Volume 2, Number 1

Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense in South Asia: The U.S. Role

by Warren Christopher, David A. Hamburg, and William J. Perry

Preventive Defense Project

A research collaboration of
Stanford University and
Harvard University

Co-Directors

William J. Perry
Ashton B. Carter

Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense in South Asia: The U.S. Role

Conveners
Warren Christopher, David A. Hamburg, and William J. Perry

With Contributions by
Karen Ballentine, Lee Hamilton, and Strobe Talbott

A Special Report
of the
Preventive Defense Project
A Research Collaboration of
Stanford University and Harvard University

Publications of the Preventive Defense Project

NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future

The Content of U.S. Engagement with China

Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Partnership Between Ukraine and NATO

Reforming the Department of Defense: The Revolution in Business Affairs

Building U.S. and NATO Military Cooperation with Russia

Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy

Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense in South Asia: The U.S. Role

The Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project

Stanford University
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
(650) 725-6501

Harvard University
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-1405

©1999 by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University and the Board of Trustees of Harvard University
Printed in California
August 1999

This publication was made possible in part by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Contents

Foreword: Preventive Defense v

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1
by David A. Hamburg

America's Interest in Preventing Deadly Conflict 5
by Lee Hamilton

Dialogue, Democracy, and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia 19
by Strobe Talbott

Rapporteur's Report
by Karen Ballentine
Part I: Recommendations 27
Part II: Towards a Framework for Preventive Action 35
Part III: The Challenges for Preventive Defense and Preventive Diplomacy in South Asia 46

Conference Agenda 53

About the Conference Conveners and Contributors 57

About the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 61

About the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project 63

FOREWORD

Preventive Defense

Through more than four decades of Cold War, American national security strategy was difficult to implement but easy to understand. America was set on a clear course to contain Soviet expansionism anywhere in the world, all the while building a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union from using military force against it or its allies. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the underlying rationale for that strategy—the threat from the Soviet Union—has disappeared. What strategy should replace it? Much depends on finding the correct answer to this question.

The world survived three global wars this century. The first two resulted in tens of millions of deaths, but the third—the Cold War—would have been even more horrible than the others had deterrence failed. These three wars trace a path that leads to the strategy needed for the post-Cold War era.

At the end of the First World War, the victorious European allies sought revenge and reparations; what they got was a massive depression and another world war. The United States sought "normalcy" and isolation; what it got was total war and leadership in winning it. Because it failed to *prevent* and then to *deter* Germany's aggression, America was forced to mobilize a second time to *defeat* it.

At the end of the Second World War, America initially chose a strategy based on prevention. Vowing not to repeat the mistakes made after World War I, the Truman administration created the Marshall Plan, which sought to assist the devastated nations of Europe, friends and foes alike, to rebuild. The Marshall Plan and other examples of the preventive defense strategy, aimed at preventing the conditions that would lead to a future world war, were an outstanding success in Western Europe and in Japan.

But the Soviet Union turned down the Marshall Plan and, instead, persisted in a program of expansion, trying to take advantage of the weakened condition of most of the countries of Europe. The resulting security problem was clearly articulated by George Kennan, who forecast that the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union would be replaced with a struggle for the heart of Europe and that the United States should prepare for a protracted period of confrontation. Kennan's analysis was accepted by the Truman administration, which then formulated a strategy that would get us through the Cold War: deterring another global war while containing the Soviet Union's demonstrated expansionist ambitions. Deterrence supplanted prevention: there was no other choice.

Even deterrence was a departure from earlier American military strategy. The United States had twice previously risen to defeat aggression, but it had not maintained the peacetime military establishment or the engagement in the world to deter World Wars I or II. Marshall and other defense leaders around Truman created the peacetime posture and new security institutions required. In time, as George Kennan had forecast, the Soviet Union disintegrated because of the limitations of its political and economic systems. Deterrence worked.

The result is a world today seemingly without a major threat to the United States, and the U.S. is now enjoying a period of peace and influence as never before. But while this situation is to be savored by the public, foreign policy and defense leaders should not be complacent. This period of an absence of threat challenges these leaders to find the vision and foresight to act strategically, even when events and imminent threats do not compel them to do so.

To understand the dangers and opportunities that will define our nation's strategy in the new era, we must see the post-Cold War world the way George Marshall looked upon Europe after World War II, and return to prevention. In essence, we now have another chance to realize Marshall's vision: a world not of threats to be deterred but a world united in peace, freedom, and prosperity. To realize this vision, we should return to Marshall's strategy of preventive defense.

Preventive Defense is a concept of defense strategy for the United States in the post-Cold War era. It stresses the need to anticipate security dangers which, if mismanaged, have the potential to re-create Cold War-scale threats to U.S. interests and survival. The foci of Preventive Defense are: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

catastrophic terrorism, "loose nukes" and other military technology from the former Soviet Union, Russia's post-Cold War security identity, and the peaceful rise of China.

Preventive Defense is the most important mission of national security leaders and of the defense establishment. They must dedicate themselves to Preventive Defense while they deter lesser but existing threats—in Iraq and North Korea—and conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian missions—in Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and so on—where aggression occurs but where American vital interests are not directly threatened.

This is the first report of Volume Two of the Preventive Defense Project's series on key applications of Preventive Defense. Volume Two will consist of reports generated in 1999 and 2000, while Volume One contains six reports generated in 1997 and 1998. We are grateful to Warren Christopher and David Hamburg and to the participants of the conference on Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense in South Asia for their collaboration.

Ashton B. Carter
William J. Perry
Co-Directors
Preventive Defense Project

Acknowledgments

This report is the result of a conference, sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, held at Stanford University on January 15-16, 1999. The conference participants consisted of roughly thirty security and conflict resolution experts and U.S. government officials who convened to consider the challenges of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense, with special attention to South Asia.

The purpose of the meeting was twofold: 1) to explore ways in which the United States can, in cooperation with other nations and international organizations, enhance its capacity to contribute to international peace through preventive diplomacy and preventive defense; and 2) to asses the utility of third-party, particularly U.S., preventive action in reducing the multiple dangers posed by the ongoing ethno-territorial conflict in Kashmir and the incipient nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan.

This gathering provided an opportunity to take stock of the current state of the art of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense and to help move this scholarly and policy agenda forward. While recognizing the profound complexity of South Asian security dilemmas and the constraints they pose for effective preventive action, the participants focused their energies on developing practical and reliable strategies to reduce the risk of conflict escalation in the short-term and on creating a more enduring basis of security and cooperation between India and Pakistan.

We would like to thank the participants for their contributions and participation:

Karen Ballentine (rapporteur), Research Associate, Carnegie Corporation of New York

Harry Barnes, Director, Conflict Resolution Program, Carter Center

Marshall Bouton, Executive Vice President, The Asia Society

Ashton Carter, Professor of Science and International Affairs, Harvard University and Co-Director, Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project

Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Francine Frankel, Director, Center for Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania

Sumit Ganguly, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College

Alexander George, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Stanford University

Lee Hamilton, Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Jane Harman, Former U.S. Representative

Selig S. Harrison, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center and Project Director, The Century Foundation

Jane Holl, Executive Director, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

David Holloway, Raymond A. Spruance Professor in International History; Professor of Political Science; and Director, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

Bruce Jentleson, Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace and Director, UC Davis Washington Center

Michael Krepon, President, Stimson Center

Thomas Leney, Senior Associate, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

Winston Lord, Vice-Chairman, International Rescue Committee

Robert Oakley, Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Larry Register, Vice President, Special Projects, CNN International

Scott Sagan, Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University

General (ret.) John Shalikashvili, Visiting Professor, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University and Senior Advisor, Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Senior Advisor, Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project

Thomas Simons, Consulting Professor of History, Stanford University

David Speedie, Chair, International Peace and Security Program, Carnegie Corporation of New York

Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute

Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State

Peter Tarnoff, President, International Advisory Corporation

Frank Wisner, Vice-Chairman, External Affairs, American International Group, Inc.

Stanley Wolpert, Professor of South Asian History, UCLA

William Zartman, Professor of Conflict Resolution, Johns Hopkins University

The rapporteur's report contains a list of recommendations arising from the conference by which U.S. political and military officials, as well as the nongovernmental, academic, and business communities, may better contribute to a coordinated and fruitful process of confidence building and conflict resolution, both in this vitally important region and beyond. We owe a special note of gratitude to Karen Ballentine for her exceptional work as the rapporteur of the conference and as the author of that report.

We would also like to thank Jane Holl, Executive Director, and Thomas Leney of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, and Lainie Dillon and Deborah Gordon, of the Preventive Defense Project at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, for their invaluable support in organizing and coordinating this conference.

Finally, we would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its abiding support—of both the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project—in making this important work possible.

Warren Christopher
David A. Hamburg
William J. Perry

INTRODUCTION

Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense in South Asia: The U.S. Role

David A. Hamburg

For the last four years, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has sought to stimulate international scholars and foreign policymakers to think and act preventively. It has been our collective conviction that conflict prevention is both necessary and possible. We are convinced of its necessity because, in the post-Cold War era, the international security environment is characterized by a new generation of intrastate conflicts and new threats of catastrophic terrorism brought on by the combustible blend of regional instability and the wider proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Already, the eruption and escalation of civil and regional wars in the Balkans, Africa, and elsewhere have put us on notice that the paradigm and policy instruments which helped us manage the Cold War are now of limited utility. Likewise, adopting a policy of "doing nothing" in the face of deadly conflict simply defers the problem to a later date when the level of destructiveness and the costs of intervening are higher and the risks of action even greater. The world urgently needs a better framework for understanding and coping with violent conflicts, one which places a premium on acting early to prevent them rather than on halfhearted efforts to extinguish fires that already threaten to burn out of control.

During the course of our work, the Commission undertook an extensive assessment of the concepts and practices of conflict management and conflict prevention with the purpose of determining which strategies have the greatest potential for averting outbreaks of mass violence and under what sorts of conditions. While the record we surveyed was mixed, we found heartening evidence that where sufficient political, economic, and military resources are properly mobilized for the task, conflict prevention can be successful. Among

the many findings detailed in the Commission's *Final Report*, we concluded that the best practices of conflict prevention are those which rely on well-developed systems of early warning, explicitly provide for resource-pooling and burden-sharing among a range of diverse actors and agencies, aim at redressing underlying structural problems as well as the proximate causes of conflict, and apply diplomatic and military leverage appropriate to the problem at hand.

Far from offering the last word on this most vital of subjects, the Commission has sought to engage others to take up the challenge of prevention, to elaborate a more robust analytical and policy framework while working to make preventive action a routine practice of international policymaking. We have sponsored more than forty additional publications on various aspects of conflict prevention and hosted numerous meetings around the globe which have focused on the ongoing contributions of an ever-widening circle of people. In so doing, we have attracted the energetic involvement of scholars, international organizations, and nongovernmental actors as well as the governments of the United States, Britain, Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Japan.

The idea for convening a meeting specifically devoted to preventive diplomacy and preventive defense owes much to the creative leadership of William Perry and Warren Christopher. As secretary of defense and secretary of state respectively, they experienced firsthand the need for new approaches to the security challenges of the emerging twenty-first century. And it is largely due to their seminal thinking on the subject that people increasingly have come to think of diplomacy and defense in explicitly preventive terms. This said, there is still much conceptual and practical work to be done to transform the nascent promise of these ideas into the sturdy pillars of an emerging paradigm of global security. The primary objective of this meeting, then, was to help move this agenda forward.

We chose to do so by considering the merits of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense as applied to the specific security challenges posed today in South Asia. The manifest urgency of preventing a cataclysm in this region cannot be exaggerated, nor should we ignore the complexity and risk which such a task involves. The rivalry between India and Pakistan has led to outright war already three times in the post-colonial era, twice over the disputed state of Kashmir. It has also fed an indigenous Kashmiri uprising, which has cost an esti-

mated 35,000-40,000 lives since 1989. The introduction of the nuclear variable into the already tense India-Pakistan relationship has qualitatively altered the equation of the conflict. By undertaking nuclear tests and unilaterally asserting their claims to nuclear status, India and Pakistan have posed a direct threat to the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime while sharply escalating the stakes of continued fighting in Kashmir. While regional instability has long attracted international concern, the tests refocused the attention of the United States and the larger international community, offering a powerful stimulus for making determined and creative use of the untapped potential of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense.

Our parallel decision to limit our discussions to U.S. policy towards South Asia was certainly not meant to suggest that conflict prevention should not be an international priority. As stressed in the *Final Report* of the Carnegie Commission, the tasks of prevention are simply too diverse and too complex to be the exclusive responsibility of any one institution or nation. By practical necessity, the prevention of deadly conflict is a global, collective, and cooperative enterprise. Our focus on the role of the U.S., instead, reflects the undeniable reality of its preeminent political, economic, and military power in the world at large as well as in South Asia. Quite simply, effective conflict prevention greatly depends on the quality and determination of American leadership.

