
David Carment
Dane Rowlands

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About The Authors

David Carment is an Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa. His primary research interests fall into the categories of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, ethnic conflict, peacekeeping, Internet technology and Canadian foreign affairs. Dane Rowlands' current areas of research include the political economy and economic analysis of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, their structure and reform, and their interaction with international capital flows. His research in the area of conflict analysis focuses on the role of third party interveners in situations of civil conflict, including the role of international financial institutions in conflict situations in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Throughout the 1990s multilateral interventions deviated significantly from their predecessor missions in a number of important ways. For one, the central characteristics of traditional peacekeeping missions - the use of force for self defense only, the interposition of troops after a ceasefire and the maintenance of tactical and strategic impartiality - no longer provided the delimiting boundaries for presumed mission success. Second, intrastate conflicts proved to be decidedly more complex and often more deadly for both the belligerents and peacekeepers as well as ordinary citizens caught in the fray. Third, in order to execute functions such as guaranteeing the safe passage of humanitarian assistance, assisting displaced persons, and stopping the killing of ordinary citizens, peacekeepers often resorted to more forceful measures.

Responses to this sea change have been twofold. On the one hand, many observers have concluded that the key principles informing conventional, essentially peaceful, missions are problematic if not anachronistic in an era dominated by armed conflict within rather than between states (Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1997; Smith 2000). Following on the controversial results of the NATO campaign to stop the killing in Kosovo, the peacekeeping nations have undertaken efforts to improve the quality of responses to complex intrastate conflicts. Such efforts draw on recent studies on UN security reform commissioned by the United Nations General Secretary, such as the Brahimi Report (2000) and the findings of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2000). Among the recommendations of these reports is the call for the development of more meaningful criteria for distinguishing between the cases where intervention should be more forceful, or when it should employ less dramatic means.¹
On the other hand, more critical analyses begin by examining the traditional principles upon which peacekeeping and more forceful measures are based in order to determine why the new breed of missions succeed or fail (1996, Diehl et. al. 1996, Regan 2000, Walter 1997). The single biggest explanation for the lackluster efforts of recent missions is the problematic nature of forceful intervention in intrastate conflict. Some findings show that increases in the use of force may exacerbate tensions because of the incipient moral hazard problem (Rowlands & Carment 1998, Kuperman 1996, 1999). Others suggest that a lack of resolve and credibility within coalitions and security organizations create additional incentives for escalation and prolonged conflict (Regan 1996; Harvey 1998).

In this paper we argue that before governments consider implementing novel policy recommendations such as those in the Brahimi Report there is first the need to understand more thoroughly why third party interventions - forceful or otherwise - succeed or fail.\(^2\) While there are a myriad of criteria by which we could evaluate the linkage between force and the escalation and de-

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1. The collective management of complex intrastate conflicts, so the argument goes, tends to unfold selectively, when those who have the capability to respond also have the motivation to respond (Rotberg & Albaugh 1999). For example, selective responses to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia resulted in a UN humanitarian mission there in 1992 and later in 1993, the creation of UNISOM II and the UNITAF the predecessor mission under US command. Both missions used forceful measures, including the disarmament of militia in the absence of local consent. In 1995, air strikes and artillery were used to compel Serb belligerents to remove heavy weapons directed at safe havens in war-torn Bosnia, bringing to end the four-year war there. Rothchild & Lake (1998) see evidence of a movement towards a norm of collective intervention in a wide range of situations, including genocide, interference with the delivery of relief, violation of ceasefire agreements, collapse of civil order, and irregular interruption of democratic governance.

2. We recognize the problems of using broad and nebulous concepts. Terms such as third party, success and failure, intervention, peacekeeping, conflict management and conflict resolution are used loosely in the literature though each has a specific meaning. Kleiboer (1996), Walter (1997) Licklider (1995) Diehl et.al. (1996), Lund (1996) and Regan (1996) among others provide useful definitions of these and other terms. It is useful to develop a meaningful definition of third party intervention that is consistent with current practice. Third party intervention does not refer simply to the physical presence of a "managing agent". We define third party intervention as outside involvement in the internal affairs of a state by military means coupled with political and economic measures. Consent may or may not be present. Our definition is broad enough to encompass the kinds of strategies necessary for the termination of conflict (at different levels of aggregation - interstate, inter-group or individual). But it also recognizes that there is a significant conceptual and theoretical problem of identifying the independent effects of individual strategies.
escalation of intrastate conflict, our chosen starting point is an evaluation of the role that impartiality and bias play in determining mission outcomes. We have chosen to focus on bias and impartiality for a number of reasons.\textsuperscript{3} First, within the literature there is little consensus on whether impartiality is necessary for the successful management of today's conflicts. Second, a loss of impartiality and an increase in bias are often associated with more forceful and potentially risky and costly undertakings. Therefore it is useful to know when forceful interventions are more likely to succeed by clearly specifying the conditions under which a biased intervention is likely to either inhibit violence or act as a catalyst to it.\textsuperscript{4} Finally, no effort that we know of has been undertaken to formalize, through model and proposition development, the impact that forceful interventions have on the intensity of violent conflict.

Apart from this introduction, the paper is in four sections. In the first section of the paper we review the extant literature on bias and impartiality. Drawing first on research on small group mediation and then on peacekeeping and more forceful forms of third party intervention, we draw out the distinctions between different kinds of bias and the presumed impact that the loss of impartiality has on both violent and non-violent conflict. In the second section we develop a formal model that specifies propositions regarding the effects of biased interventions. In the third section

3. The Webster's dictionary defines bias as a highly personal and unreasoned distortion of judgment. Impartiality is defined as: "not partial or biased: treating or affecting all equally" (Merriam-Webster, Springfield, MA, 1984). The mediation literature distinguishes between content and source bias. It is obvious that in the context of peacekeeping and mediation - and third party intervention generally - bias and impartiality are applied at different levels of aggregation with different levels of pressure and coercion. With respect to peacekeeping for example peacekeepers are deemed to be impartial to the extent that tactical (local) and strategic (operational) consent are in place and force is used by peacekeepers for self defense only. The primary objective of this type of intervention is to observe. A more biased intervention would be one where peacekeepers are not there to enforce the provisions of an accord and lack both the commitment to and capability of such a process. In this case tactical consent may be absent, though operational consent is present. Even higher intensity missions apply in an intrastate conflict in which both operational and tactical consent is not available, and limited but superior force is used.

4. This approach is consistent with that espoused by Kleiboer (1996). She argues that modeling produces an incentive for more theory-driven empirical research, which, by her assessment, is more informative for the researcher and the policy maker.
we use NATO's intervention in Kosovo to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the model. In the fourth and concluding section we identify the theoretical and policy-relevant implications of the model and outline directions for future research.
There is a convenient analytical division within the literature on the role of third party bias in conflict management and resolution. There is the literature that examines bias in pacific forms of intervention such as mediation on the one hand, and in peacekeeping and peace enforcement on the other. Each is considered in turn.

To help guide us in our understanding of bias and impartiality in mediation we turn first to the work of Matz and Boskey. In his assessment of mediator pressure, Boskey (1994) argues that the first principle of mediation is that any agreement that results from the process should be voluntary. According to Boskey, the primary purpose of mediation is to gain agreement between the adversaries and this effort should not be accomplished by compromising the autonomy of either party. In a challenge to this claim, Matz (1994) stresses that autonomy is not the same as making a decision in the absence of any constraints. Pressure applied by the mediator is a legitimate tool; adversaries invite third party intervention precisely because they seek pressure as a means of solving a dispute that they cannot solve themselves (Kydd, 2000).

In support of this argument, Carnevale and Arad (1996) focused their efforts on the relationship between mediator pressure and party autonomy in small group settings. In their research, Carnevale and Arad argue that third party bias does not significantly constrain the mediation process. A third party is more readily accepted as even-handed if parties to a dispute are

5. Kleiboer argues that mediation success is determined by four broad factors: the characteristics of the dispute; the parties and their interrelationship; characteristics of the mediator; and the international context. In this study we focus on the relationship between the third party and the combatants. For broader analyses see Bercovitch (1996).
made aware of the biases inherent in the third party's approach.\textsuperscript{6} This occurs when the clear communication of third party bias creates a cushioning effect, a statement of interests and intent so that both sides can adjust their positions prior to and during the negotiations.\textsuperscript{7} Carnevale and Arad's findings support the intuitive notion that partisan and nonpartisan disputants evaluate the mediator differently. But it also makes the point that disputants are strategic actors who anticipate and act on signals of mediator intent in order to maximize their own interests.\textsuperscript{8} Indeed, disputants will more readily accept a biased mediator if that mediator can bring resources and prestige to the table.

Research by Gibson, Thompson and Bazerman (1996) supports this conclusion. They question how and why mediators often reach agreements that are less than ideal. They argue that inappropriate agreements are frequently a result of mixed and poorly communicated signals and a preoccupation with mediator impartiality.

