Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Partnership Between Ukraine and NATO

by Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

Preventive Defense Project
A research collaboration of Stanford University and Harvard University

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Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Partnership Between Ukraine and NATO

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A Research Collaboration of Stanford University and Harvard University
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Through more than four decades of Cold War, American national security strategy was difficult to implement but easy to understand. America was set on a clear course to contain Soviet expansionism anywhere in the world, all the while building a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union from using military force against it or its allies. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the underlying rationale for that strategy—the threat from the Soviet Union—has disappeared. What strategy should replace it? Much depends on finding the correct answer to this question.

The world survived three global wars this century. The first two resulted in tens of millions of deaths, but the third—the Cold War—would have been even more horrible than the others had deterrence failed. These three wars trace a path that leads to the strategy needed for the post-Cold War era.

At the end of the First World War, the victorious European allies sought revenge and reparations; what they got was a massive depression and another world war. The United States sought “normalcy” and isolation; what it got was total war and leadership in winning it. Because it failed to prevent and then to deter Germany’s aggression, America was forced to mobilize a second time to defeat it.

At the end of the Second World War, America initially chose a strategy based on prevention. Vowing not to repeat the mistakes made after World War I, the Truman administration created the Marshall Plan, which sought to assist the devastated nations of Europe, friends and foes alike, to rebuild. The Marshall Plan and other examples of the preventive defense strategy, aimed at preventing the conditions that would lead to a future world war, were an outstanding success in Western Europe and in Japan.
But the Soviet Union turned down the Marshall Plan and, instead, persisted in a program of expansion, trying to take advantage of the weakened condition of most of the countries of Europe. The resulting security problem was clearly articulated by George Kennan, who forecast that the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union would be replaced with a struggle for the heart of Europe and that the United States should prepare for a protracted period of confrontation. Kennan’s analysis was accepted by the Truman administration, which then formulated a strategy that would get us through the Cold War: deterring another global war while containing the Soviet Union’s demonstrated expansionist ambitions. Deterrence supplanted prevention: there was no other choice.

Even deterrence was a departure from earlier American military strategy. The United States had twice previously risen to defeat aggression, but it had not maintained the peacetime military establishment or the engagement in the world to deter World Wars I or II. Marshall and other defense leaders around Truman created the peacetime posture and new security institutions required. In time, as George Kennan had forecast, the Soviet Union disintegrated because of the limitations of its political and economic systems. Deterrence worked.

The result is a world today seemingly without a major threat to the United States, and the U.S. is now enjoying a period of peace and influence as never before. But while this situation is to be savored by the public, foreign policy and defense leaders should not be complacent. This period of an absence of threat challenges these leaders to find the vision and foresight to act strategically, even when events and imminent threats do not compel them to do so.

To understand the dangers and opportunities that will define our nation’s strategy in the new era, we must see the post-Cold War world the way George Marshall looked upon Europe after World War II, and return to prevention. In essence, we now have another chance to realize Marshall’s vision: a world not of threats to be deterred, but a world united in peace, freedom, and prosperity. To realize this vision, we should return to Marshall’s strategy of preventive defense.

Preventive Defense is a concept of defense strategy for the United States in the post-Cold War Era. It stresses the need to anticipate security dangers which, if mismanaged, have the potential to re-create Cold War-scale threats to U.S. interests and survival. The foci of Preventive Defense are: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
catastrophic terrorism, “loose nukes” and other military technology from the former Soviet Union, Russia’s post-Cold War security identity, and the peaceful rise of China.

Preventive Defense is the most important mission of national security leaders and of the defense establishment. They must dedicate themselves to Preventive Defense while they deter lesser but existing threats—in Iraq and North Korea—and conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian missions—in Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and so on—where aggression occurs but where American vital interests are not directly threatened.

This report is the third in a series of Preventive Defense Project reports on key applications of Preventive Defense. We are grateful to the participants of the Workshop on Ukraine-NATO Relations and to the Harvard University Project on Ukrainian Security for their collaboration.

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Acknowledgments

This report is the result of a workshop held in April 1998, when fifty policy experts, government officials and scholars met in Washington, D.C. to discuss an issue of great import: the future of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO. This event, the Workshop on Ukraine-NATO Relations, was sponsored by the Harvard University Project on Ukrainian Security and the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. The express goal of the workshop was to bring together representatives of Ukraine, NATO, and the United States so that they could collaborate on developing concrete recommendations for short and long-term next steps to broaden and deepen Ukraine-NATO relations.

Our workshop, and this volume, benefited from the participation of some of the most capable and experienced people now thinking about Ukraine, NATO, and international relations. We learned a great deal from the time we spent together, and we hope it was equally profitable for all who attended. We hope that this volume will continue to spur all of our thinking as we seek to develop the Ukraine-NATO relationship.

We thank all of the participants of the workshop for their contributions and their participation:

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We would also like to express our thanks to Ms. Olya Oliker, a doctoral candidate at M.I.T. and the coordinator of the Harvard Project on Ukrainian Security. Olya played a key role in conceptualizing and making the workshop happen, and we owe much of the credit for its success to her. We also owe a special note of gratitude to the Preventive Defense Project team that assisted with the organization of this workshop as well as with the publication of this report: Gretchen Bartlett, Christiana Briggs, Lainie Dillon, Hilary Driscoll, Deborah Gordon, and L. Celeste Johnson.

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Ashton B. Carter
Steven E. Miller
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall
Introduction

As the conveners of this workshop, we believe that the relationship now developing between Ukraine and NATO has the capacity to evolve into an important force for stability and security in Europe and the world, and to serve as a model for other countries in the region. While the NATO-Ukraine Charter and Ukraine’s participation in the Partnership for Peace and the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia provide a strong foundation, the longer-term direction of this very important relationship has continued to be largely undefined. Further, we believe strongly that the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership signed by Ukraine and NATO in the summer of 1997 is only the first step towards institutionalizing the growing Ukraine-NATO relationship. Ensuring that the Charter is meaningful depends on concrete implementation of the cooperation anticipated in that document. Thus we decided that a concerted effort needed to be made to develop a gameplan for the future.

Our meeting was a stimulating and exciting one. The energetic exchange of views provided the ideal forum for thinking about and defining goals for the future, and about how to put them into action. The papers contained in this volume reflect some of the key perspectives voiced at our meeting. It is clear that while participants may have differing views on the scope and direction of the relationship, all agree on its central importance and its promise for the future.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott started off our discussions with a major policy address on U.S. relations with Ukraine and its role in European security. His remarks reflect the U.S. government’s continuing emphasis on a strong and growing relationship with this very important partner as well as Washington’s concern about the pace and depth of reform in Ukraine. Talbott’s remarks were followed by
Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk’s speech on Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the U.S. On the eve of his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tarasyuk presented an illuminating view informed by his role as a central player in shaping Ukraine’s international relationships since the early days of independence.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski brings his wealth of practical experience in government and scholarship to his wide-ranging presentation on the future of European security and Ukraine’s role in guaranteeing it. By drawing key lessons from the past, he makes a provocative argument for the steps that must be taken in the future to ensure not only prosperity for Ukraine, but security for Ukraine and its neighbors.

Charles Dale’s first-hand experience in building the Ukraine-NATO relationship contributes to his informative overview of progress in the Partnership for Peace Program, as well as to his proposals for necessary and possible future directions for expanding PFP cooperation with Ukraine. Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall frames the discussion of military cooperation with Ukraine by highlighting the importance of coalition operations in future NATO missions. Major General Nicholas Krawciw, U.S. Army, Ret. provides an overview of peacekeeping and joint military operations generally, as well as U.S., NATO, and Ukrainian experiences with and lessons from such operations.

Dr. Gloria Duffy and Dr. Serhiy Galaka provide us with perspectives on the long-term future of Ukraine-NATO relations. While both discuss key issues for Ukraine’s integration into Europe, Galaka views Ukraine’s long-term security interests from the ever important perspective of traditional geostrategic issues, while Duffy turns her focus to some of the emerging concerns of economic security and emerging threats.

Ambassador Yuri Shcherbak draws on his experience as statesman and scholar to provide a thoughtful closing presentation. He discusses Ukraine’s future through the lens of its history, taking a pragmatic and hopeful look at his country’s interests and options as it moves into the next century.

Following the workshop, we, as its chairs, prepared our own report, which you will find following this summary of our proceedings. The specific policy recommendations we make, although informed by the discussions throughout our workshop, reflect the views of the authors, rather than a general group consensus. Thus, responsibility
for the recommendations is the authors’ alone. In our report, we focus on making some concrete recommendations for implementing the NATO-Ukraine Charter into the next century. These recommendations reflect our strong and abiding belief that the overriding goal of those committed to shaping future Ukraine-NATO relations must be to make Ukraine’s partnership with NATO as similar to membership as possible.

Ashton B. Carter
Steven E. Miller
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall
Workshop Report

Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Partnership Between Ukraine and NATO
Washington D.C., April 8-9, 1998

Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Dr. Steven E. Miller, and Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

Premises

The following premises provide the foundation for thinking about the future Ukraine-NATO relationship:

1. An independent, stable and secure Ukraine is a central player in the new Europe. Its size, geographic position, economic and military potential, relationship with Russia, and other connections to its regional neighbors make it a pivotal factor in the security order in Eurasia. A secure and stable Ukraine is a prerequisite to successfully promoting security and stability in the entire region.

2. Ukraine’s courage in acceding to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons demonstrated its commitment to playing a leadership role in the international community, and opened the door to a new relationship between Ukraine and the West.

3. This new relationship between Ukraine and the West holds great promise that must be fulfilled.

4. As the primary institution for addressing security in the new Europe, NATO must play a leading role in fulfilling this promise. One of its core missions in the post-Soviet era is to promote peace, cooperation and stability for the whole of Europe.

5. NATO cannot fulfill this mission solely by offering membership to a small number of states from Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, for the foreseeable future, the number of new members will be far exceeded by the number of countries with which security partnerships that do not entail NATO membership must be broadened and deepened. It is therefore at least equally important that NATO forge strong ties with the much larger number of Eurasian states that will not become members of NATO in the years immediately ahead. Ukraine is an obvious and compelling case in point.
6. This task represents a significant challenge for NATO. It deserves attention comparable to that devoted to enlargement, and a commensurate investment of political, economic and military resources.

7. The mechanism for bringing non-members into close and meaningful relationships with NATO already exists: NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, in which all the states of Central and Eastern Europe already participate. PFP is not a peripheral activity for NATO; indeed, it will increasingly involve the core functions of the Alliance. Indeed, because NATO's mission is evolving to emphasize coalition operations in addition to its founding function of homeland defense, combined task forces including non-members drawn from the Partnership for Peace will play a central role. Thus, the distinction between full membership and partnership will be less important. Over the next few years, the success or failure of PFP will be more important to NATO's mission of promoting peace and security across Europe than the integration of three new members into the alliance.

8. Ukraine's security and stability, and its relationship to NATO, also depends upon its successful achievement of economic reforms commensurate with the progress it has made toward political reform since independence.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Making the NATO-Ukraine Charter Real

- The July 9, 1997 signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine was an important step, but only the first step, in institutionalizing the growing NATO-Ukraine relationship. Ensuring that the Charter is meaningful depends on concrete implementation of the cooperation called for in that document.

- NATO and Ukraine should seek to make the next stage of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO as similar to membership in NATO as possible. Both the NATO-Ukraine Charter and Partnership for Peace Program permit and encourage this.

- This requires that NATO and its individual members allocate the appropriate resources, human and material, to the fulfillment of the promise of the Charter. Scarce resources continue to be a major impediment to enhanced cooperation.
• Constructing a close and meaningful relationship between Ukraine and NATO also depends on the Ukrainian government’s commitment to creating a NATO-oriented military. **Ukraine must therefore integrate its goals for partnership with NATO with its plans for defense reform and national economic planning. NATO and its members must encourage and support military reform efforts in Ukraine.**

• NATO and Ukraine should establish a system of review and evaluation of their relationship, such as through a working-level steering group involving representatives of NATO member countries and Ukraine. The goal of this group will be to draw key lessons from every event and exercise and to continually prepare, revise, and implement recommendations for next steps and solutions to problems.

_Ukraine and Partnership for Peace: Lessons Learned and Next Steps_

• Partnership for Peace should be the core component of Ukraine’s engagement with NATO. **Ukraine’s objective should be to demonstrate that PFP offers a mechanism for minimizing the distinction between membership and partnership with NATO.**

• To achieve this objective, Ukraine must fully exploit the opportunities provided by PFP. There is a general view, including in Ukraine, that so far this has not been the case, despite Ukraine’s early embrace of PFP and despite a respectable participation in PFP to date.

• To better utilize PFP, Ukraine must establish unequivocally that **full participation represents one of Kyiv’s main foreign and defense policy initiatives and this priority must be institutionalized within the relevant portions of the Ukrainian government.**

• In addition, Ukraine’s exploitation of PFP will be enhanced if the Ukrainian government develops a strategic plan to guide its PFP participation. Since resource constraints will likely prevent Ukrainian participation in every PFP activity, it is vitally important that Ukraine develop priorities that enable it to select those activities that most promote the development of closer relations with NATO. This should be undertaken as part of the effort to reform and improve defense planning in Ukraine.

• Ukraine should seek to identify and exploit areas of comparative advantage that allow it to contribute to NATO’s activities and operations. Examples include: allowing the use of Ukrainian air
space for training of NATO air forces; encouraging the use of training sites in Ukraine (such as Yavoriv) for NATO training and for PFP exercises; or use of Ukrainian territory or facilities for transit or staging of NATO forces involved in operations in Southeastern Europe. NATO should encourage such steps by providing support for refurbishment of Ukrainian facilities. Ukraine should take advantage of the fact that the NATO infrastructure program is open to PFP partners.

- Ukraine and NATO should seek to include all branches of the Ukrainian military in PFP activities.
- Ukraine needs to reach status of forces agreements that facilitate NATO PFP activities in Ukraine and Ukrainian participation in activities on the soil of other states.
- Full Ukrainian participation in PFP requires the active building of bilateral and multilateral relations with NATO members and PFP partners. The Joint Ukrainian-Polish Peacekeeping Battalion is an excellent example of the sort of cooperation we must encourage and it should be seen as a model for other peacekeeping units involving two or more NATO/PFP states. Such initiatives should benefit from NATO encouragement and material and technical support.
- PFP exercises involving NATO, Ukraine, and Russia would contribute to regional security in the eastern half of Europe.
- Ukrainian participation in PFP will be facilitated by the ongoing growth of the bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian military relationship. Both governments should continue to give priority to the further development of these ties and to identifying cooperative initiatives that are complementary to Ukraine's objectives within PFP. Further, a clearinghouse mechanism should be established so that NATO planners know the content of bilateral initiatives, and can therefore accord bilateral initiatives appropriate credit toward PFP goals.

Peacekeeping and Joint Military Operations: Lessons Learned and Next Steps

- In our judgment, NATO’s future operations will rely increasingly on military "coalitions of the willing," which in NATO parlance are called Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). In seeking to make its experience as similar to membership as possible, Ukraine should position itself at the heart of NATO's future.
- Ukraine and NATO should therefore attach the highest priority to enhancing Ukraine’s ability to participate in NATO CJTFs.
Indeed, the Charter calls for Ukrainian participation "at an early stage." An ambitious but necessary five year goal should be to make it possible for NATO to turn to the Ukrainian military as it is planning for an operation and say: "We need Ukraine to participate in this CJTF."

- Ukraine was an early participant in NATO's Bosnia peacekeeping operations. In order to draw full benefit from the Bosnia experience and build on it for future operations, NATO and Ukraine need to undertake an honest and candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Ukrainian contribution. Improvement in Ukraine's ability to contribute to peacekeeping and other joint operations will derive most directly from identification of the problems and weaknesses revealed in Bosnia. There is a strong mutual interest in confronting and eventually eliminating such shortcomings.