On this score, however, America's recent performance has been worrisome. Under the corrosive influence of strident neo-isolationist minorities at home, U.S. decision makers have been slow to mobilize the support of the generally international-minded American majority behind principled preventive action, claiming instead that their hands are tied by the allegedly entrenched isolationism of their electorates. Thus, to some extent, America has neglected the responsibilities which flow from its status as *primus inter pares* and the support which it owes the international organizations to which it belongs and from which it continues to reap major benefits. There has been a growing reliance on aggressive unilateral actions, dressed often with only a thin veneer of allied consultation. Not only is this approach an inadequate substitute for genuine and sustained multilateral cooperation in the difficult task of preventing deadly conflicts, it carries a high price in terms of America's international credibility. If the U.S. should find itself unable to bring along its allies to address the international challenges we all

face, then there is a greater risk that today's problems will become tomorrow's vital threats.

Clearly, the U.S. capacity for assuming the leading role in cooperative security is unique. By concentrating our discussion on the role of U.S. preventive diplomacy and preventive defense in South Asia, it is our hope that the meeting and this resulting report will provide a considered assessment of the capacity of U.S. civilian and defense agencies for conflict prevention, as well as suggest practical ways that the U.S. can contribute to sustained peace and prosperity in South Asia.

America's Interest in Preventing Deadly Conflict

Lee Hamilton

Introduction

It is a high privilege for me to participate in this timely and noteworthy conference on preventive diplomacy and preventive defense. I am especially delighted to join three highly esteemed statesmen—Warren Christopher, David Hamburg, and Bill Perry—at this conference. If I were to name a Hall of Fame of distinguished public officials, based on my thirty-four years in elective office, I would name each of them to it. Suffice it to say, they are among the preeminent public officials of our generation.

Most of what I say tonight about preventive diplomacy and preventive defense I have learned from them. They have made me believe that there are concrete steps we can take to prevent or contain the spread of conflict.

Similarly, the folks associated with the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project merit our gratitude and our praise for their important contributions to the cause of conflict prevention. I commend their enterprise in arranging and staging this conference. I can tell you what goes on here will have a profound impact on policymakers and policy over time.

The Problem

I speak to you this evening about a great and worthy mission—how to prevent conflict, both within nation-states and between them.

This issue is important, perhaps even transcendent. Today, there are more than two dozen deadly conflicts underway around the world. These conflicts have caused over 9.3 million casualties since 1990 and increased the number of refugees from twelve to twenty-five million.

So conflict prevention is critical. No other issue facing the world today more deserves your attention.

What do you want to do for your children and grandchildren? Many things, of course, but I hope among them will be a legacy of having tried in your own way to bequeath to them a less violent world, a world of concord, not conflict. Our task is to try to develop practical steps and a renewed commitment to preventive diplomacy and preventive defense. What more important task engages our attention than this great mission?

Many of us had hoped that the end of the Cold War would mean a more peaceful international order. We had thought that much of the conflict in the world had its origins in the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of that rivalry, we had believed that the prospects for peace were improved and that countries could be brought closer together. As it turns out, we were too optimistic.

We find ourselves still residents in a dangerous world. Wherever we turn, there are unstable nations, disgruntled groups, and terrorists. Sadly, warfare and strife have not lessened. Human beings, it turns out, have a virtuoso capacity for violence. We were, in short, unprepared for the fragmented, disorderly world of the post-Cold War era.

What we need now is a new strategy, a strategy similar to the Marshall Plan after World War II, which sought to *prevent* the conditions that would lead to another war. And it succeeded. During the Cold War we succeeded again, with policies of deterrence and containment.

But today we live in a new world. It is a world where the United States exercises an influence far beyond anything it has ever had before. It is a world where we are indeed the indispensable nation. But alas, it is also a world that still has far too much conflict and violence.

In such an era, what do we do? How do we lead? How can we keep these good times of peace and unprecedented influence going? What should our world strategy be? As I understand it, that is what this conference is all about.

All of us recognize that deterrence must not be abandoned. After all, the North Koreans and the Iraqis are not going to magically disappear. Bosnia, Haiti, and other conflicts are still too much with us. But what about the really big challenges—a Russia on the brink of

chaos, possibly losing control of its nuclear arsenal? A China that could grow hostile and uncooperative? A planet overrunning with weapons of mass destruction? A world where terrorism may be the number one threat to our national security?

We continue to need deterrence and to need military forces able to deter aggressors and to win wars quickly and decisively. But we need more. We need a broad strategy, using all the instruments of national power—political, economic, and military—to prevent conflict, to influence the world away from violence as a means of settling conflict, and to deal with a parade of challenges that threaten our survival and cause great disruption, pain, and bloodshed.

And so, we think tonight about preventive diplomacy and preventive defense. What do we really mean by these phrases? How practical are they? What capacities and tools do they require? What are the barriers to effective conflict prevention? Several features of conflict prevention impress me. We know more about it than you might initially think.

Features of Conflict Prevention

1. **We know what causes conflict.** The sources of the conflicts that have marred the 1990s are diverse. Weak, internally divided states—in Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Colombia, Algeria, Tajikistan, Cambodia, the Sudan. Unfortunately, the list goes on and on. Religious, political, or ethnic fanaticism and intolerance of every stripe—in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, the Indian subcontinent, and throughout Africa. Repression of racial, ethnic, or religious groups in areas as diverse as Guatemala, Kosovo, Kashmir, and East Timor.

Other conflicts have economic causes. Gross disparities in living standards, even economic growth and reform—so often the building blocks of stability—can contribute to strife. For example, growth has bypassed indigenous populations in many parts of Latin America, and the resulting inequality has contributed to armed revolt in Mexico and Peru.

Competition for control of or access to resources can be another cause of conflict. Scarce supplies of oil and water continue to be a source of contention—and bloodshed—in the Middle East. Population pressures and the accompanying environmental degradation can create a serious strain on limited resources as well. So can

refugees. Most of the world's fifteen million refugees today are the result of conflict, but massive refugee movements can also spread instability and strife. There are deep-seated historical animosities, as we see in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

Then there is the human element. We must always expect that a Hitler, a Stalin, a Pol Pot, or some other charismatic, inflammatory leader lurks just offstage, eager to take advantage of the social stresses in society in ways that almost guarantee new conflict.

2. **We know how important conflict prevention is to the United States.** We know that if we succeed at it, we will not have to expend blood and treasure tomorrow. We will pay fewer taxes and risk the lives of our offspring less often.

Whenever or wherever a crisis erupts, the international community looks to the United States, as the world's indispensable nation, for help in resolving it. You and I resist a U.S. role as the world's policeman. We always want to know: What are the alternatives to sending in the Marines? But unless a better system of conflict prevention is developed, the burden on the United States in the coming years to respond to instability and conflict will be progressively greater, both financially and militarily.

Americans often ask the question: Why should we care? It is a fair question. We should care because sometimes our vital national interests are at stake, as in the Persian Gulf; because we care about human values and human life (as in Somalia, where we could not tolerate those horrible pictures of starving children); and because waiting will only make the costs go up—in terms of death, the scale of relief efforts, and the damage to international standards.

In other words, preventive action can save money—and lives. It can also promote American interests—political, diplomatic, security, and economic.

3. **We know that American leadership is essential to make conflict prevention work.** When we sit on the sidelines, the world is a more dangerous place. No other country can take our place.

Only when the United States acted did the killing stop in Bosnia. U.S. leadership restored political stability in Haiti and economic stability in Mexico. We pushed reform in Russia and achieved remarkable progress toward peace in the Middle East. U.S. leadership helped broker a permanent extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, and a freeze on

North Korea's nuclear weapons facilities at Yongbyon. Leadership is inherent in our power and our values. We have a talent for it. We cannot evade it.

4. **We can predict conflict.** Where there is no democracy, where there is alienation of major groups in society, gross economic imbalances, exclusion or discrimination of groups, or historical grievances, the risks of conflict are very high. Conflicts occur in states which are undergoing major transition, or they spring from strong perceptions of inequity, uneven distribution of the good things in life, disputes over resources, repression, corruption, or a decline in the legitimacy of government.

5. **We know that the primary responsibility for conflict prevention within countries lies with the government and the people of that country.** The next responsibility lies with the international community, with the region assuming greater responsibility, and, when necessary, with outside groups.

Sovereignty always figures prominently here. Nations do not take lightly to outside intervention. But even here things are changing. Today the international community believes that with sovereignty comes responsibility. When nations cannot manage conflict, or do not show a respect for international standards and commitments, the international community sometimes steps in—as has been the case in Iraq.

What Must Be Done to Prevent Conflict

Change Attitudes

We must foster the belief that the prevention of conflict is possible. We must not accept the view that violence is inevitable. Of course, prevention will often fail. We must be realistic. But the knowledge that we will not always succeed in staving off conflict is not an argument for not trying.

There are even reasons for cautious optimism. From time to time the international community has intervened in a timely and decisive fashion either to prevent conflict or to stop it from spreading. It happened in Bosnia. In Haiti. In Sierra Leone. In the Middle East. Even the UN intervention in Cambodia in the early 1990s, as imperfect as the results have been, almost surely prevented bloodshed and saved lives. Violence usually results from human decision, not blind fate. Recognizing this reality is a necessary precondition for preventing conflict.

In addition, busy policymakers, even as they are consumed with today's troubles, must learn to take time to look at tomorrow's problems. A domestic challenge is illustrative. Today we spend one percent of the American health care budget on prevention. And yet the experts are virtually unanimous in their judgment that we could save many lives and much money if we devoted a greater percentage of our total health care costs to prevention. The same is true of conflict prevention.

I do not suggest it is easy to focus on a problem before it becomes a crisis, or to build into the decision-making process a set of rewards and inducements that will encourage the harried policymaker to look beyond today's problems. And so, we need to foster a sense of urgency, a new way of thinking that gives precedence to the prevention, and not simply the management, of conflict, to avoid disaster, rather than dealing with the consequences after it hits.

To do this requires that we get our facts straight, analyze situations objectively, keep an open mind, learn from one another, persist, and respect the importance and the difficulty of the task we have set out for ourselves.

Utilize Tools of Diplomacy

In many cases, the traditional tools of diplomacy—dialogue, mediation, political and economic sticks and carrots, diplomatic pressure from the regional and international communities, sanctions—can, if utilized skillfully, prevent or minimize conflict. We know what tools of diplomacy can work to prevent conflict.

1. **Economic measures, with both inducements and punishments, can be used to prevent conflict.** Sustainable growth and the removal of economic inequities in a country can do amazing things toward the prevention of conflict. The absence of growth is an early warning signal of potential violence. Economic aid has to be directed toward achieving growth, and aid should be conditioned on good governance. If people's basic needs are met, conflict can usually be prevented. Economic aid can help correct the underlying causes of conflict and provide incentives and hope for improvement. Sanctions can serve as deterrents to unacceptable action.

2. **The promotion of the rule of law can help diffuse tensions within a country and reduce the incidence of conflict.** Countries lacking good governance and equitable legal systems will

be susceptible to internal violence. If, on the other hand, a country has effective political, economic, and legal mechanisms, tensions can be addressed before violence erupts.

The political conditions needed to prevent conflict are not mysteries. They amount to good governance—managing diversity; building the infrastructure of democratic institutions; a robust civil society; and the active participation of women (who are increasingly playing the role we should expect from them—peacemakers), business leaders, the media (which can inform and highlight and not distort), and religious leaders (who can often play a positive role of reconciliation).

The aim of all this is to put in place a strong system of values, reinforced by international norms. At the heart of conflict prevention must be a strong system of justice—legal systems available to all that operate fairly and produce a sense of justice.

3. **Dispute-resolution mechanisms and the promotion of confidence-building measures (CBMs) are common diplomatic tools that can prevent conflict.** The establishment of confidence-building measures in central Europe in the 1970s and 1980s played a key role in convincing the Soviet Union that it could safely call an end to the Cold War. CBMs build trust between countries. Openness about military budgets, plans, and policies may be an unusual concept in defense circles, but peace requires transparency and trust.

U.S. training and education programs for foreign military establishments, International Military Exchange Training (IMET), bring nations together to learn how military establishments function in a democracy. It is striking to see officers from the former Soviet Union or from Latin American countries learning about the primacy of civilian authority, respect for human rights, the role of law, and the role of a parliament. To watch American military officers teach officers from newly democratic countries about professional military establishments under civilian control is prevention of conflict in action. It is good American policy to encourage contacts of our military with the militaries of our allies and other nations to help enlarge the community of free market democracies.

4. **Formal treaties and other accords can also help prevent conflicts.** Although it is still a work in progress, the Wye River agreement may usher in a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East.

