The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
From the inception of its civilian nuclear program, Japan has been committed to developing a closed nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing technology, and energy security is often cited as the reason for this commitment. Does energy security alone explain Japan's nuclear fuel cycle decision making, or can other models of nuclear proliferation be applied? A review of the development of Japan's nuclear policies will offer insight into these questions.