- Interoperability is only partly a matter of military equipment, and even more is a matter of language, training, and doctrine. From this reality flow several other points:
  - The development of Ukraine’s relations with NATO has been inhibited by the scarcity of personnel, especially in the senior officer corps, who speak English. NATO and Ukraine should give priority to language training, with the objective of spreading basic proficiency in English widely throughout the Ukrainian officer corps. This is both important and inexpensive.
  - NATO and the U.S. should further develop the existing range of training programs for Ukrainian personnel, which already include internships, courses, and study at Western military institutions. These should be complemented with in-country advisors from NATO-member states and Ukraine-NATO teams of working-level experts which will together seek solutions to specific challenges.
  - NATO and the U.S. can support the refinement of Ukraine’s own military education procedures to ensure efficiency and interoperability, such as by providing advice on the training of NCOs in a variety of specialties and helping to define a curriculum for Ukrainian junior officers which will ensure that they complete their training with strong practical and leadership skills.
  - NATO and the United States should share with Ukraine the handbooks and training materials developed to educate NATO officers on peacekeeping and other joint operations.
  - Ukraine should create a prestigious NATO career track for its military officers. The goal should be to provide as many
officers as possible with extensive involvement in NATO, so that NATO doctrine, procedures, and terminology become not merely familiar, but second nature.

⇒ Ukraine should aim to expand the number of troops and units that have had the experience of operating jointly with NATO. It is not desirable that the same troops and units are always allocated to collaborative efforts with NATO. Rather, Ukraine's armed forces should have the widest possible exposure to NATO.

- NATO and Ukraine should undertake a joint assessment of equipment in the inventories of former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in order to evaluate which of this equipment can be modernized to NATO standards. Undertaking such upgrades could have the additional benefit of providing an opportunity for Ukraine's defense industry, and perhaps thereby generate revenue that can be devoted to NATO-related activities.

- Ukraine's role as a template for NATO relationships with its partners should be developed in this sphere, just as it is developed in the context of PFP cooperation. Testing modalities of operations in CJTF mode with members and non-members should be a goal of both Ukraine and NATO.

The Long-Term View (and its implications for the present)

- Over the next five years, Ukraine's minimum goal should be to build the closest possible relationship with NATO short of membership. This means maximum exploitation of PFP, and the fullest possible cooperation between Ukraine and NATO on the fulfillment of new NATO missions, such as CJTF deployments.

- Over that same period, Ukraine's maximum goal should be to put itself in a position in which it has thoroughly prepared the way to opt for membership in NATO if it so chooses.

- Achieving these objectives will require progress in four broad areas over the coming years:

  1. **Ukraine must reform.** Ukraine must, on an urgent basis, undertake both economic and military reforms that make it more compatible with and attractive to its NATO partners. Revitalizing the economy will allow Ukraine to be more fully integrated with its European neighbors, and will also increase Ukraine's ability to devote financial resources to reforming its military and developing its relationship with NATO.
2. **Ukraine must create a NATO-oriented military.** Full partnership with NATO requires that Ukraine’s military develop the ability to collaborate seamlessly with NATO and to participate in multinational NATO operations. This means that in the coming years Ukraine must aim for the following objectives:

- An officer corps in which English is widely spoken.
- An officer corps most of which has participated with NATO in PFP or other activities.
- An officer corps that regards positions in NATO as a route to promotion and career success.
- An officer corps that is familiar with NATO planning processes and the institutionalization of these processes in a reformed Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
- An officer corps that is familiar and comfortable with NATO doctrine.
- A Ukrainian military all elements of which have been exposed to cooperation with NATO.
- A security establishment in which the principle of democratic control of the military is firmly entrenched.

3. **Ukraine must establish a pattern of deep and regular collaboration with NATO.** The route to full partnership with NATO, and to the development of a NATO-oriented military, involves institutionalizing cooperation between Ukraine with NATO. This means that Ukraine should seek the following:

- It should play a leadership role in PFP and within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).
- It should seek opportunities to activate the consultative mechanism provided for by the Charter.
- It should hope to become a normal and desirable participant in NATO CJTFs.
- It should avail itself of all opportunities to provide officers for staff positions in Brussels.
- It should participate annually in major PFP exercises and annually host at least one major PFP exercise in Ukraine.
- Within five years, NATO utilization of training facilities in Ukraine should be well established.

4. **Ukraine and its NATO partners must build the domestic political basis for close Ukraine-NATO relations.** At a minimum, this will require:
A campaign of public education in Ukraine, so that the population better understands the new NATO and its benefits for Ukraine. Absent such education, the Ukrainian public is likely to remain ambivalent about the hard choices and resource allocations required to support the ambitious goals laid out in this report.

Efforts to increase the appreciation within all the relevant NATO member and partner countries about the importance of the Ukraine-NATO relationship and the necessity to devote appropriate resources to the development of that relationship. The U.S. Congress must be a high-priority target, as U.S. leadership will be essential to the full blooming of the Ukraine-NATO relationship. As a first step, key congressional staff should be invited to observe NATO activities in which the Ukrainian military features prominently.

- For both Ukraine and its NATO partners, efforts to achieve these long term objectives will be constrained by the limited availability of political and financial resources. NATO and Ukraine should both work to ensure that resources available for developing NATO-Ukraine relations are commensurate with the importance of this relationship. This requires the development of a multi-year strategic plan to which the Ukrainian government, NATO's leadership, and individual allies commit themselves. Furthermore, beginning with FY99, the U.S. Congress should establish a long-term vehicle for funding bilateral and multilateral (PFP) military cooperation programs to further these goals. Additionally, NATO and Ukraine should explore possible additional sources of funding for PFP and related activities. For example, European Union assistance programs may offer a complementary source of support for the reform goals being pursued by NATO and Ukraine.

- NATO and Ukraine each hold a set of keys to Europe's future. NATO will continue to serve as the primary source of security and military coordination between the United States and Europe. Ukraine has the potential to evolve into a major force for stability and cooperation on the continent. Development of a strong and sustainable partnership between NATO and Ukraine should therefore remain a high priority in Brussels, in Washington, and in Kyiv, as well as in other NATO member and partner capitals. The relationship between NATO and Ukraine should be a model for other European countries seeking to develop post-Cold War security identities.
Let me begin by conveying to all of you greetings from Secretary Albright. She is today briefly back in Washington between trips, and she asked me this morning to stress the significance that she attaches to the issues you’ll be discussing over the next two days. It was almost exactly a month ago that the Secretary was in Kyiv for what she regarded as a highly productive visit. She believes that the partnership between NATO and Ukraine is vitally important to our effort to help build a Europe that is whole and free, prosperous and at peace for the first time in its history.

The means for achieving that goal, as we see it, are largely institutional—or, as is often said, architectural. The task of constructing a new Europe requires us to adapt existing structures where possible and to build new ones where necessary. The size, scope, job descriptions and membership lists of these institutions are different, but their missions and their compositions are often overlapping. In some key respects, they are mutually reinforcing. Together, they make up the superstructure of the new Europe.

NATO has a unique role to play in this overall scheme because it alone has military muscle. As we’ve seen, that particular form of strength is still necessary in post-Cold War Europe. From Bosnia, Croatia, Albania and Kosovo in the Balkans to Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Caucasus, more Europeans have died violently in the last five years than in the previous forty-five.

Had it not been for NATO’s exertion of force in 1995, Bosnia today would still be at war. And, of course, NATO has not acted alone. The Implementation and Stabilization Forces in Bosnia have drawn on the military manpower and resources of partner countries
that were, only a decade ago, part of the Warsaw Pact. Ukraine was among the earliest contributors to the peace efforts in Bosnia and Croatia, and it has paid a sad price in the loss of some of its finest young men.

But NATO is not just a military organization; it is also a political one; it is a catalyst for strengthening—and extending—the values, the institutions, and the ideas that the member-states have in common: democracy, rule of law, respect for human and civil rights, tolerance of ethnic and religious differences, and civilian control of the military.

NATO has always had that political function and responsibility, including in its old, Cold War incarnation. In the ’50s, the Alliance provided the security umbrella under which Germany and France could achieve their historic reconciliation.

Today, NATO fosters integration and cooperation between what we used to think of as East and West. The expansion of NATO has already been a powerful factor in cementing the reconciliation between Germany and Poland.

And the very prospect of NATO membership has encouraged positive, peaceful trends in Central and Eastern Europe. Partly in pursuit of their goal to join NATO, a number of Central European states have intensified their internal reforms and improved their relations with each other. The recent accords between Romania and Hungary are one example. Another is the improvement in relations between Romania and Moldova. And still another is the beginning of negotiations between Romania and Ukraine on the complex issue of exploitation rights on the Black Sea shelf. In fact, all Ukraine’s western neighbors have resolved disputes and improved relations with Ukraine and with each other. In that respect, NATO enlargement has already contributed substantially to Ukraine’s security.

But for this salutary dynamic to continue, the door that the Alliance leadership opened last July in Madrid must remain open. Were it to be otherwise—were the door to swing shut behind Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, or were it to swing shut behind the second tranche of new members—the Alliance and its enlargement would not only fail to be a force for integration; it would become the opposite: it would create a new dividing line, a new Iron Curtain, a new gray zone, a new strategic limbo, only further to the East. It would foment among the nations that were excluded mutual suspicion, mili-
tary competitiveness, insecurity, instability, perhaps even disintegration and violence.

Hence the principle of the open door. The NATO Summit in Madrid last year affirmed that principle, and the NATO Summit here in Washington a year from now will reaffirm it.

A corollary to the open door is the principle that every sovereign state has the right to decide on how it wishes to provide for its own security. That includes the right to decide on its relationship to NATO. Some countries aspire to full membership. Others prefer to remain non-aligned but to cooperate with NATO.

Either way, NATO will respect their decision. The Alliance, of course, has its own say in what sort of relationship it develops with non-member states. But defining that relationship is exclusively a transaction between NATO and the country in question. No third party has a veto. That principle is enshrined in several bedrock OSCE documents: the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Charter of Paris of 1990 and the Budapest Summit Declaration of 1994. And, not incidentally, it was reaffirmed in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris last May.

Russia and Ukraine have both said that they do not seek entry into the Alliance at this time. Whatever their future position on this issue, we hope that both governments will see that, in practice as well as in theory, enlargement is not a threat to any non-member of the Alliance; rather, the process reinforces security and stability across the whole of Central Europe. It was aggression and conflict in that region, after all, that drew the Ukrainian and Russian people into two world wars in this century.

Let me be very clear: We respect and accept Ukraine’s position that NATO membership is not on its agenda at this time, just as we respect and accept similar positions on the part of Sweden, Finland and other countries. But we also believe that should Ukraine one day decide to seek entry into the Alliance, the door will remain open.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has decided that it wants a Distinctive Partnership with NATO, and NATO has agreed. As several people here know, a lot of work went into the selection of that word “distinctive.” Some of us literally thumbed through the Thesaurus to make sure we ended up with exactly the right adjective. Part of the task—strategic as well as semantic—was to ensure that the NATO-Ukraine relationship had independent, indeed distinctive significance, while taking into
account the importance—to the U.S., to Ukraine, to NATO—of Russia’s own evolving relationship with the Alliance.

This was simply the latest manifestation of a now-familiar challenge—managing the trilateral, or triangular, relationship among the U.S., Ukraine and Russia. Minister Buteyko, Ambassador Tarasyuk, Ash Carter, Bill Miller, Bob Hunter and I have been working together on that exercise in complex geometry since early in 1993—and to good effect, I think.

Under both Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma, Ukraine has been generally supportive of NATO’s effort to reach out to Russia—and rightly so. After all, it is very much in Ukraine’s interest that Russian reform and integration with the West remain on course.

Despite this general and very welcome Ukrainian support for NATO’s expanding partnership with Russia, there has been a tendency among some of our Ukrainian friends to compare the particulars of that partnership too directly, and too competitively, with Ukraine’s own growing cooperation with the Alliance. President Clinton and his fellow leaders of the Alliance see NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Russia as separate initiatives that are both of vital importance to the Alliance and to the future of Europe. They are committed to letting each relationship take its own shape at its own pace in the months and years ahead.

They are also committed to supporting and encouraging close ties between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. We salute both governments for the impressive progress they have made toward that goal, particularly in the Treaty on Cooperation and Friendship that they signed in May of last year. That breakthrough will help buttress the architecture of the new Europe.

It was not coincidental that Ukraine and Russia signed their treaty the same month that NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act. The Ukraine-Russia Treaty helped establish a solid underpinning for the Madrid Summit in July, at which President Kuchma joined President Clinton and the other 15 Alliance leaders in signing the NATO-Ukraine Charter. In other words, together—in their sequencing and in their interlocking contents—the Treaty, the Founding Act and the Charter were a classic example of structurally sound diplomatic and security architecture.

Since Madrid, we’ve been making good on the promise of the Charter. In December we held the first Ministerial-level meeting in
Brussels of the our new consultative forum—the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Boris Tarasyuk and Bob Hunter were instrumental in getting the Commission up and running. Building on their good work, we’ve continued to broaden the dialogue between our senior governmental leaders, our ambassadors, our experts, and our military officers. We’ve also expanded NATO’s contact with the Ukrainian people through the Alliance’s Information Office in Kyiv, the first such facility in any country inside or outside the Alliance.

During her visit to Kyiv last month, Secretary Albright discussed the growing relationship between NATO and Ukraine in her meetings with President Kuchma and other Ukrainian leaders.

So all in all, we’re off to a good start. But we’ve got to intensify our efforts to translate dialogue—which, by definition, is mostly talk—into practical, tangible programs and initiatives that will bring the Alliance and Ukraine closer together in meaningful and mutually beneficial ways. We must move from blueprints to masonry and carpentry.

That’s the sort of activity that goes on in a workshop—and that, appropriately, is what you’re calling this conference. I notice from your agenda that the next session is on “making the NATO-Ukraine Charter real,” and that the one after that is on Ukraine’s role in the Partnership for Peace.

I’d suggest that those two topics are closely related, if not identical, because the most immediate and useful thing we can do to make the NATO-Ukraine Charter real is to ensure that Ukraine—the first former Soviet republic to join PFP in 1994—intensifies its participation. I realize that Ukraine wants to move beyond PFP to a new, genuinely “distinctive” level of cooperation, but before that can happen, Ukraine must take full advantage of the opportunities it already has before it.

Just as one example, we hope Ukraine will accept the Alliance’s invitation to station a second Ukrainian officer at the Partnership Coordination Cell at SHAPE. That would allow Ukraine to step up its involvement in joint planning between the Alliance and the Partners on projects like SFOR in Bosnia and NATO-sponsored PFP exercises. There are numerous additional ways in which we can do more and do it faster, which I’m sure Frank Miller, General Krawciw, and Jeff Starr will want to discuss during your workshops.

In the remaining minutes of these remarks, I would like to turn from the purely military dimension of Ukraine’s security to the politi-
cal and economic dimensions, which are no less important and, I'm sorry to say, considerably more difficult.

Walking toward the open door of NATO—or, for that matter, the EU, the OECD, the WTO or any other of the core institutions that bind together the successful democracies of today's world—is a daunting challenge for a country as disadvantaged by history as Ukraine. It requires changing the entire shape and direction of society. That means courageous, forward-looking leadership from the top; it means making hard, often painful choices; and it means earning, and maintaining, the support of citizens who have only recently, for the first time in their lives, been empowered with the right to vote in real elections.

One of those elections took place ten days ago, on Sunday, March 29. Nearly 70% of the electorate voted for parliamentary, municipal, and local officeholders. The polling was far from flawless, but international observers have pronounced the preliminary results generally free and fair.

Thus, for the second time since independence, Ukraine has peacefully chosen its political representatives by democratic means. That is a milestone for any young democracy. It's not just the first election but the second and the third and the fourth that begin to make voting a habit—the breathing in and breathing out of the body politic.

These latest elections also suggest that Ukrainians are dealing with their ethnic and cultural differences through peaceful, democratic means. Exit polls indicate that members of the Russian- and Polish-speaking minorities tended to vote for candidates on the basis of their stand on issues, not on the basis of their ethnicity. This, too, is good news. It helps rebut the prophets of doom who, not long ago, predicted that it would be on the rocks of ethnic separatism that the Ukrainian ship of state would founder.

And so the elections a week and a half ago were a step forward—albeit a rather wobbly one—in the process of Ukrainian democratization.

The actual results of the elections, however, are more problematic. Let me offer a few carefully chosen words about those results, mindful that the choices the Ukrainian people made on March 29th were theirs and no one else's to make.

Overall, close to sixty percent of the total vote went to centrist or reformist candidates. But the Communist Party led the balloting in a
majority of localities and won the largest bloc of seats in the Verkhovna Rada. Quite clearly, the Communists and a number of other anti-reform parties were successful in tapping into widespread popular discontent with declining living standards and rising corruption and crime.