The United States must also lead the way for the worldwide acceptance of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, bring into force the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), implement the Chemical Weapons Convention, and strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

We know we can reduce the risks of violence and conflict if we prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not alone by dismantling Cold War nuclear arsenals, but also by reducing danger through arms control treaties. Arms control treaties of various sorts—from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to the biological and chemical weapons conventions to the limitations on conventional weapons in central Europe—have played a major role in reducing the interstate tensions that foment violence.

Do not overlook the potential to prevent conflict by limitations on the transfer of small arms. After all, most violence is inflicted by small, not large, weapons.

5. **Regional organizations can play a part in preventing conflict as well.** The Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, and other organizations should assume more responsibility for economic development and integration, the promotion of good governance, and the prevention of conflict within their specific regions.

The problems within a particular region should be handled by states within that region, if possible. It is better, for example, if Africans deal with African problems and Latin Americans with Latin American problems.

Regional organizations should support confidence-building measures to increase military transparency, communication, and cooperation. They should develop the capability to apply pressure, offer assistance, and deploy regional forces to prevent conflict.

6. **Multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, can help prevent conflict.** To help these international institutions be effective in preventing conflict, the international community needs to develop a better system of early warning and response. The genocides of Bosnia, Cambodia, and Rwanda caught us unaware and unprepared. Yet conflict seldom arises without warning. Persons knowledgeable about countries are rarely surprised when long-simmering problems escalate into full-scale conflict. President Clinton recently

announced the creation of a Genocide Early Warning Center. This is an initiative to be cheered and encouraged.

But early warning must be followed by timely action. The international community needs a capability for preventive action. This means the ability to deploy civilian personnel—to mediate problems, to provide emergency economic relief, and to address the long-term issues that give rise to conflict. The United Nations can play a key role here. But this will require that the nations that make up the UN give a higher priority to conflict prevention. And this is unlikely to occur unless the United States takes the lead.

Most fundamentally, the international community, using these and other multilateral institutions, must address the underlying political and economic causes of conflict. That means the world community must support political reform and the development of responsive and accountable government. Helping to establish and promote institutions of civil society such as political parties, trade unions, independent media, and the rule of law provides important safeguards for protecting human rights, fighting corruption, and fending off political demagoguery.

The United States should work with the international community, especially the international financial institutions, to support long-term development assistance to achieve economic growth and promote economic opportunity and equality. Working through institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization, the U.S. should support market reform and regional economic integration to bolster growth.

Military Intervention

Military intervention is another tool in our prevention arsenal. We know that traditional diplomacy sometimes fails to prevent conflict, and that military intervention, if skillfully employed, can prevent conflict.

There are, of course, many problems in developing the appropriate mechanisms for an international military capability to intervene in areas of potential or actual conflict. Answers to the difficult questions of "when," "how," "who," "how long," and "for what purposes" are often elusive. So the international community must improve its ability to respond militarily to conflicts once they reach the crisis stage.

There is no inherent contradiction between the prevention of violence and the use of military force. To the contrary, the use of armed personnel has played a constructive role in Haiti, Bosnia, Macedonia, Western Sahara, Cyprus, and elsewhere. Military intervention can be either: 1) peacekeeping—after violence occurs and an agreement has been reached by the parties; or 2) preventive—as in Macedonia where American troops and others were introduced to prevent the spread of conflict from Bosnia.

A multinational "fire brigade" is a well-tested idea with a demonstrated record of success. Used with discretion, it can be a highly effective tool for the prevention of conflict. The UN coordinates efforts by governments to train military forces and set aside necessary resources for future peacekeeping missions. The U.S. should support these efforts so that the international community can act rapidly and effectively if a military response is required.

I have come to the view that the international community needs some means of responding militarily to deteriorating situations in order to prevent conflicts—some kind of multinational, multifunctional rapid-reaction standby capability, probably within the United Nations. I do not underestimate the difficulties of this task, but I believe we must begin to explore ways and means to achieve that capacity. If we do not, the U.S. will be called on again and again as the power with the most developed intervention capabilities.

Sometimes the threat of the use of force can be an effective deterrent—though it may be a gamble and must be managed with great skill.

Private Sector

The private sector can also play a key role in conflict prevention. Just think for a moment about the helpful and talented contributions made toward peace and the prevention of violence by private groups, from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Carter Center, or from human rights groups around the world. From our religious and moral leaders. From schools. From the scholarly and intellectual communities. From the media. From the business community. And from influential nongovernmental opinion leaders such as many of those here this evening. In recent years, this so-called track-two diplomacy has flourished. These efforts should be further encouraged.

Unless the private sector engages itself in the business of conflict prevention and resolution, the task of moderating strife and violence will become infinitely more difficult.

Congress and Preventive Diplomacy/Defense

Let me conclude with a few remarks about the role of the U.S. Congress in matters of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense.

I have been struck by how little of the literature—at least that which I have seen—mentions the American Congress. And yet, if the United States is to take a leading part in international efforts at conflict prevention, then the Congress is going to have to be brought in as a full-fledged partner in this effort. It seems to me that Congress might usefully take action in three areas.

1. **Congress must support the infrastructure of preventive action.** This means that the Hill must be prepared to provide adequate funding for the State Department and the other agencies that promote American interests overseas. It also requires that Congress be willing to pay for the programs that are most likely to prevent conflict. This means money for economic development, for programs promoting the rule of law, for the creation and nourishment of the political, economic, and legal institutions through which tensions can be addressed in ways short of conflict.

2. **Congress must overcome its resistance to participation in multinational organizations, both civilian and military.** When military force is called for, the presidents and the secretaries of state and defense who seek to persuade Congress to support preventive defense must emphasize the U.S. national interest that dictates such use of our armed forces.

Members of Congress are above all hardheaded pragmatists. Show them how a military intervention serves the national interest and you are much closer to persuading them of the wisdom of such action.

3. **Perhaps most fundamentally, members of Congress are going to have to do better in adapting their mind-sets to changed circumstances.** There are members of Congress today who are unable to utter the word "China" without preceding it with the adjective "communist" or "Red." This inability to move beyond old Cold War views that have more to do with Stalinist Russia than with the China

of the late 1990s has frequently led to congressional action that makes conflict with China more rather than less likely.

Unless members of Congress are prepared to look at old problems from a fresh perspective, the legislative branch is unlikely to be of much assistance in fostering a new ethos of preventive action.

And without congressional participation, the United States will not play the leading role in conflict resolution that its strength and position in the global community demands.

Conclusion

Where does all this leave us? We know the odds. We cannot eliminate all war and violence, any more than we can eliminate human folly. We know the United States cannot and should not be responsible for addressing all the ills of the world. We know that devoting more resources and greater attention to conflict prevention is a long-term investment that serves the U.S. national interest. Conflict prevention saves lives, saves money, and forestalls the human misery that leads to conflict.

We know that conflict prevention requires the participation of the entire international community. No one leader, no one country, no one institution can carry the load. Conflict prevention responses must be tailored to fit each situation, with a plan and close coordination of the tools of response from among all the actors—internal and external, regional and international, civilian and military, public and private, official and nonofficial.

The prevention of conflict is a great and worthy challenge. In our bones we know that it deserves a far higher priority from U.S. policymakers and from international organizations, especially the UN, than it has historically received. The problem is not so much in our lack of knowledge of what to do, but in our political will and commitment to do those things we know can and have prevented conflict.

As I close, let me express my concern that the U.S. leadership needed to strengthen our conflict prevention capabilities is being eroded by budget cuts from the U.S. Congress and a general tendency among the American public to draw back from international responsibilities. It is a situation that demands political leadership of the highest order from the president and the Congress. Every president, every cabinet official, every member of Congress should insist that conflict preven-

tion constitute a central component of U.S. diplomatic and defense strategy—and moreover, do a better job of educating the American people about this.

We soon complete the twentieth century. It is a century of wars—the first in which world wars were fought. It is the first century, also, in which men and women of good will, drawing on the impact of world wars, have wrestled with the idea of conflict prevention and world peace. We have glimpsed that peace is possible because it is necessary. We have not won the day, but we have begun the understanding of what peace and conflict prevention can mean—quite simply, it can change the course of history and the life of man more than anything we know or can do.

We may not be able to rid the world of conflict. We *can* make it more livable. What more important task do you have on your agenda?

Thank you.

Dialogue, Democracy, and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

Strobe Talbott

Thank you, Chris [Warren Christopher], for the kind introduction and for the chance to serve for four years at your side. It is also nice to be back together with our other colleagues: Bill [Perry], Peter [Tarnoff], Frank [Wisner], Tom [Simons] and Ash [Carter]. Chris, it was you who introduced me to the practice of preventive diplomacy in South Asia. Immediately after swearing me in as your deputy in 1994, you dispatched me to Pakistan and India with the assignment of trying to persuade the two Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and P. V. Narasimha Rao, from ratcheting up their military competition. I was not totally successful.

But I had already learned a thing or two about patience from Warren Christopher, so, undeterred, I have persisted. A week from next Thursday, I'm joining the other members of our interagency flying squad—Joe Ralston, Rick Inderfurth, Bob Einhorn, Bruce Riedel, and Matt Daley—for a trip to New Delhi and Islamabad. It will be round eight of the parallel dialogues we've been conducting with India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the explosions last May in the Pokhran Desert of Rajasthan and the Chigai Hills of Baluchistan.

Here is the essence of what I see as both the challenge and what we are trying to do. Because of those tests, we are confronted with a lamentable but, for the foreseeable future, irreversible fact: India and Pakistan have formally and overtly demonstrated that they have nuclear weapons. In so doing, they made themselves in 1998 even more part of the problem of regional and global proliferation than they were before. However, they can, in 1999, if they so choose, move back in the direction of being part of the solution—and they can do that while enhancing their own security at the same time.

One way they can move back in the right direction in the political sphere is by intensifying contacts and confidence-building measures, including on the issue of Kashmir. But they can also do it by taking four important steps in the security field:

- first, by adhering to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- second, by making possible a moratorium on the further production of fissile material;
- third, by demonstrating prudence and restraint in the development, flight testing, and storage of ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft; and
- fourth, by strengthening export controls.

Our discussions with the Indians and Pakistanis over the past seven and one-half months have inevitably focused on these core nonproliferation issues, but we've tried not to lose sight of the broader context—and indeed the broader definition of security itself. With both parties, we have been trying to make the case that security is not just a matter of what kind of weapons they have and in what quantities; rather, security is also, crucially, a matter of raising living standards and building healthy democracies. The essence of the argument that we're making to the Indians and Pakistanis is that in pursuing what we believe is their ill-advised reliance on nuclear deterrence, we hope very much they will not jeopardize the other political and economic dimensions of their own safety.

Let me elaborate, starting with the issue of democracy. It has long been a guiding principle of American foreign policy—which is to say, American preventive diplomacy—that promoting democracy advances America's own interests, including its security interests. That is because democracies are more likely to abide by their international commitments—more likely to be stable trading partners, less likely to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors, and less likely to make war on each other.

South Asia has been a testing ground for that proposition. While the record is mixed and the future clouded, there is reason for some encouragement. Today, more people live under democratic rule in South Asia than in any other part of the world. As South Asian democracies have matured, they have generally moved to settle their differences in peaceful fashion.

India and Pakistan's neighbors also offer evidence of a more hopeful trend. Tensions and misunderstandings are far less likely to

arise between India and its smaller neighbors, Bangladesh and Nepal, now that democracy has taken root in those countries and now that India has consciously moved toward an admirably more farsighted and generous approach.

Even in Sri Lanka, whose long democratic experience has failed thus far to end a bloody ethnic conflict, most observers and many government officials believe that a resolution will not be achieved on the battlefield, but through negotiations and the devolution of power. But now let me do what our Indian interlocutors frequently urge us to do, and that is look beyond the Subcontinent. The gravitational pull of South Asian democracy extends well beyond South Asia. If India's democracy continues to flourish, it can exercise a positive influence on those countries in East Asia where democracy is either in jeopardy or only a gleam in the eye of would-be reformers.

One such country that would so benefit is China—which is very much on India's mind, as well as our own. India can continue to serve as an important reminder to China that democracy is not only possible, but also necessary, if a government is to succeed in binding a huge and diverse population into a successful modern state. As others have noted, China is an immensely complicating dimension to what we are talking about at this conference. China's role in the security situation on the Subcontinent would provide enough fodder for a whole different follow-up session.

As for Pakistan, it has an important and positive role to play beyond the bounds of South Asia. Pakistan combines the attributes of a deeply religious society with many strengths of a moderate, pluralistic democratic political system. As such, it has the potential to encourage like-minded forces in an Islamic world that stretches from Morocco to Indonesia.

That is the good news to date, and it has promising implications for the future. But there's a darker side of the picture as well. In the last several years, we've seen the resurgence of forces in both India and Pakistan that threaten to undermine pluralism, civil society, good governance, and the rule of law—without which democracy loses its viability and indeed its meaning. In both countries, extremist factions and sectarian-based parties are on the rise. The world has been watching closely the growth in India of caste and religious-based politics. Even more alarming has been the spate of murderous attacks on Christians in Gujarat and Shantinagar. India today reverberates with inflamma-

tory rhetoric from religious leaders who seem bent on opening the wounds that Gandhi and Nehru worked so hard to heal—and thus jeopardizing what Indians rightly and proudly regard as their "civilizational" experience.

