological and doctrinal rift between the global-gazing Americans and the navel-gazing Europeans. In the end, it will ensure that as Europe becomes more secure, NATO will become less relevant—a sad fate for the alliance of the world’s leading democracies.

The Implications

Capabilities

If NATO were given the job of protecting its members’ common interests (wherever threatened), it would need the means to do so. Economically, of course, it has the means: the EU and the United States are the world’s largest and second largest economies, respectively. Military spending? Again, there is no shortage: \$250 billion per year for the United States and about \$160 billion per year for the European allies. Allied forces are second only to U.S. forces in quality and sophistication, and Europe has more men under arms than the United States.

Yet only the United States can project power, only the United States can fight the wars that might actually occur, and only the United States is building the capability to thwart weapons of mass destruction. By redirecting a small fraction of their current defense spending, the allies can create sufficient power projection capability to fulfill their coalition responsibilities both in and outside of Europe. While some allies have signaled their intention to move in this direction—how else can they defend the need for a military?—the French, German and other European armies are still mainly territorial defense forces. So yes, there’s a long way to go; but there are ample resources if reprogrammed.

The augmentation of west European forces to back up the Article 5 commitment to new members is, from a strategic perspective, the most important aspect of implementing NATO enlargement. Ironically, this is not because the new members are in any danger, but

because the old members will then have useful forces for more likely contingencies elsewhere (e.g., the Persian Gulf). Old members, new members, and even PfP partners should engage in a programmatic force-improvement effort to prepare for coalition operations.

Institutions

NATO's command structure has one foot on the platform and one on the train. The permanent structure would be ideal if defending Europe were the task. Since it is not, the structure and nationality of commands should reflect NATO's strategic direction, along the lines of option two. The CJTFs (Combined Joint Task Force) point in the right direction; yet this applique on the cold-war structure is no solution for a world in which Europe is not threatened but Atlantic interests outside of Europe are. Power projection command—where the action will be—should be at least as “senior” and permanent as European defense, and it should be led by an American, thus binding NATO plans to U.S. global strategy. Because it is time for the European allies to take a leading, but not sole, responsibility for whatever threats might crop up within Europe, SACEUR could be rotated between an American and a European. In any case, allies must earn major NATO commands by beefing up the right capabilities to go with the authority.

NATO's political institutions also need to be overhauled to reflect the fact that the automaticity-cum-consensus protocols of the old, Article-5 NATO need not and should not apply in the new Article-4 era. In particular, members must be able to opt out of (and not block) operations and prior planning that do not entail territorial defense. And PfP partners must be able to opt in (without blocking). The new consultative machinery for Russia and other partners points in the right direction; but further institutional development should be guided by strategic direction, not just participatory wishes.

Membership

The NATO prescribed here is one in which an active partner is more important and more involved than a passive member is. Article 5 should not be deleted from the treaty; but it need not be a divisive line through Europe. Because there is no territorial threat to Europe, including no Russian threat, the significance of who is to be defended by whom from whom is fading. Concomitantly, operations like Bosnia,

whether in or out of Europe, should be as open to partners as to members. (IFOR/SFOR precedents help.) If a country associated with NATO is willing and able to contribute to the projection of common security, why should it matter whether or not NATO guarantees its borders? And to the extent the Article 4 mode infuses NATO's planning, programs, and deliberations, the Article 5 distinction will cease to become a practical or political wall.

Traditionalists, or those fearing Russia, will argue that this will dilute the alliance. But to say that Article 5 remains the core function of NATO is to facilitate the participation of, say, Portugal and Hungary while obstructing that of Russia and Ukraine in addressing real security problems, owing solely to an anachronistic attachment to territorial defense. What really dilutes NATO is the absence of a mission that corresponds to the means, interests or strategic concerns of its members.

As NATO's strategic purpose becomes to defend common interests with combined European and American power, former communist countries that have not been invited to become members should feel less excluded and less insecure. After all, the only time NATO has used force in Europe has not been due to the Article 5 obligation (which is in any case not ironclad). If NATO intervened in Bosnia without a legal requirement to do so, why would it not help, say, Romania if nascent democracy and regional security were threatened there? Increased power projection capabilities combined with a willingness to use them when interests are threatened should, in time, allay the fears of new democracies that are not members. Conversely, Russia should feel less isolated and less paranoid if NATO's strategic purpose does not depend on the spectre of a future Russian threat.

The Next Steps

Timing

Some skeptics of NATO expansion are saying that it should have been delayed until the situation in Russia was more propitious. (Supporters of expansion interpret that as meaning never, since skeptics tend to cite both positive and negative developments in Russia as reasons to delay). What is done is done. Now, pacing expansion is a good idea, but not only to allow the dust—and the Russians—to settle. NATO next needs a strategic purpose that fits with U.S. global strategy (i.e., option two). Such a strategic purpose would not exclude new

members; nor would it demand them. There is no urgency because there is no threat. This does not suggest delay so much as getting the sequence right.

In the meantime, the EU should proceed with its enlargement negotiations, especially with the countries of northeast and southeast Europe that have not been offered NATO membership. Most important, by allowing the new NATO more time to develop and the significance of territorial defense pledges to fade, future enlargement would be less divisive.

Formulating Principles

Meanwhile, it must be acknowledged that expanding and forging ties with partners is not the equivalent of giving NATO strategic purpose. At its core, NATO is the military alliance of the American and European democracies, old and new. The need for it in the new era is great, though drastically different. A few principles would help:

- The purpose of NATO is to protect European and American interests;
- This purpose includes but is not confined to defense of territory;
- Consolidating and insuring security in Europe is a *sine qua non*;
- In the new era, common interests extend and are challenged beyond Europe; a more secure, unified and capable Europe can now join the United States in looking after those interests;
- Both the United States and Europeans should share responsibility for the security of common interests both in and beyond Europe;
- The costs and risks of protecting common interests must be fairly shared, based on economic means.

Practical Considerations

The U.S. government will be busy ensuring ratification of the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—perhaps too busy to begin defining NATO's purpose. But questions of purpose and burden-sharing will arise in the ratification proceedings, and the answers will be important both for ratification and for NATO's future. The administration can best answer those questions by pointing toward option two, i.e., that NATO's purpose is to protect common

American-European interests wherever threatened and that the burden of shared security will be shared (e.g., greater European help not only in Europe but beyond). NATO enlargement makes Europe more secure and whole, thus opening up the chance for Europeans to do more for security elsewhere. Thus, adopting a broad sense of strategic direction for NATO tracks nicely with ratification of enlargement.

It is important that NATO's leaders—especially ministers—not allow themselves to be consumed by the technicalities of enlargement, the tactics of dealing with partners, consultative wiring, and the crisis du jour (e.g., post-SFOR). They should begin, calmly, to consider how the alliance should relate to the new global security conditions, even as their staffs and representatives tug them toward modalities.

The starting point could be a look at security to the south and southeast of Europe—not incrementally at the Balkans and the Med, but at the strategic challenges of the greater Middle East and Africa (thus including WMD and energy). This will address the concerns of the southern tier allies, while bypassing a theoretical and legalistic debate over whether NATO must confine itself to Europe.

Natural leadership for such a conversation should come from the United States and France—that's right, France. The United States should signal to Paris its thinking along the lines of option two, including the shared responsibility concept and the possibility of major command realignment as forces are reoriented toward power projection. It will be difficult but not impossible to prevent such an initiative from being sidetracked into bickering over existing commands and Middle East policies.

Word also should be conveyed to new members that NATO's core function is not to protect them from Russia, though it would not hesitate nor fail to do so. This in turn will open the way for a critical step: NATO force planning should be animated by the need to be able to project substantial and combined power wherever common interests could be threatened, not only or even primarily into Eastern Europe; otherwise, lacking strategic guidance, the defense of Poland will dominate planning.

Equally important, PfP partners should be told that Article 5 is no barrier to their practical participation in NATO deliberations and operations. The content as well as the modalities of these partnerships should track with the strategic direction and openness of Ar-

ticle 4. As a consequence, there will be no need to manufacture “programs” to keep partners busy and content.

Even these practical steps involve big changes and imply a fundamental shift. So count on governments to be cautious. But be under no illusion: a fundamental shift is precisely what is needed if NATO is to serve important U.S.—indeed, Atlantic—strategic interests in this era of globalization. Responsible governments, acting true to those interests, should be able to make it happen.

NOTES

1. Even within the Balkans, the danger of large-scale war is declining as Serb military superiority declines and demands for legitimate Serb government grow.

2. At present, the United States would have to provide nearly all the forces to defeat a serious threat to common interests outside of Europe. Moreover, NATO power projection within Europe, e.g., to defend a new member, would today be mainly an American operation. Option two would result in fairer burden-sharing than option one.

The Domestic Politics of NATO Expansion in Russia: Implications for American Foreign Policy

Michael McFaul

The Past: Understanding Success to Date

For two years, opponents of NATO expansion both in Russia and the West have warned that the act of inviting former Warsaw Pact countries into the Western alliance would bolster Russia's opposition forces domestically. The historic Madrid NATO summit came and went, however, without producing any visible reaction in Russian domestic politics. Everyone from neo-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy to neo-liberal Anatoly Chubais opposes NATO expansion in principle. But, in practice, NATO expansion to date has played little or no role in Russian domestic politics. Why not?

Internal Factors

1. **Yeltsin won the 1996 presidential election.** Had Gennady Zyuganov won the 1996 election, the debate about NATO expansion in Russia would have been much more pronounced. The current Russian acquiescence to NATO expansion is not deeply rooted in Russian institutions or society, but is a consequence of a small group of leaders within Russia.

Though challenged at several critical junctures, Russian liberals have defeated their illiberal opponents during most of Russia's volatile regime transition.¹ Their victories, in turn, have ensured that Russia has pursued peaceful, integrationist policies regarding the West rather than belligerent strategies.

2. **Russia's weak opposition.** Russia's communist forces are weak and ineffective. While several former communist parties in Eastern Europe have regained political power, and a few have even regained and then lost power again, Russia's communists have been sidelined

for the past decade. Russia's communists failed to oust those who had initiated economic reform in Russia's pivotal second presidential election in 1996. Despite running against an incumbent who had shrunk the economy in half, bombed the parliament, "allowed" NATO to expand, and initiated a disastrous civil war in Chechnya in which 100,000 lives were lost in defeat, Russian communist leader Gennady Zyuganov still lost to Boris Yeltsin at the polls. Since this election, Russia's communists have become even weaker as an opposition force.²

To date, a serious nationalist opposition independent of the Communist Party also has not coalesced. In 1993, neo-nationalist Zhirinovskiy exploded onto Russia's political stage as the first politician to offer a "third way," but did much to discredit Russia's nationalist movement soon thereafter. In 1996, General Lebed's authoritarian presence began to fill the opposition void, but he currently is a marginalized political figure.

3. The primacy of domestic problems over foreign policy issues. Russian elites in Moscow care deeply about NATO expansion. Russian society as a whole does not. Midstream in a social revolution, Russian citizens have a long list of domestic issues considered more important than any foreign policy issue. In the 1996 presidential election, foreign policy issues received virtually no attention. When asked in exit polls during the 1996 elections to identify the major issues of the day, only two percent mentioned foreign policy.³ The 1996 presidential elections as well as the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections helped to keep Russian national leaders focused on domestic policy issues, and not foreign policy issues.

Regarding specific policies, three quarters of the population still see cooperation with the West as an overriding priority, despite growing suspicions about Western intentions.⁴ In January 1997, only 21 percent of the population thought that the United States, Western Europe, and NATO posed a threat to Russia.⁵ These figures contrast with elite polls which demonstrate that the majority of Russian foreign policy experts see the West as a threat to Russian national interests.

4. Economic lobbies and Russian foreign policy. Russia's economic transformation has created a small set of powerful economic interest groups who dominate state policymaking. Gazprom, oil companies, mineral exporters, financial-industrial groups, electricity and telecommunication firms, and a handful of high-tech enterprises have

been the sweepstakes winners in Russia's economic transition. This handful of very profitable corporations and their political allies have provided sustained momentum for continued integration with the West. Interest groups more openly opposed to Western integration such as domestic producers threatened by imports and enterprises associated with the military industrial complex more generally have proven to be weak and ineffective lobbyists.

The pro-Western business lobby has a rather limited scope of foreign policy interests. Above all else, they seek to maintain access to Western capital and markets. When security issues such as opposition to NATO expansion threaten these access interests, the coalition of liberals within the Russian government and their allies in Russia's economic society have cooperated to sustain engagement. Regarding other foreign policy issues that are not seen to have a direct relationship to these economic interests (such as Start II or trade with Iran), this same coalition either has neglected the problem altogether or allowed other foreign policy entrepreneurs to assume center-stage.⁶

5. Russian weakness. Finally, Russian political leaders accepted NATO expansion because they had no choice. Especially after Chechnya, Russian weakness is recognized by all political forces in Russia today.

External Factors

1. The American strategy of engagement succeeded. The American strategy of assisting Russian economic and political reform and helping to integrate Russia into the international community of states served to diminish the negative consequences of NATO expansion for U.S.-Russian relations.

The personal relationship between presidents Clinton and Yeltsin played a central role in defusing the NATO expansion issue in Russia. The timing of the "group of eight" summit in Denver was particularly well-planned. American diplomats have offered Russia a set of arguments for why NATO expansion need not derail U.S.-Russian relations and have provided concrete incentives to encourage continued engagement.

2. The selection of new NATO members. From Moscow's vantage point, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland are the most "European" and anti-Russian countries from the former Warsaw Pact. (Remember Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and Poland, 1980-

81?) Psychologically, therefore, these countries occupy a different place in Russian geo-strategic thinking than the Balkan or Baltic states.

3. American motivations for expansion were vague. Paradoxically, the debate in the United States about NATO expansion helped to diffuse Russian elite criticisms. Whatever the true motivations behind the decision to expand NATO, the account most reassuring to Russian elites was the “electoral” explanation. If the Clinton Administration was pushing for NATO expansion to win votes in 1996, then Russian elites found it easier to believe that the United States was not expanding NATO solely to keep Russia out of Europe.

4. Russia had no credible counter options. Russian foreign policy responses to NATO expansion were and remain weak. Integration with Belarus is premature economically. A push to create a military alliance between Commonwealth states would exacerbate relations at a time when economic integration is proceeding successfully. A Russian-Chinese defense agreement serves no strategic purpose and would damage the economic interests of both countries.

The Future: Factors that Could Disrupt the Status Quo

None of the factors just described that combined to defuse NATO expansion as a consequential issue in Russian domestic politics are stable. A change in any one of them could seriously alter today’s precarious balance and exacerbate in turn U.S.-Russian relations.

Internal Factors

1. Change at the top and the rise of the opposition. Boris Yeltsin will not rule Russia forever. In the next presidential election, scheduled for the year 2000, candidates associated with the current ruling government—such as Viktor Chernomyrdin and Boris Nemtsov—are unlikely to win. While three years is obviously a long time in Russia, an analysis of the causes of liberal electoral victories in the past and recent gubernatorial elections suggest a different electoral logic after 1996 than during the polarized period between 1991-1996.

The threat of a communist comeback ended in the ballot box in 1996. In every binary election in the past six years—the June 1991 presidential vote, the April 1993 referendum, the December 1993 constitutional referendum, and the 1996 presidential election—anti-communism triumphed over communism. But with the collapse of com-

munism now complete, anti-communism is also dead as an electoral platform. Additionally, in the next presidential elections, the founder and leader of Russia's anti-communist bloc, Boris Yeltsin, will no longer be heading the ticket.

Shifting alliances and reorganization in both the "party of power" and the opposition has blurred the traditional lines of cleavage that have shaped Russian electoral politics over the last six years. The salient differences between Mr. Chernomyrdin and Mr. Zyuganov are increasingly less apparent. Similarly, the cleavages between liberals and nationalists are less obvious. Is Luzhkov a nationalist or liberal when he declares that the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol must be returned to Russia? Was Lebed a patriot, reformer, or traitor by actively pursuing a peace settlement in Chechnya?

This lack of ideological clarity is compounded by the absence of an institutionalized party system. Consequently, Russian citizens will be voting for personalities, rather than liberals, conservatives, or social democrats. Charismatic personalities like Lebed and even Luzhkov gain from this new context, while bland ones like Chernomyrdin and Zyuganov suffer.

This new electoral landscape, coupled with the blurring of ideological divisions, gives two kinds of candidates the upper hand—protest candidates like Aleksandr Lebed and the non-ideological "khozyani" (authoritative administrators) who get things done like Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Both of these candidates—and these kinds of candidates more generally—will complicate Russia's relations with the West, as they have little international experience, parochial interests, and only vague (or at least unknown) commitments to liberal policies regarding markets, democracy, and foreign policy.

In the long-term, the end of polarized politics will provide opportunities for new political ideologies and new political forces to emerge. Both communism and liberalism are damaged and discredited political programs in Russia today. Liberalism has the potential for revival (communism does not), but the process will be a long one. In this political vacuum, authoritarian, nationalist and even fascist ideas still have potential.⁷

2. The breakdown of the liberal, pro-Western coalition. During the 1996 presidential election, Russia's business leaders buried their differences and cooperated to help reelect Yeltsin. In the last year, however, competition between these groups regarding economic mat-

ters have soured their political alliance.⁸ Eventually, these divides between economic elites could begin to influence Russian foreign policy, especially during the next electoral cycle.

3. The postponement of elections. Given the electoral prospects of the current government described above, ideas about postponement and fraud already have begun to percolate. No event could be more detrimental to U.S.-Russian relations than such an act. The current regime is simply not strong enough to carry out this strategy, but its attempt to do so would be very destabilizing, and offers the most likely road to a coup or installation of a military regime, and the ascension to power of Russia's most anti-Western forces.

4. The future significance of foreign policy. Paradoxically, the end of Russia's revolutionary transition may allow foreign policy issues to become more important for the population as a whole. Economic growth eventually may stimulate the emergence of a wider middle class that may not have the same foreign policy interests as Russia's oligarchies.

Conversely, the sustained absence of economic growth will stimulate the search for scapegoats abroad.⁹ In either of these scenarios, Russian foreign-policy elites—that is, those most concerned with NATO expansion—will be able to assert more influence over foreign policymaking. Because Russia's media is controlled by a handful of people, public attitudes about NATO and the West could be easily manipulated in times of crisis.

External Factors

1. The further expansion of NATO without Russia. If there is to be a second expansion of NATO, then Russia should be included at the next moment for new admissions. If Russia is not included, the next expansion will have far greater domestic consequences than the first expansion.

2. New belligerent acts by NATO. Nationalists in Russia are waiting for a belligerent NATO act against Russian foreign policy interests that can be used to confirm their explanations about the motivations behind NATO expansion.

3. Russian war with a neighboring state. Any military confrontation involving Russia will strengthen the hand of nationalist forces in Russia. The probability of such a confrontation, however, is not high.

Recommendations for American Foreign Policy

1. **Make the Founding Act meaningful.** This is a major challenge for U.S. diplomats that demands sustained attention. Concluding the agreement was the easy part; making it meaningful will be a major challenge. Neglect of this new institution will provide militant opponents of NATO with another argument about the West's true sinister intentions.

2. **Demonstrate that NATO has been transformed.** Greater information about the new NATO must be disseminated in Russia. Russian delegations to NATO headquarters, international seminars and conferences about security issues convened in Russia, and articles by Western leaders and commentators in Russian newspapers are all useful and should be expanded.

3. **End the NATO expansion "debate."** The more Americans and Russians continue to discuss NATO expansion as an "issue" or a "problem," the greater the issue or problem becomes. Paradoxically, the debate about the first phase of NATO expansion has essentially ended in Russia, but not in the United States. American foreign policymakers must make every effort to make other issues in U.S.-Russian relations more salient, both at home and in the interactions with their Russian counterparts.

4. **Actively engage Russia in other international institutions.** Above all else, Russian elite opposition to NATO expansion was driven by a suspicion that expansion would keep Russia out of Europe. This fear can be mitigated by further integrating Russia into other international institutions like the World Trade Organization, the "group of eight," and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). In parallel, the European Union should be encouraged to accept new NATO members as a way to demonstrate that NATO expansion is one component of a general strategy of European integration.

5. **Assist and insist on Russian democracy.** Over the long run, Russia will remain a peaceful partner of Western democracies if liberal institutions and liberal norms take hold internally and remain in place to shape and constrain policy after the departure of Russia's current liberal leaders. American policy towards Russia now must re-focus on fostering the consolidation of these liberal norms and institutions in Russia. It is premature to be cutting democratic assistance programs. American leaders also can help Russia avoid a domestic

disaster by insisting that their counterparts in the Russian government hold free and fair elections on time and under law.

The Russian voters are the West's greatest allies today in Russia. If Russia drifts towards authoritarian rule, elites will be more insulated from societal pressures and therefore freer to pursue more activist foreign policies. The best guarantee of peace between Russia and other democracies in the world is to insure that Russian citizens become Russia's most important foreign policymakers.

6. Engage Russia's new leaders. American support for liberal individuals in the Russian government, including most centrally Boris Yeltsin, has been a wise strategy. In times of institutional change and especially revolutionary change, individuals play a much more independent role in making policy than in stable political systems. Just as "bad" leaders in times of crisis can exacerbate the potential for conflict, "good" leaders in these same conditions can make decisions that facilitate peace. To back good leaders whose interests coincide with American interests, therefore, makes sense. The strategy of engaging individuals with dubious reform credentials in order to convince them of the benefits of reform has been less successful.

In the next few years, the lines between good guys and bad guys will become fuzzier. In this new context, U.S. leaders should seek closer ties and better understanding of those in the "gray zone" such as Aleksandr Lebed and Yuri Luzhkov. Just as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has given American leaders an opportunity to know Chernomyrdin, similar kinds of contacts should be fostered with Russia's new leaders, especially regional leaders.

