

Army Manpower and the War on Terror

Army manpower is a key factor in the military's ability to fight the war on terror, including sustaining the combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, manpower is a subject that is often misunderstood and misreported. How does the status of Army manpower affect the nation's war on terror? What if the manpower demands of concurrent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have sapped the country's ability to deploy to the next hot spot on the globe? What if recruiting shortfalls leave combat units half filled? What if frequent deployments for long periods cause professional soldiers to leave the service? And what if mobilization demands on the Reserve and Guard mean that those forces are used up and unavailable for a new contingency not yet on the radar? Political debates about the pros and cons of intervening in Syria, Darfur, or Iran, or even prolonged presence in Iraq, become academic if the reality of the manpower situation is that no troops are available for the next conflict. This paper provides background material on Army manpower that is meant to inform journalists who might cover the issue.

The Bottom Line up Front: Why is the Army's manpower situation important?

*"As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you have,
not the Army you want,"¹*

Donald Rumsfeld

When Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told a soldier in 2004 that America had to go to war with the Army it had and not the one it wished it had, he was chastised as being insensitive, but he was speaking to the question above, "Why should the public care about the manpower system?" The basic problem with the manpower system is that it is not giving us the Army we want. In the case of the current set of missions (Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Balkans, Korea, Homeland Defense, etc.) the Army we want is one which can keep over 269,000 Army personnel² deployed around the world indefinitely. Our manpower system is in danger of failing to allow us to do that.

Today there is a crisis³ in manpower management in the United States Army, and it is the direct result of the sustained high tempo of operations in our nation's global war against terrorism. The manpower system is failing to bring in enough new soldiers and get the ones we already have into the fight where they are needed. Of manpower's three components - recruiting, retention, and mobilization - recruiting is the most publicized, but retention and mobilization must also work or the system will fail. Recruiting is the function of bringing new men and women into the Army; replenishing the lower ranks thinned by departure, promotion, and in times of war, combat losses. In 2005, largely because of the impact of the war in Iraq, the Army failed to recruit enough new soldiers in the active Army, the reserves, and the National Guard. Retention is the function of keeping in uniform those quality men and women whom the Army has already trained and educated, and failure in this mission would pose the greatest danger to our professional Army. The Army exceeded its goal for retention of active component soldiers in 2005, reenlisting 69,350 troops – 5,350 more than required. In order to achieve that goal however, the Army had to allow soldiers from the 2006 and 2007 reenlistment window to reenlist earlier than normal.⁴ As a result the Army may have only forestalled a gap in retention. Mobilization is the mechanism by which the reserves are made available to fight alongside their active component comrades, and its ability to provide necessary forces has the most immediate

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impact on the war on terror. According to the Chief of the Army Reserve, because of “dysfunctional” personnel policies the reserves are in grave danger of being unable to meet operational requirements. The reserves are “rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken’ force.”⁵ Taken together these trends could become a perfect storm of manpower problems reducing the number of units available for operations, limiting the options of policy-makers, and forcing reductions in overseas deployments irrespective of the strategic impact of such reductions.

What is the status of recruiting?

*Soldiers are not in the Army. Soldiers are the Army.*⁶
Gen Creighton Abrams

By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Army had recruited 73,373 people into the active component – 91.7% of the goal. The Reserve had received 23,859 new recruits, 83.7% of its goal. The National Guard had done the poorest of the three components bringing in 79.7% (50,219) of its goal.⁷ Should we be alarmed at these numbers? According to the Army’s senior uniformed officer, General Peter Schoomaker, the figures represent the most serious recruiting challenge facing the Army in over a decade; a challenge he predicts will likely continue into 2006.⁸

No one argues that the war in Iraq has not had a negative affect on the number of young Americans willing to join the Army. Surveys show that among those contacted about service in the Army the main reason cited for declining to enlist is the war in Iraq.⁹ Research firm Millward Brown notes that the Iraq situation is increasingly the basis for not considering military service, and GfK Custom Research says that the fear factor is twice as strong on today’s recruits as it was in 2000.¹⁰

As General Schoomaker reminded Congress in June 2005, it is not just an Army problem when not enough young men and women are willing to join the Armed Forces. It is the nation’s responsibility to raise the Army it needs.¹¹ However, there is no doubt among the Army’s leadership where the buck stops when it comes to fixing the current recruiting shortfalls. The United States Army spent 1.3 billion dollars in 2005 on recruiting.¹² The Army’s recruiting operation is so important that a separate command exists to manage and execute the work for the active and reserve forces - the US Army Recruiting Command.