It's with much the same apprehension that we've seen in Pakistan, the trend toward "Islamicizing" the constitutional and legal system. This development has coincided with outbreaks of deadly sectarian violence in Karachi and the Punjab. Just two weeks ago in Punjab, sixteen Shiites were gunned down while praying at their mosque in early January. The attempted assassination of Prime Minister Sharif on January 3 was another sign of burgeoning political violence.

There appears to be a perverse and dangerous interplay between the politics of Pakistan and the turmoil inside Afghanistan. With the emergence of the Taliban, there is growing reason to fear that militant extremism, obscurantism, and sectarianism will infect surrounding countries. None of those countries has more to lose than Pakistan if "Talibanization" were to spread further.

All of this is highly relevant to the nuclear question in South Asia—and therefore to the American effort to engage in preventive diplomacy there. In addition to dealing with the immediate issue of the weapons, we also need to understand the circumstances and trends that could precipitate their use. That reality poses a challenge for Indian and Pakistani statecraft: how best to establish security policies that will, to the greatest extent possible, lengthen the fuses and remove the hair triggers of weaponry now accumulating in both countries.

Let me turn now to the other nonmilitary component of security, which is broad-based prosperity—or at least a broadly felt hope for progress in that direction. If the average citizen sees the possibility for a better future, then the state is, by definition, stronger and safer.

As Chris and other architects of our support for democracy have emphasized for many years, there is a direct linkage between economic and political freedom. Market economies tend to flourish in democratic settings.

Here again, South Asia is a case in point. With the obvious and glaring exception of Afghanistan, the region is beginning to realize its potential as a market for foreign business and investment, and it's making important strides toward integrating into a regional trading bloc.

Bangladesh—which is too often neglected in discussions of South Asian security—is key to this hopeful pattern. If it were lifted by a rising tide of regional growth, Bangladesh might gain enough economic self-confidence to export some of its enormous gas reserves. That, in turn, would give a push to regional cooperation. It would fuel India's development as well, given that nation's enormous need for energy. Pakistan and Nepal—and, a bit further to the north, central Asia—are also promising sources of natural gas, hydroelectric power, and oil.

But for the pieces of this puzzle to come together in a way—and in a time frame—that benefits all the countries of the region, three things must happen:

- there has to be a high degree of commerce, confidence, and cooperation among the states of the area (that means peace—not just peace today, or peace in the sense of absence of war, but a predictable, stable, sturdy peace stretching into the future);
- the international financial institutions must be prepared to increase their support for infrastructure, telecommunications, transportation, the energy sector, and financial reform; and
- the countries of the region must be able to attract foreign investment.

None of those conditions is firmly in place today, for reasons that derive, at least in some measure, to the explosions last May and their continuing aftershocks.

These are all points that we have included in our dialogues with the two parties—and by that I mean not just with the governments of those countries, but with others as well: media, elites, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and political figures across a broad spectrum.

That brings me to the last subject I want to touch on: the public affairs dimension of preventive diplomacy.

This is a sensitive but important dimension of our task. We understand that Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif must justify their policies to parliaments, where opposition parties are vigorous, voluble, and skeptical. India and Pakistan are, after all to their credit and to the world's benefit, democracies. That fact alone confronts us, in our own practice of statecraft, with something quite different from what we have dealt with in our earlier efforts to conduct arms-control negotiations and head off proliferation with other nations.

For most of the first half century of the nuclear age, the U.S. focused its diplomatic energies on the other nuclear-armed superpower, which was the opposite of a democracy. Whether under the rubric of SALT or START or the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement or the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks or the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, our Russian interlocutors took their cue exclusively from the Politburo and the General Staff. Neither they, nor we, gave much thought to sentiment in the Supreme Soviet or on the editorial pages of *Pravda*, *Izvestia,* and *Krasnaya Zvezda.*

It wasn't until the beginning of the Clinton administration that we began to get a real taste of what it was like to pursue arms-control and nonproliferation with fledgling democracies. Chris [Warren Christopher], Bill Perry, Ash Carter and I spent a lot of 1993 trying to ensure that, with the breakup of the USSR, there would be only one nuclear-armed successor state rather than four.

Our hardest work was in Ukraine. During our frequent trips to Kyiv, we spent a lot of time calling on the Verkhovna Rada, the parliament, where deputies were loath to let President Kravchuk give up the Soviet-era nuclear weapons that had ended up on Ukrainian soil. We succeeded in no small measure because we included a public dimension to our preventive diplomacy.

In that same spirit, we have pursued our arms-control and nonproliferation agendas with India and Pakistan in a way that both recognizes and respects the democratic environment—with all its pressures and constraints—in which our interlocutors are operating. In this regard, we admire and welcome the assiduous campaigns that both prime ministers have mounted to build support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

For our own part, we have tried to strike a balance between the appropriate degree of confidentiality in the negotiations and a necessary degree of transparency with the public. Here, I actually have in mind four publics: our own here in the U.S., the world's, India's, and Pakistan's.

With respect of American opinion: we will only be able to build a constituency for dealing with this issue if we are clear and convincing about the stakes in South Asia and about our handling of the nuclear challenge. There are aspects to our position that are inevitably going to be controversial even if—perhaps I should say, especially

if—we succeed. For example, there are quite a few experts and not a few members of Congress who believe that we should hold India's and Pakistan's feet to the fire, insisting on adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapons state and on a missile-flight test ban before we grant any significant sanctions relief.

We believe that following that stern advice would be to make the best the enemy of the good. But we can't just say, "Trust us, but don't ask us what's going on in this black box." We've got to make the case for what we're up to and why. We must do the same with regard to international public opinion, particularly in those countries—like Ukraine, for example, or Brazil or Argentina or South Africa—that had the option of going nuclear but instead decided, bravely and wisely, to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.

In our dialogues with India and Pakistan, we make no claim to having a formal mandate or proxy from any other country or international grouping—the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5), the Group of Eight (G-8), the South Asia Task Force. But we do feel a political and moral obligation to make sure that our position and proposals are consistent with the various communiqués issued by those bodies last June and that we keep faith with the world community as a whole. That consideration too argues for a carefully calibrated degree of transparency as we move forward.

Now, as for Indian and Pakistani public opinion: here we obviously and properly must let the governments in question decide how much they want to expose to public and parliamentary scrutiny the content of their side of the dialogues that they are conducting with us. We have taken pains not to reveal, or respond to, the Indian and Pakistani positions beyond what their spokesmen have chosen to say in public. But we have seen fit to summarize our own approach, our own goals and our own interests. Not least because we think we have some pretty good arguments worthy of, and appropriate for, consideration and open discussion as well as closed-door deliberations. That's why, in addition to our closed-door session with our official interlocutors, Joe Ralston and I will, in both Delhi and Islamabad, be meeting with members of the media, nongovernmental organizations, and other opinion leaders.

In any event, Chris [Warren Christopher], Bill [Perry] and David [Hamburg], I welcome the chance to be part of your conference here today—not least because it gives me a chance to benefit from your

ing and sustaining U.S. performance will require greater interdepartmental communication and cooperation between the State and Defense Departments, and, where the task is counterterrorism, among these and the relevant law-enforcement and justice agencies.

Specifically, each department was urged to adopt routine procedures for joint policy design and implementation to allow greater involvement by State officials in preventive defense policies and Defense officials in preventive diplomacy. Here, the key is policy innovation rather than any wholesale institutional restructuring. Certain specific programs, such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, have entailed moderate technical and institutional adjustments. However, successful policy innovation depends more upon engaging key decision makers in the ideas and practices of prevention than upon any particular institutional arrangement, especially when—as is the case today—that arrangement is already generally permissive. Thus, better interagency communication may be facilitated by assigning key officials an explicit mandate for the prevention of crises and violent conflict.

2. **Allocate adequate resources.** Adequate resources were cited as another critical requirement for creating an effective U.S. preventive capacity. Several practitioners described the resource base for U.S. foreign policy today as being in a parlous state. Over the last ten years, the State Department's budget has suffered cutbacks of fifty percent. Scores of diplomatic missions have been closed while others have been left understaffed, ill equipped, and—as the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania gravely dramatized—poorly protected. These closures and cutbacks have reduced the U.S. government's ability to attract the most talented people to diplomatic careers, while also removing the institutional platforms that enable other important agencies, such as Commerce, USAID, and U.S. intelligence, to promote American values and interests abroad.

Similarly, only $1 billion of the $250 billion annual defense budget is allocated to the kinds of activities which promote preventive defense. The Department of State's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which comes closest to fulfilling the goals of preventive defense, is cut back every year, even though the costs are relatively modest and the investment a prudent one. Cumulatively, these resource constraints severely weaken America's stature and influence around the globe. As many practitioners agreed, solving

the resource problem highlights the need to persuade Congress and the public that sustaining America's positive and proactive engagement with the world is a necessity we must afford, not a luxury we can dispense with.

3. **Mobilize a constituency for preventive diplomacy and preventive defense**. Given that the greatest barriers to enhancing America's role in preventive action are politically rooted, the participants also urged far greater efforts to engage the active support of the Congress and the public. Since surveys show that most Americans are not isolationist but cautiously internationalist, there is a potential constituency to be mobilized. And as most citizens' connections to the world are based on personal and business ties, strategies to tap this latent support should avoid broad, abstract appeals to globalism and aim at tying proactive diplomacy and conflict prevention to their everyday concerns.

To engage Congress, the participants recommended general efforts to build support for prevention, while emphasizing those kinds of preventive actions that are nonmilitary, low-risk, and aimed at building a strong infrastructure for peace in troubled regions. Participants emphasized the importance of regular briefings for congressional leaders so that they will be well informed and prepared to deal proactively with dangerous, conflict-prone situations.

Necessary Interim Measures for Improvement

The conference participants also suggested a number of specific, interim measures for improving various aspects of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense.

1. **Improve early warning systems**. To ensure a reliable picture of emerging hot spots and threats, and to enable informed early response, government intelligence and analysis should be complemented with data collected from additional sources, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and business people. These sources and the information they provide should be taken seriously into account when making policy recommendations.

2. **Improve U.S. cooperation with other international actors**. According to several participants, the U.S. has yet to adapt itself fully to the new realities of the changed international environment. There is a need to rethink the appropriate balance between multilateral and unilateral policies and to make more effective use of U.S.

membership in international organizations and alliances to complement U.S. preventive diplomacy and preventive defense. This need not involve an either/or choice between unilateralism and multilateralism but rather a recognition that some preventive tasks are best accomplished unilaterally and others multilaterally.

It is imperative that the U.S. be cognizant of the dangers of tasking the UN with military interventions that are beyond the capacities of conventional multilateral peacekeeping. Instead, the U.S. should look to the UN for an authorizing role in military interventions and for a supporting role in the kinds of preventive activities that UN agencies perform best, especially conflict monitoring, humanitarian assistance, refugee management, post-conflict reconstruction, and economic development. Improved burden-sharing and resource-pooling would also require strengthening the peacekeeping and dispute-resolution capacities of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) while developing more regular procedures for undertaking preventive actions with other governments in "coalitions of the willing."

Finally, the participants urged the U.S. government to make better use of the skills and resources provided by other international fora, for example, by helping European organizations, the Group of Eight (G-8), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank to incorporate conflict prevention into their agendas.

3. **Expand alternative avenues of diplomacy**. The U.S. government is urged to encourage and enable private groups to undertake alternative avenues of preventive diplomacy and conflict mediation. While government fears that private diplomacy may complicate official efforts are not unfounded, track-two and private-citizen diplomacy have proven useful to peace processes, especially when official avenues of negotiation are foreclosed. The U.S. government should explore ways to coordinate parallel efforts at diplomacy.

4. **Adapt U.S. military to preventive tasks**. In the view of several practitioners, the American military is increasingly undertaking the functions of peace enforcement. Much of this ongoing transformation has occurred on an ad hoc basis, as a result of U.S. involvement in the former Yugoslavia and Haiti. While U.S. forces have performed admirably in this role, according to the U.S. military's own estimates peacekeeping operations have proven more taxing than

conventional military missions for which U.S. forces have long been trained and equipped. For the U.S. military to become a premier peace enforcement force, there is a need for systematic restructuring in key areas of counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, and peace enforcement.

The U.S. capacity for preventive defense would also benefit from expanded joint military exercises and training. This would enhance combat readiness for joint operations, and, where new democracies are involved, would also help consolidate professional and civilian-controlled militaries.

