Applied History Project

The mission of Harvard’s Applied History Project is to revitalize applied history by promoting the production and use of historical reasoning to clarify public and private challenges and choices. Founded by Professors Graham Allison and Niall Ferguson in 2016, the Applied History Project builds upon the foundation laid by Professors Ernest May and Richard Neustadt in the 1980s, reflected in their book Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. 

Advancing its mission, the Project sponsors the Applied History Working Group of faculty members across Harvard University to organize discussions with scholars and practitioners; supports historians and policymakers in producing Applied History; develops courses in Applied History; funds the Ernest May Fellowships in History and Policy for pre- and post-doctoral students; and holds Applied History Events open to the Harvard Community and the public. Harvard’s project is one of the leaders among a rapidly expanding network of universities and think tanks that are furthering the discipline of Applied History by clarifying predicaments and choices to inform better decisions.

The Project gratefully acknowledges the Stanton Foundation's generous support for its Applied History endeavors. 

Quote of the Week 

“History is past politics and politics are present history.” – Edward Augustus Freeman, “The Practical Bearings of General European History” (1882) 

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Article of the Week 

“Critics of the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Have It Exactly Wrong” by Daniel Poneman (Board of Directors, Council on Foreign Relations; former Deputy Secretary, US Department of Energy) in The New York Times 

Poneman disputes the accusation that the newly announced US-Saudi nuclear deal contains insufficient safeguards, instead tracing the history of US nuclear exports to show that the US has mandated the most rigorous safety protocols in the world since the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The "gold standard" provision on which many pundits focus is in fact an anomaly—just two of the US's 24 nuclear agreements include the pledge that the recipient never enrich uranium. Moreover, Poneman emphasizes that the history offers a compelling argument for the deal: US competitors offering nuclear technology with fewer strings attached will fill the void. In the 1970s, France and West Germany used promises of less stringent contracts to battle US companies for nuclear deals in Pakistan, Brazil, and others—just as China and Russia are actively pursuing deals abroad today, he argues.