7. Promote Russian economic development. The faster the Russian economy begins to grow, the better the chances are the Russian liberals can stay in power. It is unlikely, however, that economic growth will be sufficient enough in the next three years to influence the next presidential election. Consequently, a successful strategy for managing U.S.-Russian relations while NATO expands cannot be based solely on promoting economic reform and growth in Russia.

8. Open a dialogue with Russia's opposition leaders. In parallel to expanding contact with Russian government officials at lower levels of power, U.S. policymakers should seek to develop informal channels with Russia's nationalist and communist opposition leaders and ideologues. Many of these people have poorly formed ideas about the West and little if no contact with Westerners. Likewise, Western

policymakers and analysts have an equally poor understanding of the ideas and interests that motivate these opposition forces. Through non-governmental organizations and academic institutions, relations with these political leaders should be greatly expanded.

NOTES

1. The decision to invade Chechnya was a notable (and tragic) exception.
2. While the Russian government has pursued a partial economic reform strategy that has benefited only a few and caused considerable pain to many, the Russian Communist Party and its allies in the Duma have approved every budget proposed by Yeltsin's government since 1994. In four years, Russian legislators have threatened a vote of no confidence in Yeltsin's government only once. Similarly, at the regional level, Russian communist and nationalist organizations supported several successful gubernatorial candidates during the flurry of local elections that occurred in the fall of 1996. Soon after assuming power, however, most of these new "opposition" governors quickly pledged their loyalty to Yeltsin's government and distanced themselves from their opposition supporters.
3. The poll was conducted by Mitovsky International and CESSI, Ltd. during first round voting in June and was reported in *The New York Times*, June 18, 1996, p. A4.
4. Richard Dobson, "Is Russia Turning the Corner? Changing Russian Public Opinion, 1991-1996," No. R-7-96, (Washington, DC: USIA, September 1996) p. 70.
5. T.I. Kutkovets and I. M. Klyamkin, *Russkie Idei*, (Moskva: ISA, 1997) p. 39.
6. For instance, Russian oil companies and bankers have demonstrated little interest in arms control issues, allowing other interest groups to dominate debate on issues like START II or CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) negotiations. Similarly, this engagement coalition has ceded arms trade promotion to the Ministry of Atomic Energy and individual enterprises of the military-industrial complex.
7. In comparative perspective, authoritarian dictators (Napoleon, Stalin, Hitler) have tended to seize power during revolutionary transitions roughly a decade after the beginning of transition. Russia is only six years into its transition.
8. The divisions between Gazprom and the Chubais/Nemtsov part of the Russian government prompted an alliance between Gazprom and the communists in regards to demonopolization regulations. Similarly, the Svyazinvest auction fueled divisions between Oneksimbank and Chubais/Nemtsov, on the one hand, and Boris Berezovsky, Logovaz, and Most Bank, on the other.

9. The composition of the new government in Russia combined with the ethnic backgrounds of many prominent Russian bankers already has served to increase anti-Semitic and anti-foreign attacks within the nationalist press.

Russia and the West After Madrid

Sherman W. Garnett

Months of wrangling with Russia over NATO enlargement that many predicted would end with a bang over NATO enlargement have ended with a whimper and a strong sense of anti-climax. Unyielding Russian opposition ultimately gave way to a grudging acceptance of NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, even as Russia tries to rule out membership for the Baltic states and for the states of the former USSR. President Yeltsin extracted the best deal he could get, including expanding Russia's relationship with NATO. Skillful U.S. diplomacy, Yeltsin's return to political and physical health and Russia's weak hand overall brought about the accomplishments of Helsinki, Paris and Madrid. However, those charged with making the Russia-NATO Founding Act and other aspects of NATO-Russian cooperation work face real tests in the days to come.

Russia's Awkward Fit

Wherever its current economic and political reforms are ultimately headed, Russia remains an awkward fit in Europe now and for the foreseeable future, especially in Europe's core institutions. Russia cannot and should not be excluded from Europe, but the problems Russia poses to the expanding European order cannot be wished away. For the next 5-10 years, Russia will remain a troubled state. Fiscal pressures, what Yeltsin has described as "the irresponsibility and incompetence" of the government, military weakness and the sheer magnitude of political and economic reforms will make Russia a distracted and declining power.

Yeltsin has been the main steady influence on a wide range of foreign and security policy agreements, particularly on NATO-Rus-

sian cooperation. Yet his indispensability is proof of the systemic weakness of Russia's foreign and security policy-making structure. Without him this structure could not have produced the agreements we have. Moreover, Primakov, other senior officials and the bureaucracy have to date been unable or unwilling to follow through on agreements negotiated by Yeltsin. Without radical transformation in the months ahead, this structure will be a major drag on progress after Yeltsin has left the scene.

Reform of the key foreign and security policy institutions should be an important priority. Yet since January 1996, there has been a dizzying array of comings and goings at the most senior positions (two foreign ministers, three defense ministers, three national security advisers). Negotiating authority is fragmented. The current team, led by Primakov, offers no great hope of long term stability for Russian policy (nor even of short-term survival for the team itself). The Russian military in particular is in disarray. Russia's abiding weakness inspires greater suspicion of the motives of others, especially the United States, and a creeping nuclearization of Russian defense policy. Russia has a whole set of security commitments to states in the former Soviet Union that its current military forces can not keep. In late August it chose to make another, agreeing to regard an attack on Armenia by a third party as an attack upon itself. The disparity between Russia's reach and grasp will continue to be key to understanding Russia's actual foreign policy.

This turmoil goes hand in hand with an unrealistic foreign policy consensus on many key items. Yet this consensus has proven no sure guide to Russian policy. Russia's long term place in the world and basic national interests are in no way as clearly understood as this consensus now presents them to be to the outside world. The complete set of players and interest groups has not yet arisen, nor has a stable state structure capable of managing their interaction on key foreign and security policy questions.

Besides the elements of the traditional Moscow foreign policy community, new business and regional interests have arisen and have exerted their influence at times, especially on international economic issues. The debate between these rising interests and traditional players in Russian foreign policy is still a missing element of the reform debate. There is no reason to expect that it will unfold any more smoothly than has the struggle over political and economic reforms.

Still, it is also wrong to assume that Russia is too weak or too dependent on the West and the world economy for the outcome of this debate to matter.

A Distracted and Divided West

The previous six months have produced enormous accomplishments, yet there are several factors at work in the West that will make it difficult—though not impossible—to sustain the momentum on Russian-NATO cooperation. First and foremost, however important such cooperation is, it no longer has the center stage. NATO has done its work in designing a framework for security cooperation, but for many in Europe the old urgency has passed. The apocalyptic clash of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is no more. Measures designed to ensure that NATO enlargement did not revive old style military confrontation are in place. Russia is in no position to revive that competition in the next decade, even if its generals or a new set of political leaders wanted to. NATO never resolved satisfactorily its role in “out-of area” operations before NATO-Russian cooperation became a real option; it is no more likely to come to consensus now. As Bosnia has shown, the out of area issue will not go away. European capabilities to support such operations will continue to erode, as has the public and elite consensus to support defense spending on such capabilities.

For most NATO countries, the security agenda has itself been transformed in ways that raise questions about Russia’s immediate relevance to their concerns, especially if Russia is too weak or too divided to play a positive role. In part, that agenda has been regionalized, creating even among close allies markedly different threat perceptions and policy priorities. The Danes want the Baltic states in NATO. Turkey demands attention to its much more threatening regional environment. France’s neo-Gaullist foreign policy finds in Russia a potentially attractive partner.

In a future crisis, some states might wish to draw Russia in; others will certainly want to keep Russia out. In its current condition, Russia has little to offer in conflicts far from home except its presence as a symbolic indication of the Concert of Europe. In other ways, the security agenda has turned to global issues. It is crucial that Russia participate in efforts to address nuclear and WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation, narcotics trafficking and other terrorism, but its weakened condition make it at best a bench player on these

issues. On the nuclear and WMD issues, Russia must be present because it is the main source of potential problems.

Finally, the set of issues likely to dominate Russia's relations with the West is not the security agenda, but the economic one. Russia's entrance into WTO (the World Trade Organization) by the end of 1998—a goal set by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit—is a difficult undertaking. A crucial question for our allies is Russia's long-term access to European markets for products other than its oil, gas and other desirable natural resources. Russian policy has consciously embraced the European Union (EU) (and even its expansion) as a positive institution to be contrasted to NATO, yet there is no reason to expect a swift and carefree negotiation of trade, tariff and other regulatory issues between Russia and the EU.

Russia's New Neighbors

The former Soviet Union could also become a source of persistent friction and anxiety. What is at stake is not so much a conscious revival of great power competition, as a complex matrix of overlapping interests, expectations and policies that could produce misperceptions and inadvertent conflicts. Though Russia continues to enjoy real leverage over its new neighbors, its power is still contracting for the most part. The states that have arisen on the territory of the former USSR are a diverse lot. Some are potential sources of instability. Some continue to look to Moscow, but none want to give up their sovereignty. They all want to take advantage of new openings to the outside world. The outside world in turn, once shut out of this space, now wants in. New economic, political, cultural and security ties are forming. New influences, from China in the East to NATO's new front line in the West, are making themselves felt in Russia and the territory of the former USSR more generally.

Russia's initial response to these trends was to stimulate integration via the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Enough time has passed to say that this wholesale solution to restoring Russian influence in the former USSR is a failure. Still, Russia has made inroads with its new neighbors. It has real influence over them but lacks the economic, political and military power to create and lead such a community. The other CIS states simply do not want to follow. Russia is now in retreat from its integration-oriented policies on the ground, though it has not completely given up on the policies them-

selves. It is a telling point, however, that Russia has had more success in the last few months in normalizing its ties with its difficult neighbor, Ukraine, than in deepening integration with its more willing neighbor, Belarus. In large measure, the impending prospect of an expanded NATO inspired Russia's more friendly approach toward Ukraine.

The West is only beginning to discover—in many cases, inadvertently—its interests in the former USSR. These range from stabilizing the far edge of an expanded NATO to ensuring access to energy and natural resources in the still neglected southern tier of the former USSR. Future economic and security ties, transportation links, pipelines and other connections between the former Soviet Union and East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Central Europe will likely transform western perception of the region's importance. The great issue of the past several years where Western and Russian interests have overlapped is Ukraine. The big issue of the next few years will doubtless be the Caucasus, where Western interests in oil will be projected into a region of weak states, recurring regional conflict and traditional Russian, Turkish and Iranian interplay. Fortunately, hard work in the past several years has produced important instances of soft landings and genuine cooperation. Such experience lies at the heart of Ukrainian denuclearization and the Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltic states. This policy experience needs to be applied to the Caucasus and elsewhere in the former USSR as Western engagement continues to grow.

Conclusion

The past few months have seen real accomplishments in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations, but many more tests lie ahead. This paper has emphasized some of the larger challenges to the current U.S.-Russian and U.S.-NATO relationship. Still, a concrete security agenda has to be pursued as a key element of sustaining momentum. Such an agenda could include the following elements:

1. **Serious implementation of the NATO-Russian Founding Act.** Given Russia's internal problems, resource constraints and suspicions, Moscow is unlikely to be a particularly dynamic element in the NATO-Russian partnership. NATO must be. Yet the debate surrounding the Joint Council, for example, has focused on restricting its scope or shielding it from undermining NATO as a whole. If Russia misbehaves in the Joint Council, such misbehavior must be managed.

Yet we must keep our perspective: such misbehavior poses much less risk to the Alliance than the growing disunity among the allies themselves.

2. High-level strategic dialogue on NATO's future. For Russia, the most serious question on the agenda is NATO's future plans for enlargement. NATO's next moves on enlargement, not the workings of the Joint Council, will be the long-term litmus test for Russia's approach to NATO. Russia needs to understand U.S. and NATO intentions regarding interim measures, including our Baltic strategy, policies toward the Nordic countries and their possible interest in NATO membership and the evolution of the U.S.-Ukrainian strategic partnership. This dialogue also has to take account of NATO's ongoing transformation, its continuing reduction of both forces and readiness and other aspects of NATO that are not well understood or deliberately distorted in Russia. The small alliance liaison effort in Moscow has to be expanded.

3. Enhanced Western support for conflict settlement on the territory of the former USSR. Recently, Russia has taken important steps to multilateralize the resolution of the Transdniestrian problem in Moldova. Russia has agreed to open the process to Ukrainian participation in the Moldovan-Transdniestrian process, both in mediation and the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Russian-French-U.S. cooperation has also brought new momentum to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These are important and positive developments. As western interests in energy grow, so will the need to support lasting and truly multilateral solutions to conflicts in the Caucasus that threaten the stable flow of oil and gas. Arranging a truly win-win outcome in the Caucasus will certainly require greater western support for mediation and peacekeeping—and an extended dialogue over these issues with Russian interlocutors within and beyond the traditional foreign policy community.

4. Conclusion of a comprehensive CFE-II agreement and other measures to support the lower levels of military forces in Europe. CFE-II should involve at least some reductions, in addition to moving to national ceilings in the control of conventional armed forces in Europe. Together with existing arms control regimes and NATO's promises of nuclear and conventional restraint, a new CFE agreement will make plain that no single country or group of countries possesses the capacity for large scale offensive action. An unap-

preciated aspect of the conventional arms control agenda that NATO can help foster is the encouragement of unilateral defense decisions that respect the current low levels of military forces and readiness in Europe. Ukraine is an important test case, as it moves from its current military chaos to a new doctrine, deployments and—for at least some Ukrainian defense officials and industrialists—possible acquisition of a short range missile. Enhanced transparency and Russian cooperation with regional peacekeeping units like the Polish-Ukrainian battalion also makes sense.

5. Russia and NATO membership. Some have argued that an important symbol at this juncture to mitigate the problems of future enlargement would be to declare NATO ready for Russian membership. NATO, of course, should remain open, but possible Russian membership needs to be further analyzed. Such a commitment in advance would imply the comprehensive transformation of the alliance's collective defense core, as well as an array of possible defense commitments to Russia outside the European theater.

6. Addressing military reform and the nuclearization of Russian defense policy. The West is served by a successful reform of the Russian military. Senior level U.S. and NATO officials need to make the case to publics at home and in Russia itself of the role a reformed and modernized Russian army could play in working with NATO to address European security problems. More attention needs to be put on the consequences of Russian military weakness, especially the growing nuclearization of Russian defense policy. Of special concern is the emerging consensus within the Russian foreign policy community that embraces tactical nuclear weapons as compensation for conventional weakness.

7. Enhancing the security dialogue with a new set of issues. Arms control, denuclearization and other nuclear issues have rightly been at the forefront of U.S.-Russian dialogue and will continue to be. More effort needs to be made to raise the relationship's sights to a set of issues where there are potential common interests, particularly those that grow out of shared interests in Eurasian stability, support of moderate Islamic regimes, the proliferation of advanced military technologies along the Eurasian rimland, tactical missile defense, etc. The U.S.-Russian dialogue is absent on the future of Asia.

Even if we succeed in pursuing this agenda against the resistance in the West and Russia's own reluctance and fiscal constraints, a seri-

ous question is whether we are ready to listen to Russia bilaterally or in the small groups that still make the key security decisions. On Bosnia and other questions, we have often not been ready. We have moved ahead without Russia or given Russia a *fait accompli* that it has so far accepted. These decisions, as well as the NATO-Russian Founding Act, reveal our sense of whether we believe Russia and its current foreign policy are compatible with the new Europe.

NATO must be the most active player in the dialogue, at least in the beginning, but Russia must demonstrate a willingness to follow through on outstanding arms control commitments, like START II ratification, and clear up questions regarding continued chemical and biological weapons activities. The current environment makes a policy of patient engagement especially vulnerable to Russian non-performance.

Russia will never be a pliant or easy partner. For the next few years, it will have trouble bringing resources to the table, though it is wrong to presume it will be as weak as it is forever. Russia is deeply sensitive about its status and role in Europe, not only because of our actions, but because it questions its own capacity to play such a role. A weak Russia is inclined to attempt to delay and derail arrangements it believes may be in conflict with its long-term interests.

The work of bringing Russia into the new European order has always been a matter of decades, not years. It is not destined to succeed, though neither is it doomed to fail. Russia could well play the role of a disgruntled state on the periphery of Europe and its core institutions. Such a Russia would not represent the return of the Soviet threat, but it would complicate the security picture enormously and make more likely frictions and even potential conflicts on the edge of Europe and in the former USSR. It would certainly narrow the chances for wider Western-Russian cooperation on important global issues. It would also be a poor harvest gathered from what was so hopelessly planted in 1989 and 1991.

Beyond the Madrid Three: What About the Rest of Eastern Europe?

Steven E. Miller

The lands that lie between Russia and Western Europe in East Europe and the Balkans are home to eighteen states. NATO membership is presently on offer to only three of these eighteen. The initial enlargement of the alliance is, therefore, only a partial solution to the problem of security and stability in Eastern Europe. Whatever the benefits of NATO enlargement (whether promoting stability, filling a security vacuum, or cementing the Western orientation of new member states), they are being extended in a very incomplete way into the region. In this post-Madrid phase, the security environment in this region will be shaped more by the perceptions, policies, behavior, and fortunes of those many states that are not going to become members of NATO in the period immediately ahead than by the impact of the several states to whom membership has been offered.

Why Should NATO Care?

This reality should command the attention of and deserves priority in the policy deliberations of NATO and its member states for at least four reasons.

First, the implications of NATO enlargement for NATO itself will depend in part on the character of the security environment in Eastern Europe. Given that NATO is assuming formal security obligations in the region, it will matter enormously whether this area is stable, prosperous, and peaceful or troubled, friction-laden, and disorderly. Though NATO is presently extending membership to only three states, it has a stake in the wider security situation in the region.

Second, NATO's policy of very selective enlargement has drawn a vivid new line in Europe. To be sure, NATO and its member states

do not intend or desire a new division in Europe. In their rhetoric, NATO's leaders have sought to deny the existence of or minimize the importance of this line. But those in the region—both those who will be in and those who will not—are and will remain acutely aware of the difference between those who are full members of NATO and those who are not, those whose security is afforded protection by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and those who do not enjoy such protection, those whose security is directly linked to American power and nuclear capabilities and those whose security is not so linked. It is precisely the fact of such differences that makes NATO membership or non-membership so consequential. The import to the states in question is so great that it is pointless to pretend that this line does not exist or is not meaningful.

There is, moreover, a second line that may be emerging, though so far less vividly and less clearly, in post-Madrid Europe: that between those states who hope or expect to be included in a second wave of new NATO members and those for whom NATO membership is a more distant, or even a nonexistent, prospect. In the coming few years, then, there may be three classes of states in Eastern Europe: three new NATO members; perhaps a handful of states optimistic about their chances of attaining NATO membership in the second tranche; and those for whom NATO membership is not a realistic prospect in the near- to mid-term future. The priorities and orientations of these three categories of states are likely to be quite different; this is a potential impediment to the fashioning of security arrangements in the region.

If the stark division of the past is not to be succeeded by new (presumably less malignant but nevertheless real) lines of separation, NATO must find ways of addressing security concerns in the region as a whole, including attention to those states who are not part of the initial enlargement and those unlikely to become full members of NATO for the foreseeable future (a category that presently includes one of the most important states in the region, Ukraine). Europe will not be “whole and free” or “undivided” if half or more of the states in Eastern Europe are not a part of the main institutional adaptation to the end of the Cold War in Europe. As Asmus and Larrabee have written, the West “must forge a clear policy toward the have-nots if NATO is to achieve its post-Cold War goal of security integration and cooperation in Europe.”¹ Creating a new security order in Europe

requires that NATO do more than simply engage with the concerns and interests of the three states selected for membership at Madrid.

Third, NATO's enlargement policy has the potential to exacerbate security problems for states in the region left out of the Madrid round. They fear, privately if not publicly, that they will be denied the benefits of NATO membership while facing more assertive behavior on the part of a Russia disgruntled by NATO's policy. Consequently, they urge, sometimes explicitly, that NATO be accountable for proceeding with enlargement in a way that does not harm the security position of the have-nots.² NATO's enlargement policy will not be regarded as a success if it provides security for three states and problems for a larger number of other states in the region.

Fourth, this region looms large in relations between Russia and the West. NATO enlargement has already been, in the past several years, one of the most difficult issues in relations between Moscow and Brussels, and between Moscow and NATO member states. Uncertainties about or unsettlement in the security environment in Eastern Europe can complicate, irritate, or (in the worst case) poison relations with Russia.³ NATO's strategy for managing NATO enlargement depends on success in building good relations with Russia while adding new members of the alliance. It will be more difficult for this strategy to succeed if security arrangements in Eastern Europe become a serious point of contention with Moscow.

In short, truly attending to security in Eastern Europe necessarily involves much more than extending NATO membership to three new members. It requires engaging the concerns, fears, interests, and security situations of the much larger number of states in the region who will not be in the first round of new NATO members. NATO's Madrid enlargement can only be a piece of a coherent strategy for promoting stability and security in Eastern Europe. For the reasons described above, it is important that NATO not neglect or overlook the need for a more comprehensive approach to security in the region, one that goes beyond the favored three.

What Can Be Done?

What, then, might be done (and in some cases, is being done) to assuage the concerns of states left out of the Madrid enlargement and to promote the emergence of a stable and peaceful region-wide security arrangement?