We in the U.S. Government are continuing to observe and assess the results of the election and its aftermath. As we do that, we are keeping in mind a number of factors. Let me touch upon several.

First, the ability of the Communist Party—or anyone else—to turn back the clock is severely limited. Ukraine’s continuing need for access to international investment capital and development assistance is stronger than the siren song of a certifiably bankrupt ideology. The GDP has declined by 60% since 1991, and recent risky ventures into international financial markets have further burdened the country with massive short-term debt at high interest rates. Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have made clear that they will withhold further support until Ukraine makes progress on a number of long-postponed economic reforms, particularly the restructuring of the energy and agricultural sectors and the imposition of greater discipline in government spending.

There is another point we should all keep in mind as we assess the election. It is not unheard of for a party, even though it calls itself Communist, to adjust to the realities of the present rather than falling back on the failed policies of the past. For example, in both Lithuania and Poland, the Communist Parties’ experience with the responsibilities of governance has transformed them into something like mainstream social democratic parties. And in Hungary, the Socialists—the successors of the Communist Party—have implemented the most far-reaching privatization program in the former COMECON space. Moreover, it was the Socialists in Hungary and their confrères (I’ll resist saying comrades) in Poland who negotiated their countries’ terms of accession for entry into NATO and who paved the way for accession negotiations with the European Union.

Of course, the Ukrainian Communist Party is by no means a clone of those other parties. It exists in different circumstances, and it has its own track record and platform. And those are none too encouraging. The Ukrainian Communists have worked with other so-called leftist parties in the Rada to block many of the reforms that Ukraine needs most. What’s more, the Communists’ stated policy goals include the
reversal of some key elements of Ukraine’s privatization program, the partial renationalization of industry and the banking system and the reconstitution of something that sounds ominously like the Soviet Union.

This doesn’t mean that the Communist Party now rules Ukraine. Far from it. It does mean, however, that President Kuchma is faced with the daunting challenge of trying to reunite the fractured political center, even as he works with the Left to get economic reform moving again. We will do everything we can to help. But we need Ukraine’s leaders to help us help them. A particularly important area of concern is the country’s openness to foreign investment and international business.

As many of you are aware, our Congress has mandated that unless Secretary Albright can certify by the end of this month that there has been “significant progress” on a number of specific disputes involving the entry of U.S. firms into the Ukrainian market, American assistance to Ukraine will be drastically reduced. We currently have a team in Kyiv reviewing the facts and the trends. I will be honest: last week, Ukraine’s senior economic team—led by Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Reform Tyhypko—was in Washington, and what we heard from them was not very encouraging.

Let me stress a key point that everyone should keep in mind as the U.S. and Ukraine work together on this issue over the next several weeks: our goal is not only to insure a level playing field for American business in Ukraine; equally important is the need to encourage reforms that will allow Ukraine to attract the foreign investment it so desperately needs.

We are well aware that the Ukrainian economy will not evolve—or, for that matter, deteriorate—in a political vacuum. Quite the contrary, Ukrainian democracy faces its next test in 18 months, in the October 1999 presidential election. Politicians from across the political spectrum, in both the legislative and executive branches, may be tempted to defer difficult decisions so that they can say and do things that they believe will earn favor with the voters. To put it bluntly, that is time that Ukraine simply does not have to waste. And we can only hope that elected officials will see that wasting time is bad politics, since a year and a half of finger-pointing, demagogy, empty promises and inaction on economic reform will only make things worse in October of 1999, not better.
So the choice that Ukraine faces today is not really between reform on the one hand and, on the other, a return to what the Communists may have advertised as the good-old-days of the Soviet system; rather, it is a choice between forward movement and stagnation, between developing traction and remaining stuck in a deepening rut.

That brings me back to the principal topic of this conference: Ukraine's security. The interplay between the workings of Ukrainian politics and the Ukrainian economy is very much a security issue, and right now, it is a security vulnerability.

In its foreign policy, Ukraine has moved forward. Many in this room have helped to make that progress possible by steadily improving Ukraine's relations with its neighbors and with the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole. But as a result of what it has done—and, more to the point, not done—within its own borders, Ukraine has inhibited its ability to do two things which are, quite simply, vital for its own long-term viability: provide a prospect of prosperity for its own now-enfranchised citizens and integrate with the outside world. These twin disabilities put Ukrainian security itself in jeopardy. That's because Ukraine is not just a new state—it is in certain respects a fragile one. And the biggest source of its fragility today is an economy that is failing to produce the kind of benefits that people in other post-Communist societies have begun to take for granted and that repels rather than attracts foreign investment.

All this is a very real cause for concern about what lies ahead for Ukraine. But there are reasons for optimism as well. On more than one occasion, the Ukrainian government, with the support of the Ukrainian people, has made courageous, far-reaching choices that have contributed in fundamental ways to their own well-being, to regional stability and to the good of the international community at large. That was true of the peaceful way in which Ukraine gained its independence in 1991. It was true of Ukraine's decision in 1994 to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state, and more recently it has been true of Ukraine's principled decision to cease all cooperation with Iran's nuclear program. Another cause for gratification and congratulation is the way in which Ukraine has resolved ethnic differences within its borders and reached out across divides of history and geography to its neighbors, particularly Russia.

These achievements—these examples of national and international good-citizenship—are reasons for what might be called strate-
gic optimism with regard to Ukraine’s future. They are also tangible incentives for the major industrialized democracies to persist in their supportive engagement with Ukraine.

As for the United States, as long as Ukraine moves forward with economic and political reform, we will maintain the wide array of programs and initiatives that have made Ukraine the fourth largest recipient of American assistance in the world—and the number one recipient in the former Soviet Union. We will also continue to provide expertise and ideas through the U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission led by President Kuchma and Vice President Gore, which has already proved itself as a valuable mechanism for cooperation on a broad range of important issues since it was created just under a year ago.

By the way, the Vice President and President Kuchma had an extremely good telephone conversation earlier today. It was clear that Mr. Kuchma is anything but discouraged. Quite the contrary, he conveyed to the Vice President a determination to meet all the difficulties Ukraine faces—political and economic—and to continue leading the country in the right direction.

We will be at Ukraine’s side as he does so. We will sustain our effort to help integrate Ukraine more fully into international institutions and structures. That means further collaboration in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and in the OSCE. It means continuing to work with Ukraine toward eventual membership in the World Trade Organization, the Central European Free Trade Area, the European Union and the OECD. And, of course, we will continue our joint construction project to build a distinctive partnership between Ukraine and NATO.

We will do all that because so much depends on our success helping Ukraine achieve its own best aspirations for itself. That brings me, in conclusion, back to what, for us, is a first principle: an independent, unitary, secure, democratic, prosperous, self-confident, integrated Ukraine is a keystone in the architecture of this new Europe. I borrow that metaphor from Sherm Garnett advisedly, knowing full well (as he does) that the keystone keeps in place the arch in architecture; if the keystone crumbles, the structure collapses. We cannot let that happen—for Ukraine’s sake, or for our own.

Thank you very much.
OPENING REMARKS

Making the NATO-Ukraine Charter Real

Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk*

Introduction and Background

Since the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO in the summer of 1997, a great deal has been achieved, but even more has yet to be done, in part to correct mistakes and misunderstandings of the past. I will begin my discussion with a short historical sketch of how the Charter came into being and move on from there to consider its implications and significance for the future.

You may know that the idea of such a relationship between Ukraine and NATO was first proposed by the President of Ukraine in June of 1995. It may be less well known, however, that of the two long years it took to make this idea a reality, 18 months were marked by a conspicuous lack of desire on the part of the Alliance to respond to our proposals.

Only after a clear policy had been developed for attracting and involving Russia in NATO affairs was attention turned to Ukraine. The traces of this blunder on the part of NATO are still present, to my sincere regret. It is particularly saddening because when the Charter was put to paper, it became obvious that this document and the preceding negotiations contributed not only to enhancing Ukraine’s cooperation with the Alliance, but also greatly promoted NATO-Russian and Ukrainian-Russian relations.

So, with a better vision, one that did not view Ukraine-NATO relations as a derivative of Russia-NATO relations, we could have achieved this progress much earlier. And this is not simply hindsight.

*Shortly after this workshop, on April 17, 1998, Ambassador Tarasyuk was named Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.
In fact, this argument was made to the Allies long before any real work on the Charter was begun.

The Charter and its preparation exercised a significant positive influence on regional stability. Besides improved relations with Russia, we also saw a breakthrough in our relations with NATO aspirant Romania. Without the Charter, we might not have treaties with Russia and Romania today. Together, we managed to find agreeable resolutions of all pending issues with our neighbors, something that was widely praised in Europe and which directly corresponds both to the goals of NATO and of Ukraine—to have a favorable security environment.

An impediment to Ukraine-NATO relations which has yet to be removed, however, is the rather inflexible mechanism for negotiations. Instead of direct discussion of contested issues, all communication has gone through the Secretariat, slowing the process. This approach surprises me, because it undermines the fundamental trust and mutual understanding we are working to build. But, having noted this criticism, I cannot but mention the invaluable assistance and cooperation, throughout the negotiations, of the U.S. Mission headed by the Honorable Ambassador Hunter who substantially contributed to our improved mutual understanding with NATO and to the resolution of many problems. I also cannot but mention the many of you present here who contributed to the success of our joint venture.

Finally, to conclude the retrospective portion of my presentation, I must say that the Ukrainian political elite has accepted the Charter as a positive and tangible force which supports Ukraine’s strategic foreign policy course. Of course, the leftists were and are worried by these developments because they ruin their hypothetical plans for a reunion with Russia. I do not believe they can have much influence on that issue with the population, which is already becoming much more receptive to an objective picture of NATO as the Alliance of democratic nations, because the people are also much more preoccupied with other things.

What Does the Charter Mean to Ukraine and to NATO?

The most important and immediate result for Ukraine of signing the Charter was that we left “the grey zone of security” and found our clear and stable place in the European security system—for today and for the near future, with an open possibility of membership. Not
a "bridge," not a "buffer-state," not a sphere of someone else's influence, Ukraine is an equal and reliable partner in a united Europe.

Another positive outcome of the Charter is that by signing this document the leading Western countries reached a consensus on their conceptual approach to Ukraine, for example, by recognizing Ukraine as an integral part of Central and Eastern Europe. This point may seem trivial to outsiders, but we know very well that this recognition is crucial to the definition of a great many aspects of Western policy towards Ukraine, far beyond the limits of the security issue. Here again, though, what unpleasantly surprises me is that the same countries that supported this attitude towards Ukraine from their perspective as NATO Allies are most reluctant to reconfirm it as EU members. This is illogical, worrying, and dangerous, because that reluctance and strange lack of political will fundamentally harms Ukraine's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions other than NATO.

For NATO, the Charter also means clarified status for an important partner as well as an understandable framework and established mechanisms for a more structured cooperation with that partner, enabling cooperation to develop further, faster, and more efficiently.

On the other hand, we must not overlook a few deficiencies of the Charter, the most obvious one being that this document fails to provide clear assurances of Ukraine's national security. I understand that it is a principle of NATO not to have half-members or half-hearted assurances. So, maybe it would, in fact, be easier to invite Ukraine to join NATO as a member and to thus close this issue once and for all. Seriously, I would like to draw your attention to the Crisis Consultative Mechanism, called for in the Charter, which is now being developed between us. It can help us to minimize the factors of instability which objectively still exist in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) area.

The Charter as Guidance for Planning and Activities

As I have already mentioned, the Charter provides a framework for a more structured and effective cooperation. Many existing activities and mechanisms flow directly from Charter implementation or are meant to further develop its provisions. Among these are:

- Establishment of the Ukrainian Mission to NATO, with a military representative component;
• Regular meetings of the established Ukraine-NATO Commission at the Ministerial and Ambassadorial levels;
• Annual Work Plans;
• The State Inter-Agency Commission of Ukraine, which coordinates, mobilizes, and obliges state bodies to implement official policy on closer cooperation with the Alliance;
• Coordinated activities of the NATO Information and Documentation Center (IDC) in Kyiv, with the close cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mission of Ukraine to NATO, and the NATO Office of Information and Press (OIP), aimed at promoting objective information about each other;
• The Joint Working Group on Defense Reform, which performs the valuable task of matching Ukraine’s acute needs with NATO and NATO members’ capabilities in the military reform sphere;
• Cooperation in Civil Emergency Planning, a program born of the Charter but now possessing its own more action-oriented guidance, a Memorandum of Understanding, and schedules for annual activities; and
• Joint exercises and peacekeeping, though not immediately linked to the Charter, through their intensity help to achieve a number of the Charter’s stipulated goals, such as interoperability and common standards for armaments. Most important, they are in full conformance with the spirit of the Charter, practically visualizing the essence of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) in its direct, and not only its institutional, meaning.

I could further expand this list, but it is already quite illustrative of how the Charter practically defines and guides us in our planning. On the other hand, we will never consider this document as something rigid and imperative for all time. On the contrary, it is quite flexible and leaves room for new approaches and sound creativity.

**Goals of the Charter**

One of the goals of the Charter, which was also clearly declared during the preparations for Madrid, is to combine the individual potential of all of the partners in order to achieve a higher, special level of cooperation with NATO, in addition to the format and substance proposed within PFP. The ultimate goal is achieving such intensity and volume of cooperation that it can be comparable to that with new members and candidates.
On the other hand, I should admit that the first months after Madrid showed that Ukraine was lagging behind in practical cooperation, which did not always correspond to the declared political objectives. Therefore, when elaborating the Work Plan for 1998, we aimed at a less ambitious volume of activities, but one which can be implemented more effectively. It is especially important to intensify cooperation in the military sphere, and I believe my colleagues from the Ministry of Defense will discuss a number of recent developments which definitively demonstrate the increasing scope of military activities between Ukraine and NATO.

Speaking in broader terms about better defining future goals initiated in the Charter, I believe that it is indispensable to review, evaluate, and enrich the very concept of our special partnership at least once a year.

**Bringing Goals into Line with the Charter**

We can and should change some of our concepts and attitudes to help release the Charter’s potential. In the first place, as I have mentioned, Ukraine-NATO relations should not be a background to or a shadow of NATO-Russia relations. To my regret, I believe that NATO is still not paying enough attention to Ukraine, or rather that it is afraid of doing anything more with Ukraine prior to having an analogous program already set up with Russia. I understand that NATO has its own priorities, among which Ukraine comes almost always after Russia.

But the Charter was not meant to push Ukraine behind Russia, to give it what is left after NATO has exhausted its arsenal of proposals with Russia. And I strongly believe that it is wrong to build relations with Russia at the expense of relations with Ukraine, at the expense of our national interests.

This seems a vicious circle. Being very well aware of the delicacy of dealing with our eastern neighbor, Ukraine has never taken any rash steps which would harm NATO-Russia relations. On the contrary, Ukraine is very much in favor of improving those relations. So, I see only two possible explanations of such behavior on NATO’s part: either it accepts Russian-imposed dictates not to get closer to Ukraine, or it is too weak and scared to make any moves which may “embarrass” Russia. In both cases, NATO does not come out looking particularly well.
I am not yet tired of repeating one obvious fact, that both relationships—with Ukraine and with Russia—have their own dynamics, nature, and goals, as well as completely different histories. Therefore it is impossible to link these relations conceptually. At the same time, it is always possible to see common ground for cooperation within EAPC. Ukraine is always open to any joint efforts with Russia or any other EAPC partner.

**What Should Be Done**

First of all, we should change the approaches and methods of our cooperation. We should be more flexible and more trusting with each other. I suggest that we cease communicating through the Secretariat, and instead get together directly. On some issues, when both sides agree on the development of one or another aspect of cooperation, it may be useful to work on this issue even before defining the common position of all Allies, to spare ourselves time and effort wasted on continual reformulation, reapproval, etc.

Second, I think it is high time that Ukraine initiate, on an ad hoc basis, invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to our bilateral NATO-Ukraine format.

I believe that the priority spheres for our practical cooperation with NATO should be military, economic, and informational activities, because their progress will first of all determine the readiness of Ukraine to become a full member of NATO: Success in military cooperation will help achieve interoperability and vitality of our Armed Forces, which will have to bear a major burden; recovery of Ukraine’s economy is seen as a prerequisite for a strong and lasting commitment to the goals shared with NATO, a perspective with which I agree; and unbiased information about NATO will break all stereotypes and change the mentality of the Ukrainians.

