The Evolution of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine

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Credible Minimum Deterrence and Nuclear Doctrine

“We have formally announced a policy of Non-First-Use … We are also not going to enter into an arms race with any Country. Ours will be a minimum credible deterrent, which will safeguard India’s security, the security of one-sixth of humanity, now and into the future.” - Atal Vajpayee, December 1998

“We refuse to enter a nuclear arms race and instead seek stability in the region. Pakistan, unlike India, does not have any pretensions to regional or global power status. We are committed to a policy of responsibility and restraint by maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.” – Pervez Musharraf, May 2000
# Four Theories in Search of a Doctrine

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“It is well known that Pakistan does not have a ‘No First Use Policy.’ Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be used if:”

1) India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold)

2) India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military threshold)

3) India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic threshold)

4) India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization threshold)
“The Prime Minister told Clinton that he wanted desperately to find a solution that would allow Pakistan to withdraw with some cover. Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really was? Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles? Sharif seemed taken aback and said only that India was probably doing the same.”

“However, in view of the intelligence reports about the Tilla Ranges being readied for possible launching of missiles and repeated statements being made by their political leaders and non-military senior officials, we considered it prudent to take some protective measures. Accordingly, some of our missile assets were dispersed and relocated.” – General V.P. Malik
Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons

-- Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal to at least six secret new locations and has recognized military oversight of the nuclear forces in the weeks since Pakistan joined the U.S. campaign against terrorism, according to senior officials here.

[In 1999] military officers here secretly contacted Taliban officials about the possibility of moving some nuclear assets west to neighboring Afghanistan for safekeeping, according to a recently retired Pakistani general familiar with the talks.

‘The option was actively discussed with the Taliban after some indications emerged that India may open hostilities at the eastern border,’ the official said. ‘The Taliban accepted the requests with open arms.’”
Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan Network

- Illicit export activities:
  - Iraq (offered centrifuge and bomb designs)
  - Libya (centrifuges and design)
  - DPRK (centrifuges and ?)
  - Iran (centrifuges and ?)

- Negligence or complicity?

- Musharraf’s memoirs
Strategic Culture or Military Morale?

“There is a misconception in the minds of some that this very threat (an Indian attack) was surmounted owing to someone’s help or participation. I want to tell you all today that for facing threat no one comes to anyone’s help. It is because of our own strength, morale, faith, determination that we surmounted this threat.” - Pervez Musharraf, December 31, 2002.

“Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent’s heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is a means of warfare, imposing upon the enemy a decision.

“Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have.”

Ronald Reagan, January 1981
Goal Displacement and Nuclear Doctrine –

“Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these come under threat it would be a worse situation for us... If you watch [Indian] television, you will find them dishing out propaganda against Pakistan, day in and day out. I would like to tell India “Lay Off.” Pakistan’s armed forces and every Pakistani citizen is ready to offer any sacrifice in order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets.” – Pervez Musharraf, September 19, 2001.

“We have two national vital interests, our nuclear program – being a nuclear state and the Kashmir cause is national vital interest. We will put our lives at stake for these strategic assets. So I think nothing would roll back. There is no pressure whatsoever on me to roll back the nuclear and missile programme, we are not rolling back, there is no question. These are our national interests, like only a traitor would think of rolling back. We shall not do this to deceive the country and the nation just for nothing.” – Pervez Musharraf, February 5, 2004
Indian Nuclear Doctrine: 2001-2002 Crisis

“If we have to go to war, jolly good…If we don’t, we will still manage. [Pakistani leaders had] “stated that they will use nuclear weapons first should the necessity arise.” [In an apparent reference to Musharraf,] “if he is man enough, correction mad enough…he can use it.” If anyone uses nuclear weapons against India…the perpetrators of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in fray will be in doubt…Yes, we are ready. Take it from me, we have enough.” – S. Padmabhan, January 2002.

“The Government had not been talking of nuclear weapons. I wish everyone would give up this talk of nuclear weapons being brought into play. The use of nuclear weapons is far too serious a matter that it should be bandied about in a cavalier manner.” – George Fernandes, January 2002.
“For us, the use of nuclear weapons is an utterly last resort. We conduct ourselves responsibly…We would consider the nuclear option only if "all Pakistan were in danger of disappearing from the map." In that case: nuclear weapons too.” – Pervez Musharraf, April 2002.

“Any incursion by the Indian forces across the LoC even by an inch will unleash a storm that will sweep the enemy…Victory comes through offensive strategy and our forces are ready for it if war is thrust on Pakistan by India…Military history is full of examples where numerically inferior forces defeated the larger numbers… Seeing the glimmer in the eyes of all pilots and airmen I met, I am fully confident that Insha’Allah (God willing), the PAF will give a befitting response to any adventurism by India and create yet another chapter full of glory and valour in the history.” – Pervez Musharraf, May 29, 2002.
Indian Nuclear Doctrine – January 2003 Statement

(i) Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;

(ii) A posture of “No First Use”: nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;

(iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.

(iv) Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.

(v) Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;

(vi) However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons

Conclusions

1. “Credible Minimum Deterrence” is highly elastic.

2. Pakistani FU doctrine and procurement goals reflects parochial interests of military and goal displacement.

3. Indian nuclear doctrine - strongly influenced by US Doctrine – is moving away from strict NFU

4. Resulting nuclear operations are dangerous

5. Significant room for arms racing, crisis instability, and inadvertent escalation in the future.