Manage the Relationship with Russia

NATO and its members have their own interests in Russia's internal reform and external policies. But another reason to work hard to preserve and enhance a friendly and constructive relationship with Russia (a subject whose particulars are addressed elsewhere in this report) is the formative position Russia occupies in the security environment in Eastern Europe. The security of states in the region (particularly those like Ukraine and the Baltics, that border on Russia and are of particular interest to Moscow) will be directly and profoundly influenced by the character of the Russian state and the foreign policies it pursues. States in this region are likely to feel much more immediately and much more deeply than any present NATO member the failure of NATO's effort to give life and practical significance to the NATO-Russia Charter. Hence, though some in the region may resent and regret the attempt to create a so-called "special relationship" between NATO and Russia, such a relationship is very much in their interest, and their security will be enhanced to the extent that NATO succeeds in influencing Russia in benign directions. Indeed, these countries may have a stake larger than that of NATO itself in the success or failure of NATO's Russia policy.

Keep Open the Door to Further NATO Membership

By the summer of 1997, a dozen states in this region had formally applied for NATO membership. Madrid thus produced three winners but nine losers; Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia saw their hopes for membership thwarted at Madrid. The best palliative for those states that wish NATO membership but were not among the chosen three at Madrid is the prospect of future membership. Leaving the door open ensures those states that their disappointment is only temporary and creates powerful incentives for them to act, both internally and externally, in ways that are consistent with future NATO membership. This can promote democratization at home and the peaceful resolution of disputes within the region, as called for by NATO's membership criteria, and can provide NATO with considerable leverage for encouraging desirable trends in the region.

And in fact NATO's current policy does explicitly say that the first wave of new members is not the last and that the possibility of membership has not been foreclosed for any state in the region. More-

over, some of the disappointed aspirants, particularly the Baltic states, have been told by Western officials that their membership is envisioned in the next wave. Aiming for NATO membership will remain at the heart of the security policies of those states that have already applied for membership, and others who have not yet formally sought to do so may also decide to apply.⁴ The prospect of future membership will not be a perfect balm for Eastern European security worries, but it will greatly ease their concerns by making it seem that their preferred security solution will eventually be available to them.

NATO's open door policy on future membership is already in place and straightforward to articulate. However, sustaining its benefits in terms of post-Madrid aspirants is subject to several complications. First, subsequent rounds of membership are being contemplated before the first wave of new members has been dealt with. Should the ratification process for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic prove messy and politically costly, or should NATO find the process of digesting new members to be more difficult than expected, NATO's enthusiasm for new members could wane, particularly in the short run. This could undermine the credibility of the open door posture.

Second, there could well be tension between NATO's desire to move toward further enlargement at a measured pace, so as to allow for the integration of the first wave and to provide time for strengthening a cooperative relationship with Russia, and the desire of NATO aspirants to become members as quickly as possible. Prospective members will be neither satisfied nor wholly reassured if NATO's door will open again only at some unspecified point years and years into the future.

Third, NATO's second round of enlargement may prove to be more controversial than the first. The Madrid enlargement involved the three easiest cases: the westernmost members of the former Soviet imperium, all rather secure, stable, and successful. The next round will inevitably involve more challenging cases. The states of South-eastern Europe, for example, are generally less stable and less successful than the Madrid three. The Baltic states are much more vulnerable and much more difficult to defend credibly, as is Ukraine, should its membership become an issue. And, of course, any move beyond the Madrid three is likely to be even more provocative to Russia, which feels historic interests in the Balkans and which has voiced strenuous

objections to the idea that NATO membership might be extended to states of the former Soviet Union. For these reasons, the commitment to go beyond Madrid in the admission of new members to NATO may trigger a contentious debate about whether further enlargement should happen, who the additional members should be, and when the subsequent enlargement should be undertaken. Such a debate is unlikely to be very comforting to those states waiting in the wings for their turn to join NATO and in the interim needing to draw their reassurance from NATO's open door policy.

Fourth, following from the previous point, NATO's open door policy has the potential to be a chronic irritant in NATO's relations with Russia. There is, at a minimum, a certain tension between the objective of building a cooperative relationship with Russia and the willingness to extend NATO membership to states on the very frontiers of Russia. This tension derives not from the logical inconsistency of the two policies but from political realities. Logically, it is possible to argue—as many do—that NATO's relations with Russia can become so close and harmonious that subsequent enlargement of the alliance will be rendered unprovocative; that, no doubt, should be a prominent goal of NATO's Russia policy. But existing political realities suggest that NATO enlargement has the potential to excite some of the worst instincts in the Russian body politic, that it raises vestigial fears, highlights Russia's sense of weakness and aggrievement, agitates nationalist impulses, and complicates cooperative endeavors between Russia and the West.

None of this means that a rift is inevitable or that it will be impossible to collaborate with Russia; the negotiation of the NATO-Russia Charter in the context of NATO's first wave of enlargement makes it clear that serious business can still be done with Moscow even when it is peeved about NATO enlargement. But nevertheless, the potential for the open door policy to disturb NATO-Russian relations clearly exists. For example, even after the NATO-Russia Founding Act and even after the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said that if NATO invites the Baltic states or other states of the former Soviet Union to become members, Russia will "review our entire relationship with NATO."⁵ Given Russia's deep unhappiness at the prospect of new NATO members beyond the Madrid three, progress in NATO-Russia relations may be slower and more costly, the risk of

failure may be higher, and some Western preferences (such as START II ratification) may be thwarted as a consequence of NATO's open-ended attitude toward membership. And should a second wave that brings NATO to Russia's borders produce more virulent reactions in Russia, more severe repercussions could ensue.

In short, agile diplomacy will be required to gain the benefits of the open door policy while avoiding the pitfalls. Two conclusions flow from the foregoing considerations. First, this discussion underscores yet again the pivotal importance of NATO's Russia policy; its success or failure will have a massive impact on the course and the cost of NATO's enlargement policy. Second, a declaratory open door policy is an important element of a comprehensive strategy for security in Eastern Europe, but the full benefits of this policy will not be gained if declarations are not accompanied by buttressing actions. Some of the measures discussed below have the virtue that they would both address concerns of the have-nots in the interim while enhancing the credibility of NATO's open door policy on membership.

Fully Exploit Partnership for Peace

NATO has a potentially potent instrument for dealing with region-wide security concerns in its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.⁶ PfP has at least two great advantages.

First, where the enlargement process presently involves only three states, to be joined at some unknown point in the future by some unknown but probably small group of additional states, PfP already includes virtually all the states in the region, including those who have applied for membership, those who have not, as well as Russia. Indeed, as of July 1997, twenty-eight states had joined PfP, including all fifteen states of the former Soviet Union, all of the Soviet Union's former allies in the Warsaw Pact, four of Europe's neutrals, two successor states of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Macedonia), and Albania.⁷ It is, in short, inclusive enough to encompass the entire security situation in Eastern Europe.

Second, PfP provides substantial access to NATO, including institutionalized consultation and cooperation and operational military collaboration. PfP members have liaison offices at NATO headquarters in Brussels and permanent representation in the Partnership planning cell associated with NATO's military headquarters in Mons, Belgium. PfP members can and do participate in NATO military exer-

cises and operations, including the one in Bosnia. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly in terms of reassuring non-member states, under clause 8 of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document, NATO offers itself as a venue in which PfP member states can voice serious security concerns: “NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.”⁸ By extending these consultative rights to PfP members, NATO ensures that it will not be able to ignore security developments relating to non-members.⁹

To be sure, PfP provides neither an Article 5 security guarantee nor full voice and vote in the North Atlantic Council, so for many states it is unlikely to be satisfying as a permanent alternative to full membership. Nevertheless, fully exploited, PfP can provide the have-nots with a close political and operational relationship with NATO. This collaboration can enhance the credibility of NATO’s open door policy and help prepare NATO aspirants for membership, while providing reassurance in the interim. It can also help even those states not presently aiming for or expecting NATO membership to feel that their security is linked, even if indirectly, to the continent’s most successful security institution.

Utilizing PfP in this way will require that it not be allowed to atrophy or languish as a consequence of the preoccupation with new members. Nor will it be effective if it is bogged down in a morass of bureaucratic inertia by the NATO bureaucracy.¹⁰ And PfP will not be able to play a central role in post-Madrid security arrangements in Eastern Europe if it is limited or crippled by financial constraints. From its inception, PfP has been a “pay to play” program; the partner states must pay their own way.¹¹ Given the economic difficulties in a number of these states, this has substantially circumscribed the impact of PfP.¹²

But with an appropriate investment of political priority and financial resources, PfP can provide many of the benefits of NATO membership and be a key element for assuaging the concerns of the have-nots in the region—it can be, as one observer put it, a “junior NATO.”¹³

NATO should have the objective of minimizing the difference between new membership and PfP partnership.¹⁴ In terms of participation in NATO activities and collaborating with NATO exercises

and operations, an invigorated PfP would provide the have-nots with nearly equal opportunities compared with those available to new members.

Assist Prospective Members in Preparing for Eventual Membership

The credibility of NATO's open door policy will be enhanced, and the confidence of Eastern Europe's have-nots will be bolstered, if prospective members receive material and financial assistance from NATO members, assistance aimed at preparing the states in question for eventual membership. Across a whole range of issues, from language training to interoperability of equipment, many prospective members could use help. They will be more quickly and more certainly ready for NATO membership in the future if they receive such help. Moreover, such assistance could play an important symbolic role, making NATO's open door policy seem genuine and providing tangible evidence of the West's commitment to security for the have-nots.

Little wonder, then, that one reaction to the failure to achieve membership in the first round has been calls for greater "concrete assistance" on the path to NATO membership.¹⁵ This assistance could be provided in the context of PfP; indeed, one purpose of PfP can be to prepare aspiring members for NATO membership. But bilateral assistance would serve this function as well, and might provide that added benefit of forging links between states in the east and major powers in the west.

Implementing this idea need not involve enormous sums of money. But it will require some political capital and commitment in this era of shrinking defense budgets and dwindling military assistance programs.

Build Special Relationships with Non-Member States in the Region

NATO has signed charters with both Russia and Ukraine, intended to establish special relationships with each and to provide mechanisms for consultation and collaboration. These charters are significant opening moves in NATO's post-Madrid strategy for the east. But the hard work of breathing life into these charters and giving them constructive meaning lies mostly in the future. If these charters do not result in institutions and actions that Moscow and Kiev find useful and relevant to their concerns, they will remain mere documents and can

easily fade from view (as has happened, for example, with the 1992 document that, with much fanfare, proclaimed a U.S.-Russian strategic partnership). NATO must guard against the temptation to regard the charters as ends in themselves and neglect the essential follow-up.

In view of the enormous centrality of the relationship with Russia and the extraordinary amount of attention that has been devoted to Moscow's relationship with NATO, there is probably little risk that this special relationship will be neglected or overlooked. Ukraine is a different matter. Though it did succeed in forging its own charter governing relations with NATO, it is overshadowed by Russia and in the background of discussions about NATO enlargement and its implications. Yet it is one of Europe's largest powers, occupies a critical geostrategic location, is involved in a close, complex, and vitally important relationship with Russia, and is awkwardly placed with respect to a number of Western institutions.

As Sherman Garnett has written, "Ukraine cannot for the foreseeable future be easily integrated into any existing political, economic, or security structure on the continent, yet it will play a key role in the success or failure of these structures and of the stability of Europe overall."¹⁶ NATO should recognize the need to give the special relationship with Ukraine due attention and to manage effectively its participation in PfP. It will be much more difficult to manage the relationship with Russia and to fashion stable and effective security arrangements for the east if Ukraine becomes unanchored and unstable, and if its policies become pointed in unfortunate directions. NATO needs the special relationship with Kiev to work.

Beyond this, there is the question of which other states, if any, should enjoy charters and special relationships of their own. Others, naturally, have expressed interest in such arrangements. None ranks with Russia and Ukraine in size and significance. It is not obvious how NATO can add others to the roster of those with charters and special relations without opening up this avenue to every state in the region. Nor is it clear that one could move in that direction without devaluing the critical special relationships with Russia and Ukraine; how special is a special relationship if every state in the region has one?

Nevertheless, this is another instrument available for dealing with the security concerns of those beyond the Madrid three. It may be that the wiser course for NATO is to preserve this instrument for

Russia and Ukraine, and address all others in the context of PfP. But until that judgment has been made, this will be another item on the menu of steps under consideration for the have-nots in Eastern Europe.

Exploit Other Institutions in which States in the Region are Full Members

NATO is only one of the European institutions relevant to security in Eastern Europe. NATO members have articulated an approach which calls for drawing the states of Eastern Europe into an interlocking web of European institutions, including the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the EU (European Union), the WEU (Western European Union), the Council of Europe, and so on. This can reduce the sense of exclusion that might follow from failure to obtain NATO membership and heighten the sense that the west is welcoming the integration of the states of the east. It can also provide other venues than NATO in which security concerns of have-nots can be addressed.

This approach can only work, however, insofar as these other institutions are regarded as effective and relevant to the security concerns of the east. The OSCE, for example, is often singled out as a potential framework for managing European security on a continental scale. Were this role for it truly credible, all the states of Eastern Europe would have a significant institutional alternative to NATO in which they could address some of their security concerns. Unfortunately, OSCE has a long history of being spurned by the major powers when dealing with major issues, and it has proven ineffective in trying circumstances such as in the former Yugoslavia. Accordingly, when OSCE is invoked in relations with states in the east, this usually includes a commitment to strengthen OSCE, obviously with the intent of enhancing OSCE's credibility as a security instrument for the states of Eastern Europe. One of the principles of the NATO-Russia Charter, for example, states that "NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation...."¹⁷

In short, NATO's strategy of interlocking institutions will require that some attention be devoted to making the interlocking institutions meaningful security instruments. This means more than just talk-

ing about how significant OSCE or WEU might be. It will require behavior that indicates that the major powers in the west themselves take these institutions seriously.

Promote Diplomacy Among the States in the East

The character of the security environment in Eastern Europe will be determined to a very large extent by the relations between the states in the region and Russia, and by their relations with one another. Hence, it will be very important that diplomacy within the east is accorded appropriate priority and is handled with skill and tact. Unfortunately, there is evident in the behavior of at least some states in the East a tendency to be primarily preoccupied with fashioning their relations with the West, whether by gaining NATO membership or simply establishing the closest possible relations with NATO, other western institutions, and major Western states—while effectively turning their backs on the east. Poland, for example, has been criticized for lacking a clear and purposeful Ostpolitik that matches its embrace of the West.¹⁸ Similarly, Ukraine is described as having “frozen” its relations with regional neighbors at times in order to pursue Western support and assistance.¹⁹ Several of these states, including Ukraine and the Baltic states, have made only erratic progress in working out their relations with Moscow.

NATO should use its considerable influence in the region to encourage active eastern diplomacy—as it has done to some extent in the past. New and aspiring members ought to be pressed to combine their welcome western orientation with active and meaningful relations with Moscow and other states in the region. This is not merely compatible with close ties to NATO, but desirable and even necessary if there are to be stable region-wide security arrangements.

Develop Bilateral Relations Between Key NATO Members and States in the Region

Substantial reassurance would be provided to have-nots in Eastern Europe by the fact of close bilateral relations with key NATO members—and in particular with the United States. President Landsbergis of Lithuania, for example, has called for a U.S.-Lithuania Charter to see his country through to NATO membership. Romania’s disappointment at failing to obtain membership at Madrid was substantially allayed simply by President Clinton’s visit to Bucharest; in

the context of American policy, a little attention goes a long way toward addressing fears of being left behind or forgotten.²⁰ Ukraine would welcome a revival of trilateralism—that is, the involvement of the United States in relations between Kiev and Moscow—and regrets its waning in the aftermath of the Trilateral Agreement in 1994.²¹ In short, sustained American diplomacy in the region in the coming period can play a significant role in ameliorating East European concerns about security.

Conclusion

All of the options described here are visible, to one degree or another, in the policies of NATO and its member states. Indeed, one could imagine NATO policymakers insisting that the foregoing items constitute a description of NATO policy. So the elements of a coherent and effective strategy for security in all of Eastern Europe are at hand. The problem is less one of conception than one of execution: talking about building a special relationship with Russia is not the same as having one; intending to enhance PfP is not the same as actually improving the program; proclaiming the significance of OSCE is not the same as actually treating it as if it were important. The credibility, and ultimately the success, of NATO's eastern policy will depend on sustained implementation of the policy impulses presently evident. As James Goodby has written, "Successful prosecution of a strategy requires not only announcing it but a disciplined, even ruthless, persistence in carrying it forward."²²

The success of NATO's eastern policy, however, will depend on more than just persistent implementation, important though that be. It will depend as well on NATO's ability to avoid the potential contradictions that lurk in these various policy options. Of these, the most important (and possibly the most difficult) is the tension between the pursuit of harmonious relations with Russia, on the one hand, and NATO's open door policy on membership, on the other. If the optimists are correct, the building of a special relationship between NATO and Russia will neutralize the potentially corrosive effects of adding members beyond the Madrid three. If the pessimists are correct, NATO's open door policy will inhibit and limit, or in the worst case prevent, the emergence of such a special relationship. NATO's entire enlargement strategy hinges on which of these two views turns out to be correct. But it may well also be difficult to accept and integrate new

members without overshadowing PfP. And the powerful allure of NATO may make it difficult to promote diplomacy within the east and to utilize other European institutions; many states of the east will have their eyes firmly fixed on NATO headquarters in Brussels.

In terms of NATO's policy toward the eastern half of the continent, the Madrid enlargement is really just the tip of the iceberg. While adding three new members will no doubt be challenging for the alliance, the bigger challenges for NATO's eastern policy lie beyond the Madrid three.

NOTES

1. Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO and the Have-Nots: Reassurance After Enlargement," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6, November/December 1996, p. 13.

2. Ukraine, for example, supports NATO enlargement provided it does not erode Ukraine's security position. See Sherman W. Garnett, "Reform, Russia, and Europe: The Strategic Context of Ukraine's NATO Policy," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *From Madrid to Brussels: Perspectives on NATO Enlargement*, U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, June 15, 1997, pp. 82-83.

3. For discussion of plausible unhappy scenarios, see Richard L. Kugler with Marianna Kozintseva, *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1996), pp. 189-194.

4. Even Ukraine, heretofore mindful of Russia's objections to NATO enlargement and formally committed to a posture of neutrality, is showing signs of interest in eventual NATO membership. See, for example, Elizabeth Pond, "NATO's Silent Role in Ukraine," *Baltimore Sun*, January 29, 1997.

5. "Primakov on NATO, China, and Arms Control," *Washington Post*, September 21, 1997.

6. For background on the origins and character of PfP, see Catherine Kelleher, *The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 95-105; and Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, *NATO in the New European Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 141-145.

7. While this paper is focused on Eastern Europe, it is worth noting that all PfP members are, at least theoretically, eligible to apply for NATO membership. This means that at some point NATO may have to deal with applications from states in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

8. The Partnership for Peace document is reprinted in Kelleher, *The Future of European Security*, pp. 174-178.

9. Some put the point even more strongly. See, for example, Jamie Shea, "Should NATO Be Enlarged to the East?," in Marco Carnovale, ed., *Euro-*

pean Security and International Institutions after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 95, which suggests that by this consultative commitment NATO is accepting "special responsibility" for the security of PfP members.

10. A concern suggested, for example, by Jeffrey Simon, "Post-Enlargement NATO: Dangers of Failed Suitors and Need for a Strategy," in Blank, ed., *From Madrid to Brussels*, pp. 34-35.

11. On "pay to play" and its impact, see William Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, *Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction*, U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, August 15, 1994, pp. 10-11.

12. Illustrative is the comment by Sherman Garnett about Ukraine's participation in PfP: "the great constraint for Ukraine has been money. How far Ukraine gets in implementing a more active relationship with NATO will depend on its finding the budgetary resources for such a relationship—and on the Western alliance and its members recognizing the importance of this new relationship." *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), pp.

13. Thomas L. Friedman, "NATOWater," *New York Times*, May 19, 1997. Friedman, however, was advocating PfP as an alternative to NATO enlargement rather than as a complement to it.

14. This formulation was suggested to me by Ash Carter. A similar notion is advanced in James E. Goodby, "NATO Enlargement and an Undivided Europe," Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, May 1997, p. 5, which suggests that NATO is seeking to "blur the distinction" between membership and non-membership.

15. The phrase was used by Lithuanian President Landsbergis in appealing for U.S. assistance that would facilitate Lithuania's preparations for NATO membership. See Lally Weymouth, "Landsbergis's Warning," *Washington Post*, May 20, 1997.

16. Sherman Garnett, "Ukraine: Europe's Crucial Frontier," p. 1.

17. "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," para. 7.

18. See Sherman W. Garnett, "Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?," *Foreign Policy*, No. 102, Spring 1996, pp.

19. Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations: A Pillar of Regional Stability?," in Monika Wohlfeld, ed., *The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, Chaillot Paper No. 26, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, June 1997, p. 45.

20. See, for example, Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Makes Also-Ran Feel Like Winner," *New York Times*, July 12, 1997.

21. On trilateralism, see Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, pp. 129-131.

22. Goodby, "NATO Enlargement and an Undivided Europe," p. 6.

European Security in 2007

James E. Goodby

Steady, purposeful U.S. policy over a long period of time yielded an outcome in the Cold War that fulfilled the fondest hopes of the founders of the strategy of containment. A tenacious commitment to this grand strategy was possible because it corresponded to U.S. foreign policy traditions, to the need to avoid nuclear war, and, above all, to the moral element in the American people's thinking about their role in the world. The United States has the power to be a global policeman or a global balancer, aligning first with one state then another in accordance with the ebb and flow of power calculations. But strategic concepts like these would be rejected and their pursuit by the American government would guarantee a return to isolationism. If these ideas will not serve to engage the American people in heroic efforts for peace, which will?