The US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), headquartered at Ft Knox, Kentucky, is a unit of carefully selected and specially trained soldiers, sergeants, officers, and civilians all focused on the mission of finding and enlisting young men and women into the Army. USAREC recruiters, organized into five brigades, spread out to cover 50 states and five overseas locations (Germany, Guam, Japan, Korea, and Puerto Rico). Over 13,000 Army and National Guard recruiters work out of over 1600 recruiting stations to track dozens of potential recruits each.¹³ Specifically, recruiters find young men and women to serve in either the active component as full time soldiers or the reserve component as part time soldiers, until and unless they are mobilized to active duty.¹⁴

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“The United States Army Recruiting Command recruits Soldiers, both officers and enlisted, to meet the needs of an expeditionary Army, begins the transformation from civilian to Soldier, acts as the Army’s liaison with the American people, and does all with integrity and a professionalism that clearly demonstrates the warrior ethos and Army values. We remain relevant and ready to provide the strength for our Army, today and into the future.”¹⁵

USAREC Mission Statement

Missing the goal in recruiting has both long-range and immediate impacts. It is a long-range concern because there is potentially a smaller pool of sergeants and from which to select the future senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) leaders. It is an immediate issue in the sense that the Army is short now the junior soldiers who conduct patrols and operate equipment. A shortfall of 7,000 recruits, as in 2005, represents the junior enlisted manning for two to three brigades and could result in cadre-led units where only the senior leadership is present. If the Army cannot man all its maneuver brigades, existing brigades will rotate longer and more often to overseas missions.

The most recent figures on recruiting, however, indicate the Army’s efforts may be closing the recruiting gap. In 2006 the Army must recruit 80,000 new people into the active component and 25,500 into the reserve component. The National Guard must bring in an additional 70,000 troops.¹⁶ The enlistment numbers for September, the last month of the 2005 fiscal year, showed the active and reserve Army had exceeded their recruiting goals while the Guard came close (98%).¹⁷ The numbers for the start of fiscal year 2006 were also encouraging with all components of the Army exceeding their goals in October.¹⁸

Is the Army lowering standards to solve its recruiting problems?

Discussions about recruiting standards can be as confusing as debates about global warming. The facts are not in dispute, but their interpretation is. Congress sets minimum standards for entry into the armed services (citizenship, education, age, health, etc.), but the Defense Department, Army, and other branches of service have established their own policies, usually with more demanding standards, within the congressional limits. The Army has not lowered the standards set by Congress, but it does adjust its own self-imposed standards from time to time. This does not mean the Army is bringing in unqualified recruits.

Take for example the educational standard for entry into the Army. According to the US Code, “...of the males with no prior military service who are enlisted or inducted into the Army during any fiscal year, the number who are not high-school graduates may not exceed, at the end of the fiscal year, 35 percent of all such persons.”¹⁹ The Army’s goal is much higher than the standard set by Congress. The Army does not accept people without either a high school diploma or a general equivalency diploma (GED). The Army attempts to recruit at least 90% with high school diplomas and accept no more than 10 to 15 percent with a GED. In 2005, 87% of the new recruits entering the active component had high school diplomas (88.8% for Reserve).²⁰