Improving U.S. Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense in South Asia

Given the profound and complex security challenges posed by South Asia today and the constraints to effective third-party preventive actions, the participants emphasized that neither the nuclear issue nor the Kashmir conflict are amenable to quick policy fixes. Accordingly, they urged U.S. policymakers to pursue a realistic, broad-based, and incremental approach of confidence building that makes use of multiple strategies to strengthen the foundations for increased India-Pakistan cooperation. Equally important, they recommended that the U.S. take advantage of the diplomatic opportunities created by the May 1998 tests to devote more attention towards improving its own long-neglected relationship with India.

Kashmir

Among the specific measures that might be usefully applied to help de-escalate the conflict in Kashmir, the following were recommended.

1. **Support bilateral diplomacy on conflict reduction**. Despite the fact that outside mediation on Kashmir would probably work to India's benefit, while making Pakistan's support for the "insurgency" less tenable, India stubbornly refuses third-party involvement. As long as this condition holds, the participants recommended that the U.S. avoid any mediation role that would alienate India. Assuring Pakistan, however, means that the U.S. must keep Kashmir on the agenda. Supporting direct India-Pakistan talks meets both requirements. Many participants cautioned that the U.S. seek to avoid any action that would play into Pakistan's characterization of the Kashmir

conflict as a nuclear flash point, as this may encourage Pakistan to use nuclear pressure to pursue its territorial preferences in Kashmir.

2. **Strengthen conflict-reduction and confidence-building measures at the line of control**. The participants recommended several short-term measures aimed at de-escalating the intense level of artillery exchanges across the line of control. These included opening direct lines of communication between Indian and Pakistani militaries, encouraging regular adherence to existing agreements on troop movements, securing agreement on new rules of engagement to prohibit targeting of civilian communities at the line of control, and reducing the number of illegal crossings by mercenary forces.

In the medium term, India and Pakistan should be encouraged to jointly redeploy heavy artillery away from the line of control and to reduce the number of troops stationed there. These goals could be accomplished through a variety of verification mechanisms, including regular visits by NGOs, media, and government officials and daily communication between brigade and division level officers. Eventually these demilitarizing measures may open the way for a permanent cease-fire. Given the facts on the ground, India and Pakistan should be encouraged to relinquish all irredentist claims and accept the line of control as the permanent international boundary.

3. **Support trans-border cooperative efforts**. The U.S. should use its diplomatic leverage to create incentives for increased trans-border trade, commerce, and civilian traffic, thereby helping to develop enduring societal-level interactions. On both sides, there are already significant business constituencies interested in expanding the sphere of joint economic activities, including the development of eco-tourism and agribusiness in the Kashmir Valley. The recent agreements between India and Pakistan on shared water and energy resources show that these kind of initiatives are also welcome at the official level. Either directly or through its influence with international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the U.S. could allocate special funds for cooperative development and enterprise projects, with follow-on investments being made contingent on successful joint implementation.

4. **Promote alternative avenues of communication and diplomacy**. In view of the difficulties besetting official diplomatic efforts, the participants urged greater support for indigenous non-governmental initiatives, citizen diplomacy, and track-two dialogues

between India and Pakistan. Expanding these initiatives would provide further momentum to India-Pakistan cooperation, while also increasing opportunities for cross-cultural exchange that can help citizens overcome long-standing mutual suspicions. Past experience suggests that framing discussions in economic terms of cost and benefit helps to reduce the level of contentiousness while also appealing to a broader range of people. In practical terms, the U.S. should encourage India and Pakistan to liberalize their visa regimes so that citizens can travel freely without being subjected to intense police scrutiny.

Nonproliferation

Among the specific measures that might be usefully applied to help reduce the nuclear risk, the following were recommended.

1. **Promote multidimensional nuclear risk reduction measures**. The official U.S. effort to reduce the nuclear risk in South Asia requires that India and Pakistan sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, adopt a moratorium on fissile material production, show restraint on missile development—including limiting the number and range of missile delivery systems—and strengthen export controls on nuclear technology and materiel. While consistent with the U.S. position on nonproliferation, most participants believed that Indian compliance is unlikely in the short to medium term.

It was suggested that these requirements might be more acceptable to India if they were reformulated in terms of adherence to a universal and inclusive international regime rather than to a set of specifically American demands. Participants were virtually unanimous that persuading India to comply with nonproliferation will require the U.S. also to offer a credible demonstration of its obligations under the NPT to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, perhaps by undertaking strategic de-alert or unilateral reductions of its own nuclear arsenal. While this would not significantly alter current India-Pakistan dynamics, it would help undercut India's claim of nuclear apartheid.

In the view of most participants, the task of nuclear risk reduction requires additional, complementary measures—in particular, interim efforts to ensure the safe command and control of Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. As the U.S. government is constrained by the NPT from undertaking initiatives which may tacitly recognize India and Pakistan as "nuclear-weapons states," it is understandably wary of providing technical advice on command and control.

It was therefore suggested that American NGOs play a greater role in promoting arms control by assisting India and Pakistan in the technicalities of monitoring and verification and by educating them as to the real complexities and risks that were involved in managing the U.S.-Soviet nuclear rivalry. The NPT notwithstanding, some participants maintained that the U.S. government could do more by providing accurate early warning of force deployments and troop movements and by encouraging India and Pakistan to improve their own capacities for mutual transparency and verification.

2. **Maintain and strengthen parallel dialogues with India and Pakistan**. Although progress in India-Pakistan relations will be slow and fitful, the participants urged the U.S. government to maintain close, high-level contacts with Delhi and Islamabad. They also strongly recommended that these bilateral dialogues—especially with India—be expanded to include a range of issues beyond nuclear nonproliferation. Given India's determination to develop its nuclear capacity and America's insistence on upholding the nonproliferation regime, the nuclear issue will remain a major source of contention for some time to come. If U.S.-India relations are to improve, then it is necessary to focus on those areas where there is a commonality of interests and potential agreement, including trade, commerce, economic development, and energy.

3. **Support military-to-military exchanges**. Participants cited military-to-military training and exchange programs as one of the most promising avenues for improved relations between India and Pakistan and between both countries and the U.S. Indeed, the observable hesitancy of the Pakistani military to endorse nuclear weapons as a guarantee of Pakistan's security was attributed to their participation in the U.S. Department of State's IMET Program. The participants lamented the U.S. government's decision to suspend Pakistan from IMET as part of the sanctions imposed after the May 1998 tests and urged that Pakistan be readmitted without delay. They also urged a broader military-to-military dialogue between India and Pakistan that would extend down to field-level officers.

4. **Promote controls on conventional arms**. The participants also urged that the nuclear issue not be allowed to obscure the far more immediate threat posed by conventional armaments. The U.S. government should work to persuade India and Pakistan that they have a common interest in reducing the risk not just of nuclear war

but of all war. India and Pakistan have already concluded a number of agreements regarding the use of airspace and prior notification of military exercises that could serve as the basis for a more comprehensive and enforceable set of confidence-building measures, including observer exchanges during military exercises, expanded hot line systems, and more regular field-level communications.

The U.S. might also explore the possibility of establishing a subcontinent-wide formal agreement on pulling back heavy artillery and reducing conventional force postures, akin to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement. While this would apply especially to reducing the level of violence in Kashmir, framing it in terms of broader regional security would make it more politically palatable while also extending the scope of a predictable security regime.

5. **Develop a multilateral and regional security approach.** Several participants spoke of the need to place India-Pakistan relations in a wider regional context. As the nuclear tests have dramatically underscored, there is a need to address the core issues of strategic well-being in a region that has, since the end of the Cold War, been left precariously adrift. It is also necessary to take seriously India's security concerns regarding China: as many participants maintained, Indo-Chinese relations are the key to South Asian stability in the longer term. It was therefore recommended that the U.S. support new multilateral and nondiscriminatory security initiatives for the region, perhaps in the form of regional confidence-building measures (CBMs) or multilateral military-to-military meetings. More ambitiously, some suggested the creation of a permanent South Asian Conference on Disarmament which, like its European predecessor, could provide an inclusive forum for ongoing discussions and an institutional mechanism for developing and implementing regionwide confidence-building measures.

Part II: Towards a Framework for Preventive Action

Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense: Conceptual Overview

The meeting began with a survey of the state of the field of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense. There was widespread acknowledgment that, theoretically as well as operationally, both of these concepts are still new and evolving. Although the term "preventive diplomacy" was coined by Dag Hammarskjöld in the early 1960s

to reflect the need to prevent regional crises from feeding the larger superpower rivalry, it was not until the end of the Cold War, and the rash of ethnic and regional conflicts left in its wake, that preventive diplomacy gained broader policy-relevance. Similarly, the first public statement on "preventive defense" came only in 1996 with William Perry's seminal article in *Foreign Affairs*, in which he urged U.S. decision makers and military planners to pursue policies that create "the conditions that support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary." While a number of scholars and policy analysts have since pursued several lines of fruitful inquiry that have added analytical and policy content, they have yet to find a robust and definitive intellectual consensus.

Few participants regarded this lack of consensus as grounds for pessimism, however. As one commentator observed, overarching policy frameworks take time to develop. In terms of policy evolution, preventive diplomacy and preventive defense are presently at a stage analogous to the notion of "deterrence," as it stood in 1948; that is, they offer a nascent and promising policy framework but not yet a full-fledged analytical paradigm or operational security doctrine. The promise of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense stems from three factors: their compelling geopolitical rationale, the intuitive and straightforward appeal of their core premise, and the availability of a wide array of usable policy instruments.

Though well suited to a bipolar world, the strategic doctrines of deterrence and containment offer little guidance in today's messier geopolitical environment, where intrastate wars outnumber conventional interstate wars, where many states are weak or collapsed, and where weapons of mass destruction are increasingly available, posing a qualitatively new threat of catastrophic terrorism. Although these diffuse and ambiguous threats do not yet pose serious challenges to U.S. vital interests, many participants believed that they have great potential to do so if left unattended. New approaches are urgently needed to understand these threats and to prevent uncontrollable and destructive spillover.

The core premise of both preventive diplomacy and preventive defense, as expressed in this meeting, is that international security is today better served by working proactively to avert outbreaks of large-scale violence, state collapse, terrorism, and weapons proliferation than it is by simply reacting to crises once they have occurred.

Preventive diplomacy, according to one participant, is commonly defined as the use of proactive, peaceful measures to prevent political conflicts from erupting into violence and to promote peaceful dispute resolution. While sharing this basic thrust, preventive defense was presented in more selective terms, as "actions taken now to prevent the emergence of threats that specifically implicate U.S. vital interests and which, if left unattended, would make a U.S. military response necessary." Doctrinally, preventive defense has been more clearly—although still provisionally—developed than has preventive diplomacy. Referring again to Secretary of Defense Perry's seminal statement, one presenter described its three core objectives as follows: 1) to *prevent* the emergence of existential threats to U.S. interests, 2) to *deter* those threats that we cannot prevent; and 3) to *defeat* those threats that we cannot deter, using force where necessary.

In an effort to draw out the policy implications of these concepts, the discussion turned to a consideration of three related questions: whether and how preventive diplomacy and preventive defense differ from diplomacy and defense, traditionally understood; whether, either as policies or as concepts, they may be regarded as distinct from one another; and whether, in the interests of promoting a more coherent and justifiable policy framework, narrower conceptions of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense, firmly grounded in U.S. national interests, are preferable to a more expansive vision.

As one participant noted, from the point of view of many practicing diplomats, there is nothing very novel in the term "preventive diplomacy." In operational terms, it appears to differ little from conventional diplomatic practice, and uses a similar repertoire of policy tools, including official and track-two negotiations, mediation, intelligence gathering, and confidence-building measures. However, several discussants emphasized that preventive diplomacy is distinguished by its forward-looking and preemptive character and its strategic emphasis on systematic early warning and early response. Traditional diplomacy, by contrast, has typically been ad hoc and reactive, more geared to limited crisis management than to a principled program of conflict prevention.

In the view of some discussants, the distinctive features of preventive defense are easier to grasp. Operationally, preventive defense requires a more imaginative use of military resources and a distinctive set of policy tools, some of which are not strictly military in nature.

These include military-to-military outreach, training programs on civil-military relations in democratic settings, confidence-building measures, and greater preparedness for peacekeeping and humanitarian contingencies. By way of illustration, the Marshall Plan, whose coordinated policies of engagement, reconstruction, reconciliation, and integration transformed former enemies into stalwart allies, was cited as the most successful example of preventive defense ever undertaken by the United States.

Typically, preventive diplomacy and preventive defense are approached as twin pillars of an integrated security paradigm. Yet, opposing views were expressed on whether preventive diplomacy and preventive defense were best understood as intertwined aspects of a single policy platform or as separate policies, each with their own distinctive logic, agenda, and agency.

Citing the examples of the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the Sinai parallel to the Camp David Accords, United States diplomatic and military intervention to restore democracy in Haiti, and the use of preventive deployments in Macedonia, one participant argued that, as a matter of practical policy, preventive diplomacy and preventive defense are mutually supportive: the successful implementation of the former necessarily depends on the success of the latter and vice-versa. The tendency to view them as two distinct sets of activities belonging to separate institutional jurisdictions is misleading since there has been a considerable degree of overlap at both the policy and agency levels.