In October 1996, President Clinton offered the vision of "a peaceful, undivided, and democratic continent" of Europe and in March 1997 President Yeltsin joined him in this grand design. An undivided and democratic Europe will be exceedingly difficult to achieve and the steps necessary to achieve it will be controversial. The concept implies that the norms, rules, and structures that would impress the logic of peace on relations among nations of the Euroatlantic community will come to be accepted throughout that region—essentially that all of Europe will be run along Western democratic lines. A long-term strategy would have to be devised to achieve that goal, the American people would have to be persuaded that it makes sense, and the administration would have to begin the long process of institutionalizing a policy pattern that would survive the end of the Clinton administration and, indeed, of several successor administrations.

Currently, there are two Europes—the West and the larger community of Euroatlantic states. The United States is part of both. The Euroatlantic states, including Russia and other Eastern European states, are linked by rules and institutions that are different in quality from those which link the United States and the European democracies, old and new. The Euroatlantic community has achieved some notable successes in concerting policies, for example, regarding Bosnia. But that community is functioning at best as an informal concert of sovereign nations; the roots for a deeper relationship are not yet in place.

Peace between Russia and the West is still *conditional*. Neither side has traveled so far in its thinking about the other that war between them is totally excluded as a conceivable, though unlikely, contingency. They have not yet achieved a *stable* peace, like that which exists among the Western nations, in which the possibility of war among them does not enter into their calculations.

Writing in 1951, George Kennan addressed the question of what we might hope Russia might become:

“These, then, are the things for which an American well-wisher may hope from the Russia of the future: that she lift forever the Iron Curtain, that she recognize certain limitations to the internal authority of government, and that she abandon, as ruinous and unworthy, the ancient game of imperialist expansion and oppression.”

These are goals toward which Russia already has moved in a dramatic fashion. But the Kremlin still wields arbitrary authority and Russia’s interest in her neighbors could, with cause, be labeled expansionist. Russia’s political and economic reforms are new and still shaky and therefore an authoritarian, nationalist, and expansionist Russia is not altogether inconceivable in the post-Yeltsin period. The two Europes will exist for a long time while Russia’s future comes into focus.

Still, we should ask whether war between Russia and the West could become as unthinkable as it already has become among the Western democracies and whether we should try to make it so. President Clinton acknowledged the daunting nature of the challenge: the opportunity to build such a new Europe exists now, he said, “for the very first time since nation-states first appeared in Europe . . . it has never happened before.” Speaking in Madrid on July 9, 1997, Clinton suggested that in the 21st century countries will find other ways to define their greatness than through 20th century-style territorial poli-

tics. This is a grand design worthy of the highest aspirations of the American people but

- What grand strategy might be pursued to achieve it?
- And is this grand strategy a feasible and a desirable policy for the United States to embrace?

The question of whether the American public and the Congress would regard the achievement of a stable peace throughout Europe as a goal worth pursuing for generations, if necessary, can be divided into five elements:

- Why bother?
- Will Americans support this or any other grand design?
- How should a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe be defined?
- What are the implications for U.S. relations with Western Europe?
- How burdensome will it be?

First, why bother? Plausible answers are that the division of Europe into the indefinite future will inevitably accentuate latent big power rivalries, that American indifference concerning democracy in Europe is not compatible with America's status as a leading member of the Western world, and that peace in Europe ultimately will depend on Russia's becoming a normal, democratic state within the Euroatlantic system.

More concrete answers suggest themselves if we consider the fate of the states to the east and south of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, if the division of Europe cannot be overcome. "Eastern Europe," here defined as the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and the Balkans, may ultimately be integrated into a Euroatlantic community, including both Russia and the United States, through a "series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships," to quote from declarations of Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin made in Moscow on May 10, 1995, and in Helsinki on March 21, 1997.

The building blocks of such relationships include Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and associate memberships in the EU (European Union), in addition to possible membership in NATO. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also will be useful mainly for long-term conflict resolution and for the promotion of democracy. It is unlikely to develop

the tools necessary for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement, particularly since it is not likely to acquire the authority of the UN Security Council. Sub-regional associations, for example, among the nations around the Baltic Sea and between Ukraine and Poland, might also serve the purpose of European integration. But if integration of essentially all European and North American nations into a Euroatlantic community cannot be achieved or can be achieved only over several decades, other less desirable outcomes are possible:

- Eastern Europe becomes a buffer zone between Russia, on the one hand, and an enlarged NATO and an expanded EU, on the other hand;
- Eastern Europe comes to be dominated by Russian interests and loses some of its capacity for independent action;
- Eastern Europe becomes an area where Russia and the West engage in a protracted competition for influence;
- Eastern Europe becomes clearly identified as a Western sphere of interest, with the United States and the European Union committed to upholding their interests there, by force if necessary.

Results such as these, historically, have been the norm within the European states system. Is this type of analysis anachronistic? The president's answer is that it may have outlived its validity with the end of territorial politics.

His vision of the future leads inevitably to the second question for discussion. Will the American people place their trust in *any* grand design the U.S. government may present to them? This is not an era for heroics. The end of the era of big government may be the end, also, of the era of large conceptions in American foreign policy. The level of confidence that Americans have in their federal government is at an all-time low. Former Speaker Tom Foley has referred to a dangerous denial of legitimacy to those who would lead the country. He supported this with public opinion polls that showed only 19% of the public believing the government can be trusted to do the right thing all or most of the time, in contrast to 75% in the 1950s and 1960s.

This attitude is not cheering news but it does not necessarily translate into an opinion that the U.S. government should be less active in the international arena. The public response is very likely to depend on the skill with which the strategic concept is presented from the "Bully Pulpit" and the demands it makes on the American people.

Third, how does one define “a peaceful, undivided, and democratic continent.” Should the United States encourage the enlargement of the Western world to include all the European participants in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including Russia? One answer is that the politics of exclusion would not fit the reforming instinct of America’s engagement in world politics and would be a vote of no confidence in the new buds of democracy in Russia and in East-Central Europe. This answer is rooted in the idea that security in Europe is not just a question of the distribution of military power and that the essence of security is to be found in an inclusive community of democratic nations.

Another answer is that the ancient distinctions between Russia and the West are immutable within any time frame meaningful for policy analysis and that U.S. policy should be based on that assumption. There are good arguments to support the view that Russian governmental traditions and Russia’s Eurasian geography mean that the West ends at Poland’s eastern frontier. Perhaps the Russians would prefer to keep their distance from the West—there is such a tradition in Russia and it is still strong. The key question, however, is whether the West should force this outcome on the Russians or, to the contrary, should urge the opposite.

Fourth, what are the implications for U.S.-Western European relations? Can the European Union and its expansion to the East be a sufficient answer to the problem of creating order in Europe? The Union’s political, economic, and defense institutions are still being built. Its internal structure lacks a democratic system of governance and progress towards deeper integration may slow down as difficulties in implementing the Maastricht Treaty multiply. The Union’s weak foreign policy and security machinery will limit what it can do externally for many years to come. Furthermore, the possibility cannot now be excluded, unlikely though it seems, that the Union will disintegrate under the pressure of popular nationalist sentiments in member states. These considerations cast doubt on a policy of relying on the EU to achieve the goal of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe.

On the other hand, the European Union and the United States, with other nations, have been and still are “the West,” a community of nations not unlike Kant’s vision of a Federation of Peace, and their relations can fairly be described as a stable peace. “The West” is

the main contributor to order in Europe and its constitution is strong and well-tested. Can more be done to lock in the gains achieved over the past four decades? The reasons for considering this are that stable peace in the West makes an important contribution to peace everywhere in Europe and a Western commonwealth that is a success in every endeavor should be a magnet for Russia and for all of Eastern Europe.

But would a deepening political relationship between the United States and Western Europe not work to divide Europe rather than unite it? In the absence of vigorous U.S. leadership aimed at bringing Russia into Europe, it probably would. Paradoxically, however, it may be the case that without more North American-West European integration than is now being considered, an undivided and democratic Europe might not be achievable. The very process of agreeing on the goal of an undivided and democratic Europe requires a high degree of integration of the foreign policies of the Western nations. The sustained effort over years to achieve that goal will be even more demanding.

The implication of this discussion is that there are *two* prongs to a policy of seeking a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe—a Europe that has achieved a stable peace. One is to strengthen the constitution—the rules and institutions—of the group of Western states that has steadily consolidated its cultural, economic, political, and defense activities over the past four decades. The other is to construct the constitution—the common set of rules and expectations about the behavior of states within the system—of all European and North American nations—the Euroatlantic community.

The fifth question is how burdensome a strategy calling for an undivided and democratic Europe is likely to be in resources and risks. If that question were asked when the strategy of containment was adopted by the U.S. government, that strategy might have been discarded as impractical. In fact, critics like the dean of American columnists at that time, Walter Lippmann, thought it was impractical. He believed that, “. . . the strategical conception and plan which Mr. X recommends is fundamentally unsound, and that it cannot be made to work, and the attempt to make it work will cause us to squander our substance and our prestige.”

Can a similar criticism be made of a “strategical conception” that dedicates the United States to securing, over the long run, a peaceful,

undivided, and democratic Europe? The strategy could rely heavily on diplomacy and on economic relations; the use of American military forces might not be necessary on a scale beyond which already has been used in bringing peace to Bosnia. The burdens Americans are likely to see, however, probably would stem from the following reservations:

- The domestic affairs of other countries are beyond the proper scope of U.S. foreign policy. *Implication:* Democracy as a foreign policy objective is misguided.

- The use of U.S. military force should be confined to direct threats to U.S. vital interests. *Implication:* Deploying U.S. forces in response to concerns about long-term big power relations or international norms is unnecessary.

- Russia's transition to democracy will be difficult and lengthy but she does not present any direct threat to the United States. *Implication:* Russia can become the object of benign neglect.

- U.S. relations with her European allies are dominated by economics, not political or security concerns. *Implication:* It is a distraction from the nation's real business to set objectives like peace, unity and democracy.

These reservations may be so powerful in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere that the policies and programs necessary to create an undivided and democratic Europe cannot be realized. Presidential leadership and a bipartisan coalition in the Congress supported the grand design that rebuilt and defined Western Europe after World War II. Can those conditions be met in today's America?

Framework for Policymaking

The challenges of achieving an undivided and democratic Europe can best be understood by confronting the major issues for decision inherent in establishing a long-term policy toward Europe as a whole. Four basic issues are:

1. **Can the United States invest heavily in prestige, diplomatic energy, and resources in leading Europe toward a stable peace without sacrificing its interests elsewhere?** There is an unprecedented opportunity now to unite a democratic Europe but imminent threats to U.S. security lie elsewhere—in the Middle East, for example, or in Asia. A multifaceted U.S. policy already has replaced the Cold War's concentration on the Soviet Union. It is not certain

that an ambitious European “grand design” can be relentlessly pursued except at the expense of neglecting urgent problems elsewhere. But history shows us the heavy costs of allowing rivalries in Europe to escalate to the level of armed conflict.

2. Should the United States use NATO as its main instrument for integrating a democratic Russia with the democratic West or do NATO’s core functions preclude that? If NATO’s core functions today and in the future are denationalizing defense planning, reconciling former enemies, and integrating nations of the Euroatlantic community in a single security space, then membership in a transformed NATO should be open to a democratic Russia. If we consider peacekeeping and out-of-area operations to be the main military functions of NATO in the future this also argues for Russia’s membership. If, on the other hand, NATO’s core function remains a collective defense of the NATO area and deterrence of aggression against an inner core of old democracies, then full integration of Russia with the West will be excluded in one respect and other instrumentalities—bilateral as well as multilateral—will have to be vigorously brought into play to compensate for this. This may also entail blurring the distinction between membership and non-membership in NATO.

3. How should the United States establish coherence between a phased enlargement of NATO and its goal of an undivided and democratic Europe? One answer is to create a network of interlocking organizations and to work hard through multiple channels at harmonizing potentially conflicting interests within the Euroatlantic community. But a policy of “muddling through” will not resolve dilemmas inherent in the question of what to do about NATO enlargement after 1999. We cannot escape such questions as whether membership should be frozen at 19 or additional members invited and, if so, how to extend membership to the Baltic states without taking a position on membership of a democratic Russia. A general concept or strategy for making the transition from a conditional to a stable peace requires clarity, even if it comes at the expense of encouraging political debate.

4. What policy toward Western Europe would best promote the U.S. goals of integrating Russia with the West while securing Western Europe’s cooperation in other global problems, economic as well as military-related? The members of the European Union and other democratic nations of Western Europe do not

necessarily see themselves as America's allies in building a cohesive Euroatlantic community. Considerable effort will be required to gain their full support for an undivided and democratic Europe as a fact, not just a slogan. At the same time, Western European support for U.S. objectives in the Middle East, Asia, and other areas also cannot be taken for granted. Realistically, we will have to make choices about what we ask them to do since their complete alignment with U.S. policy objectives is unachievable.

Closing Remarks

William J. Perry

At the end of the Second World War, Europe lay in ruins—shattered both physically and psychologically. At this critical time, America did something never before done in the history of the world. We created the Marshall Plan, which sought to prevent a future war by assisting the devastated nations of Europe—friends and foes alike—in rebuilding their economic infrastructure. But the Soviet Union turned down the Marshall Plan and persisted in a relentless program of expansionism, trying to take advantage of the weakened condition of most of the countries of Europe. As the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union was replaced by a struggle for the heart of Europe, we could see that we were in for a protracted period of confrontation. So we formulated policies for getting us through the Cold War: containing the Soviet Union's demonstrated expansionist ambitions, while at the same time deterring another global war.

Not only were these missions formidable, but they were likely to be with us for many decades. So, fifty years ago we established new security institutions in order to carry out these daunting missions most effectively. At the national level we created the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Air Force (including the Strategic Air Command), and the CIA—indeed, these institutions were created exactly fifty years ago this week. Shortly thereafter, the leading nations of the Western World created NATO.

These institutions were successful: containment worked and deterrence worked. In time, the Soviet Union came apart because of internal contradictions in its system—in particular its economic system. And this was followed shortly by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The Cold War is now over, and the whole world breathes easier.

But the security dangers facing the world are far from over. We face dangers from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, from regional aggressors, and from international terrorism. Any of these dangers could become threats to our security, and indeed, some of them already have.

So today our missions are to prevent these dangers from becoming threats to our security—a mission that I call Preventive Defense—and to be prepared to deal militarily with developing threats if Preventive Defense fails. The security institutions created to deal with the missions of the Cold War are not suitable for dealing with these new missions, so we must reconsider all of these institutions and modify them as appropriate. In particular, we need to modify NATO.

I believe that NATO can be the primary security institution for carrying out these new missions, but it has to be reconceived and restructured. The original mission of NATO—detering an attack from the Soviet Union—is obviously no longer relevant. The original geographical area of NATO responsibility is no longer sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no longer appropriate. And the way in which NATO relates to Russia must be entirely different from the way it related to the Soviet Union.

The new missions of NATO should be Preventive Defense—creating the conditions for peace in Europe—and the deterrence of regional aggression. The geographical area of NATO responsibility should be anywhere in the world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members—certainly including all of Europe and certainly including the Persian Gulf.

The military structure should be reorganized to emphasize CJTFs [Combined Joint Task Forces], which use the NATO command structure but which need not include all NATO members and will typically include non-NATO members. The model of this is the NATO operation in Bosnia. And NATO should develop a strong, effective partnership with Russia, using the NATO Founding Act as the tool and using the NATO-Russian partnership in Bosnia as the model. All of these changes will be difficult to make, but all of them have been started.

Most difficult, but absolutely critical to success, will be the formation of a constructive partnership with Russia. I will describe why we want a partnership with Russia, what programs comprise this partnership, and how these programs are going.

Let me first describe why our government and NATO are both working to achieve a partnership—why we care about what transpires in Russia and the newly independent states. Some argue that we should concentrate on our own domestic problems and let Russia, Ukraine, and the Central European nations deal with their own problems. I reject that view both for logical reasons and for historical reasons.

The most compelling philosophical reason has been stated eloquently by Reinhold Niebuhr, who wrote, “Man’s capacity for good makes democracy possible; his capacity for evil makes it indispensable.”

The most compelling historical analogy is, of course, the fate of the Weimar Republic after the First World War, which has been stated brilliantly by the historian, Gordon A. Craig:

“While totalitarian regimes were consolidating their power in Russia and in Italy after WWI, an experiment was being conducted in Germany to determine whether a democratic Republic could be made to work in that country. After 15 years of trial and crisis, it failed, and the ultimate consequences of that failure were a second world war and the deaths of millions of men, women, and children. If some benevolent spirit had granted the peoples of Germany and the neighboring states even a fragmentary glance at what lay in store for them in the 1940s, it is impossible to believe that they would not have made every possible sacrifice to maintain the viable Weimar Republic against its enemies, but that kind of foresight is not given in this world, and the German Republic always lacked friends and supporters when it needed them most.”

We should never believe that a failure of democracy in Russia would affect only Russians. Indeed, I believe that our long-term security depends on dealing—and dealing effectively—with the security problems facing not just Europe, but facing the world, because of the problems associated with the bold attempts of the Eastern European countries to restructure their political and economic systems.

Our security strategy is to do everything we reasonably can to keep these problems from developing into a security threat. We can do this by establishing what we call Preventive Defense programs—programs designed to create the conditions for peace and minimize the chance of war.

We are doing this in the spirit of George Marshall who, in the wake of WWII, established the Marshall Plan to assist former en-

emies in their reconstruction efforts. We have a rich menu of such Preventive Defense programs, including:

- The Nunn-Lugar program;
- The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission;
- Partnership for Peace;
- The partnership between NATO and Russia in Bosnia;
- The Marshall Center in Europe; and
- The NATO-Russian charter (the Founding Act).

These programs, all done cooperatively with Russia, effectively amount to an existing partnership between Russia and America and an emerging partnership between Russia and NATO.

One of the most dramatic examples of Preventive Defense is the Nunn-Lugar Program, wherein we have spent almost two billion dollars of defense funds to assist the nuclear states of the former Soviet Union in dismantling their Cold War nuclear legacy. In the last four years, this program has led to the dismantling of 4,000 nuclear weapons, the destruction of 800 launchers, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons in three nations (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan).

Ukraine was particularly significant, since they had the third largest nuclear force in the world. The so-called Trilateral Agreement, under which Ukraine became non-nuclear, was reached in January 1994. As the American Secretary of Defense at that time, I set about immediately to implement it, using defense resources under the Nunn-Lugar program. In March 1994, with the permission of the President of Ukraine, I visited the missile field at Pervomaysk—the crown jewel of the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] sites in the former Soviet Union. They took me deep underground to the control center, where two officers demonstrated a simulated launch, up to but not including the release of weapons.

Never shall I forget that experience, watching these young officers rehearse launching 700 nuclear warheads, all aimed at targets in the U.S. After the visit to the control center, I witnessed the removal of the first group of the 700 warheads. I returned to Pervomaysk in March 1995 and witnessed the removal of the first group of missiles. I returned again in March 1996, and the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Russian Minister of Defense, and I participated in the destruction of the first group of silos.

In the fall of 1996 I made my last visit to Pervomaysk, where I was joined again by the Ministers of Defense of Russia and Ukraine,

and together we planted sunflowers in soil that used to contain a nuclear missile silo. Ukraine is now nuclear weapons-free, and the Pervomaysk missile field is now a productive sunflower field.

Another example of the existing partnership between Russia and America is the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, formed by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in 1993 as a vehicle for the United States to help Russia with its economic restructuring. Vice President Gore saw the importance of Russia restructuring its economy after the Cold War much as George Marshall saw the importance of Europe restructuring its economy after WWII—both of them had the specter of the Weimar Republic in mind.

So Vice President Gore encouraged the different departments of the U.S. government, including the Defense Department, to organize projects that could assist in strengthening Russia's economy and infrastructure. Vice President Gore did not have access to the kind of resources committed to the Marshall Plan, but he was able to take advantage of the appropriated funds that were available—e.g., from the Nunn-Lugar program—and leverage them with large investments from U.S. companies in Russian-American joint ventures.

The Defense Department participated in this commission by managing a number of important programs in Preventive Defense. These programs are designed to facilitate the conversion of large, capable defense facilities to the development and production of commercial products, generally by stimulating a joint venture between a Russian defense enterprise and an American commercial enterprise. These joint ventures not only help rebuild the Russian economy, but they provide expanding markets for American companies and new understanding of Western business methods for Russian businessmen.

A testimony to the success of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission was the request of the Ukrainian government for a similar program, which led to the establishment of the Gore-Kuchma Commission.

The centerpiece of our Preventive Defense programs in Central and Eastern Europe is Partnership for Peace (PfP), in which all 16 NATO nations conduct joint peacekeeping exercises with 27 Eastern and Central European nations to demonstrate in practice how the military can support democratic institutions. In 1994 we held the first PfP meeting in Brussels where NATO defense ministers met with

partner defense ministers. At that meeting one of the Eastern European defense ministers said to me, “I spent almost my entire career doing nuclear planning targeting NATO. I never dreamed that I would ever be sitting in a NATO meeting with an American Secretary of Defense planning a joint peacekeeping exercise.”

Partnership for Peace is in the best spirit of the Marshall Plan. In fact, I saw Marshall’s Europe being built in Ukraine last year, when I attended Peace Shield ’96—the first PfP exercise ever held on the soil of the former Soviet Union. It was held on the L’viv training grounds. Where forces once trained for war, troops from nine nations were training for peace. There they were, exercising together, soldiers from Russia and Ukraine, Belarus and Poland, Romania and Albania, all training with soldiers from the United States and Germany. They were bridging old Cold War chasms and building personal ties of cooperation, trust and understanding between military personnel of the East and West.

