When Gen. Eric Shinseki, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, testified in February 2003 that an occupation of Iraq would require “something on the order of several hundred thousand troops,” officials within George W. Bush’s administration promptly disagreed. Within two days, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared, “It’s not logical to me that it would take as many forces following the conflict as it would to win the war”; Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz characterized Shinseki’s estimate as “wildly off the mark.” More than a year after the occupation of Iraq began, the debate continues over the requirements and prospects for long-term success. History, however, does not bode well for this occupation. Despite the relatively successful military occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II, careful examination indicates that unusual geopolitical circumstances were the keys to success in those two cases, and historically military occupations fail more often than they succeed.

Why do some military occupations succeed whereas others fail? Although the occupation of Iraq has prompted a slew of analyses on op-ed pages, there is almost no academic literature answering this question. The most relevant studies choose “nation building” as their primary subject of interest and focus

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on liberal democracy and successful economies as key objectives. Nation building, however, is not the central goal of occupations, and, further, not all occupations aim to build nations. Rather, the primary objective of military occupation is to secure the interests of the occupying power and prevent the occupied territory from becoming a source of instability. When creating certain political or economic systems, such as liberal democracy or an open economy, has been the goal of an occupying power, it has been so because it was thought that democracy and open markets would further the occupying power’s security goals. Security objectives and nation-building objectives sometimes coexist within occupations, but conflating occupation success with the establishment of liberal democracy and functioning economies is misguided. This study recognizes the different goals of military occupation and includes occupations with objectives other than nation building.

Further, in these studies of nation building, the logic of case selection is usually not explicitly presented. Discussions of the current occupation of Iraq often either turn to the relatively successful cases of post–World War II Germany and Japan or randomly select a subset of occupations to examine, but a valid study of occupations must examine both successes and failures. I present a data set of twenty-four military occupations since the Napoleonic Wars, which allows for a more systematic examination of the causes of occupation success and failure.

Finally, many studies of nation building offer interesting and provocative arguments, but they stop short of answering the most important questions. For example, a recent RAND study concludes that successful nation building requires a lengthy time commitment, normally at least five years, but that study does not ask what conditions are conducive to occupiers making the costly commitment to a lengthy occupation and to occupied populations accepting the extended presence of a foreign power. I explain why some occupations last long enough to succeed whereas others end prematurely and why some occupations, such as the U.S. occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the early twentieth century, fail despite their protracted nature.

The crux of my argument is that military occupations usually succeed only if

they are lengthy, but lengthy occupations elicit nationalist reactions that im-
pede success. Further, lengthy occupation produces anxiety in impatient occu-
pying powers that would rather withdraw than stay. To succeed, therefore,
occupiers must both maintain their own interest in a long occupation and con-
vince an occupied population to accept extended control by a foreign power.
More often than not, occupiers either fail to achieve those goals, or they
achieve them only at a high cost.

Three factors, however, can make a successful occupation possible. The first
factor is a recognition by the occupied population of the need for occupation.
Thus, occupation is more likely to succeed in societies that have been deci-
mated by war and require help in rebuilding. The second factor is the percep-
tion by the occupying power and the occupied population of a common threat
to the occupied territory. If the survival of the occupied country is threatened,
then the occupying power will want to protect a country that it has already in-
vested resources in and considers geopolitically significant, and the occupied
population will value the protection offered to it. The third factor involves
credibility. Occupation is likely to generate less opposition when the occupy-
ing power makes a credible guarantee that it will withdraw and return control
to an indigenous government in a timely manner. When these three conditions
are present, occupying powers will face less resistance both in the occupied
territory and at home; they will be given more time to accomplish their occu-
pation goals, and, therefore, will be more likely to succeed. Absent these three
conditions, occupying powers will face the dilemma of either evacuating pre-
maturely and increasing the probability that later reintervention will be neces-
sary or sustaining the occupation at an unacceptable cost.

My conclusions with regard to the contemporary occupation of Iraq are not
sanguine. Whereas war-weary Germans and Japanese recognized the need for
an occupation to help them rebuild, a significant portion of the Iraqi people
have never welcomed the U.S.-led occupation as necessary. Further, the com-
mon analogy between the occupations of Germany and Japan and the occupa-
tion of Iraq usually undervalues the central role that the Soviet threat played in
allowing those occupations to succeed. Whereas Germans, Japanese, and
Americans mostly agreed on the compelling nature of the Soviet threat, there is
no similar threat that will enable Iraqis and the U.S.-led coalition to coalesce
around common occupation goals. Finally, the Bush administration has had
difficulty convincing significant segments of the Iraqi population that it in-
tends to return control to a truly independent, indigenous government that
will represent their interests, not those of the United States.

The article has four sections. First, I define the concept of military occupa-
tion, identify the relevant universe of cases, and establish metrics for success and failure. Second, I present my explanation for occupation success and failure. Third, I explain the dilemma that failing occupying powers face. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the argument for the current occupation of Iraq and future potential occupations.

**Defining Concepts and the Universe of Cases**

Occupation is the temporary control of a territory by another state that claims no right to permanent sovereign control over that territory. An occupying power must intend at the onset of the occupation to vacate the occupied territory and return control to an indigenous government. A precise date for evacuation need not be specified, but the occupying power’s intention must not be to stay indefinitely.

The intended temporary duration of occupation distinguishes it from both annexation and colonialism. Annexation denotes the permanent acquisition and incorporation of territory into the annexing state’s homeland. Colonialism may end at some point, but this intention may not be clear at the onset of a colonial mission. Although colonial powers may insist that they are on a civilizing mission to foster the eventual independence of a colonized territory, they are frequently willing to stay indefinitely to achieve these goals. This distinction is what makes successful occupation so difficult: in an occupation, both sides—the occupying power and the occupied population—feel pressure to end an occupation quickly, but creating enough stability for the occupation to end is a great challenge. Occupations are also distinct from short-term interventions in which the occupying power exerts little political control over the territory in which it has intervened. Thus, I do not consider the U.S. interven-
tions in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, or Haiti in 1994 to be occupations.

I also exclude two other types of occupations from this analysis. First, wartime occupations straddle the line between military occupation and annexation. Although German control of France during World War II is usually referred to as an occupation, this was only apparent once Germany had been defeated. Germany intended on maintaining control of France, not simply occupying it temporarily. For similar reasons, I do not include the Japanese occupation of much of Southeast Asia before and during World War II. Second, United Nations occupations are excluded because they do not pose the same challenge as a territory being occupied by a military conqueror. The presence of the United Nations is often welcomed by the occupied population, and the multilateral nature of the occupation reduces pressure on occupying powers to end their costly occupation.

Occupations differ in the extent of their ambitions. Although there are at least four different types of occupations, I am concerned with the two most common types: security occupations and comprehensive occupations.

Security occupations seek to prevent the occupied country from becoming a threat to the occupying power or other states and to ensure that the occupied territory does not become a destabilizing influence in its region. They refrain, however, from remaking the political or economic system of the occupied country. For example, the Allied occupation of the Rhineland following World War I was primarily intended to prevent the reemergence of a powerful Germany.

Although France initially advocated Rheinish independence, none of


12. The two other types of occupations are collateral occupations and caretaker occupations. Collateral occupations hold foreign territory until some indemnity is repaid. For example, following the Franco-Prussian War, 50,000 German troops occupied six departments of France until the French paid 1.5 billion francs in war reparations. Caretaker occupations are designed to hold a territory until a long-term settlement of the status of the territory is devised. The British occupations of Cyrenaica, Eritrea, Somalia, and Tripolotania after World War II are examples of caretaker occupations. I exclude these two types from this study because they are qualitatively different from either security or comprehensive occupations. For a more detailed typology that delineates seventeen different forms of occupation, see Adam Roberts, “What Is a Military Occupation?” British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 55, (1984), pp. 249–305.

the occupying powers ultimately hoped to install a particular government in
the Rhineland.

Comprehensive occupations also seek primarily to secure the interests of the
occupying power and to ensure long-term stability, but they are distinct from
security occupations in that they also aim to create a certain political system
and a productive economy. Thus, comprehensive occupations are closer to na-
tion building. The U.S. occupation of Japan and the four-power occupation of
Germany after World War II are the best-known examples of comprehensive
occupation. Importantly, reconstruction is often valued precisely because it
serves the primary security objective. Even though great powers may claim
that they seek to install governments of a certain ideology such as democracy,
their primary goal is to install regimes that do not threaten their interests re-
gardless of their ideology. The oft-cited post–World War II cases of Japan and
Germany demonstrate how reconstructed industrial economies are sought by
occupying powers largely because they are geopolitically valuable.14 Security
goals and reconstruction goals often feed each other. Installing a regime of a
certain ideology or economic system can further security goals, and providing
security may, in fact, make it easier to install a regime of a certain type.