Other discussants maintained that recent U.S. policy offers even more evidence in support of this view. Both the successful denuclearization of Ukraine and the Dayton Accords required an unprecedented degree of collaboration between the U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense, in policy design as well as in execution. Moreover, in accomplishing these tasks, both agencies engaged a common set of policy tools, including outreach programs, multitrack mediation, confidence-building measures, sanctions, and incentives. Indeed, several participants believed that this qualitative shift from traditional bureaucratic isolation, even rivalry, to creative interagency partnership is what provides the most telling evidence of the interconnectedness of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense, as well as the novelty of the preventive approach in general. This said, these participants agreed that a more sustained consideration and even

institutional formalization of the operational division of labor between military and civilian agencies is desirable.

While accepting that there has been a practical change in how United States foreign policy is now being made, some participants remained skeptical about the fundamental compatibility of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense. As one analyst observed, there are a number of significant conceptual differences between preventive diplomacy and preventive defense, the full practical implications of which remain unclear. Accordingly, preventive diplomacy, with its emphasis on averting all forms of large-scale conflict and instability, wherever they may occur, has an expansive agenda that encompasses a wide array of issues. In consequence, there is often considerable ambiguity about its precise policy objectives. The literature on preventive diplomacy has been much clearer in detailing the mechanisms and tools of prevention than in laying out the specific threats and challenges which they are intended to prevent. Consequently, a wide range of different problems and potential threats—from political instability, adversarial military postures, and the international arms trade to ethnic cleansing, terrorist attacks, and nuclear proliferation—are often approached in an undifferentiated way, even though each may pose a qualitatively different kind of problem requiring a different kind of response.

In contrast, preventive defense proceeds from a more specific assessment of major threats and is limited to a consideration of only those which are likely, in the medium to long term, to pose direct security challenges to U.S. interests. From the perspective of practical policymaking, it was argued that the more narrow vision of preventive defense makes security objectives more tractable, while allowing a more systematic allocation of attention and scarce resources to those areas where they are most needed and can be most effectively deployed.

It was further suggested that these conceptual differences might have important consequences for the ability of the U.S. government to mobilize broader congressional and public support behind preventive policies. In a time when American foreign policymaking is hampered by an aggressively isolationist Congress and widespread public uncertainty, and when there are presently few, if any, clear-cut threats to vital U.S. interests that might help forge a solid domestic consensus, it is more important than ever that policymakers be at-

tuned to the need to design policies with a compelling and easily defensible public rationale.

As the participants noted, the task of doing so for preventive diplomacy and defense is complicated by their long-range focus on future contingencies, where the dangers are not always self-evident. While in some specific cases, such as the North Korean or Iraqi weapons programs, the danger seems relatively clear, it is often difficult to marshal convincing evidence that there exist serious threats, that they have been reliably identified, and also that the means and costs of addressing them are necessary and appropriate.

With these concerns in mind, some participants took the view that, because it is more narrowly conceived and is more in tune with the conventional "deter and punish" concerns of U.S. defense, preventive defense offers a more compelling and defensible rationale than does preventive diplomacy. They recommended that preventive diplomacy be reconceived along the lines of preventive defense; specifically, that it be firmly and explicitly grounded in a coherent vision of U.S. national interests, aimed at clearly specified and limited goals, and that it avoid appeals to more abstract notions of global security.

While the need for publicly defensible preventive policies was shared by all participants, the assertion that preventive defense is easier to explain to Congress and to the public was disputed by several of the practitioners present. They maintained that the actual record of recent preventive defense policies has been mixed. For example, while Congress has been highly supportive of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, it objected to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on the grounds that helping dismantle Russian nuclear arsenals, convert defense industries to civilian purposes, and retrain Russian nuclear scientists for other nonmilitary pursuits were not appropriate actions for the military to undertake or for the military budget to support. Preventive defense policies, no less than those of preventive diplomacy, still confront major difficulties when it comes to mobilizing public support.

At the same time, the lack of conceptual and programmatic specificity has not posed insuperable obstacles to effective preventive diplomacy. In fact, preventive diplomacy has had a number of important policy successes, from securing peace agreements in Northern Ireland and Bosnia to peacefully defusing ethnic and regional tensions in the Baltic States, Macedonia, and Ukraine. From this perspective,

the problem is not that policies of preventive diplomacy have few inherent selling points but rather that they have suffered from poor salesmanship.

Rather than limit the scope and objectives of preventive diplomacy, the proper response might instead be to focus on strategies that seek to strengthen innovative leadership and political will, with more determined efforts at constituency building, public education, and congressional engagement.

Evaluating the Policy Tools of Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense

Several presentations offered a partial review of the policy tools of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense and an appraisal of what lessons may be learned from the experience of using them. According to one presenter, our scholarly and practical knowledge has advanced dramatically over the past few years. We now have more nuanced and rigorous studies available on the strengths and limitations of tools such as early warning, sanctions, incentives, mediation, and power sharing as they have been applied in a wider number of cases.

Practically, we also have a better understanding of how to employ these tools with good effect. For example, we know that sanctions policies will be more successful where there is a careful blend of positive rewards and negative punishments than where negative sanctions are pursued alone. This has been borne out in many parts of post-Communist eastern Europe, where integration into Euro-Atlantic structures has provided a compelling incentive for these governments to extend effective protection to ethnic minorities and to resolve long-held ethnic and territorial claims against neighboring states.

Likewise, we have also learned more about the requisites of successful mediation in cases of ongoing conflict: specifically, that efforts to strengthen the hand of moderate forces on each side are more successful where accompanied by those that isolate and undercut extremist factions that otherwise act as "spoilers" of peace processes.

Regarding preventive defense, the discussion touched upon a number of useful tools and practices, including: military-to-military training programs, combined training exercises, joint military missions, various other confidence-building measures, and preventive military deployments.

In the view of several discussants, one of the most valuable forms of preventive defense has been direct military-to-military consultation and training. These have included the highly rated International Military Education and Training Program, which is administered jointly by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense at the Marshall Center in Germany and the Asia-Pacific Center in Hawaii, and which has introduced dozens of military leaders from Russia and elsewhere to the workings of modern militaries in democratic societies.

The assignment of military liaison teams to the defense ministries in newly democratizing countries and the Partnership for Peace program have also contributed to the development of military professionalism, transparency in defense doctrines and budgets, and civilian control.

The participation of a Russian brigade in NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) mission in Bosnia was cited as a very good example of the value of combined-force missions, not only in making the task of post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia easier but also in promoting mutual understanding and respect between NATO and Russian military professionals.

Considerable attention was paid to an evaluation of preventive deployments as a means of providing both assurance and deterrence functions in conflict-prone regions. Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations in which troops are dispatched only once conflict has given way to cease-fire, preventive deployments are undertaken in an effort to stop conflicts before they start. Citing the pathbreaking success of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, where the presence of lightly armed blue helmets acting as both monitors and mediators has been credited with helping Macedonia avoid the fate of other former Yugoslav republics, many participants asked whether this model could be extended to other conflict-prone areas.

While all saw the value of the UNPREDEP mission, some participants remained skeptical of its wider applicability. In particular, it was doubted whether the conditions which made UNPREDEP successful—particularly, the consent of key local leaders, the absence of armed opposition, and the absence of a direct or imminent threat to UN troops—also obtained in other cases. Underscoring this skepticism, one participant noted that a U.S. preventive deployment failed in Haiti in 1993 because widespread local hostility exposed the politi-

cal and military vulnerability of a battalion that was unwanted, small, and ill-equipped. Some participants speculated that there would be few opportunities favoring successful preventive deployment in the future.

Others, however, remained more optimistic, arguing that this very discussion shows that the failures of preventive defense have helped us to gain a more refined and realistic understanding of the ingredients necessary for future applications as well as of the proper ways of ensuring and measuring success. In the view of these participants, for preventive deployments to have broader utility, they must have appropriate rules of engagement. Thus far, however, there has been a tendency to let the rules of engagement for preventive deployments be excessively defined by the Weinberger/Powell doctrine, in particular by its overwhelming preoccupation with preventing United States casualties at all costs and with securing a clear "exit strategy" beforehand.

While these strictures may be appropriate at times when the U.S. faces direct threats to vital interests, they currently hamstring America's ability to undertake preventive deployments and to sustain credible threats that can deter aggressors. Because America does not today face major security threats, the presumption that U.S. military power should only be used to defend vital national interests categorically disqualifies the use of preventive deployments and makes America's extraordinary military power virtually irrelevant to the management of the lesser but still destabilizing security challenges that plague the world today.

Unresolved Issues

The meeting identified several outstanding problems which need to be addressed if the agendas of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense are to make practical headway. Most important among them were the problem of political will; the strategic dilemmas that new security challenges—particularly those of catastrophic terrorism and intrastate conflicts—pose for third-party action; and the question of the legitimacy of preventive actions.

As one presenter noted, preventive diplomacy places great emphasis on maintaining reliable systems of early warning, including the improvement of routine capacities of intelligence gathering, data analysis, and timely dissemination to relevant decision makers. The record

of the last few years suggests that the U.S. capacity for early warning has been more than adequate.

The far more critical obstacle to successful prevention has been the periodic failure of decision makers to respond quickly, or sometimes at all. Here, it was argued that the logic of early warning collides head-on with the logic of electoral politics; whereas the utility of early warning demands early response, risk-averse leaders tend to be wary of possible foreign policy entanglements and often prefer inaction as the best way of ensuring their domestic political survival.

This tendency has resulted in a number of "missed opportunities" in crises and conflicts that may well have been preventable, including the Rwandan genocide. As our collective knowledge of preventive action increases, there will be new possibilities for addressing the issue of political will. While acknowledging that this problem defies easy answers, many participants recommended that much more intellectual and political effort be devoted to analyzing the roots of this problem and devising appropriate responses.

Another enduring problem stems from the strategic challenges posed today for effective third-party—particularly U.S.—preventive action. As one participant observed, the great paradox today is that while the U.S. has attained global military supremacy, its ability to deter rogue states, neutralize determined terrorists, and prevent civil wars is nonetheless highly circumscribed. Coercive diplomacy and deterrence, strategies well suited to Cold War conditions, have limited utility today. There is a pronounced imbalance between the increasing demands the U.S. government now makes of its adversaries and its ability to muster a sufficiently credible threat to compel compliance.

Part of this problem stems from the constraints posed by extant doctrines of state sovereignty and part from the reluctance of American leaders, especially since the Somalia debacle, to risk using ground troops. The danger, however, is that the failure to design and apply a credible threat sends powerful signals of American irresolution and vulnerability to precisely those adversaries whose aggressive behavior we seek to deter. Maintaining America's global influence in the twenty-first century will require a more careful calibration of the means and ends of policy and a more informed public discussion on the risks and benefits of preventive actions.

There was a widespread consensus that the efficacy of third-party preventive actions critically depends on the legitimacy they elicit,

not just from domestic constituencies but also from the populations directly concerned and the larger international community. Undertaking such actions without due regard for their legitimacy could prove counterproductive to the aims of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense, particularly where these actions conflict with established norms of state sovereignty. Rather than preempt or defuse threats, poorly justified outside actions might instead provoke resentment and escalate conflict. For the United States, this problem is complicated by its de facto hegemonic status in world affairs—a status that many others resent and fear—and its insistence on reserving to itself the right of unilateral, preemptive attack.

Given these realities, several participants asked, what difference is there between preventive defense and preventive war, conventionally understood? How are we to distinguish between those preventive actions which genuinely seek the promotion of peace and those which merely mask a traditional pursuit of self-interest? Will not many nations view U.S. efforts at counterterrorism or nonproliferation as just another instance of American bullying? In short, what price does preventive defense have for U.S. standing in the international community? And what price does continued U.S. unilateralism have for the integrity of preventive defense?

In response, many participants agreed on the desirability of multilateral preventive actions and on the prior attainment of UN Security Council authorization for all preventive actions which involve third-party military interventions. Beyond this, however, there was little consensus. Some discussants spoke of the need to make a clear distinction between a "preventive use of force" on the one hand, and the "preventive deployment of forces" on the other, noting that not all preventive deployments require the use of force. Others argued that the preemptive use of force, especially to deter catastrophic terrorism or to stop imminent attacks on civilian populations, is justifiable but only under specific conditions in which the targets are limited, the level of force is commensurate, and the ancillary destruction is kept to a minimum. Still others suggested that the question of the legitimacy of preventive actions and the extent to which U.S. actions are compatible with "neutral" peace promotion are empirical questions that can only be answered on a case-by-case basis.