Closely allied to PfP is the Marshall Center, where American and German instructors teach mid-level officers in Eastern and Central European nations on the functions of a military in a democracy. Every six months a new class of about sixty officers and senior civilians meets and studies together with officers and instructors from Germany, the United States and Eastern European nations. I have personally visited each of the first six classes and talked with their students, because I believe that the graduates of these classes will comprise the leadership of the military establishments of their nations on into the 21st century.

But the greatest test of our strategic partnership with Russia is in Bosnia. For it is in Bosnia that we are showing that NATO forces can work as partners with Russian forces. Indeed, a distinct NATO-Russia cooperative relationship is being built in practice in Bosnia.

Today, a Russian brigade is serving with the American Multinational Division of the peace implementation force. I visited that division three times last year, and I met with the American brigade commanders and with the Russian brigade commander. I can report to you that the operation is going very smoothly and that there is real cooperation between the Russian brigade commander and his counterpart American brigade commander, Turkish brigade commander and Nordic brigade commander. In Bosnia, Russia is demonstrating its commitment to participating in the future security architecture of

Europe. Indeed, Russia's participation in Bosnia casts a very long shadow on the security of Europe that will be felt for years to come.

Well, I have given you some of the highlights of the programs that NATO and the American government—particularly the Defense Department—are undertaking to transform our Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union into today's cooperation with Russia. Today the U.S. is cooperating with Russia in a comprehensive strategic partnership that has dramatically improved the relationship between our two countries—and that has made the whole world safer.

It also has improved stability in Russia and contributed in small but important ways to the economic transformation underway in Russia. I believe that this economic transformation is going remarkably well, considering the magnitude and unprecedented nature of the effort. No nation has ever attempted such a bold change:

- A complete transformation of the political system;
- A complete transformation of the economic system;
- All of this accompanied by a concomitant sociological transformation.

To be sure, this is still a work in process, and the process has entailed many mistakes. But the Russians have also made important, tangible progress, particularly compared with the history I cited earlier of the Weimar Republic—the Russian success in controlling inflation is just one such example.

They deserve the support of our government—and they are getting it.

Rapporteur's Report

Welcome and Opening Comments by William Perry

Perry welcomed the participants on behalf of the Preventive Defense Project and the five sponsors of the conference. He thanked the Center for International Security and Arms Control, the Institute of International Studies, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Johnson Foundation for their support.

Perry said that this conference is motivated by the debate over the Madrid decision on NATO enlargement. This debate cleaves American political parties, and it is profound because it is the first public debate over the post-Cold War security order. The conference organizers reject looking back, but wish to see the path ahead debated in advance, and seek recommendations for future American policy. The goal of the conference is to restate NATO's core mission, since this is the fundamental task facing the alliance. The alliance's original military structure and its relation with Russia must be very different in the post-Cold War world.

Perry stressed four key elements:

- Preventive Defense;
- Deterrence of regional aggression;
- A more flexible structure, based around Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) which can include NATO members as well as non-members;
- A strong, effective partnership with Russia.

All four of these elements are currently underway. The constructive relationship with Russia is really the key for the future. The discussions during the conference should focus on how NATO can change so that Russia becomes a more effective partner.

At the end of the conference, the five organizers will prepare a report. The organizers will not seek a consensus among the conferees, nor will they seek the participants' approval. Rather, the conference discussions will be used to inform the general conclusions of the report.

Session 1: The Enlargement Process

Moderated by Warren Christopher

Ken Myers presented his paper, entitled "The NATO Enlargement Process." During his presentation, and in response to questions, Myers stressed four points.

1. NATO's game plan is to have the accession protocols in place by the December 1997 Ministerials. The three new members—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—should be ready to submit the protocols by that time. Two factors may negatively impact that timetable. First, the upcoming Polish elections [held on September 21, 1997] may affect the domestic coalition which supports membership. Second, some governments may need to hold referenda before they can officially submit the protocols.

This may become a particular problem in the Czech Republic, even though all major Czech parties support accession. It is not clear that a majority of the electorate, which is economically cautious, would vote for accession, and this could pose a problem if a referendum were binding.

2. The allies' ratification procedures are complex. Most of the allies agree that the United States should be the first country to ratify the accession protocols, but that may not happen. The United Kingdom may ratify it quickly because their ratification procedures are fairly simple, and Germany would like to ratify the protocols before their 1998 elections. Some have expressed concern about Greek and Turkish ratification, but both are likely to ratify without too much trouble.

3. In the United States, Senate ratification will be driven by process rather than by substance. Three committees are currently scheduling hearings. The Foreign Relations Committee has already scheduled four hearings, which will start on October 7, 1997. The Budget Committee will examine how enlargement will impact a balanced budget. The Defense Appropriations Subcommittee will examine the resource commitments and the impact on readiness.

4. There will be four key issues for the Senate:

- *Cost.* Too many studies have presented too many different estimates. The Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and others are now trying to reconcile their different studies, but this will be hard since the studies do not share any common assumptions. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solano has said that cost should not affect the decision to enlarge the alliance, but the Senate will probably not share this European view.

- *The U.S.-Russian strategic partnership.* Some Senators think we have lost sight of our broader relationship with Russia.

- *Bosnia.* The Senate will debate enlargement at the same time it debates the June 30, 1998, deadline for pulling American troops out of Bosnia. These two debates will certainly influence each other.

- *Substance and process.* When a treaty goes to the Senate floor, there is little debate about its actual substance. Almost all of the debate will focus on the resolution of ratification. The key question is how to make use of this procedure, and its binding provisions.

Myers was asked about the prospects for ratifying the three new entrants. He responded that the accession protocols were likely to be signed at NATO Ministerial Meetings held on December 16, 1997. These protocols are general documents: they signify a willingness to accept the responsibilities of membership, but they do not include any specific military responsibilities. This timetable will make it difficult for the United States to be the first state to ratify the protocols: the Senate cannot begin a full floor debate until the protocols are officially submitted in January 1998, and other members may start to ratify as early as April or May 1998.

The participants then discussed many points that Myers raised during his presentation. Four major issues recurred throughout their discussion: the costs of enlargement, burdensharing within the alliance, future rounds of enlargement, and the Bosnia pullout debate.

Costs of Enlargement

The first question addressed the costs of enlargement, which quickly became one of the most contentious issues during the session. It was pointed out that this and other current debates are being held in the context of a balanced budget. There was some confusion about the assumptions underlying different cost estimates. One participant presented the Department of Defense (DOD) estimates so

they could be used as a benchmark during the discussions. The DOD estimate breaks down the costs into the following three categories:

- Internal reform of the new members;
- Increasing NATO's power projection capabilities;
- Integrating the new members into the alliance.

DOD estimates that each of these three categories will cost \$1 billion a year for the following ten years. Although the exact numbers may be off, this three-fold categorization may be a good way to think about the different types of costs. The first two categories do not require us to spend any additional money, since the new members will pay for their internal reform and the alliance has already planned to increase its power projection capability. DOD estimates that the United States would have to provide 25% of the funds for the third category, or about \$250 million a year for the next ten years, which is only 1/1000 of the annual defense budget. It was noted that most of this money would be spent on training and improving military infrastructure, such as air defense and communication, rather than on weapons acquisition. Another participant pointed out that the costs include the conduct of operations in addition to readiness. One participant asked whether any studies had focused on possible economic benefits of enlargement. No one knew of any such study, but someone said that the Bosnia operation had saved a lot of money by using a logistics base in Hungary. Another participant noted that it would be very hard to quantify long-term economic benefits in any meaningful way.

Burdensharing within the Alliance

Another area of concern was how enlargement would affect intraalliance relations. Several participants expressed concern that the European allies might be unable or unwilling to pay for enlargement, given their shrinking defense budgets and their focus on achieving the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. Recent comments by French President Jacques Chirac were seen as potentially problematic.

One participant argued that enlargement would not force the European allies to spend more money on defense, but they may need to alter their current defense priorities. A shift away from static defense and toward power projection would enable the European allies to meet the enlargement criteria without increasing overall defense budgets. Such a shift would also facilitate their participation in major out-of-area actions, which would benefit the United States. The Ad-

ministration should therefore try to convince the European allies that they should allocate more resources to power projection capabilities.

Another participant argued that the United States must work closely with the three new members to get them to contribute as much as possible, and to convince them to invest in communications and logistics instead of advanced weaponry.

Future Rounds of Enlargement

In Madrid, NATO decided that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should be admitted into the alliance. Yet there are many more states that would like to become alliance members. The conference participants recognized that we must think about the possibility of future enlargement now, before the new members are fully integrated.

One participant argued that if the rationale for admitting the three new members is based on arguments about democratization and stabilization, then membership almost automatically has to be extended to others in the future. The question will then become not *whether* the alliance should expand, but when and how *far* it should expand.

Many European states wanted Slovenia and Romania to be included in the first round of enlargement, and are likely to support further expansion to include at least these two states. France is particularly likely to raise this issue again in the future.

Several participants noted that a particularly thorny question will be whether Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia should be offered admission in the future. Russia vehemently opposes Baltic membership in the alliance, and has made clear that such a move will completely derail Russia's relations with NATO and the West. Yet at the same time, the Baltic states have some strong supporters in the Senate, who may insert a clause in the resolution of ratification that requires the Baltic states to be considered for future membership.

Bosnia and the American Troop Pullout

Most of the participants agreed that the enlargement debate will be tremendously influenced by the current NATO operation in Bosnia, and particularly by the American intention to withdraw its ground troops from Bosnia by June 30, 1998. The European allies have already stated that they will withdraw their ground forces once the United States withdraws its ground forces. Therefore, an American decision to pull out its troops will effectively end the Bosnia operation.

One participant noted that the United States has been trying to convince the Europeans that the Bosnia operation should be considered as the first CJTF, but that the Europeans remained adamant that they would not remain in Bosnia after American ground troops are withdrawn.

The United States will have to decide whether to adhere to the June withdrawal deadline at the same time that the Senate is debating the accession protocols of the three new members. Some in the Senate favor pushing the Administration to make a decision on the troop pullout as soon as possible, so that it is completely settled before the enlargement debate. Others favor pushing the Senate to ratify the accession protocols as quickly as possible, so that they are ratified before the pullout debate begins. However, these two issues cannot be disaggregated easily.

NATO must think through the consequences of several different future scenarios, and figure out how each of them could affect the enlargement debate. What if NATO ground troops pull out, and the fighting starts again? What if NATO decided to continue to rotate troops in, and becomes a semi-permanent presence in Bosnia? What if NATO soldiers are killed between now and the June 30 deadline? Two participants warned that Bosnia almost tore the alliance apart once before, and that a failure in Bosnia would pose many dangers for the future cohesion of the alliance.

Session 2: Adapting NATO to New Times and Members

Moderated by David Hamburg

David Gompert presented his paper, entitled, "What Should NATO's Purpose Be?" Gompert argued that there are two different concepts of NATO's purpose. The first concept is based on *geography*: NATO should provide security for Europe, which means retaining its Cold War and post-Cold War focus.

The second concept is based on *interests*: NATO should provide security for the shared interests of Europe and the United States wherever they may be threatened.

Gompert argued that NATO must adopt the second concept if it is to remain relevant in the post-Cold War world. He made four main points during his presentation.

1. **Europe has not been this stable and secure in over a century.** The hegemonic threats are gone, and the danger of ethnic con-

flict in Eastern and Central Europe has already peaked. Yet there are new security challenges:

- The allies are vitally dependent on insecure energy supplies;
- Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are spreading;
- Energy and WMD concerns are highest in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union—which are the least stable regions of the world;
- China's power is growing.

The first three threats are common interests of the United States and its allies. And the United States will be better able to deal with the Chinese threat if its European allies help address the first three threats.

2. American and European military capabilities and posture are extremely different from one another. The United States military is designed for decisive power projection, and the European militaries generally focus on static border defense.

3. The Europeans will continue to decrease their defense budgets until they face an incentive to change and they explain to their publics that they need the capability to address a wide range of their interests beyond their borders. Can NATO function as both a European insurance policy and a security exporter? To a large extent, it already does. Its security exporting functions already fall under Article 4 of the treaty. Article 4 operations are not geographically limited to Europe, and they do not conflict with territorial border defense. However, to fulfill both functions, the Europeans must reorient their forces towards power projection. Only 20% of European forces are currently oriented towards power projection, and only half of those can actually be used effectively. The European responsibility for power projection should include command responsibility. The Europeans should take the lead in providing security *within* Europe, while the United States should take the lead for power projection operations.

4. Reorienting NATO towards defending its members' interests wherever they occur would have a positive impact on the enlargement debate. Enlargement will become less of a contentious issue, since the distinction between members and non-members will not be as sharp. It is very easy to invite non-members to participate in Article 4 actions.

Gompert's paper and presentation proved to be extremely controversial. None of the participants wholeheartedly endorsed

Gompert's future vision of the alliance. One group of participants argued that NATO should have a wider mission, but that Gompert's vision went too far. A second group of participants argued that NATO's mission should remain largely unchanged.

Supporters of a Wider Mission

Many of the conference participants agreed that NATO should widen its mission to include more Article 4 missions, yet disagreed with some of Gompert's recommendations. Specific comments included the following:

- Responsibility within the alliance should not be divided, so that the Europeans are mostly responsible for actions within their area and the United States takes the lead in out of area operations. This has not worked in the past, for two reasons: American capabilities are needed for some European operations, and the United States provides a perceived objectivity and fairness that the Europeans cannot provide for one another. NATO's experience in Bosnia demonstrates both of these points. The United States will continue to be needed in Europe.

- Although Gompert's paper claims to support enlargement, it ironically argues *against* it. If NATO should be focusing more on Article 4 operations outside of Europe, then it does not make sense to admit three new members that will need to look *inward* for some time to come. For Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO membership is about the Article 5 security guarantees, not about Article 4 out of area operations.

- How would Russia react if NATO adopts this new, wider mission? If NATO focuses on Article 4 operations, and the Europeans develop a power projection capability, won't Russia feel increasingly threatened by NATO?

- The only alternative to a wider NATO mission is to keep it as a hedge against future threats from Russia. Yet it is hard to believe that we see our strategic relationship with Europe in such narrow terms. We must think about NATO's mission in the broader context of future security relations with Europe.

- NATO needs the flexibility necessary to address new types of threats. Peacekeeping operations are important, but are fundamentally different from problems such as loose nuclear weapons and fissile material in the former Soviet Union. NATO has dealt with

these new threats in an ad hoc manner, since it is not really structured to address them effectively.

- NATO has always been partially about power projection. For example, NATO's structure and history made it much easier to plan for and to conduct the Gulf War.

- The United States needs its allies, and will not conduct a major operation alone. We cannot accept a more modest NATO, because the alliance cannot prosper if it is limited to territorial defense and Balkan problems. Ad hoc coalitions are problematic. They take a long time to put together, and they cannot plan or train as effectively as a standing organization.

Opponents of a Wider Mission

Several participants disagreed with the entire thrust of Gompert's argument. They argued that the globalization of NATO is not desirable because it would dilute the alliance's strengths, and would not further American security interests. Their reasons included the following:

- It is not clear that American and European out-of-area interests really do converge. American military strategy is designed to address three Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs): one in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, a second in Taiwan, and a third in Korea. NATO is irrelevant for the two Asian MRCs, and history shows that NATO will have a hard time forging a consensus in the Middle East. Any actions in the Gulf will probably be based on a coalition with Great Britain and France outside of the alliance structure.

- American security interests can prosper with NATO retaining the same mission. U.S.-NATO relations are not the same as U.S. relations with its European allies. The latter will remain central, while NATO as an organization will increasingly become less important.

- If NATO adopts a wide vision, and it fails to fulfill that vision, it will kill NATO altogether. Then NATO will not be able to continue its current limited but important role. Such a grand vision could undermine the areas where the allies do have current interests.

- NATO's capabilities need to evolve slowly, without too many new commitments. Our first priority should be to convince the European allies to restructure their forces so that we have the capability to undertake missions together. Then the alliance can decide which operations to conduct on a case-by-case basis.

- It will be hard for any of the member countries to get domestic support for a broader NATO mandate.

- Why should the Europeans adopt a wider view? Contrary to the paper's assumptions, the Europeans do not believe that their fundamental security problems have been solved. How would we persuade them to see their interests in the way that Gompert prescribes?

- Russia will have much influence over the alliance. Even though it will not possess a veto in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the allies will listen to their opinions. Russia's views are likely to particularly resonate with the European allies. This will make it much harder to achieve a consensus on global action.

Some of those who opposed a global mission for NATO also acknowledged that peacekeeping and peacemaking within Europe as a logical extension of NATO's current mission. They believed that NATO needed to develop a stronger capability to conduct these types of missions.

NATO's Mission and Enlargement

One participant noted that without a clear consensus on NATO's future mission, it is hard to demonstrate a clear military rationale for NATO enlargement. None of the comments made throughout this session have anything to do with accepting the three new members of the alliance. Another participant argued that this is not an ideal time for enlargement. It might have been better to enlarge the alliance five years ago. But if NATO had said no to enlargement now, Europe would have become so preoccupied with its internal divisions that it would not be able to address any other issues. Before future rounds of enlargement proceed, NATO must develop a clearer strategic vision and mission.

Session 3: NATO-Russian Relations After Madrid

Moderated by William Perry

Michael McFaul presented his paper, entitled "The Domestic Politics of NATO Expansion in Russia: Implications for American Foreign Policy." McFaul argued that we must look at the NATO-Russian relationship in a broad political context, instead of focusing on small details.

There are five reasons why NATO expansion is not a big domestic deal in Russia:

- Yeltsin won the 1996 election—the discussion would be completely different if Zyuganov had won;

- Russian domestic opposition is very weak, as the communists are not strong, and Zhirinovskiy has discredited the nationalists;

- Russia is going through a social revolution, where domestic politics are much more important than foreign policy;

- Economic lobbies have emerged which have a strong interest in integration with the West, and which don't want NATO expansion to interfere with their prosperity;

- Russian weakness meant that there were no credible alternatives to NATO enlargement—the enlargement debate ended in Russia some time ago because they knew they had no real options.

There are also three important external factors:

- The American strategy succeeded, it was brilliant and well timed;

- Enlargement only involved a limited number of countries—and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are seen very differently in Russia than the Balkans or the Baltics;

- U.S. motivations were vague, and this actually worked to our advantage—many accepted the viewpoint that enlargement was being driven by Clinton's reelection prospects.

The bad news is that all of these factors can change:

- Yeltsin will not be President forever, and may not be President for very much longer;

- The Russian opposition will not always be weak or led by unreformed communists;

- Until now, the electorate has pretty much been polarized between those who are for and those who are against the revolution, and the next election will have an entirely different set of actors;

- The nationalist card may be played again;

- There may be a breakdown of the nationalist coalition.

The next round of expansion—if there is one—will not be easily sold as American electoral politics, and will figure much more prominently in Russian political debates. Russians put Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in a different category than the other Eastern and Central European states, so further rounds of expansion may become more problematic.

American foreign policy should be geared towards two main goals. First, we must renew our engagement with Russia. If we pay less at-

tention to our relationship with Russia now that the enlargement decision has been made, Russian political entrepreneurs will fill that void and may define our relationship in unfavorable ways.

Second, we must continue to promote Russian democracy. The Russian people want democracy, but there are many Russian elites who do not. We must do whatever we can to ensure that the Russian people have a voice in their political system. We will spend \$250 million a year on NATO enlargement, but we will spend only 1/25 of that amount on democratic education. Older Russians tend to view integration with the West as a threat, while younger Russians tend to want democracy and to become a core member of the West. Yet we must not forget that this support is fragile, and the nationalist ticket received the second largest share of the youth vote in the last election.

Sherman Garnett then presented his paper, on "Russia and the West after Madrid." He began his comments by noting that Russia fits awkwardly into Europe. It wants to be a major European power, yet it is geographically removed and it lacks a strong state structure. Russia's economic team is quite competent, but key foreign policy and national security institutions have not yet been reformed. The military is particularly in disarray. The current foreign policy consensus actually reflects the views of a very small number of people at the highest levels of government.

However, Russian foreign policy towards the other former Soviet republics has evolved significantly over the past few years, from a policy based on assertiveness to one based on compromise. American interests in this region of the world have also shifted since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We have always been concerned about Russian nuclear weapons, but we have developed new interests in Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the Caucasus.

Our current policy provides a good framework for the future, which has to be fine-tuned instead of completely rethought. Those who argue that we need a strategic pause before the next round of enlargement must understand the viewpoints of those states that are impatient to join. We must demonstrate progress in other key areas, such as START II and chemical and biological weapons.

The floor was opened for comments on both papers. Five central concerns were the excessive "NATOization" of the American relationship with Russia, closing the door to future members, the lack of Russian military reform, Russian interests in enlargement, and con-

cerns about Russia's nuclear weapons. Several policy recommendations were also made.

Broadening the Relationship Between Russia and the United States

Many participants argued that NATO enlargement is in danger of becoming the defining feature of the American relationship with Russia. They stressed that our relationship is extremely complex, which encompasses a range of economic, political, social and military interests. This broader range of mutual interests includes Russia's nuclear legacy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, economic reform, energy, the Caucasus, and instability in the Middle East.

However, all of these important mutual interests have been put on the back burner, as both countries have focused their energies on the enlargement issue. They argued that the United States must make an effort to broaden the context of this important relationship, and must stress positive efforts in these other dimensions.

Keeping an Open Door

It was generally agreed that the door to membership should be left open to all states. At this point, it would not be wise to specify particular countries that will be admitted to or excluded from future membership. Russia must be seen as a possible candidate for the second round, or it will strengthen the opposition's argument that a hostile NATO is deliberately excluding Russia.