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Another example of the Army maintaining high standards is the minimum allowable test score for new recruits on the mandatory ASVAB-AFQT (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery - Armed Forces Qualification Test). The AFQT measures “trainability” and compares the score of the new recruit with the score of a control group of young adults taken in 1980. A score of 50 means the examinee scored better than 50% of those who took the control test in 1980.²¹ Congress has mandated that no one who scores below the 10th percentile may be admitted into the armed forces, and only 20% of the recruits may score below the 31st percentile. The Army has the goal of accepting only those who score in the 31st percentile or better, although some waivers have been granted for scores as low as 26th percentile. The Army requires even higher scores for more technical jobs such as Signal Corpsman or Engineer. A new recruit must obtain a score of 50 or better on the test to be eligible for an enlistment bonus. An interesting point is that the ASVAB-AFQT was “re-normed” in 2004 to account for the fact that “...scores [among today’s youth] on educational achievement tests such as the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) are up [from 1980].”²² The average student today is in fact doing better than twenty years ago. As a result, the Coast Guard lowered the minimum allowable score for its new recruits from 40 to 36. But, the Army has not lowered its minimum score, meaning that today’s enlistees must do better on the exam than his or her predecessors in the 1980’s and 1990’s. If the Army does reduce its minimum in the future, any claims of lowering standards should be judged in the context of the changed AFQT norms.

There are other requirements established by Congress in the US Code for armed service. A person must be an American citizen or permanent resident, must be at least 18 (17 with a guardian’s permission) and cannot be insane, a felon, or former deserter.²³ Department of Defense Policy (and not law) establishes the maximum age for recruits at less than 35, but the Army has received permission from DoD to conduct a trial of extending to 40 the age of new recruits into the Army Reserve.²⁴ This change, if adopted after the three-year trial, would apply only to the Reserve and is intended to widen the pool of available recruits.

The Army has a vested interest in maintaining high standards for enlistment, and while pressure to meet goals can cause some recruiters to cut corners, the standards for graduation from basic training and for retention act to weed out unqualified recruits.

Do we need a draft if we can’t meet our recruiting goals?

In October 2004, Congress considered a bill introduced by Representative Charles Rangel to reinstate the draft. It was voted down 402-2.²⁵ The short answer to the question, “Do we need a draft?” is, “No.”

The question of whether to man our military with a draft is really a philosophical one and not one driven by necessity. After the experience of Vietnam our nation chose to move to a volunteer system which has been rightly credited as a fundamental reason for the quality of our current force. However, the draft Army of World War II was also, by the end of the war, a highly capable Army, and there is no reason we could not make a quality force from a mixture of draft and volunteer servicemen and women. For example the German Army, a highly respected force, was manned during the Cold War by both conscripts and volunteers. Mandatory service is

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championed by some as a means of ensuring that all who benefit from the freedoms of a country contribute to their protection. However, the changes which would have to be made to reintroduce a conscription force would be significant and force major change in how the Army itself trains and fights.

A draft would address only the recruiting aspect of our manpower system, an aspect that is not fundamentally broken. It would do little or nothing for retention or mobilization issues. Frankly, the gap in recruiting would have to be much wider and last much longer to force a change from our volunteer system.

Is Stop-loss a “back-door draft”?

Stop-loss is a policy which prevents soldiers whose enlistment ends during the period of a deployment from leaving the unit while they are deployed. It has nothing to do with resolving recruiting shortfalls or boosting strength numbers. It is a command tool which improves the readiness of deployed units. Soldiers affected by stop-loss are usually discharged soon after the unit has completed its mission and redeployed to its home station.

What is the status of retention?

Retention has been a strongpoint for the Army over time, an indicator of general satisfaction among the troops and their families with life in the Army. The Army exceeded its goal for retention of active component soldiers in 2005, reenlisting 69,512 troops – 5,350 more than required. The Army Reserve retained 102% of its target 16,485, and the National Guard surpassed its goal of 33,804 by 1,233.²⁶ Despite these numbers, the Army’s leadership watches retention trends closely for any signs that its treasured resource may begin departing in unexpected numbers. Retention is a broad term which encompasses different trend lines and populations.

Retention figures such as those quoted above usually refer to the gross number of reenlistments by soldiers and sergeants – enlisted personnel. The numbers can be broken down by rank and specialty but generally are not when they are published for mass media. The gross numbers can inadvertently hide some important insights. For example, a GAO report in 2005 noted that although the Army was meeting its overall retention goals, 65% of the specialties (jobs) had more people than needed by the Army and 35% had too few people.²⁷

Another important point to note is that retention figures generally do not refer to officer retention. Officers serve on an “indefinite” status meaning that they continue to serve until they ask to separate or reach a mandatory retirement date. In a 2002 study, Rand Corporation determined that, up to that time, frequent deployments were not causing a reduction in retention among junior officers.²⁸ In fact following 9/11, the retention rates for junior officers rose. However, between 2003 and 2005 the number of junior officers leaving the Army has grown to 10.7%; about its pre-9/11 level.²⁹ Attrition among junior officers is closely watched by the Army, because the departure of too many junior officers could threaten the health of Army small units and the force’s future senior leadership.

