Middle East & North Africa

Over the past two decades, the United States has increasingly turned to targeted sanctions and export restrictions, such as those imposed against Iran and North Korea, in order to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction. One vexing problem, however, is how to contend with jurisdictional hurdles when the violations occur overseas, in countries that are unable or unwilling to assist US enforcement efforts. To solve this problem, US prosecutors are turning to strategies with significant extraterritorial implications—that is, exercising legal authority beyond national borders. One such tool is to use civil legal procedures to seize assets linked to sanctions or export-control violations in jurisdictions that lack cooperative arrangements with US enforcement agencies. While this may be an attractive strategy to bolster enforcement efforts against overseas illicit procurement, using such tools is not without consequence. This article explores the political, legal, and technical implications of enforcing extraterritorial controls against overseas non-state actors by exploring the recent uses of civil-asset forfeiture against Iranian and North Korean procurement networks.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are not suitable for the Iranian Army, given its non-mechanized nature; its defensive military posture; its current status as a non-nuclear weapon state; and its sufficient conventional preparation to meet its protective security interests. This paper proposes three interlinked policy approaches to resolve the current impasse.

Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."

This paper investigates the roots of Iranian foreign policy toward Iraq and Syria after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Because of its geo-strategic location, political-cultural characteristics and energy sources, Iran is a pivotal state in shaping the international politics of the Middle East. Since the September 11th events, Iran has increasingly had impact on the issues such as regional crises in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon as well as the war against global terrorism, which are currently the most significant agenda items of international security. The author argues that Iran's foreign policy towards Iraq and Syria is primarily geopolitical, oriented at building a secure environment at its borders, for strategic-pragmatic purposes.

"Extremist forces in the Muslim world can only be defeated if progressive forces in both the West and the Islamic world cooperate to tackle the issue through dialogue and constructive engagement. A partnership is required. A unilateral campaign by the West to win the hearts and minds of Muslims without listening to their concerns or enlisting their aid will not succeed."

Turkey and Israel enjoyed an almost perfect relationship throughout the 1990s that amazed their friends, yet bothered their rivals. The US war in Iraq revealed, however, that the two longstanding allies did indeed have contradictory objectives and concerns with respect to the future restructuring of Iraq.

There are historical, political, economic and military dimensions of Turkey’s longstanding interest in the developments taking place in Iraq. Close historical and cultural ties with the Turkomans, or Iraqi Turks, living mostly in northern Iraq; claims of Kurdish groups for independence; rich oil and gas reserves in the Mousul and Kirkuk districts; and instability due to insurgencies in the country are issues that make Iraq a case for serious concern for the Turkish security elite.