In brief, mediation research indicates that bias acts as a catalyst in moving the process forward to resolution because it allows the disputants to more readily develop a position that will maximize their own gains. It remains to be seen, however, if this basic finding on effectiveness can be extrapolated to incidences where third party intervention consists of mediation - essentially a

\textsuperscript{6} Apart from the idea of content and source bias, the term is used by many mediators to refer to the position and framing a mediator has on a particular issue. Bias is also informed by the prior relationship between the mediator, the substance of their proposals, and by the pressure the mediator applies to persuade the parties to accept an outcome.

\textsuperscript{7} Their primary study attempted to measure two factors against one another: the extent of mediator bias and the potential for future mediation, using university students as subjects assigned to represent hypothetical countries - two disputants and one as mediator. Their results indicate that mediators are able to alter their behavior in an effort to preserve their acceptability as mediator to the disputants, suggesting there may be two basic forms of bias in mediation: (1) bias of content, which pertains to the mediator's behavior and substance of their proposals, and (2) bias of source characteristics, which pertains to expectations that stem from a mediator's closer ties to one party over the other party. The authors are unable to say conclusively whether either form of bias has significant effects on judgment of the mediator and on the nature of the settlement proposals put forward.

\textsuperscript{8} For example, pro-Israeli participants in the Carnevale/Arad experiment tended to evaluate the proposal of the mediator based on whether it was favorable to their position, while neutral participants evaluated the same proposal based on its evenhandedness.
voluntary process - coupled with peacekeeping or more forceful measures as a way of preventing or managing violent conflict between groups of peoples.

**Forceful Intervention, Peacekeeping and Bias**

Traditional perspectives assume that a violation of impartiality goes against the underlying precepts of peacekeeping. For example, Alan James has consistently argued that favoritism in intrastate ethnic conflict is more likely to make peacekeepers targets rather than intermediaries (James 1998). Citing evidence from the Congo, Lebanon and Bosnia, James suggests that outside forces should not intervene unless the three basic conditions, specified at the outset, can be reasonably met. Similarly Krain, (1999) decrying the absence of any systematic study of effectiveness in the prevention or mitigation of widespread atrocities, evaluates potential responses by the international community to genocides. Krain chronicles longstanding as well as more recent explanations for why actors engage in mass killings, and traces the evolution of preventive efforts from a focus on diplomatic maneuvering, to economic sanctions, to military intervention. He finds evidence indicating that interventions that increase the resources available to the faction intent upon genocide will increase the severity of the acts, while intervention aimed at increasing the resources of the opposing side will decrease the severity and scope of the subsequent killings. Krain concludes

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9. According to Ruggie, peacekeeping is an attempt to overcome a coordination problem between belligerents by enhancing transparency and establishing clearly defined rules of the game. Highly intense operations are compared to a game of chicken; an escalatory ladder of means up to and including war is used to "force an aggressor off its track" (Ruggie 1994: 29). Rothchild and Lake (1998) argue that noncoercive interventions can be helpful in raising the costs of purely ethnic appeals and in structuring the incentives of group leaders prepared to accept international norms; but that, where conflicts are intense, exhortations and international warnings may not deter or end violence.

10. Krain also presents a threat model hypothesizing that threat perceptions on the part of the genocidal faction will mean that any outside intervention aimed at re-distributing resources will not impact upon the decision to undertake a program of mass killing.
that neutral interventions could, therefore, have an impact on conflict intensity and recommends that third parties play a more impartial intervening role in future conflicts that involve genocidal activities.\(^\text{11}\)

Roberts (1996) sees the problematic nature of forceful interventions in terms of "loss of consent" rather than in terms of "loss of impartiality." He characterizes the downgrading of the consent of the parties to a conflict as a requirement for UN action to be at the heart of the peacekeeping crisis. He uses the crises in Iraq (the establishment of safe areas for Kurds in northern Iraq), the former Yugoslavia (the entire operation), and Somalia (no functioning government to grant consent) as case studies.\(^\text{12}\) Roberts cites as a major problem the incongruity between the UN's stated willingness to use force within the scope of its peacekeeping operations and a reluctance to perform this role in practice; instead the UN contracts out the use of force to regional organizations or specific countries. Like James, Roberts believes that the willingness to use force leaves lightly-armed UN peacekeepers vulnerable to attack and exposes the UN to criticism for engaging in force that may have an adverse impact upon civilian populations.

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11. For the purposes of this study we consider only third party interventions conducted by multilateral security organizations such as the UN and NATO or coalitions led by state actors. There is an abundant and very good literature on the role of partisan states in ethnic conflict that is not covered here. A leading concern for a third party state is a pressing sense of obligation to support a minority brethren's claims (Saideman 1997, Davis, Jaggers & Moore 1997). In turn, a weak and disadvantaged minority is invariably in search of a third party that will support its cause. The ensuing combination of motivations, coalitions and linkages are often steeped with powerful affective elements, including regional identity and religious affinities (Heraclides 1991; Suhrke and Noble 1977).

12. Evidence supporting this argument is provided by Roberts (1997), who chronicles the experiences of the UN operation in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993 (UNTAC). He shows that UN impartiality promoted conflict there. He argues that it is misleading to assess the mission on the basis of its relative success in implementing an electoral process. Roberts (1997) claims that some analyses of the UN's Cambodian experience over-emphasize the significance of the technical aspects of the operation (logistics, communication, training, materiel deployment). He argues that UNTAC fundamentally failed to maintain consent from the two core actors: the government in Phnom Penh and the Khmers Rouges. This loss of consent, argues Roberts, severely hampered UNTAC's ability to implement its broad and sophisticated mandate, which was the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operation at the time.
Others have argued that forceful and more biased interventions are merited under specific circumstances especially when the outcome is likely to result in significant defeat of one party (Enterline & Balch-Lindsay 1999; Rothchild and Lake 1998; Carment & Rowlands 1998; Betts 1996). For example, Betts argues that intervention cannot hope to maintain impartiality even if the form of forceful intervention is limited in scope. According to Betts only instances where the outside power takes complete command of the situation and imposes a peace settlement will the intervention result in stability. More limited forms of intervention undertaken with the goal of impartiality may keep either belligerent from defeating the other, but will not stop the adversaries from waging war in an attempt to do so.\footnote{13} Betts calls for the recognition of the hard realities of international conflict management. First, the intervening force must recognize that to make peace is to decide who rules. The intervening force should have no illusions as to what the application of force will accomplish: victory for one faction over the other. Second, the intervener must avoid half-measures, because limited intervention will only create confusions within the belligerents' calculations for victory and create false hopes for victory, thereby increasing the level of violence. Third, Betts argues that one should not confuse peace with justice and that putting an end to the killing should be the intervener's first priority, not allocating justice within the conflict-ravaged society.\footnote{14}

Empirical support for this argument is provided by Enterline and Balch-Lindsay (1999). They conduct an empirical analysis of 74 civil conflicts between 1900 and 1992 Their results indicate

\footnote{13. Betts uses the examples of UN intervention in Bosnia, US intervention in Somalia, and US and UN intervention in Haiti to underscore his argument. He argues that impartial intervention can work in more limited instances - such as the ceasefire mediation between Iran and Iraq and the political receivership of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia - but that these instances prove only that impartiality works best where intervention is needed least, where wars have “burned out” and the fighting factions need only the good offices of mediators to end the fighting formally.}

\footnote{14. In contrast, Luttwak (1999) argues that intervention, and especially peacekeeping, disallows for the possibility of a decisive conclusion, or the true exhaustion of the parties to the dispute, which would allow them to seek a sincere agreement for a denouement.}
that third parties have virtually no significant impact on conflict duration in cases of a negotiated settlement. However third parties do play a decisive role in those conflicts that are brought to a conclusion through military victory by one of the belligerents. The authors define competing risks as those factors that parties to a conflict calculate as influencing whether the conclusion of their conflict is best addressed through negotiated settlement, military victory or mediation.  

Carment and Rowlands (1998) argue that forceful measures are appropriate under a pre-specified set of conditions and are most likely to succeed only when the conflict is salient to the outside party. Less forceful measures are likely to prevent continued fighting only when the belligerents' expected gains are low. To support this argument they develop a game-theoretic model for evaluating peacekeeping strategies in intrastate conflicts. They base their model on four variables: the mission's intensity, the salience of the conflict to the intervener, the capabilities of the belligerent, and the belligerent's expected gains from continued fighting. The authors characterize intervention as a calculation of third party interests and the willingness of belligerents to continue fighting.