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Although the success of retention helped offset some of the damage from the recruiting gaps in 2005, the achievement may have been costly. During 2005 as the Army faced recruiting shortages it also began to encounter retention problems. As a result, in May the window for reenlistment was expanded beyond the normal group of soldiers whose enlistment was up in the next 12 months to include those whose service expired as far out as 24 months. In addition, soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, Kuwait, or Iraq were permitted to reenlist regardless of when their service contract was due to expire.³⁰ Soldiers who reenlist while serving overseas in a war zone get their reenlistment bonuses tax free, making it very popular. The resulting surge of reenlistments put the Army over its goal for 2005, but it remains to be seen what impact that will have on reenlistments in 2006 and 2007.

The impact of the war in Iraq on retention has not yet been fully understood. Trends in retention are what the experts call “trailing indicators.” In other words the first time you know soldiers or officers might be leaving is when they have gone. The fact that so far the retention rates among junior officers and enlisted have met or exceeded projections is a testament to both the patriotism of our service people and to the strength of the Army as an institution. But the Army may have sown the seeds for a retention problem back in 2003/2004 when it decided to go with one-year rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan rather than 6 month tours. As it became more likely that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan might continue for several years, the Army Operations strategic planning staff struggled with a double edged problem. All conventional wisdom and experience told the staff that a shorter 6-month tour was important to the retention of troops. The Marine Corps in fact chose that path, as have most coalition partners. But, the Army, much more than the Marines, was dependent on the continued presence of its reserves and National Guard. Data clearly showed that, if reservists and units were only mobilized for 6-month deployments, the Army would eat through its reserves in just a couple years. In order to extend the presence of vital reserve units in the conflict, the Army accepted risk in the stress its longer deployments might cause.³¹ Up to now the decision has paid off, but the next 18 months will be critical.

What role does mobilization of reserves and National Guard play?

In the winter of 2003-2004 the Army Operations Directorate’s strategic planning division within the Pentagon was grappling with an emerging realization that the need for ground troops in Iraq was growing, not shrinking as anticipated. As the “Harvard Captains” and “Iron Majors” (so-called because of their specialized training and long work hours) counted up the pool of useable units and projected several years of rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, they laid out a disturbing fact. The Army would run out of deployable Reserve and National Guard forces within a few rotations. If those rotations were 6 months long the units would be exhausted twice as fast as they would if the rotations were one year long. The decision to require one-year deployments was driven by manpower considerations: specifically, mobilization concerns trumped concerns about the impact of one-year tours on retention. It bought the Army and policy-makers a couple more years of flexibility which are now about to run out.

The “reserves” is a broad term encompassing both the Army Reserve and the National Guard and is composed of units at a lower state of readiness; normally training once a month and for a two-

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week period each year. (For a discussion of the relationship between the reserves and the active Army see the additional reading section at the end of this paper.) Maintaining a portion of the military force in the reserves allows the nation to reduce its defense expenditures while retaining important capabilities. For the most part, units in the reserve are duplicates of those in the active component, and they provide the strategic depth for a large-scale or lengthy conflict. In some cases, however, the majority of a specific skill or capability (such as Civil Affairs or Military Police) resides in the reserves. While the active component units are fighting the initial battles, most reserve units gather, mobilize, train, and deploy as follow-on supporting forces. About 62,000 members of the 205,000 Army Reserve component are currently mobilized and deployed around the world.³² According to the Chief of the National Guard, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, about one third of the National Guard's 350,000 member force had been mobilized as of January 2005.³³

