



NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW  
★★★★★  
2010

## POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES

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## Overview

- Policy Issues: The Mission
- Force Structure Issues: The Arsenal
- War Planning Issues: OPLAN 8010
- Q/A

## Policy Issues: Guidance

Prague speech “sets the stage” for the Nuclear Posture Review by pledging that the “United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons,” including:

- “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy...to put an end to Cold War thinking”
- “maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies...as long as these weapons exist”

The NPR will “analyze the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, the size and composition of nuclear forces necessary to support that strategy, and the steps necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence posture.”

DOD Fact Sheet, *The NPR, Arms Control and Deterrence*, August 6, 2009

## Policy Issues: Declaratory Policy

“the United States has made clear for many years that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our people, our forces and our friends and allies. Additionally, the United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.”

The White House, *Remarks by the National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, to the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, February 8, 2008, p. 5.*



## Policy Issues: Where to “Reduce Role”?

Potential areas:

“the United States has made clear for many years that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our people, our forces and our friends and allies.

Additionally, the United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.”

Most likely areas for change:

- replace “weapons of mass destruction” with “nuclear”
- remove terrorist connection



## Policy Issues: Where to “Reduce Role”?

How dynamic must “respond with overwhelming force to the use of” be?

- Deter and prevent: Very broad including preemptive
- Deter: Very broad
- Respond to: Broad but less proactive
- Retaliate: No-first-use without calling it so
- No-first-use: Constrained but credible?



## Force Structure Issues: The Arsenal

### Estimated Nuclear Warheads

Weapons Category	Estimated Warheads
<i>Operational</i>	2,600
Strategic	2,100
Tactical	500
<i>Reserve</i>	2,400
<b>Total Stockpile</b>	<b>5,000</b>
Awaiting Dismantlement	~4,500
<b>Total Inventory</b>	<b>~9,500</b>

### Nuclear Delivery Vehicles


Weapons Category	Number Deployed
<i>Strategic</i>	
SLBM	288
ICBM	450
Bombers	60
	} ~800
<i>Non-Strategic</i>	
DCA	400(400)*
TLAM/N	100(200)*

\* About 1,200 total;  
200 in Europe; all  
TLAM/N in storage



## Force Structure Issues: The Trend

**DOD Nuclear Weapons Arsenal 1945-2012**



Note: Estimates jointly developed by FAS and NRDC.






# Force Structure Issues: Big Items

Major force structure decisions required (predominant rumor):

- Triad or Dyad?
- SSBN(X): 14, 12, or 10?
- New SLBM or D5LE beyond 2042?
- New ICBM or Extend Minuteman III ICBM through 2040?
- New bomber or phase out?
- New cruise missile or extend ALCM?
- New fighter-bomber (F-35 JSF) or phase out?
- Retire or extend TLAM/N?
- New bomb factory (Pu/HEU fabrication, enhanced LEPs)



## War Planning Issues: OPLAN 8010

 **OPLAN 8010 Background** SECRET

- OPLAN 8010 base plan approved Dec 07, including:
  - [REDACTED] (b)(1)
  - Nuclear force employment plans
- Status of Adversary Appendices:
  - [REDACTED] Next review forecasted [REDACTED] (b)(5)
  - [REDACTED] Assumptions and concept approved [REDACTED] (b)(5)
  - [REDACTED] Final review/approval scheduled [REDACTED] (b)(5)
  - [REDACTED] Approval of assumptions and concept scheduled [REDACTED] (b)(5)
  - [REDACTED] Approval of assumptions and concept forecasted [REDACTED] (b)(5)
  - [REDACTED] Mission analysis in progress
  - [REDACTED] Mission analysis in progress

OPLAN 8010 first entered into effect on October 1, 2008

Strategic war plan; replacing SIOF and OPLAN 8044.

First real non-SIOF, “New Triad” war plan.


Directed against six adversaries: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Syria, and 9/11 WMD scenario.

Three of the adversaries do not have nuclear weapons; two of them are signatories to the NPT.

Merges strategic deterrence and Global Strike missions.

Includes broad “family” of nuclear and non-nuclear strike options.

## War Planning Issues: OPLAN 8010



### PLANNING FOR REGIONAL STATES

TOP SECRET

- **Series of options**

(S) "b1" USSC

North Korean  
Taepo Dong 1
- **Scenario driven approach**

(S) "b1" USSC

Libyan  
Tarhuna  
Facility
- **Planning Assumption:**

(S) "b1" USSC

Scud Missile  
(Iran, Iraq, Libya)

TOP SECRET

Mission creep beyond “nuclear” to “WMD” broadened geographic scope and contingencies. Compared with SIOP, OPLAN 8010 “provides more flexible options” for “a wider range of contingencies.”

Wider targeting scope combined with reduction in deployed warheads has led to requirements for increased flexibility, “grooming” of weapons, and created an increasingly complex plan.

Executable strike plans against regional states first entered the strategic war plan in March 2003.



# War Planning Issues: Potential Changes

Potential changes to OPLAN 8010 resulting from changing declaratory policy from WMD to nuclear adversaries:

- Reduce adversaries in plan from six to three (Russia, China, North Korea)
- Reduce target list by removing chemical and biological facilities
- Reduce number of warheads required to meet targeting plans
- Reduce flexibility requirement
- Allow greater separation of nuclear from non-nuclear capabilities

Other options for changing posture:

- Reduce alert-level and/or decision time
- Reduce SSBN deployments and tempo
- Curtail most offensive and threatening first-strike capabilities
- Reduce force-on-force scenarios and focus posture on retaliation



## QUESTIONS?