Finally, as I mentioned before, it is worthwhile to stop looking back at Russia, and truly recognize the “distinctiveness” of NATO relations with Ukraine. Let us transform speeches about the geopolitical place and role of Ukraine into concrete steps, which will make that role more visible.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, I would characterize Ukraine-NATO cooperation in the framework of the Charter for the last nine months as growing
and expanding in two major interrelated components. First, institutionalization of relations with the Alliance and establishment of new creative mechanisms promotes enhancement of practical cooperation. Second, and simultaneously, accumulation of joint experience and activities by means of that cooperation should naturally lead to a higher level of institutionalized relations. The continuation of these two processes is what I wish for all of us.

ADDENDUM

The Ukrainian Position on NATO

1. Ukraine considers NATO to be one of the most effective structures for maintaining stability and peace in Europe. As an organization uniting democratic nations, NATO is called upon to protect the socio-economic achievements of those nations and the supreme values of democracy, developing and enhancing them in the most sensitive sphere, which is security. We therefore see no threat in the process of NATO enlargement. Moreover, Ukraine supports NATO enlargement as a process of expression of the will of the peoples of those states that wish to join; and as a process of expanding the area of stability and strengthening of democracy.

Ukraine welcomes the fact that its immediate neighbors Poland and Hungary, as well as the Czech Republic, are to join NATO.

2. Ukraine’s Constitution and the Main Guidelines of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy, approved by the Verkhovna Rada, do not exclude Ukraine’s accession to security organizations in principle. That right of states is also enshrined in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. However, in view of a number of circumstances, the issue of Ukraine’s joining NATO is not on the agenda today, but is a prospect for the future.

Ukraine therefore is not applying to join NATO since, taking serious account of the situation, it considers such a step, without taking into account relevant conditions, to be premature, both for Ukraine and NATO. Ukraine sees these conditions as:

a. Readiness of Ukraine’s citizens and Ukrainian society as a whole for the country’s membership in NATO. Cooperation with NATO in the information field serves this purpose;

b. Readiness of Ukraine’s defense structures for cooperation with NATO partners, which we aim to achieve through our participation in PFP and through implementation of the Charter;
c. Adequate perception by neighboring states that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is a step towards further strengthening stability in the region;

d. Readiness of NATO members for Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance.

3. The strategic course of the President and Government of Ukraine for integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures therefore remains unchanged. The relevant provisions of the President’s State of the Nation Address to the Verkhovna Rada (1997) and the Program of Activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (1998) continue to govern action by the nation’s executive.
DINNER ADDRESS

Ukraine and Europe

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

The topic that I plan to address is not really “Ukraine and Europe.” Because Ukraine is a European state, it is in fact more appropriate to discuss “Ukraine in Europe.” And the question that I want to pose and to try to answer is this one: “What place in Europe should Ukraine occupy?”

As Europe itself changes dramatically, our concept of Europe is changing with it. It was not such a long time ago when here in America, when we spoke of Europe and used the term “Europe,” what we really meant was Western Europe. Only eight years ago, if someone said “America and Europe,” he really meant America and a small segment of Europe: Western Europe, which we called Europe. Everything else west and everything else east of the Elbe was Eastern Europe. Still further east was the Soviet Union. We forget today that the German Democratic Republic, in our thinking then, was in Eastern Europe. That is how we spoke, that is how we thought. Now today, what we think of as Eastern Europe is further east—but where? Western Europe today co-exists with Central Europe. “Europe” is really the combination of Western Europe and Central Europe: Western Europe is organized on a European basis and Central Europe is in the process of becoming a part of that Europe.

Where, then, is Ukraine? That is an important question, the answer to which will determine the future of Ukraine. Before trying to answer it, however, let me note that it is now commonplace to observe that independent Ukraine has transformed the geopolitical map of Europe by terminating the Russian Empire. Without Ukraine, the Russian empire is no longer an empire. Further, without Ukraine, if a Russian empire were to be re-established it would be a primarily Asian empire. Even the Russians realize that this would not be very good
for Russia. So, Ukraine has transformed the Russian Empire and eliminated it.

Ukraine plays a very important role in the CIS. Recently there has emerged a new acronym for something that exists within this CIS—GUAM: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. And before too long, probably, GUAM will not be GUAM but GUAMU, because Uzbekistan will also be associated with it. And that too is a very major impediment, a practical impediment, to the CIS becoming some sort of new, modernized, more flexible version of the USSR, that most recent incarnation of the Russian Empire.

There are two great historical dilemmas that in the course of this century Europe has been unable to resolve on its own. These are the dilemmas posed by the rise of disproportionate power of Germany and of Russia. The first, the rise of German power, was creatively, peacefully, and cooperatively resolved through NATO. If NATO did not exist, there would have been no Franco-German reconciliation. That is just a basic, fundamental, simple, yet extraordinary fact of life. Without NATO, there would have been no resolution of the Franco/German problem while with NATO, France and Germany can cooperate in creating Europe—the Europe that today extends from Western to Central Europe. It is also through NATO that German/Polish reconciliation is becoming a reality. Again, there would be no German-Polish reconciliation if there were no NATO, if Germany was not a part of NATO, and if Poland did not know that soon it, too, will be a NATO member.

The second tragic European problem which Europe has not been able to resolve on its own and has needed America to help it resolve, is now being partially resolved by independent Ukraine’s appearance on the geopolitical map of Europe. To say this is not to advocate Ukrainian-Russian hostility. Far from it, a good relationship between Ukraine and Russia is as important to the stability of the larger continental geographical area of Eurasia as American-Canadian friendship is to the stability of the Northern Hemisphere. But before this second problem of disproportionate Russian power is historically resolved in as final a fashion as the problem of German power has almost entirely been resolved within the European framework, three important conditions must be satisfied.

The first is that Ukraine must become a truly effective and organic part of Central Europe. Once that happens, Russia will become
the Eastern Europe of Europe—which is as it should be. For this to come into being, however, this goal must be sought deliberately through hard work by Ukraine and by others. This has practical implications. Ukrainian and Polish, Ukrainian and Romanian or perhaps Ukrainian, Polish, and Romanian cooperation must be deliberately fostered: politically, militarily, and socially. It is important that Ukraine become a fully active, formal, engaged participant in the Central European initiative. Ukraine has been moving into that framework. That is an important institutionalized definition of being a Central European country. Further, as Ukraine’s economy evolves, it is important that Ukraine be a full participant of CEFTA, the Central European Free Trade Area, for the economic relationships of Central Europe must be organic to true membership in that region.

In brief, it is important to create the objective reality of Ukraine’s definition as a Central European state. This isn’t merely a matter of rhetoric. It is a matter of engagement, orientation, and strategic priorities. Hand in hand with that goes the importance of Ukraine developing a relationship with Turkey, parallel to its relationships with Poland and Romania, through Poland with Germany, and also with the Czech Republic. Only then will the Black Sea region, which is part of central Europe, be stable; only then will Europe and the West more generally have access to the Caucasus; only then will the southern flank of Ukraine’s geopolitical existence be secure; and only then will Ukraine’s participation in Central Europe be geopolitically defined in an enduring fashion. These, in brief, are the objective requirements if our goal of seeing Ukraine become a Central European state is to be more than just a slogan.

Just as important, however, are the subjective requirements. These are a question of individual identity and culture. I think Ukraine is a Central European nation. I think Ukraine partakes of the western heritage. I think Ukraine is an integral part of the European civilization. For it to be real, however, it is important that the Ukrainians feel that way subjectively, consciously, assertively.

I have the strong feeling from my travels around Ukraine, that Ukrainians in Lviv feel that way instinctively, in their bones, that Ukrainians in Kyiv (and I am generalizing) think it politically and that Ukrainians in Kharkiv, in Donetsk, are very skeptical. And that is not surprising. The country has not been independent for long. It was intellectually decapitated as a matter of deliberate policy during the Stalin
years and beyond with the effect that the most able and energetic Ukrainians were either killed or magnetically attracted to Moscow and Russified.

This means that there must be a deliberate effort by the Ukrainian government and by the key institutions of the Ukrainian state to promote a consciousness of Ukrainian identity which can be tolerant linguistically and which should be tolerant ethnically, a Central European identity based on western heritage. This must be the job of the state, and also the job of the church. And I am still surprised that seven years after independence, the most important church in Ukraine has its headquarters in another capital. This, I think, is very strange.

It is also the responsibility of the armed forces. For the armed forces, particularly as they are still composed largely by draftees, are a very important instrument of civic education. One of the central roles, in my view, of the Ukrainian army today is to help create a special consciousness of Ukrainian identity which is distinctive, which has cultural content, and which is defined in a way that makes young Ukrainians feel instinctively part of the European community and certainly very much at home in Central Europe. Only if this is done will the subjective element of Ukrainian definition as a Central European state be enduring and lasting. And I think that is terribly important, because if Ukraine is not part of Central Europe, what is it part of? Eastern Europe? Well, we know who will be dominant in Eastern Europe in the new geography of Europe. And if not Eastern Europe then perhaps Eurasia? We also know very well what that means. Therefore, I think this is a terribly important condition that must be met if the problem of disproportionate Russian power is to be resolved and Ukraine is to fulfill its special role on the European scene.

The second condition that must be fulfilled is the credible and conclusive demonstration that Ukraine is not that which the Germans used to describe Poland as being during the interwar period. The German term for Poland between 1920 and 1939 was *saisonstadt*: a seasonal state, a temporary state. Some of you may read the magazine *SShA.* This is a rather important journal, published in another capital. During the summer of last year, shortly after the conclusion of Ukraine’s treaty of friendship with a neighbor, it ran two long articles on the subject of Ukraine. I suggest that every Ukrainian here read those two articles. Because he will learn from these two articles, which were published in this very important publication, that there is no
such thing as a Ukrainian nation, that there is no such thing as Ukrainian history, and that there is no such thing as a legitimate case for a separate Ukrainian state.

So, there are still doubts in some parts of the world as to whether Ukraine is here to stay or not. Our Chairman said Ukraine is here to stay. I agree with him, I want to agree with him, but it is not enough. It is important that everybody else feels that way and that is something that can be attained only by making Ukraine a viable, successful, prosperous participant in the international community. Ukraine has made great progress over the last six years, you have achieved universal international recognition and that is important. You have signed a number of agreements with important countries, including a special partnership with the U.S. You have a special status in NATO. You have proven that you are capable of being a democratic state. You are the most democratic state in the CIS. You are the only one that has had a genuinely free presidential election in which the president actually lost the election (which is a good test) and you have dealt well with linguistic and ethnic problems. But the socio-economic change so far can only, and very charitably, be described as ambivalent (and that is very charitably indeed).

There is a pervasive impression of stagnation, of lack of adequate change. Unfortunately, there is also a sense that determined energetic leadership in that area of activity has been lacking, that some of the other states have done better. This is already reducing dramatically congressional support and sympathy for Ukraine here in the U.S. and is becoming a serious problem. I think it could create real problems, for example, for the required certification of Ukraine’s eligibility for congressionally mandated U.S. assistance.

The recent elections in Ukraine are also worrisome in terms of their consequences. One cannot dismiss entirely the concern that Ukraine may still continue with essentially a politically paralyzed situation. Political paralysis will prevent the implementation of needed reforms, of new laws, of the kinds of initiatives that are necessary to shake up the system and release the vital energy of the Ukrainian people, to exploit the enormous resources that Ukraine possesses.

If you look at the talent of the Ukrainian people, their endurance, their patience, their intelligence, and if you look also at the natural resources of Ukraine, you expect to see a very successful European country. But socially it is not evident that Ukraine is, in fact, such a
country and, what is even more important, a great many Ukrainian people believe that independent Ukraine is not, in fact, successful.

I have looked very closely at Ukrainian public opinion polls. They show a very high level of social dissatisfaction. They show a level of nostalgia for the past which is dismaying. They show a disturbing percentage of people explicitly advocating a Belarus model of connection with Russia. And that is something one must be concerned about. For if political paralysis prevents movement on reforms, if it creates a political stalemate and socio-economic deterioration, then there are likely to be demands at some point, maybe within a year, for a referendum on the question of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia, and that would not be a healthy development. And in any case, even if that does not happen, but if Russia begins to develop well; if, let us say within a year or two or three, Russia has 5% per annum growth rate but Ukraine does not; I think there will be people who will be saying that Ukraine is a saisonstadt.

That means, very briefly, that there is a need for assertive leadership advocating reform in the name of defending Ukrainian independence, for that is the central issue at stake. I don’t want to use Yeltsin as an example, but Yeltsin scored a real coup several years ago when he succeeded in asserting himself against the Duma in the name of defending democracy. It may not have been an entirely accurate description of what was happening, but it was a great political coup. In the event of a stalemate later, or in order to avert the stalemate now, assertive political leadership is required, leadership that dramatizes the need for reform and that energizes the public to support it. I think that only in this way will Ukraine be truly successful and meet the second condition for its attaining its proper central role in Europe and for resolving thus the second of Europe’s two great dilemmas.

There is also a third condition, namely that in the meantime it is important for the United States to continue supporting Ukraine. We, too, must not let pessimism dominate our perspectives and we must not engage in petulant, punitive steps such as decertification.

Rather, we must realize that we are witnessing a long-term process, integral to the fundamental geopolitical change taking place in Europe, and one which we here in America must support. That change is the successful, continued, steadfast expansion of NATO and the gradual, more complicated and difficult expansion of the European Union.
I think we have to anticipate that the expansion of NATO this summer, after the various votes formalized in April, will entail at least two more paths, one perhaps southward, one perhaps northward, and perhaps some combination thereof. Expansion of the European Union will be slower and more complicated, but also will move in the eastern, northern and southern directions, and sometime, not too much beyond the next century, the expansion of NATO and the expansion of the EU will reach a stage when Ukraine will be in a position to decide what kind of institutional, organizational, and formal links it wishes to have with these bodies. While that will be the moment for a formal decision, one certainly cannot exclude earlier commitments to and indications of desire for this historical direction; it is not up to us to say to you when you should make that historic commitment.

I would think, however, that a Ukrainian who is 25 or 30 or younger would want to know where Ukraine is headed in his lifetime. I would also think that the sooner he knows that Ukraine sees its future as a Central European state firmly and institutionally involved in the larger European adventure, a state formally linked to a security system that gives security and democracy to its participants, the more confident he will feel about the kind of sacrifices that need to be made in the short run in order to make Ukraine a success in the long run, the kind of success that it deserves to be.

Notes
1. Delivered without formal text.
2. SShA—Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya (USA—Economics, Politics, Ideology) is published in Moscow by the USA Institute of the Academy of Sciences.
Ukraine and Partnership for Peace: Lessons Learned and Next Steps

Charles Dale*

Let me begin by providing a quick general overview of the current situation with Partnership for Peace (PFP). Nine months after Madrid, we remain deeply involved in developing and implementing the major elements of the enhanced Partnership that we defined last year. Some examples of our activity and accomplishments include the following:

- We have expanded the scope of the Partnership Work Plan to reflect the increased scope of an enhanced PFP. Exercises are widening to reflect the full range of the Alliance’s and its Partners’ new roles and missions in crisis prevention and crisis management.
- We have established eight Partner Staff Elements (PSEs) at NATO military commands. These PSEs involve Partner officers in the everyday work of the Alliance on PFP, such as planning activities and operations “inside the fence,” and, most importantly, in simply serving as international officers.
- The gap between the PFP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and NATO defense planning is being closed. Partnership goals, which are similar to Alliance force goals, and related ministerial guidance will be introduced into the PARP over the next year.
- We will reach agreement in time for the spring ministerials on the first PFP projects to use NATO Security Investment Funds, the old infrastructure program. This demonstrates NATO’s continuing capital investment in PFP.

*The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of NATO or of NATO member governments.
Thus, we see that a PFP-Plus is taking shape. This enhanced PFP will allow for a "razor-thin" difference between membership and Partnership in many areas of cooperation for nations seeking it.

What does this mean for the Partnership with Ukraine? In the first instance it means that our principal aim for Ukraine, with our policies and our assistance, must be to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by PFP-Plus for moving ever closer to the Alliance. Ukraine needs to be a leader in this Partnership. To do anything less would, in my view, severely challenge and possibly undermine the credibility of the Distinctive Partnership itself. To do this fully, however, will require concerted effort on the part of all the players. It will not happen automatically, and the Alliance cannot do it alone.