Some participants supported announcing a strategic pause, such as a statement that no new members will be considered until after the year 2000. Others favored a much vaguer statement, saying only that future rounds of enlargement will only be considered after the full integration of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. One participant noted that the Russians will remain sensitive to NATO for a long time into the future, and that each round of enlargement would be like one more turn of the knife in the wound.

Russian Military Reform

One participant noted that Russian military reform has been constantly deferred, which is a potentially dangerous problem for Russia. The Russian military is a key constituency, which is currently under severe strain. The military faces a very serious mismatch between its

force structure and its actual resources, and NATO enlargement has a nontrivial impact on this problem. The Founding Act presents an opportunity to establish key military-military contacts, and to shape the thinking of key military personnel. One participant warned that the main danger to NATO-Russian relations is not that Russia will over-exploit the Founding Act, as some critics have charged, but that both Russia and the United States will remain indifferent to it.

One participant argued that the Russian military wants to cooperate with the West, and has been extremely pragmatic about NATO enlargement. Another participant noted that the Russian military is extremely bifurcated. A very small number of high-level officers are cooperative and pragmatic, but the rest of the military has been completely untouched by reform or contact with the West.

Russian Interests in Enlargement

One participant suggested that concerns about Russia may be overblown, and that Russia may simply have been acting in its own interests by supporting the first round of enlargement. Since Russia wants to reform and to become more integrated into the world economy, NATO enlargement may actually have been a good deal. This participant expressed skepticism that Russia would act against these fundamental interests during future rounds of enlargement. Another participant cautioned that one should never underestimate the capacity of states to act against their own interests.

Nuclear Concerns

We must be more specific when we talk about the possibility of a renewed threat from Russia. We must specify what type of threat it might pose, and whom it might threaten. Is there any serious scenario where Russia could pose a significant military threat to the NATO members? One participant argued that it was hard to imagine such a scenario, particularly given Russia's force structure problems. Right now, the preeminent threat comes from Russia's nuclear weapons: the possible loss of control of fissile material, the collapse of the command and control system, and their marketization. Enlargement has a small negative impact here, because it distracts NATO and the United States from paying attention to this very serious set of issues.

Several participants expressed concern about the renuclearization of Russian defense policy. One participant noted that paradoxically,

after years of trying to get the Russians to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, Western actions are actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons.

A second participant said that Russian renuclearization is driven mainly by concerns about China. A third participant said that even if this is true, renuclearization will mean placing weapons throughout Russian territory. The weapons located in Russia's west can threaten NATO.

Policy Recommendations

The following policy recommendations were suggested during various points of the discussion:

- The door should be kept open for future members, without naming specific countries or providing a detailed timetable;
- NATO should stress its new missions, to reduce Russian concerns about the alliance's hostile intent;
- Russia and other non-members should be encouraged to continue working through Partnership for Peace (PfP);
- The Founding Act should be developed and given military content—but this must be done carefully, to avoid increasing Senate opposition to ratification;
- The United States should maintain a strong bilateral defense relationship with Russia.

Session 4: Relations with other Non-Members

Moderated by Warren Christopher

Steve Miller presented his paper, entitled "Beyond the Madrid Three: What about the Rest of Eastern Europe?" Miller argued that NATO enlargement constitutes only a small part of a security strategy for the eastern half of Europe. More than twenty states have not been offered membership, and these states have both strategic value and symbolic importance.

NATO needs to care about the non-members because it cannot fulfill its objective of an undivided peaceful Europe by focusing solely on Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO enlargement has the potential to complicate the security of those who are left out, and raises the sensitive issue of relations with Russia.

What can be done? Eight recommendations:

- Our relationship with Russia must be successfully managed.

- States that have not been invited to join NATO must have the prospect of future membership.

- Partnership for Peace involves almost all states in the region, and offers them a great opportunity for collaboration and integration. This organization can go a long way towards ameliorating concerns. However, there is a risk that enlargement will overshadow its importance. Its pay-to-play nature may also become problematic.

- We should help states that want assistance preparing for membership.

- We must give meaning to our special relationships with Russia and Ukraine. Yet we must be careful of handing out special relations to everyone who wants them, because then it becomes a meaningless concept.

- NATO is not the only security institution in Europe. The others must become meaningful and relevant for them to be realistic alternatives. We don't always treat them as serious organizations, and we should begin to do so.

- The lure of the West has been a powerful force. We should encourage the former Soviet states to sort out their relations with Moscow, and we should encourage a regional dialogue.

- We should promote bilateral relations. The United States can make states feel more comfortable with their circumstances, and we need to make them feel more relevant.

None of these recommendations are inconsistent with current Western policy. We face a challenge of execution, not of conceptualization.

One group of participants strongly supported widening the scope of the alliance's relations with non-members. Partnership for Peace does not just include the states of Eastern and Central Europe, but also includes states from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and other areas where we have interests. For example, PfP exercises in Central Asia brought together several countries that had never previously trained together. Such activities give these states an important role, even if they will not become members any time soon. Another group of participants cautioned that NATO must focus on deepening the relationships among its current members before focusing on its relationships with non-members.

Partnership for Peace was seen as the most important mechanism through which NATO could reach out to non-members. Twenty-

three out of 25 PfP members currently have liaison officers at the PfP planning cell in Mons, which makes it a great outreach vehicle. One participant argued that the PfP experience should be as close to the experience of membership as possible, and suggested that the PfP be given resources comparable to the resources given to the new members. Another participant feared that the incentives for PfP participation would decline as NATO pushes enlargement forward.

Just as western relations with Russia are excessively dominated by NATO enlargement, so are western relations with other non-member states. The participants identified several different organizations and programs that could broaden the focus of these important relationships. Particular suggestions included:

- Strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE can help manage important regional security issues. The United States has long neglected the OSCE, and we should think about using it as a way to build a broader Eurasian security community.
- Emphasize the importance of economic integration efforts and the European Union (EU).
- Developing bilateral military-military contacts. The Garmisch center in Germany was cited as an excellent example of how such contacts can be successfully established.
- Continuing the North Atlantic Assembly outreach seminars, which provide good examples of civilian control over the military.

Luncheon Roundtable: the Politics of Senate Ratification

Moderated by Doyle McManus

Doyle McManus started the session by stating that the Senate debate will not just focus on whether the treaty amendments should be ratified. The resolution of ratification may attach conditions for future rounds of enlargement, and may spark a broader debate over the context, goals, and principles of American foreign policy.

Only 6% of the American public say that it is watching this debate closely. Public opinion is therefore malleable and movable on this issue. What positive and negative effects will this debate have? What actions can be taken to ensure the debate is a constructive one?

Four major points emerged during the discussion.

1. The Senate is likely to ratify the treaty amendments—but ratification will not be easy, and it may only pass by a one or two

vote margin. In June, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and several other Senators sent a letter to President Clinton, which asked several important questions about enlargement. They wanted to know whether NATO will extend the same commitment to the three new members as to the current members, what military threat exists in Europe, how enlargement will strengthen stability, and whether enlargement risks creating a new dividing line in Europe.

Senator Helms recently stated that he would support NATO enlargement, but only if several extremely restrictive conditions are met. Former Senator Nunn and others have also sent a letter to the President, stating their opposition to enlargement. The Senate debate will therefore be extremely robust, and this issue could play into the 1998 Congressional elections and the beginning of the 2000 Presidential campaign.

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott has already stated that he favors enlargement, and his support will be crucial. Lott published an op-ed piece in the *Washington Post*, which argued that enlargement should proceed with no more ambiguity. Lott is likely to actively promote this issue, and has already convened a NATO Observer Group to be a focal point on this issue.

At the moment, however, many Senators know very little about this issue. Serious debate of this issue is just beginning, as the Senate committees start scheduling hearings. One encouraging sign is that the Senate has already passed some legislation that supports enlargement. That legislation may make it hard for some Senators to change positions and vote against ratification. Many Senators are reluctant supporters of enlargement, who would have preferred to proceed more slowly by strengthening Partnership for Peace. These Senators are likely to hedge their bets and wait until the very last minute before deciding to vote in favor of ratification.

One participant stressed that retired military and political leaders need to speak out in favor of enlargement. Such external validators can address the concerns of mainstream America, and increase both popular and Congressional support for enlargement.

2. Cost will be a key issue during the Senate debate. As discussed in the first session, the variance in the cost estimates will be a significant problem. All of the studies use different assumptions, so naturally they provide different estimates. Efforts are currently underway to standardize the assumptions of these studies, but at the

moment it appears as though no one has any idea of what the total cost will be.

Since the Senate will debate the Bosnia troop pullout at the same time that it debates enlargement, Senators are likely to remember that the cost of the Bosnia operation was severely underestimated. Total costs were estimated at \$2.5 billion, and costs so far have reached over \$7.5 billion. Senators are likely to assume that the Administration is underestimating the costs, and this issue may cause some Senators to withdraw their support for enlargement.

3. The ratification debate will include serious questions about future rounds of enlargement. The Senate debate will start with the fundamental question of whether enlargement is a good idea. This will necessarily include some consideration of whether enlargement should stop after Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are admitted, or whether enlargement should proceed after that.

The Senate is aware that once these accession protocols are ratified, it will be very difficult to oppose future rounds of enlargement. Therefore, there will be an effort to attach conditions to the resolution of ratification, which would bind future actions of the Administration. For example, legislation is currently pending in the House that calls for the Baltic states to be included in the next round. The Senate may try to specify similar types of conditions.

4. The ratification debate may strengthen Russian opposition to enlargement. As the Senate ratification debate proceeds, the ambiguity that dampened Russian opposition to enlargement will disappear. A prolonged Senate debate will make enlargement much more of an issue in Russia. Senators will support NATO enlargement for one of two reasons: either as a hedge against future threats from Russia, or because they believe that opposing ratification would doom the alliance as it doomed the League of Nations. Either way, Russia will interpret these arguments as further evidence of NATO's hostile and threatening intent.

Also, if the Senate resolution of ratification mentions specific candidates for future rounds, such as the Baltic states, Russian opposition to enlargement is likely to dramatically increase. One participant recommended that the Senate debate be as short as possible, so these problems are minimized.

Yet a serious dilemma was noted: while a lengthy Senate debate might strengthen Russian opposition to enlargement, a curtailed Sen-

ate debate might strengthen American opposition to ratification. It would be extremely dangerous to limit the Senate debate, since it would appear as though some sort of flaw is being hidden. This is a disturbing dilemma, with no easy solution.

Session 5: European Security in 2007

Moderated by David Hamburg

Jim Goodby's paper shifted the conference's focus towards the longer-range future. What do we want Europe to look like in the next 10, 20, or 30 years? What actions can we take now to make it turn out that way? Can we overcome or transcend history? To what extent should values and interests inform our policies, and what is the proper mix of the two?

During the Cold War, our interests and values mixed well. The American people understood the simple moral content of our policy. President Clinton has voiced a strategic vision, which has not been discussed very much during the conference. He has talked about a "cutting edge" NATO, in an undivided, peaceful, and democratic Europe. Yet he has not explained concretely what that means. In part, that means that Europe would be a single security space. The peace would be stable instead of conditional, and the European states have no expectations of ever going to war with one another. Although Clinton has yet to fill in many of the details, we should start to think about whether we want this type of Europe in the future.

This vision is important because the longer that Europe remains divided, the higher the risk of renewed confrontation, especially as excluded countries compete for influence. How should a peaceful and undivided Europe be defined? A democratic Russia would have to be admitted to any organization that it wishes to join. Russia must not be automatically excluded. What are the implications for U.S.-Western European relations? We must emphasize even closer ties than we have today, and we must stress the economic dimension of our relationship. This will not be terribly burdensome. The real questions are about values, norms, and institutions, not about money.

As we seek to flesh out this vision, we must keep four questions in mind:

- Can the United States use its prestige, diplomacy, and so on to push Europe in this direction? If so, will it come at the expense of promoting other goals and satisfying other interests?

- Is NATO the main instrument through which Russia can be integrated into the West? Maybe its core functions preclude this role, since NATO is there partially as a hedge against a resurgent Russia.

- How can the United States combine phased expansion and broader security into a single coherent policy? For example, what will happen with the Baltics?

- What is the best way to integrate Russia and the West?

- Like Goodby's presentation, the discussion provided more questions than answers. The issues raised by the participants can be grouped into three broad sets of questions.

What is Europe?

When we discuss European security in 2007, what group of states are we talking about? How far east and how far south does Europe extend? Are the Caucasus included? Are the Central Asian states included? One participant said that Goodby's vision suggests that we need to become closer to those states that are most like us. However, as globalization increases, we will increasingly have to cooperate with countries that are *not* like us. Will this vision help us cross the cultural and political divides that we will face?

How does NATO fit into the Future Europe?

NATO's future purpose is linked to what type of European security order we are trying to achieve. Three alternative visions have been presented during the conference, and we need to seriously consider which one we want to pursue.

1. **Transform Europe so it becomes whole and free.** This vision means proceeding with enlargement as quickly as possible, and accepting military limits on enlargement.

2. **Transform NATO, not Europe.** NATO will undertake new types of missions, and become a multi-tiered organization.

3. **Accept the three new members, and then broaden our focus beyond NATO.** Conditions about future members should be resisted, but there should be a long pause before the next round of enlargement. In the meantime, we should promote a wider range of our interests by strengthening democratization, denuclearization, and Partnership for Peace.

Our strategic partners are largely missing from this discussion. During this conference, we have not said much about Great Britain,

France, Germany, or even the EU. These states are currently discussing their future path, particularly after the failure of the Intergovernmental Conference. We need to identify what we want from them, and how we expect to achieve our goals.

What is the Central Issue Facing Europe?

Almost all of the participants agreed that Russia is the central question, although they stressed different aspects of Russia's future. One group emphasized Russia's nuclear weapons, and warned that corruption, crime, and incentives for marketization could threaten the security of their arsenal. These important problems can only be solved if Russia and the West maintain a deeply cooperative relationship. Therefore, we must determine whether future rounds of NATO enlargement will jeopardize our cooperative relations with Russia.

Another group of participants argued that the central issue for the future was the success of Russian democratization. They noted that Russia, like many of the Central and Eastern European states, is just beginning the process of democratic consolidation, and that young democracies are inherently unstable.

Two crucial factors are the future of the Russian military, and the nature of Russian domestic politics after Yeltsin leaves office. Yeltsin has supported the first round of enlargement, but it is unclear whether he or future leaders would support future rounds. One participant argued that Europe will remain divided as long as Russia is not a member, regardless of how many Eastern European and even Central Asian states become members.

Developing an Action Plan

Moderated by William Perry, Coit Blacker, and Ashton Carter

The conference organizers sought suggestions that would assist them in preparing the organizers' report. They are not looking for a consensus or approval, but rather are trying to gather ideas on the spectrum of issues related to NATO enlargement.

The premise of the conference has been that NATO continues to serve a vital purpose in post-Cold War Europe, for the following five reasons:

- NATO is the world's only effective standing coalition military force—it possesses a unique capability, based on its common doctrine, training, and high degree of readiness;

- NATO anchors the United States in Europe, which benefits both the United States and the Western European countries;
- NATO exercises a stabilizing influence on both current and future members;
- NATO is the concrete expression of shared values and interests of a community of member nations;
- NATO provides a security component that allows for the potential to realize a vision for a united and peaceful Europe—it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the realization of that vision.

Perry then solicited policy recommendations in the following areas: defining NATO's core purpose, the future of NATO enlargement, the NATO-Russian relationship, and NATO's relations with nonmember states.

Defining NATO's Core Purpose

The participants agreed that NATO's core purpose must continue to include collective defense, but they remained divided over the extent to which NATO should promote collective security. This division reflected the two viewpoints expressed in Session 2.

One group argued that NATO must encompass a broader range of security functions, whether they occur inside Europe or out of area. We no longer need NATO to provide some of its Cold War functions, such as drawing a line against Russia. Article 5 still plays a residual role, but its importance is decreasing. Article 4 is becoming increasingly important, for it enables NATO to respond to any threats to its members' national interests. Article 4 is particularly important for the United States, since it has extensive global interests. Article 4 operations can also easily accommodate important nonmembers, through Partnership for Peace or the Combined Joint Task Force. NATO must be seen as the mechanism through which the United States and its Western partners protect and promote their common interests. NATO exists to protect the common interests of its members, so it must change and adapt to the new types of threats that they face.

Another group argued that NATO is not the proper organization for global outreach, even though many of the allies do have global interests. NATO remains an important vehicle for American leadership in Europe, especially considering that the European Union possesses neither the willingness nor the capacity to integrate the Eastern

European states effectively. We should not take any actions that threaten to erode that important role. If NATO is the principal vehicle through which the United States engages the world, then enlargement is a fundamental mistake that will hamstring American foreign policy and erode its collective defense functions.

The Future of NATO Enlargement

While there was little enthusiasm during the conference for future rounds of enlargement, it was generally agreed that it would not be practical to close the door to future members at this time. Several participants argued that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should be fully integrated into the alliance before enlargement proceeds. We need to be sure that we are on the right track before pushing enlargement beyond that. In the meantime, we should have a robust Partnership for Peace program, so potential members, including Russia, can work closely with the alliance without feeling excluded.

One participant argued for a distinction between strategic and tactical thinking about future rounds of enlargement. At a strategic level, we want to keep our options open as long as possible. Yet at a tactical level, we must start thinking about a second round right now. France and Italy are likely to push for Romania and Slovenia to be admitted in the next round, and the House and Senate debates are likely to directly address the question of future rounds. We need to think through these tactical issues now, before they become prominent, and to start developing criteria for admission in a second round.

Another participant noted that adding a large number of new members would change NATO enormously, and could affect its central function of providing security for its members. Contrary to the tone of the discussion, European security problems are *not* over. Europe's economic situation vacillates from good to bad. Right now Europe is in the middle of a good period, but there are plenty of alternative movements brewing in France and Germany. Ironically, the interests of the Central and Eastern European states might be better served by staying *outside* a strong and cohesive NATO, instead of joining a struggling alliance.

The NATO-Russian Relationship

Several participants expressed strong support for implementing the Founding Act. The military dimensions of the Founding Act were

seen as particularly valuable, since they provide a mechanism through which Russia can join coalition operations, such as the current operation in Bosnia. Yet several other participants noted that there was a tension between implementing the Founding Act and promoting Senate ratification of enlargement. Some hard-liners in the Senate and elsewhere support NATO enlargement as a hedge against Russia, and they will see efforts to strengthen the Founding Act as a way to give Russia unacceptable influence over alliance decisions. Henry Kissinger is an excellent example—he has been a strong supporter of NATO enlargement, yet staunchly opposes the Founding Act. One participant argued that we must work closely with Russia to ensure that the Bosnia operation is a success, since that will impact the ratification debate. Once ratification is complete, then we can turn our attention to the Founding Act. Another participant noted that the Founding Act will collapse if enlargement proceeds too quickly.

NATO's Relations with Nonmember States

Several participants repeated the argument that Article 4 is critical to NATO's future role, since it reduces the distinctions between members and nonmembers. The risks of focusing too much on NATO were also reiterated. We must not lose sight of our larger relationships with all of these countries. Some of these larger interests can be addressed through other international organizations, such as the OSCE, the World Trade Organization, and the Group of Eight.

Text of the North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C., April 4, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.¹

ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,² on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

ARTICLE 7

The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifica-

tions of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

NOTES

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey and by the Protocols signed on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Spain.

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognised the independence of Algeria. The result was that the "Algerian departments of France" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that

they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing. Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

Text of the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation

Issued by the Heads of State and Government

July 8, 1997

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have come together in Madrid to give shape to the new NATO as we move towards the 21st century. Substantial progress has been achieved in the internal adaptation of the Alliance. As a significant step in the evolutionary process of opening the Alliance, we have invited three countries to begin accession talks. We have substantially strengthened our relationship with Partners through the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and enhancement of the Partnership for Peace. The signature on 27th May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Charter we will sign tomorrow with Ukraine bear witness to our commitment to an undivided Europe. We are also enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue. Our aim is to reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

A new Europe is emerging, a Europe of greater integration and cooperation. An inclusive European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this process.

2. We are moving towards the realisation of our vision of a just and lasting order of peace for Europe as a whole, based on human rights, freedom and democracy. In looking forward to the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty, we reaffirm our commitment to a strong, dynamic partnership between the European and North American Allies, which has been, and will continue to be, the bedrock of the Alliance and of a free and prosperous Europe. The vitality of the transatlantic link will benefit from the development of a true, balanced partnership in which Europe is taking on greater responsibility. In this spirit, we are building a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. The Alliance and the European Union share

common strategic interests. We welcome the agreements reached at the European Council in Amsterdam. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

3. While maintaining our core function of collective defence, we have adapted our political and military structures to improve our ability to meet the new challenges of regional crisis and conflict management. NATO's continued contribution to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the unprecedented scale of cooperation with other countries and international organisations there, reflect the cooperative approach which is key to building our common security. A new NATO is developing: a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe.

4. The security of NATO's members is inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe. Improving the security and stability environment for nations in the Euro-Atlantic area where peace is fragile and instability currently prevails remains a major Alliance interest. The consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire continent, in accordance with OSCE principles, is therefore of direct and material concern to the Alliance. NATO's policy is to build effective cooperation through its outreach activities, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, with free nations which share the values of the Alliance, including members of the European Union as well as candidates for EU membership.

5. At our last meeting in Brussels, we said that we would expect and would welcome the accession of new members, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Twelve European countries have so far requested to join the Alliance. We welcome the aspirations and efforts of these nations. The time has come to start a new phase of this process. The Study on NATO Enlargement—which stated, *inter alia*, that NATO's military effectiveness should be sustained as the Alliance enlarges—the results of the intensified dialogue with interested Partners, and the analyses of relevant factors associated with the admission of new members have provided a basis on which to assess the current state of preparations of the twelve countries aspiring to Alliance membership.

6. Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of

Accession at the time of the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999. During the period leading to accession, the Alliance will involve invited countries, to the greatest extent possible and where appropriate, in Alliance activities, to ensure that they are best prepared to undertake the responsibilities and obligations of membership in an enlarged Alliance. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop appropriate arrangements for this purpose.

7. Admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance. It will involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily require. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to bring to an early conclusion the concrete analysis of the resource implications of the forthcoming enlargement, drawing on the continuing work on military implications. We are confident that, in line with the security environment of the Europe of today, Alliance costs associated with the integration of new members will be manageable and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided.

8. We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have previously expressed an interest in becoming NATO members but that were not invited to begin accession talks today will remain under consideration for future membership. The considerations set forth in our 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement will continue to apply with regard to future aspirants, regardless of their geographic location. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration. Furthermore, in order to en-

hance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies.

To support this process, we strongly encourage the active participation by aspiring members in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, which will further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance. We also intend to continue the Alliance's intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions. To this end, these intensified dialogues will cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision. They will include meeting within the EAPC as well as periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session and the NATO International Staff and with other NATO bodies as appropriate. In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us.

We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999. With regard to the aspiring members, we recognise with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.

The Alliance recognises the need to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries of southeast Europe, and in promoting their increasing integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members. As we look to the future of the Alliance, progress towards these objectives will be important for our overall goal of a free, prosperous and undivided Europe at peace.

9. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Sintra constitutes a new dimension in the relations with our Partners. We look forward to tomorrow's meeting with Heads of State and Government under the aegis of the EAPC.

The EAPC will be an essential element in our common endeavour to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Build-

ing on the successful experience with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and with Partnership for Peace, it will provide the overarching framework for all aspects of our wide-ranging cooperation and raise it to a qualitatively new level. It will deepen and give more focus to our multilateral political and security-related discussions, enhance the scope and substance of our practical cooperation, and increase transparency and confidence in security matters among all EAPC member states. The expanded political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the EAPC will offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. The EAPC will increase the scope for consultation and cooperation on regional matters and activities.

10. The Partnership for Peace has become the focal point of our efforts to build new patterns of practical cooperation in the security realm. Without PfP, we would not have been able to put together and deploy so effectively and efficiently the Implementation and Stabilisation Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the participation of so many of our Partners.

We welcome and endorse the decision taken in Sintra to enhance the Partnership for Peace by strengthening the political consultation element, increasing the role Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and by making PfP more operational. Partners will, in future, be able to involve themselves more closely in PfP programme issues as well as PfP operations, Partner staff elements will be established at various levels of the military structure of the Alliance, and the Planning and Review Process will become more like the NATO force planning process. On the basis of the principles of inclusiveness and self-differentiation, Partner countries will thus be able to draw closer to the Alliance. We invite all Partner countries to take full advantage of the new possibilities which the enhanced PfP will offer.

With the expanded range of opportunities comes also the need for adequate political and military representation at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. We have therefore created the possibility for Partners to establish diplomatic missions to NATO under the Brussels Agreement which entered into force on 28th March 1997. We invite and encourage Partner countries to take advantage of this opportunity.

11. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed on 27th May

1997 in Paris, is a historic achievement. It opens a new era in European security relations, an era of cooperation between NATO and Russia. The Founding Act reflects our shared commitment to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security. Its provisions contribute to NATO's underlying objective of enhancing the security of all European states, which is reinforced also through our actions here in Madrid. It provides NATO and Russia a framework through which we intend to create a strong, stable and enduring partnership. We are committed to working with Russia to make full use of the provisions of the Founding Act.

Through the new forum created under the Founding Act, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will consult, cooperate and, where appropriate, act together to address challenges to security in Europe. The activities of the Council will build upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. The cooperation between Russian and NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina and between the staffs at SHAPE demonstrate what is possible when we work together. We will build on this experience, including through PfP, to develop genuine cooperation between NATO and Russia. We look forward to consulting regularly with Russia on a broad range of topics, and to forging closer cooperation, including military-to-military, through the Permanent Joint Council, which will begin work soon.

12. We attach great importance to tomorrow's signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. The NATO-Ukraine Charter will move NATO-Ukraine cooperation onto a more substantive level, offer new potential for strengthening our relationship, and enhance security in the region more widely. We are convinced that Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty are a key factor for ensuring stability in Europe. We continue to support the reform process in Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation with a market economy.

We want to build on steps taken to date in developing a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine. We welcome the practical cooperation achieved with the Alliance through Ukraine's participation within IFOR and SFOR, as well as the recent opening of the NATO Information Office in Kyiv, as important contributions in this regard. We look forward to the early and active implementation of the Charter.

13. The Mediterranean region merits great attention since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the development of the Mediterranean initiative that was launched following our last meeting in Brussels. The dialogue we have established between NATO and a number of Mediterranean countries is developing progressively and successfully, contributes to confidence-building and cooperation in the region, and complements other international efforts. We endorse the measures agreed by NATO Foreign Ministers in Sintra on the widening of the scope and the enhancement of the dialogue and, on the basis of their recommendation, have decided today to establish under the authority of the North Atlantic Council a new committee, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, which will have the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue.

14. We welcome the progress made on the Alliance's internal adaptation. Its fundamental objectives are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. We recognise the substantive work which has been carried out on the development of a new command structure for the Alliance; the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept; and the building of ESDI within NATO. We attach great importance to an early and successful completion of this process. Building on the earlier reductions and restructuring of the Alliance's military forces, it will provide the Alliance with the full range of capabilities needed to meet the challenges of the future.

15. We welcome the substantial progress made on the development of a new command structure which will enable the Alliance to carry out the whole range of its missions more effectively and flexibly, support our enhanced relationship with Partners and the admission of new members, and provide, as part of the development of ESDI within NATO, for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations.

We note that essential elements of the new command structure have been identified and will form the basis for further work. We must maintain the momentum of this work. We have, accordingly, directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the Military Committee, to work on the resolution of outstanding issues

with the aim of reaching agreement on NATO's future command structure by the time of the Council Ministerial meetings in December.

16. Against this background, the members of the Alliance's integrated military structure warmly welcome today's announcement by Spain of its readiness to participate fully in the Alliance's new command structure, once agreement has been reached upon it. Spain's full participation will enhance its overall contribution to the security of the Alliance, help develop the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO and strengthen the transatlantic link.

17. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the CJTF concept, including the initial designation of parent headquarters, and look forward to the forthcoming trials. This concept will enhance our ability to command and control multinational and multiservice forces, generated and deployed at short notice, which are capable of conducting a wide range of military operations. Combined Joint Task Forces will also facilitate the possible participation of non-NATO nations in operations and, by enabling the conduct of WEU-led CJTF operations, will contribute to the development of ESDI within the Alliance.

18. We reaffirm, as stated in our 1994 Brussels Declaration, our full support for the development of the European Security and Defence Identity by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations. With this in mind, the Alliance is building ESDI, grounded on solid military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permitting the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. We endorse the decisions taken at last year's Ministerial meeting in Berlin in this regard which serve the interests of the Alliance as well as of the WEU.

We further endorse the considerable progress made in implementing these decisions and in developing ESDI within the Alliance. In this context we endorse the decisions taken with regard to European command arrangements within NATO to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities (including provisional terms of reference for Deputy SACEUR covering his ESDI-related responsibilities both permanent and during crises and operations), the arrangements for the identification of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led opera-

tions, and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations. We welcome inclusion of the support for the conduct of WEU-led operations in the context of the ongoing implementation of the revised Alliance defence planning process for all Alliance missions. We also welcome the progress made on work regarding the planning and future exercising of WEU-led operations, and in developing the necessary practical arrangements for release, monitoring and return of NATO assets and the exchange of information between NATO and WEU within the framework of the NATO-WEU Security Agreement.

We note with satisfaction that the building of ESDI within the Alliance has much benefited from the recent agreement in the WEU on the participation of all European Allies, if they were so to choose, in WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing for such operations. We also note the desire on Canada's part to participate in such operations when its interests make it desirable and under modalities to be developed. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to complete expeditiously its work on developing ESDI within NATO, in cooperation with the WEU.

19. The Alliance Strategic Concept, which we adopted at our meeting in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance. Recognising that the strategic environment has changed since then, we have decided to examine the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges. As recommended by our Foreign Ministers in Sintra, we have decided to direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop terms of reference for this examination, and an update as necessary, for endorsement at the Autumn Ministerial meetings. This work will confirm our commitment to the core function of Alliance collective defence and the indispensable transatlantic link.

20. We reiterate our commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including as necessary through joint consultations on how to address contingencies. In this context, we are determined to strengthen the institutional cooperation between the two organisations. We welcome the fact that the WEU has recently undertaken to improve its capacity to plan and conduct crisis management and peacekeeping operations (the Petersberg tasks), including through setting the groundwork for possible WEU-led operations with the support of NATO assets and capabilities, and ac-

cepted the Alliance's invitation to contribute to NATO's Ministerial Guidance for defence planning. We will therefore continue to develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning, preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.

21. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening the OSCE as a regional organisation according to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary instrument for preventing conflict, enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights. The OSCE, as the most inclusive European-wide security organisation, plays an essential role in securing peace, stability and security in Europe. The principles and commitments adopted by the OSCE provide a foundation for the development of a comprehensive and cooperative European security architecture. Our goal is to create in Europe, through the widest possible cooperation among OSCE states, a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of particular states.

We continue to support the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in accordance with the decisions of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, including consideration of developing a Charter on European Security.

22. We welcome the successful holding of elections in Albania as a vital first step in providing the basis for greater stability, democratic government and law and order in the country. We stress, in this context, the importance of a firm commitment by all political forces to continue the process of national reconciliation. We also welcome the crucial role of the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, with the participation of several Allies and Partners, in helping to create a secure environment for the re-establishment of peace and order. We value the efforts of the OSCE as the coordinating framework for international assistance in Albania, together with the important contributions made by the EU, WEU and the Council of Europe. We are following closely events in Albania and are considering measures through the Partnership for Peace to assist, as soon as the situation permits, in the reconstruction of the armed forces of Albania as an important element of the reform process. Continued international support will be essential in helping to restore stability in Albania.

23. We continue to attach greatest importance to further the means of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

We welcome the progress made since the Brussels Summit, as an integral part of NATO's adaptation, to intensify and expand Alliance political and defence efforts aimed at preventing proliferation and safeguarding NATO's strategic unity and freedom of action despite the risks posed by nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. We attach the utmost importance to these efforts, welcome the Alliance's substantial achievements, and direct that work continue.

We call on all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Recognising that enhancing confidence in compliance would reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we reaffirm our determination to complete as soon as possible through negotiation a legally binding and effective verification mechanism. We urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty without delay so that negotiation of START III may begin.

We support the vigorous pursuit of an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban world-wide the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. We note the positive developments in the Conference on Disarmament. We further note the progress made by the Ottawa Process with its goal of achieving a ban by the end of the year.

24. We continue to attach utmost importance to the CFE Treaty and its integrity. In this context, we welcome the entry into force of the CFE Flank Agreement on 15th May 1997 and underline its importance for regional stability. We share the commitment of all thirty States Parties to continue full implementation of the CFE Treaty, its associated documents, and the Flank Agreement. We confirm our readiness to work cooperatively with other States Parties to achieve, as expeditiously as possible, an adapted CFE Treaty that takes account of the changed political and military circumstances in Europe, continues to serve as a cornerstone of stability, and provides undiminished security for all.

NATO has advanced a comprehensive proposal for adaptation of the CFE Treaty on the basis of a revised Treaty structure of national and territorial ceilings. The Allies have already stated their intention to reduce significantly their future aggregate national ceilings for Treaty-Limited Equipment. We look forward to working with other

States Parties on the early completion of a Framework Agreement on CFE adaptation.

25. We reaffirm the importance of arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature, including those linked to illegal arms trade and acts of terrorism, which affect Alliance security interests. We continue to condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.

26. The steps we have taken today, and tomorrow's meeting with our Partners under the aegis of the EAPC, bring us closer to our goal of building cooperative security in Europe. We remain committed to a free and undivided Euro-Atlantic community in which all can enjoy peace and prosperity. Renewed in structure and approach, strengthened in purpose and resolve, and with a growing membership, NATO will continue to play its part in achieving this goal and in meeting the security challenges in the times ahead.

27. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Spain. We are looking forward to meeting again on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1999.

Text of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation

Paris, May 27, 1997

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.

NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

This Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia.

NATO has undertaken a historic transformation—a process that will continue. In 1991 the Alliance revised its strategic doctrine to take account of the new security environment in Europe. Accordingly, NATO has radically reduced and continues the adaptation of its conventional and nuclear forces. While preserving the capability to meet the commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty, NATO has expanded and will continue to expand its political functions, and taken on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support

of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to address new security challenges in close association with other countries and international organisations. NATO is in the process of developing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. It will continue to develop a broad and dynamic pattern of cooperation with OSCE participating States in particular through the Partnership for Peace and is working with Partner countries on the initiative to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO member States have decided to examine NATO's Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges.

Russia is continuing the building of a democratic society and the realisation of its political and economic transformation. It is developing the concept of its national security and revising its military doctrine to ensure that they are fully consistent with new security realities. Russia has carried out deep reductions in its armed forces, has withdrawn its forces on an unprecedented scale from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries and withdrawn all its nuclear weapons back to its own national territory. Russia is committed to further reducing its conventional and nuclear forces. It is actively participating in peacekeeping operations in support of the UN and the OSCE, as well as in crisis management in different areas of the world. Russia is contributing to the multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I. Principles

Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states. NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as in enhancing its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. The OSCE, as the only pan-European security organisation, has a key role in European peace and stability. In strength-

ening the OSCE, NATO and Russia will cooperate to prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state.

Consistent with the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, and taking into account the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a Charter on European security, NATO and Russia will seek the widest possible cooperation among participating States of the OSCE with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.

NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability.

This Act does not affect, and cannot be regarded as affecting, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, or the role of the OSCE as the inclusive and comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its area and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

In implementing the provisions in this Act, NATO and Russia will observe in good faith their obligations under international law and international instruments, including the obligations of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as well as their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:

- development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
- acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil

liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security;

- refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act;

- respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;

- mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines;

- prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;

- support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

II. Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council

To carry out the activities and aims provided for by this Act and to develop common approaches to European security and to political problems, NATO and Russia will create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.

The Permanent Joint Council will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia.

The shared objective of NATO and Russia is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible. As the relationship develops, they expect that additional opportunities for joint action will emerge.

The Permanent Joint Council will be the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability. Extraordinary meetings of the Council will take place in addition to its regular meetings to allow for prompt consultations in case of emergencies. In this context, NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will be built upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. In the course of their consultations and cooperation, NATO and Russia will inform each other regarding the respective security-related challenges they face and the measures that each intends to take to address them.

Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states.

The Permanent Joint Council will meet at various levels and in different forms, according to the subject matter and the wishes of NATO and Russia. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors/permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council. The Permanent Joint Council may also meet, as appropriate, at the level of Heads of State and Government. The Permanent Joint Council may establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate.

Under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet; meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, and also monthly at military representatives level. Meetings of military experts may be convened, as appropriate.

The Permanent Joint Council will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO mem-

ber States on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia. To support the work of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish the necessary administrative structures. Russia will establish a Mission to NATO headed by a representative at the rank of Ambassador. A senior military representative and his staff will be part of this Mission for the purposes of the military cooperation. NATO retains the possibility of establishing an appropriate presence in Moscow, the modalities of which remain to be determined.

The agenda for regular sessions will be established jointly. Organisational arrangements and rules of procedure for the Permanent Joint Council will be worked out. These arrangements will be in place for the inaugural meeting of the Permanent Joint Council which will be held no later than four months after the signature of this Act.

The Permanent Joint Council will engage in three distinct activities:

- consulting on the topics in Section III of this Act and on any other political or security issue determined by mutual consent;
- on the basis of these consultations, developing joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel;
- once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation, making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis, including participation, on an equitable basis, in the planning and preparation of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia, together or separately, must be consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE's governing principles.

Recognizing the importance of deepening contacts between the legislative bodies of the participating States to this Act, NATO and Russia will also encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

III. Areas for Consultation and Cooperation

In building their relationship, NATO and Russia will focus on specific areas of mutual interest.

They will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the following areas:

- issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area or to concrete crises, including the contribution of NATO and Russia to security and stability in this area;
- conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these organisations in these fields;
- joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and if Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation in them at an early stage;
- participation of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
- exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes;
- arms control issues;
- nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum;
- preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combatting nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspects of proliferation;
- possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence;
- enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic capacity and reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, to promote confidence through increased measures of transparency and exchanges of information in relation to air defence and related aspects of airspace management/control. This will include exploring possible cooperation on appropriate air defence related matters;
- increasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of member States of NATO and Russia;
- reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO and Russia;
- coordinating a programme of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments, as further detailed below;
- pursuing possible armaments-related cooperation through association of Russia with NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors;

- conversion of defence industries;
- developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defence-related economic, environmental and scientific fields;
- conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;
- combatting terrorism and drug trafficking;
- improving public understanding of evolving relations between NATO and Russia, including the establishment of a NATO documentation centre or information office in Moscow.

Other areas can be added by mutual agreement.

IV. Political-Military Matters

NATO and Russia affirm their shared desire to achieve greater stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.

Recognising the importance of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) for the broader context of security in the OSCE area and the work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, the member States of NATO and Russia will work together in Vienna with the other States Parties to adapt the CFE Treaty to enhance its viability and effectiveness, taking into account Europe's changing security environment and the legitimate security interests of all OSCE participating States. They share the objective of concluding an adaptation agreement as expeditiously as possible and, as a first step in this process, they will, together with other States Parties to the CFE Treaty, seek to conclude as soon as possible a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, consistent

with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment permitted in the Treaty's area of application compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party. NATO and Russia encourage all States Parties to the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe's security environment.

The member States of NATO and Russia commit themselves to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations, as foreseen in the Document on Scope and Parameters, in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces—in particular with respect to their levels of forces and deployments—in the Treaty's area of application, in order to avoid developments in the security situation in Europe diminishing the security of any State Party. This commitment is without prejudice to possible voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests.

The member States of NATO and Russia proceed on the basis that adaptation of the CFE Treaty should help to ensure equal security for all States Parties irrespective of their membership of a politico-military alliance, both to preserve and strengthen stability and continue to prevent any destabilizing increase of forces in various regions of Europe and in Europe as a whole. An adapted CFE Treaty should also further enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and verification, and permit the possible accession by new States Parties.

The member States of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to take and resulting national Treaty-Limited Equipment ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all States Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, the sub-

stantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished.

The member States of NATO and Russia reaffirm that States Parties to the CFE Treaty should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty.

Each State-Party will base its agreement to the provisions of the adapted Treaty on all national ceilings of the States Parties, on its projections of the current and future security situation in Europe.

In addition, in the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the member States of NATO and Russia will, together with other States Parties, seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO and Russia have clarified their intentions with regard to their conventional force postures in Europe's new security environment and are prepared to consult on the evolution of these postures in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council.

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

The member States of NATO and Russia will strive for greater transparency, predictability and mutual confidence with regard to their armed forces. They will comply fully with their obligations under the Vienna Document 1994 and develop cooperation with the other OSCE

participating States, including negotiations in the appropriate format, inter alia within the OSCE to promote confidence and security.

The member States of NATO and Russia will use and improve existing arms control regimes and confidence-building measures to create security relations based on peaceful cooperation.

NATO and Russia, in order to develop cooperation between their military establishments, will expand political-military consultations and cooperation through the Permanent Joint Council with an enhanced dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its member States and of Russia. They will implement a programme of significantly expanded military activities and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels. Consistent with the tenets of the Permanent Joint Council, this enhanced military-to-military dialogue will be built upon the principle that neither party views the other as a threat nor seeks to disadvantage the other's security. This enhanced military-to-military dialogue will include regularly-scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will include the broad possibilities for joint exercises and training.

To support this enhanced dialogue and the military components of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish military liaison missions at various levels on the basis of reciprocity and further mutual arrangements.

To enhance their partnership and ensure this partnership is grounded to the greatest extent possible in practical activities and direct cooperation, NATO's and Russia's respective military authorities will explore the further development of a concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. This initiative should build upon the positive experience of working together in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the lessons learned there will be used in the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces.

The present Act takes effect upon the date of its signature.

NATO and Russia will take the proper steps to ensure its implementation in accordance with their procedures.

The present Act is established in two originals in the French, English and Russian language.

The Secretary General of NATO and the Government of the Russian Federation will provide the Secretary General of the United

Nations and the Secretary General of the OSCE with the text of this Act with the request to circulate it to all members of their Organisations.

Text of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine

Madrid, July 9, 1997

I. Building an Enhanced NATO-Ukraine Relationship

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member States and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Ukraine,

- building on a political commitment at the highest level;
- recognizing the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe which have inseparably linked the security of every state to that of all the others;

- determined to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation in order to enhance security and stability, and to cooperate in building a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe;

- stressing the profound transformation undertaken by NATO since the end of the Cold War and its continued adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of Euro-Atlantic security, including its support, on a case-by-case basis, of new missions of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the United Nations Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE;

- welcoming the progress achieved by Ukraine and looking forward to further steps to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms, and to deepen the process of integration with the full range of European and Euro-Atlantic structures;

- noting NATO's positive role in maintaining peace and stability in Europe and in promoting greater confidence and transparency in the Euro-Atlantic area, and its openness for cooperation with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, an inseparable part of which is Ukraine;

- convinced that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole;
 - mindful of the importance of a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine and recognizing the solid progress made, across a broad range of activities, to develop an enhanced and strengthened relationship between NATO and Ukraine on the foundations created by the Joint Press Statement of 14 September 1995;
 - determined to further expand and intensify their cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, including the enhanced Partnership for Peace programme;
 - welcoming their practical cooperation within IFOR/SFOR and other peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
 - sharing the view that the opening of the Alliance to new members, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, is directed at enhancing the stability of Europe, and the security of all countries in Europe without recreating dividing lines;
- are committed, on the basis of this Charter, to further broaden and strengthen their cooperation and to develop a distinctive and effective partnership, which will promote further stability and common democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe.