15. Enterline and Balch-Lindsay maintain that this calculation shifts and changes throughout the course of a conflict, depending on a number of factors that affect the strategic environment, perceptions of the actors involved, tactical considerations, and so on. The authors attempt to model the belligerents changing perceptions of the state of the conflict through time using a pseudo-real time analysis. They perform this analysis through the application of models to the 74 conflicts studied, taking into account conflict duration, levels of third party involvement at various stages in each conflict, the nature of that involvement (balanced support vs. support for one side or the other), and what they term 'the Cold War factor' - which is premised on the assumption that, in times of high international tensions, military victories should be more easily reached than negotiated settlements in civil conflicts.

16. It is possible for the third party to begin an intervention in one of three ways. The first is to remain aloof from the conflict without any military involvement. The tasks here include mediation, fact finding, preventive diplomacy and sanctions. The second strategy commits troops to a low intensity conventional peacekeeping mission. The final strategy is to engage in forceful intervention requiring substantial and favorable military capabilities.

17. Carment and Rowlands conclude that intensive initial interventions are more likely to result in cooperative outcomes. They also claim that their model identifies when low-intensity interventions can generate desirable solutions - namely in the case of highly salient conflicts with weak combatants and high gains. The Carment/Rowlands model also shows that intensive interventions will not always work, especially when third party credibility is low; and the model demonstrates scenarios in which it is better to let the conflict run its course rather than intervening.
In a similar vein, Rothchild and Lake (1998) argue that forceful intervention has two primary effects. First, like Krain, they believe it alters the internal balance of power. This can be useful in equalizing forces and in creating a hurting stalemate in which neither side can be victorious, thereby encouraging a negotiated settlement. Second it can also lead to situations wherein the intervention emboldens the weaker party to the conflict, encouraging it to increase its demands and thus prolong the conflict. Accordingly, Rothchild and Lake argue that pressure must be exerted on both sides to moderate their demands.

Finally, Luttwak weighs in against intervention in any form (Luttwak, 1999). He makes an argument counter to Krain (1999) and Rothchild and Lake (1998) that intervention, and especially peacekeeping, disallows for the possibility of a decisive conclusion, or the true exhaustion of the parties to the dispute, which would allow them to seek a sincere agreement for a denouement.18

The general conclusion that can be taken from these analyses is twofold. On the one hand, both the mediation and peacekeeping literature question the assumption that interveners must be perceived and act as impartial parties. Under certain circumstances, such as genocide, failed peace accords or prolonged conflict, the intervener should not be discredited when seeking to bring about a specific outcome. This finding is reinforced by Zartman and Touval (1996) and Watkins and Winter (1997) who argue that an intervener may be more effective in achieving a stable short-term outcome when the third-party has a vested interest in a specific outcome that may favor one side over another.19

18. This is somewhat supported by an assessment by ICG (1999b): "The sad lesson from Bosnia is that reconciliation between former foes cannot be expected for years. The war produced no clear result, unlike in 1945, to allow for some form of de-nazification and a completely fresh start".

19. Others have also argued in favour of a biased approach to intervention. Ruggie (1994) suggests that outside forces should gradually escalate in order to dissuade, deny and deter an ascendant force. Citing evidence from Bosnia he argues that the conflict would have ended more quickly had force been used decisively earlier on. Stedman (1997) draws similar conclusions from his focus on spoilers in a peace process. Harvey (1998) suggests that the use of force is appropriate when coupled with basic tenets of deterrence, such as when signals to use force are credible and the third party shows
On the other hand, while it may be accurate to assume that third parties have the ability to impose costs through more biased interventions, it remains unclear whether they will want to or have to impose high costs in all instances and whether these efforts will succeed. Our review indicates that there may be instances where biased interventions lead to escalation and there may be instances where de-escalation is the result. Further, the literature is ambivalent on specifying the conditions in which forceful interventions will lead to increased stability. This is a significant weakness in our view because intervention imposes significant long and short-term costs on both the intervener and the belligerents. Failed interventions also have implications for future interventions. Biased efforts that result in failure may result in future challenges at a later stage of the conflict. Finally, none of the studies reviewed here compare the effects of a biased intervention against those instances where no intervention took place (as suggested by Luttwak). The non-intervention benchmark is a preliminary but important step in drawing valid conclusions regarding the likelihood of escalation and the presumed impact of a biased intervention. Indeed most analyses that are critical of a biased intervention fail to specify what the outcome would have been if the combatants engaged one another unfettered by third party influence.

In order to address these concerns, we identify outcomes first in the absence of third party intervention then outcomes based on a biased intervention. The four propositions derived from the model are then applied against the evidence taken from Kosovo before and during NATO's bombing campaign.

Regan (1996) uses game theoretic insights in which incentives and disincentives are used to alter the belligerents' expected utility, namely the benefits accrued from using force. For Zartman and Touval (1996) power is the basis for this process. Power translates into leverage in the form of persuasion, extraction (producing a favourable outcome for each party); termination (the ability to withdraw from a negotiation); deprivation (the ability to affect a hurting stalemate by withholding resources from one side or shift them to another); and gratification (the ability to add resources to the outcome). They emphasize that interveners make as much of a calculation based on interest in deciding to mediate as is the case for adversarial parties when deciding to engage in war.
A MODEL OF BIAS

The model used to investigate the effects of bias in intervention is based on Rowlands and Carment (1998), which in turn draws on the work of Becker (1983), Wolfson (1992) and Hirshleifer (1988, 1995). The model first examines the behavior of two combatants in the absence of a third party intervener.

There are two groups, \( A \) and \( B \), that compete for resources within a jurisdiction. These resources (\( R \)) can represent land or other physical goods that can be used in combination with labor effort to enhance the welfare, and security, of the group. Each group is also endowed with a given quantity of labor \( (L_A, L_B) \) which they divide between productive effort and fighting \( (P_A, F_A \) and \( P_B, F_B) \). Thus \( P_A + F_A \leq L_A \), and while formally these variables are measured as units of effort available in a given time period, they can be thought of as being directly related to the population sizes of the groups.

The intervener, however, can also affect the division of resources by exerting some level of effort in such a way as to benefit one group at the expense of the other. The relative fighting effort of the two groups, along with the intervener’s effort, is a key determinant of the division of \( R \). For example, group \( A \) receives resources in the amount of \( R_A = r_A(F_A, F_B, I, R, z) \), where \( z \) is a random variable and \( E(R_A) = R_A(F_A, F_B, I, R) \), where \( E \) is the expectations operator. It is sensible to assume that \( E(R_A) \) increases at a diminishing rate as \( A \) increases its fighting effort, and decreases at a diminishing rate as \( B \) increases its fighting effort. \( R_A \) is also assumed to increase with changes in

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20. Before we accept the abstraction of third parties and ethnic groups as rational unitary actors we must satisfactorily specify the objectives of their decision makers. Arrow’s theorem suggests that although states unified under a multilateral coalition and members of an ethnic group may act as if they are unitary decision makers, they may also act incoherently in the sense of not revealing a complete set of transitive preferences. It may be impossible to argue that any collection of persons or states is acting as if they were pursuing an identifiable goal. Nevertheless we assume that in our model they act as if they share readily discernible goals. For the third party the primary goal is the cessation of violence with minimum costs.
total resources $R$. These intuitively appealing assumptions can be denoted formally by the following conditions:

$$R_A / F_A 0, \quad R_A / F_A^2 < 0, \quad R_B / F_B 0, \quad R_B / F_B^2 > 0, \quad R_A / R > 0.$$  

Furthermore, if the intervener is biased against group A and in favor of group B, then the resources available to A will decline and those available to B will increase. As the intervener’s efforts increase, the resource shift increases as well, but at a declining rate. These properties can be represented as:

$$R_A / I \#0, \quad R_A / F > 0, \quad R_B / I \exists 0, \quad R_B / F < 0$$

The income generated from production by group $A$ is denoted $Y_A$, and the simple function used here to determine it is the product of productive effort and resources, $Y_A = P_A R_A F_A, F_B, R, I, z$. Hence the expected income for group $A$ is, $E(Y_A) = P_A R_A F_A, F_B, I, R \equiv E_A$. The variance of group $A$'s income is given by the function $Var(Y_A) = V(F_A, F_B, I)$ and is denoted $V_A$. In this paper, the variance is not examined directly.

The production function described here is standard in the sense that it maps different combinations of resources and productive effort onto a set of outputs for a given period of time. It is also worth recalling that the resource division function is based on the actual amount of fighting effort, not the proportion of total labor effort so engaged. This allows for a more direct consideration of how absolute combat capabilities affect the outcome of the conflict. In these cases the larger side could commit a relatively smaller proportion of its labor force to fighting and still be superior to its opponent in terms of combat capability.