Let me suggest some objectives and offer some suggestions to help us chart the course for the future, specifically in PFP. First, we need to strengthen Ukraine’s current PFP program as the foundation for future cooperation. As is always the case, there is good news and bad news in our experience with PFP to date. We are off to a good start, but we do not have a perfect program and we certainly should not yet be satisfied with the situation.

Ukraine has placed a strong emphasis on exercises, with its troops participating in eight PFP exercises in 1997. Over the next several years, I foresee a qualitative improvement in the PFP exercise program. This means participating troops will have to be better prepared, trained and equipped. These more robust requirements, which in the NATO and PFP context are a national responsibility for each state, must be met.

Ukraine-NATO cooperation in civil emergency planning is on a solid footing. But here also, we must build on what we have accomplished. The MOU that was signed last December provides the necessary framework for doing so.

There would also appear to be scope for cooperation in the armaments field. Ukraine has proposed a joint effort to work NATO standards into its plans for modernizing its tank fleets, and NATO has proposed to consider developing a Partnership project in these areas. This would break new ground and should be pursued as a priority.

A major emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring that the PARP plays a bigger role in shaping the NATO-Ukraine relationship. PARP must be institutionalized in Ukraine’s defense planning process; some-
thing I am uncertain is the case today. PARP is about more than interoperability at the operational and unit levels. It is a way of doing business in the defense planning arena: it is about the need for long-range planning and a transparent defense budgeting system; it is about managing defense resources in general. This will become even more apparent as we introduce the enhanced PARP over the next several years. Thus, clearly, institutionalization is essential if Ukraine is to be a full player in that enhanced PARP. Ukraine must be prepared, for example, to make a contribution to the development of ministerial guidance, as it will be asked to do next spring. Several weeks ago, a NATO representative suggested that Ukraine needs to develop, through PARP, a defense planning community. That is indeed the enduring goal that I think we should aim for.

As we build this foundation for PFP with Ukraine, we need to address the obstacles that have gotten in the way of full implementation of Ukraine’s Individual Partnership Program (IPP) in the past. Almost fifty percent of the activities in the 1997 IPP were not implemented, in part because the 1997 IPP was not realistic. Thus, one clear lesson is that we must put together a more feasible program for 1998.

Further, several key areas of the IPP are not being addressed. An example is airspace management and air defense cooperation. Ukraine has not participated in the Cooperative Air Defense Program, which is run by the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC). This is a tailored program of activities and assessments conducted on a 16+1 basis, and should be a core element of Ukraine’s PFP program.

Ukraine, NATO, and the U.S. all have roles to play in bettering this situation. Within Ukraine, intra-government planning and coordination needs to be improved. The creation of several coordinating bodies in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, for instance, would be a great help. Further, appropriate resources must be made available. On NATO’s part, we need to take a more proactive role in managing the bilateral relationship with Ukraine. It is not good enough to let self-differentiation rule. Additionally, we must work to better target our advice and assistance. As for the U.S., it needs to continue its direct assistance program, and it should draw closer links between its other bilateral activities with Ukraine and the PFP program.

The bottom line is that we need to continue to build the PFP program and to address those issues that get in the way of full imple-
mentation and institutionalization of the PFP relationship in Brussels and in the capitals. If we do not do this, Ukraine will not be a full player in the process. We have already seen one consequence of Ukraine's not being ready to take full advantage of PFP-Plus. Ukraine has not responded to the call for officers to man the Partnership Staff Elements, a fundamentally important component.

Let me conclude by setting the objectives just outlined for PFP in a wider context. In my view, continued progress in economic and defense reform in Ukraine is essential to the full participation of that country in PFP. PFP, or more accurately the PFP process, is already making contributions in these areas and this effort needs to be moved forward with priority attention.

Last October, a joint NATO-Ukraine Seminar on Economic Security established an initial basis for ongoing discussions of economic issues. This seminar identified several areas for further work. Of these, two, the retraining of military personnel for civilian life and the implications of downsizing on the defense industrial base, are good examples of issues that could be addressed in the wider PFP/NAC context. We are also off to a good start on an initiative to assist Ukraine in its efforts to restructure its armed forces and to reform its defense establishment. A joint working group on defense reform has been established and has in its first meeting identified the potential scope and priorities for further work. These include:

- Improvement in civil-military relations. A critical need is the development of civilian expertise in defense and security matters in Ukraine;
- The need to develop an integrated political-military decision making system and an improved planning system;
- Management of the social aspects of restructuring;
- Improvement of the legal basis for democratic control of the armed forces;
- Improved training and readiness.

These are all examples of very important work which will largely be carried forward through PFP. It is a long-term effort, but one in which we nevertheless must make almost daily progress. Without such progress, the path to a full and rich NATO-Ukraine PFP relationship will be a difficult one.

I can summarize my remarks with a series of benchmarks for the way ahead for Ukraine and NATO. First, full Ukrainian participation
in an enhanced PFP is a must. Second, we need to strengthen and build on Ukraine’s current PFP program. PARP is one of the keys to this. Third, a combined effort will be required. The Alliance and PFP cannot do it all. Rather, much responsibility falls on the nations themselves. Ukraine is no exception and its resource allocations, too, will need to increase. Fourth and finally, it is imperative that we recognize that continued progress in economic and defense reform in Ukraine is necessary to underpin the practical cooperation with NATO under PFP, and it is imperative that we act to support this progress.
The title of this session reflects my view that it is the real world experience gained by our militaries in combined operations which makes the most valuable contribution towards the institutionalization and further development of the Ukraine-NATO relationship.

If we accept as an operating principle that our goal should be to make Ukraine's experience in PFP as close to membership as possible, then no task can be more important to us than that of fulfilling the Charter's promise in Section III: "Areas for consultation and/or cooperation between NATO and Ukraine." In this section, the Charter states that areas for consultation and cooperation include: "...Ukrainian participation in operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council, or the responsibility of the OSCE, and, if CJTF are used in such cases, Ukrainian participation in them at an early stage...." To ensure that Ukraine plays a central role in the new NATO, which will depend heavily on Combined Joint Task Forces for its military operations, I would suggest that Ukraine, NATO, and the U.S. must focus their combined energy on preparing to operate together in a CJTF mode.

The words "combined" and "joint" have important military meaning. Putting them into action will require serious preparation and the involvement of all Ukrainian services. From my experience working with our military and with the Ukrainian military, I know that military officers like to be given a clear objective, and then to develop a thorough plan of action for getting from here to there. I'd like to suggest that what we do in this session is concentrate on identifying the main elements of such a plan for developing the capacity to operate together seamlessly in a CJTF mode.
A good starting point is to begin by examining the "lessons learned" from our cooperation in the former Yugoslavia in IFOR and SFOR. This means taking a hard look at the problems we have had there, as well as at the successes. Based on the identification of areas where work remains to be done—for example, in the area of logistics—we can then identify the opportunities, focused specifically on those areas, that should be made available to Ukraine through PFP, as well as through our complementary U.S.-Ukraine bilateral cooperation program. As indicated by several of our Ukrainian participants, this process can also help identify areas of Ukrainian "comparative advantage" so that Ukrainian resources can be fully recognized and utilized by NATO.

What is important is that NATO should be able to turn to the Ukrainian military as it plans for future operations and say: "We need Ukraine to participate in this CJTF; we need its resources and capabilities to make this mission a success."

We are on the threshold of a new phase in the relationship between NATO and Ukraine. In this new phase, Ukraine must continue to lead, as it has done since becoming the first NIS signatory to PFP. And the United States, as a leader in NATO and a genuine partner to Ukraine, must do everything it can to support the growth and institutionalization of Ukraine's role. Together, we must seize the opportunity to ensure the fulfillment of this promise.
Peacekeeping and Joint Military Operations: Lessons Learned and Next Steps

Major General Nicholas Krawciw, U.S. Army, Ret.

In its most rudimentary sense, peacekeeping can be defined as a national or international use of military force to prevent or reduce armed conflict.

History can demonstrate hundreds of examples of peacekeeping, some of them dating back to the “Pax Romana.” Most of these examples, as well as more current ones such as the peace kept in occupied or acquired lands by the British, Russians, and Americans in the 19th Century, were unilateral efforts to maintain control and stability. The first large-scale peacekeeping operations began during this century: after World War I in various League of Nations Mandates. However, each of these mandates, usually former colonies, was assigned to one of the World War I victors, so this peacekeeping, also, was still unilateral.

The end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations became the dawn of the age of multilateral peacekeeping. The World War II victors established zones of control in Germany and Japan, and over some former German, Italian, and Japanese possessions. In February 1946, the United States designated many of its armored cavalry units as “constabulary,” to provide additional police functions in its zone of occupation. But, even during this early aftermath of WWII, only the control of Berlin saw integrated four-power peacekeeping.

Multilateral UN peacekeeping, under the supervision of the UN Security Council, began in 1949 with the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in and around Israel. It is the oldest and still functioning UN peacekeeping operation, consisting of unarmed officer observers from some 17 countries. Since 1949, there have been more than fifty UN-led peacekeeping operations. A
number of them involved large armed forces with international authorization for the use of force.

There can be no doubt that while the numerous peacekeeping activities since World War II have not always prevented war, they have saved innumerable lives. In the post-Cold War environment, the nature of armed conflict is changing. Political, economic, and demographic pressures are causing more frequent local or regional violence. At the same time, national military budgets are shrinking and there is a greater need for international cooperation to prevent or defuse such conflicts. National armed forces, including those of Ukraine and the United States, will continue to face peacekeeping challenges in the future; challenges which may continue to grow more difficult.

Today, peace operations (this term includes peacekeeping and peace enforcement) take place with the consent of all major parties to the dispute. They are designed to facilitate the implementation of agreements and to support diplomatic efforts for a long-term political settlement. In this decade, the United States has participated in a number of major peace operations. They include the somewhat unfortunate experience in Somalia, a late but successful humanitarian effort in Rwanda, and the ongoing operations in Haiti and Bosnia. As for NATO, by late 1995 the protracted conflict in Bosnia finally galvanized the Alliance to become involved in a peace operation for the first time. Ukraine by that time had been participating in UN-directed peacekeeping in Bosnia and in Slovenia. Today, both the U.S. and Ukraine participate in the NATO-led peace enforcement in Bosnia. The political and operational experience gained in all of these peace activities has been substantial.

Practical operational lessons learned from recent peace operations include the following functional area insights, with numerous opportunities for interoperability, mutually reinforced learning, and improved operational effectiveness within each of the functional areas mentioned:

- Military activities for peace operations must be designed to accomplish a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective specified by a national or alliance mandate or resolution.

- Each peace operation is a unique and complex contingency. Therefore, an accurate mission analysis is essential. It contributes to more effective mission guidance by national and international political authorities.
• The threat to peacekeeping forces will depend on mission acceptance by local belligerents and the level of their capability (military and political) to resist an impartial conflict resolution. Availability of the most accurate intelligence will enable the peacekeeping force to handle these threat variables.
• Use of mediation and negotiation, as well as prudent and impartial application of appropriate military capabilities, will enhance mission acceptance and defuse crises.
• The desired end state for the peace operation may be a moving target, one that needs continuous refinement.
• Rules of engagement are practical guidelines on the use of lethal force set by the political mission authorities. They must always emphasize the right of self-defense.
• Force protection and security activities require continuous initiative in intelligence, military, and police operations to prevent military surprise by hostile factions.
• Multinational forces, when properly employed, widen operational capabilities and strengthen international and national support for the mission.
• Good civil-military relations and extensive interagency coordination are essential for mission success. Unity of effort is paramount.
• A well-designed chain of command, Joint Task Force (JTF) organization, and properly structured Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOCs) at military headquarters down to brigade level ensure operational and interagency coordination.
• Expertise at the JTF and at the CMOCs now includes not only all the traditional military staff functions but also representation from other agencies and non-governmental bodies, as well as specialized support elements such as international law sections, special training experts, etc.
• Military success of a peace operation begins with the capability to direct the operations of all assigned or attached units. A robust command, control, and communications capability interoperable with allies is essential. Many liaison teams and a large number of interpreters must be available.
• Establishment of Joint Military Commissions has created an effective process for interaction between military commanders and belligerent leaders to resolve conflicts or to secure cooperation.
Logistic considerations in peace operations are just as important as in war, and they are just as complex and susceptible to "mission creep." Logistic interoperability remains a challenge.

Peace Operations have high national and international visibility. A coordinated media policy should be developed and a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) should be established. Release of information that does not jeopardize force security garners public support.

Last but not least, the foundation of a peace operation rests on the discipline and training of the participating military units. Military training in the area of operations should be continuous, nonprovocative, and should involve both combat and peacekeeping tasks.

These insights and lessons learned cover functional areas that include a myriad of tasks in which Americans, Ukrainians, and now a number of other NATO members and partners are becoming quite proficient. Many other tasks in each of these functional areas receive little or no attention in our national training by the Services or in Partnership for Peace (PFP) exercises. For example, we do not see staff training exercises specifically focused on the development of a thorough JTF plan for a peace operation. Further, there are few exercises that focus on staff training of a CMOC. Finally, logistic training, coordination, and interoperability usually take a back seat to tactical exercises.

For the future, it would be beneficial for NATO and Ukraine to conduct a series of computer assisted staff exercises designed to involve, over time, as many Ukrainian military headquarters as possible in various peacekeeping staff functions. Exercises Peace Shield 97 and 98 provide a U.S.-Ukrainian model for useful future computer assisted training. Other NATO allies and partners may wish to sponsor such staff exercises at the Joint Task Force (Corps or Division) level.

Actual operational experience provides the greatest learning environment. Therefore, continuing Ukrainian participation in peace operations in Bosnia should be considered as important for NATO as Russia’s involvement.

Turning now from peacekeeping to Joint Operations, let me note that peacekeeping itself, as discussed thus far, is both a joint and a combined effort. Actually, in some cases, it has been more complex than unilateral joint operations.
Joint, and in many instances, multinational or, as we call it, combined warfare, is an American military tradition. Numerous examples that characterize the jointness of warfighting, American-style, fill the pages of our history from the Revolutionary War to the present. The defeat of Cornwallis's army at Yorktown resulted from a combined American and French land campaign supported by the timely interdiction of British reinforcement efforts from the sea by French naval forces. In 1944, American, British, and Canadian naval, air, and land forces conducted the largest shore-to-shore amphibious operation in the annals of warfare, Operation Overlord. More recently, our Armed Forces conducted Operations El Dorado Canyon in Libya, Just Cause in Panama, and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf.

In all of these examples, the aim was to coordinate the combat capabilities of the services and allies or coalition partners to achieve the greatest possible military advantage. This was accomplished through the creation and execution of plans that maximized the unique capabilities of each of the Services. The result was a synergistic force of significantly greater joint combat power than if each Service had been employed individually against the same enemy. Clearly, the idea of joint operations is a natural complement to the pragmatic, team-oriented culture of the United States.

Though the U.S. Military has a rich and successful history of warfighting, emphasis on the formal development of joint doctrine is relatively new. Prior to 1986, no single individual or agency had overall responsibility for joint doctrine. As a result, there was no established process for the identification of critical joint doctrine voids and there were no procedures for participation by the combatant commands in the development of joint doctrine. There was also no single agency responsible for ensuring consistency between existing joint doctrine, Service doctrine, multi-Service doctrine, and combined doctrine. This changed with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff singularly responsible for “developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.”

In order to carry out his new responsibilities under the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, and to improve both interoperability and efficiency, the Chairman reorganized the Joint Staff in early 1987. Responsibilities for joint plans, training, exercises, evaluation, education, interoperability, and joint doctrine were brought to-
get under a single Directorate: the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7. Today, the J-7 directorate is headed by Major General George Close, who provided me with references for this presentation.

General Close also oversees the Joint Warfighting Center located at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The Joint Warfighting Center has greatly expanded functions and responsibilities, including joint simulations and training as well as analysis and assessment of joint and combined doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The Unified Commands, which actually employ forces on the battlefield, now also participate directly in the development of the operational doctrine that will guide the employment of joint or combined forces in combat. Additionally, joint doctrine has become the basis for doctrinal interoperability agreements with our allies.