In both security and comprehensive occupations, an occupying power ide-
ally not only prevents the occupied territory from becoming a threat to its in-
terests but also befriends the postoccupation state for the long term. Thus, the
post–World War II U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan are viewed as suc-
cesses, in large part, because of the remarkable transformation of these coun-
tries from bitter adversaries to reliable allies.15

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14. In the initial aftermath of World War II, the inclination was to limit the industrial power of
both Japan and Germany. Once the Cold War had begun, the United States reversed its position
and encouraged industrialization. On the Cold War impetus to rebuild the Japanese economy, see
John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999),
p. 525–546. On U.S. policy toward postwar Germany, see Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The
American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold
War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 385–386; and Marc Trachtenberg, A Con-
sity Press, 1999).

15. In both of these occupations, a primary concern was preventing Germany and Japan from
reemerging as threats to their regions. On Germany, see John Gimbel, The American Occupation of
Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy (New York: Continuum,
2002), p. 203. Ultimately, the Japanese constitution included the famous article 9, which strictly
limits the purposes for which Japan can have a military.
Arguably, security and comprehensive occupations warrant independent studies to identify causes of success or failure. By including both types of occupations in this study, however, it is possible to examine whether occupations become more or less difficult as they become more ambitious. The objectives of security and comprehensive occupations lie on a continuum from less to more ambitious. One might expect that less ambitious security occupations will succeed more often than more ambitious comprehensive occupations. This hypothesis has important implications: if true, it suggests that occupying powers should consider limiting their occupation goals, rather than pursuing ambitious comprehensive occupation. Alternatively, if comprehensive occupations succeed more often, it suggests that rebuilding economic and political systems may be useful for securing the interests of an occupying power after the occupation concludes.

CASE SELECTION
Cases for this study were identified both by looking at the aftermath of each war since 1815 listed in the Correlates of War data set and by reviewing the historical record for other cases of occupation that may not have followed war.\textsuperscript{16} To distinguish occupations from colonialism or annexations, I examined the ex ante intentions of the occupying power. Did it plan to return sovereignty to the occupied population in relatively short order, was it planning to stay for a longer duration, or did it have no particular goals for when it would withdraw?\textsuperscript{17} I also distinguished occupations from simple intervention by looking

\textsuperscript{16} The Correlates of War data set is available online at http://cow2.la.psu.edu.

\textsuperscript{17} As always, there are some borderline cases. For example, I include the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, though the presence of the United States in the Philippines might be considered colonialism by some. U.S. leaders intensely debated whether or not to annex the Philippines after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Following the conflict with Filipino insurgents shortly after the occupation began, the United States became increasingly reluctant to stay in the Philippines. By 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt observed, “The Philippine Islands form our heel of Achilles.” Quoted in E. Berkeley Tompkins, \textit{Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970).

On the other hand, I have excluded the French mandates in Syria and Lebanon immediately after World War I. In these cases, the evidence suggests that the French viewed their presence in the Middle East as more permanent than temporary. Summarizing the League of Nations mandates in the Middle East, David Fromkin concludes, “But France, in particular, regarded the pledge of independence as window-dressing, and approached Syria and Lebanon in an annexationist spirit.” Fromkin, \textit{A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East} (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), p. 411.

I also have excluded the cases of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II. In these cases, the Soviet Union retained a considerable amount of control over the states of the Warsaw Pact throughout the Cold War. If one were to code these cases as occupations, it would be difficult to identify when, aside from 1989, these occupations ended.
at both how long the intervening power remained in the foreign territory and how much control it seized while it was there.

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SUCCESS AND FAILURE
Coding a military occupation as a “success” or a “failure” is difficult for four reasons. First, in reality, success is a continuous, not a dichotomous, variable. Most occupations achieve outcomes that contain elements of success and failure.

Second, occupiers usually do not withdraw unless they have created a degree of stability so that they can safely evacuate and claim some success. For this reason, the achievements of occupying powers must be considered relative to the cost of the occupation. Otherwise, overly optimistic conclusions about occupation success and failure might be reached.

The cost of an occupation is composed of both direct and indirect costs. The direct costs include the financial costs of the troops that must be deployed to keep the peace in the occupied territory and the occupation administration that must be established. Additionally, any lives lost as a result of resistance to the occupation are a direct cost. The indirect costs of an occupation are more difficult to measure. They include the opportunity cost of the occupation. An ongoing occupation may preclude an occupying power from pursuing other national interests.

Indirect costs also include any rivalry that might be generated with a third party as a result of the occupation. As an example, although the U.S. occupation in the Philippines had the benefit of providing the United States with a base of operations in the Pacific, it also carried the cost of rivalry with Japan. To be successful, an occupation must accomplish enough of its initial goals to justify these costs.

Third, the goals of an occupying power may shift in the course of an occupation, making it difficult to rely on ex ante intentions ultimately to judge whether an occupation has succeeded or failed. Occupying powers should be given some credit for achieving lesser goals even if they did not achieve the ambitious goals that they initially sought.


Fourth, it is difficult to know at what point an occupation has succeeded or failed. Short-term stability is not sufficient for occupation success; instead, to be considered a success, an occupation must ensure the security of an occupying power’s interests well after the occupation concludes.

Success or failure, then, is measured by looking at the long-term balance of successes and failures within an occupation relative to the cost of the occupation. The historical record indicates that military occupation is almost always a costly endeavor, lasting several years and requiring thousands of troops. The critical question then is, how often do occupations accomplish enough to justify their costs? An occupation may cost a lot, but, if it accomplishes equally as much, then it can be considered a success. Although the occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II were time consuming and costly, few would argue that the stakes did not warrant these costs. Most troubling is an occupation that costs a lot but does not accomplish its goals. Conversely, if an occupation costs little and accomplishes little, then it may be a failure, but it is not a costly failure. Finally, the ideal, but rare, occupation costs little but accomplishes a great deal.

In Appendix 1, I evaluate the historical record of military occupations. I present the initial goals of the occupation as well as successes and failures of each occupation. Finally, I reach a summary judgment of whether each occupation should be considered a success, a failure, or a mixed outcome. These judgments are made by examining the balance of successes and failures in the occupation as well as the cost. As rough indicators of cost, I present the duration of the occupation as well as an approximate number of troops involved in it. One should be careful not to read too much into the summary judgments, but the results, at the most general level, are suggestive of the historical pattern of success and failure in military occupations.

Of the twenty-four cases in Appendix 1, seven were predominately successes (29 percent), four were a mix of successes and failures (17 percent), and thirteen were predominately failures (54 percent). Importantly, though, six of the seven successes coincided with the end of World War II and the beginning

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20. For more detail on the coding of each case, see the appendix on the author’s website at: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/dme7.
21. Measuring the troops involved in an occupation is difficult. The number of troops tends to shift, sometimes dramatically, through the course of an occupation. In addition, troop levels are a direct cost; simple measures of indirect costs are impossible.
22. While inherently subjective, these codings are, I believe, fairly robust. That is, disagreements on a few of the marginal cases would not substantially change the conclusions of this study.
23. The four ongoing cases in Table 1—Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq—are not included in the twenty-four.
of the Cold War. Only the case of the allied occupation of France after the Na-
poleonic Wars was successful in another time period. The results are also re-
vealing if they are broken down in terms of type of occupation. Although nine
of the seventeen comprehensive occupations either succeeded fully or had
mixed success, only one of the seven less ambitious security occupations
achieved long-term success, and one had mixed success. These results at least
suggest that occupations may be more successful as they become more
ambitious.

Success and Failure in Military Occupations

Foreign military occupation is incongruous with the goals of a national group
to govern itself, yet the goals of military occupation cannot be accomplished in
a short period of time. To take just one example, the successful occupation of
Japan after World War II lasted almost seven years and involved an initial oc-
cupation force of 450,000 troops. Although security occupations have more
limited goals, they too take time to stabilize an occupied country and convince
a potential postoccupation government not to threaten the interests of the oc-
cupying power in the long term. The longer an occupation persists, however,
the more impatient the occupied population is likely to become. Even a small,
nationalistic minority population can be enough to frustrate an occupying
power and raise the costs for that occupying power to an unacceptable level.

The fundamental challenges of occupation, therefore, are to convince an oc-
cupied population not to resist the occupation and to grant the occupying
power time to accomplish the difficult tasks of occupation. The challenges are
only accomplished by overcoming the perception that the occupying power is
a military conqueror, convincing the occupied population that the occupation
will improve their lives, and assuring them that they will regain sovereignty
relatively soon. Put differently, an occupying power must win the hearts and
minds of the occupied population. Hearts and minds can be won with both co-
ercive strategies, such as arresting citizens loyal to the preoccupation regime,
and cooperative strategies, such as promises of aid. A successfully imple-
mented hearts-and-minds strategy both minimizes the chances that an oc-
cupied territory will again become a threat after the occupation is complete and,
in cases of comprehensive occupation, makes it easier for an occupying power
to install a stable and sustainable government.

From the perspective of the occupying power, lengthy and costly occupa-
tions that show little progress become unwelcome burdens. Great powers of-
ten take on the obligations of occupation not because they want to, but because
military victory dictates that they have to. Unless their national interests are centrally at stake and an occupation appears to be making progress toward securing those interests, great powers will be anxious to evacuate the occupied territory.