The Defense Manpower and Data Center notes that by the end of fiscal year 2004 almost one third (31.8%) of active and reserve personnel deployed on combat missions overseas had already been deployed more than once. Half of all active duty personnel have been deployed at least once since September 11, 2001.³⁴ Less than two years after its last deployment, the 4th Infantry Division, whose soldiers deployed for the war and apprehended Saddam Hussein during their year of occupation duty, is returning to Iraq. Those statistics would have been far higher had the National Guard and Army Reserve not deployed in the significant numbers in which they have. The Army Reserves, which are primarily support troops, and the National Guard, which are primarily combat troops, together counted for nearly 50% of the 150,000 troops in Iraq in January 2005. Some overseas missions such as the stabilization forces in the Balkans are handled entirely by the Guard and Reserve. Because of these extensive deployments most of the Guard and Reserve are no longer available for duty. Unlike active component units like the 4th Division, which can be easily redeployed into Iraq when needed, the reserves cannot be easily remobilized. The Guard says it has about 86,000 soldiers left for deployments, fewer than it has sent to Iraq in the two years before. The Reserve has about 18% (37,500) of its force left.³⁵

In December 2004, Army Reserve Chief, Lieutenant General James R. Helmly sent a memo to the Army's senior officer, in which he captured the coming impact of the deployment trends coupled with mobilization problems. "The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the Army Reserve's inability -- under current policies, procedures, and practices governing mobilization, training, and reserve component manpower management -- to meet mission requirements associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom and to reset and regenerate its forces for follow-on and future missions,"³⁶ LTG Helmly's complaint was not that he didn't have enough soldiers in the Reserve, but that mobilization policies and practices were preventing him from getting access to them. "The Army Reserve is hamstrung in its ability to effectively manage its force," he said.³⁷ To understand why LTG Helmly was frustrated we can examine the mobilization process.

The Secretary of Defense is authorized by the President to mobilize reservists and deploy them to Iraq by Title 10 of the US Code. The vast majority of reservists are currently called up under Paragraph 1209, Part II, Subtitle E, of Title 10, in what is commonly known as a partial mobilization. This section of the US Code allows the mobilization of reservists when the

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President has declared a national emergency, such as he did after September 11th. This authority limits the number of call-ups to one million and restricts the length of active duty to 24 consecutive months, but it does not provide guidance to the Defense Department on how to manage the mobilizations. That guidance is contained in DoD policies and it is these policies that both facilitate and hinder the Reserve's ability to mobilize the right soldiers.

One example which illustrates the complexity of mobilization policy is the problem that troubled the Harvard captains in 2003. Once a reservist has been mobilized and then demobilized it is DoD policy that he not be remobilized for at least 5 years, making it difficult, if not impossible, to remobilize him for the current effort. In the initial reaction to 9/11, many reservists were mobilized and sent to airports and other sensitive areas within the country to bolster security measures. Often these reservists served for less than a year before being demobilized. As the demand for reservists to go to Iraq grew, the Army was precluded by DoD policy from tapping those early mobilized personnel. Eventually the demand for the troops became so great that DoD allowed the Army to remobilize selected reservists as long as they volunteered to be remobilized and their cumulative (not consecutive) service did not exceed 24 months. Now the Army has begun to ask that some units be involuntarily remobilized because volunteers in certain specialties are lacking.³⁸

LTG Helmly's December 2004 memo specifically mentioned the 24-month cumulative cap as being bad for unit cohesion. It frequently forces units which are mobilized for an upcoming rotation to find substitutes for personnel who have previous mobilization time and cannot serve for the unit's full deployment. The result is often a unit which arrives at its mobilization station having never trained together before. Interpreting the Title 10 law strictly could allow the Army to remobilize a soldier and use him for 24 consecutive months as long as he hadn't served a full consecutive two years before. Taken to the extreme, a reservist could theoretically be mobilized, serve for 23 months, be demobilized, and then be called back again an infinite number of times for 23 months each. No one advocates this position, and everyone recognizes the need to find a fair and equitable policy. But, the fact remains that, as the General Accounting office said in September 2004, the problems in mobilization make it possible that the Department of Defense could "run out of forces."³⁹

If the assessments of LTG Helmly are correct, and the number of troops required overseas does not come down drastically, the Guard and reserves will not have troops of the right number and kind for the next rotations being planned for 2006 and 2007. This fact will force decisions in policy to either significantly reduce the military presence in Iraq or to remobilize many personnel who have already served a full tour overseas. It could also limit the ability of the nation to deploy reservists to new conflicts which may arise in the next several years.