21. As indicated, the case of the intervener affecting the variance is discussed in detail in Rowlands & Carment (1998).
To simplify the analysis, each group is presumed to have a mean-variance utility function. For example, group A's utility function has the form:

\[ U_A = U(E_A, V_A) / U(P_A, R_A(F_A, F_B, I, R), V(F_A, F_B, I)). \]

The utility function is assumed to have the following properties. First of all, \( \partial U / \partial E_i \geq 0 \) and \( \partial^2 U / \partial E_i^2 \leq 0 \); the utility level of group \( i \) rises at a decreasing rate as the expected value of its income increases. The sign of the derivative \( \partial U / \partial V_i \) determines group \( i \)'s attitudes towards risk. When \( \partial U / \partial V_i \) is zero, the group is risk-neutral, when it is positive the group is risk-loving, and when negative the group is risk-averse. Finally, the utility function is assumed to be smooth and continuously twice differentiable.

Initially the model is solved for the case where there is no intervention, which essentially provides the counterfactual against which intervention can be compared. The problem for each group is to decide how to divide its limited labor endowment between productive effort and fighting. The assumption of traditional Cournot behavior, in conjunction with standard optimizing methods, generates the necessary behavioral requirements for an optimum.22 The optimizing condition for group A, in terms of the group's level of fighting, is given by:

\[ (L_A - F_A) \frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} \frac{\partial R_A}{\partial F_A} = 0 \]

Equation 2 essentially defines the reaction function for group A, and a similar equation can be generated for group B. Unfortunately these reaction functions cannot be solved explicitly for group A's choice of fighting effort \( F_A \), nor is a general analytic solution possible for the Nash equilibrium

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22. The Cournot assumption simply requires the two groups to optimize simultaneously, or on the assumption that the behavioral choice of their rival does not change. The use of the Cournot (or Cournot-Nash) assumption is standard (for examples see Becker 1983 or Hirshleifer 1995). The optimizing technique used here is the standard Lagrangean approach in which the first order conditions are found and simultaneously solved for the Lagrangean equation \( U - m(L - P \cdot F) \). In the equation the value of the Lagrange multiplier \( m \) represents the marginal value of labor to the group.
level of fighting effort for the two groups. However it is possible to derive some general results regarding the slope of the reaction function.

For example, it is possible to determine how each group would react to a change in the level of fighting effort by its rival by examining the slope of the reaction function. Implicitly differentiating equation 2 yields the following:

\[
\frac{\partial F_A}{\partial F_B} = \frac{(L_A^* - F_A) \frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} \frac{\partial^2 R_A}{\partial F_B^2} \frac{\partial R_A}{\partial F_B} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial V_A} \frac{\partial^2 V_A}{\partial F_B^2}}{(L_A^* - F_A) \frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} + 2 \frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} \frac{\partial^2 R_A}{\partial F_B \partial F_A} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial V_A} \frac{\partial^2 V_A}{\partial F_A^2}}
\]

The denominator in equation 3 is negative from the second order condition for the optimization problem for group A. Hence the sign of equation 3, the slope of the reaction function for group A, is given by the sign of the numerator. Unfortunately, the sign of the numerator is not clearly determinate.

To simplify the discussion, first assume the combatants are risk-neutral, \( \frac{\partial U}{\partial V_A} = 0 \), thereby removing the third term from the numerator. Furthermore, the second term is unambiguously negative given our previous assumptions. It can also be shown that, since \( L_A^* F_A \geq 0 \), and \( \frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} \geq 0 \), the first term in the numerator will have the sign of \( \frac{\partial^2 R_A}{\partial F_B \partial F_A} \). The assumption that this term is positive (negative) implies that as group B’s fighting effort increases, the return to group A for increasing its level of fighting rises (falls). There is no strong intuitive argument for assuming either sign for this term.23 When \( \frac{\partial^2 R_A}{\partial F_A \partial F_B} \geq 0 \) (and the combatant is risk-neutral) then the slope of the reaction curve is unambiguously positive. When it is negative, the slope of the reaction curve depends on the relative magnitudes of the first and second term in the numerator. Hence it is not possible to

23. It turns out that even for intuitively appealing functional forms, the ambiguity of the sign of \( \frac{\partial^2 R_A}{\partial F_A \partial F_B} \) remains. For example, using the functional forms in Hirshleifer (1995) yields the result that the comparable derivative depends on whether \( F_A \) is larger or smaller than \( F_B \), i.e., on whether the force for group A is catching up to, or pulling away from, the level of force of group B.
determine the slope of the reaction curve analytically, an indeterminacy that is made even more complex when we relax the assumption of risk neutrality.

In order to proceed, we will assume that the slopes of the reaction curves are positive, and are shaped in such a way as to ensure a stable equilibrium. There are two justifications for these assumptions. First, third-party intervention is most likely to occur in situations that resemble this case. When the levels of violence are either extreme or unstable, it will be both less likely and more difficult to introduce outside intervention forces into the conflict zone. Secondly, other models in this genre have pursued similar approaches, and some have provided strong justifications for these assumptions. For example, while Becker (1983) essentially assumes that the reaction functions are upward sloping and generate a stable equilibrium, Hirshleifer (1995) actually generates the results numerically. Hirshleifer's model, which is the most closely related to the one developed here, derives the conditions assumed above by simulating the model for a variety of parameter values. Given the similarity of the model and the robustness of the results, Hirshleifer's analysis provides strong support for invoking the simplifying assumptions. Therefore the analysis presented here will focus on the more standard case, though Rowlands and Carment (1998) discuss other possible shapes for the reaction curves.

The model thus generates reaction curves for the model as shown in Figure 1. The fighting effort of combatant B is shown on the horizontal axis and the corresponding fighting level of A appears on the vertical axis. Note that the stability requirement is that the reaction curve for group B intersects the reaction curve for group A from below.

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24. The diagram is essentially the same as Figure 3 in Hirshleifer (1995) and Figure 1 in Becker (1983).
Since the reaction functions are upward sloping, we get the intuitively appealing result that when one group chooses a higher level of fighting effort, the other reacts with increased fighting effort as well. Following Hirshleifer (1995), the reaction curves are portrayed as convex, and result in an interior equilibrium level of fighting that the third party intervener will confront. The intersection of the curves determines the Nash equilibrium levels of fighting effort by the two groups. For example, if RCA and RCB are the two reaction curves under consideration, then \( F_A^0 \) and \( F_B^0 \) are the consequent levels of fighting chosen by A and B respectively.

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25. The existence of an interior equilibrium cannot be demonstrated \textit{a priori} because the sign of \( \frac{\partial^2 F_A}{\partial F_A \partial F_B} \) cannot be signed analytically nor by simple intuition, as the computation includes third-order cross-partial derivatives. Similarly the intercept cannot be determined from equation 2. Since interior equilibria correspond to the situations in which intervention has practical relevance, we again defer to the simulation results in Hirshleifer (1995) and reserve further analysis of the other cases for future research.
The Effects of Biased Intervention

Interveners frequently seek to alter the resource distribution that would result if the combatants were left to their own violent devices. This model allows us to examine the consequences of such behavior from a theoretical perspective. The presumption is that the intervener allocates its efforts in such a way as to favor one group relative to the other.

The effect of bias can be determined by implicitly differentiating equation 2 with respect to the intervener's effort, \( I \). The result is equation 4, which presents a simple expression for the effect on \( A \)'s choice of fighting effort:

\[
\frac{\partial F_A}{\partial I} = -\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} \frac{\partial^2 R_A}{\partial F_A \partial I} (L_A - F_A) - \frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} \frac{\partial R_A}{\partial I} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial V_A} \frac{\partial^2 V_A}{\partial I^2}}{(L_A - F_A)^2 \frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} \frac{\partial^3 R_A}{\partial F_A^3} - 2 \frac{\partial U}{\partial E_A} \frac{\partial R_A}{\partial F_A} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial V_A} \frac{\partial^3 V_A}{\partial F_A^3}}
\]

The denominator on the right hand side of equation 4 is the second-order condition for the optimizing problem for group \( A \), and must thus be negative. Therefore the sign of \( \frac{\partial F_A}{\partial I} \) is simply the sign of the numerator on the right hand side of equation 4. This term, however, cannot be signed without additional assumptions being specified.

The assumption of risk neutrality again allows us to ignore the third term of the numerator by setting it equal to zero. The second term is unambiguously negative if \( A \) is the combatant against whom the intervener is biased, and it is positive if \( A \) is favored by the intervener. While \( \frac{MU}{ME_A} \) and \( (L_A - F_A) \) are both clearly positive, it remains difficult to sign the first term of the numerator, since the sign of the cross partial derivative has not been specified.