Establishing law and order, supplying basic staples, and refraining from the abuse of occupied populations are initial necessary steps toward winning hearts and minds. Such steps signal that the occupying power is dedicated to rebuilding the occupied territory, not just plundering it for valuable resources. But resources are a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for occupation success. Claiming that resources are key to occupation success begs the critical questions of under what circumstances will great powers provide these resources, and what else might be necessary to convince an occupied population to douse its nationalist instincts in deference to an occupying power? Three factors can contribute to the successful winning of hearts and minds: the occupied population’s need for help in rebuilding after a conflict, the presence of a commonly perceived threat to the occupied territory, and credible guarantees that the occupying power will withdraw and allow an independent, indigenous government to take power.

THE NECESSITY OF OCCUPATION
Occupations are more likely to succeed when they follow a destructive military victory that has eviscerated prewar political, economic, and social institutions. Such a victory increases the likelihood of success for two reasons. First, destructive military victory demonstrates that the pre-occupation regime can no longer deliver vital needs to the population, and thereby reduces the number of loyalists to that regime. Starting from a clean slate with no lingering elements of the pre-occupation regime, the occupying power is more likely to be able to convince the occupied population that the future under and after an occupation will be better than the bitter wartime past. Once the occupation begins, strategies to eliminate the influence of the pre-occupation regime, such as denazification in post–World War II Germany, can clear the way for a successful occupation.


Second, if an occupied territory has been destroyed by war, then the population is more likely to accept the occupation as a necessary evil. Without the occupying power’s help, the country may never be able to rebuild. The population’s need for help in rebuilding is critical to understanding why the United States had considerable success in winning the hearts and minds of the Japanese population immediately after World War II, but largely failed to gain the support of Koreans liberated from decades of Japanese rule at the same time. While Japan was a downtrodden, defeated power in need of reconstruction, Korea had been liberated from decades of Japanese colonial rule, was relatively unscathed by World War II, and yearned for independence.

The occupation of Germany after World War I reveals another occupied territory and population that had been destroyed by war and welcomed, rather than rejected, occupying forces. The official U.S. history of the Rhineland occupation observes, “The occupation of the Rhineland offers one of the few instances in history in which a war has ended by an invasion in which the bulk of the hatred and resentment was on the side of the conquering armies.” Historian Keith Nelson confirms that the U.S. occupation force had “come expecting to find open hatred, but there seemed to be none. They had anticipated meeting a spirit of nationalism, but such feelings apparently had vanished.”

For both moral and strategic reasons, occupying powers are also more likely to sustain the occupation of a country that they have devastated in war. From a moral perspective, an occupying power may feel a responsibility to help rebuild a country it has destroyed. From a strategic perspective, without helping to rebuild, the occupied territory may soon again become a source of instability.

There are two important qualifications to the argument that the need for help in rebuilding fosters occupation success. First, in some instances, occupying powers might be able to garner the support of the occupied population by co-opting, rather than destroying, wartime institutions. For example, the U.S.

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27. U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918–1920, pp. 18–19.

decision to retain the emperor as the symbolic leader of Japan after World War II helped to reduce opposition from the Japanese population.  

Second, occupations are more likely to succeed if the occupied territory needs assistance in reconstruction, but also has the indigenous resources to support its reconstruction. If the occupied territory has these resources, then the cost of occupation is reduced for the occupying power and a lengthy occupation becomes more palatable. The post–World War II comprehensive occupations of Germany and Japan were made easier by the existing level of modernization in those countries.

Appendix 2 presents the twenty-four cases of military occupation as well as the three critical factors that I claim explain occupation success and failure. Figure 1 summarizes the results with regard to whether the population of the occupied territory recognized the need for an occupation. Eleven of the thirteen occupations where reconstruction assistance was not needed failed. Of the seven cases where help was wanted, five were successes. One implication of this argument is clear: pre-occupation military strategy—that is, creating an environment in which occupation assistance is needed—is critical to establishing a context conducive to occupation success.

COMMONLY PERCEIVED THREAT

The second critical variable for explaining occupation success or failure is whether or not the security of the occupied territory is threatened. When an occupied territory faces a threat, then the occupied population is likely to welcome the protection offered by the occupying power. The population will suppress its nationalist instincts in exchange for protection. As a consequence, threat buys the occupying power time to achieve its goals. At the same time, an occupying power will be willing to invest time and resources in protecting the security of an occupied territory that it views as geopolitically significant.

The occupying power and the occupied population must agree on the nature of the threat. Otherwise, either the occupying power will not maintain its com-


mitment or the occupied population will reject the occupation. For example, while the British attributed great geopolitical significance to Egypt and feared the consequences of French control of the Suez Canal, the Egyptians themselves wished to be independent of any European occupiers.\(^{31}\)

The effect that a threat has on the prospects for occupation success depends on whether the threat emanates from a neighboring state (or states) or whether the threat is posed by divisive groups within the occupied territory. When an occupied territory faces a commonly agreed upon external threat, an occupation is more likely to succeed. As long as an occupied territory is considered geopolitically significant, external threat guarantees the commitment of an occupying power to occupation success. Great powers are motivated in their occupations primarily by concerns about protecting their national security, rather than high-minded ideals such as democracy. The U.S. occupations of Germany, Japan, Italy, South Korea, and Austria after World War II best demonstrate the motivation that external threat can provide to occupation.\(^{32}\) In these cases, the


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**Figure 1. Occupational Help Needed and Military Occupation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation help needed</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ideally one would perform chi-squared tests to identify the significances of the results in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Given the small number of expected cases in each cell, however, a chi-squared test is inappropriate.*
looming Soviet threat guaranteed that the United States would commit substantial resources to those occupations. By contrast, the failed U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 demonstrates how an occupation can fail when the occupied territory is geopolitically insignificant and faces few external threats. Although the occupation of Haiti was initially premised on a potential threat from Germany, the United States withdrew in 1934 when it was clear that no geopolitical threat warranted a continuing U.S. presence and the situation in Haiti appeared to be deteriorating rather than improving.  

External threat also makes the occupation more palatable to an occupied population. If the occupying power provides vital security to the occupied territory, the citizens will welcome the occupier. John McCloy, the U.S. military governor in West Germany from 1949 until 1952, recalls, “Another element [in the occupation] was the spur which we always had at this stage—the fear of the Soviet Union, the fear of the Russians. . . . [In] a way, we could do no wrong because the importance of showing ourselves in Berlin was so apparent to the Berlin population that it was almost a delight to go up to Berlin where we could do no wrong, while down in the zone we were apt to be criticized.” Although the Americans were embraced in Berlin where the Soviet threat was most acute, they were less welcome away from Berlin where the threat was more remote.

In postwar Japan, even though conservative Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was skeptical of the democratic reforms that the U.S. proconsuls were implementing, he recognized the value of U.S. protection against the Soviet threat. As Yoshida relates in his memoirs, “The native Communists are not strong enough to [bring off a coup d’état], but had Soviet forces been permitted to enter Hokkaido, there can be no doubt that Hokkaido would today have been another East Germany or North Korea, and Japan would have been divided. . . . For preventing this, if for nothing else, the Japanese people have abundant reason to be grateful to General [Douglas] MacArthur [the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan].”  

As anxious as Yoshida was to see the Ameri-

can occupation end, the commonly perceived Soviet threat helped to ensure that the occupation would continue with little opposition from the Japanese.

In contrast to a commonly perceived external threat, an internal threat is more likely to act as a centrifugal force, undermining an occupation. Occupation will succeed when there is an internal threat only if different groups see value in keeping the occupied territory together under the protection of the occupying power, and if the occupying power perceives that allowing the occupied territory to balkanize would threaten its own security. If these two conditions are not met, then at least portions of the occupied population are unlikely to value the security guarantee offered by the occupying power, and the occupying power is unlikely to have the staying power to see the occupation through to a successful conclusion.

A similar logic applies when the occupied territory faces both internal and external threats. When an ethnically heterogeneous occupied territory is surrounded by one or more irredentist states, then the ethnic groups associated with them may conclude that they would rather be annexed by the irredentist states than remain within the occupied territory. For example, in the de facto occupation of multiethnic Bosnia, the danger of Serbian and Croatian irredentism has been a constant threat. The possibility of differing viewpoints among the population within an occupied territory complicates this threat variable. Whereas some elements of the occupied population may agree with the occupying power about the nature of an external threat to an occupied territory, others may question whether the occupying power itself might not, in fact, be the most dangerous threat that they face. Similarly, some internal groups may value the occupation as protection against other ethnic or religious groups, but others will view the occupation as an impediment to the achievement of their goals. In the case of the U.S. occupation of southern Korea after World War II, the American-supported Korean elite shared Washington’s views of the danger posed by the Soviet Union for reasons that were partly genuine and partly instrumental, motivated by a historical evidence suggests that Joseph Stalin had abandoned Japan to the United States and was focusing his efforts on controlling Central and Eastern Europe. See John Dower, *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays* (New York: New Press, 1993), pp. 163–164.

desire to retain U.S. support. The Korean public, on the other hand, was more skeptical of both the United States and the conservative government it supported. Few of the various southern Korean political parties saw the U.S. military occupation and protection from a supposed Soviet threat as the pathway to independence.