The implementation of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has revitalized thinking on joint operations. The direct involvement of the Unified Commands, Services, Service Schools, and Senior Service Colleges has resulted in the creation of an entire body of improved operational doctrine focusing on unity of effort.

Every possible contingency where the U.S. military could be involved is being examined to ensure that sound doctrine and procedures exist. Command and Control issues, which were previously avoided, are now being addressed in a new light and resolved.

Last year, General John Shalikashvili, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, published Joint Vision 2010. In his words, “Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the (U.S.) Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future.” General Shalikashvili’s successor, General Shelton, is already working with the Unified Commands and the Services on supporting operational concepts for that Vision. Other steps along the path of Joint Vision 2010 will include the refinement of joint warfighting capabilities and a series of exercises and experiments to validate the new concepts.

For cooperative work with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the future, there are a number of opportunities for interoperability training in joint operations both in the PFP exercises and in activities at the Joint Warfighting Center or at similar Unified Command simulation centers. Such opportunities also exist among our NATO Allies.
Increased U.S. and NATO quotas for Ukrainian participation in national and allied joint (all-Service) exercises and in simulation exercises may be an inexpensive way to broaden training in joint interoperability under NATO’s Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that doctrinal interoperability in joint and combined operations may well constitute the difference between ensuring the well-being and success of those sent into combat, or risking failure and loss of lives because of inadequate procedures and tactics. In this context, a strong and viable joint doctrine, with which as many as possible of our Allies and Partners are familiar, should be an essential element of NATO’s evolving defense strategy.

Notes

1. These remarks were based on personal experiences with UNTSO between 1972 and 1974 including the period of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and on information contained in The Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations, published by the Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, VA, on 16 June 1997.

2. By “doctrine” we mean operational and tactical procedures and training.
Ukraine-NATO Relations: The Long-Term View

Dr. Gloria C. Duffy

Ukraine’s relationship with NATO is only one of a number of means through which Ukraine may become more integrated with Western Europe and the United States and thus enhance its security. It is an important means, to be sure, but the degree to which Ukraine will be successful in utilizing this relationship to improve its strength and security will depend to a large extent on developments in areas not explicitly related to military issues, primarily the development of Ukraine’s economy.

The most obvious question about Ukraine’s relations with NATO is, of course, when and how Ukraine might become a NATO member. Others have addressed this question. In particular, the view on the Ukrainian side, expressed by Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk, was quite clear. He said that five to seven years seemed like the most likely timeframe. It seems apparent that Ukraine will become a NATO member when everyone concerned is ready—NATO, Ukraine, and the other NATO member states.

A more immediate question is how to facilitate the process of integration between Ukraine and NATO. What must be done to ensure that Ukraine’s relationship with NATO substantially benefits not only Ukraine, but also NATO and the U.S.? How can we ensure that the option of joining NATO is a real one when the time comes for it to be implemented? How can we see to it that that time comes as soon as possible? Clearly, part of the answer is that it is very important, as so many others have noted here, to accomplish as much practical collaboration as possible through the Partnership for Peace, Joint Task Forces, exercises, and the exchange of reciprocal representation between Ukraine and NATO.
Beyond that, more broadly, it is most important that Ukraine and NATO have a shared concept of what constitutes the most important threats to security and how those threats should be addressed. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the nature of security threats is changing, and with it the role of NATO, and indeed, of all security structures, domestic and international, is changing as well.

At the Preventive Defense Project’s NATO enlargement conference in September 1997, at Stanford University, a consensus emerged that we are experiencing a shift in the relative importance of the two main roles of NATO—territorial defense, as stated in Article V of the NATO Charter, and mobilizing forces per Articles IV and V to protect common interests either inside or outside of Europe. Specifically, the importance of territorial defense is declining, while protection of common interests, as in Bosnia or the Gulf War, is increasing.

This evolution in mission leads to certain assumptions about the structure, mission and purposes of forces, and these changing assumptions will need to be shared by NATO and any country, such as Ukraine, which is developing a close relationship with the Alliance. Ukraine and NATO have made a good start in developing this common orientation, as evidenced by the Partnership for Peace Joint Peacekeeping Exercises that have been oriented towards this mission of protecting common interests.

More can be done to help develop this shared concept of mission. NATO, for its part, can remove the current limits on Partners participating in the Combined Joint Task Forces process, in order to involve Ukraine more directly in the reshaping of NATO’s mission. Ukraine can proceed internally by reshaping its military force structure and planning to reflect these new concepts and changing missions.

The nature of security, and threats to security, is also changing in a second way. Many security threats today are subtle and not amenable to solution through military force. These include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, the vulnerability of computer systems to sabotage ("cyberterrorism"), and the kind of chain reaction of economic factors that can shake the stability of an entire region, as has recently occurred in Asia.

Generals are sometimes said to fight the last war; this can be true of academics and government officials as well. It is important to continuously assess these new threats to security and to develop strat-
egies for coping with them. If one looks at the threats against which the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is planning today, only a few of them represent traditional military territorial threats, while most of them constitute these new types of non-traditional threats. In this light, Ukraine’s recent realization of the dangers of selling nuclear technology to Iran was very important. In this era of new threats, what may look like a short-term benefit can often be a long-term danger.

The advent of new types of threats has implications for restructuring the domestic policy-making apparatus, in the U.S. as well as in Ukraine. We need to change some of the ways we detect, assess and respond to security threats to better deal with these new dangers. Such changes should also be integrated into the NATO structure.

Strobe Talbott has noted the importance of economic security. Throughout the discussion regarding Ukraine’s new relationship with NATO, the issue of how Ukraine can find the financial resources to implement these cooperative measures has arisen repeatedly. The development of Ukraine’s relationship with NATO and its economic development are closely related.

General Tyutyunik described several possible ways in which the Ukrainian government could generate the resources to participate in NATO-related activities, including undertaking efforts to revise and restructure new Eastern European NATO members’ military hardware to make it compatible with NATO standards. These are creative approaches, but limited in their ability to generate funds for Ukraine. Ultimately, Ukraine needs a growing GDP to support its relationship with NATO and eventual NATO membership.

Despite the experience of the former Yugoslavia, the European space today is primarily an economic, and not a military, space. Perhaps it is not even primarily a political space today. The same is largely true in Asia and the Americas. The currency of power, the focus of life today, is primarily economic.

To ultimately safeguard its security, Ukraine must be stronger economically, and that means developing advantageous relations with a wide range of European and international institutions in addition to and parallel with relations with NATO. To do this, Ukraine must take the domestic steps necessary to make this possible.

Becoming more integrated into the European economic system will create a framework of relationships that will support Ukraine’s participation in the European security system. The steps in this direc-
tion are clear: membership in the Western European Union and the European Union and ultimately membership in the World Trade Organization will help greatly to solidify Ukraine’s European position. Straightening out Ukraine’s relationship with the IMF is another requirement. Ukraine is taking incremental steps in this direction, by joining the Council of Europe, reaching an agreement with the WEU on air transport, and reducing inflation internally, the latter being a precondition of participation in the European economic institutions.

But greater domestic economic development is needed in Ukraine to support the process of integration with NATO and Western Europe, and this will require reforms. These include reform of the tax structure, greater transparency, developing the legal framework for foreign investment and trade, further privatization of enterprises, and so on. Such steps to make the business climate more hospitable and to attract foreign investment are also required for Ukraine to be certified as eligible for continued U.S. foreign aid.

This is a very crucial moment in the world economy, as investment capital is fleeing Japan and other parts of Asia and seeking new markets. This is a time of opportunity for other regions of the world, including Ukraine, to attract foreign investment, if the climate is attractive.

The development of Ukraine’s economy is an area in which the U.S. and Ukraine could work more closely. To take a parallel from the Russian experience, the U.S.-Russian Gore Chernomyrdin Commission has become very proactive in promoting trade by streamlining the customs process on both sides, facilitating business visas, and even stimulating the development of Russian-English language translation computer software for business communication through the Internet.

A similar Gore-Kuchma Commission exists, and it could work more aggressively to remove barriers to trade. The U.S. government and private groups should actively support and encourage trade with Ukraine and the process of economic reform.

The level of Ukraine’s economic development will determine whether Ukraine is able to find the resources for eventual NATO membership and for participation in the Partnership for Peace in the meantime. Economic development will also create true strength and security for Ukraine and will provide Ukraine with greater flexibility and opportunity to participate in European institutions. Development of the Ukrainian economy will also play a role in creating the com-
mon political, social, and economic values that will make its eventual integration into NATO smooth.

Ian Brzezinski has noted a difficult atmosphere on Capitol Hill for continued U.S. economic assistance to Ukraine. Today it seems that the American public does not care very much about NATO enlargement or the Partnership for Peace, or about supporting other countries, including Ukraine, to help integrate them into these structures. But the public does care about business and trade. Support for Ukraine in the U.S. Congress is more likely if it is on the basis of Ukraine’s economic development and evolution towards Ukraine becoming a viable trade partner for the United States.
Ukraine-NATO Relations: The Long-Term View

Dr. Serhiy Galaka
Translated by Luba Dyky

Today, Europe is experiencing an unusually stormy and dynamic era. When, in the early 1990s, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski analyzed the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR and foresaw the possibility that Ukraine might embark on a path of integration into Europe, few in the West agreed with him.\(^1\) Today, just a short time later, Ukraine is actively cooperating with the EU and NATO, taking steps not only on paper, but also in practice, that bring it closer to those key organizations. One of the primary directions of Ukraine’s state policy of national security is “entry into the existing and emerging systems of regional and global security.”\(^2\) Even prior to the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Gennadi Udovenko stated that “the formalizing of relations with NATO is seen by us as a step along the path to full-fledged integration with the European and Atlantic structures.”\(^3\)

The state of European security depends in considerable measure on the security of Ukraine. This role is made pithier by the process of NATO enlargement to the East. NATO enlargement makes the problem of Ukraine’s geopolitical choices more acute, narrowing the space for maneuver and forcing decision-making under the pressure of time constraints. While the process of North Atlantic Alliance expansion carries for Ukraine a series of potential threats, it also opens new possibilities for Ukraine’s future.

The Ukrainian declaration that it is not a member of any bloc carries with it the threat of turning Ukraine into a “buffer” between the Alliance and Russia should relations between those two entities worsen. If the process of NATO enlargement slows following the
entry into the Alliance of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Ukraine risks being left in a Russian sphere of influence. Forced close-ness with NATO also opens Ukraine to pressure from Russia, which considers the entry into NATO of even the Baltic states unimagin-able.

The North Atlantic Alliance appears today to be an institution of great promise, meeting all the requirements that would enable it to become the base of a system of European security for the 21st cen-tury. As a consequence of its geopolitical position, Ukraine cannot remain outside of such a system as it is being formed, and thus should take an active part in this process.

Objectively, Ukraine today is not ready to be a full member of NATO. The on-going socio-economic crisis, with its elements of political instability, does not bode well for Ukrainian integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, as the March Parliamentary elections have demonstrated. The left wing parties, which attained great success in these elections, campaigned on anti-NATO slogans. The Communist Party of Ukraine accused the government of turning the country into a “marionette of NATO,” while the pre-election platform of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the agrarian parties called for “not allowing the transformation of Ukraine into a colony, an appendage of NATO.” Increased tension between the legislative and executive branches of government is quite likely in the aftermath of those elections and this will not favor either reforms or tighter cooperation with the NATO Alliance.

For integration of Ukraine into NATO to be feasible, a transi-tional period is required, during which NATO expands into the coun-tries of Central and Eastern Europe, the NATO-Russia Founding Act is implemented, the “Distinctive Partnership” between NATO and Ukraine is realized through concrete actions, and the Alliance itself evolves from a focus on political-military issues to one on po-itical, economic, ecological, and other key concerns for international cooperation. This evolution is already underway, as the chief factor that spurred the creation of NATO has disappeared and NATO seeks a new mission. The process will inevitably accelerate with the entry of new Alliance members.

It follows that Ukraine should state its priorities and intentions more explicitly. Ukraine is faced with the task of creating the condi-tions that might enable eventual entry into NATO. The process of
integration of Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO, should be synchronized as much as possible with socio-economic and political reform in Ukraine. Successful market reforms; strengthening of democratic institutions; expanding the legal structures; building up a citizen-based society; introduction of civilian control of the armed forces and reform of the armed forces themselves; and development of good relations with neighboring states, firstly with Russia—these are only the first, basic problems that Ukraine must solve before it can realistically have any hope of membership in the Alliance. The realization of such reforms will make Ukraine a more attractive candidate in the eyes of the current Alliance members, give it the capability to truly contribute to European stability, and help it to develop a more proactive foreign policy that will enable it to more actively develop the geopolitical space around it. For successful realization of these reforms, considerable economic and technical assistance on the part of NATO member countries is urgently needed.

A very important factor for the definition of prospects for Ukraine-NATO relations is the attitude of Ukrainian society to the possibility of Ukraine’s joining the Alliance. According to a 1997 poll, carried out by the firm Socis-Gallup for the Democratic Initiatives Fund, of 1200 respondents polled, 38% answered in the positive the question regarding the prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership. Of those 38%, half, 19%, felt that Ukraine should become a NATO member as quickly as possible. Twenty-one percent, however, were categorically opposed to NATO membership for Ukraine.

The poll also found a considerable discrepancy in attitudes towards the Alliance between Ukrainians in the East and those in the West of the country. It is not only the staying power of Soviet-era attitudes towards NATO that is at issue, but also the generally low level of knowledge among the population regarding the real nature of the Alliance.

Ukraine must therefore actively cooperate with the alliance within the framework of the generally successful Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPO), and implement the possibilities outlined in the NATO-Ukraine Charter. Increased practical military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, as well as the seeking out of opportunities for cooperation in the field of military technology, is of particular importance.
Cooperation in military education is a promising area that should be further pursued. Study by Ukrainian officers in military educational institutions in NATO member countries, focusing especially on linguistic preparation and familiarization with NATO standards for administration and procedure, is especially important. This would support successful institution of military reforms and the preparation of the Ukrainian officer corps and the military infrastructure as a whole for even more advanced cooperation.

Critical to cooperation within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Charter would be the institutionalization of the Crisis Consultative Mechanism for review of potential threats to security, territorial integrity, and the political independence of Ukraine. Ukraine must also seek to obtain additional security guarantees from NATO members. This would enhance stability and prudent policy-making during a time of dynamic change within and around Ukraine. Positive results in these areas will foster efforts towards a coordinated policy regarding NATO enlargement and cooperative development of the conceptual principles of military policy.

The Russian factor will be one of the primary determinants of the development of Ukraine-NATO relations. Its effects will stem from the character and scale of economic association between Russia and Ukraine, especially Ukrainian dependence on Russian energy sources and Ukraine's resultant debt and Ukraine's interest in the Russian market for its manufactured goods. Also key to the relationship between Russia and Ukraine will be the maintenance of the Russian naval base at Sevastopol and ethno-cultural ties between the two countries.

Simultaneously, the dynamic nature of the Russian and Ukrainian economies will have tremendous significance. Russian capital is less risk-averse than Western capital, and thus the risky Ukrainian market is less frightening to it. Following the signing of the Russian-Ukrainian Economic Agreement, Russian investors are expressing great interest in participating in the privatization of the most promising Ukrainian enterprises, especially the natural gas shipping and oil refining sectors. Should these plans be realized, this additional factor will further complicate Ukrainian moves towards integration with the West, and leave Russia with a powerful lever of influence over its neighbor. The economic expansion of Russian investment capital would also increase in power if Russian economic growth stabilizes.
In line with this, the evolution of the political situation in Russia can also have a significant influence on the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine. There exists the possibility that in the year 2000 a more radical leadership may come to power in Russia (i.e., Lebed or Luzhkov). This would result in great change in Russian foreign policy, both on the global level and in relation to the young states that were once component parts of the USSR. The following scenarios seem plausible as descriptions of how the situation could develop following the next presidential elections in Ukraine and Russia:

**Scenario #1:** In Russia, the newly elected President is a centrist (i.e., Chernomyrdin) and in Ukraine the President is a centrist or a left centrist. This scenario posits the calmest and most stable relations between Ukraine and Russia of those we will consider. Russia strives to influence the international situation through the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Ukraine develops political and military contacts with NATO within the framework of the Charter, domestically directs its efforts towards building democratic institutions and market infrastructure, and implements military reform through cooperation with NATO. While a decision on Ukraine’s part to join NATO is unlikely, insofar as Ukraine is not ready for full membership, there is no threat to Ukraine’s continued independence.