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Conclusion

“What keeps me awake at night is, what will this all-volunteer force look like in 2007?”⁴⁰

General Dick Cody

Vice Chief of Staff, Army

What the war in Iraq and the global war on terror reveal for us is that our manpower system is not well tuned to conduct lengthy, high-intensity operations of the magnitude we see today. Of the three aspects of manpower, recruiting is an important challenge, but one which the Army has “fixed” before and for which there are proven solutions. Failure in retention could be the most dangerous development to the long-term health of the professional Army, because there is no source to replace experienced military tacticians, logisticians, or leaders. Mobilization, however, is the area whose problems most immediately threaten the success of our operations in the war on terror and the flexibility of our policy-makers in designing strategies for the future. The high tempo of the war on terror, especially within Iraq, has illuminated the inefficiency of our Cold War mobilization policies for a prolonged combat and reconstruction operation. The Army and Defense Department recognize this problem and are working to correct it. For example, the Army has developed a new process for generating the active and reserve forces it needs, which promises improved regularity and predictability to soldiers and units. General Schoomaker told Congress that 80% of the ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) Model will be instituted by 2006.⁴¹ But, the fruits of those changes will probably not come in time to provide the reserve forces the Army needs for the next rotations.

The manpower system is both an enabler and limitation on what the Army can do. It’s impact is not only on the Army but on US policy and strategy choices around the globe. The system is in crisis, but it is fixable. The answer to General Cody’s question, “What will our volunteer force look like in 2007?” will depend on how successful we are in fixing our manpower system.

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Background on Endstrength and Army Components

How many people does the Army need?

“In the debate over quality of troops versus quantity of troops, quality is always better. Especially in large quantities.”

Unknown

According to Title 10 of the US Code, Congress has specified the minimum strength of the active duty component of the Army necessary to “successfully conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies,” as 482,500.⁴² Congress did not pull this number from thin air. It is a figure based on Defense Department and Army input and Congressional wisdom. If the US Army were recruiting to fill an active duty force of 482,500, the number of enlistments in 2005 (73,375) would have been sufficient and there would have been no recruiting shortfall. But, the nation is engaged in more than two nearly simultaneous wars. It is fighting two major ground wars and a global war against terrorism, all simultaneously. At the same time the Army is transforming itself; reorganizing to increase the number and size of combat brigades and changing how it fights to meet the new challenges of today. Under this workload, the Army needs much more than the minimum cited in the US Code.

There are a number of factors the Army considers when determining its personnel needs. In fact, the computer model that the Army’s personnel analysts use to determine that number considers over 2 million variables.

Beginning with strategic requirements laid out by the President and Secretary of Defense in documents like the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, the Army Operations Directorate (G3) leads the staffing to determine the number of units the Army needs and how they should be organized. The process is detailed and partially classified because among other things, it is based on the warplans of combatant commanders and intelligence assessments of threats to our nation’s security. Suffice to say that the process considers the number and scope of anticipated operations as well as the way in which the Army will organize for combat.

The Army Personnel Directorate (G1), using its massive computer modeling programs and highly trained analysts (the team includes two PhDs), determines how many people the Army needs to man the units the G3 says are required. Their calculations detail the ranks and types of soldiers needed and include allowances for those soldiers in training schools, on sick call, in transit, in-processing and out-processing, and many more categories. The G1 model draws on historical data and current trends to project the number of soldiers who will leave the Army in the coming year and the number of soldiers that can be expected to reenlist and stay in the Army. The difference essentially is the number that recruiting must make up. The number to be reenlisted and the number to be recruited are prescribed in a memorandum from the G1 and sent to the field as a tasking to be fulfilled.

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Although it is the intent of the Army leadership to return the size of the active duty component to 482,500,⁴³ the impact of Army Transformation, two ground wars, and a global war against terrorism has forced the Army to grow in real numbers. The Army leadership has asked the Secretary of Defense to temporarily increase its active duty component from 482,500 to 512,000 in 2006 (and possibly 522,000 in 2009).⁴⁴ Congress has approved the Secretary's request for 2006. To support an active component force of 512,000 in 2006 the G1 says the Army must recruit 80,000 new people into the active component and 25,500 into the reserve component. The Army National Guard, which recruits and manages its troops separately, must bring in an additional 70,000 troops.⁴⁵

What is the relationship between the components: active, reserve, and National Guard?