For each case in the data set, I examined the historical record to see whether the occupied territory faced a commonly perceived external threat, an internal threat to its coherence, or no threat. The results are presented in Appendix 2 and Figure 2. In only seven cases, all of which coincided with the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, was there a commonly perceived external threat. As expected, occupations achieved full success in six of those cases and mixed success in one. In the eleven cases where the occupied state faced no commonly perceived external threat to its survival, the occupations succeeded in only one case, had mixed success in two, and failed in eight. Six occupations were threatened internally, and as predicted, five of those six occupations failed. The combination of internal and external threats is prominent in some contemporary cases, including Bosnia and Iraq. Although it is too early to code these cases as either successes or failures, my argument leads to the prediction that these types of occupations are more likely to fail.

CREDIBLE GUARANTEES

Occupiers can ease the process of occupation and lower costs by offering credible guarantees of their intentions to withdraw from the occupied territory in a timely manner. Occupied populations may recognize the necessity of an occupation, but they also want to know that they will regain their sovereignty relatively soon. Credible guarantees of independent, indigenous rule reduce the likelihood of costly resistance from the occupied population and may minimize domestic opposition to the occupation, and thereby make a long and successful occupation possible. Although an occupying power may genuinely

39. I code the South Korea case as having a commonly perceived external threat because many political leaders shared the U.S. assessment of the communist threat, but the occupation only partially succeeded because of popular resistance to it. Only after the Korean War was the U.S.–South Korean alliance cemented.
40. Precisely defining “timely” is unfortunately impossible. How anxious an occupied population is to see an occupying power depart varies from case to case.
intend to withdraw, credibly committing to this intention can be difficult. There are four possible ways in which an occupying power might signal these intentions.

**Set a deadline for withdrawal.** First, an occupying power could set a deadline by which time it would withdraw. Setting a deadline presumably signals to a population that it will be allowed to govern its own country after a certain date. Deadlines, however, are usually either incredible or counterproductive.41 A deadline for withdrawal is only credible if the occupying power faces some significant cost for violating the deadline. Except for possible domestic audience costs, an occupying power that is in firm control of an occupied territory may not face any penalties for violating a self-imposed deadline.

If a deadline is credible, then it is likely to be counterproductive. That is, a deadline provides an incentive to dissatisfied groups to bide their time until the occupying power withdraws. For example, the multinational deployment of an implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia following the 1995 Dayton accords was a de facto occupation. According to the Dayton agreement, IFOR was to withdraw only twelve months after its deployment. As Jane Sharp reports, however, “Far from building confidence, this schedule discouraged reconciliation and simply encouraged former enemies to prepare for the next battle.”42 The hearts and minds of the Bosnian people remained loyal to various ethnic groups rather than a unified Bosnian nation.

**Figure 2. Threat and Military Occupation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation outcome</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Internal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ADOPT INDIRECT RULE. Second, occupying states could empower occupied citizens within the occupation administration. Indirect rule, such as the United States practiced in Japan, the Western powers implemented in Austria, and the British utilized in Egypt, employs citizens of the occupied territory to fill vital roles in the occupation administration. In Japan, unfamiliarity with the Japanese language and culture forced the United States to rely heavily on preexisting political, bureaucratic, and social structures. Elsewhere, most notably in the U.S. sector of occupied Germany after World War II, direct occupation rule was adopted. Through the process of denazification, Germans who had been associated with the Nazi Party were to be removed from any significant political office and replaced by Americans until a cadre of qualified, denazified Germans could be trained to govern.

Intuitively, one might expect that indirect rule is more likely to aid in the winning of hearts and minds, but, in reality, both styles of administration are likely to lead to mixed results. By incorporating local populations into the occupation administration, indirect rule makes occupied citizens more confident that they will indeed control their own futures. Evelyn Baring, who later became Lord Cromer, British consul general in Egypt from 1883 until 1907, believed that indirect rule was more likely to lead to long-term success. Baring argued “that it was rather a good thing to see what the Egyptians will do alone in one branch of Government, at all events, and moreover, education and religion are so mixed up together that I did not think it wise to press for Christian management.” The downside of indirect rule is that the government may appear as a lackey of the occupying power. The U.S. occupation of Haiti demonstrates that indirect rule may lack local legitimacy if the ruling leaders are seen as mere puppets of the occupying power.

44. It is worth noting, though, that the process of denazification was abandoned by 1949, when the emergence of the Cold War and the urgency to rebuild Germany dictated that denazification was no longer feasible. See Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past, trans. Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
46. The illegitimacy of elections held in Haiti was clear even to Marine Col. Smedley Butler, one of the high-ranking U.S. officers administering the U.S. occupation. Describing marine-sponsored elections in June 1918, Butler observed, “The opposition candidates were declared bandits when it became necessary to elect our man to office. Our candidates always win. In one election nobody liked the fellow...the district was canvassed, and 400 were found who would vote for the proper
Direct rule also has advantages and disadvantages. It enables occupiers to avoid having to rely on local civilians of questionable loyalty to implement their reforms. Further, direct rule may, in its own way, contribute to the winning of hearts and minds by signaling to an occupied population that the occupying power is sincerely committed to the rehabilitation of the occupied territory and that it is not using indirect rule as a way of avoiding the obligations of occupation. The drawback of direct rule, however, is that it makes it even more difficult for an occupying power to demonstrate that it is not a colonial power and that it intends to withdraw from the occupied territory.

The empirical record of indirect versus direct rule is as mixed as the deductive logic. For example, the indirect rule of the occupation of Japan had some success in winning hearts and minds, but so did the direct rule of the occupation of post–World War II Germany. Ultimately, both logic and evidence suggest that the choice between direct and indirect rule is not critical to generating credibility about future intentions.

**MAKE WITHDRAWAL CONTINGENT ON BEHAVIOR.** The third method of convincing an occupied population that it will soon regain sovereignty is more promising. Occupying powers are more likely to succeed at winning hearts and minds when they gradually return governance to the occupied population without imposing deadlines. The relinquishment of occupation control, however, must be made contingent on the continuing cooperation of the occupied population. By not guaranteeing withdrawal at any certain date, occupiers can avoid the counterproductive effect of deadlines, but by offering increased control, the occupying power can generate cooperative behavior.

During the Allied occupation of Italy after the Italian surrender in 1943, the Allies adopted such a gradualist approach. As Allied control of Italy moved north, the Allies granted increased control of southern Italy to local citizens. Not only did this approach relieve the burden of occupation for the Allies, it also offered a credible signal to both northern Italians and other potentially occupied territories that the Allies were sincere in their intention to restore self-government. Gen. Julius Holmes, the liaison between the Allied Forces Headquarters and the military government of Italy, summarized the benefits of such a policy, “I personally believe that we can make some political capital out

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candidate. Notice of the opening of the polls was given five minutes beforehand, the 400 voters were assembled in a line and when they had voted, in about two hours, the polls were closed.” Butler, quoted in “The Hate of Haiti,” *Literary Digest*, December 21, 1929, pp. 6–7. Quoted in Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*, p. 99.
of the transfer of occupied areas to Italian jurisdiction, by telling the world that we install military government only where it is necessary for military operations and that, as soon as conditions permit, we hand the territory to the appropriate civil authorities.” The “conditions” to which Holmes referred included cooperation in the defascitization of Italian society and the absence of resistance to advancing Allied troops. Without imposing deadlines on the occupation, the Allied policy provided a mechanism for credibly indicating that self-governance was available to Italians as long as the occupied population was cooperative.

A strategy of contingent withdrawal requires a balance between returning sovereignty to the occupied population and retaining sufficient control over the direction of the occupied territory. Thus, in Japan, the United States retained the emperor and established a new constitution shortly after the occupation began as a way of communicating its intent to withdraw and return control to an independent Japanese government; in Germany, the United States credibly signaled its intention to permit self-government by allowing the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, three years before the occupation formally ended. At the same time, the United States also insisted on maintaining significant control over the emerging Japanese and German states, and particularly their military and foreign policies.

Although more promising than the previously mentioned strategies, a strategy of contingent withdrawal is still difficult to implement because of the trust required for this strategy to succeed. In the aftermath of conflict, both the occupying power and the occupied population must believe that their counterparts will abide by their promises. If not, a strategy of contingent withdrawal will collapse.

“MULTILATERALIZE” THE OCCUPATION. Finally, advocates of multilateral occupation provide two reasons why multilateralism enhances the prospects for occupation success. The first reason is that multilateralism makes an occupation normatively legitimate in the eyes of both other states and the occupied population. Not only will other states not question a legitimate, multilateral occupation, but an occupied population is also less likely to resist an occupation that is perceived as legitimate. If an occupation is viewed as illegitimate,

47. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–1945, p. 75.
48. “Multilateral” occupations have the participation of more than one occupying power and/or the imprimatur of a multilateral organization, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations.
then it makes it more difficult for the occupying power to achieve its goals. whereas neighboring states and an occupied population are unlikely to welcome the presence of an unhindered great power occupier, they may see value in a multilateral occupation committed to rebuilding a war-torn society.