**Scenario #2:** Russia elects a populist or leftist President (i.e., Lebed, Luzhkov, Seleznyov). Ukraine elects a centrist or left centrist. The relationship between Russia and Ukraine worsens. The probability that Ukraine will turn to NATO for help increases, as does the possibility that Ukraine will ask to join the Alliance, thus increasing the risk of a deteriorating domestic situation.

**Scenario #3:** Leftist Presidents are elected in Russia and Ukraine. While this scenario is the least probable, it is also potentially the most dangerous. It suggests a high likelihood of closer ties between Ukraine and Russia, even to the point of an anti-NATO military alliance. The most radical variation on this scenario, in which Russia attempts to renew its domination of a significant part of the former USSR, could lead to a “Mini-Cold War.”

It would be exceedingly difficult, painful, and dangerous for Ukraine to build a new wall on its northeastern border. Therefore, the central task is instead to search for means to involve Russia in cooperation with NATO that does not take place at the expense of Ukraine, but rather is broad enough to draw Russia and Ukraine into a new
security structure that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Efforts to isolate Russia are unsafe both for Ukraine and for European security as a whole.

Western analysis of the prospects for Ukrainian integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions was for a long time predominantly skeptical in nature. One characteristic example was RAND Corporation research into issues related to NATO enlargement. Their most optimistic scenario for Ukraine saw it “Finlandized,” and that assumed a considerable influx of economic assistance—more than the West seems prepared to give. Although this scenario underestimates the likely negative reaction on the part of Russia, its very formulation assigns a high probability to renewed confrontation in Europe.

From the perspective of the Ukrainian national interest, the opening of NATO to potential new members is an optimal course. It presents an evolutionary path of enlargement that takes into account the entire complex of internal and external conditions in applicant and partner countries and seeks to implement a variety of forms of cooperation (multilateral, etc.).

The process of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions would ideally be synchronized with the processes of building democratic institutions domestically: a civil society, completion of market reforms, harmonization of market infrastructure with western infrastructures, and the development of national identity. Even if the tempo of implementation of these political and economic reforms is accelerated, the creation of a fully educated society of citizens sharing a national identity will still take a longer period of time, beyond the framework of our medium-term projections.

To forecast the development of events beyond the year 2005 or so is very difficult, as there is high uncertainty regarding the future of Russia and the complex processes ongoing in Ukraine itself. Further, we cannot forget the potential development of new threats on the regional and the global level, which would essentially change the dynamic and the character of the situation in Europe. Without question, however, it is worthwhile for both NATO and Ukraine to continue to together weave the fabric of cooperation, searching for new approaches and methods, developing and meeting the requirements for next steps, and thus working to develop ever-closer relations with each other.
Notes


CLOSING ADDRESS

Ukraine and NATO: Today and Tomorrow

Ambassador Yuri Shcherbak

It is quite difficult to be the last speaker making a presentation after the speeches of a whole constellation of brilliant politicians and analysts such as Strobe Talbott and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Borys Tarasvuk and Anton Buteyko, Ash Carter and Evhen Bersheda, generals Nick Krawciw and Ivan Bizhan, as well as other distinguished participants of the workshop thanks to whom, it seems, everything that can be said about NATO and Ukraine, and even more, has already been said.

I can compare my situation with that of a poet who is going to write a poem about love. He knows that over the previous 3000 years, the most beautiful poems have already been written, and that all the words have already been said. And then the poet utters the simple and eternal words: I love you.

Indeed, everything that has been happening here testifies to a great deal of love for Ukraine and a great deal of pride in Ukraine’s achievements during the past seven years of independence; especially in the sphere of foreign policy and Ukraine-NATO and Ukraine-U.S. relations.

At the same time, we have heard a significant amount of concern for Ukraine and for the future of its security. Because the process of change continues in Ukraine and in Europe, the security system has not yet stabilized. This means that the potential for new conflicts arising and the drawing of new dividing lines still exists.

When analyzing current events and thinking about the future, it is very important not to forget about the past—about the lessons of the 20th century for Ukraine and for Europe, as mentioned earlier here by Professor Roman Szporluk, Deputy Minister Anton Buteyko, and others.
It is necessary to understand the entire chain of swift and dramatic events that has brought Ukraine from its provincial dependent status to the European orbit:

- Eighty years ago (1918): the independent state of Ukraine was proclaimed and the Ukrainian People’s Republic was founded. After three years, however, it perished in the blood and fire of civil war. As it did not receive any support from the West, it became part of the Soviet totalitarian empire that was then increasing its might;
- Sixty-five years ago (1933): Ukraine sustained a genocide unheard of in the history of mankind—approximately 7 million peasants and workers perished in Ukraine as a result of Stalin’s induced famine;
- Fifty-seven years ago (1941): Ukraine, then a part of the USSR, became an object of cruel aggression by Germany and its allies. In the course of this conflict it lost 9 million people and 70 percent of its infrastructure and industrial potential;
- Fifty-three years ago (1945): by the will of Stalin, as a reward for its heroic contribution to the victory over Germany, Ukraine became a member of the UN and actually arrived in the international arena as an entity under international law;
- Fifty-two years ago (1946): the Cold War began, leading to the concentration of a large number of shock troops and strategic nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine;
- Fifty years ago (1948): the Brussels Treaty—a prototype for NATO—was signed;
- Forty-nine years ago (1949): an agreement on NATO creation was signed in Washington (April 4, 1949);
- Forty-three years ago (1955): the Warsaw military bloc of communist states was created;
- Forty-two years ago and thirty years ago (1956, 1968): the USSR launched aggressive attacks against its own allies (Hungary and Czechoslovakia) from the territory of Ukraine in order to suppress the Hungarian revolt and the “Prague Spring;”
- Thirteen years ago (1985): Gorbachev came to power and introduced the slogans of “perestroika” and “glasnost;”
- Twelve years ago (1986): the Chernobyl catastrophe occurred;
- Nine years ago (1989): the Berlin Wall came down. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania regained their national sovereignty and independence;
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- Eight years ago (1990): the disintegration of the Soviet Union began. The Supreme Council of Ukraine passed a Declaration on State Sovereignty and proclaimed Ukraine’s desire to become a non-allied country, free of nuclear weapons;
- Seven years ago (1991): Ukraine proclaimed its independence and the Soviet Union ceased to exist;
- Six years ago (1992): the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, visited NATO Headquarters for the first time;
- Four years ago (1994): Ukraine became the first CIS country to join the Partnership for Peace Program;
- Two years ago (1996): Ukraine and the United States announced that they had reached the level of strategic partnership in their bilateral relations and agreed to set up a Binational Kuchma-Gore Commission;
- One year ago (1997): NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana inaugurated the NATO Information and Documentation Center in Kiev;
- One year ago (1997): the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, signed the historic Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO in Madrid, Spain.

As we can see, the locomotive of historical changes in Europe has been accelerating rapidly as we approached the end of the 20th century. This means that during the next few years (perhaps including the entire next decade), the process of fundamentally breaking apart the Yalta order and shifting to new principles of European relations will continue. After this, according to the law of historical rhythm (stormy change, followed by abatement of activities, followed by relative stabilization, followed by the brewing of new change, and so forth) a phase of “new European order” will emerge. Given that this order satisfies the key players (the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany and Russia), the new system of European security may exist for a relatively long time—probably several decades.

A key question arises for us Ukrainians; what place in this new system will Ukraine occupy?

All of us present in this room—I believe, I am confident—are united by a single goal: to see Ukraine integrated into a Euro-Atlantic community, to see Ukraine independent and identifying itself as a Central European State. And having such a goal, it is natural to foresee Ukraine becoming a member of NATO (the most reliable system
of European security) in the future. We have nothing to be afraid of, and moreover, nothing to be ashamed of, in saying this.

This workshop was a special one because we were telling each other the harsh truth. We heard many harsh words from Strobe Talbott, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the Ukrainian participants about the situation in Ukraine. Let us also not appease each other by telling nice stories about an ideal Europe stretching from the English Channel to the Urals, where high standards of international conduct, social peace and accord reign; where there is no violence, no military conflict, and no violations of human rights or the rights of ethnic or religious groups. Because the reality (Ukraine included) does not fit the framework of ideal dreams.

We speak about avoiding use of force in international relations, yet we see tough economic and informational pressure used by some states against others. We speak about Europe without dividing lines, yet we frequently encounter problems of significant visa restrictions, imposed by EU countries and the United States against other states. We speak about scientific and technical cooperation, yet we are confronted by a psychological COCOM when high-tech products from Ukraine are barred from entering into Western markets. This effects the morale of our society and results in great disappointment sparked by Western influence and the direction of integration.

I am not a pessimist, I am only a realist. Therefore, I would like to warn the participants of this workshop against excessively optimistic forecasts for future developments, especially frivolous manipulation of the possible time frames for Ukraine joining NATO (in 5 to 10 years). I would like to remind you of several facts:

1. The reinforcement of leftist positions in the Supreme Council of Ukraine after the March 29 election. These are people who adhere to an uncompromising anti-NATO stand. According to the preliminary count, approximately 40 percent of parliamentary mandates may be won by these leftists who last year demanded the impeachment of President Kuchma and the resignation of Mr. Udovenko, the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, in connection with the signing of the Ukraine-NATO Charter in Madrid.

The Rukh Party, on the other hand, which demands that Ukraine apply for NATO membership, will have less than 20 percent of the seats in the new parliament. Such political reality will without doubt introduce some nuances into the implementation of the "Western
vector” of Ukrainian foreign policy and may slow down the process of integration with Europe proclaimed by President Kuchma.

2. The Ukrainian Constitution (Article 17) forbids the deployment of foreign military bases on the territory of Ukraine. Only temporary utilization of the existing military bases is permitted. This applies, in accordance with the international agreement between Ukraine and Russia, only to the Black Sea Fleet, stationed in the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol according to the terms of a negotiated lease. Although the Constitution in general does not forbid the participation of Ukraine in military and political alliances and does not proclaim neutral or non-allied status, Article 17 may become a barrier to Ukraine’s joining the Alliance.

3. Article 6 of “The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership with the Russian Federation,” concluded in 1997 for a term of 10 years, reads: “Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from supporting any acts aimed against the other Party, and commits itself not to conclude with third countries any agreements to the detriment of the security of another Party.” Assuming that the negative, and, to be honest, hostile attitude of Russia towards NATO is maintained into the future, this article may be used by Russia to counter Ukraine’s desire to join the Alliance.

Apart from these political and legal “forbidding” factors we can cite a number of fundamental factors which are extremely necessary for the implementation of Ukraine’s potential as a state oriented towards the West and towards NATO. Among these factors the most important are the following:

- Development of a market economy, improvement of the economic situation in the country, and the overcoming of our current profound crisis;
- Consolidation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine under conditions of external and internal peace;
- The building of a civil society, including the introduction of efficient civilian control over the military;
- Preservation of the status quo of social stability and inter-ethnic harmony, consolidation of democratic forces and the conducting of a vast information campaign among the population as to the benefits of integration; and
- The restructuring of Ukraine’s government and of the country’s system of management in general.
The experience of the 20th century shows that in order for a newly emerging country to attain the strength necessary to withstand a possible ordeal, at least twenty years development is required. This observation is evidenced by the experience of emergence and existence of a number of Central and Eastern European states between the First and Second World Wars (1918-1939).

Thus, Ukraine needs no fewer than 10-15 more years for state building and reform of its economic, social and political system, and what is most important, for evolution from Soviet-type cadres to a new generation of politicians and managers.

During this workshop, all the participants have agreed that the question of Ukraine’s practical participation in NATO is not and cannot be viable today or in the near future. We can only theoretically consider this issue for the longer term. At the same time, however, we must remember that we are dealing with an extremely complex historical equation with a large number of unknown hypothetical factors.

Any discussion about 2005, 2010 or 2020 is an abstract one, because nobody today can foresee what NATO itself will look like in the future. What will happen to Russia? What will Ukraine be like? What will Europe be like in 2010? Let us recall—were there any analysts in 1975, at the height of the Cold War, who predicted the bloodless disintegration of the Soviet Union sixteen years later?

Does the above-mentioned example mean that we must renounce our dream and our goal? No, not at all. But we, the representatives of the Ukrainian political elite, must focus our attention not on loud declarations, not on conflicting statements about joining or not joining NATO which arouse a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding in Europe, but on practical actions. A large goal may be reached through small steps. We have already mentioned that the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO opens great possibilities for Ukraine.

The Charter was reached through the great efforts of the Ukrainian leadership and has become one of the greatest achievements of Ukrainian diplomacy. But sometimes, there seems to be an impression that this is the end of the process. Sometimes a question arises—have the people who are supposed to implement the Charter read it through carefully enough? We believe, for instance, that it is necessary to require study of this fundamental document by the Ukrainian Armed
Forces and the other governmental agencies involved in its implementation.

I will not enumerate here all the possible aspects of cooperation with NATO which directly stem from the text of the Charter—they were mentioned by many of today's speakers. I will mention only several of the most important themes which can become topics for our future discussions.

1) The issue of enhancing Ukraine's bilateral cooperation with each member of NATO: with the newly adopted members of the Alliance (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) as well as with the older members, from Norway to Turkey, from Great Britain to Italy. Each member of NATO has its own specific achievements which could be well imitated by Ukraine.

2) The issue of compatibility. First of all, I mean psychological, linguistic, educational, and political compatibility. The same types of tanks, for example, may be manned by people who think in different ways. Let us recall the German Democratic Republic on the territory of which the problems of economic, social and especially psychological compatibility with the Federal Republic of Germany still exist today, despite the huge resources invested by the government of the Federal Republic into the "Eastern Lands." We must not just have 100 English-speaking officers in the Ukrainian Army; rather, we need 100,000 young people thinking from a Western perspective and having perfect command of the English language.

This will require a great deal of time and effort.

3) The issue of predicting and preventing conflicts. Everybody must have known that there was a very tense situation in Crimea on the eve of the election. An aggressive group of Crimean Tartars were capable of provoking conflict and violence. Only thanks to the introduction of considerable police and internal military forces with a significant number of armored vehicles was it possible to prevent a conflict with unpredictable consequences.

I am confident that this is an example of a firm and adequate reaction by the Government against attempts to set a fire in a highly flammable zone.

4) The issue of security in nuclear power plants. As a country whose territory experienced the largest nuclear catastrophe in the world, in Chernobyl, Ukraine completely understands the consequences for Europe in the event of military conflict in zones where nuclear reac-
tors and facilities are located, or of terrorist acts against those nuclear reactors and storage facilities. One can only guess what would happen if nuclear facilities were located in Bosnia or in Chechnya. This issue needs to be dealt with through a concerted international effort that includes NATO and is aimed at preventing military conflicts in regions where nuclear facilities are located.

5) The issue of the security of the Trans-Caucasus oil corridor. The zone of the Caspian Sea may in the near future become one of the centers of great confrontation among various countries and various trans-national corporations. As is well known, Ukraine has an advantageous option of running part of the oil corridor through its territory. We have not forgotten that in the near future the security of oil and gas transport through this and other regions will likely require international protection, as well as prevention of military conflicts in these zones.

6) The demand for consolidation of the strategic partnership with the United States. As we move toward European integration, our cooperation with the United States acquires greater importance. One can say that the path to Euro-Atlantic structures lies not only through Brussels but also through Washington. In this context, I would like to underscore that the recent visit of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Kiev substantially contributed to the consolidation of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States. It enabled Ukraine to resolve such complicated issues as the signing of the agreement on cooperation in the nuclear sphere and it opened the opportunity for Ukraine to join the MTCR. This, in turn, enables Ukraine and the United States to promote cooperation in space. We very much appreciate our relationship with the United States and consider the high level of these relations to be one of the most important achievements of Ukrainian foreign policy.

The Embassy of Ukraine in the United States and especially its political section and office of the Military Attaché have attached and will continue to attach great importance to the promotion of further cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. We have set up an ad hoc group on NATO. We monitor NATO-related issues in the U.S. We continuously inform the leadership of Ukraine of all the important events taking place in NATO and in Washington, as we consider this to be one of the most important of our activities.