Some general direction can be acquired by considering the intuitive interpretation of the different terms in the numerator. While this will not permit an explicit numerical solution to the
problem, it will provide insight into the conditions that are more likely to be associated with one sign or the other. Of the terms in the numerator, the most difficult to interpret is that of the cross partial term $M^2R_A/ MF_A\,MI$. For this term to be positive, in the case when the intervention is favorable to group A, the marginal increase in resources acquired by A when it increases its own fighting effort is higher for higher levels of intervention. When might this be the case? If the intervener were essentially augmenting the forces of group A without adding or detracting from it in any meaningful way, then the intervention would be serving essentially as an addition to group A's forces. According to our original assumption of concavity ($M^2R_A/ MF_A^2 < 0$), however, this would lead to lower marginal gains in resources, so $M^2R_A/ MF_A\,MI < 0$. Such a result would occur if the insertion of favorable intervener forces also acted as a restraint on the activities of group A, either by preventing them from adopting certain tactics or restraining their capacity to effectively utilize the resources that they come to control. Alternatively, if the favorable intervention added a new military dimension to A's forces, allowing them to be far more effective, then $M^2R_A/ MF_A\,MI > 0$. For instance, the provision of military intelligence, an armored component, or the neutralization of key segments of the opposing force's military advantage, would be consistent with this result.

For disadvantageous interventions, we can engage in the same exercise. When would $M^2R_A/ MF_A\,MI$ be positive or negative when the intervening force favored the opponent of A? In this case the term would be positive if the intervener in some way restrained its favored combatant from resisting group A. The more likely scenario is that $M^2R_A/ MF_A\,MI < 0$, where the intervener has acted as a supplement to, or complemented in a significant manner, the ability of group A's opponent. It would generally be expected that if the intervener opposed group A and favored group B, then $M^2R_A/ MF_A\,MI$ and $M^2R_B/ MF_B\,MI$ would tend to have opposite signs according to the degree of
complementarity the intervener provided to its ally. For lower levels of complementarity, however, it is conceivable that these two cross partial terms could have that same sign, though the magnitudes would likely be small. When we examine the policy implications of the model, this issue will be discussed further.

With this heuristic interpretation of the term \( M^3R_A / MF_A M_I \) it is possible to proceed by suggesting ways in which the various combinations of the terms in the numerator are likely to affect the sign of \( MF_A / M_I \) in expression 4. There are four cases worth noting, which we state as propositions. As the expression can be signed definitively in only two of these cases, and since the magnitudes of response cannot be provided in absolute terms, we also provide sub propositions to assist the identification of responses.

**Proposition 1**: When the intervention is favorable but does not add new qualitative dimensions to the capacity of the favored combatant (or acts as a restraint on the favored combatant), the response of the favored combatant to the intervention will be to unambiguously reduce its own fighting effort.

**Proposition 1a**: In the above circumstances, the reduction in fighting effort will be larger the more restraint the intervener imposes on the combatant, the lower the original fighting effort, and the more resources that the intervener can acquire for the combatant as a consequence of their own independent efforts.

**Discussion**: The heuristic discussion indicates that under these circumstances \( M^3R_A / MF_A M_I < 0 \). Since \((L_A - F_A)\) is unambiguously positive, the first term will be negative, and larger in magnitude the smaller the fighting effort. Finally, when the intervention is favorable, \( MR_A / M_I \) is positive by definition, and since it is preceded by a negative sign, the larger the resources that can be acquired by A as a direct consequence of the intervention, the greater the reduction in its own efforts.
Proposition 2. When the intervention is favorable and adds important military resources that complement the military assets of the favored combatant, the response of the favored combatant to the intervention will be ambiguous.

Proposition 2a. In the conditions of proposition 2, the favored combatant will be more likely to increase its fighting effort when the degree of complementarity between the intervener and the combatant is high, when its original fighting effort is low, and the fewer resources that the combatant acquires as a consequence of the interveners direct and independent efforts.

Proposition 2b. In the conditions of proposition 2, the favored combatant will be more likely to reduce its fighting effort when the degree of complementarity between the intervener and the combatant is lower, when its original fighting effort is higher, and the more resources that the combatant acquires as a consequence of the interveners direct and independent efforts.

Discussion. The heuristic discussion indicates that under these circumstances $\frac{MR_A}{MI} > 0$. Since $(L_A - F_A)$ is positive, the product of these two terms will be positive. Further, this positive term will be large in magnitude, suggesting an increase in fighting effort, the smaller the fighting effort and the greater the degree of complementarity. Finally, when the intervention is favorable, $\frac{MR_A}{MI}$ is positive by definition, and since it is preceded by a negative sign, will at least partially offset the previous positive term. Hence the overall effect is ambiguous. The larger the resources that can be acquired by A as a direct consequence of the intervention, the greater the reduction in its own efforts, and the more likely that an overall reduction in fighting effort will be observed.

Proposition 3. When the intervention is unfavorable but does not add significant and complementary capacity to the favored combatant (or acts as a restraint on the favored combatant), the response of the unfavoured combatant to the intervention will be to unambiguously increase its own fighting effort.
**Proposition 3a.** In the above circumstances, the increase in fighting effort will be larger the more restraint the intervener imposes on its ally, the lower the original fighting effort of the unfavoured intervener, and the more resources that the intervener can remove from the combatant as a consequence of its intervention.

**Discussion.** The heuristic discussion indicates that under these circumstances $M R_A / M F_A M I > 0$. Since $(L_A - F_A)$ is unambiguously positive, the first term will be positive, and larger in magnitude the smaller the fighting effort. Finally, when the intervention is unfavorable, $M R_A / M I$ is negative by definition, and since it is preceded by a negative sign, the entire term will be positive. Further, the larger the resources that group $A$ stands to lose to the intervener, the greater the increase in its fighting effort.

**Proposition 4.** When the intervention is unfavorable to a group and does contribute in a significant and complementary manner to the military capability of its opponent, the response of the unfavoured combatant to the intervention will be ambiguous.

**Proposition 4a.** With the conditions of proposition 4, the unfavoured combatant is more likely to increase its fighting effort when the intervener does not add significantly to the opposing force's military capability, its own initial fighting effort is already large, and the intervener poses a serious threat to its resources.

**Proposition 4b.** With the conditions of proposition 4, the favored combatant is more likely to increase its fighting effort when the intervener does add significantly to the opposing force's military capability, its own initial fighting effort is initially small, and the intervener does not pose a serious threat to its resources.

**Discussion.** In this case the first part of the expression is negative while the second term is positive, resulting in an ambiguous response. The first (negative) term will be more likely to dominate when it
is larger in magnitude, which occurs when the intervener adds substantially to its ally, and when the unfavoured group has a low level of fighting effort. The second (positive) term is more likely to dominate when the intervener is more capable of reducing the unfavoured group's access to resources.

Finally it is important to realize that these propositions must be combined to determine the effect of intervention on the actual equilibrium level of fighting chosen by the combatants. The propositions refer to the autonomous shift in each combatant's reaction curve, not to the ultimate Nash equilibrium choice of fighting effort. Noting first that a biased intervention into a conflict with two combatants must, by definition, favor one and harm the other, the propositions combine for four different scenarios. In each of these cases it is assumed that combatant A is harmed by the intervention, and combatant B assisted by it. 26

**Scenario 1:** Group A escalates and group B de-escalates in direct response to the intervention. As depicted by the reaction functions in figure 2a, this is the equilibrium result as well. It is important to note, however, that the equilibrium is itself ambiguous. If the increase in effort by group A is very large, while group B's response to the intervention is relatively small, then in equilibrium both sides may escalate their fighting effort. In this case B will escalate its overall combat level in response to A's escalation, even though its original reaction to the intervention is generally to reduce its fighting effort. Similarly, the smaller the reaction of combatant A and the larger B's reaction, the more likely the conflict will subside. The only outcome that cannot be observed is for B to escalate while A de-escalates.

When might this scenario occur? Consider a situation in which the intervener does not add significant forces in a complementary manner to group B, which combines propositions 1 and 3. The response of the two sides is unambiguous: the target group A increases its fighting effort, and

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26. While no formal welfare analysis is presented here, it is clear that biased intervention will raise the welfare of the group in whose favor the intervener wishes to alter the prevailing or likely equilibrium.
favored group B reduces its own fighting effort. Mutual escalation in this case is more likely when the following conditions apply: the presence of the intervener detracts from group B's own efforts to acquire resources from A, possibly by acting as a restraint on B; the initial equilibrium fighting efforts of both parties is relatively low, and when the intervener itself can cause a large shift in resources from A to B. This situation might be associated more closely with more balanced and relatively advanced combatants (assuming that the intervener is itself sophisticated) in a relatively minor dispute in which the intervention is relatively powerful. The intervention will provoke combatant B to decrease their fighting effort marginally, while combatant A increases theirs significantly.

A combination of the ambiguous propositions 2b and 4a could also generate this situation. Scenario 1 would emerge when there was relatively low levels of complementarity between the intervener and group B, high levels of fighting effort by both parties, and the capacity of the intervener to significantly shift resources from group A to group B. This type of conflict might be associated with a more violent confrontation between two combatants, with a strong intervention force that did not work closely with its favored group.