Great powers supposedly gain legitimacy for their occupations both by having a justifiable reason for occupying another country and by inviting other organizations and countries to join in administering the occupation. these two methods for generating legitimacy reinforce each other: occupations driven by a legitimate objective are more likely to be multilateral, and multilateral occupations are more likely to be viewed as legitimate.

Historian John Dower forwards this normative legitimacy argument by comparing the post–World War II occupation of Japan with the current U.S. occupation of Iraq. Dower contends that other states in East Asia, the broader international community, and the occupied population viewed the U.S. occupation of Japan as legitimate, easing the process of occupation. Although the occupation of Japan was essentially unilateral, it was viewed as legitimate because Japan had clearly been the aggressor in World War II and was in dire need of political, economic, and social reconstruction. In this context, few challenged the legitimacy of the U.S. occupation, and the U.S. occupiers faced little resistance from other states or the Japanese population. In contrast, Dower contends, the current U.S. occupation of Iraq is viewed by many as illegitimate. To appear legitimate, Dower argues, the United States must pursue the occupation of Iraq more multilaterally.

The argument that the United States must act multilaterally in the Iraqi occupation to reclaim legitimacy is widespread. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin have both emphasized the need to include the United Nations in operations in Iraq for reasons of legitimacy. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman quotes United Na-

51. On Blair, see Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush Sees Aid Role of U.N. as Limited in Rebuilding
tions Secretary-General Kofi Annan as saying, “Other nations are prepared to help, but they do not want to join what is perceived as an American ‘occupation.’ If the forces in Iraq are put under a U.N. mandate, they can still be commanded by an American, like in Bosnia, but it will be perceived differently and provide the legitimacy for others to join.” Even U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has acknowledged that UN involvement is needed in Iraq to provide “international legitimacy.”

The legitimacy benefits of multilateralism are, however, frequently overstated. According to the argument, countries and occupied populations examine occupations ex ante and conclude whether the occupation is consistent with accepted norms of state behavior. In reality, governments and populations are far more pragmatic in their consideration of legitimacy. If the occupation makes other states more secure and improves the lives of the occupied population, then other countries and the occupied population are likely to view the occupation as “legitimate” regardless of any ex ante normative considerations. Nothing provides legitimacy to an occupation more than the provision of security. Conversely, even if neighboring states and the occupied population believe ex ante that an occupation is normatively legitimate, that perception is unlikely to endure through an ill-managed occupation that fails to provide security and stability. Japan’s neighbors certainly did welcome the U.S. occupation, but they did so because the occupation ensured that Japanese militarism would finally be put under control and those states would be secure, not because the occupation accorded with accepted international norms.

A second, more compelling argument contends that multilateralism is valuable because it makes an occupier’s pledge to withdraw more credible. This credibility is useful in relations with two audiences. First, by defraying the
costs of occupation, multilateralism may assuage concerns that an occupying power’s population has about the duration and costs of occupation. Second, by inviting other countries to participate in the occupation, the occupying power may tie its ability to conduct the occupation to the commitment of other states. Presumably, the international community is not interested in forming an empire, so an occupied population can be confident that a multilateral occupation will, in fact, come to an end in a reasonable period of time. For example, after World War I, French Foreign Minister George Clemenceau was concerned about how the French occupation of the Rhineland might be perceived. Clemenceau insisted that the occupation be multilateral to reassure other states and the German people that the occupation was not French expansionism, but instead was temporary and aimed only at incorporating a rehabilitated Germany into Europe.\(^55\)

Although multilateralism may indeed enhance the credibility of the occupying power, it may also hinder occupation success.\(^56\) Multilateralism forces many states to share the burden of occupation, but it also entitles those countries to a say in the goals and objectives of the occupation. If all the participants in the occupation do not agree on what the end goals of the occupation are, then it will encounter difficulty. In the post–World War I occupation of the Rhineland, France was most ambitious in its occupation goals, was determined to prevent the reemergence of a German threat, and briefly even supported Rheinish independence.\(^57\) Great Britain reluctantly participated in the Rhineland occupation and was as concerned about French ambitions as it was about the dangers of a revanchist Germany. Finally, the United States was not quite sure what its objectives were in the Rhineland and simply sought to withdraw as quickly as possible.\(^58\) Ultimately, the occupation of the Rhineland disintegrated prior to its agreed-upon fifteen-year duration, and the occupation did little to ensure long-term security for either France or Europe, more generally.\(^59\) Similar problems of multilateralism arose in the post–World War I

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59. The original agreement reached in 1919 called for a fifteen-year occupation of the Rhineland. American participation in the occupation ended in 1923; British participation ended at the close of
occupation of Istanbul, the post–World War II occupation of Germany, and in the current de facto multinational occupation of Afghanistan.  

Multilateralism may not be a credible signal that an occupation will end for one final reason. Powerful states, such as the United States, may find it difficult to genuinely tie their abilities to the commitment of the international community. A great power may ultimately disregard its pledge to abide by the will of the international community and continue the occupation with or without the support of other countries.

Of the nine occupations where either the occupation was executed multilaterally or the occupation had the imprimatur of a multilateral body, four fully succeeded, two had mixed success, and three were failures. Multilateralism has benefits, but it does not guarantee occupation success.

**One final challenge: geopolitics and credibility.** The ability to offer credible guarantees is hindered by one other significant factor: the willingness of great powers to subordinate the future of an occupied territory to their own geopolitical interests. Although democratic powers might seem more likely to support indigenous and independent self-rule, even a democratic great power is unlikely to countenance a democratically elected leader who threatens its interests and may, in fact, bolster an unpopular leader because that leader is sympathetic to its geostrategic goals. To win hearts and minds, occupying powers must promise not only an indigenous government, but also an independent one.

For example, returning to the cases of Japan and southern Korea after World War II, the United States ultimately responded to geopolitical imperatives with strategies that were at cross-purposes with credible guarantees to withdraw and leave an independent government in place. As a consequence, acceptance of the occupation among the Japanese and Korean populations declined. In Japan, according to Dower, “Until 1947, leftists as well as liberals commonly regarded the overwhelmingly American occupation force as an army of liberation and the notion of achieving a ‘democratic revolution’ under the ea-

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gle’s wing was so widespread as to become an almost instant cliché.”61 After 1947, with the emerging Cold War evident, the United States largely abandoned its original goals of “democratization and demilitarization,” executed the “reverse course,” initiated purges of communist officials, and began to view Japan almost entirely within the context of the global geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union.62 With the Japanese people increasingly disillusioned by the shifting nature of the U.S. occupation, only the common sense of Soviet threat, the existence of a new constitution for Japan, and the indigenous industrial resources of Japan enabled the occupation ultimately to succeed.63

In Korea, the United States indiscriminately endorsed noncommunist groups from the beginning and failed to win over ordinary Koreans or Korea’s postoccupation leaders. As Bonnie Oh observes, “In their fear of communism, [U.S. occupation authorities] blindly supported noncommunists, who did not necessarily have either the interest or the support of the majority of the Korean people.”64 The poorly administered occupation even disturbed right-wing politicians, including Syngman Rhee. According to James Matray, “By 15 August 1948, when the U.S. occupation formally ended with the inauguration of the Republic of Korea, [Military Governor] James Hodge’s actions had so alienated Syngman Rhee that the new president of South Korea was no longer responsive to U.S. influence and advice.”65 For the United States, containing the Soviet threat to southern Korea took precedence over any desire to allow the Koreans to choose their own government.

If occupied populations recognize that great powers are likely to view their countries as pawns in a larger geopolitical game, they will lose patience with the occupation. Even if the occupying power continues to provide security to the occupied population, nationalist anxiety is likely to emerge in response to any lengthy occupation that is driven primarily by geopolitics, not the well-being or eventual self-government of the occupied territory. This anxiety, in turn, may manifest itself in violent resistance that raises the costs of occupation.

Appendix 2 and Figure 3 confirm the difficulty that occupying powers have in credibly communicating their intentions to withdraw. Only six of twenty-

61. Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 69–70.
four occupiers were able to credibly indicate their intentions, most often through either multilateralism or strategies of contingent withdrawal. In those six cases, four occupations succeeded, one had mixed success, and one failed. In the six cases where the credibility of the signals offered was mixed, three occupations succeeded, one had mixed success, and two failed. In the twelve cases where the signal of eventual withdrawal was not credible, no occupations succeeded, two had mixed success, and ten failed.

**The Dilemma of Failing Occupations**

Occupying powers are likely to face an unwelcome dilemma of either withdrawing prematurely or prolonging a failing occupation when the occupied population does not value assistance in rebuilding, a commonly perceived external threat is absent, and credible guarantees are not issued. This dilemma unfolds in three stages.