Dear Workshop participants!
A new reality is knocking at Ukraine’s door. The affiliation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as NATO members turns Ukraine into a country sharing a border with NATO, specifically, 330 miles of common border with the Alliance. We hope that as NATO approaches our borders, the Alliance will not be indifferent to developments in Ukraine and its stability. In our opinion, it is high time already, today, that NATO should, in addition to having the Charter on Distinctive Partnership, elaborate a clear-cut and detailed concept of interaction with neighboring Ukraine, via Poland and Hungary. For our part, we also should pay closer attention to the forthcoming geostrategic changes. Here I mean the necessity of enhancing political, economic and military interaction between Ukraine and Poland, Hungary, and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, conducting joint training on the territory of Ukraine on a regular basis, and opening joint educational and training centers. A very important and far-reaching step on the part of NATO would be making a decision on cooperation with Ukraine in the military-technical sphere, and the utilization of our great potential in aircraft, missile, ship, and tank construction.

And, of course, we must promote our strategic cooperation with the United States.

Dear Mr. Chairman, dear Dr. Carter, I would like to thank you for granting me the high honor of making the final comments at the end of this workshop. I was complaining that it is difficult to be the last making comments. But this situation has its advantages. First of all, when the last speaker makes his comments, all the listeners are happy because they know that they will not have to listen to anyone else. Second, one can indulge himself in telling rubbish, knowing that no one will correct him.

Third, and this time I am serious, one can say that the workshop was really extremely successful, conducted in a constructive and friendly atmosphere, becoming a brain-storming session for all of the participants.

Fourth and finally, one can say that we have been very lucky and happy to have so outstanding a Chairman as Dr. Ashton Carter.

Yesterday, I was moved by a story Dr. Carter told about the National Anthem of Ukraine. For me the roaring of the rocket which carried a United States space shuttle with a Ukrainian astronaut aboard was the powerful song of Ukrainian/U.S. friendship.
I hope that we will always be accompanied by the music of joint space launches.

I wish all the participants good health, happiness, and success in their work. I thank you all for your attention.
**Workshop Agenda**

**Workshop on Ukraine-NATO Relations**
Washington, D.C., April 8-9, 1998

**Wednesday, April 8**
1300-1330: Arrival and check-in to workshop

1330-1430: **Welcome and Introduction: Dr. Ashton Carter**

*Opening Presentation on U.S. Policy Towards Ukraine, NATO, and the New Europe*

Speaker: **Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott**

1430-1630: **Session 1:**

**Making the NATO-Ukraine Charter Real**
The goal of this session is to define the vision the Charter presents for the Ukraine-NATO relationship, thus providing a road-map for our discussions throughout the workshop. What does the Charter mean to Ukraine? To NATO? Is it sufficient guidance for planning and activities? How can we better define its goals? What should be changed in current and planned events and activities to bring them into line with the Charter? What concrete recommendations can we make for policy and next steps?

Moderator: **Dr. Steven Miller**

Presenters: **Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk**
Ambassador Robert Hunter

1630-1645: Break

1645-1845: **Session 2:**

Ukraine and Partnership for Peace: Lessons Learned and Next Steps
The goal of this session is to take a comprehensive, stock-taking look at Ukraine’s experience with Partnership for Peace and discuss how future implementation of this program can be improved. Political and military aspects of the program should be addressed, as well as the role that Partnership for Peace plays in NATO and Ukrainian policy. Problems and successes of the past should be considered with an eye to the future. Recommendations for concrete events, with timelines, will be discussed.

Moderator: Dr. Catherine Kelleher
Presenters: General Mykola Dziubak
            Charles Dale

1900-2100: Dinner
            Presentation: Ukraine and Europe
            Speaker: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Thursday, April 9
0830-0900: Buffet breakfast

0900-1100: Session 3:
            Peacekeeping and Joint Military Operations:
            Lessons Learned and Next Steps
The goal of this session is to shift the focus to the operational aspects of peacekeeping and joint military operations in which Ukraine and NATO have been involved and look ahead to those in which they are likely to be involved in the future. We will consider what practical lessons should be drawn from the IFOR experience as well as from other bilateral and multilateral military-to-military activities. We will exchange views on NATO’s role in European and world peacekeeping and discuss the prospects for Ukraine’s cooperation in these areas with a variety of NATO and non-NATO states.

Moderator: Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall
Presenters: General Ivan Bizhan
            Major General Nicholas Krawciw, U.S. Army, Ret.

1100-1115: Break
1115-1315:  Session 4:  
The Long-Term View  
The goal of this session is to consider the NATO-Ukraine relationship in the long term. What is the future of NATO in Europe and its relationship with Ukraine? How can this relationship best play a positive role on the continent? Can Ukraine serve as a model for relations between NATO and its non-member friends? What steps must be taken and how must the relationship be changed in order to make those goals reality? Whose cooperation and support are necessary? What is Russia’s role and impact?  
Moderator: Ambassador William Miller  
Presenters: Dr. Serhiy Galaka  
Dr. Gloria Duffy

1315-1330:  Break

1330-1400:  Lunch  
Closing Presentations  
Presenters: Dr. Ashton Carter  
The Honorable Anton Buteyko  
Ambassador Yuri Shcherbak

1400-1500:  Summary: The Road Ahead  
Discussion  
Leaders: Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall  
Dr. Steven E. Miller

1830:  Reception for Workshop Participants  
Hosted by: the Embassy of Ukraine
About the Workshop Conveners and Contributing Authors

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski is Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was National Security Advisor to the President of the United States. In 1981, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations and for his contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the United States. His most recent book is *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a BA and MA from McGill University.

Dr. Ashton B. Carter is Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and co-director, with William J. Perry, of the Harvard-Stanford Preventive Defense Project. From 1993-1996 Dr. Carter served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. He was twice awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award given by the Pentagon. Dr. Carter continues to serve DOD as an adviser to the Secretary of Defense and as a member of both DOD’s Defense Policy Board and Defense Science Board. Before his government service, Dr. Carter was Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and Chairman of the editorial board of *International Security*. Dr. Carter received bachelor’s degrees in medieval history and in physics from Yale University and a doctorate in theoretical physics from Oxford University,
where he was a Rhodes Scholar. In addition to authoring numerous scientific publications and government studies, Dr. Carter is an author and editor of a number of books, including *Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union; Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World*; and *Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds*.

**Mr. Charles Dale** is the Director, Defense Partnership and Cooperation on NATO's International Staff. His directorate is responsible for Alliance defense-related cooperation and partnership policy, the Partnership for Peace, the individual partnership programs with nations in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, defense and military cooperation with Russia and Ukraine, and defense aspects of NATO enlargement. He joined the International Staff in 1995. Previously, Mr. Dale served in the United States Navy as a maritime patrol pilot. He is a graduate of the National Security Studies Program at the U.S. National War College in Washington, D.C. and subsequently served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as the Regional Director for South Asia. In 1993 Mr. Dale joined the United States Mission to NATO in Brussels, where he was responsible for U.S. policy on NATO defense and military cooperation with non-NATO nations, and where he played a major role in the development and implementation of the Partnership for Peace.

**Dr. Gloria C. Duffy** is the Chief Executive Officer of the Commonwealth Club of California, the nation's largest and oldest public affairs program, and, since 1980, a member of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Previously, Dr. Duffy served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, in which role she negotiated agreements with the former Soviet republics for denuclearization and dismantlement. She received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service in 1995. She Chairs the Board of the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation in Washington, D.C. and is a Director of the Atlantic Council of the United States. She holds an AB *magna cum laude* from Occidental College and an MA, M. Phil., and Ph.D. from Columbia University. She is co-editor of *International Arms Control Issues and Agreements* and the author of *Compliance and the Future of Arms Control*, as well as a number of monographs and articles. Dr. Duffy is currently working on a third

**Dr. Serhiy Galaka** is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations at Kyiv University, where he lectures on international relations, U.S. foreign policy, and nonproliferation. He has published extensively in these fields and has participated in the Program for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies since 1992. In 1995, Dr. Galaka was an IREX Fellow at the University of Maryland (College Park). He holds a Ph.D. from Kyiv University.

**Major General Nicholas Krawciw, U.S. Army, Ret.** is the Secretary of Defense Senior Military Representative to Ukraine and President of The Dupuy Institute (TDI), a military history research center in McLean, Virginia. General Krawciw retired from the U.S. Army in 1990, after 31 years in command and staff positions. These included two combat tours in Vietnam, service as the Senior U.S. Observer and Chief Operations Officer with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in and around Israel, and Director for NATO Policy in the International Security Policy Office of the Secretary of Defense. His education includes a BS from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and an MS in International Affairs from George Washington University.

**Dr. Steven E. Miller** is Director of the International Security Program at the Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is also Editor in Chief of the quarterly journal *International Security*. Previously he was Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and taught Defense and Arms Control Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is co-author of *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material*. He is editor or co-editor of numerous books, including *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, and *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*.

**Ambassador Yuri M. Shcherbak** is Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States of America. Previously, he served as Ambassador to
Israel and Minister of Environmental Protection of Ukraine, as well as a member of Ukraine’s National Security Council. Ambassador Shcherbak founded and became the leader of the Ukrainian Green Movement (now the Green Party) in 1988. As a member of the 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet, he initiated and led the first parliamentary investigation of the Chernobyl accident. In addition to his documentary novel, *Chernobyl*, Ambassador Shcherbak is well known as a novelist and poet. He holds a Ph.D. and D.Sc. in epidemiology from the Kyiv Medical College.

**Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall** is a Senior Advisor to the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project and a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Dr. Sherwood-Randall served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia during the first Clinton Administration, for which work she was awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. She continues to serve the Pentagon as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Prior to government service, Dr. Sherwood-Randall served as co-founder and Associate Director of the Harvard Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project. She has served as Chief Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy Advisor to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., as well as a Guest Scholar in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. She is the author of a number of publications, including *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security* and a co-author of *Window of Opportunity: The Grand Bargain for Democracy in the Soviet Union*. Dr. Sherwood-Randall received her BA from Harvard-Radcliffe Colleges *magna cum laude*. She received her doctorate in International Relations from Oxford University, where she was a Rhodes Scholar.

**Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott** was confirmed by the Senate on February 22, 1994 and sworn in on February 23, 1994. Previously, he served as Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on the New Independent States. He has also held the posts of Editor-at-Large and Washington Bureau Chief at *TIME* Magazine. Deputy Secretary Talbott has twice won the Edward Weintal Prize for distinguished reporting on foreign affairs and diplomacy. His most recent book is *At The Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of The Cold War* (co-authored with Michael R. Beschloss).
He was educated at the Hotchkiss School, Yale University, and at Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.

Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk is Ambassador of Ukraine to the Benelux Countries and Head of the Ukrainian Mission to NATO. Shortly after this workshop, on April 17, 1998, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Ambassador Tarasyuk previously served as First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine and as Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine. He has Chaired Ukraine’s National Committee on Disarmament and its State Interagency Commission on Ukraine’s Accession to the Council of Europe. He is a member of the Ukrainian-American consultative committee and the Board of Directors of the Institute for East-West Studies in New York. In 1996, he was awarded the Order of Merit of the President of Ukraine. He holds a degree from the Kyiv State University Department of International Law.
About the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project

The Preventive Defense Project is a joint venture between Stanford University and Harvard University. Preventive Defense is a concept of defense strategy for America in the post-Cold War era. The premise of Preventive Defense is that the absence of an imminent, major, traditional military threat to American security presents today's national security leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity: to prevent new Cold War-scale threats to U.S. security from emerging in the future. While the United States defense establishment must continue to deter regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula, as well as keep the peace and provide humanitarian relief in selected instances, its highest priority is to contribute to forestalling developments that could directly threaten the survival and vital interests of American citizens.

The Preventive Defense Project will initially concentrate on forging productive security partnerships with Russia and its neighbors, dealing with the lethal legacy of Cold War weapons of mass destruction, engaging an awakening China, and countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and catastrophic terrorism. The Project seeks to contribute to these objectives through the invention of new policy approaches reflecting Preventive Defense, intensive personal interaction with defense and military leaders around the world, and through the establishment of highly informed, non-governmental track two initiatives that explore new possibilities for international agreement.

Current Preventive Defense Project initiatives include:

- **Describing Preventive Defense.** In a forthcoming book, the Project's leaders will explain the concept to a wider audience, draw-
ing on their experience in the Pentagon and making recommendations for the future of American security policy.

- **Russia.** The Project is pursuing a number of activities designed to support Russian foreign and defense policy leaders in developing a post-Soviet security identity that matches Russia’s interests to the interests of international stability. These initiatives include assisting Russian military reform and the development of national security decision-making processes, furthering NATO-Russia relations, encouraging the development of mutually beneficial relations with the other Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, and charting a course for nuclear arms reduction after START II ratification.

- **Other Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.** Expanded military-to-military contacts and economic opportunities are key to the continued security and stability of the NIS. The Project is pursuing initiatives with Ukraine, the Central Asian states, and the Caucasus countries, including the Caspian Sea region.

- **Eliminating the lethal legacy of the Cold War.** Through such innovations as the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States intervened to promote nuclear safety and non-proliferation in the early years after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Much was accomplished in the first post-Cold War era, but changing politics in Russia and the U.S. have caused their cooperation in controlling “loose nukes” to bog down and progress in chemical and biological weapons dismantlement to falter. Nunn-Lugar and arms control require “reinvention” if they are to continue in the second post-Cold War era. The Project seeks to contribute fundamental new ideas to that reinvention.

- **China.** Through research and intensive track two dialogue with Chinese defense and military leaders, the Project will concentrate on defining the specific content of the U.S. policy of engagement with China.

- **Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).** The glimmers of trouble to come provided by Iraq’s WMD programs during and since the Gulf War show that proliferation has moved from a diplomatic problem to a direct military threat. DOD, therefore, needs to strengthen its Counter-proliferation Initiative, which is designed to contribute both to proliferation prevention and to the capabilities of U.S. forces to counter WMD in regional conflict. The Project seeks to define organizational and technical responses by DOD to this growing threat.
- **Organizing to combat catastrophic terrorism.** The Project convened the Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group, which is a collaboration of faculty from Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and the University of Virginia and is co-chaired by Ashton B. Carter and John M. Deutch. The Study Group is identifying appropriate responses by the United States government to the dangers of catastrophic terrorism.

The Preventive Defense Project is a multi-year effort supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and private sources. The Project's Co-Directors are former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton B. Carter. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General (ret.) John M. Shalikashvili and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall serve as Senior Advisors. Additional contributors to the Project include: member of President Clinton's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Robert J. Hermann and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White.

**Institute for International Studies**  
*Stanford University*

The Institute for International Studies (IIS) seeks solutions to real-world, international problems that affect international security, the global environment, and international political economy. IIS creates a dynamic environment in which to address these critical issues by bringing experts from a variety of disciplines within Stanford University together with long- and short-term visitors from other academic, government, and corporate institutions. At any given time, over 150 scholars are engaged in policy studies within the Institute's federation of research centers.

**Center for International Security and Cooperation**  
*Stanford University*

The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), part of Stanford University's Institute for International Studies, is a multidisciplinary community dedicated to research and training in the
field of international security. The center brings together scholars, policymakers, scientists, area specialists, members of the business community and other experts to examine a wide range of international security issues.

**Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs**

*Harvard University*

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) is the hub of the John F. Kennedy School of Government’s research, teaching, and training in international security affairs, environmental and resource issues, and science and technology policy. The center’s mission is to provide leadership in advancing policy-relevant knowledge about the most important challenges of international security and other critical issues where science, technology, and international affairs intersect. BCSIA’s leadership begins with the recognition of science and technology as driving forces transforming threats and opportunities in international affairs. The center integrates insights of social scientists, natural scientists, technologists, and practitioners with experience in government, diplomacy, the military, and business to address critical issues.
Preventive Defense—
the central strategic imperative for
the U.S. in the post-Cold War era.

The absence of an imminent, major, traditional
military threat to American security presents
today's national security leaders with an
unaccustomed challenge and opportunity: to
prevent new threats from emerging. While
day-to-day crisis management preoccupies
policymakers, Preventive Defense concentrates on identifying
and forestalling developments that could pose major new threats
to U.S. vital interests. The Preventive Defense Project seeks to
contribute through thorough research of such threats, invention
of new policy approaches reflecting a preventive defense
approach, intensive personal interaction with defense and
military leaders around the world and through the establishment
of highly informed but non-governmental "Track Two" initiatives
that explore new possibilities for international agreement.

A research collaboration of
Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Institute for International Studies, Stanford University
The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University