Part III: The Challenges for Preventive Defense and Preventive Diplomacy in South Asia

Turning to South Asia, the participants offered an evaluation of the following issues: the significance of the 1998 nuclear tests for future South Asian security relations in general and for the Kashmir conflict in particular, the prevailing constraints and opportunities for third-party preventive actions, and the specific tools and strategies that may be applied to help forestall the incipient nuclear rivalry and de-escalate tensions in the disputed territory of Kashmir.

Assessing the India-Pakistan Conflict in a Nuclear Context

For the majority of those present, U.S. diplomacy is critical for achieving substantial improvements in India-Pakistan relations. In the absence of sustained U.S. involvement, things are likely to get worse rather than better. As one regional expert explained, even holding the nuclear variable aside, several other factors could escalate the Kashmir conflict and severely destabilize India-Pakistan relations.

To illustrate this point, he compared the present situation to the past three India-Pakistan wars (1948, 1965, and 1971), noting that several aspects which formerly had served to limit the level of destruction no longer appear to obtain. The previous wars were characterized by relatively limited casualties, by predictable—if obsolete—set-piece battle tactics, and by limited firepower. In part, this was due to the material limitations of the Indian and Pakistani militaries, but it also reflected certain shared norms among that generation of Indian and Pakistani military leaders, many of whom had the same (British) training and who subscribed to the same code of military honor. This enabled certain tacit understandings about "agreed-upon limits," captured well in a former Pakistan air marshall's declaration that "gentlemen do not bomb each other's cities."

Today, however, few of these constraints remain. The combination of a move to guerilla tactics inside Kashmir and weapons proliferation has reduced the element of predictability while also threatening higher civilian casualty rates. Offensive, even preemptive, military strategies have become increasingly popular. The cohort of military officials with old-school ties is being replaced by a new generation of elites who have little or no experience with their counterparts on the other side of the line of control.

Perhaps most worrisome of all, however, is the steady erosion of effective state authority in both India and Pakistan. As many participants concurred, the secular Indian state is in deep decline, eclipsed by the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the militant Hindu nationalism which brought it to power. To be sure, the BJP is not electorally secure and democratic competition has forced it to moderate its more extreme nationalist policies. It is also far from certain that such a diffuse religion as Hinduism can generate and sustain a coherent political ideology. However, some participants feared that an insecure nationalist government may be even more inclined towards an aggressive foreign policy, if only to shore up its uncertain domestic support. Amidst this polarized and volatile political situation, the Indian state may no longer be a unitary actor capable of effectively controlling all branches of government.

As many participants noted, this is even truer of Pakistan, where intelligence agencies are increasingly autonomous from civilian political control and have begun to pursue their own agenda in Kashmir. Although the Pakistan military has officially withdrawn from political life, a weak and fractious party system, limited experience in civilian or democratic rule, a weak economy, and an upsurge of militant Islam pose severe challenges to political and social stability that a resurgent military could exploit. Frustration with the Pakistan government's lack of progress on Kashmir has also sparked the emergence of Pakistan-based Islamic paramilitary formations who use Afghani-inspired Mujahadeen tactics in an effort to wrest Kashmir from Indian control.

The nuclearization of India and Pakistan has occurred amidst this growing domestic turmoil as well as within the larger regional security vacuum left by the end of the Cold War. Several participants cautioned that India's decision to undertake nuclear tests in May 1998 should not be viewed as an idiosyncrasy of the BJP leadership or its ideology, nor as a decision that could be reversed once the BJP leaves office. For nearly two decades, India has been steadily engaged in developing a nuclear capacity. In 1995, it was only U.S. intervention that dissuaded Prime Minister Rao from proceeding with his own plans to undertake nuclear tests.

At that time, however, he maintained that the question was not "whether" India would develop an operational nuclear capacity but only "when." The timing of the May 1998 tests had as much to do with India's unaddressed security concerns and its frustration with the

failure of the nuclear states to use the extension of the NPT to demonstrate progress towards denuclearization as it did with the BJP's election. As one commentator stressed, "[T]his is an Indian bomb, not a BJP bomb."

The participants offered a mixed assessment of both the strategic and political consequences of a nuclear South Asia. On the one hand, the prospect of a viable nuclear deterrent capacity has made India and Pakistan more willing to engage in conventional military options. This finding appears to be supported by the fact that, in the summer of 1998, the level of firing across the line of control was three times higher than it was the previous summer. While senior Indian and Pakistani officials recognize that nuclear weapons make full-scale war impossible, they yet appear to believe that they can launch small-scale probes with little risk of escalation.

Given the doubtful capacity of India and Pakistan to ensure adequate command and control of their nuclear stockpiles, there is significant potential for misperception and accident to lead to an unwanted nuclear exchange. It is in this context that continuing hostilities along the line of control in Kashmir may provide a flash point for inadvertent nuclear escalation.

On the other hand, however, the introduction of the nuclear variable has altered the political and diplomatic terrain in some more hopeful respects. As many South Asians have now been forced to consider the security, economic, and social consequences of nuclear testing, there is growing recognition that the future cannot be like the past. In the view of several participants, the tests have provided an opening and opportunity for serious negotiations. And precisely because the actions of India and Pakistan have threatened the global nonproliferation regime, there is now a legitimate basis for outside diplomacy which did not exist as long as the India-Pakistan conflict was limited to Kashmir. Indeed, since May 1998, the official U.S.-India dialogue has steadily improved, as have direct discussions between India and Pakistan. Most notably, India has shown a new willingness to put the question of Kashmir on the diplomatic agenda.

Assessing Constraints and Opportunities for U.S. Preventive Action

It was generally observed that the challenges posed by a nuclear South Asia are of enormous complexity and that this complexity

poses significant limits on both the options and leverage available to third-party actors, including the United States. While Pakistan has actively sought third-party involvement in an effort to resolve the status of Kashmir, India insists on direct, bilateral negotiations. In addition, India's decision to defy international norms of nonproliferation and undertake nuclear tests was driven in large part by its security concerns regarding China, its resentment against what its officials have referred to as "nuclear apartheid" on the part of the established nuclear states, and by India's desire to be recognized as a great power. These concerns make India extraordinarily sensitive towards U.S. calls for nuclear restraint—which it views as hypocrisy—and U.S. mediation overtures—which it views as a form of interference.

Given this context, a few participants were skeptical that the U.S. had a constructive role to play, since any solutions that are too closely identified as American are bound to encounter resistance in India. They also expressed concern about possible repercussions should U.S. preventive policies fail.

There was also some uncertainty as to whether the Kashmir conflict was yet ripe for resolution. The minority view was that—given the current volatility of Indian and Pakistani domestic politics—it would be better to refrain from directly addressing the Kashmir dispute at this time. While acknowledging this constraint, most participants maintained that there are several good reasons for the U.S. to encourage India and Pakistan to begin the process now.

For India and especially for Pakistan, maintaining a highly militarized line of control is a substantial drain on resources which might otherwise be available for military modernization and economic development. The building of a nuclear capacity and the sanctions imposed after the tests have only added to this economic burden. There are also growing political costs. Pakistan's preoccupation with Indian-controlled Kashmir has diverted attention away from the considerable domestic challenges posed by the rise of Islamic extremism as well as from the costs to Pakistan's international credibility incurred by its tacit indulgence of international terrorist groups. As casualties mount and as more Islamic mercenary groups infiltrate Kashmir, Pakistan's capacity to influence events on the ground is diminishing still further. In the view of some participants, Pakistan has little to gain and much to lose by further fighting. It was also suggested that India's successful pacification of the Kashmir insurgency and the restoration

of local Kashmir government have alleviated India's immediate security concerns in the region, enough so that India can now launch a dialogue from a position of confidence.

The participants also considered whether the Kashmir conflict and the nuclear nonproliferation issue are linked, and if so, to what extent. Again, divergent views were expressed. In the view of some, these two issues are unavoidably linked—if only because Pakistan, in an effort to engage U.S. mediation of the Kashmir dispute, has insisted that there can be no progress on nonproliferation until the problem of Kashmir is resolved. Accordingly, any policy that focuses exclusively on nuclear nonproliferation to the neglect of Kashmir risks alienating Pakistan.

For the majority of participants, however, the two problems are separable. Whatever linkage that does exist between the Kashmir conflict and the nuclear issue is a result of the nuclear tests themselves rather than the motivation behind them. While global reaction to the tests has been sharply focused on violence in Kashmir, the fact is that rivalry with Pakistan over Kashmir did not figure greatly in India's decision to go nuclear. From this perspective, a more viable strategy for third-party diplomacy may be the traditional confidence-building approach, whereby the tertiary aspects of disputes are addressed separately from the more intractable root causes. In any case, given India's resistance to outside interference on the question of Kashmir, there is limited room for third parties to directly influence that dispute and little point in insisting it be redressed in parallel with nonproliferation.

Even when de-linked from the Kashmir dispute, however, U.S. efforts to promote nonproliferation in South Asia are faced with a stubborn policy dilemma: specifically, how to maintain the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime, to which the U.S. is committed, while also ensuring the safety of the de facto nuclear capacities of India and Pakistan. To accomplish the first goal, U.S. policy has insisted that India and Pakistan disavow nuclear weapons and accept fully the rules of nonproliferation, including adherence to the NPT, the CTBT, the fissile material cutoff treaty, and export controls on sensitive materials and technologies. But U.S. determination to avoid any measure that may, even tacitly, bestow recognition on India and Pakistan as nuclear-weapons states has meant that India and Pakistan are denied technical and other assistance that could assure the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals.

While understanding the vital importance of the NPT to American national interests, many participants expressed frustration with several aspects of current U.S. policy. First, there was profound skepticism about India's willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons program and hence about the utility of any policy that did not take this reality squarely into account. Second, it was argued that current U.S. policy offers India few incentives to comply with U.S. nonproliferation preferences. One possibly useful incentive would be to offer India civilian nuclear technology which it badly needs and cannot supply for itself. Doing so would also assuage India's resentment of the U.S. policy of selling this technology to nondemocratic China while denying it to democratic India.

Another, perhaps more fundamental incentive would be for the U.S. to undertake a credible demonstration of the nuclear self-restraint that it is now demanding of India and Pakistan. As several participants maintained, it is a mistake to approach India and Pakistan in isolation from global progress towards nonproliferation. The U.S. cannot hope to obtain their compliance to the nonproliferation regime, while insisting on its untrammeled right to determine its own nuclear security as it sees fit.

If, as U.S. policymakers have claimed, the U.S. wants to devalue nuclear weapons as the currency of global prestige and power, then it must set the example. The time is right for the U.S. to take seriously its obligations under the NPT toward progressive denuclearization. Participants suggested several measures by which this could be accomplished, including unilateral weapons reductions, de-alerting nuclear warheads, or forswearing first-strike options in conventional attacks, as was recently proposed by the German and Canadian governments. In the absence of such a gesture, participants feared that the U.S. will not succeed in restraining nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

Restoring the integrity of the nonproliferation regime in South Asia will also require the active inclusion of China—Pakistan's primary source of nuclear know-how and India's primary source of insecurity. The participants acknowledged, however, that establishing an India-China dialogue will be very difficult, given the long history of enmity between them and China's utter refusal to take India seriously. Yet, they also believed that the U.S. could summon greater effort and ingenuity in getting such a process established.

Conference Agenda

Friday, January 15, 1999

12:00-2:00 **Buffet Lunch and Opening Remarks** (Encina Hall)
"Why the Carnegie Commission is Committed to Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense (PD^2)."
Speaker: David Hamburg

2:00-3:30 **Session I: The Concepts of Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense**
Overview of the origins and development of PD^2, qualities that distinguish them from conventional diplomacy and defense, main strategies and practices, and utility to the present generation of interstate and intrastate conflicts.
Speakers: Alexander George, General John Shalikashvili
Chair: William Perry

3:30-3:45 **Break**

3:45- 5:30 **Session II: U.S. Government Capacities and Possibilities for Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense**
Analysis of the current organizational, political, and resource posture of U.S. government agencies, especially the State Department, Department of Defense, and National Security Council, and their capacity to undertake PD^2. Consideration of possible and feasible ways to improve the capacity for future PD^2 efforts.

Speakers: Peter Tarnoff, William Perry
Chair: David Hamburg
Discussant: Warren Christopher

7:00-9:00 **Cocktails and Dinner** (Stanford Faculty Club, Main Dining Room)
Keynote Address: "America's Interest in Preventing Deadly Conflict" by Lee Hamilton
Introduction: David Hamburg

Saturday, January 16, 1999

8:00 **Continental Breakfast** (Encina Hall)

8:30- 10:00 **Session III: India and Pakistan: Background of Conflict and Conflict-Prevention Efforts**
An overview of the main parameters of the India-Pakistan conflict, including both the ethno-territorial dispute in Kashmir and the nuclear rivalry. Analysis of past efforts at conflict mediation, resolution, and prevention in order to identify main strategies, continued shortcomings, and conditions for success.
Speakers: Sumit Ganguly, Michael Krepon
Chair: David Hamburg

10:00-10:15 **Break**

10:15-11:45 **Session IV: Preventive Diplomacy in South Asia**
Evaluation of various diplomatic strategies and tools for the resolution of both the territorial conflict in Kashmir and the incipient nuclear rivalry. Issues to be addressed might include: utility of economic sanctions and incentives, possibilities for political confidence-building measures (CBMs), applicability of different autonomy arrangements, sovereignty sharing for Kashmir, assessments of the practice of "sovereignty moratorium" developed for Chechnya and Bosnia, and track-two options.