II. Principles for the Development of NATO-Ukraine Relations

2. NATO and Ukraine will base their relationship on the principles, obligations and commitments under international law and international instruments, including the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents. Accordingly, NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to:

- the recognition that security of all states in the OSCE area is indivisible, that no state should pursue its security at the expense of that of another state, and that no state can regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence;
- refrain from the threat or use of force against any state in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter or Helsinki Final Act principles guiding participating States;
- the inherent right of all states to choose and to implement freely their own security arrangements, and to be free to choose or

change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve;

- respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other states, for the inviolability of frontiers, and the development of good-neighbourly relations;
- the rule of law, the fostering of democracy, political pluralism and a market economy;
- human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;
- the prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles.

3. Ukraine reaffirms its determination to carry forward its defence reforms, to strengthen democratic and civilian control of the armed forces, and to increase their interoperability with the forces of NATO and Partner countries. NATO reaffirms its support for Ukraine's efforts in these areas.

4. Ukraine welcomes NATO's continuing and active adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of Euro-Atlantic security, and its role, in cooperation with other international organizations such as the OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union in promoting Euro-Atlantic security and fostering a general climate of trust and confidence in Europe.

III. Areas for Consultation and/or Cooperation between NATO and Ukraine

5. Reaffirming the common goal of implementation of a broad range of issues for consultation and cooperation, NATO and Ukraine commit themselves to develop and strengthen their consultation and/or cooperation in the areas described below. In this regard, NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to the full development of the EAPC and the enhanced PfP. This includes Ukrainian participation in operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council, or the responsibility of the OSCE, and, if CJTF are used in such cases, Ukrainian participation in them at an early stage on a case-by-case basis, subject to decisions by the North Atlantic Council on specific operations.

6. Consultations between NATO and Ukraine will cover issues of common concern, such as:

- political and security related subjects, in particular the development of Euro-Atlantic security and stability, including the security of Ukraine;

- conflict prevention, crisis management, peace support, conflict resolution and humanitarian operations, taking into account the roles of the United Nations and the OSCE in this field;

- the political and defence aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation;

- disarmament and arms control issues, including those related to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Open Skies Treaty and confidence and security building measures in the 1994 Vienna Document;

- arms exports and related technology transfers;

- combatting drug-trafficking and terrorism.

7. Areas for consultation and cooperation, in particular through joint seminars, joint working groups, and other cooperative programmes, will cover a broad range of topics, such as:

- civil emergency planning, and disaster preparedness;

- civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, and Ukrainian defence reform;

- defence planning, budgeting, policy, strategy and national security concepts;

- defence conversion;

- NATO-Ukraine military cooperation and interoperability;

- economic aspects of security;

- science and technology issues;

- environmental security issues, including nuclear safety;

- aerospace research and development, through AGARD;

- civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control.

8. In addition, NATO and Ukraine will explore to the broadest possible degree the following areas for cooperation:

- armaments cooperation (beyond existing CNAD dialogue);

- military training, including PfP exercises on Ukrainian territory and NATO support for the Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion;

- promotion of defence cooperation between Ukraine and its neighbours.

9. Other areas for consultation and cooperation may be added, by mutual agreement, on the basis of experience gained.

10. Given the importance of information activities to improve reciprocal knowledge and understanding, NATO has established an Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. The Ukrainian side will provide its full support to the operation of the Centre in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and the Government of Ukraine signed at Kyiv on 7 May 1997.

IV. Practical Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation between NATO and Ukraine

11. Consultation and cooperation as set out in this Charter will be implemented through:

- NATO-Ukraine meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council at intervals to be mutually agreed;
- NATO-Ukraine meetings with appropriate NATO Committees as mutually agreed;
 - reciprocal high level visits;
 - mechanisms for military cooperation, including periodic meetings with NATO Chiefs of Defence and activities within the framework of the enhanced Partnership for Peace programme;
 - a military liaison mission of Ukraine will be established as part of a Ukrainian mission to NATO in Brussels. NATO retains the right reciprocally to establish a NATO military liaison mission in Kyiv.

Meetings will normally take place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Under exceptional circumstances, they may be convened elsewhere, including in Ukraine, as mutually agreed. Meetings, as a rule, will take place on the basis of an agreed calendar.

12. NATO and Ukraine consider their relationship as an evolving, dynamic process. To ensure that they are developing their relationship and implementing the provisions of this Charter to the fullest extent possible, the North Atlantic Council will periodically meet with Ukraine as the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as a rule not less than twice a year. The NATO-Ukraine Commission will not duplicate the functions of other mechanisms described in this Charter, but instead would meet to assess broadly the implementation of the relationship, survey planning for the future, and suggest ways to improve or further develop cooperation between NATO and Ukraine.

13. NATO and Ukraine will encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Verkhovna Rada.

V. Cooperation for a More Secure Europe

14. NATO Allies will continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole.

15. NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to consult together whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

16. NATO welcomes and supports the fact that Ukraine received security assurances from all five nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, and recalls the commitments undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom, together with Russia, and by France unilaterally, which took the historic decision in Budapest in 1994 to provide Ukraine with security assurances as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

Ukraine's landmark decision to renounce nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state greatly contributed to the strengthening of security and stability in Europe and has earned Ukraine special stature in the world community. NATO welcomes Ukraine's decision to support the indefinite extension of the NPT and its contribution to the withdrawal and dismantlement of nuclear weapons which were based on its territory.

Ukraine's strengthened cooperation with NATO will enhance and deepen the political dialogue between Ukraine and the members of the Alliance on a broad range of security matters, including on nuclear issues. This will contribute to the improvement of the overall security environment in Europe.

17. NATO and Ukraine note the entry into force of the CFE Flank Document on 15 May 1997. NATO and Ukraine will continue to cooperate on issues of mutual interest such as CFE adaptation. NATO and Ukraine intend to improve the operation of the CFE treaty in a changing environment and, through that, the security of each state party, irrespective of whether it belongs to a political-military alliance. They share the view that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a participating state must be in conformity with international law, the freely expressed consent of the host state or a relevant decision of the United Nations Security Council.

18. Ukraine welcomes the statement by NATO members that “enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’s current nuclear posture and, therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so.”

19. NATO member States and Ukraine will continue fully to implement all agreements on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and confidence-building measures they are part of.

The present Charter takes effect upon its signature.

The present Charter is established in two originals in the English, French and Ukrainian languages, all three texts having equal validity.

About the Conference Conveners and Contributors

Coit D. Blacker

Coit Blacker is the Deputy Director of the Institute for International Studies and, by courtesy, Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. From February 1995 to August 1996, Professor Blacker was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council. At the NSC, he oversaw the implementation of U.S. policy toward Russia and the New Independent States, while also serving as principal staff assistant to the President on matters relating to the former Soviet Union.

Professor Blacker is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Professor Blacker is the author or editor of seven books and monographs, including *Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991* (1993); *Reluctant Warriors: The United States, the Soviet Union and Arms Control* (1987); and, with Gloria Duffy, *International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements* (1984). Professor Blacker received an AB in Political Science from Occidental College and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Professor Blacker has held fellowships from Harvard University, Stanford University and the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Honorable Ashton B. Carter

Ashton Carter is Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and Co-Director, with William J. Perry, of the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project.

From 1993-1996 Carter served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, where he was responsible for national security policy concerning the states of the former Soviet Union (including their nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction), arms control, countering proliferation worldwide, and oversight of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and missile defense programs; he also chaired NATO's High Level Group. He was twice awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award given by the Pentagon. Carter continues to serve DOD as an adviser to the Secretary of Defense, as a member of both DOD's Defense Policy Board and Defense Science Board, and of DOD's Threat Reduction Advisory Council.

Before his government service, Carter was director of the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and chairman of the editorial board of *International Security*.

Carter received bachelor's degrees in physics and in medieval history from Yale University and a doctorate in theoretical physics from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.

In addition to authoring numerous scientific publications and government studies, Carter was an author and editor of a number of books, most recently *Preventive Defense: An American Security Strategy for the 21st Century* (with William J. Perry). Carter's current research focuses on the Preventive Defense Project, which designs and promotes security policies aimed at preventing the emergence of major new threats to the United States.

Carter is a Senior Partner of Global Technology Partners, LLC, and a member of the Advisory Board of MIT Lincoln Laboratories, the Draper Laboratory Corporation, and the Board of Directors of Mitretek Systems, Inc. He is a consultant to Goldman Sachs and the MITRE Corporation on international affairs and technology matters, a Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

The Honorable Warren Christopher

Warren Christopher returned to the law firm of O'Melveny & Myers as Senior Partner on February 1st, 1997. Immediately prior to his return, he had served as the 63rd Secretary of State of the United States from January 1993 to January 1997.

Mr. Christopher served as law clerk to Justice William O. Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1949-1950. He practiced law with O'Melveny & Myers from 1950 to 1967, becoming partner in 1958. Mr. Christopher served as Deputy Attorney General of the United States from 1967 until 1969, after which he rejoined O'Melveny & Myers. In February 1977, Mr. Christopher was sworn in as the Deputy Secretary of State of the United States and he served in that position until January 1981. He then returned to O'Melveny & Myers and was Chairman of the firm from 1982-1992.

Mr. Christopher's professional activities have included serving as: President of the Los Angeles County Bar Association; Chairman of the Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association; member of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California; and Special Counsel to California Governor Edmund G. Brown. Mr. Christopher's civic activities have included serving as: President of the Board of Trustees of Stanford University; Chairman, Carnegie Corporation of New York Board of Trustees; Director and Vice Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Los Angeles World Affairs Council; and Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Mr. Christopher received an undergraduate degree magna cum laude from the University of Southern California and a JD from Stanford University, where he was President of the *Law Review* and was elected to the Order of the Coif. In 1981, President Carter awarded Mr. Christopher the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Mr. Christopher has also received numerous honorary degrees and other awards, including the Jefferson Award from the American Institute for Public Service for the Greatest Public Service Performed by an Elected or Appointed Official.

Sherman W. Garnett

Sherman Garnett is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Garnett's professional experience includes service in numerous positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, including: Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia; Director, Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia; Director for European Security Negotiations; Secretary of Defense Representative to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Deputy Director for European Security

Negotiations; Deputy Director for Multilateral Negotiations; and Assistant for Multilateral Negotiations. Mr. Garnett also served as a Soviet Affairs Analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.

David C. Gompert

David Gompert has been Vice President of Rand and Director of the National Defense Research Institute since 1993. During a leave of absence (1997-1998), he was Distinguished Research Professor at the National Defense University and Visiting Professor at the United States Naval Academy. From 1990 to 1993, Mr. Gompert served as Special Assistant to President Bush and Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council staff. He has held a number of positions at the State Department, including Deputy to the Under Secretary of Political Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and Special Assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Mr. Gompert worked in the private sector from 1983-1990. At Unisys, he was President of the Systems Management Group and Vice President for Strategic Planning and Corporate Development. At AT&T, he was Vice President, Civil Sales and Programs, and Director of International Market Planning.

Ambassador James E. Goodby

James Goodby is a Guest Scholar at The Brookings Institution. He has been the State Department's chief negotiator for agreements with Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine; vice chairman of the U.S. delegation to the START talks; and ambassador to Finland. Winner of a Heinz Award, Goodby is a Senior Research Fellow at MIT, a Distinguished Research Professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and has taught at Georgetown University. He was a distinguished fellow at the United States Institute for Peace and Payne distinguished lecturer at Stanford's Institute for International Studies.

David A. Hamburg, M.D.

David Hamburg is President Emeritus at Carnegie Corporation of New York, after having been President from 1983-1997. He received his AB (1944) and his M.D. (1947) degrees from Indiana University. He was Chief, Adult Psychiatry Branch, NIMH 1958-61; Professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral

Sciences from 1961-72; and Reed-Hodgson Professor Human Biology at Stanford University 1972-76. Dr Hamburg also served as President of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences from 1975-80 and Director of the Division of Health Policy Research and Education and John D. MacArthur Professor of Health Policy at Harvard University from 1980-83.

Dr. Hamburg was President, then Chairman of the Board (1984-86) of the American Association for Advancement of Science. He is a member of the Defense Policy Board, the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, and Co-chair (with Cyrus Vance) of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

Dr. Hamburg received the Distinguished Service Award from the American Psychiatric Association in 1991, the Presidential Medal of Freedom at the White House in September 1996, the Achievement in Children and Public Policy Award from the Society for Research in Child Development in 1997, and the National Academy of Sciences' Public Welfare Medal in April 1998.

Michael McFaul

Michael McFaul is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Hoover Institution Fellow at Stanford University, specializing in economic and political reform in post-communist countries. Before joining the Stanford faculty in 1995, he worked for two years as a Senior Associate for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in residence at the Carnegie Center in Moscow. He maintains his affiliation with the Carnegie Endowment and travels frequently to Russia, where he has lived for over four years in the last decade. Dr. McFaul is also a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, a Research Fellow (by courtesy) at the Hoover Institution, and a senior advisor to the National Democratic Institute.

Steven E. Miller

Steven Miller is Director of the International Security Program at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is also Editor in Chief of the quarterly journal *International Security*. Previously he was Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and taught Defense and Arms Control Studies at

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is co-author of *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material* (MIT Press, 1996) as well as editor or co-editor of numerous books, including *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, and *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*.

Kenneth A. Myers

Kenneth Myers is currently Senior Professional Staff Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. Prior to joining the Select Committee, he served as Legislative Assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana) and as the Senator's representative to the U.S. Senate Arms Control Observer Group. Among his other assignments in the Senate, he has served as Staff Director of the European Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as Deputy Staff Director of the full Committee on Foreign Relations. Prior to commencing work in the Senate, he served in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and for some ten years was Director of European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

The Honorable William J. Perry

William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment in the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems & Operations Research and the Institute for International Studies; a Fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Co-Director, with Ashton B. Carter, of the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. His previous academic experience includes professor (half time) at Stanford University from 1988 until 1993, during which time he was the co-director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control (now known as the Center for International Security and Cooperation). Dr. Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense for the United States, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. His prior government experience was as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1993-1994) and as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (1977-1981).

Dr. Perry's business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics, founding and serv-

ing as the president of ESL, Inc., Executive Vice-President of Hambrecht & Quist, Inc., and founding and serving as chairman of Technology Strategies & Alliances. Dr. Perry is the Chairman of Global Technology Partners, and he serves on the boards of The Boeing Company, Hambrecht & Quist, United Technologies Corporation, and several emerging high-tech companies.

Dr. Perry received his BS and MS from Stanford University and his Ph.D. from Penn State, all in Mathematics. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dr. Perry has received a number of awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal, and Outstanding Civilian Service medals from the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Defense Intelligence Agency, NASA, and the Coast Guard.

The Honorable Strobe Talbott

Strobe Talbott's nomination as Deputy Secretary of State was confirmed by the Senate on February 22, 1994, and he was sworn in by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on February 23, 1994. From April 1993 to February 1994, Mr. Talbott served as Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on the New Independent States (NIS). He was TIME Magazine's Editor-at-Large from September 1989 until March 1993. Prior to that, he had been Washington Bureau Chief for five years. His earlier assignments for TIME were Diplomatic Correspondent (1977-1984), White House correspondent during the Ford Administration (1975-1976), State Department correspondent when Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State (1974-1975), and Eastern Europe correspondent for two years in the early 1970s.

Mr. Talbott has translated and edited two volumes of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, published in 1970 and 1974, and his expertise in arms control and Soviet affairs has been evidenced in a number of articles and five books. Mr. Talbott has twice won the Edward Weintal Prize for distinguished reporting on foreign affairs and diplomacy in 1980 and 1985.

Mr. Talbott has been a trustee of Yale University and the Hotchkiss School and has served on the Board of Directors of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Council on Foreign Relations, and The Aspen Strategy Group.

About the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project

The Preventive Defense Project is a joint venture between Stanford University and Harvard University. Preventive Defense is a concept of defense strategy for America in the post-Cold War era. The premise of Preventive Defense is that the absence of an imminent, major, traditional military threat to American security presents today's national security leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity: to prevent new Cold War-scale threats to U.S. security from emerging in the future. While the United States defense establishment must continue to deter regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula, as well as keep the peace and provide humanitarian relief in selected instances, its highest priority is to contribute to forestalling developments that could directly threaten the survival and vital interests of American citizens.

The Preventive Defense Project will initially concentrate on forging productive security partnerships with Russia and its neighbors, dealing with the lethal legacy of Cold War weapons of mass destruction, engaging an awakening China, and countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and catastrophic terrorism. The Project seeks to contribute to these objectives through the invention of new policy approaches reflecting Preventive Defense, intensive personal interaction with defense and military leaders around the world, and through the establishment of highly informed, non-governmental track two initiatives that explore new possibilities for international agreement.

Current Preventive Defense Project initiatives include:

- **Describing Preventive Defense.** In a forthcoming book, the Project's leaders will explain the concept to a wider audience, draw-

ing on their experience in the Pentagon and making recommendations for the future of American security policy.

- **Russia.** The Project is pursuing a number of activities designed to support Russian foreign and defense policy leaders in developing a post-Soviet security identity that matches Russia's interests to the interests of international stability. These initiatives include assisting Russian military reform and the development of national security decision-making processes, furthering NATO-Russia relations, encouraging the development of mutually beneficial relations with the other Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, and charting a course for nuclear arms reduction after START II ratification.

- **Other Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.** Expanded military-to-military contacts and economic opportunities are key to the continued security and stability of the NIS. The Project is pursuing initiatives with Ukraine, the Central Asian states, and the Caucasus countries, including the Caspian Sea region.

- **Eliminating the lethal legacy of the Cold War.** Through such innovations as the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States intervened to promote nuclear safety and non-proliferation in the early years after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Much was accomplished in the first post-Cold War era, but changing politics in Russia and the U.S. have caused their cooperation in controlling "loose nukes" to bog down and progress in chemical and biological weapons dismantlement to falter. Nunn-Lugar and arms control require "reinvention" if they are to continue in the second post-Cold War era. The Project seeks to contribute fundamental new ideas to that reinvention.

- **China.** Through research and intensive track two dialogue with Chinese defense and military leaders, the Project will concentrate on defining the specific content of the U.S. policy of engagement with China.

- **Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).** The glimmers of trouble to come provided by Iraq's WMD programs during and since the Gulf War show that proliferation has moved from a diplomatic problem to a direct military threat. DOD, therefore, needs to strengthen its Counter-proliferation Initiative, which is designed to contribute both to proliferation prevention and to the capabilities of U.S. forces to counter WMD in regional conflict. The Project seeks to define organizational and technical responses by DOD to this growing threat.

- **Organizing to combat catastrophic terrorism.** The Project convened the Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group, which is a collaboration of faculty from Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and the University of Virginia and is co-chaired by Ashton B. Carter and John M. Deutch. The Study Group is identifying appropriate responses by the United States government to the dangers of catastrophic terrorism.

The Preventive Defense Project is a multi-year effort supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and private sources. The Project's Co-Directors are former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton B. Carter. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General (ret.) John M. Shalikashvili and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall serve as Senior Advisors. Additional contributors to the Project include: member of President Clinton's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Robert J. Hermann and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White.

Institute for International Studies

Stanford University

The Institute for International Studies (IIS) seeks solutions to real-world, international problems that affect international security, the global environment, and international political economy. IIS creates a dynamic environment in which to address these critical issues by bringing experts from a variety of disciplines within Stanford University together with long- and short-term visitors from other academic, government, and corporate institutions. At any given time, over 150 scholars are engaged in policy studies within the Institute's federation of research centers.

Center for International Security and Cooperation

Stanford University

The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), part of Stanford University's Institute for International Studies, is a multidisciplinary community dedicated to research and training in the field of international security. The center brings together scholars,

policymakers, scientists, area specialists, members of the business community and other experts to examine a wide range of international security issues.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Harvard University

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) is the hub of the John F. Kennedy School of Government's research, teaching, and training in international security affairs, environmental and resource issues, and science and technology policy. The center's mission is to provide leadership in advancing policy-relevant knowledge about the most important challenges of international security and other critical issues where science, technology, and international affairs intersect. BCSIA's leadership begins with the recognition of science and technology as driving forces transforming threats and opportunities in international affairs. The center integrates insights of social scientists, natural scientists, technologists, and practitioners with experience in government, diplomacy, the military, and business to address critical issues.

**Preventive Defense—
the central strategic imperative for
the U.S. in the post-Cold War era.**

The absence of an imminent, major, traditional military threat to American security presents today's national security leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity: to prevent new threats from emerging. While day-to-day crisis management preoccupies policymakers, Preventive Defense concentrates on identifying and forestalling developments that could pose major new threats to U.S. vital interests. The Preventive Defense Project seeks to contribute through thorough research of such threats, invention of new policy approaches reflecting a preventive defense approach, intensive personal interaction with defense and military leaders around the world and through the establishment of highly informed but non-governmental "Track Two" initiatives that explore new possibilities for international agreement.

A research collaboration of

Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University