**Scenario 2**  Figure 2b illustrates an initial equilibrium where the shifting reaction curves signal joint escalation by the two groups. The unambiguous consequence is escalation in equilibrium as well. However this scenario is not a very likely one. Since it would emerge as a consequence of propositions 2a and 4a, there is a potentially contradictory requirement on the cross-partial derivative terms. Proposition 2a requires a high degree of complementarity between group B and the intervener, while proposition 4a is more likely when this degree of complementarity is low. Similarly, proposition b requires that group B receive little by way of resource transfers from the intervention directly, but proposition 4a requires that group A be subjected to large losses from the
intervention. This case could theoretically arise if, for example, the intervener provided B with substantial and complementary assistance in offence but restrained its defense, and if the intervener itself acquired control over A's resources without passing them along to group B.

**Scenario 3**: The response to the intervention in this scenario is the opposite of that in scenario 1: B escalates and A de-escalates. The combination of proposition 2a and 4b would generate this result. As in scenario 1, the ultimate Nash equilibrium could have joint escalation, joint de-escalation, or B escalating while A de-escalates. Only the combination of B de-escalating and A escalating cannot occur under this scenario. Diagram 2c depicts one possible Nash equilibrium for this scenario.

The combination of propositions 2a and 4b is conceivable. Both are more likely when there is a high degree of complementarity between the intervener and group B, and when the resource acquisition by B, and loss by A, are relatively small as a direct consequence of the intervention. The scenario is also most likely to occur when the initial fighting effort of both groups is initially low. A scenario in which a sophisticated intervention occurs on behalf of a militarily weak group in a low-intensity conflict would seem to fit this scenario best, especially if there was little likelihood for resource transfers between the groups either because of stalemate or the limited geographical nature of the conflict.

**Scenario 4**: As depicted in figure 2d, the initial equilibrium is one of mutual de-escalation. This scenario could emerge as a combination of propositions 2b and 4b. There is again the potential for contradiction here, however, which makes the likelihood of this scenario less likely. Proposition 2b requires low complementarity between the intervener and group B, and a significant transfer of resources to group B because of the intervention. Proposition 4b is more likely when there is high complementarity between B and the intervener deprives group A of few resources.
FIGURE 2a: Scenario 1

FIGURE 2b: Scenario 2
Therefore this relatively simple model is capable of generating several propositions, and associated scenarios, that are potentially testable against the case evidence. In the next section we examine one such case to determine how well the model performs.
**EVIDENCE FROM KOSOVO**

**Case Description**

During the crisis in Bosnia, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed as a small radical group in late 1992 and early 1993. At the time it was mostly composed of a small number of Kosovar Albanians who were members of an activist radical leftist organization in the early 1980s, the LPK or Levizja Popullore e Kosoves (the Popular Movement). The LPK consistently claimed the only way towards Kosovo independence was through violence (Judah 1999b: 20). The support of Kosovars for the militants began to grow after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed without their participation (Troebst, 1999: 89). In 1997 the KLA received a large influx of weapons looted from the military arsenals of Albania, the government of which had collapsed.

The reaction to the KLA within Western governments was not initially favorable. On February 23, 1998 U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard stated that "the KLA is without any question a terrorist group", and denounced terrorist activity in Kosovo (Hedges, 1999: 36). This was taken as a sign by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as a signal that military action could be taken against the KLA without foreign opposition (Sebak 1998). Two weeks later Serb special police attacked Prekaz, a small village enclave of some well-known KLA fighters, decimating the town with antiaircraft cannons, and killing almost one hundred, including women and children who were not KLA fighters. This action in particular ignited the

27. It is at this point that the KLA began to grow from the small group of like-minded individuals. The Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova called for Albanians living abroad to send three percent of their earnings to the alternative 'governmental' structures he and the LPK had set up in Kosovo. Some chose to divert their share to the KLA's 'Homeland Calling' fund instead (Hedges, 1999: 31). Newspapers in the Albanian Diaspora began printing statements from KLA members, as well as their ads for donations, as the KLA's reputation slowly spread (Hedges, 1999: 31).
uprising, and a build-up of the KLA.\textsuperscript{28} As talks bogged down between Belgrade and an international community comprised primarily of NATO, the UN, and the OSCE, the KLA used the brokered cease-fire to "improve its training and command and control, as well as to acquire more and better weapons" (Tenet 1999).

By early October 6, 1998 speeches by U.S. President Clinton (USIA, October 8 1998) and the U.S. Under Secretary of Political Affairs, Ambassador Pickering, issued explicit warnings to FYR President Milosevic and the Belgrade government that NATO would use force to bring about an agreement that included significant autonomy for Kosovo (USIA, October 9 1998, USIA).

As a consequence, by mid-October 1998, KLA statements were identifying NATO as an ally, and suggested that their belief was that NATO also saw them that way. On October 17 the KLA issued a statement rejecting the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement achieved earlier that year, and "demanded that the UN and NATO force the withdrawal of Serb forces from all their positions" (BBC World News, Oct 18 1998). In November 1998, after recovering a fair amount of territory, the KLA announced its plans to set up a "civilian authority in those parts of the Serbian province under its control" (BBC World News, November 6, 1998).\textsuperscript{29} In interviews with the KLA Judah

\textsuperscript{28} While FRY forces claimed to have "destroyed the core" of the KLA at this time, more independent reports noted that the actions appeared to have "swelled their ranks beyond belief" (Sebak, 1998). A reporter who spent time with the KLA, Judah (1999a) noted that "following violent events in the Drenica region [in late winter/early spring 1998] the KLA suddenly found itself in command of an uprising". Others concurred: "no one disputes the fact that since the first Serbian operation against them in March, the KLA's influence has grown" (Lungescu, 1998). British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook was quoted as saying that Milosevic's tactics had backfired, leaving the KLA in control of more territory, with greater strength and more money. (Lungescu, 1998).

\textsuperscript{29} Funding to and support for the KLA from the Albanian Diaspora increased sharply following the massacre at Racak on January 15, 1999. The slayings were attributed to Serb security forces. By February, the CIA stated that "the KLA is a more formidable force than the Serbs faced last summer", estimating its ranks at several thousand KLA, plus many thousand 'irregulars' (Tenet 1999). The KLA had also grown in its political influence by February. The 'rebels' achieved an even stronger role on the ethnic Albanian negotiating team than originally envisaged and hoped for by the international mediators, who had made the suggestion of four seats for KLA representatives. They ended up sending five members to the peace talks (BBC World News, February 3 1999). They were in possession of automatic guns (approximately 30 000 according to some reports), sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank weapons (ICG, 1999a and Hedges 1999: 37, 39).
(1999a), concluded that "[the KLA] aims to make sure that NATO troops are brought in to enforce any deal, because their presence will mean that the Serbs will no longer be able to fight - and defeat them."

On 28 January 1999, in a rare statement directed at both sides in the conflict, NATO allies announced that they were ready to use force immediately unless both sides committed to talks in February. However U.S. Secretary of State Albright blamed only Milosevic for the delays: "The Kosovar Albanians have negotiated with discipline and a unity of purpose. Belgrade, in contrast, has taken every opportunity for evasion and delay. The Serb delegation bears the lion's share of responsibility for the difficulties we have experienced today" (USIA, 20 February 1999). 30 U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen stated that the purpose of NATO air strikes would be "to reduce the military assets posing the most immediate threat to the Kosovars" (USIA, 20 February 1999). 31 The bias in favor of the Kosovars becomes even more apparent from this point forward.

In late February, Milosevic's top general, General Nebojsa Pavkovic, made public pronouncements that not only threatened war, but explicitly stated that should NATO bomb Yugoslavia, he would move quickly and forcefully against the rebel army [the KLA], so that Yugoslavia could eliminate its internal enemies and prepare for external attack (Smith & Drozdiak 1999). NATO officials would later confirm that the Serb campaign inside Kosovo was done with

30. Upon successfully bringing the KLA on board in agreement to sign, it was thought that perhaps the Serbs would be less intransigent, and more willing to negotiate. Perhaps in this belief, it was claimed by Chris Hill, one of the Rambouillet mediators, that the negotiators would have accepted a force under "any suitable disguise" by this point (Judah, 1999b: 20). If this is true, at this time, in early March, NATO was sending (private) signals that were somewhat more flexible/conciliatory than they had been seen January. Milosevic, though, would not engage on the issue. In any case, by the 18 of March, and with the futile second talks of Rambouillet behind them, diplomatic efforts aimed at securing FRY acceptance of the deal were replaced by warnings to the FRY that NATO action was likely if they did not change their stance (Department of National Defence, 1999).