*"One weekend a month my butt."⁴⁶
sign on a Reservist's truck in Iraq*

For historical reasons both the Federal Government and the States have responsibility to raise and maintain military forces for the defense of the nation. The federal ground force is the United States Army. The Army has both an active duty component and a reserve component. The active duty component is comprised of units which are always ready for deployment. They are the nation's most ready Army forces. The Army reserve component is composed largely of support units at a lower state of readiness; normally training once a month and for a two-week period each year. For the most part, units in the reserve are training, support, and service support units. They provide the strategic depth for a large-scale or lengthy conflict.

The Army National Guard is also considered a reserve force but has a special relationship with the federal force. During peacetime, each National Guard unit answers to the governors of the 50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia. During national emergencies, however, the President can mobilize the National Guard, putting them in federal duty status. Once mobilized, the Guard, which are primarily combat units, can be deployed and tasked as any other federal force.⁴⁷ According to Chief of the National Guard, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, about one third of the National Guard force has currently been mobilized.⁴⁸

In the wake of the Vietnam War the active and reserve components were structured in a way that ensured that any long-term, major war would require the participation of reservists from units throughout the United States. The idea was to ensure American support of any major conflict and to make the use of the military without that support politically more difficult. The concept that the Guard and Reserve are a strategic reserve for the United States has been altered today by the sustained operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the globe. It is more accurate to say that the Reserve and Guard are now an "operational" reserve, the difference being that they must deploy more often and more quickly than previously expected.

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Sources for Understanding Army Manpower.

Following are some suggested items for use in further research on Army manpower.

BOOKS

The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service. Edited by Bicksler, Barbara A., and Gilroy, Warner. Foreword by Donald H. Rumsfeld. Washington D.C. Brassey's Inc., 2004.

Army Manpower Economics. Edited by Gilroy, Curtis L. Westview Press, 1986.

Modeling Reserve Recruiting: Estimates of Enlistments. Arkes, Jeremy, and Kilburn. Santa Monica, CA. Rand, 2005.

INSTITUTES

Rand Corporation

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis. See also Rand Arroyo Center - the U.S. Army's only federally funded research and development center. RAND Arroyo Center conducts objective analytic research on major policy concerns, with an emphasis on mid- to long-term policy issues, helps the Army improve effectiveness and efficiency, and provides short-term assistance on urgent problems. (<http://www.rand.org/>)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

ARI is one of the lead research institutes for training, leader development, soldier research and development. The institute handles survey research and occupational analysis. ARI provides the Army with technical expertise and analytical support, along with decision-making techniques for soldiers and leaders. ARI keeps track of information on soldier and leader attitudes and concerns. The employees range from research psychologists, to those with a Ph.D., military officers, and graduate students acting as research assistants (taken from ARI's website). (<http://www.hqda.army.mil/ari/>)

Legal Information Institute (LII)

The web site has the law regarding the United States military, Title 10. Legal Information Institute (LII) is an internationally known non-profit organization under Cornell Law School that is a provider of public legal information. (http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sup_01_10.html)

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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONIES

Congressional hearings held by the Armed Services Committee of the Senate or House of Representatives are good sources of facts and figures on topical issues.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Airland Forces Subcommittee. Subject: Army Transformation. Chaired by Senator John McCain (R-AZ). 16 Mar 2005.

Witnesses: Claude M. Bolton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, General Richard A Cody, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Paul J. Francis, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, GAO, David R. Graham, Dep Director, Strategy Forces and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analysis, Kenneth F. Boehm, Chairman, National Legal and Policy Center.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Subject: Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq. Chaired by: Senator John Warner (R-VA). 23 June 2005 Thursday

Witnesses: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John Abazaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command; General George Casey, Commander, Multinational Forces Iraq.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Subject: Status of the US Army and Marine Corps in Fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Chaired by: Senator John Warner (R-VA). 30 June 2005 Thursday

Army Manpower and the War on Terror

Witnesses: David SC Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for personnel and Readiness, Charles S. Abell, Principal Dep Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Gen Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, US Army, Gen Michael W. Hagee, Commandant, US Marine Corps.

Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Subject: Improving Security in Iraq.

Chaired by: Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN). 18 July 2005 Monday

Witnesses: Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution: General Barry R. McCaffrey, President, BR McCaffrey Associates, LLC; Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

OTHER

Department of Defense Issuances & OSD Administrative Instructions

This website is a useful resource for searching for DoD Issuances and directive-type memorandums. (<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/>)

Department of Defense Home Page

The DoD home page, Defenselink, contains information on military topics and links to key sights such as National Guard and Army Reserve. News releases can be received by email from Defenselink by registering with the site. (<http://www.defenselink.mil/>)

Globalsecurity.org Home Page

This web site tracks numerous facts and statistics on manpower and other military issues. (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/index.html>)

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ENDNOTES.

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- ² Army Home Page. Shows number personnel deployed abroad (<http://www.army.mil/operations/>) 1 Nov 2005
- ³ Author's Note. There can be debate over the characterization of the manpower situation as a crisis. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (© 2000) defines "crisis" as: a. A crucial or decisive point or situation; a turning point. b. An unstable condition, as in political, social, or economic affairs, involving an impending abrupt or decisive change.
- ⁴ MILPER Message: 05-121. FY05 Retention Program Update, 05/12/2005. Army Human Resources Web Site (<https://perscomnd04.army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf>)
- ⁵ Helmly, James LTG. Memorandum: Readiness of the United States Army Reserve. 20 Dec 2004. Posted in Globalsecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/usar_memo-20dec2004.htm).
- ⁶ Abrams Creighton, quoted in *A Better War* by Lewis Sorley. Pg 370. (Harcourt, Inc. 1999)
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- ⁸ McHugh, Jane. War Worries: Recruiters Stuck Between Iraq and Hard Sell. Army Times, 21 Mar 2005
- ⁹ Tyson, Ann Scott. Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military. NY Times, 19 Mar 2005
- ¹⁰ McHugh, Jane. War Worries: Recruiters Stuck Between Iraq and Hard Sell. Army Times, 21 Mar 2005
- ¹¹ Schoomaker, Peter J. Gen. Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 30 Jun 2005.
- ¹² Kiger, Patrick J. Manpower Mission: Recruitment Battles. Crain Communications. 24 Oct 2005
- ¹³ USAREC Home Page. Recruiting stations exist in United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and at U.S. facilities in Germany and Asia. (<http://www.usarec.army.mil/>)
- ¹⁴ Note: The National Guard recruits separately, primarily from inside the state in which units are located. The Guard has traditionally relied heavily on soldiers leaving the active component to join the Guard in their home state.
- ¹⁵ USAREC Home Page. (<http://www.usarec.army.mil/>)
- ¹⁶ Information Paper: Recruiting Update. DAPE-MPA, 7 October 2005
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- ¹⁸ DoD News Release No. 1173-05. DoD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for October. 10 Nov 2005.
- ¹⁹ US Code Title 10, subtitle B, Part II, chapter 333, para 3262
- ²⁰ Information Paper: Recruiting Update. DAPE-MPA, 7 October 2005
- ²¹ Note: For a good explanation of how the ASVAB-AFQT works visit About.com and select military.
- ²² Powers, Rod. New Norming Affects Overall Scores. About.com, 25 July 2004. (<http://usmilitary.about.com/od/joiningthemilitary/a/asvabscorechg.htm>)
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- ²⁴ US Army News Release. Army Public Affairs. Army Announces Test Program to Raise Non-Prior Service Enlistment Age. 18 March 2005.
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⁴⁰ Cody, R. Gen. Senate Armed Services Hearing, Air Land Forces Subcommittee, 16 Mar 2005. Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Copyright 2005.

⁴¹ Schoomaker, Peter J. Gen. Hearing of Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 Jun 2005.

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⁴⁴ Schoomaker, Peter J. Gen. Hearing of Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 June 2005. (According to testimony by Gen R. Cody, the total number on active duty in November 2005, which includes mobilized reservists and those held beyond their separation date by stop-loss, exceeded 650,000 in March 2005. Senate Armed Services Hearing, 16 Mar 2005.)

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