In the first stage, occupying powers belatedly recognize the difficulty of the occupation tasks confronting them. To rally support for an occupation, leaders of the occupying power may purposely misrepresent the difficulty of the occupation, or they may mistakenly overestimate their ability to win over an occupied population. Even in the ultimately successful case of the U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. leaders underestimated the tasks before them, believing that the occupation would last no more than two or three years.66

In the second stage, despite the growing commitment of the occupying

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power, the challenges of occupation only multiply instead of diminish. The costs of occupation grow, and the citizens of the occupied territory become increasingly resentful of the presence of the occupying power. Simultaneously, the occupied territory becomes dependent on the occupying power, and the occupying power becomes economically and politically entrenched in the occupied territory, making it more difficult for the power to consider withdrawal. For example, the U.S. occupation of Haiti was extended because of both the perceived responsibility of Washington to protect American investments in Haitian bonds and the critical role of U.S. capital in the Haitian economy.67

In the third stage, the occupying power faces the dilemma of a failing occupation. On the one hand, the occupying power can choose to cut its losses and evacuate the occupied territory. By doing so, the occupier relieves itself of the burden of occupation, but its goals may be left unachieved and subsequent re-intervention may prove necessary. On the other hand, the occupying power can choose to stay the course and remain in the occupied territory. In this case, occupation begins to transform into colonialism, and the occupying power’s intention to withdraw may be abandoned. This alternative is only likely to generate more resentment, more cost, and less success. Stay or go, the occupying power has failed.

The British occupation of Egypt beginning in the summer of 1882 illustrates what can happen when an occupying power facing this dilemma chooses to prolong an occupation. When British gunships opened fire on the port of Alexandria in July 1882, Great Britain did it only reluctantly and with uncertain goals. Edward Malet, the British consul general in Cairo before the occupation, expressed his skepticism about the recourse to military action, “I trust there may be a way out of the difficulty, for I own to having repugnance to a war engaged on behalf of bondholders and which would have for effect to repress the first attempt of a Musselman country at Parliamentary Government. It seems unnatural for England to do this.”68

Once the occupation began, British leaders insisted that it would be short lived. Prime Minister William Gladstone assured, “An indefinite occupation would be absolutely at variance with all the principles and views of Her Maj-

esty’s Government and the pledge they have given to Europe.” Soon, however, British leaders recognized that the goal of creating a stable political order in Egypt could not easily be accomplished. Baring, the British consul general in Egypt, opined in 1886, “I do not say that our occupation of Egypt need last for ever [sic]. It may be that at some future time we may be able to withdraw. The country is too civilised and too closely connected with Europe to be able to fall back into the tranquil oriental barbarism of former days. But it is not civilised enough to walk by itself.”

Despite repeated pledges to withdraw—by one count, between 1882 and 1907, the British government made nearly 120 declarations of its intention to evacuate Egypt—the British did not fully leave Egypt until its independence in 1954, seventy-two years after the occupation began. As Baring poignantly concluded, “Many have come here with evacuation on the brain. I have not yet known a single case in which the disease has not been cured.” From the onset of the occupation through the Fashoda crisis of 1898 and beyond, the British sensed that they could not afford to evacuate Egypt and witness it descend into chaos, be overtaken by one of its European rivals, or be governed by an unfriendly regime. By staying, however, the British only fueled Egyptian anti-imperialist nationalism.

The occupation of Egypt fares poorly on all three of the critical variables that I have identified. Following the British attack, much of the Egyptian population saw little need for an occupation and continued to look forward to their own independence. No sense of shared external threat bound Great Britain

70. Sir Evelyn Baring to Archibald Philip Primrose, fifth earl of Rosebery, February 15, 1886. Quoted in Mowat, “From Liberalism to Imperialism,” p. 120.
71. Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. xi.
73. As Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher argue, “The occupation had to go on because it was the only way of retaining supremacy and keeping the lid on the unresolved internal crisis.” Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 281. On the effect of the Fashoda crisis on the situation in Egypt, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, pp. 132–133.
and Egypt together in support of the occupation, and, finally, despite the many pledges to withdraw, the British offered no credible guarantee of their intention to evacuate and establish an independent, indigenous government. The British adopted indirect rule in Egypt, but they also remained ready to react to any Egyptian leader who exhibited strong nationalist inclinations. For example, when Khedive Tewfik was replaced by the more nationalist Abbas II in 1892, the British tightened their control over Egypt. As Egyptian nationalism strengthened, the British took steps to curtail the growth of that nationalism, including placing limits on Egyptian higher education.

Ultimately, London faced an unwelcome choice between either prolonging its occupation or withdrawing with its interests still vulnerable. With the occupation faring poorly, the original British intention to withdraw quickly was abandoned. British historian Niall Ferguson argues that the occupation of Egypt was exemplary of a strategy he endorses as “willful hypocrisy”—assuring the occupied population that the occupying power intends to leave, but continuously putting off actual withdrawal. For Ferguson, the occupation of Egypt was a success as it ensured British interests in safe passage through the Suez Canal and ultimately improved the lives of Egyptians.

The ideal outcome for an occupying power, however, is a stable, long-term outcome without the costs of occupation. Occupying powers that have rejected annexation should want to end a costly occupation, not prolong it. The occupation of Egypt did enable Great Britain to retain control over the strategically important Suez Canal and did provide some economic and infrastructural benefits to Egypt. At the same time, it is not certain that Britain would have lost access to the canal without the occupation and the occupation turned out to be much longer and much more costly than any British leaders had originally anticipated.

The U.S. occupation of Cuba at the turn of the twentieth century reveals what can happen when an occupying power chooses to withdraw prema-

75. On the dependence of Egyptian rulers on British support, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. 68. Summarizing the influence of Cromer on Egypt, Al-Sayyid concludes, “The Egyptians respected Cromer for his reforms, but they also feared and disliked him for having usurped power and thwarted their leanings towards self-government.” Ibid., p. 196.
turedly. President William McKinley supported the occupation of Cuba following the 1898 Spanish-American War, but pointedly eschewed annexation, “I speak not of forcible annexation for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.” At the onset of the occupation, McKinley stated his simple conditions for ending the occupation: “Until there is complete tranquility in the island and a stable government inaugurated military government will continue.”

Throughout the occupation, the United States consistently rejected annexation, and the Teller amendment of 1898 legally restricted the ambitions of the U.S. occupation. Only four years later, with domestic pressure to withdraw growing, the initial U.S. occupation of Cuba ended with great optimism. Gen. Leonard Wood, the military governor of Cuba, wrote upon returning sovereignty to the Cubans in 1902, “The work called for and accomplished was the building of a Republic, by Anglo-Saxons, in a Latin country . . . in short, the establishment, in a little over three years, in a Latin military colony, in one of the most unhealthy countries in the world, of a Republic modeled closely upon the lines of our great Republic.” The optimism, however, was short lived. The U.S. occupation had not sufficiently resolved the political, social, and economic difficulties that plagued Cuba. Only four years later, in 1906, the United States was compelled to reoccupy Cuba to restore order.

Relishing their recent liberation from Spanish control, the majority of Cubans did not welcome a lengthy occupation by the United States, nor did they perceive an external threat that made them receptive to a U.S. occupation. Although the United States did return control to a Cuban government, it did so

82. Events had conspired to make a lengthy occupation of Cuba intolerable. By 1900, according to David Healy, “The circumstances of the past months—the postal scandals and the near-rebellion of Congress, the imminence of the elections of 1900, the embarrassments in the Philippines, Wood’s ambition to play a role in the China expedition—had succeeded at last in bringing the administration, the Congress, and the occupation generals into a temporary agreement in favor of early action in Cuba.” Ibid., p. 146.
only under the onerous conditions of the Platt amendment. Through the Platt amendment, the United States committed (and demanded Cuban acceptance of their commitment) to reintervene in Cuba if domestic unrest erupted. Cuban sovereignty was thereby limited, and the Platt amendment created a perverse incentive for dissatisfied Liberals to instigate disorder and precipitate U.S. re-intervention in 1906 after Tomas Estrada Palma and his Moderate Party swept elections in 1905.  

The Egyptian and Cuban examples demonstrate the unfortunate dilemma that an occupying power faces when hearts and minds are not won. In both cases, the occupying powers underestimated the challenges ahead of them and the ease with which they would be able to restore order and withdraw. As the tasks of occupation grew, the occupier ultimately faced a choice between continuing a struggling occupation or withdrawing. The British chose to stay whereas the Americans chose to withdraw, but in both cases, the occupations did not achieve their original goals.

The empirical evidence does not clearly indicate which horn of this dilemma future occupiers should choose. On the one hand, the evidence does indicate that comprehensive occupations succeed more often than more limited security occupations. Although this evidence is only suggestive, it leads to the conclusion that occupiers would be better off pursuing an ambitious occupation that completely remakes the occupied territory than a more limited occupation that simply tries to restore order. On the other hand, the costs of comprehensive occupation can be significant. Convincing the domestic population of an occupying power to accept this cost is likely to be quite difficult. Thus, the leaders of occupying states are likely to be faced with an uncomfortable choice between the exorbitant costs of comprehensive occupation or the possibility of having to re-intervene after a failed occupation.