31. In support Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, also spoke of NATO air strikes in concrete, planned terms: "The European Allies will provide most of the troops. But U.S. involvement is crucial. It will demonstrate in the most concrete way the essential transatlantic unity of purpose without which we simply cannot solve problems like Bosnia and Kosovo" (USIA, 20 February 1999).
precision and speed (Smith and Drozdiak 1999). While the Serb authorities may have changed their strategy in response to what they expected from NATO, one observer suggested that the Serb forces started and kept up their campaign using methods as if they were only fighting out their issues with the KLA (Partos 1999).

By the beginning of April, the KLA already appeared to be marshalling its resources while waiting for NATO's air strikes to weaken Yugoslavia's military capacity (Partos, 1999). At the same time the KLA intensified its attacks on the FRY forces. In turn, both the military personnel and equipment Milosevic had trained on Kosovo -- nearly 27,000 troops inside the province and 15,000 on its border, as well as tanks and heavy artillery -- suggested something much larger than the annual spring clearing of rebel army units. "You don't need tanks to fight an insurgency," said a Western official. "They needed them to attack villages." (quoted in Smith and Drozdiak, 1999). With the start of the NATO bombing, and the outpouring of ethnic Albanian refugees, came indications of the methods being employed by the KLA. A KLA official for the north and east of Kosovo told a BBC reporter that they would like NATO to continue with the air strikes, hopefully send in ground troops, and at the very least supply the KLA with weapons and ammunition so "we could do it

32. Certainly, reports of the order in which Serb forces attacked and cleared areas and cities seem to indicate a decisive plan, and one aimed at clearing out the province of Kosovo. "Western officials now believe that the aim of attacking in the south and west [in mid-March] was to clear a path to the border for a mass expulsion. 'It was very intentionally done to drive large masses of Kosovars,' said a NATO official. Thus, the southern city of Decani was attacked before Pec; Pec was struck before Klina; and Klina was assaulted before the central Kosovo towns of Malisevo, Orlate and Likovac, among others" (Smith & Drozdiak, 1999). It is noted by Hedges (1999:25) that the Serbian ethnic cleansing and aggression in Kosovo seems to be of a different character than that which they undertook in Bosnia. In Kosovo, "it is to a large degree tactical, designed to deny the rebels succor from civilians and therefore aimed primarily at the inhabitants of KLA strongholds". In the Washington Post, Smith and Drozdiak similarly note that in many villages, paramilitary and Interior forces reportedly executed individuals or groups to create an instantaneous climate of terror that would hasten the evacuation of civilians. "Refugees describe these killings as methodical and deliberate, as if to set an example." Further, "Western officials said the mass urban expulsions were meant not only to empty cities of ethnic Albanians but also to provoke a humanitarian crisis that would overwhelm and distract NATO forces stationed on the other side of the border. They were pointed decisively towards Macedonia, in a very intentional way, like the old Westerns where they used to send a cattle stampede against the Indians," said a NATO official (Smith & Drozdiak, 1999).
ourselves” (BBC World News, March 31 1999). It is quite clear by this point that despite NATO's reluctance, the KLA has come to see NATO loosely as its air force.

After the signing of the Peace Agreement between KFOR and FRY in the Spring of 1999, KLA fighters quickly moved into the towns and cities left by the withdrawing Serbs, "[i]n a bid to establish authority ahead of the arrival of incoming NATO troops", and setting up administrative centers (ICG, 1999d). Essentially, it was acting to establish itself as a government, as it had indicated it would upon the implementation of a peace agreement, back in March. This was as much a notice to other political factions in Kosovo, such as Rugova's LDK, as it was to the FRY and NATO. KLA soldiers also took control of a border crossing into Albania, erecting an Albanian flag in replacement of a Yugoslav one. (ICG, 1999d). On June 20 1999, the KLA signed an arms-surrendering agreement with NATO because it "had a genuine interest in cooperating with NATO" as they could not have won their concessions against Serbia without NATO (ICG, 1999d).

**Testing the Model**

The Kosovo case offers several challenges for the model. There are eight elements of the model that need to be identified: the direction of bias, the degree of complementarity between NATO and the KLA, the fighting efforts of both of the two combatants relative to their potential military strength, the prospect of the intervener transferring resources from the Serbs and to the KLA, and the responses of both sides to the biased intervention.

By the time that NATO intervention actually occurred or became likely, the direction of bias was clear. The preceding narrative indicates that aside from a few efforts at the beginning to retain some balance, NATO and key officials in its member governments were making it clear that Serb
forces would be their target, and their goals were largely aligned with those of the KLA. Statements issued by both sides in the conflict clearly reflected this understanding.

The next condition that needs to be identified is the degree of complementarity between the intervention force and its favored group. The Kosovo case highlights the difficulty of the test despite the very apparent evidence. Theoretically, the sophisticated but almost exclusively aerial intervention of NATO would serve as a valuable complementary force for the largely irregular and lightly-armed infantry of the KLA. At the beginning of the intervention, however, the degree of coordination between the two forces was almost non-existent. By the end of the actual bombing, however, the degree of coordination improved noticeably. In fact, by the end, "NATO air strikes and KLA attacks had synergistic effects. KLA ground offensives drew Serbian forces out of hiding, greatly increasing the lethality of air strikes…As one U.S. Army general claimed, 'What you had, in effect, was the KLA acting as a surrogate ground force'" (Bymana and Waxman 2000: 29).

It is perhaps even more difficult to judge the initial fighting efforts of the two sides, though some observations can be made. In the months preceding the actual NATO intervention, FRY troops were engaged in an aggressive campaign to crush the KLA and maintain authority over Kosovo. Freedman (2000: 351) claims that the 1998 campaign by the Serbs had displaced over 200 thousand people in Kosovo, with troop strength over 22 thousand by year's end. These numbers grew to nearly 30 thousand by March, 1999. The presence of heavy armaments also suggests that FRY efforts were substantial. Posen (2000:53) claims that for the year preceding the air strikes, "the Serb security forces and the Serb army had tried to crush the KLA." Therefore it is sensible to conclude that the Serb fighting effort prior to the intervention is best categorized as "high" for the purposes of evaluating the model.
In contrast KLA forces were still fairly small, though growing. The 1998 campaign by Milosevic's troops in Kosovo had led to an increase in KLA support and strength, but operations were primarily limited to the southern parts of Kosovo (Freedman, 2000: 351). Posen (2000: 63) also suggests that the KLA's fighting capacity was initially fairly low. Although it is important not to confuse relative effort with actual fighting ability, in the absence of better data on the KLA forces it would appear that their effort is probably best described as comparatively low, at least initially.

Finally, the question of the intervention shifting resources away from the Serbs and towards the KLA is interesting. The air strikes could arguably deny control of Kosovo to the Serbs to a degree, but it could not in itself deliver Kosovo to the KLA in the absence of ground support. Therefore the direct transfers to the favored group, the KLA, should be characterized as positive but low, while the effect on the targeted FRY forces is probably moderately negative.

If we characterize the degree of intervener-ally complementarity as being initially low, then we have a combination of propositions 1 and 3 (Scenario 1), leading to the unambiguous expectation that the KLA would tend to de-escalate, while the Serbs would escalate. However most of the conditions that would reinforce the magnitude of the change seem to be missing, suggesting that the responses would not be overwhelming. The expectation would thus be a moderate escalation by the Serbs, with relatively little change in the initial KLA operations.

The later period is probably better characterized as having fairly high degrees of complementarity between the KLA and NATO. The reactions are ambiguous under these propositions. The KLA situation seems to be best captured by proposition 2a, however, due to the inability of NATO to transfer territory to the KLA itself without using ground troops, the low level of the KLA's initial effort, and the possibility of very substantial complementarity. The expectation would be for KLA escalation. The FRY analysis is more mixed. The high complementarity between
the NATO and KLA suggests proposition 4b, while the high fighting effort by FRY suggests proposition 4a. While NATO could not itself seize resources or territory on behalf of the KLA, it could deny them to FRY forces with a degree of efficacy. So the direct response of the FRY forces is difficult to pin down, although circumstances would likely lead to escalation again if only in reaction to the KLA's response. The situation sounds closest to scenario 2.

What was the response of the two sides to the intervention? On the Serb side, Posen (2000:53) states that "While NATO attacked Serbia, Serbia would attack the Kosovo Liberation Army." Freedman (2000: 352) is even more clear in suggesting that Serbia accelerated its campaign, arguing that the evidence is "reasonably conclusive. It is not the case that NATO air strikes prompted the campaign against the Kosovar Albanians. There is, however, no doubt that on 24 March it moved immediately to a new and unprecedented scale of ferocity." The evidence is that there was escalation by the Serbs throughout the campaign, but especially at the beginning, which is consistent with the model's expectations.