Speakers: Bruce Jentleson, Harry Barnes
Chair: Warren Christopher

11:45-2:00 **Lunch** (Stanford Park Hotel)
Address: "U.S. Policy Towards South Asia" by Strobe Talbott
Introduction: Warren Christopher

2:00-3:30 **Session V: Preventive Defense in South Asia**
Evaluation of applicability and utility to both the Kashmir and nuclear issues of the main instruments of Preventive Defense, including enhanced military-to-military contacts and other CBMs, sharing of nuclear security technologies, strengthening the demilitarized zone in Kashmir, and potential for third-party peace-keeping.
Speakers: Ashton Carter, Frank Wisner
Chair: William Perry

3:30-3:45 **Break**

3:45-5:00 **Session VI: Practical Measures for Applying Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense to South Asia**
A round-table discussion on the next practical steps for a preventive U.S. role in South Asia.
Discussants: Jane Holl, Robert Oakley, William Zartman
Chair: David Hamburg

About the Conference Conveners and Contributors

Karen Ballentine

Karen Ballentine is a research associate at the Carnegie Corporation of New York and a PhD candidate in Political Science at Columbia University.

The Honorable Warren Christopher

Warren Christopher returned to the law firm of O'Melveny & Myers as senior partner on February 1, 1997. Immediately prior to his return, he had served as the sixty-third secretary of state of the United States from January 1993 to January 1997.

Mr. Christopher served as law clerk to Justice William O. Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1949-1950. He practiced law with O'Melveny & Myers from 1950 to 1967, becoming partner in 1958. Mr. Christopher served as deputy attorney general of the United States from 1967 until 1969, after which he rejoined O'Melveny & Myers. In February 1977, Mr. Christopher was sworn in as the deputy secretary of state of the United States and he served in that position until January 1981. He then returned to O'Melveny & Myers and was chairman of the firm from 1982-1992.

Mr. Christopher's professional activities have included serving as: president of the Los Angeles County Bar Association, chairman of the Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association, member of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, and special counsel to California Governor Edmund G. Brown. Mr. Christopher's civic activities have included serving as: president of the Board of Trustees of Stanford University, chairman of the Carnegie Corporation of New York Board of Trustees, di-

rector and vice-chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, director of the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Mr. Christopher received an undergraduate degree magna cum laude from the University of Southern California and a JD from Stanford University, where he was president of the *Law Review* and was elected to the Order of the Coif.

In 1981, President Carter awarded Mr. Christopher the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Mr. Christopher has also received numerous honorary degrees and other awards, including the Jefferson Award from the American Institute for Public Service for the Greatest Public Service Performed by an Elected or Appointed Official.

David A. Hamburg, MD

David Hamburg is president emeritus at Carnegie Corporation of New York, after having been president from 1983-1997. He received his AB (1944) and his MD (1947) degrees from Indiana University.

Dr. Hamburg was chief, Adult Psychiatry Branch, NIMH 1958-61; professor and chairman of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences from 1961-72; and Reed-Hodgson Professor of Human Biology at Stanford University from 1972-76.

Dr. Hamburg also served as president of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, from 1975-80 and director of the Division of Health Policy Research and Education and John D. MacArthur Professor of Health Policy at Harvard University from 1980-83.

Dr. Hamburg was president, then chairman of the board (1984-86), of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the Defense Policy Board, the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, and co-chair (with Cyrus Vance) of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

Dr. Hamburg received the Distinguished Service Award from the American Psychiatric Association in 1991, the Presidential Medal of Freedom at the White House in September 1996, the Achievement in Children and Public Policy Award from the Society for Research in Child Development in 1997, and the National Academy of Sciences' Public Welfare Medal in April 1998.

The Honorable Lee Hamilton

Lee Hamilton is director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and director of the newly created Center for Congress at Indiana University. In January 1999, he retired from Congress after 34 years of distinguished service as representative from Indiana's Ninth District. As ranking Democratic member of the House, he was chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, the Joint Economic Committee, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.

Mr. Hamilton holds a PhD in jurisprudence from the University of Indiana School of Law. He is the recipient of numerous awards and honoraria, including the American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) Award, the Edmund S. Muskie Distinguished Public Service Award of the Center for National Policy, and the Outstanding Legislator Award of the American Political Science Association. In 1998, he was awarded the Hubert H. Humphrey Award of the American Political Science Association in recognition of his distinguished career in public service.

The Honorable William J. Perry

William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University with a joint appointment in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies; a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and co-director, with Ashton Carter, of the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. His previous academic experience includes professor (half-time) at Stanford University from 1988 until 1993, during which time he was the co-director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control (now known as the Center for International Security and Cooperation). Dr. Perry was the nineteenth secretary of defense for the United States, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. His prior government experience was as deputy secretary of defense (1993-1994) and as under secretary of defense for research and engineering (1977-1981).

Dr. Perry's business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics, founding and serving as the president of ESL, Inc., serving as the executive vice president of Hambrecht & Quist, Inc., and founding and serving as chair-

man of Technology Strategies & Alliances. Dr. Perry is the chairman of Global Technology Partners, and he serves on the boards of The Boeing Company, Hambrecht & Quist, United Technologies Corporation, and several emerging high tech companies.

Dr. Perry received his BS and MS from Stanford University and his PhD from Penn State, all in Mathematics. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dr. Perry has received a number of awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal, and Outstanding Civilian Service medals from the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Defense Intelligence Agency, NASA, and the Coast Guard.

The Honorable Strobe Talbott

Strobe Talbott's nomination as deputy secretary of state was confirmed by the Senate on February 22, 1994, and he was sworn in by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on February 23, 1994. From April 1993 to February 1994, Mr. Talbott served as ambassador-at-large and special advisor to the secretary of state on the New Independent States (NIS). He was *Time* magazine's editor-at-large from September 1989 until March 1993. Prior to that, he had been Washington bureau chief for five years. His earlier assignments for *Time* were diplomatic correspondent (1977-1984), White House correspondent during the Ford Administration (1975-1976), State Department correspondent when Henry Kissinger was secretary of state (1974-1975), and Eastern Europe correspondent for two years in the early 1970s.

Mr. Talbott has translated and edited two volumes of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, published in 1970 and 1974, and his expertise in arms control and Soviet affairs has been evidenced in a number of articles and five books. Mr. Talbott has twice won the Edward Weintal Prize for distinguished reporting on foreign affairs and diplomacy, in 1980 and 1985.

Mr. Talbott has been a trustee of Yale University and the Hotchkiss School and has served on the Board of Directors of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Council on Foreign Relations, and The Aspen Strategy Group.

About the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the looming threat to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. An operating program of the Corporation, the Commission is co-chaired by Corporation President Emeritus David A. Hamburg and Cyrus R. Vance, former U.S. secretary of state. It has a membership of sixteen eminent international leaders and scholars with long experience in conflict prevention and resolution. An Advisory Council, expert consultants, and experienced practitioners have assisted the Commission in its work.

The Commission has examined the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, it seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission looks at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considers ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

About the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project

The Preventive Defense Project is a joint venture between Stanford University and Harvard University. Preventive Defense is a concept of defense strategy for America in the post-Cold War era. The premise of Preventive Defense is that the absence of an imminent, major, traditional military threat to American security presents today's national security leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity: to prevent new Cold War-scale threats to U.S. security from emerging in the future. While the United States defense establishment must continue to deter regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula, as well as keep the peace and provide humanitarian relief in selected instances, its highest priority is to contribute to forestalling developments that could directly threaten the survival and vital interests of American citizens.

The Preventive Defense Project will initially concentrate on forging productive security partnerships with Russia and its neighbors, dealing with the lethal legacy of Cold War weapons of mass destruction, engaging an awakening China, and countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and catastrophic terrorism. The Project seeks to contribute to these objectives through the invention of new policy approaches reflecting Preventive Defense, intensive personal interaction with defense and military leaders around the world, and through the establishment of highly informed, nongovernmental track-two initiatives that explore new possibilities for international agreement.

Current Preventive Defense Project initiatives include:

- **Describing Preventive Defense.** In a recently published book (*Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*, Brookings Institution Press, 1999), the Project's co-directors explain the concept

to a wider audience, drawing on their experience in the Pentagon and making recommendations for the future of American security policy.

- **Russia.** The Project is pursuing a number of activities designed to support Russian foreign and defense policy leaders in developing a post-Soviet security identity that matches Russia's interests to the interests of international stability. These initiatives include assisting Russian military reform and the development of national security decision-making processes, furthering NATO-Russia relations, encouraging the development of mutually beneficial relations with the other Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, and charting a course for nuclear arms reduction after START II ratification.
- **Other Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union.** Expanded military-to-military contacts and economic opportunities are key to the continued security and stability of the NIS. The Project is pursuing initiatives with Ukraine, the Central Asian states, and the Caucasus countries, including the Caspian Sea region.
- **Eliminating the lethal legacy of the Cold War.** Through such innovations as the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States intervened to promote nuclear safety and nonproliferation in the early years after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Much was accomplished in the first post-Cold War era, but changing politics in Russia and the U.S. have caused their cooperation in controlling "loose nukes" to bog down and progress in chemical and biological weapons dismantlement to falter. Nunn-Lugar and arms control require "reinvention" if they are to continue in the second post-Cold War era. The Project seeks to contribute fundamental new ideas to that reinvention.
- **China.** Through research and intensive track-two dialogue with Chinese defense and military leaders, the Project will concentrate on defining the specific content of the U.S. policy of engagement with China.
- **Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).** The glimmers of trouble to come provided by Iraq's WMD programs during and since the Gulf War show that proliferation has moved from a diplomatic problem to a direct military threat. The Department of Defense (DOD), therefore, needs to strengthen its Counterproliferation Initiative, which is designed to contribute both to proliferation prevention and to the capabilities of U.S. forces to counter WMD in regional conflict. The Project seeks to

define organizational and technical responses by DOD to this growing threat.

- **Organizing to combat catastrophic terrorism.** The Project convened the Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group, which is a collaboration of faculty from Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and the University of Virginia and is co-chaired by Ashton B. Carter and John M. Deutch. The Study Group is identifying appropriate responses by the United States government to the dangers of catastrophic terrorism.

The Preventive Defense Project is a multi-year effort supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, and private sources. The Project's co-directors are former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton B. Carter. Serving as Senior Advisors for the Project are: former U.S. Congresswoman from California Jane Harman; former DOD Special Assistant for Strategic Technology Planning Michael J. Lippitz; former Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command Admiral (ret.) Joseph Prueher; former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General (ret.) John M. Shalikashvili; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall; and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White.

Institute for International Studies

Stanford University

The Institute for International Studies (IIS) seeks solutions to real-world, international problems that affect international security, the global environment, and international political economy. IIS creates a dynamic environment in which to address these critical issues by bringing experts from a variety of disciplines within Stanford University together with long- and short-term visitors from other academic, government, and corporate institutions. At any given time, over 150 scholars are engaged in policy studies within the Institute's federation of research centers.

Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University

The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), part of Stanford University's Institute for International Studies, is a multidisciplinary community dedicated to research and training in the field of international security. The center brings together scholars, policymakers, scientists, area specialists, members of the business community, and other experts to examine a wide range of international security issues.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard University

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) is the hub of the John F. Kennedy School of Government's research, teaching, and training in international security affairs, environmental and resource issues, and science and technology policy. The center's mission is to provide leadership in advancing policy-relevant knowledge about the most important challenges of international security and other critical issues where science, technology, and international affairs intersect. BCSIA's leadership begins with the recognition of science and technology as driving forces transforming threats and opportunities in international affairs. The center integrates insights of social scientists, natural scientists, technologists, and practitioners with experience in government, diplomacy, the military, and business to address critical issues.

Preventive Defense—
the central strategic imperative for
the U.S. in the post-Cold War era.

The absence of an imminent, major, traditional military threat to American security presents today's national security leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity: to prevent new threats from emerging. While day-to-day crisis management preoccupies policymakers, Preventive Defense concentrates on identifying and forestalling developments that could pose major new threats to U.S. vital interests. The Preventive Defense Project seeks to contribute through thorough research of such threats, invention of new policy approaches reflecting a preventive defense approach, intensive personal interaction with defense and military leaders around the world, and the establishment of highly informed but nongovernmental "Track Two" initiatives that explore new possibilities for international agreement.

A research collabortion of

Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University