Conclusion

The starkest pattern to emerge from the twenty-four military occupations examined for this study is the critical role of commonly perceived external threat

in determining occupation success. Of the seven cases of success, six came in the wake of World War II as the Cold War was emerging. Occupation success, then, is largely influenced by structural factors that occupying powers cannot easily manipulate. To the extent they can, great powers must therefore carefully choose places to occupy where the threat environment is conducive to occupation success. It is not merely coincidence that occupations have most often failed on the periphery of the international system where geostrategic importance is questionable, great powers are likely to be impatient, and nationalism is often in its emergent stages. This is not to suggest that the policy choices that occupying powers make are irrelevant. Occupying powers can increase their chances of success both by pursuing a wartime strategy that creates an environment welcoming to occupation and by employing strategies, such as contingent withdrawal, that make their pledges to create an independent, indigenous government more credible.

The history of occupations suggests three final lessons for potential occupying powers. First, the need for occupation, commonly perceived external threats, and credible guarantees are both the causes and the effects of occupation success. That is, the more successful an occupation is, the more likely it is that an occupied population will view the occupation as necessary, will perceive a common external threat, and will view the occupying power as credible. Conversely, if an occupation does not have the prerequisites for success and begins poorly, then the tasks of occupation are only likely to get more difficult over time.

Second, several occupations have been undone by a failure to clearly establish the goals of the occupation and appropriately train occupiers. The U.S. occupation of Korea after World War II suffered from a lack of clear goals, poorly qualified leadership, and a general “policy of drift.” Gen. John Brooke, the first U.S. military governor in Cuba, was not provided any clear instruction about the ultimate objectives of the Cuban occupation. Similarly, in Egypt, British occupation authorities were unclear about the ultimate goal of their mission. And the U.S. occupation force in Germany after World War I was inadequately prepared for its unclear mission. As one military assessment

87. Thomas, *Cuba*, p. 245; and Healy, *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902*, p. 84.
later concluded, “The American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”

By contrast, during World War II, the United States established Civil Affairs Training Schools at various U.S. educational institutions including the University of Virginia and Yale University. In anticipation of postwar occupations, these schools provided not only training in military administration but also in the language, history, and culture of Germany and Japan. As a consequence, the U.S. occupation authorities in both countries were far more qualified for the job than their predecessors had been. Even still, participants in the post–World War II occupations lament their inadequate training for the mission and the inappropriateness of utilizing the army for civilian affairs missions.

Third, sometimes, occupation is a necessity, not a choice, so calling an occupation a failure if there was no reasonable alternative may seem unfair. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States could not easily escape the responsibility of occupying Japan or Germany. Even if occupation is the least bad of a set of alternatives, however, it is important to understand why occupations succeed or fail. If occupation is the only reasonable option, then great powers should (1) anticipate the possibility of occupation before engaging in war, and (2) employ a military strategy that creates conditions conducive to occupation success.

If the argument presented in this article is correct, then it is difficult to reach optimistic conclusions about the continuing U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Based on all three critical variables, the occupation appears headed toward failure. After decades of Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian rule, nationalist Iraqis have been understandably reluctant to welcome a U.S.-led occupation. Further, the coalition victory over Iraq left much of the Ba’athist foundation in place, and loyalists to the Hussein regime remain active. As for threat, while Iraq may indeed face some external threat from Iran, the most significant

89. U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918–1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920, p. 36.
90. On the Civil Affairs Training Schools, see Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 206–208.
93. On June 28, 2004, the occupying powers formally returned sovereignty to an Iraqi government. With approximately 150,000 foreign troops remaining in Iraq, however, the de facto occupation continues.
threats to Iraqi security are internal. The disparate ethnic and religious groups that make up Iraq are resisting efforts at centralization. Finally, Iraqis are suspicious of U.S. pledges to return their country to an indigenous and independent government. While movement toward more multilateralism may eventually lend some credibility to U.S. guarantees to withdraw, it may also adversely affect the prospects for ultimate occupation success by giving more countries a say in occupation policy.

Washington faces few good options in Iraq. Comprehensive reconstruction of Iraq cannot be achieved quickly or cheaply, but nationalist Iraqis have become only more impatient with the occupation as it continues. The United States faces the unwelcome choice between prolonging a failing occupation or withdrawing before U.S. interests in the Gulf region have been secured. Already, the Bush administration has rethought and reduced its initial ambitious occupation goals. Ultimately, however, the United States might be better advised to stay the course of comprehensive occupation. Premature withdrawal from Iraq promises greater costs in the future if civil war breaks out or a regime unfriendly to the United States emerges. Washington faces a difficult trade-off: it may be able to achieve its goals in Iraq eventually, but the costs are likely to be high.

Perhaps the most important implication of this article is that military occupations should generally be avoided, if possible. Unfortunately, the increasingly prominent problem of failed states raises the prospect that military intervention followed by military occupation is going to become more common. Although potential occupiers may not be able to manipulate the external threat environment of the occupied state, occupying powers should choose military strategies that establish a favorable context for occupation and occupation policies that credibly signal future intentions. Even so, the desire of national groups to govern themselves is likely to impede successful occupation. Given the vast quantitative and qualitative superiority of the U.S. military, it is increasingly evident that winning the peace will continue to be much more difficult for the United States than winning the war.