The KLA also stepped up at least their recruiting efforts following the initial NATO air strikes. The activity of the KLA was certainly more pronounced only towards the end of the campaign, however. Freedman (2000: 355) claims that the KLA met with growing success "in re-establishing themselves in Kosovo, with numbers put at up to 10,000 by the war's close". Posen (2000: 64) and Byman and Waxman (2000: 24) discuss the military importance of the KLA offensive that began in May, after the NATO air strikes had started. The evidence is again fairly clear that KLA military effort increased after the intervention, especially towards the end. This is also reasonably consistent with the outcomes of the model.

The model's predictions therefore appear to have some empirical support on the basis of this portrait of the Kosovo case. While a single case cannot provide concrete evidence of the
model's veracity, especially given the ambiguities that emerge in the predictions, it provides some assurance that this approach to analyzing conflict intervention has merit.

**Review of the Case and Model Performance**

A number of observations emerge from reviewing the Kosovo case in light of the model. These observations highlight the operational and strategic links between intervention and response that is missing from the stylized model, and identify some problems in interpreting the model in the context of an actual case. We turn first to the question of the impact of NATO's biased intervention on the escalation of the conflict. The question of potential escalation or intensification of the conflict cannot be answered solely in terms of the actual bombing of Kosovo but needs to be understood by the actions undertaken by the KLA and FRY prior to the bombing campaign as well. While the model makes reasonably specific predictions about some outcomes, the Kosovo case makes it clear that some issues of timing may be determined by military strategy or seemingly unrelated and idiosyncratic factors.³³

First, we find that third party (US and NATO) statements and action before the bombing phase served to bolster the KLA in a number of important ways—through tangible military growth, strengthened numbers and increased international legitimacy. For example, the KLA used the cease-fire obtained during the Rambouillet talks to increase their fighting capacity. They also used the cease-fire and the presence of international verifiers to reoccupy all the territory it lost in the

³³ In addition to the arguments presented towards this end in the last section, it is also possible to argue that the removal of the international observers, necessitated by the impending bombing, actually increased the likelihood of atrocities and ethnic cleansing. The bombing gave Milosevic a strong incentive to be in control of as much territory as possible before sitting down to talk about an end to bombing, especially if he took lessons from Dayton: many feel that it essentially rewarded ethnic cleansing. Knowing he would have to deal with NATO at some point gave Milosevic an incentive to scare ethnic Albanians from returning, and thus for employing the tactics he did.
previous year, and to keep up a continuous series of small-scale attacks against Serb Security Forces (Tenet 1999). The escalation itself brought about 11,000 recruits from other countries to be received in KLA training camps (ICG, 1999c estimates). The KLA also used the Rambouillet cease-fire to improve its training and command and control, as well as to acquire more and better weapons for these new recruits (Tenet 1999). By late 1999, many members of the KLA who had previous experience of political administration, most notably with the LPK, began to set up local administration structures, bolstering hopes that the KLA would quickly transform itself into a political party. (ICG, 1999d). These developments suggest that care must be used in attributing causality exclusively to bias, or that favorable bias must be interpreted more broadly to incorporate the improvements in the international environment that foreign actors may consciously or accidentally generate on behalf of a combatant.

Second, NATO bombing escalated but did not initiate the reactions of FRY authorities to the KLA "problem". Certainly, it contributed to the FRY offensive in Kosovo and the acceleration of refugee flows. Knowing he would have to deal with NATO at some point gave Milosevic an additional incentive to use fear to dissuade ethnic Albanians from returning even though these tasks were underway well before the bombing.

By March there was clearly a plan for the expulsion of Kosovars in place by FRY authorities, indicated by how their forces were situated, and their subsequent preciseness in clearing paths to the borders and speedily driving out ethnic Albanians. The implementation of this plan was not merely

34. As the Albanian Kosovars signalled their willingness to sign an agreement, and NATO and Belgrade continued their posturing over seemingly diametrically opposed views, support grew further in the Albanian Diaspora overseas. For example, in Yonkers, NY, rallies raised tens of millions of dollars (much higher that the amounts raised the year before). There were no attempts to curb such open fund-raising, and, in fact, many believed they had the tacit approval of Washington (Leyne, 1999). There were some new arms reaching Kosovo at this point, but they did "not change the military balance [with amassing Serb forces clearly outpowering the ethnic Albanians], but they did give the KLA leadership the self-confidence to play tough in the peace talks (Leyne, 1999). Just previous to the bombing the KLA was estimated to number from 7000 to 8000 people. (ICG, 1999d)
a spontaneous reaction of anger to the NATO bombing. The bombing gave Milosevic a strong incentive to be in control of as much territory as possible before sitting down to negotiate a settlement.

Analyzing the accelerated response of the FYR government to the threatened or actual presence of an unfavorable intervention is difficult. NATO air strikes have often been identified as a catalyst for the acceleration of the conflict, suggesting the effect of the intervention is discernible. But there is also evidence to suggest that the conflict may have been accelerating before the bombing began. Indeed, the forceful policy of the Belgrade government to suppress the Kosovar rebellion escalated in advance of the actual air strikes.35

Third, as the NATO bombings continued, the Serb forces become less strong in terms of the weaponry and capacities, and "if it were not for NATO's air strikes there is little doubt the KLA would have been largely eradicated" (Judah, 1999b: 23). In the case of a robust intervention such as the air campaign by NATO, it is important to distinguish between effort and capacity. In the extreme, if the intervention actually defeats a military force then it may be forced to de-escalate, regardless of what its intentions might actually have been.

35. While the model appears to perform well, some forethought is needed in its interpretation. Actual cases, as in Kosovo, make it clear that identifying fighting effort and responses to intervention are demanding due to different combatant capacities and strategic timetables that are partially related to intervention. A larger number of case studies will be needed to calibrate the model to distinguish between "weaker" and "stronger" efforts by combatants. Greater care will also be needed to take into account factors such as intervention strength and its effects on responses, as well as other military and political constraints that may drive the behaviour of combatants. Finally, three of the four scenarios identified in the model may lead to escalation, but in two of these cases one side escalates in a defensive response to their opponent, not directly because of the intervention. This ambiguity in the evaluation will also be difficult to overcome. As an initial test, however, the Kosovo case appears to be consistent with the model of biased intervention developed in this paper.
CONCLUSIONS

Is there a place for biased interventions in situations where a state fails or is weakened because political participation and opportunities become defined along narrow bands of ethnic sensibility? In a perfect world the best strategy would be to prevent tensions from leading to violence in the first place. However, on occasion it may be necessary for international forces to intervene directly in an ethnic conflict as peace enforcers and such interventions will undoubtedly favor one side over another. On occasion, early and judicious use of force may be necessary, while impartiality may be both impossible and undesirable. This paper set out to evaluate a model of conflict and investigate how intervener bias may affect the behavior of combatants, and to develop clear propositions about behavioral responses. These responses are contingent on the direction of bias and the choice of fighting effort. Although the evidence from the Kosovo case supports the model, several caveats seem warranted.

First, astute leaders aware that increased tensions may lead to outside involvement and subsequent escalation might prefer a low intensity campaign effective enough to accomplish specific objectives, without attracting outside attention. Jonathan Fox (1995) noted that the Serbian-dominated government seems to have calculated that as long as they kept their efforts below the level of ethnic cleansing, the world will focus on ending violence in Bosnia and tolerate repression in Kosovo. This point is similarly argued by Shalom (1999), who suggests that as long as Milosevic could oppress the Albanian minority without creating large refugee flows that might destabilize the region, Washington was uninterested in the Kosovo issue. When these refugee flows could no longer be ignored, he argues, Kosovo became a symbol of a test of wills between NATO and Milosevic.
Second, the nature of the intervention may be critical. Instruments that either replace or supplement forceful interventions may play a role in bringing about a de-escalation of violence, but actions such as sanctions or embargoes and war crimes tribunals appear relatively ineffective. This model does not speak to the type of intervention, but where along a continuum of actions an intervener chooses to operate may well be critical in determining success.

Finally, of the four scenarios identified in the model, only one was characterized by a unambiguous de-escalation, and this scenario itself seemed an unlikely occurrence. As long as a biased intervention leads one combatant to wish to escalate, the other may be forced to do likewise as a defensive measure. While this result suggests that care is needed in interpreting the model, it may also be true that the choice of biased intervention also needs to be done with care.

If biased intervention does lead to escalation, it does not necessarily mean that bias is an inappropriate component of modern peacekeeping. It may simply be necessary to recognize that such an intervention is unlikely to be cheap, or that it is unlikely to lead to immediate de-escalation. Instead, a predictive capacity based on theory and careful empirical work may simply provide the forewarning by which the interveners may be forearmed. Such work will be difficult; the model in this paper clearly demonstrates some of the theoretical and empirical challenges that quickly emerge. Rather than capitulate in the face of these difficulties, however, we believe that further research may help to answer some of the puzzles identified in this paper. If successful, such an endeavor would go a long way in the reconstruction of the principles upon which to base third-party intervention.
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