## Appendix 1. Military Occupations, 1815–2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory (Primary Occupier)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type (Force Size)</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France (United Kingdom, Russia, Prussia, Austria)</td>
<td>1815–18</td>
<td>Security (150,000)</td>
<td>Ensure that France no longer threatens European security; restore stable, monarchical French government</td>
<td>Prevented France from threatening European security; created stable French government</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ili-China (Russia)</td>
<td>1871–81</td>
<td>Security (2,000)</td>
<td>Stabilize internal threats within Ili until China is able to administer the territory</td>
<td>Ili peacefully restored to China</td>
<td>Fairly lengthy occupation with little reward for Russians</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (United Kingdom)</td>
<td>1882–1954</td>
<td>Comprehensive (30,000 initially; reduced to less than 10,000)</td>
<td>Protect Suez Canal and economic interests in Egypt; create a friendly political regime</td>
<td>Constructed valuable infrastructure; protected Suez Canal from adversaries</td>
<td>Lengthy and costly occupation; development of anti-imperialist nationalism in Egypt and subsequent pan-Arabism</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (United States)</td>
<td>1898–1902</td>
<td>Comprehensive (45,000)</td>
<td>Stabilize Cuba so as to extend U.S. control of Western Hemisphere; protect economic interests; create stable political and economic institutions</td>
<td>Constructed some infrastructure; established U.S. foothold in Cuba</td>
<td>Reintervention necessary in 1906</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (United States)</td>
<td>1898–1945</td>
<td>Comprehensive (peak of 70,000 during 1898–1902 insurgency; reduced thereafter except during the final battles of World War II)</td>
<td>Establish U.S. presence in Asia to protect U.S. interests; create stable political and economic institutions</td>
<td>United States gained military presence in Asia; democratic elections eventually held</td>
<td>Lengthy and costly occupation including major counterinsurgency campaign; fomented Japanese antagonism</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (United States)</td>
<td>1906–09</td>
<td>Security (6,000)</td>
<td>Ensure security by restoring order after 1905 elections</td>
<td>Temporarily restored order</td>
<td>Intervention required again in 1912 and 1917</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory (Primary Occupier&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type (Force Size&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;)</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (United States)</td>
<td>1915–34</td>
<td>Comprehensive (2,000)</td>
<td>Protect entrance to Panama Canal from Germany; secure interests of U.S. bondholders; create stable political and economic institutions</td>
<td>Panama Canal protected (largely, though, because of World War I)</td>
<td>Lengthy and costly occupation had few beneficial effects on Haitian society or Haitian-U.S. relations; Haiti remained a source of instability</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic (United States)</td>
<td>1916–24</td>
<td>Comprehensive (3,000)</td>
<td>Protect entrance to Panama Canal from Germany and U.S. economic interests; create stable political and economic institutions</td>
<td>Panama Canal protected (largely, though, because of World War I)</td>
<td>Decades of authoritarian rule ensued after occupation; Dominican Republic remained a source of instability in the Caribbean</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul-Turkey (France, United Kingdom, Italy)</td>
<td>1918–23</td>
<td>Security (30,000 British, 18,000 French, 2,000 Italians)</td>
<td>Create international administration of Istanbul; ensure safe passage through Dardanelles</td>
<td>Safe passage through the Dardanelles possible (but occupation not necessary to achieve this goal)</td>
<td>Popular resistance to the occupation; plan to turn Istanbul into international city abandoned</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (France, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>1918–30</td>
<td>Security (150,000)</td>
<td>Administer Germany until postwar agreements are settled and nonthreatening German government is established</td>
<td>Allies gained some leverage over Germany on the issue of reparations</td>
<td>Disagreement among occupying powers led to disintegration of occupation and reemergence of Germany as a threat to international security</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory (Primary Occupier(^a))</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type (Force Size(^b))</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (United Kingdom)</td>
<td>1918–32</td>
<td>Comprehensive (limited numbers(^c))</td>
<td>Maintain presence in geostrategically important and oil-rich Iraq; League of Nations mandate to guide Iraqis to independence with a stable and sustainable government</td>
<td>Limited development of Iraqi infrastructure</td>
<td>Britain forced to withdraw in face of widespread popular opposition to occupation</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine (United Kingdom)</td>
<td>1919–47</td>
<td>Comprehensive (limited numbers)</td>
<td>Protect strategic interests, including access to Suez Canal; League of Nations mandate to guide Palestine to independence; create a homeland for the Jewish people</td>
<td>Israel created</td>
<td>Decades of continuous conflict since Israeli independence</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saar (France)</td>
<td>1920–35</td>
<td>Comprehensive (7,000)</td>
<td>Maintain security against potentially resurgent Germany; extract coal; create political stability under League of Nations administration until 1935 plebiscite</td>
<td>France profited from extraction of coal</td>
<td>Population of Saar opted to rejoin revanchist Germany</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>1943–47</td>
<td>Comprehensive (1943–45: several hundred thousand; 1945–47: civilian advisers but reduced military force)</td>
<td>Protect Italy until Germany is defeated; ensure presence of Italy in Western bloc; complete political, social, and economic reconstruction</td>
<td>Fended off German threat; incorporated democratic Italy into Western alliance</td>
<td>Chaotic Italian political system threatened to become communist</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Austria (Soviet Union)</td>
<td>1945–55</td>
<td>Comprehensive (200,000)</td>
<td>Extract reparations from Austria; prevent Austria from joining the Western bloc; convince Austrians to adopt communist system and ally with Soviet Union</td>
<td>Extracted some reparations; Austria eventually became neutral</td>
<td>Austrian voters rejected communism and relationship with the Soviet Union</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory (Primary Occupier&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type (Force Size&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;)</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Austria (United Kingdom, United States, France)</td>
<td>1945–55</td>
<td>Comprehensive (20,000–100,000)</td>
<td>Persuade Austria to join Western bloc; prevent Austria from joining the Soviet bloc; create a democratic political system and a liberal economy</td>
<td>With the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, Austria became neutral; Austrians developed a liberal democracy and an open economy</td>
<td>Although Austrians did not join the Soviet bloc, they did not join the Western bloc either</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany (France, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>1945–52</td>
<td>Comprehensive (400,000)</td>
<td>Maintain Germany as an ally against imposing Soviet threat; complete political, economic, and social reconstruction</td>
<td>Germany became an invaluable ally, a thriving democracy, and an economic success</td>
<td>Social reconstruction faced challenges; denazification ultimately abandoned</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (United States)</td>
<td>1945–52</td>
<td>Comprehensive (initially 450,000 and lessened thereafter)</td>
<td>Prevent resurgence of Japanese militarism; persuade Japan to ally with United States; complete political, economic, and social reconstruction</td>
<td>Japan becomes a key ally of the United States in the Cold War; Japanese political, economic, and social institutions rebuilt</td>
<td>Some Japanese opposition to U.S. treatment of Japan as a pawn in the Cold War</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryukyus-Japan (United States)</td>
<td>1945–72</td>
<td>Comprehensive (20,000 and lessened thereafter)</td>
<td>Retain control over geographically significant islands; install a liberal democratic government</td>
<td>Ryukyuus remained under U.S. control; transition to full Japanese control in 1972</td>
<td>Lengthy and costly occupation required and met with mostly passive popular resistance</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea (Soviet Union)</td>
<td>1945–48</td>
<td>Comprehensive (100,000)</td>
<td>Guarantee North Korean friendship within emerging Cold War context; convince North Koreans to adopt communist system</td>
<td>North Korea remained a member of the communist bloc throughout the Cold War</td>
<td>Kim Il Sung among the more independent of Soviet bloc leaders during the Cold War</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory (Primary Occupier)</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Goals</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea (United States)</td>
<td>1945–48</td>
<td>Comprehensive (25,000)</td>
<td>Prevent Soviet takeover of South Korea; create pro-U.S. government and liberal economy</td>
<td>South Korea became a vital ally of the United States, although friendship was cemented after occupation ended</td>
<td>Much popular resistance to occupation; Korean War needed to cement alliance between the United States and South Korea</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank/Gaza (Israel)</td>
<td>1967–present</td>
<td>Security (varying)</td>
<td>Ensure Israeli security against threat from neighboring states and Palestinian refugees</td>
<td>Control over West Bank and Gaza has provided some territorial security to Israel</td>
<td>Continuous conflict between Palestinians and Israelis with no end to occupation likely soon</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (Vietnam)</td>
<td>1979–89</td>
<td>Comprehensive (180,000)</td>
<td>Prevent future Cambodian incursions into Vietnamese territory; install pro-Vietnamese, communist government in Cambodia</td>
<td>Cambodia and Vietnam now peaceful, if not friendly</td>
<td>UN peacekeeping mission ultimately necessary to stabilize Cambodia after twenty years of fighting</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (Israel)</td>
<td>1982–2000</td>
<td>Security (1,200)</td>
<td>Ensure Israeli security against threat from Lebanese militia and terrorist groups</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Lengthy and costly occupation; political militias and terrorist groups continue to strike at Israel</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (NATO)</td>
<td>1995–present</td>
<td>Comprehensive (12,000–60,000)</td>
<td>Prevent future conflict among diverse ethnic groups; foster prewar reconciliation among diverse groups; create stable political system</td>
<td>Absence of active conflict among groups</td>
<td>Continuing tension among ethnic groups; indefinite international presence to maintain peace</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory (Primary Occupier&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type (Force Size&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;)</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (NATO)</td>
<td>1999–present</td>
<td>Comprehensive (60,000)</td>
<td>Prevent future conflict, especially involving Albania or Macedonia; manage transition of Kosovo to self-determination</td>
<td>Conflict has not spread; some progress toward political autonomy</td>
<td>Ongoing concerns about the possibility for future conflict in the southern Balkans</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (NATO)</td>
<td>2001–present</td>
<td>Comprehensive (13,000 U.S., 10,000 international)</td>
<td>Prevent future conflict; eliminate terrorist groups within Afghanistan; comprehensive political, economic, and social reconstruction in the aftermath of the Taliban regime</td>
<td>Limited success in reestablishing law and order in Afghanistan and in eliminating terrorist groups within Afghanistan</td>
<td>Central government of Afghanistan remains weak; violence against multinational force in Afghanistan continues</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (United States, United Kingdom)</td>
<td>2003–present</td>
<td>Comprehensive (150,000)</td>
<td>Install nonthreatening, pro-Western government; protect valuable economic assets; comprehensive political, economic, and social reconstruction</td>
<td>Iraqi oil industry functioning earlier than expected; training of Iraqi military has begun</td>
<td>Continuing resistance to U.S.-led occupation; lengthy and expensive occupation appears likely</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>a</sup>In some cases, additional countries participated in the occupation. In this appendix, I present the primary occupying powers.

<sup>b</sup>Force size numbers are difficult to find for several of these cases. In particular, in almost every occupation, the number of occupying forces varied considerably over the course of the occupation. Annual occupation force numbers are impossible to find in several cases and unwieldy to present. Therefore, the numbers given in this appendix should be taken as representative.

<sup>c</sup>In the aftermath of World War I, Britain limited the number of troops deployed to the territories it controlled in the Middle East.
## Appendix 2. The Causes of Occupation Success and Failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory (Primary Occupier)</th>
<th>Help Needed</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Credibility of Guarantee</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France (United Kingdom, Russia, Prussia, Austria) 1815–18</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High (multilateral)</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ili-China (Russia) 1871–81</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (United Kingdom) 1882–1954</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (United States) 1898–1902</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (United States) 1898–1945</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (United States) 1906–09</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (United States) 1916–34</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic (United States) 1916–24</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul-Turkey (France, United Kingdom, Italy) 1918–23</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium (multilateral)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (France, United Kingdom, United States) 1918–30</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High (multilateral)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (United Kingdom) 1918–32</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Medium (League of Nations mandate)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine (United Kingdom) 1919–47</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Medium (League of Nations mandate)</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saar (France) 1920–35</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High (multilateral)</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (United Kingdom, United States) 1943–47</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>High (contingent withdrawal; multilateral)</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory (Primary Occupier)</th>
<th>Help Needed</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Credibility of Guarantee</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Austria (Soviet Union) 1945–55</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Austria (United Kingdom, United States, France) 1945–55</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>High (contingent withdrawal; multilateral)</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany (France, United Kingdom, United States) 1945–52</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>High (contingent withdrawal; multilateral)</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (United States) 1945–52</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Medium (contingent withdrawal)</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryukyus-Japan (United States) 1945–72</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Medium (contingent withdrawal)</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea (Soviet Union) 1945–48</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Medium (contingent withdrawal)</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea (United States) 1945–48</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank/Gaza (Israel) 1967–present</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (Vietnam) 1979–89</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (Israel) 1982–2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (NATO) 1995–present</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>External and internal</td>
<td>High (multilateral)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (NATO) 1999–present</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>External and internal</td>
<td>High (multilateral)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (NATO) 2001–present</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Medium (multilateral)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (United States, United Kingdom) 2003–present</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>External and internal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>